

INTRODUCTION TO BOOK II

THE manuscripts available are as for Book I. The text is based on MS. Rheims 875 (ff. 81^r-150^v) collated with Bamberg Ph 2/1 (ff. 66^r-136^r) and Paris Bibl. Nat. lat. 12964 (pp. 65-139).

The subject of the book (PL cxxii. 523D-620A) was intended to be the Second Division of Nature, the primordial causes, but it is not properly broached until 545B, and most of what follows is an exposition of the doctrine of the Trinity.

The matter which precedes 545B consists of a recapitulation on the Four Divisions (523D-529C), and the discussion of another system of division which E has found in Maximus Confessor, *I Ambig.* xxxvii (529C-542C). 542C-545B is taken up with two problems raised by Alumnus (but not answered here): the accidental nature of sexual differentiation (542C-543B); and the dependent question of the asexuality of the post-resurrection body (543C-545A). The creation of the Second and Third Divisions of Nature is mystically recorded at the beginning of Genesis, where the creation of heaven refers to the primordial causes, and that of earth to their effects. Therefore the substance of Books II-IV is a *Hexaëmeron*, a commentary on the opening chapters of Genesis. Book II covers Gen. i. 1-2, and begins (after the introductory matter) with a commentary divided into three parts:

- (i) 'In the beginning God created heaven and earth' (545B-548A).
- (ii) 'And the earth was waste and void, and there was darkness upon the face of the deep' (548A-552C).
- (iii) 'And the spirit of God moved upon the face of the waters' (552C-554C).

This is followed by a résumé (554C-555C).

The foregoing shows that the creation of the primordial causes and their effects is the operation of the Trinity (555C-566A). This introduces the exposition of the doctrine of the Trinity which occupies most of the book (556A-615C):

The begetting of the Son (556B-562A).

The procession of the Holy Spirit (562A-566A).

The special properties of the three Hypostases (566A-D).

The expression of the Trinity in human nature in two ways:

- (i) Being, virtue, operation (567A-568D).
- (ii) Intellect, reason, sensation (568D-570A).

The two are assimilated (570A-C).

The lower parts of the soul are not included (570C-572A).

The three motions of the soul (572C-579A).

These also express the Trinity (579A–580A).

The difference between the prototype and the image (580A–585D). Alumnus suggests a second difference: the prototype knows itself while the image does not. This is refuted by the doctrine of the Divine Ignorance (586A–598A).

Therefore the sole difference is the difference between being the original and being the copy (598A–C).

Whether the Divine Causality resides in the Essence or the Substance: involving a discussion of what is meant by the One Essence and what by the Three Substances; and of the mode of the procession of the Holy Spirit (598C–615C).

Resumption of the proper subject of the book, the primordial causes (615D–620A).

As in the first volume, the translator's policy has been, in the interests of fidelity to Eriugena's thought, to employ for each Latin term the same English word throughout. In most cases the meaning the English is made to bear, though not always its usual contemporary meaning, can be supported by precedent or is apparent from the context. Perhaps the only exception is 'reason' for *ratio*, which for Eriugena, as for St. Augustine before him, bears most of the many senses in which the Greeks used *λόγος*.¹ 'Reason' has been chosen to supply the lack of any English word that can be normally used in this way not only because it is the etymological equivalent of *ratio*, but because it at least can bear, in normal usage, two important senses of the Latin word: causativeness, and a faculty or content of the mind, whether human or divine. See further, Book I, note 34.

SIGLA

- R MS. Rheims 875.
 B MS. Bamberg Ph. 2/1.
 P MS. Paris, Bibl. Nat. lat. 12964.
 C Eriugena's supposed autograph.
 sC other scribes writing apparently from Eriugena's dictation.
 sR, sB, sP supplementation, in the hands of the scribes of RBP, of words or passages omitted.
 R*, B*, P* uncorrected readings of RBP.
 R^c, B^c, P^c corrected readings of RBP.

¹ For a convenient summary of these as they had already proliferated by the time of Heraclitus see W. K. C. Guthrie, *History of Greek Philosophy*, i (Cambridge, 1962), pp. 420–4. He concludes with a remark that, *mutatis mutandis*, is very much to the point here: 'The above account has tried to bring out what a dictionary article inevitably tends to obscure, that word and thought go together, and notions which the Greeks conveyed by one and the same word were more closely linked in their minds than in those of people who lack a word of the same coverage. In reading Greek it is difficult, and sometimes wrong, to draw a hard and fast line between them' (my italics).

- Rm the scribe of the twelfth-century lemmata added to R.
 *(**) one (two) letter(s) erased.
 <...> words or letters added to the text.
 [...] words or letters excluded from the text.
 [...] Eriugena's additions to the text of R, in hand C unless otherwise stated.
 [2...]² additions in hand C to such additions.
 <...> Eriugena's additions to the text of B, in hand C unless otherwise stated. (The lemmata, however, which are in hand C unless otherwise stated, are not distinguished typographically.)
 <2...>² additions in hand C to such additions.
 Small type additions to the text found in P only.
 Italics corrections in hand C to RB.

In view of the fact that MSS. R B P represent three successive recensions of the text it has been decided to give a full 'positive' *apparatus criticus*, and to do so, for the sake of consistency, even where a manuscript variant is merely a scribal blunder.

In the *apparatus fontium* and in the Notes the titles of the Ps.-Dionysian treatises are abridged as follows: *CH* = *De caelesti hierarchia*; *EH* = *De ecclesiastica hierarchia*; *DN* = *De diuinis nominibus*; *MT* = *De mystica theologia*; *Ep.* = *Epistulae*.

The numbers and letters in the right-hand margin of the Latin text refer to columns and sections of PL cxxii; the numbers in the right-hand margin of the English text to the chapter numbers used by Gale and Floss.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I should like to reiterate my gratitude for assistance of various kinds, much of it still continuing, to the persons and institutions mentioned in the *Foreword and Acknowledgements* prefixed to Volume I of this work; but since then I have incurred two further debts. The first is a collective one to the many scholars who have supplied me with valuable constructive criticism of that volume which I hope it will be possible to incorporate at some future date; the second is to the British Academy, without whose munificence it would have been extremely difficult for me to continue this work.

Oxford

The Feast of the Transfiguration, 1970

PERIPHYSEON

LIBER II

N. Quoniam in superiore libro de uniuersalis naturae uniuersali diuisione non quasi generis in formas seu totius in partes [non enim deus genus est creaturae et creatura species dei sicut creatura non est genus dei neque deus species creaturae. Eadem ratio est in toto et partibus: deus siquidem non est totum creaturae neque creatura pars dei quomodo nec creatura est totum dei neque deus pars creaturae, quamuis [2]altiori theoria iuxta Gregorium theologum pars dei simus qui humanam participamus naturam, quoniam in ipso uiuimus et mouemur et sumus]2 metaforice[2]que]2 deus dicatur et genus et totum et species et pars. Omne enim quod in ipso et ex ipso est pie ac rationabiliter de eo praedicari potest] sed intelligibili quadam uniuersitatis contemplatione—uniuersitatem dico deum et creaturam—breuiter diximus, nunc eandem naturae diuisionem latius, si uideatur, repetamus.

A. Videtur quidem ac ualde necessarium. Nam si latiori rationis inquisitione non aperiatur, tacta solummodo non autem discussa resedissee uidebitur.

N. Talis itaque erat ut opinor supradicta uniuersalis naturae quadri-formis diuisio: in eam scilicet formam uel speciem—si rite forma uel species dicenda est prima omnium causa quae superat omnem formam et speciem dum sit formarum et specierum omnium informe principium—quae creat et non creatur [Informe autem principium propterea deum dicimus ne quis eum formarum numero aestimet censi dum sit formarum omnium causa. Ipsum etenim omne formatum appetit, cum sit per se ipsum infinitus et plus quam infinitus; est enim infinitas omnium infinitatum. Quod igitur nulla forma coartatur uel diffinitur quia nullo intellectu cognoscitur, rationabilius dicitur informe quam forma, quia, ut saepe dictum est, uerius per negationem de deo aliquid praedicare possumus quam per affirmationem]; secunda in eam quae et creatur et creat; sequitur tertia quae creatur et non creat; dehinc quarta quae nec creat nec creatur.

4-13 cf. Max. Conf. *I Ambig.* iii, PG xci. 1081C 7-8 9 pars dei simus: *ibid* 1068D 3 = Greg. Naz., *Orat.* xiv. 7, PG xxxv. 865C 3-4 10 Actus xvii. 28 29-30 cf. i. 216, 32-34

1-2 *Titulo caret* R: Incipit secundus ΠΕΡΙΦΥΣΕΩΝ in quo multa de reditu disputantur B(C)P: Incipit liber secundus Rm 1 sqq. *marginalia quae totum paginae marginem sinistrum compleuerant erasa sunt in B* 3 superiore RB: superiori P 5 et RB^c: nec B*(?)P *essentia supra creatura* (1) R(C) 6 est (?) *post eadem rasum in B* 11 metaforiceque R^cB^cP: metaforicaeque B* 15 eandem RBP^c: eadem P* 17-18 discussa resedissee B: discutare sedisse R*: discussa resedissee R^c: discutare sedisse P 22 informe RB^cP: informae B*

PERIPHYSEON

BOOK II

NUTRITOR. Since in the earlier book we spoke briefly of the universal division of universal nature—not as (a division) of a genus into its species (1) nor of a whole into its parts [for God is not a genus of the creature nor the creature a species of God any more than the creature is the genus of God nor God a species of creature. The same can be said of the whole and its parts, for God is not the whole of the creature nor the creature a part of God any more than the creature is the whole of God or God a part of the creature (2), although [2 in the loftier contemplation of Gregory the Theologian we who participate in human nature are a part of God because ‘in Him we live and move and have our being’, and]2 in a metaphorical sense God is said to be both genus and whole and species and part since everything which is in Him and (comes) from Him can honestly and reasonably be predicated of Him], but by a kind of intellectual contemplation (3) of the universe, under which term I include both God and creature—let us now, if you agree, re-examine the same division of nature more broadly (4).

ALUMNUS. I agree, and (it seems) very necessary. For unless (this subject) is opened up by a broader inquiry of the reason it will appear that we have only touched upon it, not discussed it.

N. This then, as I think, was the fourfold division of universal nature as we gave it above: (first) into that form or species (5)—if one may rightly call form or species the First Cause of all things which surpasses every form and species since it is the formless Principle of all forms and species—which creates and is not created [Now we call God the formless Principle so that no one may suppose that He is to be reckoned in the number of the forms while (in fact) He is the Cause of all forms. For every formed thing seeks Him while in Himself He is infinite and more than infinite, for He is the Infinity of all infinities. Therefore, not being constricted or defined by any form, since He is unknowable to every intellect, He is more reasonably called formless than form; for, as has often been said, we can speak more truly about God by negation than by affirmation]; secondly into that which is both created and creates; third comes that which is created and does not create; then fourth that which neither creates nor is created.

25 etenim RB^cP: enim B* 26 per se R^cBP: prope R* enim *s.l.* R(C) 27 diffinitur BP: definitur R 29 quia ut RBP^c: qui aut P* 30 per RBP^c: *om.* P* 32 reat' (= reatur) *ante creatur erasum in R*

A. Ita sane diuisum est.

N. Quoniam igitur de oppositionibus praedictarum naturae formarum breuiter in priori disputatione iam dictum est—considerauimus enim quomodo resultat tertia primae, ambae siquidem ueluti quodam diametro ad se inuicem e regione oppositae respiciunt; creata enim, ut diximus, et non creans opponitur creati et non creatae. Similiter secunda forma e diuerso respicit quartam; opponitur enim creata et creans neque creatae neque creati [Vniuersalem uero naturam formas habere propterea dicimus quoniam ex ea nostra intelligentia quodammodo formatur dum de se ipsa tractare nititur; nam per se ipsam uniuersa natura non ubique formas recipit. Eam siquidem deo et creatura contineri non incongrue dicimus, ac per hoc in quantum creatrix est nullam formam accipit in se ipsa, formatae uero a se naturae multiformitatem praestat]—iam nunc de similitudine earum deque differentia considerandum esse arbitror.

de eo quod uniuersitas in deo considerata informis est, in creatura uero multiformis

A. Non aliter ordo rerum exigit.

N. Secunda forma primae similis est in eo quod creat, ab ea uero distat in eo quod creatur. Nam prima creat et non creatur, secunda uero et creat et creatur. Tertia secundae similitudinem attrahit eo quod creatur, ab ea tamen differt eo quod nil creat. Nam secunda et creatur et creat, tertia uero creatur et non creat. Tertia quartae similis est in eo quod non creat, dissimilis uero in eo quod creatur. Tertia enim creatur et non creat, quarta uero neque creatur neque creat. Item quarta similis est primae quia non creatur, ab ea uero distare uidetur quia non creat. Prima siquidem creat et non creatur, quarta uero neque creat neque creatur. Et quia de oppositionibus et similitudinibus deque differentiis est dictum, de earundem reditu atque collectione ea disciplina quam ΑΝΑΛΙΤΙΚΗΝ philosophi uocant breuiter dicendum uideo.

A. Hoc quoque ordo poscit. Nulla enim rationabilis diuisio est siue essentiae in genera siue generis in formas et numeros siue totius in partes, quae proprie partitio nominatur, siue uniuersitatis in ea quae uera ratio in ipsa contemplatur quae non iterum possit redigi per eosdem gradus per quos diuisio prius fuerat multiplicata donec perueniatur ad illud unum inseparabiliter in se ipso manens ex quo ipsa diuisio primordium sumpsit. [Sed prius de ΕΤΥΜΟΛΟΓΙΑ ipsius

5-8 cf. i. 1, 30-32

2 oppositionibus: oppositione *currente calamo corr.* B 5 uniuersitas in deo
considerata informis est Rm 9 ex ea *s.l.* R(C) 10 quodammodo RBP^c:
quoniam modo P* lemma B(C)P 15 esse *s. arb rasum in B* 19 post Tertia
erasum est uero (?) in R 20 quod nil creat R^cBP: quod nil creatur R* 22 eo (1)
RB^cP: ea B* 24 ea RB: eo P 24-25 distare uidetur R^c(C)BP: distat R*
32 post quae (1) *erasum est a graecis (?) in R* ea quae R^cBP: eaque R*
33 uera RB^cP: uere B* quae: qu *in ras.* R 35 illud RBP^c: illud P*

A. So indeed was the division made.

N. Therefore, since in our earlier discourse we have already spoken briefly of the oppositions of these forms of nature—for we considered how the third conflicts with the first, for they confront each other as it were from diametrically opposed positions; for, as we said, (the species) which is created but does not create is the opposite of that which creates and is not created. Similarly the second form is opposed to the fourth; for (the species) which is created and creates is the opposite of that which neither is created nor creates (6) [Now, the reason why we say that the universal nature possesses forms is that it is from her that our intelligence is in a manner formed when it attempts to treat of her (7); for in herself the universal nature does not everywhere admit forms. It certainly is not improper for us to say that she comprises God and creature, and therefore in so far as she is creative she admits no form in herself, but gives multiformity to the nature formed by her (8)]—I think we should now consider in what respects they resemble one another, and in what they differ (9).

That the universe considered in God is formless while in the creature it is multiform

A. The natural order demands (that we should proceed) in no other way.

N. The second form is similar to the first in that it creates, but dissimilar in that it is created. For the first creates and is not created, while the second both creates and is created. The third takes on a likeness of the second in that it is created, but differs from it in that it creates nothing. For the second both is created and creates, while the third is created and does not create. The third is similar to the fourth in that it does not create, but is dissimilar in that it is created. For the third is created and does not create, while the fourth neither is created nor creates. Furthermore the fourth is similar to the first because it is not created, but *appears to be* remote from (10) it because it does not create. For the first creates and is not created, while the fourth neither creates nor is created. And now that the oppositions and similarities and differences have been stated, I see that we must say a few words about their return and collection by that science which the philosophers call ἀναλυτική (11).

A. This too is required by the (natural) order. For there is no rational division, whether it be of essence into genera (12) or of genus into species and individuals or of the whole into its parts—for which the proper name is partition—or of the universe into those divisions which right reason contemplates therein (13), that cannot be brought back again by the same stages through which the division had previously ramified into multiplicity, until it arrive at that One which remains inseparably in itself (and) from which that division took its

36 ΕΤΥΜΟΛΟΓΙΑ R*(C): ΕΤΟΥΜΟΛΟΓΙΑ R^c(C)BP

nominis quod est ANAΛYTIKH pauca edisseras—non enim mihi plane patet—necessarium esse uideo.

N. ANAΛYTIKH a uerbo ANAΛYΩ diriuatur, id est resolutio uel 526B
 redeo; ANA enim re, ΛYΩ uero soluo interpretatur. Inde etiam nomen
 nascitur ANAΛYCIC, quod in resolutionem uel reditum similiter uer- 5
 titur. Sed ANAΛYCIC proprie de solutione propositarum quaestionum
 dicitur, ANAΛYTIKH uero de reditu diuisionis formarum ad prin-
 cipium eiusdem diuisionis. Omnis enim diuisio, quae a Graecis
 MEPICMOC dicitur, quasi deorsum descendens ab uno quodam diffi-
 nito ad infinitos numeros uidetur, hoc est a generalissimo usque ad 10
 specialissimum, omnis uero recollectio ueluti quidam reditus iterum
 a specialissimo inchoans et usque ad generalissimum ascendens
 ANAΛYTIKH <uocatur>. Est igitur reditus et resolutio indiuiduorum
 ANAΛYTIKH in formas, formarum in genera, generum in OYCIAC, OYCIARum 526C
 in sapientiam et prudentiam ex quibus omnis diuisio oritur in 15
 eas<dem>que finitur.

A. Satis dictum de ANAΛITIKHC <etymologia>. Perge ad caetera.]

N. Quaternarum itaque praedictarum formarum binis in unum
 coeuntibus fiat analitica id est reditiua, collectio. Prima nanque
 [et] quarta unum sunt quoniam de deo [solummodo] intelliguntur. Est 20
 enim principium omnium quae a se condita sunt et finis omnium quae
 eum appetunt ut in eo aeternaliter immutabiliterque quiescant. Causa
 siquidem omnium propterea dicitur creare quoniam ab ea uniuersitas
 eorum quae post eam [ab ea] creata sunt in genera et species et nume-
 ros differentias quoque caeteraque quae in natura condita consideran- 526D
 tur mirabili quadam diuinaque multiplicatione procedit; quoniam 26
 uero ad eandem causam omnia quae ab ea procedunt dum ad finem
 peruenient reuersura sunt, propterea finis omnium dicitur et neque
 creare neque creari perhibetur. Nam postquam in eam reuersura sunt
 omnia, nil ulterius ab ea per generationem loco et tempore generibus 527A
 et formis procedet quoniam in ea omnia quieta erunt et unum indi- 31
 uiduum atque immutabile manebunt. Nam quae in processibus
 naturarum multipliciter diuisa atque partita esse uidentur, in primor-
 dialibus causis unita atque unum sunt, ad quam unitatem reuersura
 in ea aeternaliter atque immutabiliter manebunt. 35

Sed de hac quarta uniuersitatis consideratione, quae in solo deo

11-13 cf. Eriug., *Expos. in CH*, PL cxxii. 184D 3-185A 3; *Annot.*, p. 81, 23-24
 Lutz 20-22 cf. i. 200, 15-17

1 ANAΛYTIKH R(C)B: ANAΛITIKH P mihi: mi in ras. R(C) 3 ANA-
 ΛYTIKH R(C)B: ANAΛITIKH P 4 ΛYΩ R(C)P: ΛIΩ B 5 ANAΛYCIC
 R(C)B: ANAΛICIC B*P post quod *erasum est etiam in R(C)* 6 ANAΛYCIC
 R(C)B: ANAΛICIC B*P 7 ANAΛYTIKH R(C)B: ANAΛITIKH B*P ad
s.l. B 10 numeros in ras. B post uidetur *rasura in B* 12 et usque RBP:
 eiusque P* 13 uocatur *deest in R; in ras. B(C) lemma BP* 14 OYCIAC
 R*BP: YCIAC R* OYCIARum BP: OYCIAPYM R 17 ANAΛITIKHC RB:
 ANAΛITIKEC P etymologia *deest in R, in textum inclus. B*P: etoumologia B**

origin. [But I see that it is necessary that first you tell me a little about
 the etymology of the word ἀναλυτική, for it is not clear to me.

N. ἀναλυτική comes from the verb ἀναλύω which means 'I resolve'
 or 'I return'; for ἀνα- stands for 're-', λύω for 'solve'. Thence comes
 also the noun ἀνάλυσις, which is similarly rendered 'resolution' or
 'return'. But ἀνάλυσις is properly used in connection with the
 solution of set problems, while ἀναλυτική is used in connection with
 the return of the division of the forms to the origin (14) of that
 division (15). For every division, which is called by the Greeks
 μερισμός, seems (to be) a kind of descent from some finite unity down
 into an infinite number of individuals, that is to say, from the most
 general to the most specific, while every recollection, which is like
 a return back, starting from the most specific and ascending to the
 most general, <is called> ἀναλυτική. Thus it is the return and resolu-
 tion of individuals into forms, of forms into genera, of genera into
 οὐσία (16), of οὐσία into the Wisdom and Providence (17) with which
 every division begins and in which every division ends (18).

A. You have said enough about <the etymology> of ἀναλυτική.
 Pass on to other matters.]

N. Let us then (19) make an 'analytical' or regressive (20) collec- 2
 tion of each of the two pairs of the four forms we have mentioned so
 as to bring them into a unity. The first, then, [and] fourth are one
 since they are understood of God [alone]. For He is the Principle of
 all things which have been created by Him, and the end of all things
 which seek Him so that in Him they may find their eternal and im-
 mutable rest. For the reason why the Cause of all things is said to
 create is that it is from it that the universe of those things which have
 been created after it (and) [by it] proceeds by a wonderful and divine
 multiplication into genera and species and individuals, and into
 differentiations and all those other features which are observed in
 created nature; but because it is to the same Cause that all things that
 proceed from it shall return when they reach their end, it is therefore
 called the end of all things and is said neither to create nor to be cre-
 ated. For once all things have returned to it nothing further will pro-
 ceed from it by generation in place and time (and) genera and forms
 since in it all things will be at rest and will remain an indivisible and
 immutable One. For those things which in the processions of natures
 appear to be divided and partitioned into many are in the primordial
 causes unified and one, and to this unity they will return and in it they
 will eternally and immutably remain.

But this fourth aspect (21) of the universe, which, like the first

19 analitica R: ANAΛYTIKH B*: ANAΛYTIKA B*P reditiua R*BP: reductiua R*
 22 lemma BP 31 quieta RB*P: quiaeta B* 32 lemma BP 34 ad RB*P:
 at B* 35 aeternaliter R*BP: aeternalitate R*

Concerning
 ἀναλυτική

Concerning
 the Principle
 of all things

Concerning
 the End of
 all things

de
 ANAΛYTIKH

de principio
 omnium

de fine
 omnium

intelligitur quemadmodum et prima, suo loco latius disputabitur quantum lux mentium donauerit. Quod autem de prima et de quarta dicitur, hoc est: nec illa nec ista creatur, cum et illa et ista unum sint—
 527B
 5
 utraque enim de deo praedicantur—, nulli recte intelligentium ob-
 scurum esse arbitror. A nullo enim creatur quod causa superiori se uel
 sibi coequali caret. Est enim prima omnium causa deus, quem nil
 praecedit, nil ei cointelligitur quod sibi coessentiale non sit. Videsne
 itaque primam et quartam naturae formam in unum esse reuocatas?

A. Satis uideo pureque intelligo. [Non enim in deo prima forma
 a quarta discernitur. In ipso siquidem non duo quaedam sed unum
 10
 sunt, in nostra uero theoria dum aliam rationem de deo concipimus
 secundum considerationem principii aliam uero iuxta finis contem-
 plationem duae ueluti quaedam formae esse uidentur ex una eademque
 simplicitate diuinae naturae propter duplicem nostrae contemplatio-
 nis intentionem formatae.]
 15

N. [Recte uides.] Quid igitur? Num et secundam et tertiam in
 527C
 unum similiter debemus redigere? Non enim te latet, ut aestimo, quod
 sicut prima et quarta in creatore ita secunda et tertia in creatura
 rationabiliter cognoscuntur. Secunda enim, ut praedictum est, et
 creatur et creat et in primordialibus causis conditarum rerum intelli-
 20
 gitur, *tertia* uero forma creatur et non creat atque in effectibus primor-
 dialium causarum reperitur. Secunda itaque et tertia uno eodemque
 genere, creata uidelicet natura, continentur atque in ea unum sunt.
 [Formae siquidem in genere unum sunt.] Num itaque uides quat-
 tuor formarum praedictarum duas quidem, primam uidelicet et
 25
 quartam, in creatorem, duas, secundam dico et tertiam, in creaturam
 recollectas?

A. Plane uideo [admodumque admiror rerum subtilitatem. Nam
 527D
 duae praedictae formae non in deo sed in nostra contemplatione dis-
 cernuntur et non dei sed rationis nostrae formae sunt propter dupli-
 30
 cem principii atque finis considerationem neque in deo in unam
 formam rediguntur sed in nostra theoria, quae dum principium et
 finem considerat duas quasdam formas contemplationis in se ipsa
 creat, quas iterum in unam formam theoriae uidetur redigere dum
 528A
 de simplici diuinae naturae unitate incipit tractare. Principium enim
 35
 et finis diuinae naturae propria nomina non sunt sed habitudinis eius
 ad ea quae condita sunt. Ab ipsa enim incipiunt atque ideo principium
 dicitur, et quoniam in eam terminantur ut in ea desinant finis

7 cointelligitur: hic additur glossa glo. hoc dictum est propter diuinae bonitatis
 tres coessentiales substantias B(C)sP co*intelligitur P 20 conditarum RP:
 condita*rum in ras. B 21 tertia in ras. R(C) 22 reperitur B^cP: repperi-
 tur RB* 23 creata . . . natura RB: creatae . . . naturae P 38 ea RB^c:
 eam B*P

also, is understood to exist in God alone, will receive a more detailed
 treatment in its proper place, as far as the Light of Minds (22) shall
 grant (us).

Now what is said of the first and fourth, that is to say, that neither
 the one nor the other is created since both the one and the other are
 One—for both are predicated of God—will not be obscure, I think,
 to any who use their intelligence aright. For that which has no cause
 either superior to or equal with itself is created by nothing. For the
 First Cause of all things is God, whom nothing precedes (nor) is
 anything understood (to be) in conjunction with Him which is not
 coessential with Him. Do you see, then, that the first and fourth forms
 of nature have been reduced to a unity?

A. I see it sufficiently and I understand it clearly. [In God, therefore,
 the first form is not distinct from the fourth. For in Him they are not
 two things but one; in our contemplation, however, since we form one
 concept of God from consideration of Him as Beginning and another
 concept when contemplating Him as End, they appear to be as it were
 two forms, formed from one and the same simplicity of the Divine
 Nature as a consequence of the double direction of our contemplation.]

N. [You see it correctly.] Well, then, ought we not also, in the
 same way, to reduce the second and the third to a unity? For I think
 you will not have failed to notice that as the first and the fourth are
 with reason recognized in the Creator, so are the second and the third
 in the creature. For the second, as has been said, both is created and
 creates and is understood (to be) in the primordial causes of created
 things, while the third form is created and does not create, and is
 found in the effects of the primordial causes. Thus the second and
 third are contained within one and the same genus, namely, created
 nature, and in it are one. [For forms are a unity in their genus.] Do
 you not then see that of these four forms two, namely, the first and
 the fourth, have been resumed into the Creator; and two, I mean the
 second and the third, into the creature?

A. I see it clearly [and I am filled with wonder at the subtlety (23)
 of nature. For these two forms are discerned not in God but in our
 contemplation (of Him), and are not forms of God but of our reason,
 resulting from our double consideration of (Him as) Beginning and
 End, nor is it in God that they are reduced to one form but in our
 contemplation which, in considering the beginning and the end,
 creates in itself, as it were, two forms of contemplation, and these
 again, it would seem, it reduces into a single form of contemplation
 when it begins to consider the simple unity of the Divine Nature.
 For Beginning and End are not proper names of the Divine Nature
 but of its relation to the things which are created. For they begin
 from it and that is why it is called Beginning; and since they end in

uocabulo meruit appellari. Aliae uero duae formae, secundam dico et tertiam, non solum in nostra contemplatione gignuntur sed etiam in ipsa rerum creaturarum natura reperiuntur, in qua causae ab effectibus separantur et effectus causis adunantur quoniam in uno genere, in creatura dico, unum sunt.] 5

N. De quattuor itaque fiunt duae.

A. Non resisto.

N. Quid si creaturam creatori adiunxeris ita ut nil aliud in ea intelligas nisi ipsum qui solus uere est—nil enim extra ipsum uere 528B
essentiale dicitur quia omnia quae ab eo sunt nil aliud sunt in quantum 10
sunt nisi participatio ipsius qui a se ipso solus per se ipsum subsistit—, num negabis creatorem et creaturam unum esse?

A. Non facile negarim. Huic enim collectioni resistere uidetur mihi ridiculosum esse.

N. Vniuersitas itaque quae deo et creatura continetur prius in quattuor ueluti formas diuisa iterum ad unum indiuiduum, principium quippe causamque finemque reuocatur. 15

A. De uniuersali uniuersalis naturae diuisione et adunatione interim satis dictum uideo. Nam de subdiviisionibus singularum formarum suis locis considerabimus [—secundae dico et tertiae; primam 528C
quippe et quartam subdiviisiones recipere non facile dixerim—], 21
ideoque ad alia quae iam dicenda sunt transeundum arbitror.

N. Quid tibi uidetur? Num alia tenenda est semita ad inuestigationem propositarum quaestionum quam ut nunc secundam naturae formam quaeramus quoniam de prima in priori libro quantum facultas suppetebat considerauimus, in quo magis de decem rerum omnium 25
generibus, quod proprie de creatrice omnium causa dici non possunt, disputatum est quam de ipsa omnium causa? Nam quae de ea dicenda sunt ad quartae formae considerationem reseruanda esse iudicauimus [non quod et ibi de diuina natura proprie quid aut digne nos dicturos 30
esse promittamus sed quod de reditu omnium in eam per primordiales 528D
causas quantum ipsa dederit dicturi sumus, sicut in hac secunda inquisitione maxime intentionis nostrae propositum deo largiente constitutum est [²quaedam dicere]² de processione creaturarum ab una ac prima omnium causa per primordiales essentias ante omnia 35
ab ea in ea per eam conditas in diversa rerum genera diuersasque 529A
formas numerosque in infinitum. Et ne mireris si quaedam in hoc

15 uide p. 4, 14 supra

11 qui R^cBP: quia R* 13 post Non erasum est id in R 14 ridiculosum
in ras. R 17 finemque s.l. R reuocatur in ras. R 19 satis in ras. R
20–21 primam quippe BP: nam primam R(C) 26 considerauimus R^cBP:
considerabimus R* 28 omnium RB^cP: ommum B* 29 esse s.l. B(C)
iudicauimus BP: audicauimus R 30 na**tura R 32 ipsa R^cBP: ipse R*

it so that in it they cease, it is rightly called by the name of End. On the other hand, the other two forms, I mean the second and the third, not only come into being in our contemplation but are also found in the very nature of created things, in which the causes are separated from the effects and the effects are united to the causes because they make one with them in a single genus, I mean, in the creature (24)].

N. So the four become two.

A. I do not deny it.

N. But suppose you join the creature to the Creator so as to understand that there is nothing in the former save Him who alone truly is—for nothing apart from Him is truly called essential since all things that are are nothing else, in so far as they are, but the participation in Him who alone subsists from and through Himself—, will you deny that Creator and creature are one?

A. It would not be easy for me to deny it. For it seems to me ridiculous to resist this reduction.

N. So the universe, comprising God and creature, which was first divided as it were into four forms, is reduced again to an indivisible One, being Principle as well as Cause and End.

A. Concerning the universal division and unification of universal nature I see that enough has been said for the time being. For the subdivisions of each of the forms (25) we shall consider in their proper places [—of the second and third, that is; for I should not care to say that the first and fourth admit subdivision—]; and therefore I think we should pass on to the other matters that have still to be discussed.

N. What is your opinion: is there any other line of investigation of the problems we have set ourselves than to inquire now into the second form of nature, seeing that we have considered the first to the best of our ability in the first book, in which the discussion turned rather on the ten genera of all things (and) the fact that they cannot be predicated literally of the creative Cause of all things, than on the Cause of all things itself? For we have decided that what must be said about that (Cause) should be postponed until we come to consider the fourth form [though we do not promise even there to say anything of the Divine Nature in a proper sense or a worthy manner, but to speak, in so far as it itself gives us power (to do so), of the return of all things to itself through the primordial causes, just as in this second inquiry the task particularly commended to our attention, if God will aid us, is [²to say something]² concerning the procession of the creatures from the one First Cause of all things through the primordial essences (26), which before all things were created by itself in itself through itself, into the various genera of nature and the various forms and individuals (extending) to infinity. And do not be surprised if you find something said in this book about the return of the creatures

libro de reditu creaturarum ad principium sui finemque dicta uideris. Processio nanque creaturarum earundemque reditus ita simul rationi occurrunt eas inquirenti ut a se inuicem inseparabiles esse uideantur, et nemo de una absolute sine alterius insertione, hoc est de processione sine reditu et collectione et conuersim, dignum quid ratumque potest explanare].

A. Disputationis series nil aliud exigit quam ut post primae [quaestionis] considerationem ad secundam transeamus.

N. Vniuersalis [itaque] naturae, ut iam dictum est, ea forma secunda enitet quae creatur et creat *et* non nisi in primordialibus causis rerum, ut aestimo, intelligenda est. Ipsae autem primordiales rerum causae a graecis ΠΡΩΤΟΤΥΠΑ, hoc est primordialia exempla, uel ΠΡΟΟΠΙΜΑΤΑ, hoc est praedestinationes uel praediffinitiones, uocantur. Item ab eisdem ΘΕΙΑ ΘΗΛΗΜΑΤΑ, hoc est diuinae uoluntates dicuntur. ΙΔΕΑΕ quoque, id est species uel formae in quibus omnium rerum faciendarum priusquam essent incommutabiles rationes conditae sunt, solent uocari [de quibus latius in processu operis dicemus testimoniisque sanctorum patrum roborabimus et] nec inmerito [sic appellantur] quoniam pater, hoc est principium omnium, in uerbo suo, unigenito uidelicet filio, omnium rerum rationes quas faciendas esse uoluit priusquam in genera et species numerosque atque differentias caeteraque quae in condita creatura aut considerari possunt et considerantur aut considerari non possunt prae sui altitudine et non considerantur—et tamen sunt—praeformauit.

Sed priusquam ad primordialium causarum theoriam perueniamus uisum est mihi sententiam uenerabilis Maximi de diuisione omnium quae facta sunt huic disputationi nostrae si tibi placet inserere. Si enim multiplex rerum omnium diuisio iterumque adunatio multipliciter demonstrata fuerit, ad cognitionem principalium causarum quae principaliter a deo conditae sunt patefacta uia facilius apparebit [praesertim cum ipsius diuisio a nostra praedicta diuisione in nullo discrepare uideatur excepto quod ille sensibilem creaturam, quam tertiam formam naturae posuimus, <quoniam in ea maxime causarum effectus apparent, in tres species> subdividit <quartamque nostram a prima non discernit> sicut sequentia demonstrabunt, quam subdivisionem sensibilis creaturae ad materiem nostrae quaestionis tertiae prout deus dederit reseruabimus].

11–17 cf. p. 204, 10–22 infra

1 libro B^c(C)P: libello RB* dicta P: dictu RB 3 eas s.l. B 4 et nemo R(C)^cBP: nec R(C)* 9 lemma de natura quae creatur et creat Rm 10 et (2) in ras. R(C) 11 quid sim primo quod in leuitate (?) habet in marg. recenti manu (? Alixii) scriptum P 12 ΠΡΩΤΟΤΥΠΑ RB: ΠΡΟΤΟΤΥΠΑ P 15 ΙΔΕΑΕ B: ΙΔΕΑΙ P: ΙΔΕΑ R 15–17 ΙΔΕΑ quoque id est species uel forma in qua . . . conditae sunt solet uocari R 20 in uerbo suo hoc est unigenito suo filio R* 22 considerari R^cBP: considerara R*

to their Beginning and End. For the procession of the creatures and the return of the same are so intimately associated in the reason which considers them that they appear to be inseparable the one from the other, and it is impossible for anyone to give any worthy and valid account of either by itself without introducing the other, that is to say, of the procession without the return and collection and vice versa (27)].

A. The order of discussion demands nothing else than that after considering the first [question (28)] we should turn to the second.

N. Of the universal nature [then], as has already been said, the second form to be distinguished is that which is created and creates *and* which is to be understood, I think, only of the primordial causes of things (29). Now these primordial causes of things are what the Greeks call *πρωτότυπα*, that is, primordial exemplars, or *προορίσματα*, that is, predestinations, or predefinitions. They are also called by the same *θεία θελήματα* that is, divine volitions (30). They are commonly called *ιδέαι* also, that is, species or forms (31) in which the immutable reasons (32) of things that were to be made were created before (the things themselves) existed [concerning which we shall speak more fully in the course of the (present) work, and support (our reasons) by the testimonies of the Holy Fathers. And] not inappropriately [are they called so], for the Father, that is to say, the Principle of all things, pre-formed in His Word, that is, His only-begotten Son (33), the reasons of all things that He wished to be made before (they came into being) (34) in their genera and species and individuals and differences and the other things which either can be and are considered in the created creature, or cannot be and are not considered in it because of their exalted nature—and yet they are.

But before we pass on to the contemplation of the primordial causes, I thought we should introduce into this discussion of ours, if you agree, the opinion of the venerable Maximus concerning the division of all things that have been created. For if the manifold division of all things and their reunification is given a manifold demonstration the way will be more easily opened towards a knowledge of the primordial causes which were created by God first of all [especially as his division does not seem to disagree with our own aforementioned division at any point except that he subdivides the sensible creature, which we placed as the third form of nature <because in it for the most part appear the effects of the causes, into three species, and does not distinguish our fourth form from our first>, as the sequel will show (35); and that subdivision of the sensible creature we will, with the help of God, reserve for the subject of our third inquiry].

25 lemma diuisio omnium quae facta sunt secundum maximum monachum Rm 33–34 quoniam—species addidit ad calcem paginae C in B 34–35 quartamque—discernit inseruit s.l. C in B

de diuisione
substantia-
rum

Tricesimo et septimo capitulo De ambiguis, 'Sancti', inquit, 'qui
 'multa diuinorum mysteriorum ex his qui pedisequi et ministri
 'fuerunt uerbi et inde immediate eorum quae sunt eruditi scientiam 530A
 'per successionem per eos qui ante se erant in se ipsos distributa
 'accipiunt dicunt omnium quae facta sunt quinque diuisionibus se- 5
 'gregari substantiam', [Videsne quanta auctoritate diuisionis suae
 originem commendat? Ab ipso enim uerbo, hoc est dei filio qui est
 fons totius perfectae doctrinae—merito quia ipse est sapientia quam
 omnes sapientes participant—, per pedisequos suos, hoc est discipulos
 qui eum et in carne uiuentem uiderunt et docentem audierunt, in- 10
 choasse commemorat et per apostolorum successores in doctrina et
 sapientia immediate, hoc est nulla alia auctoritate interposita, usque
 ad sua tempora traditam fuisse] 'quarum primam' [inquit] 'esse aiunt
 'eam quae a non creata natura creatam uniuersaliter naturam et per
 'generationem esse accipientem diuidit. Dicunt nanque deum per 530B
 'bonitatem fecisse existentium' simul 'omnium claram dispositionem.' 16
 [Et paulo post:] 'Secundam uero per quam ipsa' simul 'omnis natura
 'a deo per creationem esse accipiens diuiditur in intelligibilia et
 'sensibilia. Tertiam' deinceps 'per quam ipsa sensibilis natura diuidi-
 'tur in caelum et terram; quartam itidem per quam terra diuiditur in 20
 'paradisum orbemque terrarum, et quintam per quam ipse in omnibus
 'ueluti quaedam cunctorum continuatissima officina omnibusque per
 'omnem differentiam extremitatibus per se ipsum naturaliter medie-
 'tatem faciens bene ac pulchre secundum generationem his quae sunt
 'superadditus homo in masculum feminamque diuiditur, omnem 25
 'habens profecto naturaliter extremorum omnium medietatibus per 530C
 'ipsam ad extrema omnia copulatiuam propriarum partium proprie-
 'tatem adunationis uirtutem.' Partem siquidem sui, ut idem magister
 alibi ait, cum sensibilibus possidet in quantum corpus est, partem cum
 intelligibilibus in quantum anima, ideoque uniuersam creaturam in se 30
 continet.

Et paulo post: 'Huius rei gratia nouissimus introducitur in his quae
 'sunt homo ueluti coniunctio quaedam naturalis uniuersaliter per
 'propriam partem medietatem faciens extremitatibus et in unum ducens
 'in se ipso multum secundum naturam a se inuicem distantia spatio' 35

1-6 Max. Conf., *I Ambig.* xxxvii, PG xci. 1304D 3-7 13-16 id., *op. cit.*
 xxxvii, PG xci. 1304D 7-1305A 2 17-28 id., *op. cit.* 1305A 8-B 5 32-35 id.,
op. cit. xxxvii, PG xci. 1305B 13-C 2

1-5 Sancti inquit qui—dicunt B^cP: Qui inquit—sancti dicunt RB* (*cf. Max. Conf.*
ad loc.) 2 pedisequi RP: pedissequi B 3 immediate B^cP: immedietate
 RB* 5 lemma BPRm 5-13 diuisionibus cum quarum *conectenda notis*
indicat B 11 commemorat BP: commenorat R 13 inquit R^cBP:
 quidem (?) R* (*cf. Max. Conf. ad loc.*) 14 a s.l. B 21 orbemque
 RB: et orbem P 24 pulchre BP: pulcre R 25 feminamque RP:

Concerning
the division
of substances

In the 37th chapter (36) of the Ambigua he writes: 'The saints who
 receive (37) many of the Divine Mysteries which are handed down
 (38) from those who were the followers and ministers of the Word,
 and thence, directly instructed in the knowledge of the things that
 are (39), by transmission to themselves through those who preceded
 them, say that the substance (40) of all things that have been made is
 separated (41) into five divisions (42).'

[Do you notice with what a weight of authority he commends the
 source of his division (43)? For it is from the Word itself, that is, from
 the Son of God who is the fount of all perfect doctrine—naturally,
 since He is the Wisdom in which all the wise participate—, through
 His followers, that is, through the disciples who both beheld Him
 living in the flesh and heard Him teach, that he declares (that division)
 to take its origin; and that through the successors of the Apostles
 in doctrine and wisdom by direct communication, that is, without
 any other intervening authority, it was handed down to his own
 times.]

