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[This is from 2013 and it shows how the 'powers that be' game the system in regards to surveillance] 

Brennan Center For Justice 
Are They Allowed to Do That?
[2013] A Breakdown of Selected Government Surveillance Programs
[excerpt]

Over the past six years, the NSA has obtained unprecedented access to the data processed by nine leading U.S. internet companies. This was facilitated by a computer network named PRISM. The companies involved include Google, Facebook, Skype, and Apple. Limitations on the NSA’s access are the source of current debate. Initial reports, which have since been qualified, said that the NSA can “pull anything it likes” from the companies’ servers. Government officials and corporate executives have responded that the NSA only obtains data with court approval and with the knowledge of the companies. Some companies have also denied knowledge of PRISM.

***

To collect the kind of phone records it did from Verizon, the government must obtain a Section 215 order from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISA court) — a federal court established under FISA which oversees government applications to conduct surveillance for the purposes of obtaining foreign intelligence. The request for the order, and the court’s ruling, are classified. The number of Section 215 orders has soared in recent years, from just 21 applications in 2009 to 212 applications in 2012. None of the applications in 2012 were denied by the FISA court. Classified reports about these applications are submitted to Congress’s intelligence and judiciary committees. Unclassified aggregate numbers, such as the above, are sent to Congress annually.

When it comes to Section 702, the law cited for PRISM, the FISA court’s role is more limited. Even though Section 702 does not allow the intentional surveillance of U.S. persons, the government is not required to go before the court to obtain individual surveillance orders. Instead, the court approves the “targeting” and “minimization” procedures described above to limit the amount of information about law-abiding Americans that is intercepted, retained, and disseminated. In deciding whether to approve the procedures, the court reviews whether they are consistent with the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution. But it has no ongoing authority to determine if the government is complying with these procedures, and both the procedures and the court orders relating to them are classified. Some information about Section 702 programs must be reported to Congress’s intelligence and judiciary committees, including significant legal opinions of the FISA court. However, these reports are generally classified and not share.

**

The same questions can be raised about PRISM. Like Section 215, Section 702 is remarkably broad, allowing the government to target non-U.S. persons “reasonably believed to be outside the United States.” However, the NSA has reportedly interpreted that to mean that it need only ensure “51 percent confidence of the target’s ‘foreignness.’” Even if the process works as advertised, it could be wrong nearly half the time. '''Consequently, one of every two people targeted by the NSA may be an American citizen or located in the U.S. The NSA’s training materials call such collection “nothing to worry about.” And even if this practice is deemed consistent with Section 702, it is difficult to see how it comports with the Fourth Amendment, which requires the government to obtain a warrant for much of the information about U.S. persons that is being “inadvertently” collected.

https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/analysis/Government%20Surveillance%20Factsheet.pdf