>>/54432/
And lastly negotiations can end enemy status.
The US negotiates with enemies all the time. In most cases it's fairly inconsequential, about details in whatever questions, and status doesn't change, they do their routinely hostile activities in the background. The US might stop intervention, or start new one if these negotiations fail. But there are notable cases when negotiations led to the end of enemy status. This usually happens when another enemy with a more immediate or larger threat arises - so when an outside pressure forces the US to stop being a hardass in certain questions, and give up from their stance, in short: to be reasonable...
In 1933 Japan became such a threat, that Washington sat down with Moscow and made a deal. Similarly the rise of the Axis in Europe, and the start of the war there motivated the US to change her stance on Mexico.
One major example is rapprochement with China, a the start of the 70s. Important example since there wasn't a new threat, since the Soviet Union - whom the US tried to isolate with this move - existed for quite a while now. What changed was how the US viewed China. They thought up a different approach to the Chinese question, they saw an opportunity and a situation which a friendlier China could fit into. So they went and made a deal. Ofc they did not do this from their good heart, but because they gained a better strategic position during the Cold War. I don't think Taiwan was happy about it (it led them out of the UN and state status) but the US had to break their eggs so they did.

picrel: Zhou Enlai, Chinese Premier under Mao, and Kissinger when the American security advisor sneaked into China from Pakistan in 1971 July.