'Of these the first' [he says] 'they declare to be that which divides
 from the uncreated nature created nature in general, which receives
 being through generation. For they say that God by His goodness
 made (44) the clear disposition of all existing things' at one and the
 same time (45). [And a little later:] 'But the second (is that) by which
 the universal' and simultaneously (created) 'nature which receives its
 being from God through creation is divided into intelligibles (46) and
 sensibles (47).' Then 'the third, by which the sensible nature is divided
 into heaven and earth, and again (48) the fourth by which the earth
 is divided into paradise and the inhabited globe (49), and the fifth by
 which man himself, who, well and beautifully through generation
 superadded to the (sum of) things that are as a most effective agent
 of the continuity (50) of all, in everything (51) naturally establishing
 in himself a mediation between all extremes effected by every dif-
 ference, is divided into male and female; possessing naturally by the
 mediations of all the extremes, through the property of proper parts
 which exerts a copulative force (52) over the extremes of the in-
 dividual parts, the potentiality of the unification of them all (53).'

For part of himself, as the same Master says in another place, he
 possesses (in common) with the sensibles inasmuch as he is a body,
 part with the intelligibles inasmuch as (he is) a soul; and thus he con-
 tains within himself all creation.

And a little later: 'This is why man is introduced last among the
 things that are, to be a kind of natural link (54) everywhere mediating
 between the extremes through their proper parts (55), and reducing
 to a unity in himself things which in nature are widely (56) disparate'
 feminamque B 35 multum RB: multo P (*cf. Max. Conf. ad loc.*)

[—extremities here call invisible and sensible creature which
 a from one another as though by a very wide space. For they are opposed to one another as
 the two extreme terms of created natures; but human nature supplies
 a middle term between them, for in it they are joined to one another,
 and from being many become one. For there is no creature, from the
 highest to the lowest, which is not found in man, and that is why he
 is rightly called 'agent (of continuity)' of all things. For into it flow
 together (57) all things which have been created by God, producing
 a single harmony from diverse natures as from different sounds—]
 'so that, by the unification which brings all things to God as
 Cause, he, starting from what before was his proper division' and
 'proceeding thence through the intermediaries, by successively combin-
 ing with them (59), to God, should reach the end of his ascent into
 the heights, which passes from all things through union (60) (in Him)
 in whom (61) there is no division'.

Huc usque praedicti uenerabilis magistri non continuatim sed
 quibusdam intermissis uerba introduximus incipientis quidem eorum
 quae facta sunt substantiae diuisionem a summa omnium causa et in
 homine qui ad imaginem et similitudinem dei factus est uniuersalis
 substantiae differentias terminantis. Homo siquidem [ut diximus
 iterumque <saepissime> repetemus] in tanta naturae conditae digni-
 tate creatus est ut nulla creatura siue uisibilis siue intelligibilis sit quae
 in eo reperiri non possit. Est enim ex duabus conditae naturae uniuersalibus
 partibus mirabili quadam adunatione compositus, ex sensibili
 nanque et intelligibili, hoc est ex totius creaturae extremitatibus,
 coniunctus. Nil quidem inferius est in natura rerum quam corpus et
 nil superius quam intellectus, teste sancto Augustino in libro De uera
 religione sic dicens: 'Inter mentem nostram qua ipsum intelligimus
 patrem et ueritatem per quam ipsum intelligimus nulla interposita
 creatura est' [quibus uerbis sanctissimi patris datur intelligi huma-
 nam naturam etiam post praeuaricationem dignitatem suam non
 penitus perdidisse sed adhuc obtinere. Non enim dixit magister 'nulla
 interposita creatura erat' sed 'nulla interposita est.' Non ergo etiam
 in langoribus nostris deum penitus deserimus nec ab ipso deserti-
 sumus dum inter mentem nostram et illum nulla interposita creatura
 est. Leprositas siquidem animae uel corporis non aufert aciem mentis qua
 illum intelligimus et in qua maxime imago creatoris condita est].
 Videsne igitur quomodo omnium substantiarum diuisio in humana
 natura terminatur?

9-13 Max. Conf., *I Ambig.* xxxvii, PG xci. 1305C 2-8
 relig. 113, PL xxxiv. 172, 7-10

26-28 Aug., *De uera*

1 lemma quod homo de duabus extremitatibus totius creature sit compositus et
 ideo omnium dicitur esse officina Rm 2 longissimo BP: longuissimo R
 6 reperiatur RB*P: repperiatur B* 19 repetemus B*(C)P: repetamus R(C)B*
 21 reperiri B*P: repperiri RB* 24 lemma quod humana natura post praeuari-
 cationem dignitatem suam non perdidit Rm quidem BP: enim R 27 nulla

[—by the extremes he here means the invisible creature and the sensi-
 ble creature, which by natural difference differ from one another as
 though by a very wide space. For they are opposed to one another as
 the two extreme terms of created natures; but human nature supplies
 a middle term between them, for in it they are joined to one another,
 and from being many become one. For there is no creature, from the
 highest to the lowest, which is not found in man, and that is why he
 is rightly called 'agent (of continuity)' of all things. For into it flow
 together (57) all things which have been created by God, producing
 a single harmony from diverse natures as from different sounds—]
 (58), 'so that, by the unification which brings all things to God as
 Cause, he, starting from what before was his proper division' and
 'proceeding thence through the intermediaries, by successively combin-
 ing with them (59), to God, should reach the end of his ascent into
 the heights, which passes from all things through union (60) (in Him)
 in whom (61) there is no division'.

Thus far we have quoted, not continuously but with some words
 omitted, the passage of the venerable Master in which he begins with
 the division of the substance of all things that have been made from
 the supreme Cause of all, and ends with the differences of universal
 substance in man, who was made in the image and likeness of God.
 For man [as we have said and shall <very often> say again] was created
 with a nature of so high a status that there is no creature, whether
 visible or intelligible, that cannot be found in him. For he is composed
 of the two universal parts of created nature by way of a wonderful
 union (62). For he is the conjunction of the sensible and the intelli-
 gible, that is, the extremities of all creation. For in nature there is
 nothing lower than body and nothing more exalted than intellect, as
 St. Augustine testifies in his book 'De uera religione', where he says
 the following: 'Between our mind by which we have an understanding
 of the Father Himself, and the Truth through which we understand
 Him, no creature intervenes.' [In these words of the most holy Father
 we are given to understand that human nature, even after the Fall,
 did not wholly lose its status, but still retains it. For the Master did
 not say 'no creature intervened' but 'no (creature) intervenes'. So not
 even now in our feeble condition have we wholly abandoned God nor
 have been abandoned by Him (63), for still between our mind and
 Him no nature intervenes. For the leprosy of the soul or of the body
 does not deprive us of the mental vision by which we have an under-
 standing of Him and in which the image of our Creator is pre-
 eminently established.] Do you see, then, how the division of all
 substances reaches its term in human nature?

RP: nulli B
 RB*P

32 langoribus BP: languoribus R poenitus B*: penitus

A. Plane uideo multumque nostrae naturae inter omnia quae facta sunt dignitatem admiror dum in ea ueluti quandam omnium creaturarum substantiarum mirabilem compositionem praedictis rationibus suasus perspicio.

N. Itaque quoniam clare uides diuisionem naturalem omnium a 5
 creatore et creatura inchoantem et in homine qui in summitate
 diuinae operationis ueluti in senaria quadam perfectione conditus 531D
 est desinentem, iam nunc substantiarum omnium adunatam collectio-
 nem ab homine inchoantem et per hominem ascendentem usque
 ad ipsum deum qui est totius diuisionis principium totiusque 532A
 adunationis finis praedicti patris Maximi uerba considerantes uidea- 11
 mus. [Non enim, ut praediximus, recta ratio de diuisione permittit
 absolute tractare et ANAΛYTIKAM intermittere, sed de ambabus con-
 nexim ueritatem iubet consulere.] Ait ergo 'ex propria diuisione
 inchoans' ac si aperte diceret: Quoniam substantiarum diuisio quae 15
 a deo sumpsit exordium et gradatim descendens in diuisione hominis
 in masculum et feminam finem constituit, iterum earundem substan-
 tiarum adunatio ab homine debuit inchoare et per eosdem gradus
 usque ad ipsum deum ascendere in quo ut ipse ait non est diuisio
 quoniam in eo omnia unum sunt, incipiet ergo ab homine naturarum 20
 adunatio per saluatoris gratiam in quo, ut ait apostolus, non est
 masculus neque femina quando humana natura in pristinum restau-
 rabitur statum. Nam si primus homo non peccaret naturae suae
 partitionem in duplicem sexum non pateretur sed in primordialibus
 suis rationibus in quibus ad imaginem dei conditus est immutabiliter 25
 permaneret, quod his uerbis praedictus magister aperit. Dicit enim:
 'Huius rei gratia nouissimus introducit in his quae sunt homo . . .
 'ipsam nullo modo pendentem, *quippe* aduersus primordiale
 'rationem ipsius circa generationem hominis diuini propositi, secun- 532C
 'dum feminam masculumque proprietatem in ipsa circa diuinam 30
 'uirtutem impassibilissima copula ubique naturae extenturus ita ut
 'ostenderet futurum hominem secundum diuinum propositum solum-
 'modo, secundum masculum et feminam appellatio non diuiden-
 'dum, per quam rationem primitus etiam factus est in ipsis nunc
 'existentibus circa eum sectionibus non diuisus, propter ipsam 35
 'perfectam adunationem ad propriam . . . rationem per quam subsistit.'

12-14 cf. p. 14, 2-6 *supra* 14-15 cf. p. 18, 10 19-20 cf. p. 18, 13
 21-22 non-femina: Gal. iii. 28 27 cf. p. 16, 32-33 27-36 Max. Conf.,
 I Ambig. xxxvii, PG xci. 1305C 8-D 3

16 descendens BP: discendens R 17 lemma BPRm 18 glossa diuisionem
 hominis in feminam et masculum non futuram si non peccasset quod tamen a nullo
 catholico recipitur quia apud latinos scriptum non reperitur sicut nec sexum post
 resurrectionem futurum falsum esse conuincitur Rm 19 ait RBP^c: at P*
 28 non post ipsam addit R pendentem RB*: pendit quippe B^cP (cf. Max. Conf.)

A. I see it clearly, and am filled with admiration at the status of
 our nature among all the things that have been made, for, convinced
 by the reasons you have given, I see that in it there is a wonderful
 kind of composition of all created substances.

N. Since, then, you have a clear perception of the natural division
 of all, beginning from (the division of) Creator and creature and
 ending in man, whose creation crowns the divine operation, perfecting
 as it were the six days' work, let us now look at the gathering together
 into the One which begins from man and ascends through man to
 God Himself, who is the beginning of all division and the end of all
 unification, in the light of what is said by the above-mentioned Father 6
 Maximus. [For, as we said before, correct reason does not allow us
 to treat division by itself to the exclusion of ἀναλυτική, but demands
 that we should consult the truth about both together.] He says, then:
 'Starting from his proper division—' by which he means: Since the
 division of substances, which took its beginning from God, and,
 descending by degrees, reached its end in the division of man into
 male and female, (and) again the reunification of the same substances
 ought to begin from man and ascend through the same degrees to
 God Himself, in whom, as (Maximus) himself says, there is no
 division because in Him all things are one; so the unification of
 natures will begin from man, through the grace of the Saviour, in
 whom, as the Apostle says, there is neither male nor female when
 human nature shall be restored to its pristine state. For if the first
 man had not sinned (64) he would not be suffering the division of
 his nature into the two sexes, but would be remaining without change
 in his primordial reasons (65) in which he was created in the image
 of God, as the aforesaid Master explains in these words; for he says:
 'This is why man is introduced last among the things that are, . . .
 everywhere about to extend (66) that property in respect of (being)
 male and female which certainly does not depend (67)—being con-
 trary to the primordial reason contained in the divine plan for the
 generation of man—upon (68) the most impassible linking up (69) of
 his nature (70) (which is in accordance with) Divine Virtue (71), so
 as to show that, according to the divine intention, there would be
 simply man (72), not to be divided (73) by the names of male and
 female, (in accordance with) the reason through which (74) he was
 first also made, not divided (75) into those sections which now exist
 in him, through the perfect unification (76) with (77) the proper . . .
 (78) reason through which he subsists.'

ad loc.) 31 copula: glossa interlinearis .i. adunatione B(C)P glossa marginalis
 hoc est quando adunabitur uniuersa natura B(C): hoc est quando adunabitur
 in uniuersa natura P extenturus: glossa interlinearis .i. porrecturus B(C)P
 33 masculinum RB: masculinum P

Concerning
 the unifica-
 tion of
 substances

[In his uerbis apertissime insinuat diuini consilii propositum erga hominis conditionem si eum peccaturum non praenosceret. 'Homo' nanque 'solummodo' esset in simplicitate suae naturae creatus eoque modo quo sancti angeli multiplicati sunt intellectualibus numeris multiplicatus, sed reatu suae praeuaricationis obrutus naturae diuisionem in masculum et feminam est passus et quoniam ille diuinum modum multiplicationis suae obseruare noluit in pecorinum corruptibilemque ex masculino et femina numerositatem iusto iudicio redactus est, quae diuisio in Christo Iesu adunationis sumpsit exordium qui in se ipso humanae naturae restaurationis exemplum ueraciter ostendit et futurae resurrectionis similitudinem praestetit.]

de ablatione sexus omniumque naturarum adunatione principaliter in Christo deinde in tota humana natura in consummatione mundi

'In ipsis', inquit, 'quae nunc circa eum sectionibus non diuisus.' Sectiones dicit circa hominem post peccatum non solum diuisionem in masculum et feminam uerum etiam in multiplices uarietates qualitatum et quantitatum differentiarumque unius formae. Siquidem diuersitas hominum a se ipsis qua uniuscuiusque species ab aliis discernitur et staturae modus uariatur non ex natura peruenit sed ex uitio et diuersitate locorum et temporum terrarum aquarum aerum aescarum caeterorumque similium in quibus nascuntur et nutriuntur. De diuersitate morum cogitationumque superfluum est dicere cum omnibus manifestum sit ex diuisione naturae post peccatum initium sumpsisse.

'Propter ipsam', inquit, 'perfectam adunationem ad propriam rationem per quam subsistit', ac si diceret: Ideo homo naturae suae diuisionem non pateretur si non peccaret quia perfectis rationibus suis in quibus secundum imaginem dei conditus est, primordialibus uidelicet causis in quibus subsistit, inseparabiliter adhaereret si sponte sua ab eis <se ipsum> non euelleret. Non enim in his in quibus uidetur esse homo subsistit sed in occultis naturae causis secundum quas primitus conditus est et ad quas reuersurus est continetur in quantum est.]

Et quoniam post adunationem hominis, hoc est duplicis sexus, in pristinam naturae unitatem in qua neque masculus neque femina sed simpliciter homo erat, *confestim* orbis terrarum adunatio ad paradysum sequetur, 'Deinde', inquit, 'paradisum orbemque terrarum per propriam sanctam conuersationem adiungens unam faceret terram, non diuisam in eo secundum partium eius differentiam sed magis congregatam ut nulla partium eius ullam *patiatur* subductionem.'

12 cf. p. 20, 34-35 supra
I Ambig. xxxvii, PG xci. 1305D 3-8

23-24 cf. p. 20, 35-36

35-38 Max. Conf.,

3 nanque BP: namque R
pecorinam RB*
24 suae R^cBP: sui R*

6 passus BP: pasus R

10 se s.l. P

11 praestetit RBP*: prae-

25 perfectis R^cBP: perfecte R*

28 se

[In these words he shows very clearly the intention of the divine plan for the creation of man had He not foreknown that he would sin. For he would be 'simply man' created in the simplicity of his nature, multiplied in intelligible numbers, as the holy angels are multiplied, but, oppressed by the guilt of his disobedience, he suffered the division of his nature into male and female, and since he was unwilling to keep to the divine mode of multiplying himself he was degraded by a just decree to the bestial, and to the corruptible proliferation out of male and female; and this division has taken the beginning of its unification in Christ Jesus, who truly showed in Himself an example of the restoration of human nature, and exhibited a likeness of the resurrection that is to come.]

'Not divided', he says, 'into those sections which now (exist) in him.' By the sections (that exist) in man after sin he means not only the division into male and female but also the division of one form into the manifold varieties of qualities and quantities and differences. For the diversity of men among themselves by which the form of each is distinguished from the others and the measure of stature is varied does not proceed from nature but from the defect (79) and diversity of places and times, of lands, of waters, of airs, of diets, and of the other circumstances of this sort of their birth and breeding. Of the diversity of manners and opinions it is superfluous to speak for it is obvious to all that these took their origin from the division of nature after sin.

'Through the perfect unification (80)', he says, 'with the proper reason through which he subsists.' (This is) as if he said: Man would not suffer the division of his nature if he were not in a state of sin for the reason that he would inseparably adhere to his perfect reasons in which he was created in the image of God, that is to say, in the primordial causes in which he subsists if he were not of his own will tearing <himself> away from them. For man does not subsist in these (circumstances) in which he now appears to be, but in so far as he exists he is contained within the hidden causes of nature after which he was first created and to which he is destined to return.]

And (81) since after the unification of man, that is, of his two sexes, into the original unity of nature in which there was neither male nor female but simply man there will immediately follow (82) the unification of the inhabited globe with paradise, he says: 'Then, by bringing together, by the holiness of his own way of life (83), paradise and the inhabited globe, he would make the earth one, not divided in him by difference of its parts, but rather so gathered together

Concerning the abolition of sex and the unification of all natures first in Christ and then in the whole of human nature at the end of the world

7

ipsum addidit sC in B
32 duplicis RBP^c: duplici P*
B^c(C)P: sequitur R*: sequeretur R^c(C)B*
in ras. B^c(C): pateretur R^c(C): partiatur P

euelleret B^cP: euelleretur RB*

29 sed s.l. P

34 confestim in ras. R(C)

35 sequetur

38 patiatur uel patienti R*: patiatur

Quae sententia ualde obscura uidetur. Non enim facile patet quid
 suadere uelit: utrum orbis terrarum dum omnes substantiae aduna- 533D
 buntur paradiso copulabitur ut nulla diuersitas partium in eis fiat sed 534A
 totus paradisi erit—nam in ratione adunationis hoc semper obseruari
 necessarium est ut quod inferius esse uidetur in id quod superius, hoc 5
 est melius, moueatur, non autem quod melius est in deterius transire,
 [hoc est redire in renouatione naturarum, alioqui adunatio non erit
 sed diuisio,] uera sinit ratio, sicut humanae naturae adunatio duplicis
 sexus diuisionem in simplicitatem hominis reuocat quia homo melior
 est quam sexus, masculus siquidem et femina non sunt nomina 10
 naturae sed partitionis eius per praeuaricationem, homo uero *specialis*
 ipsius naturae appellatio est—; an sic orbis terrarum et paradisi in
 unam illam terram quae altera species est sensibilis creaturae in caelum 534B
 et terram diuisae applicabuntur ut ipsa terra [non solum] uarietate 15
 partium careat sed [etiam] in simplicitatem quandam naturae
 reuocabitur ut plus spiritualis quam corporalis esse *credatur* <qualis
 futurus esset si homo non peccaret> *et* intelligamus quod dixit ‘non
 segregatam in eo’, id est homine [nam in homine omnia adunan-
 tur], ‘secundum partium suarum’ [terrae uidelicet] ‘differentiam’ [ut]
 quemadmodum nulla partium diuersitas in homine erit quoniam nulla 20
 compositio in eo permanebit ita etiam terrena natura sibi copulabitur
 ut unum in eo et cum eo esse uideatur. Ait enim: ‘sed magis con-
 ‘gregatam quatenus nullam ulla partium eius subductionem’, hoc est
 separationem, ‘patiatur’. Vbi enim uera est simplicitas ibi nullius
 subductionis, id est segregationis, reperitur uarietas. Cui sensui 534C
 sequentia fauere apertissime uidentur; sequitur enim: ‘Inde caelum 26
 ‘et terram adiungens per ipsam angelis uitae omnino secundum
 ‘uirtutem quantum hominibus possibile est similitudinem unam
 ‘faceret inseparabilem ubique a se ipsa sensibilem creaturam non
 ‘separatam in eo’ [uidelicet homine] ‘localiter omnino in spatiis leui 30
 ‘facto spiritu et nulla grauitate corporali detento . . . neque ad caelos
 ‘ascensione prohibito per ipsam ad haec perfectam animi AOPACIAN’,
 hoc est exorbitatem uel caecitatem, ‘sincere ad deum peruenientis . . .
 ‘sapienter ad eum intentione.’ Vbi datur intelligi quod homo quando
 reuocabitur in pristinam naturae suae gratiam quam praeuaricando 35

17–19 cf. p. 22, 37 supra 22–24 cf. p. 22, 37–8 supra 26–34 Max. Conf.,
 I Ambig. xxxvii, PG xci. 1305D 9–1308A 8

2 glossa hic ambiguum ponit utrum mutabitur orbis terrarum omnino in paradisi
 sicut sexus in hominem ea ratione qua inferiora melioribus absorbentur an orbis
 terrarum et paradisi in eandem ueluti spiritualis terrae qualitatem adunabuntur
 ea ratione qua sibimet similia coaptantur in marg. scripsit C in B: litteris minusculis,
 praefixa uoce glo, P 6 autem BP: enim R 7 alioqui RB: alioquin P 8 post
 sicut habet enim R; quae uox erasa est in B, deest in P 10 quam s.l. R 15 sed
 in ras. B 17 futurus B^c: futrus B*(C): futura P 21 sibi s.l. R 24 enim
 RB: quippe P 25 reperitur B^cP: repperitur RB* 30 separatam in ras. R(C)
 31 grauitate corporali detento BP: grauitate corporali in terra detento R (cf. Max.

that none of its parts (84) suffers (85) loss (86).’ This statement
 sounds very obscure. For it is not easy to see what he is trying to say:
 whether (that) the inhabited globe, when all substances are unified,
 will be joined with paradise in such a way that there will be no
 diversity of parts in them but all will be paradise—for in the reason of
 unification this must always be observed, that what appears to be
 inferior moves towards what is superior, that is, better, but true
 reason does not allow that what is better passes into the worse [that
 is to say, returns in the renewal of natures; otherwise it will not be
 a unification but a division], just as the unification of human nature
 recalls the division of the two sexes into the simplicity of man because
 man is better than sex, for male and female are not names of his
 nature, but of its partition through disobedience, whereas ‘man’ is
 the special name of his nature (87);—or (that) the inhabited globe
 and paradise will be brought together into that one earth which is the
 second species of the sensible creature divided into heaven and earth
 (88) in such a way that even the earth will [not only] be without
 variety of parts but [also] will be recalled into a simplicity of nature
 so as to be *believed* to be a spiritual rather than a corporeal nature
 <such (89) as it would be if man were not in a state of sin>, *and* (so
 as to) let us understand the words ‘not divided in him’, that is in man
 [for in man all things are unified] ‘by the difference of its’ [the earth’s,
 that is] ‘parts’ [in the sense that] as there will be no diversity of parts
 in man because no (element of) composition will remain in him, so
 also the earth’s nature will be so united with him as to seem one with
 him and in him. For he says: ‘but rather so gathered together that
 none of its parts suffers annihilation’, that is, separation. For where
 there is true simplicity there is not found the variety of any annihila-
 tion, that is, of segregation. This interpretation appears to be fully
 borne out in what follows; for he continues: ‘Then, by uniting (90)
 heaven and earth through the perfect (91) similarity of his life in
 respect of virtue to that of the angels in so far as that is possible for
 men, he would make (92) the sensible creature one (and) everywhere
 inseparable from itself (93) in him (94)’ [that is, in man] ‘not at all
 separated spatially by distances (95), (man) having become a weight-
 less spirit (96) and not held down by any gravity of the body . . . (97)
 nor hindered from ascending to the heavens through the perfect
 ἀορασία’—that is, sightlessness or blindness (98)—‘towards those
 things of his mind which purely attains to God by approaching Him
 in wisdom (99).’ Here we are given to understand that when man is
 recalled into the original grace of his nature which he abandoned by

Conf. ad loc. et p. 26, 7 infra) 32 glossa AOPACIA (AOPOCIA P: Aoracie
 Rm) interpretatur caecitas sed non illa quae (quaeque P) priuatio uisionis dicitur sed
 illa (om. Rm) caligo quae rebus uisibilibus circumuoluitur ut intuentibus se (ut se
 intuentibus Rm) apparere non possint (non possint apparere Rm) B(C)PRm

deseruit omnem sensibilem inferiorem se creaturam in unitatem sibi
 recolliget mirabili quadam diuinae uirtutis potentia in restitutione
 hominis. Dum enim sincere, ut ipse ait, humanus animus ad deum
 perueniet tum diuinam AOPACIAN, hoc est omnium creaturarum
 quas omnino superascendet ignorantiam, patietur, ad ipsum deum
 perueniens ipsumque in omnibus contemplan. Totus namque homo,
 ut ait ipse, leuis spiritus futurus est et nulla grauitate corporali in terra
 detinebitur neque ad caelos ascensione prohibebitur.

'Deinde' inquit, 'intelligibilia et sensibilia cum his copulans', hoc est
 cum praedictis naturarum adunationibus, 'per ipsam ad angelos scien-
 tia aequalitatem unificabit creaturam simul omnem creaturam
 non separatam in eo secundum scientiam et ignorantiam, aequali sibi
 ad angelos indifferenter futura rationum in his quae sunt gnostica
 scientia per quam ipsa uerae sophiae infinita donorum effusio super-
 ueniens quantum fas est pure de caetero ipsam circa deum et in medi-
 ate dignis praestat incognitam et ininterpretabilem notitiam.' Huius
 sententiae altitudo incomprehensibilis mihi uidetur [et maxime ubi
 ait 'secundum scientiam et ignorantiam aequali sibi ad angelos
 gnostica scientia'], et merito. In prioribus enim nil aliud uidebatur
 suasisse nisi omnium rerum sensibilibus et intelligibilibus in unitatem
 quandam adunationem ita ut nil separabile nil corporeum nil uarium
 in eis remaneat sed ut mirabili quadam regressione inferiora semper
 in superiora transeant; *nunc uero* dicere uidetur adunationem natura-
 lium substantiarum in intellectu solummodo non autem in ipsis rebus
 esse, hoc est non eas res quae per generationem in diuersa genera
 diuersasque formas infinitosque numeros iuxta creatoris prouidentiam
 intelligibilem sensibilem acceperunt uarietatem [—non enim
 aliter adunationem creaturarum substantiarum in angelis esse intel-
 ligimus nisi sola gnostica scientia, non autem ipsarum rerum col-
 lectione in unum. Naturarum enim omnium conditarum rationes in
 semet ipsis sub uno quodam intelligentiae tenore cognoscunt quemad-
 modum in quadam humana sapientissima anima diuersarum artium
 una eademque et inseparabilis cognitio est, ita ut ignorantia siue in
 angelis—nam et eorum quosdam nondum omni purgatos ignorantia
 legimus—siue in rationabilibus animabus nullam segregationem rerum

6-8 cf. p. 24, 31-32 supra 9-16 Max. Conf., I Ambig. xxxvii, PG xci. 1308A
 9-B 4 18-19 cf. 12-14 supra 34-35 e.g. Eph. iii. 10; 1 Pet. i. 12

6 namque BP: enim R 11 unificabit B(C)P (cf. Max. Conf. ad loc.): unificaretur
 RB* creaturam (2) RBP: om. P* 12 aequali sibi RBP: aequalis ibi
 P* 13 s ante gnostica erasum in B 15 pure RBP: purae R* immediate B:
 immediate RP 17 incomprehensibilis RBP: comprehensibilis R* 23 nunc
 uero in ras. R(C) dicere BP: docere R 24 glossa ambiguum hic dicit utrum
 res ipsae sibi inuicem adunabuntur ut unum sint an earum solummodo intel-
 lectus in homine adunantur ut simul omnia cognoscat sicut angeli cognoscunt.
 Ad hoc tamen peruenit ut non solum secundum intellectum sed secundum res

transgression, he will gather again to himself every sensible creature
 below him through the wonderful might exercised by the Divine
 Power in restoring man. For when, as he says, 'the human mind
 purely attains to God', it will experience the divine ἀποσία, that is,
 the not-knowing of all the creatures which he shall wholly surpass
 now that he has attained to God Himself and contemplates Him in
 all things. For the whole man, as he says, will become 'weightless
 spirit' and will not be 'held down to the earth (100) by any weight of
 the body nor hindered from ascending to the heavens'.

'Then,' he says, 'by joining (101) the intelligibles and the sensibles
 in addition to these'—that is, to the unifications of natures that have
 been mentioned—'through the equality of his knowledge (102) with
 (that of) the angels, he will make (103) all creatures one single
 creature, not separated in him in respect of knowledge and ignorance
 (104), for he (105) will have (106) a gnostic science (107) of reasons
 in the things that are, equal to that of the angels without any difference
 (108), by means of which the infinite outpouring from above (109)
 of the gifts (110) of the true sophia, as much as is meet, supplies
 henceforth purely (111) and directly (112) to those who are worthy
 the unknown and inexplicable knowledge (113) of God.' The profun-
 dity of this sentence appears to me unfathomable [and especially
 where he says 'in respect of knowledge and ignorance, for he will
 have a gnostic science equal to that of the angels'], and not without
 reason. For in what went before he seemed to teach nothing else than
 a certain unification into unity of all the sensibles and intelligibles
 so that nothing would remain in them that was separable, nothing
 that was corporeal, nothing that was variable, but that by a wonderful
 return the lower natures would always pass into the higher (114);
but now he seems to say that the unification of natural substances is
 in the intellect alone, but not in the things themselves, that is to say,
 that it is not those things which through generation into divers genera
 and divers forms and infinite individuals received from the Creator's
 Providence their intelligible or sensible diversity [for not otherwise
 do we understand that there is a unification of created substances in
 the angels than by their gnostic science alone, but not by the gathering
 together of the things themselves into one. For they know the reasons
 of all created natures in themselves by a single apprehension of the
 intellect as there is in the wisest human soul a single and inseparable
 knowledge of the various arts (115), so that ignorance, whether in
 angels—for even among them we read of some who are not purged
 of all ignorance—or in rational souls, brings about no segregation of

ipsas adunatio futura sit C in B (cf. glossam in P ad p. 30, 8 infra) 25 in s.l. R
 26 infinitosque RBP: infinitos P* 30 enim RB: quippe P 31 quodam
 RBP: quodam P* 35 rationabilibus animabus RB: hominibus P melius

faciat, scientia uero gnostica adunationis causa fiat. Intellectus enim rerum ueraciter ipsae res sunt, dicente sancto Dionysio: 'Cognitio eorum quae sunt ea quae sunt est'—], sed ipsas primordiales suas causas rationesque in adunationem quandam actione intelligentiae, non autem re ipsa colligi. Sed priusquam ad huius quaestionis theoriam perueniamus si de ea quid dicendum, praedictae adunationis rerum secundum Maximum residua dicenda esse arbitror. 'Et finis', inquit, 'in omnibus his creatam naturam non creatae per dilectionem unificans—o miraculum erga nos diuinae clementiae!—unum idipsumque ostendet secundum habitum gratiae: totus homo toto uniuersaliter ambitus deo et factus omne si quid est deus praeter similitudinem secundum essentiam et totum ipsum accipiens a se ipso', uidelicet deo, 'deum . . . ueluti ascensionis praemium ipsum singularissimum possessurus, deum utpote finem eorum quae mouentur motionis et statum firmum immutabilemque eorum quae feruntur in ipsum et omnis finis et statuti et legis rationisque intellectusque et naturae finem ac terminum infinitum et interminatum existentem.' Ad hoc igitur quantum ex praedicti magistri sermonibus datur intelligi inter primordiales rerum causas homo ad imaginem dei factus est ut in eo omnis creatura et intelligibilis et sensibilis ex quibus ueluti diuersis extremitatibus compositus unum inseparabile fieret et ut esset medietas atque adunatio omnium creaturarum. Non enim ulla creatura est quae in homine intelligi non possit, unde etiam in sanctis scripturis omnis creatura nominari solet. In euuangelio siquidem scriptum est: 'Praedicate euuangelium omni creaturae.' Item in apostolo: 'omnis creatura congemiscit et dolet usque adhuc.' Et si non peccaret non esset in eo diuisio sexuum sed solummodo homo esset; non separaretur in eo orbis terrarum a paradiso sed omnis terrena natura in eo esset paradisu, hoc est spiritualis terra atque conuersatio; caelum et terra in eo non segregarentur—totus enim caelestis esset et nil terrenum nil graue nil corporeum in eo appareret; esset enim et multiplicaretur in numerum a conditore sui praefinitum sicut angeli et sunt et multiplicati sunt—; sensibilis natura ab intelligibili in eo non discreparetur, totus enim esset intellectus creatori

2-3 Ps.-Dionysius, *EH* i. 3, PG iii. 376A 7 7-18 Max. Conf., *I Ambig.* xxxvii, PG xci. 1308B 4-C 2 25 Marc. xvi. 15 26 Rom. viii. 22

2 dionysio BP: dionisio R 3 quae sunt ea quae sunt B^cP: quae sunt quae ea quae sunt RB* 5 Sed priusquam RB^c: Priusquam uero B*: Verum priusquam P 10 ostendet BP: ostenderet R 11 si quid est R^cBP: siquidem R* 12-13 a se ipso RB: ab ipso P 13 uidelicet deo deum u *in ras.* R 14 singularissimum BP: singularisissimum R possessurus BP: posessurus R 16 in *s.l.* P 19 imaginem B: imaginem RP 22 medietas R^c(C)BP: mediatas R* 23 intelligi: -gi *s.l.* P 24 euuangelio B: euangelio RP 25 euuangelium B:

natures, whereas gnostic science is the cause of their unification. For the understanding of things is what things really are, in the words of St. Dionysius: 'The knowledge of the things that are is the things that are (116)', but (117) their primordial causes and reasons, that are gathered into a certain unification, and that by an act of the intelligence, not in the thing itself (118).

But before we come to the contemplation of this question, if there is anything to be said about it, I think the rest of Maximus' theory of the aforesaid unification of things must be given.

'And the end (119),' he says, 'uniting in all these (120) through love (121) the created to the non-created nature—O the wonder of the divine clemency towards us!—would manifest (122) it as one and the same in the state of grace: the whole man wholly encompassed by the whole of Divinity (123) and made everything that God is (124) excepting similitude of essence and receiving the whole of Him from Himself (125), namely from God, 'about to possess (126) God (127) as the most singular prize of his ascent, God, that is, as the end of the motion of the things that move, and the secure and immutable stability of the things which are borne towards Him, and the infinitely and illimitably existing (128) end and limit of every limit and statute and law and reason and intellect and nature.'

Therefore it was to this end, as far as we are given to understand from the discourse of the aforesaid master, that man was made among the primordial causes in the image of God; that in him every creature, both intelligible and sensible, of which he is composed, as of various extremes (129), should become an inseparable unity, and that he should be the mediating term and unification of all creatures. For there is no creature than cannot be understood (to be) in man, whence also in the Holy Scriptures he is wont to be called 'every creature'. For in the Gospel it is written 'Preach the gospel to every creature', and in the Apostle, 'Every creature groaneth (130) and travaileth until now.' And if he were not in a state of sin there would not be in him the division of the sexes, but there would be only man; the inhabited globe would not in him be separated from paradise, but the whole of earthly nature would in him (131) be paradise, that is to say, a spiritual earth and way of life; heaven and earth would not in him be segregated—for he would be wholly heavenly, and nothing earthly, nothing heavy, nothing corporeal would appear in him; for he would be and would multiply to the number pre-determined by his Creator, as the angels both are and multiply—; the sensible nature would not in him be distinct from the intelligible, for he would be

euuangelium RP 26 congemiscit R^cBP: congemiscit R* 32 et bis scriptum in R 34 discreparetur R^cB: discreparet R*P Caue in marg. recenti manu P

suo semper et immutabiliter adhaerens et nullo modo a primordi-
 alibus suis causis in quibus conditus est recederet; omnisque creatura
 quae in eo condita est nullam diuisionem in eo pateretur. Sed quoniam
 primus homo in tali felicitate permanere neglexerat et ab ea super-
 biendo cecidit et in infinitas partitiones uarietatesque naturae huma-
 nae unitas dispersa est, diuina clementia nouum hominem in quo ipsa
 natura quae in ueteri homine dispertita est ad pristinam unitatem
 reuocaretur in mundo [de mundo, hoc est homo ex hominibus, 536D
 propter homines] nasci constituit. Hinc idem Maximus, 'Quoniam
 itaque', inquit, 'naturaliter ut creatus est circa immutabile proprium
 principium—dico autem deum—homo non est motus, circa uero ea
 quae sub ipso sunt, quorum ipse diuinitus principari ordinatus est,
 contra naturam uolens insipienter est motus ea in adunationem
 separatorum data sibi naturali potentia per generationem in ipsam
 adunandorum magis abusus est separationem, "Nouantur naturae
 et deus homo fit" ut hominem perditum saluet et in toto uniuersaliter
 naturae per se ipsum quae contra naturam sunt fisuras adiungens et
 uniuersaliter eorum quae partita sunt praemonstratas rationes quibus
 ipsa segregatorum fieri consueuit adunatio ostendens magnum con-
 silium impleret dei et patris in se ipsum recapitulans omnia', id est
 recolligens, 'quae in caelo sunt et quae in terra, in quo etiam creata
 sunt. Ipsa itaque uniuersaliter omnium ad se ipsum adunatione ex
 nostra inchoans diuisione fit perfectus homo ex nobis propter nos
 secundum nos, omnia nostra perfecta habens . . . non ex nuptiali
 consequentia . . . per hoc ostendens, ut arbitrator, quomodo erat et
 alius modus propagationis hominum in multitudinem deo prae-
 cognitum si mandatam primus homo custodiret inque pecudalitatem
 se ipsum eo modo qui est per abusionem propriis potentiis non
 deiiceret, in ipsam secundum masculinum et feminam differentiam et
 diuisionem naturae retrusus, cuius ut fieret, sicut dixi, homo non
 omnino indigebat. Sine quibus autem esse fortassis est possibile, haec
 in perpetuum non necesse manere. In Christo enim Iesu, inquit
 diuini apostolus, neque masculus est neque femina.' [Videsne quan-
 tum diuisionis humanae naturae causam ad peccatum primi hominis
 referendam esse inculcat? Sine quibus, enim inquit, 'esse fortassis
 est possibile, haec in perpetuum non necesse manere', ac si aperte 36

9-15 Quoniam—separationem: Max. Conf., *I Ambig.* xxxvii, PG xci. 1308C 3-10
 15-16 Nouantur—fit: Greg. Naz., *Orat.* xxxix. 13, PG xxxvi. 348D 16-33 et
 deus—femina: Max. Conf., *op. cit.* 1308D 2-1309A 5 32-33 Gal. iii. 28

2 omnisque RB: omnis P 4 neglexerat: -erat ad finem lineae addidit sR
 8 glossa hic approbare adunationem omnium non solum intelligentia sed et
 re ipsa futuram incipit P (cf. glossam ad p. 26, 24 supra) 10 immutabile:
 -le in ras. B(C) 21 in terra RBP^c: intera P* 22 adunatione: -ne s.l. P

all intellect, ever and immutably attached to his Creator and in no
 way inferior to his primordial causes in which he was created; and
 no creature which is created in him would in him suffer any division.
 But because the first man had refused to remain in such a happy state,
 and fell from it through pride, and the unity of human nature was
 dissipated into infinite divisions and variations, the divine clemency
 ordained that there should be born a new Man in the world, [of the
 world, that is, a man born of men for the sake of men], in whom that
 nature which in the old man was divided should be called to its
 pristine unity.

So the same Maximus (says): 'Seeing then that by nature, as created
 in his proper principle (132)—I mean God—, man is not moved but
 among those things that are beneath him, over which he himself is the
 divinely appointed principle, not by nature but by will he was moved
 to folly (and) used the natural power for the unification of separated
 things with which he was endowed through generation rather for the
 separation of things that should be unified . . . , "The natures are made
 anew and God becomes man (133)" so that He may save man from
 destruction, and by re-uniting through Himself universally in every-
 thing (134) the fissures of nature which are contrary to nature, and by
 showing forth universally the foreshown (135) reasons of the things
 that are divided, by which the unification of the separated things is
 wont to be brought about, He might fulfil the great plan of the God
 and Father, summing up', that is, gathering together, 'into Himself
 all things which are in heaven and which (are) on earth; in whom also
 they were created. So (136), by the unification (137) of all things uni-
 versally to Himself, beginning from our division, He is made perfect
 man from us and in us and for us, possessing all our characteristics
 completely . . . not as a consequence of the marriage-bed (138) . . .
 thereby showing, as I think, how there was also another manner
 of man's propagation into multiplicity foreknown to God (139) if
 the first man should keep the commandment and should not cast
 himself down into bestiality (140) by turning his own powers to
 evil uses (141) and be thrust into the difference and division of his
 nature into male and female, which (142), as I have said, he certainly
 did not require in order to become man. But those things without
 which it is perhaps possible for him to exist need not endure for ever.
 For in Christ Jesus, says the divine Apostle, there is neither male
 nor female.'

[Do you see how much he insists that the cause of the division of
 human nature must be attributed to the sin of the first man? For,
 'those things', he says, 'without which it is perhaps possible to exist

27 inque RB^cP: in quae B* 29 deiiceret B^cP: deiceret RB* 34 diuisionis
 R^cB^cP: diuisiones R*: disionis B*

diceret: Quoniam si homo non peccaret absque diuisione suae naturae permanere poterat—non enim hoc ei ex natura accessit sed ex delicto contigit—, quae igitur necessitas cogit ut post adunationem naturae in pristinam sui dignitatem illa diuisio permaneat? Vt enim ante peccatum potuit ea carere, ita poterit post eius redintegrationem aeternaliter permanere.]

Sed ne per singula ipsius persequare sermones in quibus apertissime edocet adunationem totius creaturae quae in primo homine fieret si non peccaret in Christo [resurgente ante omnes] per omnia factam, pauca de pluribus praesentis disputationis gratia introducam. Primo igitur dominum Iesum diuisionem naturae, id est masculinum et feminam, in se ipso adunasse [edocet]. Non enim in sexu corporeo sed in homine tantum surrexit ex mortuis. In ipso enim nec masculus nec femina est—quamuis in ipso sexu uirili in quo natus est ex uirgine et in quo passus est apparuit discipulis suis post resurrectionem ad confirmandam resurrectionis suae fidem. Non enim aliter eum cognoscerent si notam eis formam non uiderent. Nondum siquidem spiritum sanctum pleniter acceperunt qui eos docuit omnia.

