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 >>/52324/
That "Daily Russian attacks" graph is lying with the "Russian Spring-Summer Offensive 2024" title for the Russians are on the offense since the Ukrainian "Spring"/Summer Offensive 2023 stopped in Autumn. There is no separable line between the winter campaign and this year's activity.
But about the graph: if we compare it with what's happening on the ground we see that the RuAF takes more land with less attacks, which means less effort on the front, means Ukraine is failing.
Another week passed since that graph was published I wonder how the numbers look like today.
Where is that graph is from? ISW?

> Russians continue to advance in Pokrovsk on a daily basis 
And not just there. Lugansk front, New York, Vodian (the highway leading to Vuhledar was cut yesterday).
> points out Ukraine's impeccable secrecy
It is so impeccable that the only information that is available was made available by the Russians. Imagine the implications.

I'm skimming the article. Here's some quotes.
> And one of the main Russia rail lines supporting the war for a large part of the front line—the Lgov-Belgorod Line—has now been severed during this operations
Wow they're practically isolated the SMO forces! They can collapse any day now!
Frankly it could be uncomfortable for the forces at Kharkov, but might not even that.
> to the point that they have taken over and will be able to use Russia’s own rail lines to rapidly move in its own heavy equipment into the area.
They can't because RuAF can (and do) bomb their equipment to hui. Air force is very active there. They took out some important heavy weaponry already (among them at least one HIMARS).
> the choice for Putin is clear: cannibalize key parts of the Russian lines in Ukraine
Which - now with some hindsight - clearly did not happen.
> Ukraine [...] will be able to threaten and roll up a large chunk of the Russian line in the north of Ukraine unless a dramatic redeployment of Russian troops from those Ukrainian lines occurs.  Again, simple math.  And Russia will have to keep a closer eye on other border areas, too, further diverting resources from the front lines in Ukraine.
So the number of solders and equipment on the fronts is a problem for Russia, but not Ukraine? Very lopsided view.
> prime position
> massive damage
The whole article is full of these expressions. The author really tries to encourage. I don't blame him, the view is bleak.