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Неплохой анализ всего происходящего в общем, переводить лень, думаю большинство тут английский понимают достаточно. Часть 1/2 > It's mid-2022. Ukraine has a massive advantage in numbers, forcing Russia to abandon the northern front due to insufficient personnel to cover such a large frontline. > Late 2022. Russia still doesn't have enough manpower to hold the frontline and instead relies on sheer firepower. They move most of their forces to Kherson. > Ukraine achieves a breakthrough in Balakliya. > The West’s advice on a Zaporizhzhia offensive: A breakthrough is possible, but warns Ukraine that the Russians would crush them if they succeed (Wow, USA military genius!) > Russia withdraws from Kherson to protect Zaporizhzhia and prevent a breakthrough to Crimea. > The West asks Ukraine to sit out the rest of 2022, promising to deliver mountains of equipment for a spring counteroffensive. > Bakhmut holds back the Russian invaders for half a year. But in the end, it falls. All this is happening as Russia mobilizes enough infantry to plug the gaps on the eastern and southern fronts, redeploying all units to sit within Ukraine, completely neglecting the northern border. > Spring arrives, and the West continues delaying materiel deliveries. General Surovikin builds the most extensive line of fortifications since WW2 along Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, and Donetsk. Ukraine complains. > Texeira leaks the plans to the Russians. (Why the hell did someone so low-ranked have access to Ukraine's counteroffensive plans? Oh, right.) > Unbeknownst to the United States, Ukraine has a final ace up its sleeve: Open a northern front and push toward the undefended cities of Belgorod and Kursk to force Putin into negotiations. When the U.S. learns of the plan, they shut it down in the strongest possible terms, including some very undiplomatic -offers- that shouldn't be launched between "allies." > Ukraine is forced to rely on Russian volunteers in the north, but they don't have the numbers needed to accomplish anything meaningful. > Four months later, the so-called summer counteroffensive begins. The plans for a large-scale naval landing in Kherson are foiled by Russia blowing up the Kakhovka dam, allowing even more Russian forces to concentrate in Zaporizhzhia. > After just ten days, it's clear to every analyst that the counteroffensive has failed. > Ukraine asks for the equipment it was promised. The West instead offers idiotic advice about concentrating all its offensive forces in eastern Zaporizhzhia (the strongest point of Russian fortifications). > A hopeless all-out offensive tries to penetrate the second layer of the Surovikin line. Miraculously, Ukraine almost manages to break through the Russian frontline west of Verbove, but the Russians somehow pull themselves back, retreat in an orderly fashion, redeploy VDV reinforcements from the Eastern front, and deny Ukraine a breakthrough. > The counteroffensive ends in failure. 31 Abrams tanks arrive just in time for the celebration of the failure. > America goes schizophrenic. After the colossal effort of supplying 31 downgraded tanks following the failed summer offensive, Congress refuses to pass aid to Ukraine and Israel because of a completely unrelated immigration crisis, in a display of retardation not seen since the late 1930s. > Ukrainian general staff is confused as hell. Realizes the mistake of listening to the Americans. Shifts to strategic defense.