Deinde post resurrectionem nostrum orbem terrarum paradiso in se ipso copulauit. Nam ex mortuis in paradysum rediens in hoc orbe cum discipulis suis conuersatus est, ostendens eis manifeste non aliud esse paradysum praeter resurrectionis gloriam quae primum in eo apparuit et quam omnibus fidelibus daturus est docensque nostrum orbem terrarum differentiam in paradiso iuxta rationem [naturae] non habere [non enim natura separantur sed qualitatibus et quantitatibus caeterisque uarietatibus, quae propter peccatum generale generalis humanae naturae ad poenam eius, immo etiam ad correctionem et exercitationem, huic terrae habitabili superaddita sunt] et, 'quoniam una terra dum ad se ipsam constituitur inseparabilis [est], 'ipsam [naturae] rationem [in] qua est liberam diuisione secundum differentiam saluans'. Non enim mole uel spatiis discernitur paradysus ab isto habitabili orbe terrarum sed diuersitate conuersacionis differentiaque beatitudinis. Nam et primus homo si non peccaret feliciter in orbe terrarum uiuere posset quoniam una eademque ratio est in

20–21 ex mortuis—ostendens: cf. Max. Conf., *I Ambig.* xxxvii, PG xci. 1309B 8–10
29–31 quoniam—saluans: Max. Conf., *I Ambig.* xxxvii, PG xci. 1309B 10–12

3 igitur s.l. R(C) 6 post aeternaliter erasum est sineza (?) in B 9 post factam rasura in R Caue in marg. rec. manu scriptum in P 11 post igitur erasum est docet (?) in R 13 lemma BPRm 15 apparuit in ras. R(C) resurrectionem R^cB^cP: recurrenceionem R*: resurrectionem B*: -onem in ras. B 17 post non erasum est dum in R 19 glossa hic datur intelligi non aliud esse paradysum praeter humanam naturam ante peccatum et condignam sibi sensibilem si non peccaret creaturam B(C)P 20 rediens R^cBP: rediturus (?) R* 23 et s.l. R docensque n in ras. R(C) 24 in om. P melius 29 post

need not endure for ever', as though he were to say explicitly: Seeing that if man had not fallen into sin it was possible for him to endure without the division of his nature—for this is not a part of his nature but happened to him as a consequence of sin—, what need, then, requires that after the unification of nature into its primitive status that division should endure? For as before sin it was possible to be without it, so it will be possible after his reintegration (143) to abide eternally.]

But so as not to go in detail through his discourses in which he most clearly teaches that the unification of the whole creature which would be effected in man if he were not in a state of sin is achieved through all things in Christ [whose resurrection precedes that of all], I shall select from many passages a few which are relevant to the present discussion. First, then, [he shows] that the Lord Jesus united in himself the division of (our) nature, that is, male and female. For it was not in the bodily sex but simply in man that He rose from the dead. For in Him there is neither male nor female, although it was in that masculine sex in which He was born of a Virgin and in which He suffered that *he appeared* to His disciples after His resurrection so that their faith in the resurrection might be confirmed. For otherwise they would not recognize Him if they did not see the shape that was known to them. For they had not yet fully received the Holy Spirit which taught them all things.

Then, after the resurrection, He united in Himself the inhabited world to paradise. For on His return from the dead into paradise He conversed in this world with His disciples, clearly showing (144) them that paradise is not other than the glory of the resurrection which first appeared in Him and which He would bestow upon all the faithful; and teaching (them) that our habitable globe has not any difference in paradise in respect of the reason [of its nature; for it is not by nature that they are separated but by the qualities and quantities and other variations, things that were added subsequently to this habitable earth as the consequence of the general sin of human nature in general for its punishment, and, what is more, also for its correction and education]; and, 'that (145) the earth, being one, [is] indivisible with itself, preserving the reason [of its nature in] which (146) it is free from division by difference' (147). For it is not by matter or spatial intervals that paradise is distinguished from this inhabited globe but by diversity of conduct and difference in (degree of) blessedness (148). For the first man also, had he not become a sinner, could live happily in the inhabited globe since there is one and the

dum erasum est sit (?) in R constituitur R^cBP: constitutus (?) R* 31 paradysus B^c: paradysus RB*P 32 conuersacionis B: conuersacionis RP 33 lemma BP 34 ratio est RB^cP: rationem B*

de eo quod in sexu uirili dominus post resurrectionem apparuit dum sine sexu surrexit

de differentia paradisi et orbis terrarum

That it was in the male sex that the Lord appeared to His disciples after the resurrection although He arose without sex

Concerning the difference between paradise and the inhabited globe

principalibus causis orbis terrarum et paradysi, quod apertissime in se 538c
 ipso dominus noster post resurrectionem manifestavit. Simul enim et
 in paradyso erat et in hac terra cum discipulis moratus est. Non enim
 credendum est aliunde uenisse localiter [ut] suis discipulis appareret
 et aliorum recessisse quando non apparebat [qui post resurrectionem 5
 naturam locorum ac temporum non solum diuinitate uerum etiam
 humanitate fuerat supergressus—spiritualia siquidem corpora loco
 temporeue coartari non facile crediderim quemadmodum neque qua-
 litatibus quantitibusue seu alicuius formae descriptionibus uariari.
 Simplicissimae enim naturae sunt, quod maxime argumento puri ignis 10
 colligitur, qui dum per omnia sensibilis mundi corpora diffunditur
 tantae subtilitatis est ut nullo loco detineatur et tamen in omnibus 538D
 operationem suam manifestare denoscitur—], sed uno eodemque
 tempore uno eodemque loco ad tempus eis apparebat in ea forma in 539A
 qua passus fuerat ut fidem illorum nutriret donec uerae cognitionis 15
 uirtutem qua postmodum perfusi sunt [illuminarentur] et peracto
 momentaneae apparitionis spatio mox in intellectualem inuisibilem-
 que spiritualis corporis AOPACIAN, id est inuisibilitatem, quae omne
 tempus [ut praediximus] omnemque locum superat redibat, uel quod
 credibilius esse uidetur nullo modo ex resurrectionis gloria loco 20
 uel tempore uel quantitate qualitateue recedens [—his enim omnibus
 spiritualia corpora carere nemo qui dubitat—] in ea forma qua mundo
 apparuit in mundo uiuens pro mundi salute post resurrectionem
 discipulis suis se ipsum manifestabat. Non enim humana ratiocinatio
 prauelet ubi diuina potentia solummodo pollet. [Nam quod ipse ait, 539B
 ‘Ecce ego uobiscum sum omnibus diebus usque ad consummationem 26
 ‘saeculi’, satis ac plane indicat ipsum non solum secundum uerbum
 quo omnia implet et super omnia est uerum etiam secundum carnem
 quam in unitatem suae substantiae uel personae accepit et ex mortuis
 suscitauit et in deum transmotauit semper et ubique esse, non tamen 30
 localiter seu temporaliter nec ullo modo circumscriptum. Mirabili
 siquidem et ineffabili modo et super omnes caelestes essentias et cum
 patre est secundum humanitatem quae uerbo patris adunata est et
 deus est et ubique regit mundum et deligentibus se siue inuisibiliter
 siue uisibiliter apparet. Caelum non deserit et mundum regit. Ad 35

26–27 Matth. xxviii. 20

1 paradysi B^cP: paradisi RB* 2 ipso BP: ipsa R 3 paradyso: Bpara-
 diso RP post Non rasura in P 4 localiter: lo- in ras. R(C) 5 recessisse
 BP: recessisse R apparebat R^cBP: appareret R* 10 Simplicissimae BP:
 simplicissimae R 13 manifestare: -re in ras. R(C) lemma Christi humani-
 tas post resurrectionem non loco sicut et diuinitas eius continetur Rm (cf. 27
 infra) 14 apparebat R^cBP: appareret R* 15 passus BP: p* sus R*: pasus R^c(C)
 16 uirtutem codd.: lege uirtute 17 momentaneae: -eae in ras. R(C) 19 post
 quod rasura in R 20 post uidetur rasura in R 20–21 loco–recedens in ras.
 in R(C) 21 tempore RP: temporae B qualitateue RB*: qualitate B*: qualitatiue

same reason in the principal causes of the inhabited globe and of
 paradise, as our Lord most clearly showed in Himself after the resur-
 rection. For at once He was both in paradise and abode with His
 disciples. For it is not to be believed that in a local sense He came 11
 from some other place [that] He might appear before His disciples
 and departed into another place when He was not appearing [—He
 who after resurrection had passed beyond the nature of places and
 times not only by His Divinity but also by His Humanity; for I should
 find it hard to believe that spiritual bodies were confined within place
 or time, as (I should) not (believe) that they are diversified by qualities
 or quantities or any describable forms. For they are natures of the
 utmost simplicity, as can be particularly well deduced from the
 evidence of pure fire which, while pervading all bodies of the sensible
 world, is of such subtlety that it is not retained in any place and yet
 is seen to reveal its action in all things—], but at one and the same
 time in one and the same place appeared to them for a season in that
 shape in which He had suffered so as to nourish their faith until [they
 should be illuminated] by the power of true knowledge with which
 afterwards they were transfused, and then, when the interval of His
 momentary appearance was over, He would at once return to the
 intelligible and invisible ἀορασία of the spiritual body, that is, (its)
 invisibility (149), which surpasses all time [as we said before] and
 all place; or, what appears to be more likely, He in no way departed
 from the glory of the resurrection in place or time or quantity or quality
 [for there is no one who doubts but that spiritual bodies are without
 all these] when, in that form in which He appeared to the world when
 He was living in the world for the world's salvation, He revealed
 Himself to His disciples after the resurrection. For human reason
 yields where the Divine Power alone prevails. [For that saying of
 His, 'Behold, I am with you always, even unto the end of the world',
 sufficiently and clearly indicates that not only as the Word by which
 all things are fulfilled and which is above all things, but also according
 to the flesh which He received into the unity of His Substance or
 Person and which He raised from the dead and which He changed
 into God, He exists always and everywhere, though not circumscribed
 by place or time or any (other) means. For in some wonderful and
 ineffable way He is both above all the heavenly essences and is with
 the Father in that Humanity which is unified with the Word of the
 Father and is God and reigns throughout the world; and appears to
 those who love Him either invisibly or visibly. He does not leave
 heaven and yet He rules the earth. He sits at the right hand of the

P enim RB: siquidem P 23 post salute addit et P* 26 ego s.l. R(C)
 27 lemma BP (cf. Rm ad 13 supra) 31 Mirabili: -bi- s.l. B 33 Caue in
 marg. rec. manu scriptum in P

That the
 Humanity of
 Christ after
 His resur-
 rection is not
 confined in
 place any
 more than
 His Divinity

dexteram patris sedet in summis omnia gubernans, humanae naturae salutem in imis ministrans. Noli ergo in loco fingere Christi humanitatem quae post resurrectionem translata est in diuinitatem. Diuinitas Christi in loco non est, igitur neque eius humanitas. Eodem modo sane intellige de tempore de qualitate de quantitate de forma circumscrip-
ta. His enim omnibus tota Christi humanitas, hoc est corpus et anima et intellectus, carere piissime creditur purissimeque intelligitur post resurrectionis palmam, et ad eandem gloriam electos suos post catholicam resurrectionem ducturus <qui> unum in eo et cum eo futuri sunt.]

Christus igitur et in paradyso erat simul et in mundo ostendens et mundi et paradisi unam rationem [naturalem] esse, in se ipso mundum et paradysum adunans. Non enim in mundo moles corporeas spatisque distentas multiplicesque diuersarum partium eius uarietates uera ratio considerat et honorificat sed naturales et primordiales illius causas in se ipsis unitas atque pulcherrimas in quas dum finis [suus] uenerit reuersurus erit et [in eis] aeternaliter mansurus. [Non autem alium finem mundi huius sensibilis credimus esse futurum nisi in deum et in primordiales suas causas in quibus naturaliter subsistit reditum.] Etenim, ut ratio edocet, mundus iste in uarias sensibiles[que] species diuersasque partium suarum multiplicitates [non] erumperet si deus casum et interitum primi hominis unitatem suae naturae deserentis non praeuideret, ut saltem post ruinam suam de spiritualibus ad corporalia, de aeternis ad temporalia, de incorruptilibus ad caduca, de summis ad ima, a spirituali homine in animale, a simplici natura ad sexuum diuisionem, ex angelica dignitate et multiplicatione ad pecorinam contumeliosam[que] corruptibilemque secundum corpus generationem, suum miserabilem interitum tali poena admonitus cognosceret et ad suae dignitatis pristinum statum [poenitendo superbiamque suam deponendo diuinisque leges quas transgressus fuerat implendo] redire postulet. Non enim credendum est diuinissimam conditoris clementiam peccantem hominem in hunc mundum retrusisse quasi quadam indignatione commotus aut quodam uindicandi motu cupidus—his enim accidentibus diuinam bonitatem carere uera ratio indicat—sed modo quodam ineffabilis doctrinae inconprehensibilisque misericordiae ut homo qui liberae uoluntatis arbitrio in suae naturae dignitate se custodire noluerat conditoris sui gratiam suis poenis eruditus quaereret et per eam diuinis praeceptis

de eo quod
expulsio
primi ho-
minis de
paradyso non
diuina
indignatione
sed potius
eruditione
facta sit

2 glossa de hoc etiam in quinto libro disputatum est B(C)P 4 humanitas BP: humana R 5 forma RB^cP: forma B* 6 circumscrip-
ta BP: circumscrip-
ta R 8 post RP: pos B 9 catholicam RB^c: katolicam cum spiritu aspero
s.l. inserto B*: catholicam P 11 paradyso BP: paradiso R 13 adunans
R^c(C)BP: adunatus est (?) R* 14 multiplicesque RB: multiplices quae P
partium RB^cP: spatium B* 18 autem BP: enim R 19 in primordiales: in
s.l. P 20 Etenim R^c(C)BP: non enim R* post edocet erasum est quod in B

Father in the height, governing all things; He ministers salvation to human nature in the depth. Do not therefore imagine that the Humanity of Christ which after the resurrection was transformed into his Divinity (is) in place. The Divinity of Christ is not in place: so neither is His Humanity. Be sure that it is the same (150) with time, with quality, with quantity, with circumscribed form. For it is most piously believed and most clearly understood that all these are absent from the whole Humanity of Christ, that is, from His body, His soul, and His intellect, after the triumph of the resurrection; and to that same glory He shall, after the general resurrection, bring His chosen, <who> shall be one in Him and with Him.] So Christ was both in paradise and at the same time in the world, showing that of both world and paradise there is one [natural] reason, (and) uniting the world and paradise in Himself. For in the world it is not the corporeal and spatially extended masses and the manifold varieties of its divers parts that right reason contemplates and venerates, but its natural primordial causes, united in themselves and most beautiful, to which, when [its] end comes, it shall return and abide for ever [in them].

[Now we hold that the end of this sensible world will be nothing else but its return into God and into its primordial causes in which it naturally subsists.] For, as our reason teaches us, this world would [not] (151) have burst forth into a variety of [both] sensible species and the divers multiplicities of their parts if God had not foreseen the fall and ruin of the first man when he abandoned the unity of his nature; so that at least, after his fall from spiritual to corporeal things, from eternal to temporal, from incorruptible to perishable, from the heights to the depths, from the spiritual man to the psychical (152) man, from a simple nature to the division of the sexes, from the status and multiplication of the angels to the bestial [and] contemptible and corruptible generation according to the body, he should, admonished by such a punishment, understand the wretchedness of his plight and [by penitence and laying aside of his pride and by observance of the divine laws which he had transgressed] plead his return to the first state of his honour. For it is not to be believed that the most divine clemency of the Creator thrust forth sinning man into this world as though actuated by anger or desirous of revenge—for sound reason shows that these accidents are absent from the Divine Goodness—, but as a kind of ineffable teaching and incomprehensible clemency, so that man, who, by the judgement of his free will, had refused to maintain himself in the status of his nature, might, having learnt from

That the
expulsion of
the first man
from para-
dise was not
a conse-
quence of
the divine
anger but
rather a
means of
correction

22 si R^cBP: nisi R* 23 praeuideret RBP^c: praeuaderet P* 24 spiritua-
libus RP: spiritu talibus B 25 in s.l. P 28 miserabilem RB: mirabilem
P 31 lemma BPRm: de eo quod om. Rm 33 retrusisse BP: retrusisse R
35 carere RB^cP: careret B* 36 inconprehensibilisque B: inconprehensibilisque
RP 36 liberae B^c(C)P: libero RB* 37 custodire RB^cP: custonere B*

obediens quae prius superbiendo neglexerat ad suum pristinum
 statum cautus prouidusque [pristine suae neglegentiae superbique
 casus humilis atque memor] rediret, unde iterum gratia ac libero
 [suae uoluntatis] arbitrio custoditus *non caderet nec cadere uellet nec*
 posset. Sed redeamus in adunationem naturarum in Christo. 'Deinde',
 inquit praedictus magister, 'per assumptionem in caelum profecto
 'caelum unificauit et terram et cum terreno hoc corpore nobis con-
 'naturali', in spiritualem substantiam uidelicet mutato, 'rediens in
 'caelum unam existentem . . . omnem sensibilem naturam manifesta-
 'uit . . . deinde . . . sensibilia et intelligibilia consequenter per omnes
 'caelestes diuinosque intellectuales ordines transiens cum anima et
 'corpore, hoc est perfecta nostra natura, adunauit, totius creaturae
 'secundum principalissimam eius rationem concursum in se ipso per-
 'fecte inseparabilem atque immobilem ostendens. Et finis in omnibus
 'his secundum intelligentiam humanitatis', [hoc est secundum ipsam
 humanitatem,] 'apud ipsum fit deum, apparens pro nobis sicut scrip-
 'tum est uultui dei et patris quantum homo, qui numquam ullo modo
 'a patre quantum uerbum potest recedere . . . ac primum adunauit nos
 'nobismet in se ipso per ablationem secundum masculum et feminam
 'differentiae et pro uiris et mulieribus quibus diuisionis maxime
 'inspicitur modus homines solummodo proprieque uereque ostendit
 ' . . . mundam ferentes imaginem quam nullo modo corruptionis nota-
 'mina tangunt' [Videsne quantum aperte denuntiat hominem ad
 imaginem et similitudinem dei conditum sexus differentia omnino
 caruisse et adhuc quantum in eo imago et similitudo conditoris per-
 manet carere ipsamque diuisionem propter peccatum secundum
 corpus solummodo accidisse? Quamquam enim in anima spirituales
 sexus intelligantur—NOYC siquidem, id est intellectus, ueluti quidam
 masculus in anima est, AICΘHCIC uero, id est sensus, ueluti quaedam
 femina—, non tamen ibi cognoscimus naturae deuortium sed Christi
 et ecclesiae mysterium uniusque intellectus ad creatorem et ad crea-
 turam contuitum] 'et nobiscum' [inquit] 'et propter nos simul omnem
 'creaturam per medietates ueluti propriarum partium extrema con-
 'prehendens et circa se ipsum insolubiliter paradikum orbemque ter-
 'rarum coniunxit, caelum et terram, sensibilia et intelligibilia, corpus

5-18 Deinde-recedere: Max. Conf., *I Ambig.* xxxvii, PG xci. 1390B 13-D 3 16-17
 sicut scriptum est: Heb. ix. 24 18-23 ac primum-tangunt: Max. Conf., *op.*
cit. 1309D 8-1312A 11 32-p. 40, 3 et nobiscum-recapitulauit: Max. Conf., *I*
Ambig. xxxvii, PG xci. 1312A 5-14

1 obediens B: oboediens RP neglexerat RB^cP: ne legerat B* 2 pristine B:
 pristinae RP neglegentiae BP: negligentiae R 4 non caderet R^c(C)BP:
 nec caderet R* 17 numquam BP: nunquam R 20 post uiris rasura in R
 21 inspicitur: -ci- s.l. R 23 denuntiat RB^cP: denontiat B* 28 lemma BP:
 de spiritalibus sexibus in anima Rm id est R: om. BP quidam RP: quidem

his punishments, seek the grace of his Creator, and by becoming
 through it obedient to the Divine Laws which he had previously in his
 pride neglected, with care and prudence [humble and mindful of his
 former neglectfulness and of his fall through pride] might return to
 his first state, from which, protected by grace and the free judgement
 [of his will] he would not fall again or wish to fall or be able to fall.

But let us return to the unification of natures in Christ. 'Then'.
 says the aforesaid Master, 'by His ascension (153) into heaven, He
 straightway (154) united heaven and earth, and returning with this
 earthly body which is of the same nature as (155) we'—changed, that
 is, into a spiritual substance—to heaven, He revealed the whole of
 sensible nature to be one (156) . . . Then, . . . passing with soul and
 body, that is, with our human nature in its totality, through all the
 heavenly and divine (157) intelligible orders in succession He united
 the sensibles and intelligibles, revealing that the convergence . . . (158)
 of the whole creature in its very first reason (159) (is) in Him
 perfectly inseparable and immutable (160). And finally (161), in
 (addition to) all these (162), in respect of the understanding of
 Humanity (163) [that is to say, in respect of humanity itself], 'He
 comes into the presence of God Himself (164), appearing for us, as
 it is written, before the face of His God and Father as Man, who as
 the Word can by no means ever depart from the Father . . . and first
 He in Himself united (165) us with ourselves in Himself by taking
 away the difference between male and female and instead of men and
 women, in whom the mode of division is most apparent, exhibited
 (166) men as such properly and truly . . . bearing immaculate their
 image which marks of corruption do not touch at all.'

[Do you see how openly he declares that man created in the image
 and likeness of God was entirely without difference of sex, and is
 still without it to the extent that the image and likeness of the Creator
 persists in him, and that that division was an accident affecting only
 his body, as a consequence of sin? For although spiritual sexes are
 understood to exist in the soul—for *νοῦς*, that is, intellect, is a kind
 of male in the soul, while *αἴσθησις*, that is, sense, is a kind of female
 (167)—, yet we do not recognize there any deviation from nature, but
 the mystery of Christ and the Church, and the concept of a single
 understanding of Creator and creature.]

'And with us', [he says,] 'and for us (168), comprehending (169)
 the whole creature by means of the intermediaries (which are) as it
 were the extremes of their proper parts (170), He also joined to-
 gether (171) in Himself indissolubly paradise and the inhabited
 globe, heaven and earth, the sensibles and the intelligibles, since like

B (cf. ad 29) 29 quaedam RB^cP: quidem B* 30 deuortium RB: diuortium P
 33-34 comprehendens B: comprehendens RP

Concerning
 the spiritual
 sexes of the
 soul

'quippe et sensum et animam secundum nos habens et intellectum
'quibus quasi partibus per singula unicuique uniuersaliter cogna-
'tum adsocians extremum iuxta prius redditum modum diuinitus
'omnia in se ipsum recapitulauit' [Vim uerborum intentus perspice;
non enim uacant uirtute. 'Corpus quippe', inquit, 'et sensum et
'animam secundum nos habens', Christus uidelicet, 'et intellectum.'
His enim ueluti quattuor partibus humana constituitur natura, quas
partes uerus quippe homo Christus et assumpsit et in se adunauit.
Homo siquidem perfectus factus est. Nil enim hominis reliquit praeter
peccatum quod in unitatem substantiae suae non acciperet inque semet
ipso non adunaret, hoc est unum non faceret. Non enim in illo post
resurrectionem quattuor sunt sed unum et non compositum unum
sed simpliciter unum corpus et sensus, anima et intellectus, 'quibus',
inquit, 'quasi partibus per singula unicuique uniuersaliter cognatum
'associans extremum', ac si aperte diceret: Quoniam Christus quattuor
humanae naturae partes accepit et in se ipso adunauit, uniuersam
creaturam, hoc est intellectualem et sensibilem, assumpsisse et in se
ipso adunasse manifestum est. Etenim in homine quem totum accepit
uniuersa creatura condita est, singulis enim partibus, ut ipse ait,
'cognatum associans extremum', cognata uocans extrema corpora
omniaque uisibilia. Haec enim extremitatem uniuersae creaturae
deorsum uersus obtinent sibi inuicem cognata sunt, sursum uero
uersus alteram creaturae obtinent extremitatem omnes intellectuales
essentiae, quae inter se inuicem similiter cognatae sunt. Singulis ergo
partibus humanae naturae cognata extrema, hoc est connaturales
naturae, in Christo sociata sunt. Corpus siquidem accipiens quartam
ueluti hominis partem omnem corporalem creaturam sibi adiunxit,
sensus uero assumens uniuersam sensibilem sensuque utentem
sibimet copulauit. Quid de anima dicendum? Nonne in ea quam ac-
cepit non solum rationabilem animam uerum etiam omnem uitam
nutritiuam et auctiuam in se ipso associauit? De intellectu nemo
sapientum dubitat. Humano enim intellectui quem Christus as-
sumpsit omnes intellectuales essentiae inseparabiliter adhaerent.
Nonne plane uides omnem creaturam, intelligibiles dico sensibilesque
mediasque naturas, in Christo adunatam? Quod breuiter conclusit
magister dicens], 'unam subsistentem simul omnem creaturam quasi
'aliquem hominem partium suarum ad se inuicem coitu completam

13-15 cf. 2-3 supra 36-p. 42, 4 Max. Conf., I Ambig. xxxvii, PG xci. 1312A
14-B 6

3 adsocians: -ians in ras. R(C) 5 uacant RBP^c; uocant P* 10 acciperet
RP: acciperet B 11 glossa in hoc gregorius et maximus et ambrosius consen-
tiunt B(C)P 12 quattuor BP: quatuor R 15 quattuor BP: quatuor R
17 in ante sensibilem erasum in B assumpsisse RB: asumpsisse P 19 enim
s.l. B 20 assotians B: associans RP cognata RB^cP: cognita B* 23 obtinent

us He has body and sense and soul and intellect, to which parts, as
it were, associating in each case the extreme which in every respect
is cognate to each, He recapitulated in the way already described (172) 13
all things divinely into Himself.' [Consider carefully the force of the
words; for they are not without power. 'Since', he says, 'like us He',
that is, Christ, 'has body and sense and soul and intellect.' For human
nature is constituted of these as of four parts, and Christ, as true
Man, took them upon Himself and unified them in Himself. For He
was made perfect Man. For He left nothing of man, except sin, that He
would not receive into the unity of His Substance and would not unify,
that is, would not make one, in Himself. For in Him after His resur-
rection body and sense, soul and intellect are not four but one, and not
a composite one, but simply (173) one, 'to which parts', he says, 'as it
were, associating in each case the extreme which in every respect is
cognate to each', as though he were to say explicitly: Since Christ
received the four parts of human nature and unified (them) in Him-
self, it is clear that He took upon Himself and unified in Himself the
universal creature, that is, the intelligible and the sensible. For in
man, which He received whole, the universal creature is created; for
to each part, as he says, 'associating the extreme which is cognate',
calling bodies and all visible things cognate extremes. For these oc-
cupy the lowest extremity of the universal creature, and are cognate
to one another, while the other (and) highest extreme is occupied by
the intellectual essences, which are similarly cognate to one another
(174).

Therefore, for each part of human nature the cognate extremes,
that is, natures of the same nature, are associated with Christ. For in
receiving the body (which is), as it were, the fourth part of man, He
attached to Himself the whole corporeal creature, while in assuming
sense He combined with Himself the whole sensible and sense-
employing creature. What is to be said of soul? Did He not in (the
soul) which He received associate in Himself not only the rational
soul but also all nutritive and auctive life? (175). Concerning intellect
none of the wise is in doubt. For to the human intellect which Christ
assumed all the intellectual essences adhere. Do you not clearly see
that the whole creation, I mean the intelligible and the sensible and
the intermediate natures, is unified in Christ? And this is briefly stated
by the Master in his conclusion:] 'Showing (176) that the whole crea-
ture together (177) exists as a unity, like a man (178), fulfilled by the
coming together of its parts to one another and looking towards (179)

s.l. B intellectuales RP: intelectuales B 26 sociata B: sociata RP 31 nutritiuam
R^cBP: nutritiuam R* auctiuam R: actiuam BP assotiauit B: associauit RP
33 inseparabiliter: -bi- s.l. B 34 Nonne plane uides RBP^c: nonne uides
plane P* 35 naturas B s.l., P: nataturas R

'ostendens et ad se ipsam intuentem per uniuersitatis subsistentiam
'iuxta unam et simplam et indiffinibilem ex eo quod non est deduc-
'tionis et indifferentem notitiam per quam unam eandemque *omnis*
'*creatura recipere potest causam penitus indiscretam.*'

Hactenus de diuisionibus deque adunationibus substantiarum
uenerabilem magistrum, Maximum dico, secuti quantum ad praesen-
tis quaestionis attinet negotium diximus et iam ad propositum, id est
ad eam formam uniuersalis naturae quae et creatur et creat et in
primordialibus causis constituta est discutiendam—de hac enim in
hoc libro dicere proposuimus—, si tibi uidetur redeundum.

A. Videretur plane si de quibusdam quae in praedictis rationibus
dicta sunt, quoniam multum me mouent, clarius explanares.

N. Dic mihi quae sunt illa quae inter ea quae a me dicta sunt ualde
te mouent quorumque explanationem luculentiore[m] poscere uideris.

A. In diuisionibus creaturarum substantiarum secundum Maximum
nihil me mouet uel ualde mihi obscurum uidetur seu ambiguum prae-
ter hominis diuisionem in masculum et feminam eamque non ex prima
hominis conditione ad imaginem dei sed ex poena peccati processisse
iterumque post catholicam omnium corporum resurrectionem quae in
fine mundi futura est ipsam diuisionem non amplius permansuram
sed in unitatem primordialis conditionis naturae reuersuram. Quis
enim talia audiens non expauescat confestimque in haec uerba non
erumpat dicturus: non ergo post resurrectionem masculi feminae-
[que] *futurus est sexus* si uterque ab humana penitus auferetur natura?
Aut qualis forma in homine apparebit si nemo masculi seu feminae
formam habuerit? Aut qualis poterit fieri cognitio si utriusque sexus
futura sit exterminatio inque simplicem indiscretamque *formarum*
differentiis adunationem omnium hominum coagulatio siue spiritualis
incorporea siue uisibilis et corporea loco ac tempore circumscrip-
ta? Et hoc in ambiguo a te praetermissum est [atque indiscussum],
quamuis uidearis in corporibus resurrectionis spirituales qualitates
quantitatesque magis quam corporales suadere esse futuras, ut non
dicam quantum haec doctrina omnium aut paene omnium latiaris
linguae sanctorum magistrorum auctoritati resistat, qui unanimiter
post resurrectionem omnium utriusque sexus integritatem futuram
esse asserunt ita ut uir in formam uiri, femina in formam feminae cum

2 indiffinibilem: -bi- s.l. B 3-4 omnis-indiscretam in ras. R(C) 4 penitus
RB: poenitus P 8 uniuersalis RB^cP: uniuersales B* 9 hac RB^cP:
haec B 10 hoc s.l. B redeundum RB^cP: redeundam B* 17 post masculum
erasum est eamque (?) in R 18 processisse BP: procesisse R 19 post
catholicam rasura in R 21 in s.l. P unitatem R^cBP: unitiatem R* condi-
tionis BP: condicionis R naturae RB: terrae P 22 confestimque RB^cP: con-
festim quae B* 23-24 masculi-uterque R^cBP: masculus et femina futuri sunt si
uterque sexus R* 24 sexus om. P ab RB^cP: ad B* penitus RB: poenitus
P auferetur B^c(C)P: auferatur RB* 27-28 formarum differentiis in ras. R(C)
28 post siue *erasum est est in R* 29 post incorporea *erasum est est in R*

itself through the totality of its subsistence in consequence of the
knowledge, one and simple and without specification (180) or differen-
tiation (181), of the descent from that which is not (182), through
which *the whole creature is able to receive* (183) one and the same cause
(184) *wholly undivided.*'

Up to this point we have been speaking about the divisions and
unifications of substances, following the venerable Master—I mean
Maximum—as far as is relevant to the present question, and now we
must, if you agree, return to the subject proposed, that is, to the dis-
cussion of that form of universal nature which both is created and
creates, and which is constituted in the primordial causes; for it was
about this that we proposed to speak in this book.

A. I should certainly agree if you would explain more clearly
certain things that were said in the foregoing exposition, for they
trouble me considerably.

N. Tell me what those things are which, among the things which
I have said, particularly trouble you, and of which you seem to require
a clearer explanation.

A. In the divisions of created substances according to Maximum
nothing troubles me or seems to me particularly obscure or doubtful
except the division of men into male and female, and (his opinion)
that this did not proceed from the first creation of man in the image
of God but from the punishment of his sin, and that again after the
general resurrection of all bodies which is to come at the end of the
world the division will no longer remain but will return into the unity
of the primordial creation of nature. For who is there who, hearing
such things, would not be horrified and at once break out in these
words: 'Then after the resurrection there will be no sexual division
of male [and] female if each is to be totally removed from human
nature? Or what form will appear in man if no one has either the
male or the female form? Or what sort of recognition will there be
if there is to be an extermination of both sexes and an amalgam of
all men, whether spiritual and incorporeal or visible and corporeal
(and) circumscribed by place and time, into a simple unification, not
divided *by difference of forms?*'—And this is something that has been
left undetermined by you [and not discussed] although you appear to
mean that in the bodies of the resurrection qualities and quantities
will be rather spiritual than corporeal—, to say nothing of how much
this doctrine conflicts with the authority of all or almost all the holy
masters of the Latin tongue, who unanimously declare that after the
resurrection of all things each sex will have its integrity, so that
man returns into the form of a man, woman into the form of a woman,

uisibilis RB: sensibilis P circumscrip- ta RB^c: circumscrip- ta B*P 30 -um est
in ras. R(C) 32 esse s.l. B 33 paene B: pene R: poene P

omnibus corporalium partium indiciiis quibus maxime uterque sexus discernitur redeat ac sic siue in gloria siue in poena aeternaliter permaneat [— si tamen aeterna poena <corporaliter> futura sit sicut aeterna gloria, *de qua quaestione in quinto tractabimus*. Multis enim uidetur incongruum coaeternam beatitudini miseriam fore credere, quibus euangelicus sermo uidetur resistere qui ait: 'Ite maledicti in ignem aeternum'].

Haec ut dixi in praedictis substantiarum factarum a deo diuisionibus maxime mihi scrupulum iggerunt. De reditu autem et adunatione quicquid iam a te dictum est durum mihi atque obscurum universaliter esse fateor. Non enim clare uideo quomodo utriusque sexus humanae naturae adunatio in Christo primum ex mortuis resurgente facta est et in omnibus hominibus finito mundo futura sit [—in eodem enim sexu quo in carne uixit Christum credimus resurrexisse semperque permanere et permansurum esse. Quis autem negabit uirilem sexum ipsum fuisse indutum prius quam pateretur et resurgeret? Similiter etiam credimus omnes homines in eodem sexu in quo cadunt resurrecturos esse—], quomodo orbis terrarum paradiso, terra[que] unita caelo, omnis sensibilis creatura intelligibili, et haec omnia deo cupulabuntur ita ut unum [sint nullaque in eis diuersitas appareat], et maxime illud quod promisisti a te explanandum, hoc est quomodo omnium substantiarum praedictarum reditus in unum atque adunatio futura sit, utrum re ipsa, hoc est transitu omnium sensibilibus in intellectualia ita ut peracto mundi huius sensibilis curriculo omnia sint spiritualia nihilque corporeum seu sensibile remaneat, an solo contuitu animi naturalem unitatem omnium rerum in suis rationibus primordialibusque causis contemplantis. Ea namque quae extrinsecus corporeo sensui uaria multipliciaque locis temporibus qualitibus quantitibus caeterisque sensibilis naturae differentiis apparent in suis rationibus secundum quas a creatore omnium condita sunt aeternaliterque [im]mutabili suae naturae statu certisque diuinae prouidentiae regulis subsistunt puro intellectui rerum omnium ueritatem inquirenti inuenienti consideranti unum indiuiduum esse uidentur et sunt. Nam quantum exteriores naturae, sensibiles dico atque corporeas, locis temporibusque caeterisque accidentibus uariari appetunt—in his enim eorum pulchritudo maxime arridet ideoque

6-7 Matth. xxv. 41

3 permaneat R^cBP: maneat R* 4 de qua-tractabimus B^c(C)P (tractabimus P: tratabimus B^c): sed de hac quaestione alius disserendi locus est RB* 5 beatitudini RB^cP: beatitudinis B* miseriam R^cB^cP: miseriae R*: miseria B* fore s.l. B 9 iggerunt codd.: intellege ingerunt (uide p. 58, 27 infra) 10 a te RB: ante P 13-14 in (2)-quo B^c(C)P: in eadem enim forma qua RB* 14 enim s.l. B 15 negabit BP: negarit R 16 sexum B^c(C)P: formam RB* indutum RB: induturum P 17 eodem sexu in quo B^c(C)P: eadem forma in qua RB* 20 cupulabuntur B^c: cupulantur B*: copulabuntur RP in ipso post ita ut addidit

with all the marks of their bodily parts by which each sex is particularly distinguished; and so eternally remains, whether in glory or in punishment [—if, that is, the punishment will be <corporeally> eternal as the glory is eternal, a question which we will discuss in the fifth book (185)]. For many think it unseemly to believe that suffering should be co-eternal with blessedness, although the words of the Gospel which says, 'Depart, ye accursed, into everlasting fire (186)', seem to be against them].

These things especially, as I have said, among the aforesaid divisions of the substances made by God, bring doubt upon me. But I confess that concerning the return and unification whatever has been said by you is in all respects difficult and obscure for me. For I do not clearly see how the unification of both sexes of human nature came about in Christ when He first rose from the dead, or how it will come about in all men at the end of the world[—for we believe that Christ rose again in the same sex in which He lived in the flesh, and that He remains in it eternally and will so remain; for who will deny that He was of the male sex before He suffered and rose again? Similarly we also believe that all men will rise again in the same sex in which they fall—]; how the habitable globe will be united with paradise; [and] earth with heaven; the whole sensible creature with the intelligible; and all these will be joined together with God so that they [may be] one [and no diversity appear in them]; and especially that which you promised (187) would be explained by you, that is, how the return of all the aforesaid substances into the One and (their) unification are to come to pass, whether in the thing itself, that is to say, by the passage of all sensible things into intelligible things, so that when this sensible world has run its course all things may be of a spiritual nature and nothing corporeal or sensible remain; or whether it is only in the concept of the mind which contemplates the natural unity of all things in their reasons and primordial causes. For things which from the outside appear to the corporeal sense to be various and manifold in places, times, qualities, quantities and the other differences of sensible nature, in their reasons, according to which they were created by the Creator of all things and eternally subsist in the immutable condition of their nature and by certain rules of the Divine Providence, are seen by the pure intellect which inquires into the truth of all things, which finds out (all things) and which considers (all things) to be an indivisible unity, and are so. For to the extent that exterior natures, I mean sensible and corporeal, tend to be varied by times and places and the other accidents—because it is in

in marg. C in R, erasum in B sunt (?) post unum erasum in R 25 nihilque BP: nilque R 26 animi RBP^c: in anima P* 27 namque BP: nanque R 32 regulis in ras. R(C) 33 inquirenti R^cBP: inquerenti R*

a carnalibus animis [longe a ueritate et unitate distantibus inque temporalium rerum numerositatem diffusis] intemperate luxurioseque amantur—tantum interiores, hoc est intelligibiles essentiae, simplicem sui indiuiduamque unitatem in se ipsis et inter se ipsas inseparabiliter ostendunt ac per hoc sapientum animos pulchritudinem armoniae societatisque earum contemplantes delectant, [quibus ex instabili diuersaque locorum ac temporum uarietate redeuntibus solius unitae immotabilisque ueritatis contemplatio praemium promittitur.] Non enim caelestes uirtutes quas uariis nominationibus scriptura sacra nominat hunc mundum uisibilem extrinsecus corporeisque sensibus intueri credendas esse aestimo. Nec tamen eum ignorare omnino est putandum quando per eas regi ac ministrari [haec omnia uisibilia] sancta edocet historia [—leges siquidem diuinae per angelos administratae sunt, bonorum hominum mores correcti ordinati a prauis uisus reducti multiplicibus diuinae prouidentiae doctrinis exercitati ad pristinum naturae modum reuocantur—]; sed in aeternis causis quas ipsae aeternaliter considerant hunc mundum quem gubernant <quantum eis sinitur> perspiciunt, non locorum spatiis diuisum, non uariis temporum motibus distinctum, non numerositate partium suarum dispersum, non qualitatum quantitatumue multiplicibus differentiis dissimilem, non molis magnitudine tumidum, non diuersis longitudinis altitudinisque latitudinisque spatiis distentum, sed totum simul simpliciterque in suis rationibus immutabiliter subsistentem.

De his igitur obscuris quaestionibus quae per me ipsum ad liquidum intueri nequeo luculentius a te disserendum esse aestimarim. Tuo tamen arbitrio quo ordine aperienda sunt, tantum ut aperiuntur siue nunc siue postea, mihi uisum est tribuere.

N. De his omnibus quae tibi ut dicis non clare patescunt alium disserendi locum ordo rerum expetit <—sed hic breuiter praelibandum quoniam haec omnia quae difficilia tibi uidentur uno argumento possunt concludi. Si enim Christus qui omnia intelligit, immo est omnium intellectus, re ipsa omnia quae assumpsit adunauit, quis dubitat quod praecessit in capite et principali exemplo totius humanae naturae in tota fore subsecuturum, sicut in quinto libro tractabimus—?> siquidem huius praesentis libri textus nil aliud flagitat quam ut pro uiribus nostris quicquid lux animorum largita fuerit de primordialibus causis disputemus.

1 longe BP: longue R 2 luxurioseque BP: luxurioseque R 4 indiuiduamque RB^cP: inuidiamque B* 6 societatisque RB^cP: societatesque B* 7 unitae RB: unitate P 8 immotabilisque RB: immutabilisque P promittitur BP: promittatur R 13–16 leges—reuocantur in ras. in marg. R 15 prouidentiae BP: prorouidentiae R 16 ipsae RB: ipse P 21 non (2) s.l. R 22 altitudinesque RB: altitudinis P 25 intueri: -eri in ras. R nequeo R^cP: neq. o B: ne- in ras. R disserendum RB: discernendum P esse s.l. B aestimarim RB^cP: aestimari B* 29 disserendi R^cBP: deserendi R* 34 tota RB^cP: toto B*

these that their beauty is chiefly displayed and therefore by carnal minds [far removed from truth and unity and dissipated in the multiplicity of temporal things] they are intemperately and lustfully loved—, to the same extent interior natures, that is, the intelligible essences, inseparably show their simple and indivisible unity within themselves and among themselves, and therefore delight the minds of the wise which contemplate the beauty of their harmony and fellowship [and to these when they return from the unstable and diverse variability of places and times the contemplation of the sole unified and unchangeable truth is promised as a reward].

For I do not think it is to be believed that the celestial powers, which Holy Scripture calls by various names (188), look upon this world from without or with corporeal senses. Nor, however, is it to be supposed that they are altogether ignorant of it, for the sacred history teaches that [all these visible things] are governed and administered through them [for through the angels the divine laws are executed, the behaviour of good men is corrected, ordered, brought back from wicked ways, trained in the manifold doctrines of Divine Providence, and called back to the original mode of their nature (189)—]; but (190) they behold this world which they rule <in so far as is permitted them> in the eternal causes which they themselves eternally contemplate, not divided by intervals of places, not distinguished by different motions of times, not dispersed in the multiplicity of its parts, not (as) dissimilar by (reason of) the manifold differences of qualities and quantities, not (as) swollen by the size of its bulk, not extended by differing spaces of length and depth and breadth, but (as) immutably subsisting all together and not compositely (191) in its reasons.

Therefore I would consider that these difficult questions (192), which by myself I cannot clearly discern, should be more clearly discussed by you. But I think it best to leave to your judgement in what order they should be broached, provided that broached they are, whether now or later.

N. The (natural) order of things demands that all these matters which you say are not clearly apparent to you should be discussed elsewhere <although a few words may be said here in anticipation, for all these (questions) which seem difficult to you can be summed up by a single argument. For if Christ Who understands all things, (Who) indeed is the understanding of all things, really unified all that He assumed, who doubts but that what first took place in the Head and principal Exemplar of the whole of human nature will eventually happen in the whole, as we shall consider in the fifth book (193)?>. For the text of this present book (194) makes no further demand than that to the best of our ability we discuss whatever the Light of Minds (195) shall have granted (us) concerning the primordial causes.

