Actions
(285.77 KB, 757x1270)
(553.95 KB, 1224x1487)
(20.76 KB, 1056x455)
>>/29233/ > And even what really happened, the bombing campaigns weren't that much of a hindrance to the German economy. They were. Allied strategic bombing became serious in 1943. The RAF's assault on the Ruhr and Hamburg in March-August 1943 stopped the "Speer miracle" (not fully Speer's and not fully a miracle, as will later be shown) dead in its tracks. The Ruhr's heavy industry was heavily damaged and factories across the whole country experienced a Zulieferungskrise (subcomponents crisis). Civilian morale began its collapse in 1943. Fighters and anti-aircraft weapons had to be diverted from other fronts. When the Zentrale Planung (the organization Speer founded to bring together the key figures in the war economy) met in 29 July 1943, Speer told them Only if the enemy air attacks can be stopped will it be possible to think of an increase in production. If, however, the air attacks continue on the same scale as hitherto, they [the Zentrale Planung] would, within twelve weeks, be automatically relieved of a lot of questions that they were now discussing ... A greater output of fighter aircraft is the only means of preventing everything being smashed up, otherwise they might as well put a bullet through their heads. (p.604) Output did not plunge, but it stagnated for nearly a year. There is no other explanation for this, bombardment in early 1943 had a major impact. What saved Germany was Bomber Command's mistake to shift priority to Berlin and new fighter tactics. In the first half of 1944 output had one last period of increase, but at the same time new American fighters gave the Allies air superiority. Armaments production peaked around mid-1944 and declined over the rest of the war. This was before Silesia and the Rhineland fell, so bombing is one of the main factors, though there's another important reason in the internal disorganization of the war economy due to inflation.