>>/29515/
> Weapons and Tanks grew with same proportion as before
From September 42 to May 43 weapons grew by 58% with an average of 7% per month. Tanks grew by 255% with an average of 17%.
From June 43 to February 44 weapons grew by 19% with an average of 2% per month. Tanks grew by 35% with an average of 2% per month.
The only sector that didn't slow down was ammunition, which even managed a larger growth in the later period (32% versus 21%). But it's correct that most sectors experienced clear but slowed down expansion. So strategic bombing had a concrete economic impact. Its effectiveness was limited by three things, Allied geographical focus, the attainability of air superiority and a learning process in which targets moved to infrastructure and caused more damage. There was a succesful initial campaign over the Ruhr and Hamburg, which didn't even last the whole stagnation period, a lull and then everything converged again by late 1944 and it became highly effective. Cutting off the Ruhr's coal mines is no insignificant feat.
> Western writers tend to exaggerate their role in WWII.
They do, but it's not dramatic in this case. In popular views of the war strategic bombing -except for the nukes- doesn't get a lot of attention, causing massive civilian deaths is not glamorous. The Wikipedia page shows controversy, not a scholarly consensus in favor of its impact. Another case, the blockade, is obscure for laymen, and the scholarly reference described in the footnotes is Medlicott's official history of the blockade, which begins on a famously downbeat note - 'too much . . . was expected of the blockade' - in fact cites little or no evidence from the German side and shows no appreciation of the severity of the Reich's import problem.
And as the book shows Germany's leadership was constantly worried about American economic capacity as an existential threat and America as a very difficult enemy. The Germans themselves assigned a large role to the Western powers.
> Yeah, but not due to the bombing. It was an all round war thing.
There was a continuous exhaustion but anxiety was suddenly heightened from the shock of bombing and defeats.
> This is true to the Allies as well. All of them. They were corrupt as fuck in and out. Catch 22 is a fiction but it relies on Heller's experience in war, and reflects his criticism toward the USAian war machine.
America's war economy was still running well at the end while Germany's was imploding with inflation getting out of control. The Western Allies didn't have it as bad.