A. Ingredere quo uis ordine. Eo enim modo quo praesentes quaestiones de quadripartita *uniuersalis* naturae diuisione propositae sunt non incongrue explanandas esse opinor.

N. Ratiocinationis exordium ex diuinis eloquiis assumendum esse aestimo.

A. Nil conuenientius. Ex ea enim omnem ueritatis inquisitionem initium sumere necessarium est.

N. Diuinissimus propheta, Moysea dico, in prima fronte libri geneseos, 'In principio,' inquit, 'fecit deus caelum et terram.' Quo in loco omnes sanctae scripturae expositores ingenii sui acumen exercuerunt diuersisque intelligentiae modis quid caeli nomine quid terrae propheta, immo etiam sanctus spiritus per prophetam, uoluit significari exposuerunt. Alii siquidem breuem quandam comprehensionem totius [perfectae] creaturae his uerbis insinuari aestimant, caeli quidem nomine totam spiritualem intellectualemque creaturam conditam [atque formatam], terrae uero omnem corpoream sensibilemque suis perfectissimis diffinitionibus constitutam intimari arbitrantur. Alii infortitatem utriusque creaturae, spiritualis quidem nomine caeli, terrae uero appellatione mundi huius corporalis, *inchoationem* suadere conantur. Alii totius sensibilis creaturae, quae ueluti duabus principalibus partibus, caelo dico ac terra, perficitur, creationem his uerbis indicari affirmant ita ut nihil de spiritualis creaturae conditione hoc in loco significetur sed solummodo plenitudinem corporeae creaturae propheta uoluit describere. Inter has enim duas partes, caelum dico et terram, ueluti inter quosdam extremos terminos a se inuicem discretos suis medietatibus connexos huius mundi sensibilis uniuersitatem armonia quadam naturali compositam coadunatamque esse certis rationibus edocent.

Sed longum est et praesentis operis proposito inconueniens per diuersas diuersorum opiniones multas ac uarias sermonem extendere [superfluumque uidebitur aliorum intellectus de huius modi negotio nisi ubi summa necessitas exigit introducere]. Mihi autem multorum sensus consideranti nil probabilius nil uerisimilius occurrit quam ut in praedictis sanctae scripturae uerbis, significatione uidelicet caeli et terrae, primordiales totius creaturae causas quas pater in unigenito suo filio qui principii appellatione nominatur ante omnia quae condita sunt creauerat intelligamus *et* caeli nomine rerum intelligibilium

9 Gen. i. 1 17-20 Alii-conantur: cf. Aug., *De gen. ad litt.* i, PL xxxiv. 247-9

2 uniuersalis *in ras.* R 4 assumendum RB^cP: sumendum B* 6 lemma hic incipit exponere exameron Rm 7 necessarium BP: necessarium R 8 Moysea RB: moyse P 10 loco: -co *s.l.* B 14-15 quidem RB: siquidem P 15 post creaturam *erasum est* perfectam *in R* 18 infortitatem R^cBP: infirmitatem R* creaturae R^cBP: creatura R* 19 inchoationem: -choationem *in ras.* R 21-22 his uerbis indicari B^cP: haec uerba indicare RB* 26 connexos B^cP: conexos RB* 31 huius B^cP: eius RB*

A. Proceed in what order you wish. For I think it is not inappropriate that the present questions about the quadripartite division of universal nature should be expounded in the same order in which they were set out.

N. I consider that we should take the beginning of our reasoning from the Divine Oracles.

A. Nothing (would be) more proper. For it is necessary that from them (196) every inquiry into truth should take its beginning.

N. The most divine prophet, I mean Moses, at the very beginning of the book of Genesis says: 'In the beginning God made heaven and earth.' On this passage all the commentators of Holy Scripture have exercised the keenness of their genius and have given various meanings to what the prophet, or rather the Holy Spirit through the prophet, wished to be signified by the name 'heaven', and what by 'earth'. Some consider a compendious expression comprehending the whole [perfected] creature to be meant by these words (and) think that by the name of heaven the creation [and formation] of the whole spiritual and intelligible creature is intended, and (by the name) of earth the constitution of the whole corporeal and sensible creature by its most perfect definitions (197). Others try to teach (that what is signified is) the formlessness (198) of each creature, the inception of the spiritual by the name of heaven, and that of this corporeal world by the appellation of earth (199). Others affirm that by these words is indicated the creation of the whole sensible creature, which is made up, as it were, of two principal parts, I mean heaven and earth, so that nothing about the creation of the spiritual creature is signified in this passage, but the prophet wished to describe the plenitude of the corporeal creature only (200). For by sure reasons they teach that between these two parts (201), heaven I mean and earth, as though between certain extreme limits distinct from one another (but) linked by their intermediaries, the universe of this sensible world by a certain natural harmony is composed and made into one.

But it would be tedious and irrelevant to the subject of the present work to prolong the discourse with the many and diverse opinions of divers (authorities) [and it will seem superfluous to introduce the views of others on this kind of problem except where the utmost necessity requires (it)]. But as for myself, when I consider the interpretations of the many commentators (202), I think none is more acceptable, nothing more likely to be true, than that in the aforementioned words of Holy Scripture, that is, by the choice of the terms 'heaven' and 'earth', we should understand the primordial causes of the whole creature, which the Father had created in His only begotten Son, Who is given the name of 'Beginning', before all things which have been created, *and* that we should accept that under the name of

caelestiumque essentiarum, terrae uero appellatione sensibilibus rerum quibus uniuersitas huius mundi corporalis completur principales causas significatas esse accipiamus.

A. Similiter etiam hunc intellectum prae caeteris elegerim si me paululum non moueret illa ambiguitas quae in praedictis intelligentiae discretionibus uidetur oriri. Nam, ut mihi uidetur, aut parua aut nulla differentia est inter eorum intellectum qui dicunt informitatem utriusque naturae, intelligibilis dico atque sensibilis, et eorum qui primordiales causas intelligibilium et sensibilibus praedictis scripturae uerbis descriptas esse iudicant. [Nam informem materiem eiusque informitatem causam [quandam]² rerum esse dicimus. In ea siquidem inchoant quamuis informiter, id est adhuc imperfecte, ac prope nihil esse, non tamen penitus nihil esse intelliguntur sed inchoamentum quodam modo esse formamque et perfectionem appetere.]

de differentia
causae et
informis
materiae
N. Esto igitur intentior et rerum differentias acute perspice nebulasque ambiguitatis ex acie intentionis tuae penitus depelle. Non enim, ut arbitror, te potest latere alias esse rerum informitates et alias rerum causas [perfectaque principia]. Nam si esse et non esse sibi inuicem e contrario opponuntur et nil propinquius est ad uere esse quam causae creatae creatarum rerum nihilque uicinius ad non uere esse quam informis materia—est enim, ut ait Augustinus, informe prope nihil—, num tibi uidetur parua distantia inter id quod uerae essentiae est propinquum et id quod uerae essentiae priuationi quae nihil [omnino] dicitur proximum? [Nec rerum informitatem causam essentiae formaeque ac perfectionis rerum esse diximus sed magis priuationem essentiae formae perfectionisque rerum. Causa siquidem si uere causa est omnia perfectissime quorum causa est in se ipsa praecambit effectusque suos priusquam in aliquo appareant in se ipsa perficit et dum in genera formasque uisibiles per generationem erumpunt perfectionem suam in ea non deserunt sed plene et immutabiliter permanent nulliusque alterius perfectionis indigent nisi ipsius <unius> in qua semel et simul et semper subsistunt.]

A. Non parua quidem uidetur mihi esse talis differentia. Longe siquidem a se ipsis distant primordiales causae quae ab uno summoque omnium principio quod a nullo est perfectissime in suis immutabilibus rationibus conditae sunt et informitates omnium rerum

21 Aug., Conf. xii. 6–p. 269, 1 Knöll

4 etiam R^c(C)BP: et ego R* si me RB^c: sine B*P 8 intelligibilis R*BP: intelligibiles R^c sensibilis R*BP: sensibiles R^c 8–18 intelligibilis–principia fortasse totum a C scriptum in R 13 penitus RB: poenitus P 15 lemma BPRm 16 ambiguitatis R^cBP: ambiguitates R* ex in ras. R 20 nihilque BP: nilque R 22 uere BP: uerae R 25 formaeque: –que in ras. B

heaven the principal causes of the intelligible and celestial essences have been signified, and under the appellation of earth those of the sensible things by which the universe of this corporeal world is made up (203).

A. I too would prefer this interpretation to the others if I were not slightly troubled by that uncertainty which seems to arise in the aforesaid differences of interpretation. For, as it seems to me, there is little or no difference between the interpretation of those who consider that these words of Scripture describe the formlessness (204) of both natures, I mean the intelligible and the sensible, and those who consider that they describe the primordial causes of the intelligibles and the sensibles. [For we say that formless matter and its formlessness are a [kind of]² cause of things. For in it they have their beginning, although formlessly, that is to say, imperfectly as yet, and are understood to be almost nothing, yet not to be entirely nothing, but to be in some fashion a beginning and to seek form and perfection (205).]

N. Be more attentive then, and examine acutely the differences of things, and dispel the clouds of ambiguity wholly by the keenness of your attention. For you cannot, as I think, be unaware that the formlessness of things is not the same as the causes [and perfect principles] of things. For if being and not-being are the direct opposites of each other, and nothing is closer to true being than the created causes of created things and nothing closer to true not-being than formless matter—for, as Augustine says, the formless is next to nothing—, does it seem to you that the difference is slight between that which is close to true essence and that which approximates to the privation of true essence which is called nothing [at all]? [And we did not say that the formlessness of things is the cause of the essence and form and perfection of things but rather that it is the privation of the essence, form, and perfection of things. For the cause, if it be truly cause, most perfectly pre-encompasses in itself all things of which it is the cause, and perfects in itself its effects before they become manifest in anything, and when they break forth through generation into genera and visible species they do not abandon their perfection in it but fully and immutably abide (in it), and need no other perfection than it <alone> in which they subsist all at once and eternally.]

A. Such a difference (206) does not seem to me slight at all. For the primordial causes which have been most perfectly created in their immutable reasons by the One and Supreme Principle (207) of all things which itself derives from nothing are far removed from the formlessness of all things which not only do not yet arrive at the

26 post perfectionis rasura in B
32 post semel om. et P

28 praecambit RB^cP: perambit B*

Concerning
the differ-
ence be-
tween cause
and formless
matter

quae non solum ad perfectionem formae nondum perueniunt sed uix
iam esse incipiunt nec longe ex non esse recedunt. Quamuis enim
uideantur rerum informitates medietatis locum obtinere inter esse et
non esse, incipientes ex non esse esse—siquidem ex non esse proces-
sionem quandam ad esse inchoant, nondum tamen ad perfectionem
formae atque essentiae intelliguntur peruenisse—, plus adpropinquare
iudicantur ad non esse quam ad esse. Nil enim est aliud rerum in-
formitas nisi motus quidam non esse omnino deserens et statum suum
in eo quod uere est appetens; primordiales uero causae ita in prin-
cipio, hoc est dei uerbo quod uere dicitur esse et est, conditae sunt ut
nullo motu perfectionem suam in aliquo appetant nisi in eo in quo
sunt immutabiliter perfecteque formatae sunt. Semper enim ad unam
rerum omnium formam quam omnia appetunt, uerbum patris dico,
conuersae formantur et formationem suam nusquam numquam de-
serunt causae quippe locorum et temporum in eis sunt, quae uero sub
ipsis sunt in inferioribus rerum ordinibus ita ab eis creantur ut ad se
ipsas ea attrahant omniumque rerum unum principium appetant,
ipsae uero nullo modo ad ea quae sub eis sunt respiciunt sed suam
formam superiorem se semper intuentur ut semper ab ea formari non
desinant. Nam per se ipsas informes sunt et in ea uniuersali sua forma,
in uerbo dico, semet ipsas perfecte conditas cognoscunt.

Quis autem recte intelligentium haec quae de primordialibus
causis dici possunt de informitate rerum dicere audebit, praesertim
cum et informis rerum materia non aliunde credatur manare nisi ex
primordialibus causis? Si enim primordiales causae ideo primordiales
appellantur quia primitus ab una creatrice omnium causa creantur et
ea quae sub ipsis sunt creant—nam primordiales causas et creati et
creare praediximus—, quid mirum si quemadmodum in numero
eorum quae post et per primordiales causas condita sunt informem
materiem esse credimus certisque rationibus firmamus, eam quoque
a primordialibus causis creati fateamur?

N. Alius igitur intellectus est primordialium causarum alius in-
formium materialium?

A. Praedictis rationibus ita concedere cogimur. [Caetera con-
sidera.]

N. Similiter et quod sequitur uarie tradunt: 'Terra autem erat
'inanis et uacua'—uel iuxta LXX 'inuisibilis et incomposita'—'et

27-28 *Lib. i, 1, p. 38, 4* 36-37 *Gen. i. 2*

4 incipientes: entes *in ras.* R 4-5 processionem R^cBP: procesionem R* 6 *post*
plus *erasum est* tamen *in* R adpropinquare BP: appropinquare R 14 num-
quam RB: nunquam P 16 *ut s.l.* R 17 attrahant BP: trahant R*: ad-
trahant R^c 18 *ipsae uero* B^c(C)P: et RB* 21 perfecte RB^cP: perfectae
B* 22 recte intelligentium R: rectae intelligentiae B*P: rectae intelligentium
B^c 24 manare RB: manere P 26 quia RB^cP: qua B* causa *s.l.* B
29 *per om.* P 37 iuxta RB: iux P

perfection of their form but are scarcely yet beginning to be and
hardly yet emerging from not-being. For although the formless-
nesses of things seem to occupy an intermediate position between
being and not-being, beginning out of not-being to be (208)—for
they set out upon a kind of progress out of not-being towards being,
but are understood not yet to have attained the perfection of their
form and their essence—, they are considered to be nearer to not-
being than to being. For the formlessness of things is nothing else
but a certain motion which is departing from absolute not-being and
seeking its rest in that which truly is (209); the primordial causes, on
the other hand, are so created in 'the Beginning', that is, in the Word
of God which is truly said to be and is, that they do not by any motion
seek their perfection in anything but that in which they immutably
are, and (in which they) are perfectly formed. For in being ever turned
towards the one Form of all things, which all things seek, I mean the
Word of the Father, they are formed, and never anywhere depart from
their formation (210) for the causes of places and times are in them (211);
but the things which are below them are so created by them in the
lower orders of things that (the causes) may draw them to themselves
and (that they) may seek the one Principle of all things, *but they them-*
selves by no means look towards the things that are below them, but
eternally contemplate their Form which is above them, so that they
do not cease to be eternally formed by it. For in themselves they are
formless, and know that they themselves are perfectly created in their
universal Form, I mean the Word (212).

But which of those who have a right understanding will dare to say
of the formlessness of things what can thus be said of the primordial
causes?—especially as the unformed matter of things also is believed
to flow from no other source than the primordial causes. For if the
primordial causes are called primordial precisely because they are first
created by the one creative Cause of all things, and (themselves)
create the things that are below them—for we have already said that
the primordial causes both are created and create—, what wonder if,
as we believe and confirm with sure reasons that unformed matter is
in the number of those things which are created after and through the
primordial causes, we admit that this too is created by the primordial
causes? (213).

N. So primordial causes mean one thing, and unformed matters
another?

A. This we are compelled to concede for the reasons already given.
[Proceed to the consideration of what follows.]

N. Similarly they also translate in various ways what follows:
'But the earth was waste and void',—or, according to the Septuagint:
'invisible and non-composite (214),—'and darkness (was) over the

diuersae
opiniones de
terra inani
et abyssio
tenebrosa

‘tenebrae super faciem abyssi.’ Alii namque terrae inanis ac uacuae
seu inuisibilis et incompositae nominatione uisibilis creaturae, abyssi
uero tenebrosae uocabulo inuisibilis essentiae informitatem figurate
significari uolunt. Omnis siquidem corporalis sensibilisque creatura
ex materia et forma constituitur atque ideo materia carens forma
informis dicitur, hoc est carens forma, et inuisibilis et incomposita
seu inanis et uacua, accidente uero forma uisibilis dicitur et composita
solidaque atque perfecta naturae suae certis finibus circumscripta;
inuisibilis uero creatura, id est intellectualis et rationalis, informis
dicitur priusquam ad formam suam, creatorem uidelicet suum, con-
uertatur. Non enim ei sufficit ad perfectionem [ex] essentia essen-
tialique differentia subsistere—his enim duobus omnis intellectualis
creatura componitur—nisi ad uerbum unigenitum, dei filium dico
qui est forma omnis intellectualis uitae, conuersa perficiatur. Aliter
enim imperfecta informisque remanet. Alii terram inanem uacuam-
que seu inuisibilem incompositamque dictam esse arbitrantur molem
hanc terreni corporis primo conditam uacuam quidem atque inanem,
ut illis uidetur, quia nondum diuersis generibus formisque germinum
fruticum animaliumque ornata erat, inuisibilis uero aut quia humidae
naturae abundantia undique superfusa erat aut quia homo qui eam
aspicere posset nondum ex primordialibus causis per generationem
eruperat [tenebras autem super abyssum fuisse aiunt quia aer qui
abyssio undique circumfusus fuerat adhuc lucidus non erat ideoque
constitutam intra se abyssum nondum illuminare poterat], cui sensui
quamuis sanctus Augustinus refragari uideatur non omnino tamen,
quoniam sancti Basilii est, a nobis refellitur. Non enim nostrum est
de intellectibus sanctorum patrum diiudicare sed eos pie ac uenerabiliter
suscipere. Non tamen prohibemur eligere quod magis uidetur
diuinis eloquiis rationis consideratione conuenire. Sed si quis dixerit
praedicta prophetae uerba non aliud quam primordiales rerum
causas innuere non uidebitur ex ueritate deuiare. Quid enim? Num
incredibile est ΠΠΟΤΟΥΤΥΠΙΟΝ, hoc est principale exemplar, corporalis
naturae quod significatur terrae *nomine* quodque ante hunc mundum
sensibilem perpetuo perfectissimeque deus in principio, hoc est pater
in filio, considerat uacuum atque inane posse uocari, uacuum quidem
quoniam omni sensibili in suis effectibus uacabat priusquam in genera

25 sanctus Augustinus: *De gen. ad litt.* i. 15, 29
PG xxix. 29AB

26 sancti Basilii: *Hex.* ii. i,

1 namque BP: nanque R ac RB^c: et B*P 2 lemma BPRm (de ante diuer-
sae P abyssio B: abyso P: abisso Rm) 6 incomposita: in- s.l. R 14 qui est
RB^cP: quem B* 14-15 Aliter enim RB: alioquin P 15 post Alii *rasura in* R
16 esse om. P 17 quidem RB^cP: quedam B* 19-20 humidae naturae abun-
dantia R^cBP: humide naturae et abundantiae R* 22 abyssum BP: abysum R
23 abyssio BP: abyso R 24 abyssum BP: abysum R post nondum *erasum*
est po in R 25 omnino tamen R^cBP: omni nota iam R* 27 pie RB^cP: pie

face of the abyss.’ For some think that by the phrase ‘earth waste and
void’ or ‘invisible and non-composite’ is figuratively signified the
formlessness of the visible creature, and by the word(s) ‘dark abyss’
that of the invisible essence. For every corporeal and sensible creature
is composed of matter and form (215), and therefore matter, lacking
form, is called formless, which means lacking form, and invisible and
non-composite, or waste and void, but when it receives form it is
said (to be) visible (216) and composite and solid and perfect, being
circumscribed within the certain limits of its proper nature; but the
invisible creature, that is, the intelligible and rational, is called form-
less before it turns towards its proper Form, that is to say, towards
its Creator (217). For to achieve perfection it is not enough for it
to have subsistence [from] essence and essential difference—for
every intellectual creature is composed of these two—, without the
perfection of being turned towards the only begotten Word, I mean
the Son of God, Who is the Form of all intelligible life. For otherwise
it remains imperfect and without form.

Others think that the earth that is waste and void or invisible and
without composition refers to this hulk of the earthly body (as it was)
first created, waste and void, as they think, because it was not yet
decked out with the divers genera and species of buds, fruits, and
animals (218), invisible either because it was everywhere covered with
an abundance of the moist nature or because man who would have
the ability of beholding it had not yet emerged through generation
from the primordial causes (219) [but they say that there was darkness
over the abyss because the air which enveloped the abyss on all sides
was not yet infused with light and therefore was not able to illuminate
the abyss (which was) established within it (220)]. And although
St. Augustine seems to oppose this interpretation, it is not altogether
rejected by us since it is that of St. Basil. For it is not for us to ad-
judicate between the interpretations of the Holy Fathers, but to
acknowledge them with piety and veneration. However, it is not for-
bidden us to select that which seems after rational consideration to
accord the better with the divine oracles. But if one should say that
these words of the prophet refer to nothing other than the primordial
causes he will not appear to deviate from the truth. For is it so in-
credible that the *πρωτότυπον*, that is, the principal exemplar, of
corporeal nature which is what is meant *by the name* of ‘earth’ and
which God in the Beginning, that is, the Father in the Son, had
eternally and most perfectly created before this sensible world should
be called void and waste?—void because it was void of every sensible
thing in its effects until it issued forth into the genera and species of

B* 30 lemma BPRm 33 nomine *in ras.* R 36 suis effectibus B:
suo effectu R: in suis effectibus P

Various
opinions
about the
void earth
and the dark
abyss

Concerning
the creation
of the prim-
ordial causes
of sensible
things

formasque sensibilis naturae per generationem locis temporibusque prodiret, inane uero quia nullam qualitatem nullam quantitatem nil corporali mole densum nil locis dispersum nil temporibus mobile adhuc in eo intellectus profeticus qui in diuina misteria est introductus 549B
 aspexerat? Haec enim uocabula, inane dico et uacuum, plus primordialis naturae ante omnia in uerbo conditae plenissimam immutabilemque significant perfectionem quam mutabilem imperfectamque huius mundi sensibilis informem adhuc processionem locis temporibusque dispersam perque generationem esse inchoantem diuersisque sensibilis creaturae numeris formari appetentem. 5

Saepe siquidem inane ac uacuum etiam in laudibus corporali-um rerum solent poni. Totum nanque spatium quod inter globum terrae chorosque siderum extremumque mundi ambitum in medio est constitutum in duas partes a sapientibus mundi diuinaeque scripturae diuisum. Inferior enim pars a terra usque ad lunam aer dicitur, hoc 549C
 est spiritus, superior uero [a luna usque ad sidera extremae sperae] 16
 aether, id est purus *spiritus*, <ambae autem> K<O>YΦOC a Grecis, uacuum seu inane a Latinis *uocantur*. Sed purissimum clarissimumque illud <superius spatium> constat semper esse. Serenissimum [nanque est aeternoque silentio quietum exceptis armonicis consonantiis planetarum, omnem mortalem terrenumque sensum tonorum hemitoniorumque acumine superans subtilissimique ignis motibus labens], diuturni luminis plenum praeter portiunculam quam umbra terrae obtinet [quae nox appellatur]; ideoque uacuum dicitur. Nec inmerito, quoniam omni terrena crassaque mole uacat nulloque 25
 corporeo pondere impletur. Planetarum etenim globi leuissimi et 549D
 spirituales sunt, nulla terrena *qualitate* grauantur, nullam obscuritatem efficiunt. Lunae siquidem umiditas sordesque quae in ea apparent non ex suae naturae puritate sed ex terrenae molis [uaporibus quos Greci ΑΤΜΙΔΑC uocant] umidaeque abyssi uicinitate accidunt. 550A
 Huius quoque corpulentioris aeris inferiorisque nebulositas et obscuritas non ex se ipso sed ex aquarum terrarumque propinquitate aduenit. [Vnde enim nascitur lunae umiditas inde etiam aeris nebulositas.] Tonitrua quoque fulmina-que imbres pluuiiae nix gelu uarii uentorum flatus non aliunde nisi ex terrenis aquaticisque uaporibus 35
 occasionem accipiunt.

24 quae nox appellatur: cf. Eriug., *Annot. in Marc.* 55, 6-7 Lutz

2 nullam qualitatem nullam quantitatem R^cB: nulla qualitas nulla quantitas R*: nullam quantitatem P 4 profeticus B: propheticus RP misteria B: mysteria RP 5 uacuum RB^cP: uacuum B* 5-6 primordialis R^cBP: primordiales R* 8 procesionem RB: processionem P 9 perque RB: per quae P 11 siquidem RB^cP: quidem B* 13-14 constitutum RP: constitutum B 14 in B^cP: inque RB* 15 lege <est> diuisum? usque om. P 16 spiritus in ras. R 18 uocantur B^cP: uocatur R^cB*: dicitur (?) R* Sed B^cP: quoniam RB* 18-19 clarissimumque BP: clarissimumque R 19 post Serenissimum *erasum est*

sensible nature in places and times; waste because the understanding of the prophet who was initiated into the Divine Mysteries had as yet beheld no quality, no quantity, nothing filled out by corporeal matter, nothing extended in place, nothing moving through time. For these words, I mean 'waste and void', signify rather the most complete and immutable perfection of the primordial nature (that was created before all things in the Word than the mutable and imperfect and as yet formless procession of this sensible world, extended in places and times, and coming into being through generation, and seeking to be formed in the divers individuals of the sensible creature.

For waste and void are often used even in praise of corporeal things. For the whole space which is set in the midst between the terrestrial globe and the choirs of the stars (221) and extreme circumference of the world is divided by those who are learned in (the nature of) the world and in divine Scripture into two parts (222). The lower part, from the earth to the moon, is called air, that is, spirit, the upper [from the moon to the stars of the outermost sphere] (is called) aether, that is, pure *spirit*; <but both> are called by the Greeks *κοῦφος*, 'void' or 'waste' by the Latins (223). But it is agreed that that <upper region> is ever the purest and brightest. [For it is] the most serene (224) [and rests in an eternal silence save for the harmonious symphonies of the planets and surpasses every mortal and earthly sense by the high pitch (224a) of its tones and semitones and gliding with the motions of the subtlest fire], flooded with everlasting light except for the little portion occupied by the earth's shadow [which is called night]; and this is why it is said to be void. And not unreasonably, for it is void of all earthly and gross mass and is filled by no corporeal heaviness. For the globes of the planets are of the utmost lightness and are spiritual; are weighed down by no earthly quality (and) cast no shadow. For the moisture of the moon and the grime which appears on her are not the product of the purity of her nature but of [the vapours of the earthly mass [which the Greeks call *ἀτμίδες*] and of the proximity of the moist abyss. Also the cloudiness and obscurity of this more corporeal air come not from itself but from the propinquity of waters and earths. [For where the humidity of the moon is born, there also (is born) the cloudiness of the air.] Again, thunders and lightnings, showers, rains, snow, ice (and) the various blasts of the winds take their origins from no other source but the vapours of earth and water.

atque R 20 nanque est om. P 22 hemitoniorumque RB: emitoniorumque P superans RB^cP: superantibus B* 23 est post diuturni *erasum* R 24 uacuum dicitur RB: dicitur uacuum P 25 crassaque BP: crasaque R 27 nulla terrena qualitate R^cB: nullo terreno ***** R*: nulla terreno qualitate P 28 umiditas BP: humiditas R post sordesque *erasum est ulla in* R 29 terrena molis R^cBP: terrena mole R* 30 umidaeque BP: umidaeque R: -i- s.l. B 33 umiditas BP: humiditas R 34 Tonitrua quoque RB: tonitruaque P fulmina-que: -que s.l. P

Quid ergo mirum si primordiales uisibilium rerum causae terrae inanis ac uacuae uocabulo figurate insinuentur prae nimia sui subtilitate ineffabilique intellectualis suae naturae simplicitate priusquam in genera ac formas sensibilesque numeros [in quibus ueluti quibusdam nebulis corporeis sensibus apparent] per generationem *profuerent* 550B
6
paene incorporalitate inania seu uacua non incongrue appellantur, sicut ait quidam poetarum:

Aera per uacuum saltu iaculabere corpus,
item Virgilius in XII: 10

Tum lapis ipse uiri uacuum per inane uolutus?

Eadem ratio est alterius interpretationis quae dicit terram inuisibilem incompositamque fuisse. Quid enim aliud rationabilius ista inuisibilitas mysticae terrae significaret quam primordialium causarum corporalis creaturae *obscuritatem* nullo coloris lumine nulla formarum discretione 15
adhuc declaratam, insuper etiam purissimos intellectus superantem? Merito *quoque* causae [primordiales] incompositae praedicantur. Sunt 550C
enim simplices omnique compositione omnino carentes. Nam in eis est ineffabilis unitas inseparabilisque incompositaque armonia uniuersaliter differentium seu similium partium copulationem supergrediens. 20
Quid dicam de causis principalibus intellectualis essentiae? Nonne congruentissime tenebrosae abyssi uocabulo a spiritu sancto appellatae sunt? Abyssus enim dicuntur propter earum incomprehensibilem altitudinem infinitamque sui per omnia diffusionem, quae nullo percipitur sensu nullo comprehenditur intellectu praeque ineffabili 25
suae puritatis excellentia tenebrarum nomine appellari meruerunt. Nam et sol iste sensibilis intuentibus eum saepe ingerit tenebras non ualentibus eximium sui intueri fulgorem. Tenebrae itaque erant super 550D
causarum primordialium abyssum. Nam priusquam in *spiritualium* essentiarum numerositatem procederent nullus intellectus conditus 30
cognoscere eas potuit quid essent et adhuc tenebrae sunt super hanc abyssum quia nullo percipitur intellectu, eo excepto qui eam in principio formauit. Ex effectibus autem, hoc est processionibus eius in intelligibiles formas, cognoscitur solummodo quia est, non autem intelligitur quid est. 35

de primord-
ialibus causis
intelligibil-
ium

quaestio de
causis

Sed utrum mystica illa terra inuisibilis ipsaque tenebrosa abyssus intellectualis primarum causarum erit perpetuo inuisibilis terra abyssusque tenebrosa aeternaliter permanebit an quando[que, hoc est post finem huius mundi uisibilis,] in notitiam intellectualium

9 uide adnotationem no. 225, p. 227

11 Virg., *Aen.* xii. 906

2 prae nimia RB: praemia P 4 formas RB^cP: formis B* 5-6 pro-
fluenter quando praedic in ras. R 9 A ante aera erasum in B 14 quam BP:
qua R 15 obscuritatem R^cBP: profunditatem R* 17 quoque in ras. R
21 lemma BRm 24 diffusionem R^cBP: difusionem R* 25 ineffabili RB^cP:

What wonder, then, if the primordial causes of visible things are 17
figuratively signified by the term 'waste and void earth' on account
of their excessive subtlety and the ineffable simplicity of their intel-
ligible nature before they *flowed forth* through generation into the
genera and species and sensible individuals [in which, as though in
corporeal clouds, they appear to the senses], *when the aforementioned*
regions of the visible world, because of their subtlety and all but
incorporeality, are not inappropriately called waste and void, as one
of the poets says: 'Thou shalt hurl thy body with a leap through the
void air,' (225) and Virgil in (his) twelfth (book): 'Then the man's stone
itself hurtling through the waste void'? The same reasoning (under-
lies) the other interpretation which says that the earth was invisible
and incomposite. For what else could that invisibility of the mystical
earth more reasonably signify than the *obscurity* of the primordial
causes of the corporeal creature not yet manifest by any light of
colour (or) distinction of forms (and) moreover surpassing even
the purest intellects? Rightly also are the primordial causes called
incomposite. For they are simple and entirely lacking in any composi-
tion. For there is in them the inexpressible unity and the indivisible
and incomposite harmony which go beyond every combination
of parts whatever, whether (these be) dissimilar or similar. What
shall I say of the primordial causes of the intelligible essence? Is
it not most appropriate that they should be called by the Holy Spirit
by the name of a dark abyss? For they are called 'abyss' on account
of their unfathomable depth and their infinite diffusion through all
things, which is perceived by no sense (and) comprehended by no
intellect; and they have earned the name of 'darkness' because of the
ineffable excellence of their purity. For even this sensible sun often
brings darkness upon those who look into it, since they are unable to
face its excessive brilliance. Thus there was darkness over the abyss
of the primordial causes. For before they entered into the plurality of
the *spiritual* essences no created intellect could know of them what
they were, and darkness is still over this abyss because it is perceived
by no intellect except that which formed it in the beginning. But
from its effects, that is, from its processions into intelligible forms it
is known only that it is, but not understood (as to) what it is. 18

Concerning
the prim-
ordial causes
of the
intelligibles

18
An inquiry
concerning
the causes

ineffabile B* 27 Nam RB: siquidem P ingerit RB: iggerit P (uide p. 44,
9 supra) 29 spiritualium B^cP: caelestium RB* 35 intelligitur RB^cP:
intellegitur B* 36 lemma BRm inuisibilis RB: inuisibiles P 37 erit per-
petuo inuisibilis RB: perpetuo inuisibilis erit P terra om. P melius

rationalibiliumque essentialium peruenturae sunt non parua indiget indagine.

A. Immo maxima. Et ne hoc intactum praetermittas obnixè peto.

N. Dic quaeso quid tibi uideatur. Num primordiales rerum causae quas terrae atque abyssi uocabulis significatas esse praeque incomprehensibili atque excellenti altitudine inuisibiles tenebrasque dictas arbitramur, dum per generationem in genera formasque in numeros differentiasque rerum seu sensu seu intellectu comprehensibilium procedunt inuisibiles incomprehensibilesque esse desinunt an semper in excellentia suae naturae in qua ante omnia in principio conditae sunt permanent et sub nullum sensum intellectumue cadunt, ita ut et in rebus quarum causae sunt sensibus intellectibus quodam modo appareant et excelsitudinem suae incomprehensibilitatis non deserant ac ueluti in tenebris quibusdam, in secretissimis dico diuinae sapientiae sinibus, semper sedeant?

A. Eas perpetuo inuisibiles tenebrasque esse crediderim. Si enim ipsa sapientia dei patris in qua omnia facta sunt uereque subsistunt et extra quam nil esse intelligitur in se ipsa incomprehensibilis inuisibilisque permanet—lux enim est inaccessibleis omnem intellectum superans—, quid mirum si causae omnium quae in ea et per eam et ad eam factae sunt inuisibiles incomprehensibilesque aeternaliter credantur esse et incommutabiliter permanere? Et exemplo nostrae naturae [illud] possumus coniecere. Nam quod intellectus noster in se ipso primum rationabiliter concipit [et ad habitum purae perfectaeque intelligentiae perducit] semper et in se obtinet et quibusdam signis extrinsecus profert. Verbi gratia si ueram cognitionem de aliquo sensibili uel intelligibili sapiens animus perceperit ipsa cognitio et in eo fixa perseuerat et *per fantasias* primo in cogitationem, deinde in sensum, deinde in uocum signa aliosque nutus quibus animus secreta sua molimina gradatim descendencia solet aperire inque] aliorum animorum notitiam naturalibus artificibusque progressionibus proferre non retardat.

N. Principales itaque causae et in *ea* uorum causae sunt proueniunt et principium, id est sapientiam patris in qua factae sunt, non relinquunt et ut sic dicam sicut in se ipsis [permanentes] inuisibiles tenebris suae excellentiae semper absconditae in effectibus sui ueluti in quandam lucem cognitionis prolatae non cessant apparere.

19–20 cf. 1 Tim. vi. 16

3 praetermittas RC: praetermittis P 4 Num RB: non P 7 arbitramur
R^cBP: arbitramus R* 16 crediderim RB: crediderint P 18 nil RB:
nihil P intelligitur RB^cP: intellegitur B* 22 *post et rasura in R* 23 coniecere RB^cP: coicere B* 27–28 perseuerat RB: permaneat P 28 *per fantasias in ras. R*
cogitationem RB: cognitionem P 30 descendencia BP: discendencia R *post aliorum erasum est -que in R* 31 proferre R^cBP: proferr^e R* 32 Principales RB: Principalis P *ea quo- in ras. R*
34 sic RB: ita P 35 *post tenebris erasum est -que in R* sui B: suis RP

knowledge of intelligible and rational essences, (is a question which) requires no little investigation.

A. Rather the greatest. And I earnestly beg you not to pass it by without examination.

N. Tell me, please, what you think: Do the primordial causes of things, which we think to be signified by the words 'earth' and 'abyss', and to be called invisible and dark on account of their incomprehensible and excessive depth, cease to be invisible and incomprehensible once they proceed through generation into the genera and species, individuals and differences of things (which are) comprehensible either to sense or to intellect, or do they remain for ever in the excellence of their proper nature in which they were created in the beginning before all things, and do not become subject to any sense or intellect, so that at the same time as they are manifest to senses (and) to intellects after a certain mode in the things of which they are the causes, they do not abandon the excellence of their incomprehensibility but ever abide, as it were, in a kind of darkness, I mean in the most secret recesses of the Divine Wisdom?

A. I should believe that they are always invisible and dark. For if the Wisdom of God the Father itself, in which all things were made and truly subsist and without which it is understood that there is nothing, remains in itself incomprehensible and invisible—for it is the inaccessible light which passes all understanding (226)—, what wonder if the causes of all things, which are created in it and through it and for it, should be believed to be eternally invisible and incomprehensible and to remain for ever without change? And we can make [that] conjecture from the example of our own nature. For that which our intellect once rationally conceives in itself [and brings to the condition of pure and perfect understanding] it always retains in itself at the same time as it expresses it outwardly by certain signs. For instance, if the wise mind has grasped the true knowledge of some sensible or intelligible thing, that knowledge remains fixed in it at the same time as it does not hesitate to express it, first by means of fantasies to the thought, then to the senses, [then in verbal signs and other indications by which the mind is wont to reveal its secret undertakings so that step by step they descend into] the knowledge of other minds by natural and artificial progressions (227).

N. The principal causes, then, both proceed into *the things of which* they are the causes and at the same time do not depart from their Principle, that is, the Wisdom of the Father, in which they are created, and, if I may so express it, just as [remaining] in themselves invisibly by being eternally concealed in the darkness of their excellence, do not cease to appear by being brought forth into the light, as it were, of knowledge in their effects.

alia quaestio
de causis

A. Haec probabiliter suaderi *possunt* [sed nosse uelim utrum principia rerum quae primordialium causarum nominibus appellantur se ipsa intelligunt priusquam in ipsas res quarum causae sunt profluant necne.

N. Ad hoc breuiter respondendum. Si enim deus in sapientia sua fecit omnia quae fecit, teste scriptura quae dicit: 'Omnia in sapientia fecisti', cui dubitare permittitur omnia quae in sapientia facta sunt sicut ipsa sapientia se ipsam cognoscit et quae in ipsa facta sunt non solum se ipsa cognoscere sed et rerum quarum principia sunt notitia non carere? Non enim credendum est in diuina sapientia aliquod insipiens et se ipsum ignorans conditum fuisse. Sed de his diligentius alibi considerandum.

alia quaestio
de causis

A. Ita fiat.² Non enim breuem transitoriamque quaerit indagationem. Si primordiales causae se ipsas sapiunt quoniam in sapientia creatae sunt aeternaliterque in ea subsistunt, quae nullum insipiens [in se]³ recipit, quomodo ex sapientibus causis multa insipientia procedunt? Non enim omnia quae ex eis profluunt sapientia sunt. Duas siquidem naturas sapientiae participes esse credimus, intellectualem in angelis et in hominibus rationalem. Caetera uero quae a sensibus seu intellectu comprehendi possunt sapientiae expertia existimamus esse (quamuis breuiter quis respondere ualeat non esse mirum in sapientibus exemplaribus insipientium causas subsistere dum uidemus in solaribus radiis tenebrarum occasiones naturaliter inesse dumque in se ipsis nullas tenebras esse sinunt, eas tamen de causis in se insitis ueluti sibi oppositas gignunt)²].

de super-
eminentia
diuini
spiritus

N. Quid ergo uult quod sequitur: 'Et [spiritus dei] superferebatur super aquas?' An forte hoc additum ne aestimarentur primordiales causae non solum intellectualis rationalisque creaturae uirtutem uerum etiam creatoris earum intelligibilem cognitionem prae nimiae suae naturae excellentia superare? 'Et spiritus dei,' inquit, 'superferebatur super aquas', ac si diceret: primordialium causarum infinita incomprehensibilisque abyssus ac per hoc inuisibilis tenebrosaque merito appellata non ita omnem intellectum rationemque altitudine obscuritatis suae effugit ut etiam a spiritu dei comprehendi et superari non possit. Deus nanque ipsas ueluti quaedam fundamenta principiaque naturarum omnium quae ab eo sunt in principio fecit supereminenteque infinita sua gnostica uirtute eas comprehendit spiritusque eius [non locali uehimentia sed cognitionis eminentia] eis superfertur.

5-6 Ps. civ. 24. 24-25 Gen. i. 2

1 lemma B Haec . . . possunt R^cBP: Hoc . . . potest R* 3 quarum
causae sunt RB: quibus clauerunt P 4 enim s.l. B: om. P 9 aliquod
RB: aliquid P 10 diligentius BP: deligentius R considerandum BP: con-
siderabimus R 11 Non enim RB: nam non P 12 lemma B (uide p. 64, 2)
14 recipit RB: recepit P 18 comprehendi BP: compraehendi R post possunt
rasura in R 21 occasiones B: occasiones P 22 dumque B^cP: dum B*
25 post ne erasum est aperte in R 27 lemma BRm nimiae codd.: lege
nimia 32 obscuritatis suae R^cBP: obscuritate sua R* 33-34 principiaque

A. *These things can* be reasonably argued. [But I should like to know whether or not the principles of things which are called by the names of the primordial causes understand themselves before they flow forth into those things of which they are the causes.

Another
inquiry con-
cerning the
causes

N. This can be answered in a few words. For if God made in His Wisdom everything that He made, as the Scripture witnesses which says, 'Thou hast made all things in Thy Wisdom', who may doubt but that all things that were made in Wisdom, as Wisdom knows herself and the things that are made in her, (so) not only know themselves but also do not lack knowledge of the things of which they are the principles? For it is not to be believed that anything was created in the Divine Wisdom which is not wise and does not know itself. But these things we must consider more diligently elsewhere.

A. So let it be. [For it requires an explanation (that is) neither brief nor perfunctory. If the primordial causes have wisdom of themselves because they are created in Wisdom and subsist eternally in that which admits nothing unwise [in itself], how is it that from the wise causes many unwise things proceed? For not all things that flow forth from them are wise. For we hold that two natures participate in wisdom, the intellectual in angels and the rational in men. But the other things which can be comprehended by the senses or by the intellect we consider (to be) devoid of wisdom (although one might reply briefly that it is not strange that the causes of unwise things subsist in wise exemplars when we see that the origins of darkness naturally inhere in the rays of the sun and that while these allow no darkness to be in themselves, yet they produce it as an opposite of themselves, as it were, from the causes that inhere in them)]²].

Another
inquiry con-
cerning the
causes

N. What, then (228), is the meaning of what follows: 'And the Spirit of God was borne above the waters'? Was this perhaps added lest it should be thought that the primordial causes, by the excellence of their nature, surpass not only the power of the intellectual and the rational creature but also any cognition by intellect on the part of their Creator? 'And the Spirit of God', he says, 'was borne above the waters', as though he was saying: The abyss of the primordial causes, (which is) infinite and incomprehensible and therefore justly called invisible and dark, does not so far elude by the depth of its obscurity every intellect and reason that it cannot even be comprehended or surpassed by the Spirit of God. For God made them in the beginning as a kind of foundations and principles of all the natures which are from Him, and He comprehends them in His supereminent (and) infinite gnostic power, and His Spirit is borne above them [not by movement through space but by the eminence of its knowledge].

