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Next piece on the puzzle is what happened in Guanabara state, Rio de Janeiro proper. Here opposing forces were sometimes only meters from each other but there was no city-wide confrontation, only several local standoffs, some of which involved violence or the threat of it. All of it happened under the sights of the media and over 3 million civilians, on famous landmarks.

The pieces in the chessboard were:
-Governor Carlos Lacerda wielding the police and his supporters
-Castelo Branco wielding his inferior, general Mamede, who commanded ECEME (the Command and General Staff School) in the Urca peninsula (where the Sugarloaf lies), where several other military schools were also located
-Costa e Silva
-Rebels in the Navy
-Civilian supporters of the coup
-Goulart
-Admiral Aragão wielding his marines
-Major-Brigadier Francisco Teixeira wielding the 3rd Air Zone
-Âncora wielding the garrison
-General Moraes (under Âncora) wielding the coastal artillery
-Liutenant Colonel Arídio Brasil (under Moraes) wielding the Copacabana fort

Closing in on the city from afar:
-Mourão Filho
-Kruel

Carlos Lacerda knew an uprising would commence on the 2nd of April, that he'd be a prime target for the legalists, that they'd control his state in the beginning and that his police was no match for the Army's garrison. He was advised to shelter far away, but took a courageous attitude and chose to entrench in his palace and resist. 
He already had a security plan since late 1963, with investment into radios, vehicles and weapons. In the days immediately before the outbreak his staff had prepared for the siege, arranging a medical service, food stocks and generators, spilling oil on the hills to the rear so the enemy would not bring artillery up the slope, etc. On the 30th the political section of the police (DOPS) arrested some union figures, which might have been the main reason for their haphazard mobilization. And on the 31st, by 09:00 part of his security ring was already activated. Radio patrols monitored key views in the city.

Meanwhile Castelo Branco failed to interrupt the coup and simply went to work on the Ministry of War's palace. Right from the nerve center of the legalist military he nonchalantly coordinated the uprising through the official telephone. In doing so he gave a demonstration of leadership. Costa e Silva and others couldn't miss out and joined him. 
The handful of officers in the Army General Staff, wielding only pistols, called general Mamede to help. At 10:00 classes on ECEME were suspended; it was now the focal point of rebellion. The school had 400 officers, 28 revolvers, 30 rifles and 3 Thompsons plus 10 INA SMGs ceded by the police. Students formed shock teams of 20 each. Morale was high because the government dumped undesirable officers into it. Only 8 officers didn't want to join and were arrested.