>>/54274/
cont.
There is a third type of intervention group besides the non-combat and combat, the interventions against unacceptable leaders. This is the case when the US has a client regime but the leadership (usually one particular person, like a president) is not acceptable for Washington for various reasons, which we can sum up as the leader endangers the client status in some way. No ideological reasons.
Previously the book established that with an intervention the US takes over certain tasks of the regime. It occurs to me that in this case they take over the role of the constituency and choose a new leader... Tho the US not always has a say who the new leader is.
Have to stress: this is about the leader, not the regime, the regime - serving as a client for the US - is just fine.
The key question is: does the military supports the leader? Four possible cases arise.
1. Military supportive, fighting feasible: overthrow by U.S. combat forces
The US military, especially the marines were among the earliest available policy tools. They can be used when the client military supports the leader, but they are weak. Literally all the examples are from the Caribbean and Central America. Honduras 1911, Haiti 1994
2. Military supportive, fighting not feasible: long-term pressures
When the US can't just curbstomp the client's military. Might not be the question of might, but logistics, large landmass, difficult topography. Time would be a factor in this group of interventions, the US just wants to flip to another, more acceptable leader, without losing the client, and don't want to be bogged down by long campaigns, or drained by cost. So no combat troops, no coup, they stuck with the leader. Then the US essentially Cold War them, deploys economic and diplomatic tools to make their lives hard, indefinitely if it's necessary. The only two examples are Allende's Chile and Chavez' Venezuela.