19
Concerning
the super-
eminence of
the Divine
Spirit

RB: principia quae P 35 infinita om. P 36 post locali rasura in B
cognitionis RP: cognotionis P post eis rasura in R

Potest et sic *dici*: 'Spiritus dei superferebatur super aquas.' Non enim primordiales omnium causas tantae excellentiae esse credere debemus ut nulla superior eas causa praecedat quae eas superat. Est enim una eademque omnium causa ex qua et per quam in qua et ad quam rerum omnium causae atque praecedentes [occasiones] primitus factae sunt ideoque omnibus superferri non inmerito scriptura [testatur quia uniuersae creaturae a se inchoantis esse ordinem praecedit et in eam desinit]—non quod in ea hoc prius et hoc posterius ratione temporum creatum sit—simul enim et semel omnia aeternaliter in ipsa sunt et ab ipsa facta sunt—, sed quod ordine ineffabili incomprehensibilique omni intellectui diuina prouidentia uniuersitatem conditae naturae ex non existentibus [in] existentia produxit quadamque essentiali dignitate alia aliis praeferuntur ita ut ea quae circa uniuersalem omnium causam, ipsum deum dico, proxime atque immediate, hoc est nulla superiori creatura interposita, creduntur et intelliguntur esse principalissima conditae uniuersitatis principia iure praedicentur ac deinde alia ex aliis a summo usque deorsum [hoc est ab initio intellectualis creaturae usque ad omnium infimum quod est corpus] descendunt.

Spiritus ergo dei super tenebrosam abyssum causarum omnium primordialiter factarum superfertur quia solus conditor spiritus conditas causas cognitionis excellentia supereminet omniumque causarum quas creauerat una ac sola praecedens et superexcellens causa est et principalissimus fons omnium quae a se in infinitum profluunt et in se recurrunt et nullo alio, si de spiritu sancto proprie intelligitur, nisi a patre manat. Ab ipso enim est filius per ineffabilem generationem in quo ut in principio fecit omnia, ab ipso est spiritus sanctus per processionem qui fertur super omnia. Pater siquidem uult, filius facit, spiritus sanctus perficit.

[Nec hoc theologiae uidetur obsistere quae dicit patrem in filio omnia fecisse. Non enim aliud est patrem uelle omnia fieri et aliud patrem in filio omnia facere sed unum atque idipsum est patrem uelle et patrem facere. Ipsius enim actio suum uelle est. Nam et de filio et spiritu sancto similiter intelligendum. Eorum siquidem operatio nil aliud est quam eorum uoluntas nec alia uoluntas est patris, alia filii,

30–31 patrem–fecisse: cf. Col. i. 16

1 *dici* B^cP: intelligi RB* 2 *post enim rasura in R* lemma alia questio de causis Rm (*uide p.* 62, 12) 3 *praecedat* RB^cP: praecedant B* eas RB: eius P *superat* R^cBP: superaret R* 6 *inmerito* BP: immerito R *post scriptura erasum est dicit in R* 8 *praecedit* RBP^c: praecedat P* 9 *ratione temporum* RB^cP: ratione et tempore B* *Caue in marg. recenti manu scriptum in P* 14 *immediate* B^cP: immediate RB* 19 *descendant* B^cP: discendant RB* 23 *quas* RB: quae P 24 *et R^cBP: etenim R** principalissimus RB^cP: principalissima B* 28 *per om. P* processionem BP: procesionem R fertur R^cBP: superfertur R*

This also can *be said*: 'The Spirit of God was borne above the waters.' For we ought not to believe that the primordial causes of all (things) are of such excellence that no higher cause precedes them so as to surpass them. For there is one and the same cause of all (things) out of which and through which (and) in which and for which the causes and preceding [origins] of all things were first created, and therefore not inappropriately Scripture [testifies] that it is borne above all things [because it precedes the order of the universal creature which takes the beginning of its being from it and in it finds its end (229)]—not that in it one thing is created sooner or later than another in a temporal sense, for all things are eternally in it and were created by it at one and the same time (230)—but because the Divine Providence brought forth from non-existence [into] existence (231) the universe of created nature in an order (which is) ineffable and incomprehensible to every intellect; and (because) some things are preferred to others by reason of a kind of dignity of their essence, so that those things which are believed and understood to be in the immediate and proximate presence of the Universal Cause of all, I mean God himself, without, that is, the interposition of any higher creature, are rightly called the first principles of the created universe; after which the rest descend one after another, from the highest to the lowest [that is, from the beginning of the intelligible creature to the lowest of all, which is body] (232).

So the Spirit of God is borne above the dark abyss of the primordially created causes of all (things) because only the Creator Spirit is supereminent over created causes in the excellence of His knowledge and is the one and only cause which precedes and excels over all the causes which He had created, and the first Source of all things which flow forth from Him into infinity and return to Him again; and if we have a right understanding of the Holy Spirit, Himself flows forth from none other than the Father. For from Him through an ineffable generation is the Son in Whom, as in the Beginning, He made all things; from Him in procession is the Holy Spirit Who is borne above all things. For the Father wills, the Son makes, the Holy Spirit perfects.

[Nor does this appear to conflict with the divine word which says that the Father made all things in the Son. For it is not one thing for the Father to will all (things) and another for the Father to make all (things) in the Son, but it is one and the same thing for the Father to will and for the Father to make (233). For His will is His act. And (234) the same must be understood both in the case of the Son and in that of the Holy Spirit. For their act is not other than their will,

29 *sanctus s.l. R* 30 *theologiae* B^cP: theologia R: teologia B* 34 *est post similiter erasum in R*

alia sancti spiritus, sed una eademque uoluntas, unus amor trium substantiarum unius essentialis bonitatis quo se mouet pater facere omnia in filio, perficere in spiritu sancto, et quod facit filius et spiritus sanctus perficit totum refertur ad patrem facientem et perficientem quia ex ipso sunt omnia. Ex ipso enim est filius per generationem qui facit omnia, ex ipso est spiritus sanctus per processionem qui perficit omnia: summa trinitas quae intelligitur esse ex his quae sunt et sapiens esse cognoscitur ex his quae sapiunt et uiuere ex his quae mouentur manifestissime approbatur. Est igitur et sapit et uiuit.] Si autem, sicut quidam Syrus transtulisse fertur qui, ut ait sanctus Basilius, 'tantum a mundana sapientia recessit quantum uerorum doctrinae adpropinquauit,' sic legatur: 'Et spiritus dei fouebat aquas,' facilius intellectus occurrit. Spiritus enim sanctus causas primordiales quas pater in principio, in filio uidelicet suo, fecerat ut in ea quorum causae sunt procederent fouebat, hoc est diuini amoris fotu nutribat. Ad hoc nanque oua ab alitibus, ex quibus haec metafora assumpta est, fouentur ut intima inuisibilisque uis seminum quae in eis latet per numeros locorum temporumque in formas uisibiles corporalesque pulchritudines igne aereque in humoribus seminum terrenaque materia operantibus erumpat.

A. Nec hoc sano intellectui repugnat. Sed breuem luculentamque ANAKEΦΑΛΙΟCIN, hoc est recapitulationem, uelim a te fieri quatenus clarius distinctiusque ualeam intelligere quae uerba specialiter praedictae sanctae scripturae primitiua rerum causas, quae causarum omnium causam uolunt significare.

N. Adesto igitur ad haec diligentius intuenda.

A. Presto sum.

N. Primitiua causas quas sanctus Dionysius principia rerum omnium uocat simpliciter generaliterque significatas esse his uerbis intellige: 'In principio fecit deus caelum et terram,' hoc est deus in uerbo suo intelligibilium essentiarum sensibilibusque uniuersaliter causas condidit. Sed propheta quae generaliter pronuntiauit specialiter diuidere uoluit. Causas itaque sensibilibus rerum quibus mundus iste conficitur praeque nimia suae naturae subtilitate mentis oculis incontemplabiles eximiaque sui puritate omni corporea crassitudine

11-12 tantum-adpropinquauit: Basil, *Hex.* ii. 6, PG xxix. 44B 12 fouebat: cf. eund. loc. cit. 16-20 cf. eund. loc. cit. 28-30 Ps.-Dionys., *DN* v. 5, PG iii 820B 8; cf. p. 208, 21-210, 1 *infra.* 30 Gen. i. 1

2 quo se mouet RB^cP: quos emouet B* 11 recessit R^cBP: recesit R*
12 adpropinquauit BP: appropinquauit R 19 pulchritudines BP: pulchritudines R
21 sano RB^c: sane B*P luculentamque R^cBP: luculentemque R* 22 a te RB^cP: ante B* lemma B 28 quas RB: qua P Dyonysius R: dionysius B: dionysius P 32 causas: c- in ras. B pronuntiauit RP: pronunciauit B 35 incontemplabiles BP: incontemplabilis R

nor is there one will of the Father, another of the Son, another of the Holy Spirit, but one and the same will, one love of the three Substances of the one essential Goodness by which the Father moves Himself to make all things in the Son (and) to perfect all things in the Holy Spirit; and the whole of that which the Son makes and the Holy Spirit perfects is referred to the Father as maker and perfecter because from Him are all things. For from Him through generation is the Son Who makes all things, from Him through procession is the Holy Spirit Who perfects all things: the supreme Trinity Whose being is understood from the things that are, and Whose Wisdom is known from the things that are wise, and Whose Life is most clearly demonstrated from the things that move (235). Therefore it is, and is wise, and is living.]

But if it be read as it is reported to have been translated by a certain Syrian (236) who, as St. Basil says, 'was as far from worldly wisdom 'as he was near to the doctrine of the things that are true (237)', 'And the Spirit of God fermented (238) the waters', it becomes easier (239) to understand. For the Holy Spirit fermented, that is, nourished in the fermentation of the Divine Love, the primordial causes which the Father had made in the Beginning, that is, in His Son, so that they might proceed into those things of which they are the causes. For to this end are eggs fermented by birds, from whom this metaphor is drawn, that the inward invisible power of the seeds which is latent in them may break forth through the individuation of places and times (240) into visible forms and corporeal beauties by the operation of fire and air upon the humours and the earthly matter of the seeds (241).

A. Nor is this repugnant to a sound intellect. But I should like you to make a concise and clear ἀνακεφαλαίωσις, that is, recapitulation, so that I may the more plainly and distinctly understand which words of the passage of Holy Scripture specifically signify the first causes of nature, (and) which the Cause of all causes.

N. Be ready, then, to attend more carefully to these (words).

A. I am ready.

N. Understand that the first causes, which St. Dionysius calls the beginnings of all things (242), are signified by these words both in a general and in a special sense: 'In the beginning God made heaven and earth', that is: In His Word God created all at once the causes of the intelligible and of the sensible essences. But what the prophet pronounced generically he then wished to divide specifically. Therefore understand that the causes of the sensible things of which this world is made and which because of the excessive subtlety of their nature cannot be contemplated by the mind's eye, and because of their extreme purity are free from all bodily grossness, are signified

carentes his uerbis significatas esse intellige: 'Terra autem erat in-
 'uisibilis et incomposita'—sic enim transtulerunt septuaginta—seu
 secundum Ebraicam ueritatem: 'Terra autem erat inanis et uacua.'
 Deinde caelestium intelligibiliumque essentiarum primitiua principia
 tanta altitudine tantaque subtilitate obscuritateque suae conditionis
 omnem intellectum superantia his uerbis intellige esse significata
 utriusque interpretationis consonantia: 'Et tenebrae erant super
 'abyssum.' Quoniam uero causarum omnium causa omniumque
 principiorum principium singularisque fons ex quo omnia quae in
 celo et in terra sunt profluunt inaccessibili incomprehensibilique lucis
 suae excellentia omnia quae in primordialibus causis condidit super-
 exaltat et supercognoscit, superessentialitatem superexcellendamque
 ipsius his uerbis intellige esse significatam: 'Et spiritus dei superfere-
 'batur super aquas.' Nam quod specialiter theologia de spiritu sancto
 protulit hoc communiter de summa sanctaque trinitate sana fides et
 credit et intelligit. Sancta etenim et inseparabilis trinitas infinitae
 abyssu a se conditae excellentia suae essentiae sapientiaeque super-
 fertur.

Si uero illum Syrum quem sanctus Basilius in Examerone suo magnis
 laudibus praedicat, qui pro eo quod alii interpretes posuere, hoc est:
 'Et spiritus dei superferebatur super aquas,' interpretatus est Syra
 lingua quae Ebraeae uicina est: 'Et spiritus dei fouebat aquas,' uel: 'Et
 spiritus dei foecundabat aquas,' sequi uolueris, diuinam pietatem
 altitudine suae clementiae tenebrosam primordialium causarum abys-
 sum superantem eamque fouentem et foecundantem, ut ex occultis
 incognitisque suae naturae sinibus in cognitionis facultatem per
 generationem perque in genera ac formas speciesque proprias sensi-
 bilium intelligibiliumque substantiarum multiplicem processionem
 in suos uarios innumerabilesque prodirent effectus, his uerbis in-
 sinuatam reperies: 'Et spiritus dei fouebat aquas.'

Ac per hoc summam ac singularem omnium causam, sanctam dico
 trinitatem, aperte declaratam his uerbis intellige: 'In principio fecit
 'deus caelum et terram,' patrem uidelicet et dei nomine uerbumque
 eius principii appellatione et paulo post spiritum sanctum ubi ait:
 'Spiritus dei superferebatur,' non enim de alio spiritu hunc locum
 sancta scriptura protulit. Ecce habes et causas primordiales et

3 Gen. i. 2 7-8 *ibid.* 13-14 *ibid.* 19-20 Basil., *Hex.* ii. 6,
 PG xxix. 44B 32-33 Gen. i. 1 35 Gen. i. 2 35-36 non enim-
 protulit: cf. Basil., *Hex.* ii. 6, PG xxix. 44A

1 significatas RB: insinuat P intellige RB: cognosce P 4 caelestium RB^cP: inuisibilium B* 6 intellige RB: noueris P esse *s.l.* B significata RB: introducta P 10 celo B: caelo RP *post et erasum est quae in R sunt deest in R** 13 intellige RB: inspice P esse *s.l.* B significatam RB: intimatam P 13-14 superferebatur RB^cP: supererebatur B* 17-18 superfertur RB: superfertur P 20 laudibus RB^cP: laudi B* 25 occultis BP: oculis R 26 incognitisque RB: ignitisque P

by the words, 'Now the earth was invisible and incomposite'—for so the Seventy translated it—or according to the Hebrew original, 'Now the earth was waste and void.'

Next, understand that the first beginnings of the celestial and intelligible essences, which because of the excessive profundity and subtlety and obscurity of their condition surpass all understanding, are signified by these words, which accord with both interpretations: 'And darkness was over the abyss.' But seeing that the Cause of all causes and the Beginning of all beginnings and the unique Source from which all (things) which are in heaven and earth flow forth by the inaccessible and incomprehensible excellence of its light, more than surpasses and more than knows all (things) which it created in the primordial causes, understand that its superessentiality and superexcellence are signified by these words: 'And the Spirit of God was borne above the waters.' For that which Theology has revealed specifically of the Holy Spirit sound faith both believes and understands generally of the Most High and Holy Trinity. For the holy and indivisible Trinity, by the excellence of its essence and wisdom, is borne above the infinite abyss which it created.

But should you wish to follow that Syrian whom St. Basil praises so highly in his Hexameron, who, in place of what other translators put down, namely, 'And the Spirit of God was borne above the waters,' translated in the Syrian tongue which is akin to the Hebrew (243), 'And the Spirit of God fermented the waters', or, 'And the Spirit of God fertilized (244) the waters', you will find that the divine goodness, surpassing by the height of its clemency the dark abyss of the primordial causes and fermenting and fertilizing it so that from the hidden and unknown recesses of their nature they might issue forth into the faculty of knowledge through generation, and through the multiple procession into genera and forms and proper species (245) of sensible and intelligible substances into their various and innumerable effects, is intended by these words: 'And the Spirit of God fermented the waters.'

And from this understand that the most high and unique Cause of all (things), I mean the Holy Trinity, is openly revealed by these words: 'In the Beginning God made heaven and earth,' that is to say, the Father (246) under the name of God, and His Word under the name of Beginning, and the Holy Spirit a little later where (the Scripture) says: 'The Holy Spirit was borne above'; for Holy Scripture did not here mean any other spirit. Thus you have, if I am not mistaken, both the primordial causes and the Cause of causes

28 processionem R^cBP: procesionem R* 29 uarios innumerabilesque *in ras.* R prodirent R^cBP: prodiret R* 30 reperies RB^cP: repperies B* 35-36 hunc locum sancta *in ras.* R 36 protulit *in ras.* R

causarum causam praedictis theologiae uerbis aperte distincteque ni 556A
fallor declaratas.

A. Habeo plane libenterque accipio [dei nomine patrem, principii
filium, spiritus dei spiritum sanctum significatos, terrae uero uocabulo
uisibilium causas, abyssi intelligibilium indicatas, diuinae uero 5
[²naturae supere]²minentiam, hoc est altitudinem causae causarum,
superlationis seu fatus seu foecundationis symbolo esse suasam].

N. Prius itaque quam ad senariae quantitatis primordialium causarum
in sex intelligibiles primos dies a theologia distinctarum ueniamus
considerationem pauca de prima summaque omnium causa, de 10
sancta dico trinitate, dicenda arbitror si tibi uidetur.

de summa
causa
omnium A. Nil audius quaesierim, nil libentius audierim, nil salubrius
crediderim, nil altius intellexerim quam quod de uniuersali omnium 556B
ineffabili fonte ueris probabilibusque dicitur inuestigationibus. Non
enim alia fidelium animarum salus est quam de uno omnium prin- 15
cipio quae uere praedicantur credere et quae uere creduntur intel-
ligere.

N. Dic itaque quaeso. Quid intelligis quando theologiam dicentem
audis: 'In principio fecit deus'?

A. Nil aliud nisi quod inter nos conuenerat patrem in uerbo suo 20
omnia fecisse. Dum enim deum audio deum patrem cogito, dum
principium intelligo deum uerbum.

N. Quid est [quod theologus ait]: 'In principio fecit deus'? Vtrum
intelligis patrem uerbum suum primo genuisse ac deinde caelum et
terram in eo fecisse an forte suum uerbum aeternaliter genuit et in 25
ipso aeternaliter omnia fecit ita ut nullo modo processio uerbi a patre
per generationem praecedat processionem omnium de nihilo in uerbo 556C
per creationem? [Et ut manifestius dicam: utrum primordiales
causae [²in]² uerbo dei in quo factae sunt non semper fuerunt et erat
uerbum quando non erant causae an coaeternae ei sunt et numquam 30
erat uerbum sine causis in se conditis et nullo alio modo intelligitur
uerbum causas [²in se]² conditas praecedere nisi quod uerbum creat
causas, causae uero creantur a uerbo et in uerbo?]

de eo quod
uerbum non
temporaliter A. Illud primum non temere concesserim. Non enim uideo
quomodo possit temporaliter praecedere generatio uerbi ex patre 35

19 Gen. i. 1 23 Gen. i. 1

1 -dictis theologiae uerbis in ras. R 3-7 dei-suasam in textu scripsit
C in R 9 a theologia RB: athologia P 12 lemma B: de summa
omnium causa Rm 14 probabilibusque R^cBP: probabiliusque R* 18
quaeso BP: quaesso R 21 Dum enim R^cBP: cum enim R* 21-22 dum
principium R^cBP: dum uero principium R* 23 Quid est R^cB^cP: Quidem
R*B* 26 processio R^cBP: procesio R* 27 processionem R^cBP: procesionem
R* 28 per creationem RB: procreationem P 30 post an erasum est -que
in B 31 nullo RB: nulli P 34 lemma BRm (de eo om. Rm) non temere
R^cB: omnino non temere R*: omnino P

openly and distinctly declared in these pages from the divine word
(247).

A. I have certainly, and I readily agree [that by the name of
God is indicated the Father, (by the name) of Beginning the Son, (by
the name) of Spirit of God the Holy Spirit; while by the word 'earth'
are indicated the causes of visible (things), by the word 'abyss' those
of intelligible (things), and the [²super]²eminence of the Divine
[²Nature]², that is, the transcendence of the Cause of causes, is
intimated by the symbol of superlation or fermentation or fertiliza-
tion].

N. Before, then, we come to consider the sixfold quantity of the
primordial causes distinguished by the divine word into the six
intelligible first days, we should, I think, if you agree, say a few
(words) about the first and supreme Cause of all, I mean, about the
Holy Trinity.

A. There is nothing I should more eagerly ask for, nothing I would
more willingly hear, nothing I would more wholesomely believe,
nothing more profound that I could understand, than what, after
true and credible investigations, is said of the universal (and) ineffable
Source of all (things). For there is no other health for faithful souls
than to believe in what is truly said of the One Principle of all (things),
and to understand what is truly believed.

N. Tell (me), then, please: What do you understand when you
hear it said by the divine word: 'In the Beginning God made'?

A. Nothing else than what we have agreed upon, that the Father
made all things in His Word. For when I hear 'God' I think of God
the Father, (and) when (I hear) 'Beginning' I understand God the
Word.

N. What is it [that the theologian says], 'In the Beginning God
made'? Do you understand that the Father first brought forth His
Word and then made heaven and earth in Him? Or perhaps that He
brought forth His Word in eternity and in eternity made all things
in Him, so that the procession of the Word from the Father through
generation in no way precedes the procession of all (things) from
nothing in the Word through creation? [And to put it more clearly:
Were the primordial causes not always [²in]² the Word of God in
Whom they are made, and was there the Word when the causes were
not? Or are they co-eternal with Him and was the Word never with-
out the causes created in Him, and does (the fact that) the Word
precedes the causes created [²in Him]² mean nothing else than that
the Word creates the causes, while the causes are created by the Word
and in the Word?]

A. I should hesitate to agree with the former alternative, for I do
not see how the generation of the Word from the Father can in a
That the
Word pre-
cedes all

sed causaliter
omnia
praecedit creationem omnium a patre in uerbo et per uerbum; sed haec coaeterna
sibi esse arbitror, generationem dico uerbi et creationem omnium in 556D
uerbo. Nullum enim in deo accidens aut temporalis motus aut tem-
poralis processio recte quis intelligit. Hoc autem quod posterius 557A
propositum est non incongrue concesserim, hoc est generationem
uerbi a patre nullo modo creationem omnium in uerbo a patre
<temporaliter> praecedere, sed coaeternam sibi esse. Nam et propheta
dicit patrem alloquens: 'Omnia in sapientia fecisti.' Simul enim pater
et sapientiam suam genuit et in ipsa omnia fecit. Et alibi idem
propheta ex persona patris ait: 'Eructauit cor meum uerbum bonum, 10
'dico ego opera mea regi,' ac si aperte diceret: ex secreto essentiae
meae uerbo meo nascente opera mea in eo facio quae ego ipsi regnanti
do. Idem iterum ad patrem: 'Tecum principium [in die uirtutis
' tuae], ac si dixisset: tecum semper est et in te principium omnium,
hoc est uerbum tuum. Si ergo semper principium est in patre et cum 557B
patre, numquam erat et principium non erat; sed semper principium
erat, et quia non accidit ei principium esse, numquam sine his
quorum principium est erat. 'In die uirtutis tuae:' <'In die,'> hoc
est in notitia intellectualis et rationalis creaturae generationis a te;
'uirtutis tuae,' hoc est sapientiae tuae. Dies enim uirtutis patris in hoc 20
loco non incongrue intelligitur cognitio ineffabilis natiuitatis dei
uerbi ex deo patre [quantum datur creaturae intelligere quod superat
omnem intellectum et ad lucem inaccessibilem conceditur accessus per
theofanias [2, <hoc est> diuinas apparitiones,]²quas theologia puris
intellectibus ingerit et ineffabili modo nullique cognito infigit ut de 25
omnino per se ipsum incognito habitum quendam uerae cognitionis
in semet ipsis possideant]. Virtus enim patris est sapientia patris in 557C
qua omnia fecit.

Sed illa cognitio [diuinae generationis] <adhuc> in me est per fidem,
in angelo est per speciem—immo etiam nec in me est per speciem nec 30
in angelo. 'Generationem' enim 'eius quis enarrabit?' Nullus quippe
hominum, nulla caelestium uirtutum generationem uerbi a patre
potest cognoscere quomodo uel qualis est sicut nemo nouit hominum

8 Ps. civ. 24 10-11 Ps. xlv. 1 13-14 Ps. cix. 3 18 *ibid.* 31 Is.
liii. 8 (Actus viii. 33)

1 *post haec rasura in R* 3 enim RB: quippe P 3-4 temporalis motus
aut temporalis processio B: temporalis—praecessio R*: temporalis—praecessio
R^c: temporales motus aut temporales processiones B: *lege* temporalem motum aut
temporalem praecessionem 4 intelligit RB^c: intellegit B*: existimat P poste-
rius RB^cP: posterius B* 7 coaeternam R^c: conaeternam R*: coaeterna BP
10 Eructauit BP: Eructabit R 16 numquam RB: nunquam P erat
alterum om. P 17 numquam RB: nunquam P 18 tuae: -ae *in ras.* B
19 in notitia RB: in innotitia P a te RB: ait P 24 theofanias RB: theo-

temporal sense precede the creation of all (things) by the Father in (things) not
the Word and through the Word; but I think these to be co-eternal temporally
with each other, I mean the generation of the Word and the creation but causally
of all (things) in the Word. For one rightly understands that there is
no accident or temporal motion or temporal process in God. But I
see nothing inconvenient in granting the second proposition, that is,
that the generation of the Word by the Father does not in any
<temporal> sense precede the creation of all things in the Word by
the Father, but is co-eternal with it. For the prophet also says,
addressing the Father, 'Thou hast made all things in Thy Wisdom.'
For in one act (248) the Father brought forth His Wisdom and made
all things in it. And in another place the same prophet says, (speaking)
in the person of the Father: 'My heart brought forth the good Word,
I speak my works unto the King,' as though he were to say openly:
When my Word is born out of the recesses of My Essence I make
in Him My works which I give to Him as King. Again the same
prophet (says, addressing) the Father: 'With Thee is the Beginning
[in the day of Thy power], as though he had said: With Thee and
in Thee is eternally the Beginning of all (things), that is, Thy Word.
If, then, the Beginning is eternally in the Father and with the Father
there was never (a time when) it was without being a Beginning; but
it always was the Beginning; and because it is not an accident of it
to be the Beginning, it was never without those things of which it
is the Beginning.

'In the day of Thy power.' <'In the day,'> that is, in the knowledge
of the generation by Thee of the intellectual and rational creature;
'of Thy power', that is, of Thy Wisdom. For the day of the Power of
the Father is here not inappropriately understood (as) the knowledge
of the ineffable birth of God the Word from God the Father [in so far
as it is given to the creature to understand that which passes all under-
standing, and access is permitted to the inaccessible Light (249) by
means of theophanies (250) [²<that is> divine manifestations]², which
the divine word instils into, and, in a manner ineffable and known to
none, implants in pure intellects so that they possess in themselves
some condition of true knowledge of that which in itself is altogether
unknowable]. For the Power of the Father is the Wisdom of the
Father in which He made all (things).

But that knowledge [of the divine generation] is in me <at present>
by faith, in the angel by vision (251), or rather, neither in me nor in
the angel is it by vision. For 'who shall relate His generation?' For
no man, nor any of the celestial powers, can know of the generation
of the Word from the Father how it is or of what kind it is, just as no

phanias P 25 cognito RB: cognitio P ut de RB: unde P 26 uerae
RB: uere P 31 enim *om.* P quippe BP: enim R

de gignente
et genito

uel angelorum quid est [uel quis] qui genuit et [quis est uel] quid est
quod genitum est sed [solus] nouit quid genuit qui genuit et quomodo
genitum est quod genitum est *et* qui genuit nouit se ipsum quid est et
quomodo et qualiter genuit quod de se genuit. Similiter quod genitum
est nouit se ipsum quid est et quomodo et qualiter genitum est et 557D
nouit eum qui se genuit quis et quid est [—si enim nemo nouit
patrem nisi filius et cui uult filius reuelare, nonne consequens est 6
dicere: nemo nouit filium nisi pater et cui uult pater reuelare, ita ut 558A
intelligamus: reuelare per theofanias? Nam essentiam patris et filii
et spiritus sancti atque substantiam per se ipsas immediate creaturae 10
reuelari impossibile est. Similiter de modo et qualitate diuinae genera-
tionis intelligendum—]—si tamen proprie dicitur de diuina natura
quis et quid—plus enim est quam persona et plus est quam sub-
stantia—, similiter si proprie modus et qualitas de ea natura prae-
dicanda sunt quae superat omnem modum omnemque qualitatem 15
caeteraque quae secundum accidens dicuntur, de quibus in priori
libro inter nos conuenerat.

⟨Sequitur⟩ 'In splendoribus sanctorum ex utero ante luciferum
'genui te.' Ordo uerborum: ex utero genui te in splendoribus sanc- 558B
torum ante luciferum. Vterum hic intellige secretos paternae *sub-*
stantiae sinus ex quibus unigenitus filius qui est uerbum patris natus 20
est et de quibus semper nascitur et in quibus dum semper nascitur
semper manet, de quibus in euangelio dictum est: 'Deum nemo uidit
'umquam. Unigenitus autem filius qui est in sinibus patris ipse
'narrabit.' Non enim separatur a patre *qui* aeternaliter et incom- 25
mutabiliter est in patre, sicut ipse ait: 'Ego in patre et pater in me.'

de splendo-
ribus
sanctorum

Pater igitur ex utero suo genuit filium suum in splendoribus sanc-
torum. Nascente enim filio ex patre splendores fiunt sanctorum, hoc
est cognitiones electorum et praedestinationes [substantiales in uerbo
dei] qui nos apostolo teste ante tempora saecularia praedestinauit in 558C
regnum. Non dixit ante tempora aeterna [—tempora enim aeterna 31
sunt patris et filii et spiritus sancti coessentialis aeternitas in qua
substantiales splendores sanctorum omniumque rerum primordiales

6–7 Matth. xi. 27 18–19 Ps. cix. 3 23–25 Ioh. i. 18 26 Ioh. xiv. 10
30 ante tempora saecularia: 2 Tim. i. 9; Titus, i. 2; Ambr., *De fide* iii. 5; cf. 1 Cor.
ii. 7 30–31 nos . . . praedestinauit in regnum: cf. Eph. i. 5 praedestinauit nos;
1 Thess. ii. 12 uocauit uos (nos *Pelag. B*) in suum regnum

1 quid est RB^c: quidem B*P lemma BRm 2–3 sed solus—quod genitum
est om. P 2 quomodo B^c: quia RB* 3 et qui R^cBP: quo uero R*
4 quod de se R^cBP: quidquid R* 9 theofanias R^cB^c: teofanias R*B*: theo-
phanias P 10 glossa Impossibile est uidere per se et immediate ess(ent)ia(m)
sed tantum per theofanias *recenti manu* P substantiam RB: substantias eorum
P 14 ea R^cBP: eadem R* 15 sunt R^cBP: quae R* 17 conuenerat RB:
conuerat P glossa quae ad conuenerat respiciebat *erasa in R* 20 intellige BP:
intelligi R*: intelligi R^c 20–21 substantiae B*P: essentiae RB* 21–22 glossa
erasa in R 24 umquam RB: unquam P 25 narrabit R^cBP: narrauit R*

man or angel knows what [or who] it is who begat or [who it is or]
what it is that was begotten, but [only] He Who begat knows what He
begat and how was begotten that which was begotten, *and* (only) He
Who begat knows of Himself what He is and the manner and the
character of that which He begat from Himself. Similarly that which
is begotten knows of itself what it is and the manner and the character
of its begetting, and of Him who begat it knows who and what He is
[for if no one knows the Father save the Son and him to whom the Son
is willing to reveal (Him), does it not follow that no one knows the Son
save the Father and him to whom the Father is willing to reveal (Him)?
—provided we understand by that revelation through theophanies?
For it is impossible for the Essence of Father, Son, or Holy Spirit,
and (their) Substance(s) to be revealed to the creature directly as they
are. The same must be understood concerning the manner and quality
of the divine generation],—that is, if it is proper to apply the terms
'who' and 'what' to the Divine Nature, which is more than person and
more than substance; (and) if, similarly, manner and quality may be
predicated of that Nature which surpasses every manner and every
quality and the other things that are spoken of as accidents (252), on
which we reached agreement in the first book.

Concerning
the Begetter
and the
begotten

⟨(The passage) continues:⟩ 'In the splendours of the saints out of
the womb before the daystar I have begotten Thee.' The order of the
words (should be): Out of the womb I have begotten Thee in the
splendours of the saints before the daystar. Understand 'womb' here
to be the secret recesses of the Father's *substance* out of which the only
begotten Son, Who is the Word of the Father, was born, and from
which He is always being born, and in which, while He is always
being born, He always remains; of which it is said in the Gospel: 'No
man hath seen God at any time, but the only begotten Son Who is in
the recesses of the Father shall Himself tell of Him.' For He *Who* is
eternally and immutably in the Father is not separated from the
Father, as He Himself says: 'I (am) in the Father and the Father in
me.'

So the Father out of His womb has begotten His Son in the splen-
dours of the saints. For with the birth of the Son from the Father come
into being the splendours of the saints, that is, the cognitions of the
elect (253) and their [substantial] predestinations [in the Word of
God], Who, as the Apostle witnesses, predestined us for His King-
dom before the secular ages (began) (254). He did not say 'before the
eternal ages' [for the eternal ages are the co-essential eternity of the
Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit in which the substantial
splendours of the saints and the primordial causes of all things are

Concerning
the splen-
dours of the
saints

qui *in ras.* R: quia P 27–28 sanctorum gr (?) *in marg. ad calc. paginae scripsit* sR
28 lemma BRm 30 praedestinauit RB: praedistinauit P 31 Non R^cBP: in R*

causae aeternaliter conditae sunt ipsarumque causarum effectus et praesciti et praedestinati fuerunt—] sed ante tempora saecularia [in quibus causae semel ac simul et aeternaliter in principio factae ordine quodam saeculorum similiter praediffinito atque praecognito in effectus suos siue uisibiles siue inuisibiles diuina prouidentia administrante procedunt]. Praedestinationes siquidem et praecognitiones sanctorum quas psalmista fulgores nominat rerumque omnium uisibilium et inuisibilium rationes patri et filio coaeternas esse credimus. 'In uerbi,' enim, 'dei dispensatione,' ait Augustinus, 'non facta sed aeterna sunt.' Non facta dicit adhuc temporibus et locis per generationem, facta uero aeternaliter in uerbo iuxta primordialium causarum conditionem. 'In principio,' enim, 'fecit deus caelum et terram.' Idem alibi 'uerbum dei,' inquit, 'per quod facta sunt omnia, ubi incommutabiliter uiuunt omnia, non solum quae fuerunt sed etiam quae futura sunt, nec tamen in illo fuerunt nec futura sunt sed tantummodo sunt et omnia unum sunt et magis unum est.' Item [Johannes theologus] in euangelio: 'Quod factum est in ipso uita erat.'

In splendoribus itaque sanctorum pater ex utero suo suum genuit filium, hoc est in filio suo unigenito cognitionem futurorum sanctorum genuit, immo etiam <eos> creauit. Sanctorum quippe in sapientia patris cognitio eorum est creatio. Intellectus enim omnium <in deo> essentia omnium est [siquidem idipsum est deo cognoscere priusquam fiant quae facit et facere quae cognoscit. Cognoscere ergo et facere dei unum est. Nam cognoscendo facit et faciendo cognoscit. Cognitio non praecedit factum nec factum praecedit cognitionem quia semel et simul sunt omnia coaeterna praeter rationem creantis et creati]. Non enim deus cognouit omnia postquam facta sunt sed antequam facta essent cognouit omnia quae facienda erant et—quod est mirabilius—propterea omnia sunt quia praecognita sunt. Nil enim est aliud omnium essentia nisi omnium in diuina sapientia cognitio. In ipso enim uiuimus et mouemur et sumus. Cognitio enim, ut ait sanctus Dionysius, eorum quae sunt ea quae sunt est.

Splendores igitur sanctorum sunt eorum in sapientia diuina et in primordialibus suis causis clarae cognitaeque deo substitutiones, et hoc totum ante luciferum, hoc est et natiuitas uerbi ex patre et splendor

7 fulgores: cf. Ps. xvii. 13; xcvi. 4 9–10 Beda, *de nat. rer.* i, PL xc. 187A–188A; *uide annot. ad Periphyseon* iii. 640B 12–13 Gen. i. 1 13–16 Aug., *De Trin.* iv. 1, 3, PL xlii. 888 17 Ioh. i. 3–4 30–31 Actus xvii. 28 31–32 Ps.-Dionys., *EH* i. 3, PG iii. 376A 7

2 praedestinati BP: praedestinati R 3 factae RBP^c: fecit P* post factae *erasum est sunt in R* 6 Praedestinationes RB: Praedestinationes P 12 conditionem RB: conditione P enim *s.l.* B 16 item RB^cP: ita B* 17 euangelio RB: euangelio P 20 quippe BP: enim R 24 f- ante cognoscendo *erasum in R* post cognoscit *rasura in R* 26 creati RBP^c: creanti P* 28 erant

eternally created, and the effects of those same causes were foreseen and fore-ordained], but 'before the secular ages' [in which the causes, made at one and the same time and eternally in the Beginning, in a certain order of secular ages, similarly predefined and foreknown, proceed under the administration of Divine Providence into their effects, whether visible or invisible]. For we believe that the predestinations and precognitions of the saints which the Psalmist calls brightnesses and the reasons (255) of all (things) visible and invisible are co-eternal with the Father and the Son. For, says Augustine, 'in the dispensation of the Word of God they are not made but eternal (256)'. By 'not made' he means (not) yet made at times and in places through generation, but made eternally in the Word with the creation of the primordial causes. For 'in the Beginning God made heaven and earth.' And elsewhere he says: 'The Word of God, through which all (things) are made, in which all (things) immutably live, not only (the things) that have been but also (the things) that shall be—in Him, however, they neither have been nor shall be, but only are, and all are one, or rather, is one.' Also [John the Theologian] in the Gospel: 'That which was made in Him was the life (257).'

So in the splendours of the saints the Father from His womb has begotten His Son, that is, in His only begotten Son He has begotten the knowledge of the saints that were to be, and indeed created <them>. For the knowledge of the saints in the Wisdom of the Father is their creation. For the understanding of all things <in God> is the essence of all things [because with God it is one and the same thing to know before they are made (the things) which He makes, and to make the things which He knows. God's knowing and God's making are therefore one. For by knowing He makes and by making He knows. The knowledge does not precede the thing made nor does the thing made precede the knowledge, since all are once and for all co-eternal save for the status of creator and created]. For God did not get to know all (things) after they were made, but before they had been made he knew all (things) that were to be made, and—what is more wonderful—all things are precisely because they were fore-known (258). For the essence of all (things) is nothing but the knowledge of all things in the Divine Wisdom (259). For in Him we live and move and have our being. For, as St. Dionysius says, the knowledge of the things that are is the things that are.

So the splendours of the saints are their substantiations, *clear and known to God*, in the Divine Wisdom and in the primordial causes; and all this precedes the daystar, that is, both the Nativity of the Word from the Father, and the splendour of the knowledge (260) of the

RB^cP: erat B* 29 Nil RB: nihil P 32 Dionysius R: dyonisius B: dionisius P post sunt (1) *erasum est quae in R* ea quae RB: eaque P 34 -rae—deo in *ras.* R

de lucifero cognitionis sanctorum, immo etiam omnium naturarum in principa-
libus suis causis [praecedat luciferum]. Sed quis est iste lucifer ante
cuius ortum praedicta omnia intelliguntur esse multis uariisque modis a
sapientibus tractatur, quorum sententias longum est modo introducere
[—nam quod per Isaiam prophetam dicitur: 'Quomodo cecidit de
'caelo lucifer mane oriens,' de diabolo aperte intelligitur deque eius
corpore quod maxime <in> impiis et apostatis et in hereticis denoscitur
constitutum. Psalmistae autem lucifer quibusdam uidetur in signifi-
catione diaboli, quibusdam in significatione ipsius clarissimae stellae
quae solet ortum solis praecedere, ante cuius stellae apparitionem
sursus uersus orizontem Christus secundum carnem ex uirgine natus
traditur sicut sanctus pater Augustinus in Decadibus suis scribit. Sed
quoniam sanctae scripturae interpretatio infinita est, quod praesenti
disputationi magis conuenire uidetur quia non satis uideo dic quaeso
et edissere.—

N.], mihi quidem [in hoc loco] sufficit simplicitas [quia non con-
uenit aliorum sagacitas].

Lucifer iste mysticus atque propheticus ante cuius ortum splendor
sanctorum in uerbo dei unigenito intelliguntur esse istum mundum
uisibilem [significare uidetur uerisimile] ea forma locutionis quae
grece dicitur CYNEKΔOXH et interpretatur conceptio, qua [forma]
pars a toto totumque a parte significatur. Prius igitur quam mundus
iste uisibilis in genera et species omnesque numeros sensibiles per
generationem procederet ante tempora saecularia deus pater uerbum
suum genuit in quo et per quem omnium naturarum primordiales
causas perfectissimas creauit quae diuina prouidentia administrante
mirabili quadam armonia processionibus suis per generationem
numeris locorum et temporum generum quoque ac specierum multi-
plicibus differentiis hunc mundum uisibilem ab initio quo coepit
usque ad finem quo desinet esse [non abolitione essentiae sed quali-
tatum et quantitatum motatione] naturali cursu perficiunt. Et ne
mireris totum hunc mundum parte sua quae est lucifer, cum uideas
per ipsum solem cui semper lucifer adhaeret—non enim longe ab eo
recedit sed aut [paulo] ante ipsum orientem oritur [aut paulo post
occidentem] occidit—hunc eundem mundum sensibilem, mysticae

5-8 nam quod—denoscitur constitutum: cf. Aug., *De Gen. ad litt.* xi. 24, pp. 356,
5-357, 7 CSEL 5-6 Is. xiv. 12 apud Tyconium 12 cf. Aug., *Enarr. in*
Ps. xcii. 6, PL xxxvii. 1186-7; in *Ps.* cix. 16, *ibid.* 1458-9 (CC Lat. xxxix. 1295-7;
xl. 1615-16) 20-22 Isid., *Etym.* I. 37, 13 Synecdoche est conceptio
24 ante tempora saecularia: cf. p. 74, 30 *supra*

2 lemma BRm 3 cuius: -ius in ras. R uariisque R^cBP: uariisque
R* 7 in hereticis RB: hereticis P 10 stellae R^cBP: stelae R* 11 post
natus *erasum* est esse(?) in R 14-15 quia—edissere B^cP: dicendum esse
arbitror. A. Dic quesso atque edissere RB* 16 quidem BP: itaque R sufficit
R^cBP: sufficiat R* 16-17 conuenit RB: cognouit P 21 CYNEKΔOXH

saints, and indeed of all natures, in their principal causes [precedes the
daystar]. But (the question) what is the daystar whose rising all these
things are understood to precede is treated in many different ways by
the wise, and it would be tedious even to mention their opinions. [For
that which is said through (the mouth of) the prophet Isaiah, 'How
did he fall from heaven, the early arising lightbringer' is clearly
understood of the devil, and of his body which is known to consist
chiefly <in> the impious and apostates and heretics (261). But the
daystar of the Psalmist, while it seems to some to signify the devil,
to others (seems) to signify that very bright star which is wont to
precede the rising of the Sun, the star before whose appearance above
the horizon tradition relates that Christ was born of a virgin according
to the flesh, as the holy Father Augustine writes in his 'Decades' (262).
But as the Scriptures can be interpreted in an infinite number of
ways, tell me, I pray, and explain that which is most convenient to
the present discussion, for I (myself) do not see (clearly) enough (which
is best).

