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>>/43349/ But back to the topic at hand. Szálasi suppose that the fights of 1942 showed and the subsequent Soviet winter offensive proved to the Germans they fighting a war against an enemy which is organized to total war. This led to the decision to set the Axis countries to total war. He estimated the Germans need quite a few months at best, to make the adjustments, it's more likely close to a year, and even two if things go real slow. So he expected the closest date of a decisive attack during the spring-summer of '44, or even '45. After the Soviet winter campaign the Germans kept on defending up to this study's date of writing. Safe to assume the voice of the Allied propaganda and the inner opposition got some strength and started to predict the defeat of the Axis. And while one defends it's hard to provide something to counter that. I suppose the Axis propaganda did what the USian did in Vietnam, sending reports about the "body count". And the numbers showed the huge losses they caused to the Red Army both in manpower and war material. Another thing worth spending a thought that there's a huge ass operational area between the "gullet" and the "crisis-line". From retrospect it's easy to say that while the Soviet retreated they used that land as part of their defensive scortched earth tactic, expanding the opponents supply line while wearing them down. And it is also easy to say from here, that the German retreat was the sure sign of their inevitable defeat. Szálasi saw that differently. He considered the constant German defense as part of their attrition warfare they were forcing onto the Soviet. And when he tried to figure out the Strategic Plans of the participants behind the events of '43, this was the other cornerstone of his thought process, next to the buildup for a total war.