>>/43397/ > He considered the constant German defense as part of their attrition warfare they were forcing onto the Soviet. The Third Reich in its position fighting attrition warfare sounds like a dangerous idea. By Tooze's interpretation the German leadership knew it couldn't win such a war and was on a constant battle against time. >>/43404/ > The mobilization of the country for total war demands full attention, if they were divided the efforts between the buildup and an offensive campaign both would have been doomed In the war economy sense what this means is that production won't increase while changing gears for full mobilization. This kind of happens with the delay between increased resource allocation and increased production, which is particularly pronounced in the aircraft sector. Or with long-term preparation, like the France-Barbarossa period. And the very early war disarray caused by mobilization and blockade. But overall this dichotomy doesn't exist, a fast transition to total war allows an emergency mass military buildup which is what will be used in waging campaigns. > A German offensive would have needed the concentration of troops to the east Doesn't he consider Kursk as Germany going on the offensive? Or did its limited success lead him to believe that it was just a limited effort? Certainly one could've seen the shrinking scope of each German offensive (Barbarossa across the whole front, Case Blue on one sector, Kursk on the border between two sectors) as a sign of waning German resources. > which would have allowed the Anglos to land somewhere between the Seine and the Weser Landing in the Netherlands would be particularly interesting as it'd allow an offensive right into Germany's industrial heartland at the Rhineland, knocking it out in two blows. I think I've read it was a bit too far for effective air coverage, though. > He praises the Germans their foresight and prudence they decided to play for time during '43. They formulated a Strategic Plan, and they executing it consciously, with "iron consistency", and they work independently from the will of the enemy, they force those to react despite they are on the defense, preserving the initiative. He was certainly an optimist. >>/43405/ > The losses of 1941-42 in manpower makes it impossible for her to continue with a long winded war, so they had to act quick. But did he take into account that the Soviet manpower pool was much larger than Germany's in the first place?