N. (263)] But (264) for me the simplicity (of the text) is sufficient 21
[for the occasion] [for the ingenuity of others is not relevant (here)].

[It seems likely that] this mysterious and prophetic daystar, before
whose rising the splendours of the saints in the only begotten Word
of God are understood to be, [signifies] this visible world, by that
figure of speech which in Greek is called *συνεκδοχή* and is interpreted
conceptio. By this [figure] the part is signified by the whole and
the whole by the part. So before this visible world proceeded through
generation into the genera and species and all the sensible individuals,
God the Father, before the secular ages (began), brought forth His
Word, in Whom and through Whom He created in their full perfec-
tion the primordial causes of all natures, which, under the administra-
tion of Divine Providence, in a wonderful harmony, in their natural
course bring to perfection, by their processions through generation at
certain places and times (265) and in the multiple differences of genera
and species, this visible world from the start at which it begins to be
to the finish at which it ceases to be [not by the destruction of its
essence but by mutation of its qualities and quantities]. And do not
be surprised that this whole world is mystically signified by that part
of it which is the daystar, since it is through the sun to which the
daystar always clings—for it never moves far from it but either rises
a [short] while before its rising or sets [a little after its setting]—,

R^c(C)B: CYNEK*OXH R*: CYNEKΔOXH P 22 significatur: -fi- s.l. R igitur
quam R^cBP: itaque R* 25 naturarum R^cBP: creaturarum (?) R* 28 tem-
porum RB: corporum P 30 quo desinet RB^cP: quod desinet B* 32 mireris
R^cBP: miris R* post sua add. significari RB*, *erasum* in B^c deest in P 33 solem
RB^cP: solum B* 34 post orientem *erasum* est aut occidentem in R 35 oc-
cidit RBP^c: occidat P* mysticae B: mystice RP

significari, dicente Salomone: 'Quid est quod fuit? Ipsum quod
 'futurum est. Quid est quod futurum est? Ipsum quod faciendum est.
 'Nihil sub sole nouum.' Solem [siquidem non incongrue] hic intel-
 ligimus omnem uisibilem creaturam. Non enim solummodo de ea
 parte mundi huius quae intra solarem circulum comprehenditur, 5
 terram dico aquarumque naturam aera quoque cum inferiore aetheris
 parte qua lunaris globus uoluitur, his uerbis theologi significatur
 uerum etiam superiora mundi spatia a solari linea usque ad extremum
 caelestis sphaerae ambitum. In his enim omnibus sub sole, hoc est sub 9
 mundo, non est nouum siue quis intelligat nil nouum esse in praesen- 560D
 tis uitae curriculo quod prius in naturali rerum ordine non appareret 561A
 —nil enim aliud in temporibus praeter earundem rerum reuolutionem
 sentitur et intelligitur—siue, ut Maximus hunc scripturae intelligit
 locum, quod ante hunc mundum fuit id ipsum futurum est post
 mundum, hoc est ea sola quae aeterna sunt ante hunc mundum 15
 fuerunt et <post eum> futura sunt et nihil sub sole nouum, hoc est quic-
 quid nouum sub hoc mundo est nil est. Mundus enim iste totus nouus
 dicitur quia aeternus non est <et in tempore ortus est> ideoque nil est.
 Peribit enim cum omnibus quae in eo sunt [teste psalmista qui ait:
 'Opera manuum tuarum sunt caeli. Ipsi peribunt'—si autem maxima 20
 pars mundi quae caelum esse perhibetur atque pulcherrima caeteras-
 que partes undique ambire non ignoratur peritura sit, putasne quod 561B
 in caeteris suis partibus interioribus uilioribusque permanere prae-
 ualebit? In omni enim corpore compacto dum ea quae continent
 pereunt quae continentur remanere non possunt—, sed quia ad nihilum 25
 penitus redire non poterit quoniam ex deo factus est et omne quod
 ex deo factum est semper manet, quid in eo peribit et quid non peribit
 diligenti indagine quaerendum et in aliud tempus reseruandum.
 Nunc autem quod instat sequere].

A. Cautae ac uigilanter disputas. 30

N. Coaeternae igitur sunt principales rerum omnium causae deo
 et principio in quo factae sunt. Nam si deus nullo modo praecedit
 principium, id est uerbum a se ac de se genitum, ipsumque uerbum
 nullo modo praecedit factas in se rerum causas, sequitur haec omnia, 561C
 deum patrem dico et uerbum rerumque causas in eo factas, coaeterna 35
 esse.

1-3 *Eccl.* i. 9
 20 *Ps.* cii. 25

13-16 *cf.* *Max. Conf.*, I *Ambig.* lxxvii, PG xci. 1412C 14-D8

3 nouum om. P 4-5 de ea parte *codd.*: lege ea pars 5 comprehenditur
 RB: comprehenditur P 7 significatur RB: significatur P 8 superiora RB:
 supra P mundi RB: modi P 9 enim s.l. R 13 ut s.l. B(C) 16 et post
 eum B*(C): post eum B*(C)P 17 enim s.l. B nouus s.l. R 18 non s.l. B
 23 uilioribusque RB*P: uilioribusque B* 27 quid in eo peribit RB*P: qui in eo
 peribit B* quid non peribit RB: quod non peribit P 28 diligenti BP: diligenti
 R 31 N. s.l. R coaeternae B*P: coeterna RB* 34 sequitur: -tur s.l. R

that one sees this same sensible world, as Solomon says: 'What is it
 that was? The same as that that shall be. What is it that shall be? The
 same as that which is to be made. There is nothing new under the sun.'

[For] here we [reasonably] understand the sun (to mean) the whole
 visible creation. For not only is it that part of this world that is en-
 compassed within the sun's orbit, I mean the earth and the nature of
 the waters and the air with the lower part of the aether where the
 globe of the moon revolves, that is meant (266) by these words of the
 theologian, but also the upper regions of the world (that extend) from
 the path of the sun to the extreme circumference of the celestial sphere
 (267). For in all these things 'under the sun', that is, under heaven
 (268), there is nothing new, whether (by this) one understands that
 there is nothing new in the course of (our) present life which has not
 appeared before in the natural order of things—for nothing else is
 perceived and understood at any given time (269) by either sense or
 intellect save the recurrence of the same things—or, as Maximus
 understands this passage of Scripture, that which was before this
 world the same shall be after the world, that is, only those things that
 are eternal existed before this world and will exist <after it>, and there
 is nothing new under the sun, that is: Whatever new thing there is
 under this heaven is nothing (270).

For this whole world is called new because it is not eternal <and
 arose in time> and therefore is nothing. For it will perish with all
 that is in it [as the Psalmist witnesses when he says: 'The heavens
 are the work of Thy hands. They shall perish.'—Now, if the greatest
 and most beautiful part of the world, which heaven is recognized to
 be, and of which we are not ignorant that it circumscribes the other
 parts, is to perish, do you suppose that anything in the other parts
 which are within (it) and inferior (to it) will be able to endure? For in
 every compact (271) body when the things which contain perish those
 that are contained cannot remain.—But because it (272) cannot be
 totally reduced to nothing since it is made by God and everything that
 is made by God abides for ever, what in it will perish and what will
 not perish must be inquired into by a careful investigation and must
 be left for another time. For the time being follow the subject that is
 in hand].

A. You argue cautiously and observantly (273).

N. So the principal causes of all things are co-eternal with God
 and with the Beginning in which they were made. For if God does
 not in any way precede the Beginning, that is, the Word begotten by
 Himself and from Himself, and the Word itself does not in any way
 precede the causes of things that are created in it, it follows that
 all these, I mean, God the Father and the Word and the causes
 created in it, are co-eternal.

de eo quod
omnia uerbo
coeterna et
non omnino
coeterna
sint

A. Non omnino coeterna sunt. Nam filium patri coaeternum esse omnino credimus, ea uero quae pater facit in filio coeterna esse filio dicimus, non autem omnino coeterna. Coeterna quidem quia numquam fuit filius sine primordialibus naturarum causis in se factis, quae tamen causae non omnino ei in quo factae sunt coeternae sunt. Non enim factori facta coeterna esse possunt. Praecedat enim factor ea quae facit. Nam quae omnino coeterna sunt ita sibi inuicem coadunantur ut nullum sine altero possit manere *quia coessentialia sunt*. Factor autem et factum quoniam coessentialia non sunt non coguntur esse coeterna. Coguntur autem semper esse relatiua et simul esse quia factor sine facto non est factor et factum sine factore non est factum. Hinc conficitur quod ideo primordiales rerum causas deo coaeternas esse dicimus quia semper in deo sine ullo temporali principio subsistunt, non omnino tamen deo esse coaeternas quia non a se ipsis sed a suo creatore incipiunt esse. Ipse uero creator nullo modo incipit esse. Solus enim ipse est uera aeternitas omni principio omnique fine carens quia ipse est principium omnium et finis. [Non enim uera est aeternitas quae quodammodo incipit esse sed uerae aeternitatis, quae ANAPXOC est, hoc est omni caret principio, participatio est. Omnis autem creatura incipit esse quia erat quando non erat. Erat in causis quando non erat in effectibus. Non omnino igitur uerae aeternitati coeterna est.] Si autem in ipsa causa causarum omnium, in trinitate dico, quaedam intelligitur praecessio—deitas enim gignens et mittens praecedat deitatem genitam et deitatem procedentem ex gignente et genita dum sit una et inseparabilis deitas—, num mirum aut incredibile causarum causam omnium omnia quorum causa est praecedere et in ea incommutabiliter aeternaliterque sine temporali initio fuisse? Si ergo pater occasiones rerum quas fecit in filio eo modo quo factor facit facta sua et uerbum ea quae pater in se fecit eo modo quo ars artificis eas rationes quae in ea ab artifice conduntur praecedat, quid obstat si sanctus spiritus qui super abyssum primordialium causarum quas pater in uerbo creauit superfertur [his quibus superfertur] praeesse intelligatur? Spiritus ergo

2 coeterna R^cP: cocoaeterna R*: coaeterna B 3 lemma B: quod omnia uerbo sunt coeterna et non omnino coeterna sunt Rm: primordiales causae uerbo coeternae sunt non tamen omnino coeternae rec. manu P coeterna quidem RB^cP: coeterna quidem B* 5 factae R^cBP: facta R* coeternae R^cBP: coeterna R* 7 Nam quae RP: namque B coeterna RP: coeterna B 8-11 quia—non est factum B^cP: factor autem etiam si nihil faciat potest in se ipso esse, factum uero absque factore per se ipsum non potest subsistere RB* 13 post principio erasum est -que in B 14 coeternas R: coeternas B 15 Ipse uero—incipit esse om. P 17 est principium s.l. R 18 uerae RB: uere P aeternitatis quae RB^cP: aeternitatisque B* 20-21 erat in causis—in effectibus quod ut glossam scripsit C in B in textum interpolat P 21 uerae RB: uere P 22-23 omnium—quaedam s.l. R 23 praecessio BP: praecio R rasura ante deitas in R mittens R^cBP: mit*tens R* 25 post aut rasura in B 26 omnium RB^cP: omnia B* post est rasura in B 30 fecit RB^cP: facit B* 33 intelligatur R^cBP: intelligitur R*

A. They are not in all respects co-eternal (274). For while we believe that the Son is in all respects co-eternal with the Father, those things which the Father makes in the Son we call co-eternal with the Son, but not in all respects co-eternal. They are co-eternal in the sense that the Son was never without the primordial causes of natures created in Him, and yet these causes are not in all respects co-eternal with Him in Whom they are created. For (things) made cannot be co-eternal with their maker because the maker precedes the (things) which he makes. For those (things) which are in all respects co-eternal are so united to one another that neither can endure without the other because they are co-essential. But since the maker and the (thing) made are not co-essential, they are not necessarily co-eternal. They are, however, necessarily correlative and simultaneous, for a maker without a (thing) made is not a maker, and a (thing) made without a maker is not a (thing) made. Hence it follows that our reason for saying that the primordial causes of things are co-eternal with God is that they always subsist in God without any beginning in time, (and our reason for saying) that they are not in all respects co-eternal with God is that they receive the beginning of their being not from themselves but from their Creator. But the Creator Himself receives the beginning of His being from no one (275) because He alone is true eternity, without any beginning and any end since He Himself is the Beginning of all things and their End. [For that is not true eternity which receives the beginning of its being from something else (276), but is a participation of true eternity which is *ἀναρχος*, that is, without any beginning. But every creature begins to be, because there was (a time) when it was not. It was in its causes when it was not in its effects (277). Therefore it is not in all respects co-eternal with true eternity (278).]

But if within the very Cause of all causes, I mean in the Trinity, there is understood (to be) some kind of precedence—for the Deity which begets and which sends forth is prior to the Deity which is begotten and the Deity which proceeds from the begetter and the begotten (279), although it is one indivisible Deity—, is it surprising or incredible that the Cause of all causes should precede all things of which it is the Cause, and (yet) that they have been in it immutably and eternally without any beginning in time? If, then, the Father precedes the origins of the things which He made in the Son in the way in which a maker precedes (the things) which he has made, and the Word precedes (the things) which the Father has made in it in the way in which the art of the artist precedes those reasons (280) which are created in it by the artist, why should not the Holy Spirit Who is borne above the abyss of the primordial causes which the Father has created in the Word be understood to precede [those (things) above which it is borne]? Therefore the Holy Spirit, by

That all things are co-eternal but not in all respects co-eternal with the Word

sanctus mysticas aquas quas fouet et foecundat in se ipso aeternaliter aeternitatis suae uirtute et superat et praecedit.

Sed si haec rationabiliter responsa sunt de conditione principiorum, quid ueluti specialiter patri, quid uerbo, quid sancto spiritui attribuendum uidetur plane edisseras flagito. Quanquam enim trium substantiarum diuinae bonitatis una atque eadem communisque credatur et intelligatur esse operatio, nulla tamen differentia ac proprietate dicendum est carere. Sunt enim quae singulis personis ueluti quadam proprietate a sancta theologia distribuuntur, quorum exempla nota tibi esse non dubito [sed ut paucis utamur exemplis proprium patris audiamus diuino ore loquente: 'Dum uenit plenitudo temporum 'misit deus filium suum factum ex muliere factum sub lege;' proprium filii: 'Qui cum in forma dei esset non rapinam arbitratus est esse se 'aequalem deo sed semet ipsum exinaniuit formam serui accipiens,' et reliqua; proprium sancti spiritus in administratione incarnationis uerbi euangelium manifestat dicente angelo de sancta dei genetrice: 'Quod in ea natum est de spiritu sancto est']].

N. Ratiocinationis tuae inuestigatio rata mihi uidetur. Non enim a ueritate opinor deuiare ideoque quod a me postulas conabor inquirere, eo duce qui ad se ipsum inquirendum nos illuminat et inuitat. Videtur itaque mihi conditionis naturarum causaliter proprietatem deo et patri theologiam tribuere. 'In principio,' enim inquit, 'fecit deus caelum et terram,' item alibi: 'Omnia in sapientia 'fecisti,' item: 'Qui fecisti mundum de materia informi,' et alibi: 'Omnia quaecumque uoluit dominus fecit in caelo et in terra, in mari 'et in omnibus abyssis,' et caetera mille. In uerbo autem rationes omnium rerum substantias conditas esse perhibet, praedictis [eisdem] atestantibus testimoniis: 'In principio fecit deus caelum et 'terram,' et: 'Omnia in sapientia fecisti.' Non enim aliud est principium aliud sapientia aliud uerbum sed his omnibus nominationibus unigenitus filius dei in quo et per quem a patre facta sunt proprie significatur. *Apostolus item*, 'In quo uiuimus,' inquit, 'et mouemur et 'sumus.' [Idem: 'Ipse est imago dei inuisibilis primogenitus omnis 'creaturae in quo creata sunt omnia in caelestibus et in terra siue

11-12 Gal. iv. 4 13-14 Phil. ii. 6-7 17 Matth. i. 20 22-23 Gen. i. 1
23-24 Ps. civ. 24 24 Sap. xi. 17 25-26 Ps. cxxxiv. 6 32-33 Actus xvii. 28
33-p. 86, 2 Col. i. 15-16

1 foecundat B^c: fecundat RP: foecundet B* 3 post haec rasura in R
4 lemma quod ad 10 scriptum est hic erasum in B: quid de conditione principiorum specialiter attribui debeat patri filio et spiritui sancto *recenti manu* P 4-5 attribuendum R^cBP: attribuendum R* 5 edisseras RB: edisseras P 9 a s.l. R
10 lemma BRm (*uide ad 4 supra*). *Nomnulla quae legi nequeunt uerba sequuntur in* Rm dubito R^cBP: dubium (?) R* utamur RB: utamen P exemplis s.l. B
13 se deest in R 19 postulas R^cBP: postu****las R* 20 illuminat: illu- in ras. R 22 principio RP: princio B 28 atestantibus RB: attestantibus P

virtue of His eternity, surpasses and precedes the mystical waters which He eternally ferments and fertilizes in Himself.

But if these are reasonable answers to the question concerning the creation of the beginnings, I beg you to explain clearly what is the special role, so to say, which seems to be attributable to the Father, what to the Word, what to the Holy Spirit. For although the operation of the three Substances of the Divine Goodness is believed and understood to be one and the same and common (to all), yet it must be said that it is not without any difference (in each) or property (of each). For there are things which are attributed by God's holy word to each of the Persons as though by proper right, examples of which are doubtless known to you [but, to make use of a few examples, let us hear from the mouth of God (281) the property of the Father: 'When the fulness of time had come God sent His Son, made of a woman, made under the Law;' the property of the Son: 'Who being in the form of God thought it not robbery to be equal to God and yet emptied Himself, receiving the form of a servant,' and so forth; the property of the Holy Spirit in administering the Incarnation of the Word is shown in the Gospel when the angel says of the Holy Mother of God, 'That which is born in her is of the Holy Spirit']].

N. Your thought seems to me to be pursuing its investigation along right lines. For it does not, in my opinion, deviate from the truth, and therefore I shall attempt an inquiry into that which you ask of me, under the guidance of Him Who enlightens and encourages us to inquire of Him. It seems to me, then, that the divine word attributes to God the Father (282) the property of creating natures in their causes. For it says: 'In the Beginning God made heaven and earth,' (and) again in another place: 'Thou madest all (things) in (Thy) Wisdom,' (and) again: 'Thou Who madest the world out of unformed matter,' and in another place: 'All things whatsoever the Lord willed He made in heaven and earth, in the sea and in all the depths,' and (there are) a thousand other (instances). But it (also) asserts that it is in the Word that the substantive reasons of things are created, as these [same] passages which have been quoted witness: 'In the Beginning God made heaven and earth,' and, 'Thou madest all things in (Thy) Wisdom.' For Beginning is not one thing and Wisdom another and the Word another, but by all these names the only begotten Son of God in Whom and through Whom all things are made by the Father is properly (283) signified. *The Apostle also says*: 'In Whom we live and move and have our being' [(and) again: 'He is the image of the invisible God, the Firstborn of every creature, in Whom all (things) are created in the heavenly (regions) and on earth, whether visible

30 sapientia RB: sapientium P 31 patre RP: patreo B facta RB^cP: factu B*
Proprie RB^cP: propriae B* 32 Apostolus item in ras. R 33 Idem RB: id est P

'uisibilia siue inuisibilia siue sedes siue dominationes siue principatus
'et potestates. Omnia per ipsum et in ipso creata sunt.'] Omnium
uero causarum quas pater in uerbo suo uniuersaliter et essentialiter
creauit distributionem spiritui sancto [eandem] theologiam reperimus
applicare. Si enim ipsi diuinarum donationum partitio distributioque
5 teste apostolo datur, cur non etiam primordialium causarum sub-
stantialiter in uerbo dei conditarum diuisio daretur? 'Alii,' enim
563c inquit, 'per spiritum datur sermo sapientiae, [alii sermo scientiae]
'secundum eundem spiritum, alii fides in eodem spiritu, alii autem
'donationes sanitatum in eodem spiritu, alii autem operatio uirtutum,
10 'alii prophetiae, alii discretio spirituum, alii autem genera linguarum,
'alii interpretationes sermonum. Omnia autem haec operatur unus
'atque idem spiritus diuidens propria unicuique prout uult.' Hoc
etiam ex scriptura Geneseos possumus argumentari ubi scriptum est:
'Et spiritus dei fouebat aquas.' Ad quid enim aliud aestimandus est
15 spiritus dei primordialium causarum aquas fouisse foecundasse
nutrisse nisi ut ea quae uniformiter unitimque ac simpliciter in uerbo
563D facta sunt per differentias generum formarum totorumque [ac]
partium numerorumque omnium distribueret atque ordinaret? [Et si
nemo sane credentium recteque intelligentium haesitat affirmare
564A spiritualia dona quae propheta Isaias super caput ecclesiae quod est
21 Christus requietura prophetauit non per alium nisi per spiritum
sanctum deo uerbo incarnato distributa esse, quid mirum si ecclesiae
quae est corpus eius non solum dona gratiae per Christum sed etiam
dona naturae per eundem Christum idem spiritus diuidat et det?
25 Insuper etiam omni creaturae uisibili et inuisibili donum essentiae
tribuit ut sint quae solummodo sunt, donum uitae uiuentibus quo
uiuunt, sentientibus donum sensus quo sentiunt, rationalibus rationis
donum quo naturas rerum ratiocinandi actu uere ac deligenter per-
quirunt et inueniunt, intellectualibus intelligendi donum quo circa
564B deum, causam uidelicet donationum omnium, incognite ac super
31 omnem creaturam uoluuntur ineffabili motu mirabilique reditu.] *Nam*

7-13 1 Cor. xii. 8-11 15 Gen. i. 2 21-22 Is. xi. 2 26-32: cf.
p. 90, 20-23 *infra* 32-p. 88, 1 Zach. iv. 2; Exod. xxv. 31

4 reperimus R^cB: repperimus R^{*P} 5 partitio RB^cP: partio B^{*} 11 spi-
rituum R^cBP: spiritus R^{*} autem *s.l.* B 12 sermonum R^cBP: linguae R^{*}
16 foecundasse RB: fecundasse P 17 *glossa* spiritus dei primordialium
causarum aquas dicitur fouisse foecundasse nutrisse uidelicet ea quae uniformiter
unitimque ac simpliciter in uerbo facta per differentias generum formarum totorum
ac partium numerorumque omnium distributa atque ordinata *recenti manu* P
unitimque R^cBP: unicuique R^{*} 18 totorumque R^cBP: totorum R^{*} 19 *glossa*
donum pro dato in hiis omnibus ponit Rm (*uide infra ad 26*) 20 recteque RB:
rectaeque P intelligentium RB^cP: intilligentium B^{*} 23 incarnato BP^c:
incarnate R: incarnata P^{*} 24 dona RB: dono P 25 idem RB: id est P
26 *glossa* glo donum pro dato in his omnibus posuit dona siquidem gratiae proprie
datum naturae tribuit C *in B* (*uide ad 19 supra*) 27 tribuit *s.l.* R 28 uiuunt

or invisible, whether Thrones or Dominations or Principalities and
Powers. All were created through Him and in Him']. Finally, the
distribution of all the causes which the Father created in His Word
generically and essentially we find allotted by the [same] divine word
to the Holy Spirit. For if to Him, as the Apostle witnesses, is given
the sharing-out and distribution of divine gifts, why should He not
also be given the division of the primordial causes (which are)
substantially created in the Word of God? For he says: 'To one is
given through the Spirit the speaking of wisdom, [to another the
speaking of knowledge] according to the same Spirit, to another faith
in the same Spirit, but to another the gifts of healings in the same
Spirit, but to another the working of miracles, to another prophecies,
to another the discerning of spirits, to another (divers) kinds of
language, to another interpretations of discourses. But all these are
operated by one and the same Spirit, Who dispenses to each as He
wills that which is proper (for each) (284).' This we can also demon-
strate from the Book of Genesis where it is written: 'And the Spirit
of God fermented the waters.' For what is to be understood by the
Spirit of God fermenting, fertilizing (and) nourishing the waters of
the primordial causes except the distribution and ordering of those
things which in the Word are made simply, as of one form and one
(substance), into the differences of all the genera (and) species and
wholes [and] parts and individuals? [And if no one of sound faith
and right understanding hesitates to affirm that the spiritual gifts
which the prophet Isaiah prophesied would rest upon the Head of the
Church, which is Christ, are distributed by no other than the Holy
Spirit upon God the Incarnate Word, what wonder if upon the
Church, which is His Body, the same Spirit should divide and bestow
not only the gifts of grace through Christ, but also the gifts of nature
through the same Christ?

Moreover upon every creature (285) visible and invisible He be-
stows the gift of essence so that those things which possess only being
should be, to living things the gift of life by which they live, to
sentient things the gift of sense by which they perceive sensibly, to
rational beings the gift of reason by which through the act of reason-
ing they inquire into and find out the natures of things truly and
diligently, to intellectual beings the gift of intellect by which they
revolve in an ineffable motion and marvellous return about their God,
about the Cause, that is, of all gifts, in a manner beyond knowledge and
surpassing every creature.] *For* the symbolic candlestick of the prophet

RBP*: uiuent P^c rationalibus BP: rationabilibus R rationis RB: rationes P
29 quo RB: quae P ratiocinandi: -ci *s.l.* B(C) actu uere RB: ac uiuere P
deligenter RB^cP: delegenter B^{*} 31 *post* donationum *erasum est est in R*
incognite RB: incognitae P 32 *Nam in ras.* R(C)B

mysticum Zachariae prophetae candelabrum ut de Mosaico sileam [dum ad id ipsum pertinet mysterium] ecclesiam significat. Lampas uero eius desuper posita paternum est lumen ac uerum quod illuminat omnem hominem uenientem in mundum, dominus noster Iesus Christus, qui quoniam pro nobis ex nobis in nostrae carnis natura et conceptus et natus est et apparuit mundo super candelabrum ecclesiae lampas dicitur dum sit secundum naturam ipsa dei et patris substantialis sapientia et uerbum, super quem primo secundum intelligentiam humanitatis, caput quippe uniuersi corporis ecclesiae est, donationes sancti spiritus quae septenario numero significari solent requiescunt.

Diuina siquidem dona quae per spiritum sanctum distribuuntur ecclesiae quoniam ab uno spiritu distribuuntur ab ipsius capite, Christo dico, inchoantia nomine ipsius spiritus solent significari. Non enim ipse secundum naturam donum dici potest sed distributor donorum, ideoque septiformis dicitur quia plenitudinem diuinorum donorum, quae septenario insinuatur numero, uniuersaliter ecclesiae diuidit ac proprie. Ipse enim spiritus coessentialis est [patri et] filio secundum diuinitatem, super quem [, filium dico,] diuinas donationes quas distribuit requiescere facit secundum humanitatem. 'Et requiescet,' inquit [propheta], 'super eum spiritus dei,' ac si aperte diceret: Et requiescent super eum dona quae diuidit spiritus dei, 'spiritus sapientiae et intellectus, spiritus consilii et fortitudinis, spiritus scientiae et pietatis, et implebit eum spiritus timoris domini', quos omnes spiritus, hoc est quas omnes donationes spiritus, caput ecclesiae quod est Christus primo secundum humanitatem accipiens [corpori suo] ecclesiae suae per spiritum suum partitur. Ipse autem spiritus sanctus sicut [in] natura secundum essentiam subsistit dei et patris sic et [in] filii natura est secundum essentiam quia ex patre *substantialiter* per filium natum ineffabiliter procedit ac per hoc dona quae distribuit non sua solummodo sunt sed et patris ex quo procedit et filii a quo et per quem procedit.

Et ne aestimes multiformes donationes spiritus quibus multiformia peccati genimina expelluntur ab ecclesia penitusque extinguuntur solas per spiritum distributas. Facit enim sapientia interemptionem insipientiae, intellectus stultitiae ablationem, consilium indiscretionis destructionem, fortitudo infirmitatis solutionem, scientia ignorantiae

3-4 Jn. i. 9 4-11 dominus noster-requiescunt: cf. Max. Conf., *Quaest. ad Thalass.*, PG xc. 665A-668B 10-11 cf. Zach., *loc. cit.*; Exod., *loc. cit.*
20-21 Is. xi. 2 22-24 *ibid.*

2-3 Lampas uero eius RB: lampades uero eorum P 3 paternum: pater- *in ras.* R
5 post Christus *s.l.* est, *postea deletum* R(C) natura R^cBP: naturae R* 6 lemma mysticum candelabrum zacarie et de vii. donis spiritus sancti secundum ysaiam Rm
8 super RB: supra P 10 septenario RB: supernario P 11 requiescunt R^cBP: requiescit R* 12 siquidem: -em *in ras.* R(C) 13 post distri-

Zechariah, to say nothing of that of Moses [which symbolizes the same thing], signifies the Church. But its lamp which is placed above it is the Light of the Father and of truth 'which lighteth every man that cometh into the world', our Lord Jesus Christ Who, because He was conceived and born and manifested in the world for us and out of us in the nature of our flesh, is called the lamp above the candlestick of the Church; for by nature it is the substantial Wisdom and Word of God the Father (286), upon Whom rest first (of all), humanly speaking, because He is the Head of the universal body of the Church, the gifts of the Holy Spirit, which are usually signified by the number seven.

For the divine gifts which are distributed through the Holy Spirit to the Church, since their distribution by the one Spirit starts from the Church's Head, I mean Christ, are usually signified by the name of the Spirit Himself. For by nature He cannot be called a gift but the Distributor of gifts, and He is called sevenfold for the reason that He divides among the Church universally and particularly the plenitude of the divine gifts to which the number seven refers. And rightly so; for the Spirit Himself is co-essential with [the Father and] the Son in respect of His Divinity, upon Whom [I mean, upon the Son (287)] in His Humanity He causes the divine gifts which He distributes to rest. 'And,' says [the prophet], 'the Spirit of God shall rest upon Him,' as though he said openly: And there shall rest upon Him the gifts which the Spirit of God divides: 'the spirit of wisdom and understanding; the spirit of counsel and strength; the spirit of knowledge and piety; and He shall be filled with the spirit of the fear of the Lord'; and all these spirits, that is to say, all these gifts of the Spirit, the Head of the Church, which is Christ, first receives in His Humanity and then shares through His Spirit with [His Body] (, that is,) the Church. But the Holy Spirit Himself, as He essentially subsists [in] the nature of God the Father, so also essentially is [in] the nature of the Son since *as substance* He proceeds from the Father through the Son ineffably born (288), and therefore the gifts which He distributes are not only His but the Father's from Whom He proceeds and the Son's from Whom and (289) through Whom He proceeds.

And do not suppose that the manifold gifts of the Spirit by which the manifold seeds of sin are expelled from the Church and utterly destroyed are the only ones distributed through the Spirit. For wisdom takes away unwisdom, understanding removes stupidity, counsel destroys indiscretion, strength dissolves weakness, science abolishes ignorance, piety drives out impiety and the wickedness of the works

buuntur *rasura in R* 18 proprie RB^cP: propriae B* 19 diuinitatem R^cBP: diuini***** R* 21 propheta BP: profeta R(C) 28 post essentiam *erasum est* quia *in R* (cf. P) 28-29 subsistit-essentiam *om. P* 29 substantialiter B^c(C)P: essentialiter RB* 30 procedit BP: procedens R 33 Et ne ac- *in ras.* B
34 extinguntur: *ex-s.l.* R 35 solas RB: sola P

abolitionem, pietas impietatis et in ipsa operum prauitatis persecu-
tionem, timor contemptus abigit caecitatem, *sed* et praeter haec dona
gratiae quibus et purgatur et aedificatur et illuminatur et perficitur
ecclesia bonorum omnium [donationes] quae et secundum essentiam
sunt et secundum naturalia accidentia non aliunde uenire *nemo fidelium*
dubitat nisi ex causa omnium bonorum, ex patre dico ex quo omnia, per
filium in quo sunt omnia, [nec eorum per alium] nisi per spiritum
sanctum *esse distributionem* qui diuidit omnia [omnibus prout uult].

'Omne,' inquit theologus, 'datum optimum et omne donum per-
'fectum desursum est descendens a patre luminum.' Quid apertius,
quid clarius? Non aliunde ait nisi a patre luminum, hoc est a patre
omnium bonorum quae *sunt* secundum naturam et quae *sunt* secun-
dum gratiam. Pulchre siquidem lumina dicuntur omnia dona quae ex
ingenito lumine per genitum lumen descendunt et [per] procedens
lumen prout est capacitas [naturae et largitas gratiae] <in> unius-
cuiusque siue generalis siue specialis siue indiuiduae essentiae sub-
stantiam diuiduntur. Nam quod apostolus ueluti soli homini uidetur
dicere, 'O homo quid habes quod non accepisti?', uniuersaliter omni
creaturae uisibili et inuisibili potest dici. Nulla enim natura est creata
quae habeat <quid> praeter quod a creatrice acceperit. Si enim est [ut
praediximus] inde accepit esse, si uiuit inde uiuere, si sentit inde
sentire, si ratione fruitur inde ratio, si intelligit inde intellectus
ceteraque id genus mille. Si igitur nil in natura rerum creatarum esse
cognoscitur praeter quod a creatore donatur, sequitur nil aliud esse
creaturam siue essentialiter siue secundum accidens nisi creatoris
<data et> dona. Donorum autem distributionem quasi quandam
proprietaem spiritui sancto theologia dedicat. Omnia igitur quae
pater in filio facit spiritus sanctus distribuit et unicuique propria
prout uult diuidit.

Videsne igitur quomodo theologia singulis diuinae bonitatis sub-
stantiis seu personis suas ueluti proprietates dare intelligitur? Patri
enim dat omnia facere, uerbo dat omnes in ipso uniuersaliter essen-
tialiter simpliciter primordiales rerum causas aeternaliter fieri, spiritui
[sancto] dat ipsas primordiales causas in uerbo factas in effectus suos
foecundatas distribuere, hoc est [in] genera et species numeros dif-
ferentiasque siue caelestium <et spiritualium> essentiarum corporibus

8 1 Cor. xii. 11 9-10 Iac. i. 17 12-13 secundum naturam . . . secundum
gratiam: cf. Eriug., *Expos.* i. 1, PL cxxii. 127C 5-6 18 cf. 1 Cor. iv. 7
20-21 ut praediximus: p. 86, 26-32 29 prout uult: 1 Cor. xii. 11

2 contemptus: *glo. interlin.* .i. superbiae B(C) sed *in ras* R(C) 5-6 uenire-
dubitat R^c(C)BP: uenit R* 7 eorum RB: enim P 8 esse distribu-
tionem R^c(C)BP: est distributio R* 12 sunt . . . sunt *s.l.* B(C) 13 *post*
gratiam *erasum est sunt in B* 15 *post lumen rasura in R* 16-17 siue specialis-
substantiam B^c: siue specialis siue indiuiduae essentiae substantiae RB*: siue
specialis essentiae indiuiduae substantiam P 20 quid R*B^c(C)P: *eras.* R^c: *om.*
B* 34 sancto R^c(C): *deest in R*BP* 35 foecundatas RB: fecunditas P

(that are wrought) in it, fear banishes the blindness of contempt
(290); *but* also in addition to these gifts of grace by which the Church
is purified and edified as well as illuminated and perfected (291), [the
donations] of all good (things) which are both of (the Church's)
essence and its natural accidents come, *as none of the faithful doubts*,
from no other source than the Cause of all good (things), I mean, from
the Father, from Whom are all things, through the Son, in Whom are
all things; and [their] distribution *is* [through none other] but the
Holy Spirit, Who divides all [among all as He wills].

'Every good gift and every perfect boon', says the theologian,
'cometh down from the Father of Lights.' What is more explicit,
what more obvious? From no other source, he says, than the Father
of Lights, that is, from the Father of all good (things), those which
are of nature as well as those which are of grace. For well does he call
lights all the gifts which come down from the unbegotten Light
through the begotten Light, and [through] the proceeding Light to
the limits of the capacity [of nature and of the bountifulness of grace]
are divided in the substance of every essence, whether general or
specific or individual. For that which the Apostle appears to say as
though to man alone, 'O, man, what hast thou that thou didst not
receive?', can be universally addressed to every creature whether
visible or invisible. For there is no created nature which has <any-
thing> but that which it has received from the creative <nature>. For
[as we said before] if it is, it receives from that its being; if it lives,
from that its life; if it is sentient, from that its sensible perception;
if it enjoys reason, from that its reason; if it possesses intellect, from
that its intellect (292); and a thousand other things of that kind. If,
then, nothing is known to be in the nature of created things except
what is given by the Creator, it follows that the creature, whether in
essence or accident, is nothing else but the <gifts and> boons of the
Creator. But the divine word reserves the distribution of boons, as
a kind of property, to the Holy Spirit. Therefore all things which
the Father makes in the Son the Holy Spirit distributes and divides
as the property of each as He wills.

Do you then see how the divine word is understood to give to each
of the Substances or Persons of the Divine Goodness as it were its
(special) property? For to the Father it gives the making of all things,
to the Word it gives the coming into being eternally in Him of the
primordial causes of things universally, essentially (and) simply, to
the [Holy] Spirit it gives the distribution of the primordial causes
made in the Son and the fertilization into their effects, that is to say,
[into] the genera and species, the individuals and differences, whether
of the celestial <and spiritual> essences which (either) are wholly
without body or adhere to the very pure and spiritual bodies (which

omnino carentium seu purissimis spiritualibusque corporibus [ex
catholicorum] elementorum simplicitate factis adhaerentium, seu
sensibilium huius mundi uisibilis uniuersalium uel particularium
separatarum locis, temporibus mobilium, qualitate et quantitate
differentium, [primordiales siquidem causas siue uisibili siue in-
uisibili corpore qualitate quoque quantitate in se ipsis omnino carere
non irrationabiliter quis approbarit. Inuisibile autem corpus dicimus
simplicem ac per se intellectam singulorum huius mundi elementorum
subsistentiam, caelestes uero essentias, id est angelicas uirtutes,
quamuis ultra hunc mundum sensibilem suae naturae intellectualis
excellencia non incongrue existimentur esse, non omnino tamen
consultis sanctorum patrum sententiis spiritualibus corporibus
iudicandi sunt carere. Non enim in extraneis sed suis adhaerentibus
sibi semper spiritualibus corporibus sensibus humanis quibus saepe
apparent credendi sunt succumbere] non quia operatio inseparabilis
unitatis diuinarum substantiarum sit segregata—quod enim pater
facit hoc et filius facit [hoc] et spiritus sanctus facit—sed quia diuina
theologia singulis earum proprietates quasdam uidetur distribuere
[ueraciterque intelligitur habere. In sancta siquidem trinitate et
communis operationis cognoscitur unitas et discretarum operationum
non excluditur proprietas. Si enim in ea est essentiae unitas et sub-
stantiarum differentia, cur non et communis operatio atque differens
in ea crederetur et intelligeretur non uideo, ut communi essentiae
communis attribuat operatio et substantiali trinitate trina non
auferatur actio].

A. Video plane et mihi uidetur esse uerisimile ac diuinis eloquiis
conuenire. Sed utinam quadam similitudine ex nostra natura as-
sumpta quoniam deo similis esse perhibetur quae dicta sunt de prop-
rietatibus diuinae administrationis suaderes.

N. Trinitatem nostrae naturae te latere non facile crediderim.

A. Dic quaeso quae sit.

N. Recordarisne quid in prioris libri disputatione inter nos conuene-
rat? Num nobis uisum est nullam naturam esse quae non in his tribus
terminis intelligatur subsistere qui a Grecis ut saepe diximus ΟΥCΙΑ
ΔΥΝΑΜΙC ΕΝΕΡΓΙΑ appellantur, [hoc est] essentia uirtus operatio?

33-35 cf. lib. i. pp. 136, 13-16; 144, 19-21; 180, 15-16

1-2 corporibus—factis R^cBP^c: corporibusque ex elementorum simplicitate factis
R*: corporibusque ex catholicorum elementorum factis P* 2 catholicorum
BP: catholicorum R^c 3 uisibilis RB: sensibilis P 5 lemma celestes
creature spiritualibus corporibus non carent Rm uisibili R^cBP: inuisibili R*
7 irrationabiliter RB^cP: inrationabiliter B* 11 incongrue RB^cP: incongruae
B* existimentur RB: existimantur P esse in ras. R 13 Caue rec. manu in
marg. P carere RB: priuari P 15 credendi RB: credenda P in-
separabilis RB: inseparabiles P 16 unitatis RB^cP: ununitatis B* 17 hoc (2)
R(C)B: ita P 18 singulis RBP^c: singulas P* 19 lemma BRm 24 trini-
tate codd.: lege trinitati cum edd.? 30 lemma exempla nostre trinitatis qui ad

are) made from the simplicity of [the general] elements, or of the
sensible (beings) of this visible world, (whether) of the universals or
of the particulars which occupy separate places and move through
times and are differentiated by quality and quantity. [For one would
not unreasonably agree that the primordial causes are without body
at all, whether visible or invisible, and without quality or quantity in
themselves. But we call an invisible body the simple subsistence of
each of the elements of this world, considered in itself, while the
celestial essences, that is to say, the angelic powers, although they are
not unreasonably regarded as being outside this sensible world by
reason of the excellence of their intelligible nature, yet, to go by the
opinions of the holy fathers, must not be thought entirely lacking in
bodies of a spiritual kind. For they must be believed to be subject to
the human senses, to which they often become manifest, in spiritual
bodies (which are) not foreign (to themselves) but which are their
own and with which they are always associated.]

(It is) not that (293) the operation of the indivisible unity of the
divine Substances is divided—for that which the Father does so does
the Son and [so] does the Holy Spirit—but that the divine word
appears to distribute to each of Them certain (special) properties [and
it is right to understand that they possess them. For in the Holy Trinity
while the unity of a common operation is recognized, the property of
distinct operations is not excluded. For if there is in (the Trinity)
unity of Essence and difference of Substances, I do not see why
a common operation and different (operations) should not also be
believed and understood (to exist) in it, so that the common operation
be attributed to the common Essence without denying threefold action
to the Trinity of Substances].

A. I see (this) clearly (294), and it seems to me probable and to
accord with the divine oracles. But would you please confirm what has
been said about the properties of the divine administration by some
similitude taken from our own nature, since it is said to be in the
likeness of God.

