fe.settings:getUserBoardSettings - non array given[kc] - Endchan Magrathea
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Continuing from  >>/47082/ and referring to the comments about the real extent of russian demands and what would constitute "victory":  >>/47055/  >>/47085/  >>/47086/  >>/47062/
Regardless of official positions, and unofficial bravado, one should attempt a cost/benefit analysis. The Ru MOD has acknowledged >1300 KIA. That's no small amount. In absolute terms it's similar to the losses per day suffered by Armenia+NK in the defeat vs. Azerbaijan, quite high. After adjusting for population size (or for army size) it is much lower, but still high when compared with the recent, lower-energy, middle-eastern conflicts. Furthermore, that number probably doesn't include the losses of the Donbas militias. Equipment-wise, although rus probably doesn't have scarcity of armour, it would seem that they suffered more losses than expected, at least in logistics vehicles. To that we could add the damages caused by the economic, diplomatic, and mediatic sides of the war (waged by "the west" rather than Ukraine). So, I do think they have "crossed the Rubicon", partly by being pushed across, and already "paid the price" (or "a price"), and it would make sense, then, for them to try to get get something equivalent in return. However, I'm increasingly doubting Rus' ability to achieve such a "total victory" (beyond the official demands) under the present conditions. To wit:
- No full mobilization, no war economy, but the limited scope of a "special military operation"
- For whatever reason (maybe concern for collateral damage, maybe fear of nato AA launchers) rus has not been using its air force to its full potential, relying instead on high-precision but much more costly missiles, rather than aerial bombardment
- Although it is conceivable that ukr suffered more losses than rus, the former doesn't lack manpower, while the latter entered the conflict with only ~190k troops (a fraction of its standing army)
- Ukr basically has unending supply of nato weaponry, and ~4 weeks into the conflict rus still hasn't strangled that supply
- Rus doesn't want to unduly spite the civilian population so it's not putting pressure on cities to surrender. E.g. electricity and communications have mostly been left alone, water/food have not been touched, gas continues to flow (and transit fees continue to be paid)
- Ukr has no compunction in using schools, hospitals, shopping malls, residential buildings, civilian cars, etc., to shelter themselves and their military equipment (a Geneva convention violation) and then cry "war crime" and beg for nato to enter the war when they are targeted
- Rus is not targeting the Ukr govt
- Rus advances have been slow for the past 2 weeks, very slow or nil during the past few days, and there may have been a retreat in the area around Nikolaev (and perhaps elsewhere too, though claims are contradictory)