N. I would not easily believe that you are unaware of the trinity
in our own nature.

A. Please tell me what it is.

N. Do you remember the conclusion we reached in our discussion
in the preceding book? Did we not decide that there is no nature
which is not understood to fall under these three terms which by the
Greeks, as we have often said, are called οὐσία, δύναμις, ἐνέργεια
(295) [that is] essence, power, operation?

similitudinem dei facti sumus Rm N. Trinitatem—crediderim om. R* 31 quaeso
BP: quesso R 34 qui a R^cB^c: qui R*: quia B*P 34-35 ΟΥCΙΑ·
ΔΥΝΑΜΙC ΕΝΕΡΓΙΑ RB: CYCΙΑΔΥΝΑΜΙC ΕΝΕΡΓΙΑ P

A. Recordor sane firmissimeque teneo.

N. Nostra itaque natura quae humana dicitur eo quod eam omnes homines participant essentia uirtute operationeque subsistit?

A. Neminem peritorum diuinae philosophiae de hoc dubitare aestimarim.

N. Quid tibi uidetur? Num nostra natura teste sancta scriptura ad imaginem et similitudinem dei condita est?

A. Liberaliter agis. Qui de hoc dubitat homo non est.

N. Putasne ipsum deum qui ad imaginem suam nostram creauit naturam corpus esse an spiritum?

A. Hinc quoque haesitare ridiculum est. Deus enim spiritus est et qui adorant eum in spiritu et ueritate adorant.

N. Non ergo secundum corpus sed secundum animam imago dei nostrae naturae impressa est?

A. Hoc quoque uerissimum est fateri.

de fide N. Deus est trinitas et unitas, hoc est tres substantiae in una essentia et una essentia in tribus substantiis uel personis. Sicut enim Greci ΜΙΑΝ ΟΥΚΙΑΝ ΤΡΕΙΣ ΥΠΟΤΑΞΕΙΣ uel ΤΡΙΑ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ dicunt, id est unam essentiam tres substantias uel tres personas, ita Romani unam essentiam tres substantias uel tres personas, in hoc tamen [uidentur] differre quod Grecos ΜΙΑΝ ΥΠΟΤΑΞΙΝ, id est unam substantiam, dicere non reperimus, Latini uero unam substantiam tres personas frequentissime solent dicere. <Greci dicunt> ΟΜ<Ο>ΟΥΚΙΟΝ ΟΜ<Ο>ΑΓΑΘΟΝ ΟΜΟΘΕΟΝ, hoc est unius essentiae unius bonitatis unius *deitatis* [uel una essentia una bonitas una deitas. Haec *autem* nomina quae apud Grecos inseparabilitatem diuinae naturae insinuant in Romanum sermonem non facile uertuntur et nullo modo ad purum, ut arbitror, ideoque solus eorum intellectus separatim uerbis per ΠΕΡΙΦΡΑΣΙΝ transfertur, ut eorum solummodo uirtus intelligatur quorum interpretatio de uerbo ad uerbum non exprimitur].

A. Hoc totum fides catholica uniuersalis ecclesiae fatetur et quantum datur intelligit, sed quorsum tendunt *ista*?

de imagine N. Non aliorum nisi ut *quaeramus* pro uiribus quomodo trinitas nostrae naturae trinitatis creatricis imaginem et similitudinem [in ipsa] exprimat, hoc est quid [in ea] conuenientius patri et quid filio quid sancto spiritui adiungendum [conuenientius dico quamuis enim conuenienter nostrae naturae trinitas tota totius diuinae trinitatis

6-7 Gen. I. 26 11-12 Ioh. iv. 24

2 natura R^cBP: naturam R* omnes B^cP: omnis RB* 4 diuinae RB: dicitur P 6-7 teste-condita est *alia manu in ras.* R 12 adorant (2) RB: adorare P 13 *post dei add.* in P 16 *lemma* BRm 16-17 in una essentia *s.l.* R 18 ΥΠΟΤΑΞΕΙΣ R*BP: ΥΠΟΤΑΞΕΙΣ R^c 19 *lemma* quod latini personas dicunt greci substantias Rm 19-20 *ita-personas om.* P 21 uidentur differre R^c(C)BP: differunt R* MIAN B^cP: ΜΟΝΗΝ RB*

A. I certainly remember and most firmly have (it in mind).

N. Therefore our nature, which is called human because all men participate in it, consists of essence, power, and operation?

A. I should think that no one of those skilled in theology would have any doubt about that.

N. How does it seem to you? Is not our nature, according to Holy Scripture, created in the image and likeness of God?

A. You must be mocking me (296). He who doubts this is not a man.

N. Do you think that the God Who created our nature in His image is a body or a spirit?

A. Concerning this too it would be ridiculous to hesitate, for 'God is a spirit, and those who worship Him worship in spirit and in truth'.

N. Therefore it is not in the body but in the soul that the image of God is stamped on our nature?

A. This also is very true.

N. God is Trinity and Unity, that is, three Substances in one Essence and one Essence in three Substances or Persons. For as the Greeks say *μίαν οὐσίαν τρεῖς ὑποστάσεις* or *τρία πρόσωπα*, that is, One Essence three Substances or three Persons, so the Romans (say) unam essentiam tres substantias (297) or tres personas; but [they appear] *to differ* in that we do not find the Greeks saying *μίαν ὑπόστασιν*, that is, one Substance, whereas the Latins most frequently say unam substantiam tres personas. <The Greeks say> *ομοούσιον ὁμοάγαθον ὁμόθεον*, that is, of one essence, of one goodness, of one *deity* [or one essence, one goodness, one deity. *But* these terms which among the Greeks signify the indivisibility of the Divine Nature do not go easily into Roman speech, and never do so exactly, I think; and therefore their meaning is only translated in separate words by *περίφρασις*, so that their sense only is understood while the translation is not word for word].

A. All this the catholic faith of the universal Church professes and as far as possible understands, but where does *this* lead us?

N. Nowhere else but that we may *inquire* as best we may how the trinity of our nature expresses [in itself] the image and likeness of the creative Trinity, that is, what [in it] more appropriately applies to the Father, and what to the Son, (and) what to the Holy Spirit. [I say more appropriately because although the whole trinity of our nature is an appropriate image of the whole Divine Trinity, the whole (of it) bearing the image of the Father, the whole (of it) the image of the

22 *post* substantiam *rasura in B* reperimus B: repperimus RP 24 OMA-ΓΑΘΟΝ RB: ΟΜΟΛΑΘΟΝ P ΟΜΟΘΕΟΝ: -Ο- (2) *s.l.* R 25 *deitatis* R^c(C)BP: dei R* 26 *autem* B^c(C)P: enim RB* diuinae R^cBP: animae R* 29 ΠΕΡΙΦΡΑΣΙΝ RB: ΠΕΡΙΦΡΑΣΙΝ P 33 *ista* R^c(C): haec R*: *istac* BP 34 *quaeramus*: -uae- *in ras.* R 37 *lemma* B

imago est—tota enim patris tota filii tota spiritus sancti imaginem gerit—in ea tamen est quod ueluti specialius singulis personis accommodari posse uidetur, ut arbitror. Nam et in se ipsa nostra trinitas tota in singulis suis est. Sua enim essentia et uirtus et operatio est, sua uirtus et essentia et operatio, sua operatio et essentia est et uirtus, sicut et pater in filio et in spiritu sancto, et filius in patre et in spiritu sancto, et spiritus sanctus in patre et filio est].

A. Nil mihi probabilius occurrit quam ut patris imaginem essentia, filii uirtus, spiritus sancti operatio nostrae naturae accommodet. Paterna siquidem substantia quae de se substantiam filiatam genuit et procedentem substantiam ex se emisit non immerito principalis dicitur substantia, non quod una essentia sit sanctae trinitatis [separabilis]—est enim una atque indiuidua—sed quod substantialibus differentiis dum sit una non careat. Est enim deitas genitrix et deitas genita et procedens deitas dum sit una deitas indiuidua, non tamen substantialibus differentiis indiscreta.

de trina et una deitate

Virtus quoque non incongrue deo filio adiungitur quoniam saepe uirtus patris a theologia nominatur; sed ut unum a pluribus testimoniis accipiamus audi apostolum: 'Inuisibilia enim eius per ea quae facta sunt intellecta conspiciuntur, sempiterna quoque eius uirtus et aeternitas.' In hoc enim loco uirtutem patris sapientiam patris [filium dico] intelligimus, aeternitatem uero spiritum sanctum teste Maximo uenerabili magistro. [Nam quod spiritus sanctus uirtutis nomine in scripturis solet appellari testatur euangelium domino dicente mulierem ΑΙΜΑΡΥΚΑΝ, hoc est fluxum sanguinis patientem, sanans: 'Sensi a me exisse uirtutem,' hoc est spiritum sanctum qui diuidit dona sanitatum.]

Quid dicam de operatione essentiali nostrae naturae? Nonne aptissime sancto spiritui copulatur cui ueluti proprie operatio uirtutum diuinarumque donationum et uniuersaliter et proprie unicuique diuisio tribuitur?

In naturæ igitur nostrae essentia paternae substantiae, in uirtute uero substantiae filii, in operatione substantiae spiritus sancti proprietates dinoscitur.

19–21 Rom. i. 20 21 aeternitas *codd.*: diuinitas *Vulg.* 21–22 In hoc spiritum sanctum: hoc apud Maximum non inueni 22 *cf. p.* 184, 27–31 *infra*
24–26 mulierem—uirtutem: *cf. p.* 196, 23–24 *infra* 26 Luc. viii. 46

2–3 accommodari RP: accomodari B 5 post operatio (1) *add. est RB**
6–7 et filius—sancto *om. P* 7 post sancto *rasura in R* 9–11 hoc loco, ubi nonnulli codices terminantur alii uero incipiunt (quos omnes in introductione ad prius uolumen, p. 25, adn. I, enumeravi), figuram quadratam angulis oppositis coniunctis habet in marg. R 10 filiatam B^cP: filiilitatis RB* 11 procedentem B^cP: procesionis RB* immerito B^c: inmerito RB*P 13 post quod *rasura in B* 14 lemma B genitrix R^cB^c: genitrix R*B*P 14–15 deitas genita RB: genita deitas P 21 aeternitas *codd.*: diuinitas *Vulg.* 24 solet RB^cP:

Son, the whole (of it) the image of the Holy Spirit, yet there is in it (something) that as it were in a more special sense seems, I think, capable of being connected with each Person severally. For even (considered) in itself our trinity is present as a whole in each (of its members). For its essence is both power and operation, its power both essence and operation, its operation both essence and power, in the same way as the Father is both in the Son and the Holy Spirit, the Son both in the Father and the Holy Spirit, the Holy Spirit both in the Father and the Son.]

A. Nothing seems to me more likely than that the essence of our nature is accommodated to the image of the Father, its power (to that) of the Son, its operation (to that) of the Holy Spirit. For the paternal Substance which brought forth from itself the filiated Substance and the proceeding Substance is not unreasonably called the principal Substance—not that the one Essence of the Holy Trinity is [separable]—for it is one and indivisible—, but being one it is yet not without difference of substance. For it is the Deity which begets and the Deity which is begotten and the Deity which proceeds, though He be one indivisible Deity, even though it is not indistinguishable in differences of substance.

Concerning the Deity which is Three and One

Also, the power (of our nature) not inappropriately appertains to God the Son, for He is often called by the divine word the Power of the Father (298); but to take a single instance out of many, hear the Apostle: 'For the invisible things of Him are seen to be understood by means of the things that are made, and so are His everlasting Power and His Eternity (299);' for in this passage we understand the Power of the Father (to be) the Father's Wisdom [I mean, the Son], while the Eternity (we understand to be) the Holy Spirit, according to the venerable master Maximus. [For that the Holy Spirit is customarily called by the name of Power in the Scriptures the Gospel testifies when the Lord says, as He is healing (300) the woman (who is) αἰμορροῦσα, that is, afflicted with an issue of blood: 'I perceived power go out of Me,' that is, the Holy Spirit which dispenses the gifts of healing (301)].

What should I say of the essential operation of our nature? Does it not most aptly appertain to the Holy Spirit, to Whom is attributed, as His (special) property so to speak, the operation of the powers and the distribution of the divine gifts both uniuersally (to all) and particularly to each?

Thus, in the essence of our nature is recognized the property of the paternal Substance; in its power (that of) the Substance of the Son; in its operation (that of) the Substance of the Holy Spirit.

solet B* 25 ΑΙΜΑΡΥΚΑΝ RB: ΑΙΝΑΡΥΚΑΝ P 30 proprie RB^cP:
Propriae B* 32 essentia RB^cP: essentiae B*

N. Responsonem tuam a ueritate non discrepare arbitror, sed uide: quid tibi uidetur de famosissima nostrae naturae trinitate quae in intellectu et ratione et sensu intelligitur? Num dissonat ab ea quam praediximus an una eademque et haec et ipsa et non duae quaedam unius eiusdemque nostrae naturae? Sensum autem dico non exteriorem sed interiorem. Nam interior coessentialis est rationi atque intellectui, exterior uero quamuis plus ad animam pertinere [quam ad corpus] uideatur non tamen essentiam animae constituit sed ut aiunt Greci coniunctio quaedam est animae et corporis. Soluta enim corpore et recedente uita paenitus interimitur. Nam si in anima maneret et ad substantiam eius pertineret eo profecto etiam extra corpus uteretur, at uero quia sine corpore eo nec utitur nec uti potest relinquatur nec in corpore soluto manere nec animae regimen corporis deserenti adhaerere [nam et ipsa diffinitio qua sanctus Augustinus exteriorem sensum uoluit diffinire intra substantialia animae partes non uidetur connumerari: 'Sensus est,' inquit, 'passio corporis per se ipsam non 'latens animam.' Item alia quae dicit, 'Sensus est sensibilibus rerum 'ΦΑΝΤΑCΙΑ per instrumenta corporis assumpta,' similiter naturae animae non uidetur eum coniungere sed uelut internuntium corporis et animae constituere]. Et si quis intentius Graecae linguae proprietatem perspexerit duorum sensuum in nomine proprietatem reperiet. In ea enim ΝΟΥC intellectus dicitur, ΛΟΓΟC ratio, ΔΙΑΝΟΙΑ sensus non ille exterior sed interior, et in his tribus essentialis trinitas animae ad imaginem dei constitutae subsistit. Est enim intellectus et ratio et sensus qui dicitur interior et essentialis, exterior uero quem corporis et animae copulam diximus ΑΙCΘΗCΙC [uocatur], instrumenta autem in quibus possidet ΑΙCΘΗΤΗΡΙΑ quasi ΑΙCΘΗCΕΟC ΤΗΡΙΑ, hoc est sensus custodiae, in eis enim sensus custoditur et operatur; et sunt numero v: uisus auditus olfactus gustus tactus.

Nec te mouere debet quod nominibus quinquepertiti sensus quinquepertitum eius instrumentum appellarim. Nam frequentissimus et communis locutionis et sanctae scripturae usus est sedes sensuum ipsorum sensuum nominibus appellare. Visus enim uocatur oculus et auris auditus caeterique similiter sensus suis instrumentis

8-9 cf. Plato, *Theaet.* 184DE; Max. Conf., *I Ambig.* vi. 3, PG xci. 1113A 6; p. 106 infra 16-17 Aug. *De quant. anim.* xxiii. 41, PL xxxii. 1058; cf. *De mus.* vi. 5, 10 17-18 cf. Aug. *De gen. ad. litt.* iii. 5, 7, PL xxxiv. 282; *De mus.* vi. 10, PL xxxii. 1169 27 cf. lib. i, p. 162, 1-3

2-3 quae in intellectu R^c(C)B^c(C): quia intellectu R*: quae intellectu B*P
3 intelligitur: glo. interlin. .i. ΘΕΩΡΙΑ erasa in B Num dissonat in ras. R
8 constituit in ras. R 10 paenitus B: penitus R: poenitus P 12 at
RB*P: aut B* eo nec utitur RB: conecitur P 14 lemma B 16 con-
numerari R*BP: connumerare R* inquit s.l. R passio BP^c: pasio R: om.
P* ipsam RB: ipsum P 19 eum coniungere RB: connumerari
P 21 sensuum R*BP: sensum R* nomine conieci: homine codd.
22 intellectus BP: intelletus R 26 lemma cur dicatur quinquepertitus sensus Rm

N. I think your reply does not disagree with the truth; but consider: What is your opinion of that very much spoken-of trinity of our nature which is understood (to consist) of intellect and reason and sense (302)? Is it something different from the one we have just mentioned or are this and that one and the same, and not two (trinities) in our nature (which is) one and the same? Now by sense I mean not the exterior but the interior. For it is the interior which is co-essential with reason and intellect, while the exterior, although it seems to belong more to the soul [than to the body], yet does not constitute the essence of the soul but, as the Greeks say (303), is a kind of conjunction of soul and body. For when the body perishes and life departs it disappears entirely. For if it remained in the soul and belonged to its substance, then (the soul) would make use of it even without the body, but since in fact without the body it neither does nor can do so, one is left with the conclusion that it neither remains in the body when it perishes nor does it continue with the soul when she ceases to control the body. [For even that definition by which St. Augustine wished to define exterior sense clearly does not (make it) belong to the substantial parts of the soul. 'Sense', he says, 'is (304) a passion of the body of which the soul as such is not unaware.' Also another (definition) according to which 'sense is the φαντασία of sensible things assumed through the instruments of the body' similarly does not seem to attach it to the nature of the soul, but makes it a kind of messenger between body and soul.]

And if one examines more carefully the semasiology (305) of the Greek language one will find that the word has two senses (306). For in that language intellect is called νοῦς, reason λόγος, and sense διάνοια; (but) this (does) not (mean) exterior but interior (sense), and it is of these three that the essential trinity of the soul constituted in the image of God subsists. For (the trinity of the soul) is intellect and reason and the sense that is called interior and essential, while the exterior which we have described as a link between body and soul [is called] αἰσθησις, and the instruments in which it resides (are called) αἰσθητήρια for αἰσθήσεως τήρια, that is, the guardians of sensation, for in them sense is guarded and functions; and they are five in number: sight, hearing, smell, taste, touch. And it ought not to worry you that the fivefold instrument is named after the fivefold sense. For a very frequent usage both in common speech and in Holy Scripture calls the seat of the senses by the names of the senses themselves. For the eye is called sight and the ear hearing and the other senses also have their instruments named after them (307). But sense is called

27 ΑΙCΘΗΤΗΡΙΑ RB: ΑΙCΘΗΝΤΗΡΙΑ P post ΑΙCΘΗΤΗΡΙΑ erasum est uocatur in R ΑΙCΘΗCΕΟCΤΗΡΙΑ RB: ΑΙCΘΗ CΗΟCΤΗΡΙΑ P 30 Nec te RB: nocte P 32 sensuum: -nsuum in ras. R 34 auris RBP^c: aures P*

The definition of exterior sensation

significationem praestant. Non autem propterea quinquepartitus
sensus dicitur quod in se ipso quinario numero diuidatur—est enim
simplex et uniformis et in corde ueluti principali sede possidet—sed
quod per quinquepartitum corporis instrumentum ueluti per quas-
dam cuiusdam ciuitatis portas sensibilibus rerum *similitudines ex*
qualitatibus et quantitibus exterioris mundi uenientes [caeterisque
quibus sensus exterior formatur] interius recipiat et ueluti ostiarius
quidam internuntiusque ea quae extrinsecus introducit praesidenti
interiori sensui annuntiet.

A. Neque me mouet [sensuum nominibus eorum instrumenta
significari] neque duorum sensuum differentia quam ad purum dis-
creuisti me latet, ut opinor, et quid de praedicta trinitate naturae
nostrae sentio pro ingenioli mei captu edisseram. Duae trinitates
uidentur esse quibus nostra natura quantum ad imaginem dei facta
est probatur subsistere, sed consulta ueritate non re ipsa sed solis
nominibus a se inuicem discrepare reperiuntur. Nam N(O)YC et
OYCIA, hoc est intellectus et essentia, excelsissimam nostrae naturae
partem significant [immo excelsissimum motum. Siquidem ut tu
ipse intelligis non aliud est nostrae naturae esse et aliud moueri.
Essentia enim eius est motus circa deum [²et creaturam]² stabilis et
mobilis status. Sed dum mouetur circa deum qui superat omnia
summus motus eius dicitur, dum uero circa primordialia causas
uersatur quae proximae immediate post deum sunt ueluti medio quo-
dam moderamine intelligitur moueri, quando autem primordialium
causarum effectus siue uisibiles siue inuisibiles perspicere conatur
extremum sui motum pati dinoscitur, non quia idem motus substan-
tialis augeri uel minui in se ipso possit sed quod secundum dignitatem
rerum circa quas uoluitur et minimus et medius et maximus esse
iudicatur].

Essentia itaque animae nostrae est intellectus qui uniuersitati
humanae naturae praesidet [quia circa deum supra omnem naturam
incognite circumuehitur]. ΛΟΓΟC uero uel ΔΥΝΑΜΙC, hoc est ratio
uel uirtus, secundam ueluti partem insinuat [non irrationabiliter quia
circa principia rerum quae primo post deum sunt circumferuntur].
Tertia uero pars ΔΙΑΝΟΙΑC et ΕΝΕΡΓΙΑC, id est sensus et operationis,
uocabulis denominatur [et ueluti extremum humanae animae obtinet

30-p. 102, 2 Essentia-circumuehitur: cf. p. 106, 8-29 infra

1 quinquepartitus B: quinquepartitus R: quinqueperititus P 4 quod per
RB: per quod P 5-6 similitudines-quantitatibus in ras. R(C) 6 exter-
ioris mundi R(C)BP: exteriori mundo R* caeterisque RB: caeterosque P
7 ostiarius B: hostiarius RP 8 internuntiusque RB: internuntius quae P*:
internuntius P^c 9 annuntiet B: adnuntiet RP 10-11 nominibus-sensuum
om. P 12 praedicta RB: praedicti P 19 intelligis RB^cP: intelligis B*

fivefold not because it is in itself divided into five parts—for it is
simple (308) and uniform and resides in the heart as its principal seat
—but because it is through the fivefold instrument of the body, as
though through the five gates of a city, that it receives within *likenesses*
(309) of sensible (things) originating *from the qualities and quantities* of
the outside world [and from the other things by which the exterior
sensation is formed] and like a gate-keeper and messenger announces
to the presiding interior sense whatever it lets in from outside (310).

A. It does not worry me [that the names of the senses are given to
their instruments] nor am I unaware, as I think, of the difference
between the two (kinds of) sense which you have clearly distinguished;
and with such power of comprehension as my feeble intellect possesses
I shall say what I perceive about the aforesaid trinity of our nature.

There seem to be two trinities in which our nature is shown to
subsist in so far as it is made in the image of God, but if the truth be
consulted they are found to differ from each other not in reality but
only in name. For νοῦς and οὐσία, that is, intellect and essence,
denote the highest part of our nature [or rather, its highest motion.
For, as you yourself understand, it is not one thing for our nature to
be and another thing for it to move. For its essence is its motion-in-
rest and rest-in-motion about God (311) [²and the creature]². But
when it moves about God, Who surpasses all things, this is called its
highest motion; while when it turns about the primordial causes which
are closest to God and come next after Him, it is understood, as it
were, to moderate its motion somewhat; but when it attempts to
perceive the effects of the primordial causes, whether visible or in-
visible, it is recognized to be going through its lowest motion—not
because what is the same substantial motion (312) can itself become
greater or less, but because it is thought of as being least or moderate
or greatest according to the status of the objects about which it turns].
Therefore (313) the essence of our soul is the intellect which presides
over the totality of human nature [because it is carried about God
above every nature (and) beyond knowledge (314)].

But λόγος (315) or δύναμις, that is, reason or power, signifies, as
it were, the second part [not unreasonably, since they are carried
about the principles of things, which are first after God]. The third
part, however, is denoted by the names of διάνοια and ἐνέργεια,
that is, sensation and operation, [and occupies, as it were, the lowest

20 lemma quod ad 21 inuenitur hoc in loco erasum in B 21 lemma B
22 summus B^c(C)P: maximus RB* dicitur RB: datur P 23 proximae BP:
proxime R immediate RB^c: in medietate B*: inmedietate P 25 uisibiles
RB: uisibilis P inuisibiles RB: inuisibilis P 30 itaque in ras. R uni-
uersitati RB: uniuersitate P 32 ΔΥΝΑΜΙC B: ΔΙΝΑΜΙC RP 34 circum-
feruntur RB: circumfertur P

locum, nec inmerito quoniam circa effectus causarum primordialium siue uisibiles siue inuisibiles sint circunuoluitur]. Ac per hoc non duas substantiales trinitates sed unam eandemque ad similitudinem creatoris sui conditam oportet nos intelligere.

Sed miror qua de causa uitam ipsam quae a Grecis ΤΡΕΦΘΙΚΗ et 5
ΑΥΧ<H>ΤΙΚΗ uocatur, a nostris uero nutritiua et auctiua—nutrit
enim corpora et incrementum eis praestat—, nec ueluti quartam 570D
substantialem humanae naturae partem nec intra substantialem trini-
tatem connumeratam a te uideo ac ueluti paenitus praetermissam
et nullo modo ad naturae nostrae constitutionem pertinentem. 10

N. Ne mireris. Non enim sine causa hoc fecimus *siquidem* nunc
non de uniuersa humana natura sermo est quae ueluti quinque parti- 571A
bus, *hoc est corpore* uitali [que] motu sensu et ratione constare uide-
tur et intellectu, sed de ea solummodo parte in qua imago et similitudo
conditoris perspicitur, hoc est de intellectu et ratione et sensu interiori 15
uel, ut ita dicam, essentia uirtute operatione. In hoc enim ternario
summae ac sanctae trinitatis imago expressa cognoscitur. Nam de uitali
motu [quo anima] corpus et nutrit et in unum colligit et uiuificat et
ministrat eique incrementum dat [deque ipso corpore quod totius
creaturae extremum obtinet locum] alius disserendi locus erit dum 20
<in quarto libro> de naturis sensibilibus deo duce disputabitur. Quae
pars quoniam extra proprietatem intelligibilis nostrae essentiae qua
ad imaginem dei conditi sumus dinoscitur propterea a nobis prae- 571B
sentialiter intermissa est dum sit motus quidam [extra naturam
primordialiter conditam] substantiali nostrae operationi quae sensus 25
interior ut diximus uocatur [subiectus inque poenam peccati additus]
quo uidelicet motu ea quae post peccatum humanae naturae super-
addita sunt administrat, corpus hoc corruptibile dico atque mortale
locis temporibusque uarium, partium suarum numero discretum,
spatiis distentum, incrementis decrementisque subditum, qualitibus 30
quantitatibusque diuersis subiectum, ad omnes irrationabiles motus
pronus, carnalis adhuc animae merito suae inoboedientiae super-
biaeque diuersis calamitatibus inuolutae hospitium, caeteraque quae
de infelicitate in hanc uitam humanae naturae ex felicitate paradisi 571C
expulsae et dici et experimento cognosci possunt. 35

Motus itaque humanae naturae ad ea administranda quae sibi ad
uindictam praeuaricationis diuini praecepti adiuncta sunt—uindictam

2 siue (1): si- s.l. B sint om. B* 5 ΤΡΕΦΘΙΚΗ RB: ΤΡΕΦΕΙΚΗ P
6 nutritiua R^cBP: nutritiua R* auctiua RB: actiua P 7 quartam R^cBP:
quantam R* 8 substantialem: -anti* s.l. R 9 connumeratam RB^c:
con***numeratam B*: et connumeratam P paenitus B: penitus RP 11 si-
quidem in ras. R 12 post non deletum est enim in P 12-13 post partibus
rasura in R 13 hoc est corpore in ras. R 16 uirtute RB^cP: uirtutum B*
17 expressa BP: expressa R 18 motu in ras. R: moto B* 20 creaturae RB^cP:
creatore B* disserendi BP: deserendi R 22 qua om. P 23 a nobis in ras. B

place in the human soul; not unreasonably, for it revolves about the
effects of the primordial causes, whether they *be* visible or invisible].
So, we should understand that there are not two substantial trinitates,
but one and the same, created in the likeness of the Creator.

But I wonder why I do not see that life-principle which is called
by the Greeks *θρεπτική* and *αύξητική* and by our (writers) nutritive
and auctive—for it nourishes the body and gives it increase—included
by you either as a fourth substantial part of our nature or within the
substantial trinity, but as it were wholly omitted as though it did not
belong to the constitution of our nature at all.

N. Do not wonder, for it is not without reason that we have done
this, since our discourse is not at the moment concerned with the
whole of human nature, which is seen to consist, as it were, of five
parts, that is, body [and] vital motion, sense and reason, and intellect;
but only with that part in which the image and likeness of the Creator
is seen, that is, with intellect, reason, and interior sense, or, so to say,
with essence, power, (and) operation. For it is in this triad that the
image of the most high and holy Trinity is known to be expressed.

For concerning the vital motion [by which the soul] nourishes and
unifies and quickens and administers the body as well as giving it
increase [and concerning the body itself which occupies the lowest
position in the whole creation] there will be a place for discussion
elsewhere when <in the fourth book> the discourse will be, under
God's guidance, of the sensible natures. For since it is recognized
that this part (316) lies outside the property of our intelligible essence
in which we are created in the image of God, it has for this reason
been ignored by us for the present since it is a certain motion [outside
our nature (as it was) primordially created] [subjoined to, and as
a penalty for sin added to] our substantial operation which is called,
as we have said, interior sense; by which, that is, (by which) motion,
it administers those things which have been added to human nature
after sin, I mean this body, corruptible and mortal and variable in
places and times, divisible into the number of its parts, extended in
spaces, susceptible to increases and decreases, subject to diverse
qualities and quantities, prone to every irrational motion, the shelter
of the soul while it is still carnal (and) involved in all kinds of disasters
as punishment for its disobedience and pride, and all the other things
which are spoken of and known by experience concerning the un-
happiness of human nature thrust from the happiness of paradise into
this life.

So the motion by which human nature administers those things
which are joined to it in retribution for violation of the divine

25 operationi R^cBP: operationis R* 26 inque RB^c: in quae B*: in quo P
34 hanc R^cBP: hac R* paradisi RB: paradysi P 35 et (2) om. P

autem dico non irascentis dei ultionem sed miserentis exerci-
tationem—non *irrationabiliter* extra terminos essentialis nostrae
trinitatis relinquitur. [Et ne aestimes nos his uerbis docere uelle
praedictam humanae naturae trinitatem ad imaginem dei in paradiso
conditam priusquam peccaret omnino corpore caruisse. Absit absit
a nobis hoc credere aut *ullo* modo putare! Semel enim et simul animas
nostras et corpora in paradiso conditor creauit—corpora dico caelestia
spiritualia qualia post resurrectionem futura sunt. Tumida nanque
corpora mortalia corruptibilia quibus nunc opprimimur non ex natura
sed ex delicto occasionem ducere non est dubitandum.] Quod ergo
naturae ex peccato adoleuit eo profecto renouata in Christo [et in
pristinum statum restituta carebit—non enim potest naturae esse
coaeternum quod ei adhaeret propter peccatum—]; et intra sub-
stantiales eius constitutiones non *connumerari* non incongruum ut
arbitror <non ut et illud superadditum pereat sed ut in illud quod
primo est conditum transeat et unum cum illo fiat non quasi duo sed
unum incorruptibile et spirituale per gratiam dei uerbi qui non solum
in nostra naturalia uerum etiam in superaddita nobis discenderat ut
omnia nostra in se ipso restauraret et desuper adiectis naturaliter
insita faceret qui fecit utraque unum>.

A. Plane non incongruum sed ratae subtilique inuestigationi et
inuentioni rationabilis naturae conuenientissimum. Quorsum uero
haec nondum uideo.

N. Patiens esto. Non enim res parua inter nos quaeritur nec nisi
multis diligentissime ratiocinationis ambagibus et inuestigari et in-
ueniri potest—si tamen ad purum inueniri potest. Nulli enim mortali
sensui quamuis uideatur acute inquirere licet hoc promittere ne
incautus redarguatur esse [quod suas uires superat inuenire per se
ipsum promittens. Nam si inuenitur non ipse qui quaerit sed ipse qui
quaeritur et qui est lux mentium inuenit]. Quaerimus *nanque* ni fallor
quomodo ex argumento substantialis trinitatis nostrae naturae ad
imaginem dei creatae summam illam trinitatem [quae deus est]
eiusque ueluti proprias in natura condita operationes singulis *personis*
distributas possumus inuestigare.

A. Id ipsum nunc non aliud quaerimus et ordo rerum exigit ut
sic ueritatem quaeramus [—argumento siquidem imaginis ipsa ueritas

2 irrationabiliter *in ras.* R 3 relinquitur RB^c(C)P: relinquuntur B* 4 para-
diso RB: paradyso P 5 peccaret R*BP: peccare R^c 6 ullo B^c(C)P: quo-
dam RB* 7 paradiso RB: paradyso P 9 opprimimur RB:
opprimitur P 11 adoleuit RB: adolente P 13 quod R^cBP: quo R*
14 connumerari RB: computari P: -merari *erasum et in marg. restauratum C in R*
ut *s.l.* R 22 inuentioni RB: inuentione P 24 Patiens RB: Paciens
P 25 diligentissime B: diligentissimae RP 25-26 inueniri RP: inueneri B
26 *post mortali rasura in R* 27 ne RB: nec P 28 redarguatur RB:
redarguitur P 28-29 per se ipsum *s.l.* R 29 qui (1) *s.l.* R 29 quaerit RB^cP:
quaeritur B* 30 nanque BP: namque R^c(C): enim R* 32 dei *om.* P

command—but by retribution I do not mean the vengeance of an angry
God but the chastening of a merciful one—is not unreasonably left
outside the bounds of our essential trinity. [And do not suppose that
we wish by these words to teach that the aforesaid trinity of human
nature created in paradise in the image of God was, before it sinned,
without any body at all. Far, far be it from us to believe this or in any
way think it! For the Creator made our souls and bodies all at once
in paradise—by bodies I mean celestial (and) spiritual bodies such
as they will be after the resurrection. For it must not be doubted that
the puffed up, mortal, and corruptible bodies with which we are now
encumbered take their origin not from nature but from sin.]

Therefore, that which has grown on to our nature in consequence
of sin, once (our nature) is renewed in Christ [and restored to its former
state, it will be without—for that cannot be co-eternal with nature
which is attached to it on account of sin—]; and it is not unreasonable,
I think, that it should not be counted among the constituent parts of
its substance—<not that even that which has been superadded will
perish, but it will pass into that which was created in the beginning,
and will become one with that, not as two (entities) but an incorrup-
tible and spiritual One, through the grace of God the Word Who had
descended not only into that which is of our nature but also into that
which was superadded so that He might restore in Himself all that
is ours, and so that He Who made both might make the things which
are naturally part of us one with those that were, in addition, attached
to them from above>.

A. Certainly it is not unreasonable, but in strictest accord with
what a rational nature would find by a valid and subtle investigation.
But as yet I do not see where this (leads).

N. Be patient. For it is no trivial inquiry that we are embarked
upon nor one which can be investigated or brought to a conclusion
except by many devious approaches of a most precise reasoning if,
indeed, it can ever be wholly concluded. For no mortal sense, how-
ever shrewd its inquiry may seem, can give assurance of this without
incurring the charge of rashness [because he who undertakes to find
the solution by himself surpasses his own powers. For if it is found
it is not he who searches but He Who is sought and Who is the Light
of our minds (317) Who finds it]. For, unless I am mistaken, we are
inquiring how we can argue from the substantial trinity of our nature
created in the image of God to that most high Trinity [which is God],
and *the distribution to each of the Persons* of their proper operations,
so to speak, in created nature.

A. This it is which we are now seeking and nothing else; and the
proper procedure (318) requires that we should seek the truth in this
33-34 -is personis distributas *in ras.* R 35 *post ipsum rasura in R*

cuius imago est quaerenda est—] quae quanto studiosius laboriosius-
que inquiritur tanto ardentius deligitur et apertius inuenitur. Quid
enim prodest illa uelocitas quam pura ueritatis contemplatio effugit
aut quid nocet ipsa tarditas cui desiderata facies occurrit?

N. Itaque ratiocinationis nostrae exordium ex uerbis uenerabilis
Maximi sumamus, non eisdem *sermonibus* connexim sed eodem sensu
utentes.

A. Ingredere quoquo modo uis ratiocinandi uiam.

de tribus
motibus
animae

N. Tres uniuersales motus animae sunt quorum primus est
secundum animum secundus secundum rationem tertius secundum
sensum. Et primus quidem simplex est et supra ipsius animae
naturam et interpretatione caret [hoc est cognitione ipsius circa quod
mouetur], ‘per quem circa deum incognitum mota nullo modo ex
‘ullo eorum quae sunt ipsum propter sui excellentiam cognoscit’ sec-
undum quod quid sit [hoc est in nulla essentia seu substantia uel in
aliquo quod dici uel intelligi ualeat eum reperire potest; superat enim
omne quod est et quod non est et nullo modo diffiniri potest quid
sit]. Secundus uero motus est quo ‘incognitum’ deum ‘diffinit
‘secundum quod causa’ omnium sit. Diffinit enim deum causam
omnium esse et est motus iste intra animae naturam ‘per quem
‘ipsa naturaliter mota omnes naturales rationes omnium formatrices
‘quae in ipso cognito solummodo per causam’ [—cognoscitur enim quia
causa est—] ‘aeternaliter factae subsistunt operatione scientiae sibi
‘ipsi imponit,’ hoc est in se ipsa per earum cognitionem exprimit
ipsaque cognitio a primo motu *nascitur in secundo*. Tertius motus est
‘compositus, per quem quae extra sunt’ anima ‘tangens ueluti ex
‘quibusdam signis apud se ipsam uisibilium rationes reformat.’ Qui
compositus dicitur non quod in se ipso simplex non sit quemad-
modum primus et secundus simplices sunt sed quod non per se ipsas
sensibilium rerum rationes incipit cognoscere. *Primo siquidem* phan-
tasias ipsarum rerum per exteriorem sensum quinquepartitum
secundum numerum instrumentorum corporalium in quibus et per

9-30 cf. p. 100, 30 *supra* 9-12 cf. Max. Conf., I *Ambig.* vi. 3, PG xci. 1112D
3-6 et p. 100, 20-26 *supra* 13-14 Max. Conf., *loc. cit.* 1112D 7-1113A 2
18-19 *ibid.*, 1113A 2 20-24 *ibid.*, 1113A 3-6 25-27 Max. Conf., I *Ambig.*
vi. 3, PG xci. 1113A 6-8

1 quanto R^cBP: quanta R* 2 lemma tres uniuersales motus nostre trinitatis
esse intellectum qui usia rationem qui uirtus sensum qui operatio dicitur Rm
tanto R^cBP: tanta R* deligitur RB: diligitur P 3 uelocitas RB: uoluntas P
6 sermonibus *in ras.* R(C) connexim B^cP: conexim RB* 11 lemma B
12 interpretatione RB: interpretationem P 14 sui RB: suam P 16 re-
perire RB: reperiri P 19 diffinit enim RB: diffinitum P 22 cognitio RB:
cognitio P causam: *glossa* hoc est quia deus nihil aliud cognoscitur nisi quia causa
omnium est. anima enim cognoscens solummodo de deo quoniam causa omnium est
causas omnium in ipso creatas in se ipsa conformat C *in marg.* B quia RB: quae P
24 imponit RBP^c: componit P* 25 ipsaque *in ras.* R(C) nascitur in
secundo *in ras.* R(C) 26 anima RB: animae P tangens RB: ingens P

way [for it is by arguing from the image that the very truth of which
it is the image must be sought], which the more diligently and pains-
takingly it is sought, the more ardently it is preferred and the more
clearly it is revealed. For of what avail is speed if the pure contempla-
tion of truth eludes it, and what harm is there in slowness if it lead
to the Divine Countenance?

N. Let us then begin our reasoning from the words of the vener-
able Maximus, not making use of continuous extracts from the dis-
courses but availing ourselves of their sense.

A. Proceed upon the path of reasoning by whatever means you
wish.

N. There are three universal motions of the soul (319), of which
the first is of the mind, the second of the reason, the third of sense.
And the first is simple and surpasses the nature of the soul herself
(320) and cannot be interpreted (321) [that is, it cannot have know-
ledge of that about which it moves]; ‘by this motion the soul moves
about the unknown (322) God, but, because of His excellence, she
has no kind of knowledge (323) of Him from the things that are’ as to
what He is [that is to say, she cannot find Him in any essence or
substance or in anything which can be uttered or understood; for He
surpasses everything that is and that is not, and there is no way in
which He can be defined as to what he is].

Concerning
the three
motions of
the soul

The second motion is that by which she ‘defines the unknown’
God ‘as Cause’ (324) of all. For she defines God as being Cause of
all things; and this motion is within the nature of the soul, ‘and by it
she moves naturally (325) and takes upon herself by the operation of
her science (326) all the natural reasons (which are) formative of all
things, which subsist as having been eternally made in Him Who is
known only as Cause’ (327) [for He is known because He is Cause],
that is, she expresses (them) in herself through her knowledge of
them, and the knowledge itself is *begotten* by the first motion *in the
second*.

The third motion is ‘composite, (and is that) by which’ the soul
‘comes into contact with that which is outside her as though by
certain signs and re-forms within herself the reasons of visible
things’. It is called composite not because it is not simple in itself as
the first and second are simple, but because its first knowledge of the
reasons of sensible things does not come from (the things) them-
selves. *For first* (the soul) receives the fantasies of the things them-
selves through the exterior sense, (which is) fivefold because of
the number of the corporeal instruments in which and through which
it operates, and by gathering them to itself (and) sorting them out it

27 *post* quibusdam *rasura in B* apud RB^cP: apud B* 30 primo siquidem
in ras. R(C) 32 corporalium RB: corporaliter P

quae operatur accipiens easque secum colligens diuidens ordinans
 disponit, deinde per ipsas ad rationes earum quarum phantasiae sunt
 perueniens intra se ipsam eas [rationes dico] tractat atque conformat.
 [Et nec te moueat quod paulo ante exteriorem sensum phantasiae
 rerum sensibilium esse diffiniuimus, nunc uero per eum phantasias
 earundem rerum sensibilium ad interiorem sensum peruenire doce-
 mus. Praedictus *quippe* tertius motus ex phantasiis rerum exteriorum
 per exteriorem sensum sibi nuntiatis moueri incipit. Phantasiarum
 enim duae species sunt, quarum prima est quae ex sensibili natura
 primo in instrumentis sensuum nascitur et imago in sensibus expressa
 proprie uocatur, altera uero est ipsa quae consequenti ordine ex
 praedicta imagine formatur et est ipsa phantasia quae proprie sensus
 exterior consueuit nominari. Et illa prior corpori semper adhaeret,
 posterior uero animae. Et prior quamuis in sensu sit se ipsam non
 sentit, posterior uero et se ipsam sentit et priorem suscipit.]
 Dum uero *tertius ille motus* phantasias rerum uisibilium deserit
 nudasque omni imaginatione corporea rationes ac per se simplices
 pure intelligit ipse quoque simplex simpliciter, hoc est uniuersales
 uniuersaliter rationes uisibilium omni phantasia absolutas inque semet
 ipsis purissime ac uerissime perspectas, per medium motum primo
 motui renuntiat. Ipse uero primus motus quodcumque ex tertio per
 medium et ex ipso medio *immediate* in moderationibus rerum crea-
 tarum percipit per se ipsum *immediate* incognito quidem [quid est],
 cognito uero quod causa omnium est principiisque omnium rerum,
 hoc est principalibus causis ab eo et in eo factis et a se distributis,
 refert [hoc est a deo per ipsas in omnia quae post se sunt procedere
 et iterum per ipsas in ipsum intelligit recurrere].
 Animae igitur purgatae per actionem, illuminatae per scientiam,
 perfectae per theologiam motus quo semper circa deum incognitum
 aeternaliter uoluitur ultra et suam et omnium rerum naturam ipsum
 deum omnino absolutum ab omnibus quae et dici et intelligi possunt
 nec non omnibus quae nec dici nec intelligi possunt—et tamen quod-
 dam modo sunt—intelligens eumque esse aliquid eorum quae sunt
 et quae non sunt denegans [et] omnia quae de ipso praedicantur non
 proprie sed translative de eo praedicari approbans, N(O)YC a Graecis,

23–24 per se ipsum—causa omnium est: cf. p. 106, 13–19 *supra*

1 post operatur *rasura* in R 2 phantasiae R^cBP: fantasiae R* 4 lemma
 B phantasiae BP: fantasiae R 7 quippe B^c(C)P: enim RB* phantasiis BP:
 fantasiis R 8 nuntiatis RB^cP: nuntiatus B* 14 animae. Et prior *in ras.* B
 16 tertius ille motus R^c(C)BP: ipsas R* 20 purissime ac uerissime RB^cP:
 purissimae ac uerissimae B* 21 renuntiat RB: renunciat P 22 immedi-
 ate R^c(C)B^c: immediate B*P: mediate R* 24 quod RB: quid P 27 intelli-
 git RB^cP: intelligit B* 28 illuminatae R: illuminate BP 29 perfectae RB:
 perfecte P per om. P 33 intelligens RP: intelligens B eumque RB:
 eamque P 35 proprie RB^cP: propriae B* Graecis B: grecis RP

sets them in order; then, getting through them to the reasons of the things of which they are the fantasies, she moulds them [I mean the reasons] and shapes them into conformity with herself.

[And let it not trouble you that a little earlier we defined exterior sense as the fantasy of sensible things while now we teach that it is the means by which the fantasies of those same sensible things reach the interior sense. For this third motion begins to move as a consequence of being informed of the fantasies of exterior things by means of the exterior sense.

For there are two kinds of fantasies, of which the first is that which is born at first of sensible nature in the instruments of the senses and is properly called the image expressed in the senses; while the second is that which is formed next out of this image, and it is this fantasy which properly bears the customary name of exterior sense. And that (which comes) first is always attached to the body, that (which comes) after to the soul. And the first, although it is in the sense, is not sensible of itself, but the second is both sensible of itself and receives the first.]

But when *this third motion* abandons the fantasies of sensible things and clearly understands the reasons stripped bare of all corporeal imagery and in their own simplicity, it transmits the reasons of visible things freed from every fantasy back to the first motion through the intermediate motion as the simple operation of something which is also (itself) simple, that is to say (it transmits them as) universal reasons by a universal operation. But the first motion itself carries back whatever it perceives from the third through the intermediate, and from that intermediate immediately in the modified forms of created things, to that which, unknown immediately in itself [as to what it is], is yet known by the fact that it is the cause of all things, and to the principles of all things, that is, to the principal causes which are created by it and in it and distributed by it (328). [That is, he understands that they proceed from God through them into all things that are after them and through them return to Him again (329).]

Therefore the motion of the soul which is purged by action, illumined by knowledge, perfected by the divine word (330), (the motion) by which she eternally revolves about the unknown God, and understands that God Himself is beyond both her own nature and that of all things, absolutely distinct from everything which can either be said or understood and everything which cannot be said or understood—and yet which somehow exists—and denies that He is anything of the things that are or of the things that are not [and] affirms that all things that are predicated of Him are predicated of Him not literally but metaphorically, is called *νοῦς* by the Greeks but by our

Concerning
the differ-
ence of the
senses

a nostris intellectus uel animus uel mens dicitur et substantialiter est et principalis pars animae esse intelligitur. Non enim aliud est animae essentialiter esse et substantialiter moueri. Ipsa *siquidem* in motibus suis subsistit sui que motus in ipsa subsistunt. Est enim simplex natura et indiuidua motuumque suorum substantialibus differentiis solummodo discreta. Nam si caelestes essentias, quas etiam caelestes uirtutes angelicasque diuina nominant eloquia, nil aliud esse substantialiter a sanctis traditur patribus nisi intelligibiles aeternos inaccessabiles[que] motus circa principium omnium a quo et per quem et in quo et ad quem et mouentur et subsistunt [—est enim iste circularis motus caelestium uirtutum circa suum principium, ab eo uidelicet <incipiens> ut a principio, per ipsum *per causas creatas currens*, in ipso ut in legibus naturalibus quae in ipso sunt extraque quas egredi nec uult nec potest nec posse uult, in ipsum ut in finem suum rediens. Et in sola intelligentia talis motus est. Intelligunt enim se ab ipso esse et per ipsum et in ipso intellectum suum moueri et nullum alium finem praeter illum se habere non ignorant—], quid obstat ne similiter intelligamus humanos intellectus indesinenter circa deum uolui quoniam ab ipso et per ipsum et in ipso et ad ipsum sunt [eodem nanque intelligibili circulo uoluuntur], praesertim cum diuina eloquia hominem ad imaginem dei factum perhibeant, quod de angelis dixisse aperte non reperitur? <Subintelligendum tamen propter intellectualem naturam hoc relinquitur.> Astantes etiam et ministrantes deo caelestes uirtutes legimus, humanam uero naturam in uerbo dei deum factam et sedere ad dexteram dei et regnare fides testatur catholica.

Quod autem post resurrectionem omnium generaliter omnibus hominibus dominus promittit: 'Erunt sicut angeli dei in caelo,' de condignitate naturae deque immortalitatis aequalitate et quod omni sexu corporeo omnique corruptibili generatione carebunt intelligendum arbitror. Primam nanque hominis conditionem ante peccatum in paradiso, hoc est in caelesti beatitudine, aequalem angelis ac ueluti connaturalem fuisse non incongruum credere [—de his nanque ambabus naturis, angelica dico atque humana, theologia pronuntiat

2-3 cf. p. 100, 18-19 supra 10-17 est enim iste—non ignorant: cf. Ps.-Dionys., DN iv. 8, PG iii. 704D 1-3 17-20 quid obstat—ad ipsum sunt: *id., op. cit., iv. 9, 705A 3-9* 23-24 astantes—uirtutes 2 Esdras viii. 22; 1 Reg. xxii. 19 28 Marc. xii. 25

3 *siquidem* R^c(C)BP: enim R* 6 essentias RB: essentiis P 7 nominant RB^cP: nominat B* 8 intelligibiles R^cBP: intelligibilis R* 9 incessabiles—que R^cBP: incessabilis R* 10 subsistunt R^cBP: supsistit R* 12-13 per causas creatas currens B^c(C)P: atque R: per rationes suas per ipsum conditas B* 13 post legibus *erasum est suis in B* extraque: -que *s.l.* R 14 uult (1) B^c(C)P: uoluntur R: uolunt B* nec (2)—uult B^c(C)P: nec possunt nec posse uolunt RB* post ipsum habent quippe RB* 15 suum *om.* P rediens B^c(C)P: re*unt R*: redeunt R^cB* 16 lemma B moueri B^c(C)P: exerceri RB* 19 lemma

writers intellectus or animus or mens; and it exists substantially, and is understood to be the principal part of the soul. For the essential being of the soul is not other than her substantial motion (331). For the soul subsists in her motions and her motions subsist in her. For she is by nature simple and indivisible, and is differentiated only by the substantial differences of her motions. For if, according to the tradition handed down by the holy fathers, the celestial essences, which the Divine Oracles also call the celestial and angelic powers, are substantially nothing else but intelligible, eternal [and] unceasing motions about the Beginning of all things, from Whom and through Whom and in Whom and towards Whom they move and subsist [for the motion of the celestial powers about their Beginning is circular (332), that is to say, <it starts> from Him as their Beginning, it passes through Him *by means of the created causes*, (it moves) in Him as in the natural laws which are in Him and beyond which it neither wills (to stray) nor can (stray) nor can will to stray, (and) returns to Him as its end. And such a motion exists in the understanding alone. For they understand that they are from Him and that their intellect *moues* through Him and in Him, and they know for certain that they have no other end than Him], what is to prevent us (333) from understanding in a similar way that human intellects unceasingly revolve about God, seeing that they are from Him and through Him and in Him and for Him (334) [for they revolve in the same intelligible circle], especially as the Divine Oracles declare that man is made in the image of God, which we do not find explicitly said of the angels? <However, we are left to infer this from their intellectual nature.> Also we read that the celestial powers stand in the presence of God and minister to Him, but the Catholic Faith witnesses that human nature became God in the Word of God and sitteth at the right hand of God and reigneth.

But that which the Lord promises to all men generally after the resurrection of all, 'They shall be as angels of God in heaven,' is to be understood, I think, as a sharing in the same status of nature and as an equality of immortality and (as meaning) that they shall lack all corporeal sexuality and every corruptible mode of generation. For it is not unreasonable to believe that man's first state before sin in paradise, that is, in heavenly bliss, was equal and, as it were, of the same nature with (that of) the angels. [For the divine word refers to both these natures, I mean the angelic and the human, when it says:

humana natura non solum ad dignitatem angelicam sed ultra omnem creaturam in deum assumpta Rm 20 uoluuntur BP: uoluntur R 23 hoc *om.* P 25 fides R^cBP: fide R* 27 autem B^c(C)P: enim RB* generaliter: -liter *in ras.* R 27-28 omnibus—promittit B^cP: de omnibus hominibus dominus dicit RB* 28-29 de—deque B^cP: non de condignitate natureae sed de RB* 29 post naturae *rasura in B* 30 *Caue rec. manu in marg.* P 31 primam RB: prima P 32 paradiso RB: paradiso P

dicens: 'Qui fecisti caelos in intellectu,' hoc est ut essentialiter et substantialiter intellectus essent—]; quoniam uero 'homo cum in
 575B
 'honore esset non intellexit' et 'comparatus est iumentis insipientibus
 'et similis factus est eis' longe ex angelica dignitate recessit inque
 5
 mortalis huius uitae calamitatem cecidit. Postquam autem uerbum
 caro factum est, hoc est deus homo factus est, impletur quod in
 psalmo scriptum est: 'Quid est homo quod memor es eius aut filius
 'hominis quia uisitas eum?' [admirans uidelicet primae conditionis
 humanae naturae altitudinem]. 'Minorasti eum,' <inquit> 'paulo
 'minus ab angelis' [hoc est minorari eum merito suae superbiae per-
 10
 'misisti et in turpitudinem irrationabilis uitae cadere sua propria
 uoluntate reliquisti. Deus enim facere quod fieri sinit modo quodam
 loquendi dicitur], 'gloria et honore coronasti eum et constituisti eum
 575C
 'super opera manuum tuarum. Omnia subiecisti sub pedibus eius.'
 Videsne quantum humana natura in primo homine post peccatum
 humiliata et quantum in secundo homine, in Christo dico, per gratiam
 exaltata? Siquidem non solum ad primum naturae suae statum de
 quo cecidit homo restitutus uerum etiam <in capite suo quod est
 Christus> super omnes caelestes uirtutes exaltatus. Vbi enim
 abundauit peccatum superabundauit gratia.

Si igitur humana natura non solum ad dignitatem angelicam in
 Christo renouata peruenit uerum etiam ultra omnem creaturam in
 deum assumpta est et quod factum est in capite in membris futurum
 esse impium est negare, quid mirum si humani intellectus nil aliud
 sint nisi ineffabiles incessabilesque motus—in his [dico] qui digni sunt
 575D
 —circa deum in quo uiuunt et mouentur et sunt? [Sunt quidem per
 26
 rationes quibus existunt, mouentur per rationes uirtutum quibus
 bene existere possunt, uiuunt per rationes quibus semper existunt.
 Sunt itaque et bene sunt et semper sunt in deo.]

A. Non solum concedo uerum etiam intelligo excellentissimum
 576A
 animae motum circa incognitum deum ultra omnem creaturam ueris-
 31
 sime uocari et subsistere intellectum. Sed quomodo uel qua ratione
 intellectus dum intra terminos humanae naturae concluditur supra
 se ipsum omnemque creaturam potest ascendere ut circa incognitum
 35
 deum qui longe ab omni creata natura remotus est suos substantiales
 motus ualeat perficere <quaerendum puto>.

N. In hac parte theoriae quae de intellectualibus rationalibusque
 1 Proverb. iii. 19 2-4 Ps. xlviii. 21 (illis *Vulg.*) 7-8 Ps. viii. 5 9-10 Ps. viii. 6
 (Moz. Ps. Mediol.: minuisti *Vulg.*) 13-14 Ps. viii. 6-8 19-20 Rom. v. 20
 DF*L d e f g *Patres* (delictum *Vulg.*) 26 cf. Actus xvii. 28 26-29 Sunt
 quidem—deo: cf. *infra*, lib. iii. 8, PL cxxii. 640A 5-11 29 Sunt—in deo: Max.
 Conf. I *Ambig.* vi. 3, PG xci. 1116B 3-4; cf. *infra*, lib. iii. 8, PL cxxii. 640A 5-11

4 eis RB: illis P, cf. *Vulg.* 5 mortalis RB: mortalitatis P cecidit RB^cP:
 caecidit B* 8 admirans B^c(C)P: ammirans RB* 9 eum RB: enim P
 inquit sC in B 13 loquendi RB^cP:

'Who made the heavens in intellect,' that is, in order that they might
 be intelligences in essence and substance.] But since man when he
 was in honour abandoned his intellect (335) and became equal to the
 beasts who lack wisdom and was made like them, he withdrew far
 from his angelic status and fell into the misfortune of this mortal life.
 But after the Word was made flesh, that is, (after) God was made man,
 there is fulfilled what is written in the psalm: 'What is man that Thou
 art mindful of him, or the son of man that Thou visitest him?'
 [marvelling, that is, at the exaltation of the first state of human
 nature] 'Thou madest him' <it says> 'a little less than the angels' [that
 is, Thou hast permitted him to be made less because of his pride, and
 Thou hast left him of his own proper will to fall into the disgrace of
 an irrational life. For by a figure of speech God is said to do what He
 allows to be done]; 'Thou hast crowned him with glory and honour
 and hast set him above the works of Thy hands. Thou hast subjected
 all things under his feet.'

Do you see how deeply human nature has been humiliated in the
 first man after sin, and how highly, through grace, it has been exalted
 in the second man, I mean, in Christ? For man is not only restored
 to the first state of his nature from which he fell, but is even lifted up
 <in his Head, which is Christ> above all the celestial powers (336).
 For where sin was abundant grace was more abundant.

If therefore human nature, renewed in Christ, not only attains the
 angelic status but is even carried up beyond every creature into God,
 and if it would be impious to deny that that which was done in the
 Head will be (done) in the members, what wonder if human intellects
 are nothing else but the ineffable and unceasing motions—in those
 [I mean] who are worthy—about God, in Whom they live and move
 and have their being? [For they have their being through the reasons
 by which they exist, they move through the reasons of the powers by
 which they are able to exist well, they live through the reasons by
 which they exist eternally (337). Thus they have being and well being
 and eternal being in God.] (338).

A. Not only do I admit but I also understand that the most ex-
 cellent motion of the soul about the unknown God beyond every
 creature is most rightly called, and is, intellect. But how or in what
 sense the intellect, while confined to the limits of human nature, can
 ascend above itself and above every creature so as to be able to
 perform its substantial motions about the unknown God Who is far
 removed from every created nature <should, I think, be investigated>.

N. In this part of (our) contemplation which concerns the

loquendi B* 15 Videsne RB: uidesine P 18 cecidit RB^cP: caecidit B*
 23 assumpta RP: assupta B 24 negare RB: negate P 31 *glossa* summus motus
 animae humanae intellectus dicitur et est C in marg. B 36 quaerendum puto sC in B

de defectu
rationis in
deificatis
animis

substantiis disputat dum peruenitur ad considerandum quomodo
natura creata extra se ipsam potest ascendere ut creatrici naturae
ualeat adherere omnis de potentia naturae ratiocinantium inquisitio 576B
deficit. Non enim ibi naturae ratio sed diuinae gratiae ineffabilis et
incomprehensibilis altitudo conspicitur. Nulli siquidem conditae 5
substantiae naturaliter inest uirtus per quam possit et terminos naturae
suae superare ipsumque deum immediate per se ipsum attingere.
Hoc enim solius est gratiae, nullius uero uirtutis naturae. [Hinc
apostolus fatetur se ignorasse quomodo raptus est in paradysum dicens,
'Scio hominem raptum sed nescio quomodo, in corpore an extra 10
'corpus.' Non enim in naturalibus animae motibus in corpore uel
extra corpus uideo ullam uirtutem per quam rapi possim in tertium
caelum. Deus <autem> solus scit cuius gratia sola raptum me fuisse 576C
non ignoro. Nulla siquidem natura per se ipsam potest ascendere in 15
illum locum de quo dominus ait, 'Vbi ego sum illic et minister meus.'
<Vt ergo superat omnem intellectum quomodo dei uerbum descendit
in hominem ita superat omnem rationem quomodo homo ascendit
in deum. >]

A. Quanquam breuiter sat tamen <et> clare est responsum ideoque
quod instat ad secundum animae motum considerandum mentis 20
aciem dirige.

de secundo
motu

N. Motus animae secundus est ut diximus qui et intra terminos
naturae continetur ipsumque deum secundum causam diffinit, hoc est
illud solummodo de deo incognito quid est cognoscit quod omnium
quae sunt causa sit et quod primordiales omnium causae ab eo et in 25
eo aeternaliter conditae sint earumque causarum quantum datur ei 576D
intellectarum ipsi animae cuius motus est cognitionem imprimit
[—ut enim ex inferioribus sensibilibus rerum imagines quas Greci
ΦΑΝΤΑCΙΑC uocant anima recipit ita ex superioribus, hoc est
primordialibus causis, cognitiones quae a Grecis ΘΕΟΦΑΝΙΑΙ, a 577A
Latinis diuinae apparitiones solent appellari sibi ipsi infigit et per 31
ipsas quandam de deo notitiam percipit, per primas causas dico—]
non ut intelligat quid substantialiter sunt—hoc enim superat omnem
animae motum—sed ut uniuersaliter cognoscat quia sunt inque suos
effectus ineffabili procesione profluunt; et hic est motus qui a Grecis 35
ΛΟΓΟC uel ΔΥΝΑΜΙC, a nostris uero ratio seu uirtus uocatur, et ex

10–11 cf. 2 Cor. xii. 2 15 Ioh. xii. 26 22–23 Motus—diffinit: cf. Max.
Conf., I Ambig. vi. 3, PG xci. 1113A 2–6; p. 106, 18–20 supra 34–35 inque—
profluunt: cf. Ps.-Dionys., DN iv. 9, PG iii. 705B 6 36 ΛΟΓΟC: cf. Max.
Conf., I Ambig. vi. 3, PG xci. 1112D 6 uirtus: cf. p. 102, 16 supra

1 lemma B 3 omnis RB: omnes P ratiocinantium: -ci- in ras. R 4 in-
effabilis RB: ineffabili P 5 conspicitur: -icitur in ras. R 13 autem sC in B

intellectual and rational substances, when it comes to the question how
created nature can ascend beyond itself so as to be able to adhere to
the creative Nature, every inquiry of those who study the potentiality
of nature fails. For there we see not a reason of nature but the in-
effable and incomprehensible excellence of Divine Grace. For in no
created substance does there naturally exist the power to surpass
the limits of its own nature and directly attain to Very God in
Himself. For this is of grace alone, not of any power of nature.

[This is why the Apostle confesses that he does not know how he
was rapt into paradise, saying: 'I know the man (was) rapt but I do
not know how, whether in the body or out of the body.' For it is not
in the natural motions of the soul (339) that I see in the body or out
of the body any power by which I can be rapt into the Third Heaven.
<But> only God knows, and it is only by His grace that I know
for certain I was rapt. For no nature can of itself ascend into that
place of which the Lord says: 'Where I am, there (is) my servant
also.' <Therefore, just as it passes all intellect how the Word of
God descends into man, so it passes all reason how man ascends into
God. >]

A. Although your reply is brief it is sufficient <and> clear; so turn
your attention (340) to what comes next, the consideration of the
second motion of the soul.

N. The second motion of the soul, as we have said, is that which
is contained within the bounds of its nature and defines the Very God
as Cause, that is, it knows only this about the God Who is unknown
as to what He is, (namely), that He is the Cause of all things that are,
and that the primordial causes of all (things) are eternally created by
Him and in Him; and it impresses the knowledge of those causes,
when it has understood them, upon the soul herself, whose motion it
is, as far as her capacity allows. [For as from what is below her the
soul receives the images of sensible things, which the Greeks call
φαντασίαι, so from what is above her, that is, from the primordial
causes, she implants within herself the cognitions which are usually
called by the Greeks θεοφάνειαι and by the Latins diuinae appari-
tiones, and through them, through the first causes, I mean, she
receives some notion of God (341)]—not that it (342) understands
what they are substantially—for this is beyond every motion of the
soul—but it has the general knowledge that they are and that they
flow forth by an ineffable process into their effects; and this is the
motion which is called by the Greeks λόγος or δύναμις, but by our

Concerning
the failure of
reason in (the
contempla-
tion of)
deified souls

Concerning
the second
motion

16 descendit B: descendit P 19 et sC in B 22 lemma B 28 in-
ferioribus RB^cP: inferioribus B* 30 ΘΕΟΦΑΝΙΑΙ RB: ΘΕΟΦΑΝΙΑC P
31 solent RB: solem P 32 per s.l. R 34 cognoscat RBP^c: cognoscit P*
35 procesione RB: processione P 36 ΔΥΝΑΜΙC RB: ΔΙΝΑΜΙC P

primo motu nascitur qui est intellectus. *Sicut* enim quidam sapiens artifex artem suam de se ipso in se ipso efficit et in ipsa quae sibi faciendae sunt praeuidet eorumque causas ut et potestate priusquam appareant actu et opere uniuersaliter atque causaliter creat, sic intellectus de se et in se suam rationem genuit in qua omnia quae uult facere praecognoscit causaliterque praecreat. Nam non aliud esse dicimus consilium praeter artificiosae mentis conceptum. Secundus itaque motus animae est ratio quae ueluti quidam obtutus substantialis in animo intelligitur ac ueluti ars ab ipso de se ipso in se ipso genita in qua ea quae uult facere praenoscit et praecondit ideoque non immerito forma eius nominatur, siquidem ipse per se ipsum incognitus est sed in sua forma quae est ratio et sibi ipsi et aliis apparere incipit. [Nam quemadmodum causa omnium per se ipsam nec a se ipsa nec ab aliquo inueniri potest quid sit, in suis uero theophaniis quodam modo cognoscitur, ita intellectus qui semper circa eam uoluitur et ad eius imaginem omnino similem conditus est nec a se ipso nec ab aliquo intelligi potest quid sit, in ratione autem quae de ipso nascitur incipit apparere. Quod uero dixi causam omnium et intellectum a se ipsis non intelligi [quid sint] qua ratione potest esse paulo post considerabitur.] De secundo motu quid sit et unde originem ducit satis dictum est ut opinor.

A. Sat plane.

N. Tertius itaque restat motus qui circa singulas singularum rerum rationes quae simpliciter, hoc est uniuersaliter, in primordialibus causis conditae sunt uersatur et cum ex sensibilibus rerum fantasiis per exteriorem sensum sibi nuntiatis motus sui substantialis sumat exordium ad purissimam rerum omnium discretionem per rationes proprias in essentias generalissimas inque genera generaliora, deinde in formas speciesque specialissimas, hoc est in numeros innumerabiles infinitosque immutabilibus tamen naturae suae analogiis finitos, peruenit, et ille motus est qui graece ΔΙΑΝΟΙΑ uel ΕΝΕΡΓΙΑ, latine uero sensus uel operatio uocatur, ipsum dico sensum qui substantialis est et interior, qui similiter ab intellectu procedit per rationem. Omne siquidem quod intellectus ex primordialium causarum

23-31 Tertius—peruenit: cf. Max. Conf., *I Ambig.* vi. 3, PG xc. 1113A 6-B 10

1 Sicut R^c(C)B^c(C)P: ut R*B* 2 efficit BP: gignit R 3 praeuidet BP: praeuiscit R 5 genuit: -enuit in ras. R(C) 6 praecreat: -creat in ras. R(C) esse dicimus RB: est P 8 intelligitur B^cP: intellige R*: intellige*ur R^c(C): intelligetur B* 9 de se ipso R: de ipso BP 10 lemma B praeuiscit R^c(C)BP: praecognoscit R* praecondit: -condit in ras. R(C) 11 nominatur R^cBP: nomine R* 12-20 Nam—considerabitur sC in R 13 aliquo R*BP: alio quo R^c 18 Quod R*B: quid R^c 20 rasura ante De secundo in R 23 lemma B 24 rationes quae R: rationesque BP 25 fantasiis RB: phantasiis P 30 immutabilibus RB^c: inmutabilibus B*P finitos: glossa omnis enim numerus indiuiduis constitutus multiplicationis terminum

(writers) ratio or uirtus, and it is born of the first motion, which is intellect.

For just as a wise artist (343) produces his art from himself in himself and foresees in it the things he is to make, and in a general and causal sense potentially (344) creates their causes before they actually appear, so the intellect brought forth from itself and in itself its reason, in which it foreknows and causally pre-creates all things which it desires to make. For we say that a plan is nothing else but a concept in the mind of the artist.

The second motion of the soul, then, is the reason, which is understood as a kind of substantial seeing in the mind and a kind of art begotten of it and in it, in which it foreknows and pre-creates the things which it wishes to make; and therefore it is not unreasonably named its form, for (the intellect) in itself is unknown but begins to become manifest both to itself and to others in its form, which is reason. [For just as the Cause of all things cannot in itself be discovered as to what it is either by itself or by anyone else, but somehow comes to be known in its theophanies, so the intellect (345), which ever revolves about it and is created wholly in its image, cannot be understood as to what it is either by itself or by anyone else, but in the reason which is born of it begins to become manifest. But as to my saying that the Cause of all and the intellect are not understood by themselves [as to what they are], the reason for that will be considered a little later.] Concerning the second motion, what it is and whence it takes its origin, enough has been said, I think.

A. Enough, certainly.

N. There remains, then, the third motion, which functions in the particular reasons of particular things, which are created simply, that is, as a whole, in the primordial causes; and which, although it takes the beginning of its substantial motion from the fantasies of sensible things which are communicated to it through exterior sense, attains, by the most precise discrimination of all things through their proper reasons, to the most general essences and to the less general (346) genera, then to the species and to the most specific species, that is, the individuals, countless and unlimited, but limited by the immutable proportions of their nature; and this is the motion which in Greek is called διάνοια (347) or ἐνέργεια (348), but in Latin sensus or operatio—by sensus I mean that which is substantial and interior (349)—, which similarly proceeds from the intellect through the reason (350). For everything which the intellect by its gnostic view habet. in suis uero proportionibus in infinitum progredi non potest. humanae siquidem multiplicationis per singulos nullus terminus est. omnes tamen intra unius formae anulo ambitum (?) coartantur. similiter de caeteris animalibus lignis herbis et caetera C in B 31 ΕΝΕΡΓΙΑ RB: ΕΝΕΡΤΙΑ P 32 dico in ras. R(C) sensum: s- in ras. R(C) qui in ras. R(C)

Concerning the difference between intellect and reason

Concerning the third motion

gnostico contuitu arti suae, hoc est rationi, imprimit per sensum suum
 ex se procedentem eiusque operationis nomine appellatum in proprias
 rationes singularum rerum quae primordialiter in causis uniuersaliter
 578A
 quae creatae sunt diuidit. Cunctae quidem essentiae in ratione unum
 5 sunt, sensu uero in essentias differentes discernuntur. Omnium itaque
 essentiarum ex suorum principiorum simplicissima unitate per intel-
 lectum <discendentem> simplicissimam cognitionem ratio percipit
 sed sensus ipsam simplicitatem per differentias segregat. Similiter
 rerum genera uniformiter et simpliciter in suis uniuersalibus causis et
 in se ipsis per intellectum ratio cognoscit, illam uero generalissimam
 10 simplicitatem in se ipsa indiuidam nullisque differentiis obnoxiam nullis
 accidentibus subiectam nullis spatiis distentam nullis partibus compositam
 nullo locali uel temporali motu uariam in diuersa genera differentiasque
 578B
 atque alia mille sensus partitur. Idipsum est in differentibus formis
 quae consulta ratione in generibus suis unum sunt, sensu tamen
 15 operante per naturales distinctiones a se inuicem discernuntur. [Hoc
 est, quomodo naturalibus motibus diuina prouidentia regente iubente
 administrante in discretas rerum multiformitates diuidantur ipse
 intellectus <mediante ratione> per consubstantialem sibi sensum sine
 errore inuestigat et persequitur certisque regulis comprehendit.] Quid
 20 dicam de infinitis numeris qui quanto interioris sensus actione siue
 in se ipso siue in rerum natura multiplices fiunt tanto ratione con-
 siderata in suis formis uniuersaliter et simpliciter unum sunt? 578C

Et ut breuiter colligamus: quodcumque anima per primum suum
 motum, qui est intellectus, de deo et primordialibus causis uniformiter
 25 [et uniuersaliter] cognoscit secundo suo motui, qui est ratio, eodem
 modo [uniformiter] uniuersaliter[que] infigit, quodcumque autem a
 superioribus per intellectum in ratione formatum accipit hoc totum
 in discretas essentias in discreta genera in diuersas formas in multi-
 plices numeros per sensum inferioribus [effectibus] distribuit, et ut
 30 apertius dicam quodcumque anima humana per intellectum suum in
 ratione sua de deo deque rerum principiis uniformiter cognoscit
 semper uniformiter custodit; quodcumque uero per rationem in causis
 unum et uniformiter subsistere perspicit hoc totum per sensum <in> 578D

1 imprimit RB: imprimit P 3 rerum in ras. R(C) 5 differentes RBP^c:
 differentias P* 7 simplicis ante simplicissimam add. P 9 et (2) om. P
 10 ipsis: -is in ras. R(C) 11-13 in se-uariam in in ras. R(C) 11 in om. P
 12 distentam RB: distantiam P 14 atque alia B^c(C)P: praedictas aliasque in ras.
 R(C)B* mille in ras. R(C) sensus R^c(C)BP: sensu R* 15 consulta ratione RB:
 consideratione P 16 naturales RB: rationales P 17 regente RBP^c: tegente
 P* 25 et RB: ex P fortasse recte 33-p. 120, 1 semper-intelligit in ras.
 B^c(C) 33-p. 120, 5, semper-cognoscit B^cP: hoc totum per sensum in causarum
 effectibus multipliciter intelligit, [et iterum totum quod per sensum multipliciter
 [2]sparsum] in effectibus intelligit per rationem in causis unum uniformiter subsistere
 perspicit, omnia uero ex una omnium causa et multiplicationis momentum inci-
 pere et unitatis simplicitatem qua in ea aeternaliter et incommutabiliter subsistunt

of the primordial causes impresses upon its art, that is, its reason, it
 distributes (351) through the sense which proceeds from it and
 is called after its operation, into the particular reasons of individual
 things, which were created in the causes primordially and as a whole.

All essences are one in the reason; in sense they are divided
 into different essences. Therefore reason receives the most unified
 knowledge of all the essences from the most unified unity of their
 principles through the <descending> intellect; but sense separates
 that unity by means of differences. Similarly, reason knows through
 intellect the genera of things after a uniform and simple mode in their
 universal causes and in themselves; but that most universal simplicity
 which in itself is indivisible and is liable to no differences and is subject to
 no accidents and is not extended by spatial intervals and is not composed
 of any parts and is not varied by any motion through place or time,
 sense breaks up (352) into the diverse genera and differences and
 a thousand other things. Those things which from the point of view
 of reason are one in their genera are the same in different forms as
 those which, on the other hand, by the operation of sense are differen-
 tiated from one another by natural distinctions (353). [That is to say,
 the intellect itself <through the medium of reason> (and) through
 the sense which is consubstantial with itself, infallibly investigates
 and discovers and comprehends by sure rules the manner in which
 they are divided by their natural motions under the rule and ordi-
 nance and administration of Divine Providence into the manifold
 differences of nature (354).]

What shall I say of the unlimited number of individuals (355)
 which, as much as they become multiple by the operation of sense,
 whether it is in sense itself or in nature (that they are multiple),
 so much are they one when by the reason they are considered in their
 forms under a universal and simple mode?

And to sum up: whatever the soul through her first motion, which
 is the intellect, knows under one form [and as a whole] concerning
 God and the primordial causes she implants, still [under one form
 and] as a whole, in her second motion, which is reason; but whatever
 she receives from the natures that are above her, through the
 intellect, after it has been formed in the reason, this whole she dis-
 tributes through sense into the separated genera, into the diverse
 species, into the multiple individuals, in (356) the effects below, and,
 to speak more plainly, whatever the human soul, through her intellect
 in her reason, knows of God and the principles of things as a unity
 she always retains as a unity; but whatever, through the reason, she per-
 ceives to subsist in the causes as one and under a uniform mode, this whole,

nullo modo deserere totius[que] sui motus finem in eam et in ea terminare per
 intellectum purissime cognoscit]. RB*

causarum effectibus multiplex et multiformiter intelligit. Omnia uero ex una omnium causa et multiplicationis momentum incipere et unitatis simplicitatem qua in ea aeternaliter et incommutabiliter subsistunt nullo modo deserere totiusque sui motus finem in eam et in ea terminare per intellectum purissime cognoscit. De tribus animae motibus, hoc est de intellectu qui etiam essentia et de ratione quae uirtus et de sensu qui operatio dicitur, sufficienter suasum ut opinor.

A. Lucidissime ac multipliciter.

N. Intuere itaque acieque mentis tota ambiguitatis caligine depulsa cognosce quam clare quam expresse diuinae bonitatis substantialis trinitas in motibus humanae animae recte eos intuentibus arridet seque ipsam pie quaerentibus se ueluti in quodam proprio speculo ad imaginem suam facto limpidissime manifestat et cum sit ab omni creatura remota omnique intellectui incognita per imaginem suam et similitudinem ueluti cognitam et comprehensibilem intellectualibus [oculis] ac ueluti praesentem se ipsam depromit [ultraque specillam in qua relucet purificat ut in ea clarissime resplescat una essentialis bonitas in tribus substantiis, quae unitas et trinitas in se ipsa per se ipsam non appareret quia omnem intellectum effugit eximia suae claritatis infinitate nisi in sua imagine uestigia cognitionis suae imprimeret]. Patris siquidem in animo, filii in ratione, sancti spiritus in sensu apertissima lucescit similitudo. Nam quemadmodum filium artem omnipotentis artificis uocitamus—nec immerito quoniam in ipso, [sua] quippe sapientia, artifex omnipotens pater ipse omnia quaecumque uoluit fecit aeternaliterque et incommutabiliter custodit —ita etiam humanus intellectus quodcumque de deo deque omnium rerum principiis purissime incunctanterque percipit ueluti in quadam arte sua, in ratione dico, mirabili quadam operatione scientiae creat per cognitionem inque secretissimis ipsius sinibus recondit per memoriam. Vt autem pater opifex omnium omnipotens quaecumque in arte sua quae est ipsius sapientia et uirtus in uerbo suo in unigenito filio simul et semel primordialiter causaliter uniformiter uniuersaliter condidit per spiritum sanctum ex se filioque procedentem in primordialium causarum innumerabiles effectus diuidit, siue in essentias intelligibiles differentiasque omnem sensum corporeum superantes

1 multiformiter B: uniformiter P 5 purissime RP: purissimae B 6 lemma quomodo trinitas cum sit ab omni intellectu remota per trinitatem nostram ad imaginem et similitudinem suam factam se uenerandam premonstrat Rm et om. P 9 acieque RB^cP: facieque B* 10 substantialis R^cBP: substantiales R* 11 in motibus R: immotibus BP animae RB: naturae P 12 seque RB: saepe P pie RB^cP: piaae B* 17 qua RBP^c: quo P* resplescat RB: resplescat P 19 eximia RB: eximii P 20 uestigia RB: uestigiam P 22 lucescit RB: lucessit P 24 ipse RB: in se P 26 lemma BP humanus RB: humanos P deque R^cBP: de quo R* 27 rerum RBP^c: rerom P* 28 dico RB: duo P 29 ipsius sinibus RB: sinibus ipsius P 30 post omnipotens erasum est omnia in R 32 post filio erasum est suo in R 33 post filioque erasum est suo in R 34 post siue rasura in R 35 omnem RB: omnium P

through sense, she understands as multiple and under a multiform mode <in> the effects of the causes. But she most clearly knows through her intellect that from the one Cause of all things all things start upon their movement towards multiplicity without abandoning the simplicity of the unity by which they subsist in it eternally and immutably, and (move) towards it as the end of their whole movement, and end in it.

The three motions of the soul, that is, intellect which is also called (her) essence, and reason which (is called her) power, and sense which (is called her) operation, have been sufficiently discussed, as I think.

A. Most clearly and abundantly.

N. Contemplate, then, and, dispelling all mist of ambiguity, understand with the sharpness of your mind how clearly, how explicitly the substantial Trinity of the Divine Goodness is revealed in the motions of the human soul to those who study them carefully, and manifests itself to those who seek it piously as though in a most limpid mirror (357) of their own made in its image, and although it is removed from every creature and is unknown to every intellect descends through its image and likeness (to become), as it were, known and comprehensible and in some measure present to [the eyes of] the intellect [and of its own accord cleanses the mirror which reflects it so that it may shine forth from it most brilliantly (as) one essential Goodness in three Substances; for this Unity and Trinity, because it eludes every intellect on account of the infinity of its exceeding brightness, would not appear in itself (and) by itself unless it impressed the traces of knowledge of itself upon its image]. For the likeness of the Father shines forth most clearly in the intellect, that of the Son in the reason, that of the Holy Spirit in the sense (358). For as we call the Son the art of the almighty Artist, and not unreasonably, since in Him, as in [His] Wisdom, the almighty Artist, the Father Himself, has made all things whatsoever He desired and preserves (them) eternally and immutably in Him, so also the human intellect, through the act of knowing, creates, by a wonderful operation of its science, whatsoever it most clearly and unambiguously receives from God, and from the principles of all things in its art, as it were, I mean, in its reason, and by means of the memory stores (it) in its most secret recesses. But as whatever the Father, the omnipotent Maker of all things, created at one and the same time primordially, causally, uniformly, universally in His art which is His Wisdom and His Power, in His Word, in His only begotten Son, He divides through the Holy Spirit Who proceeds from Him and from the Son (359) into the innumerable effects of the primordial causes, whether they have flowed forth into intelligible essences and differences which surpass every corporeal sense

Concerning the likeness of the Most High Trinity in the human trinity

manarint siue in huius mundi sensibilis uarium multiplicemque ornatum locorum temporumque discretionibus uariabilem profluxerint, ita intellectus, hoc est principalis animae motus ex intelligibilium rerum gnostica contemplatione formatus, omne quodcumque in arte rationis creat et reponit per sensum animae interiores in singularum rerum siue intelligibilium siue sensibilium discretam inconfusamque diuidit cognitionem. Omnia enim quae intellectus in ratione uniuersaliter considerat particulariter per sensum in rerum omnium discretas cognitiones diffinitionesque partitur.

Vides itaque patrem in filio suo omnia quaecumque uoluit uniuersaliter condidisse et per spiritum sanctum suum particulariter distribuere et distribuere et distributum esse, et ad similitudinem trium diuinitatis personarum cognosce intellectum nostrum omnia quaecumque [de deo causisque rerum] potest intelligere uniuersaliter in ratione per cognitionem actu scientiae creare [hoc est formare] et per sensum consubstantialem sibi particulariter in singulas rerum diffinitiones quas in ratione colligit contemplationis uirtute inconfuse diuidere [hoc est suam cognitionem unicuique cautissimo discretionis contuitu accommodare].

A. Haec quodam modo mihi splendescunt, sed quid distat inter operationem creatricis trinitatis et non creatae et actum trinitatis creatae et creantis nondum perspicio. [Creantis dico,] non enim dubitamus trinitatem nostrae naturae quae non imago dei est sed ad imaginem dei condita—sola *quippe* uera imago inuisibilis dei est et in nullo dissimilis unigenitum dei uerbum patri et spiritui coessentiale—non solum de nihilo *esse* creatam *uerum etiam* sub se adhaerentes *sibi* sensus sensuumque officinas totumque corpus suum, *mortale hoc dico*, creare. Ex deo siquidem ad imaginem dei *de* nihilo facta est, corpus uero suum [ipsa] creat, non tamen de nihilo sed de aliquo. Anima nanque incorporeales qualitates in unum conglutinante [et] quasi quoddam subiectum [ipsis qualitibus ex quantitate] sumente et supponente corpus sibi creat in quo ocltas suas actiones per se inuisibiles manifeste aperiat inque sensibilem notionem producat ut iam in priori libro disputatum est et adhuc dum ad considerationem actionis primordialium causarum peruentum fuerit diligentius inuestigabitur.

1 uarium RBP^c: uarum P* 4 formatus RB: formatur P 7 cognitionem R^cBP^c: confusionem R*P* 12 distributum RB^cP: distributorum B*
13 cognosce: -e in ras. R 14 causisque RB: causasque P rerum om. B*
rasura ante potest in B 15 *lemma* hominem ad igmaginem dei factum solum uero filium igmaginem esse patris Rm actu RB: actus P 17 contemplationis RB: contemplationes P 19 accommodare RP: accomodare B 20 quid RBP^c: quod P* 23 *post* dubitamus *erasum est* [hoc] in R trinitatem R^c(C)BP: quod (?) trinitas R* 24 *lemma* quid distat inter operationem creatricis trinitatis et non create et actum create trinitatis et creantis Rm quippe B^c(C)P: enim RB*
26 *lemma* BP esse R^c(C)BP: est (?) R* uerum etiam in ras. R(C) sibi in

or into the various and multiple display of this sensible world diversified by the divisions of places and times; so everything which the intellect, that is the principal motion of the soul formed by her gnostic contemplation of intelligible things, creates and stores in the art of its reason, it divides through the interior sense of the soul into the discrete and unconfused knowledge of individual things, whether intelligible or sensible. For everything which the intellect considers in the reason universally it divides into the discrete cognitions and definitions of things through the sense particularly.

So you see that the Father in His Son created universally, and through His Holy Spirit has distributed and distributes and will distribute particularly, whatsoever He wished; and learn that in the likeness of the three Persons of the Divinity everything that our intellect can understand [concerning God and the causes of things], after a universal mode it creates [that is, it forms] by an act of science through knowledge in the reason; and after a particular mode, through the sense which is consubstantial with it, divides unconfusedly [that is, accommodates its knowledge to each (particular) by the most careful observation of distinction(s)] by the power of its contemplation into the individual definitions of the things which in the reason it gathers together.

A. These things are becoming clear to me in some measure, but I do not yet see what difference there is between the operation of the creative and uncreated Trinity and the act of the trinity (which is) created and creates. [I say creates] because we do not doubt but that the trinity of our nature, which is not the image of God but is made in the image of God—for the only true image of the invisible God, and in nothing dissimilar (from Him), is the only begotten Word of God (which is) co-essential with the Father and the Spirit—, is not only created out of nothing *but also* creates the senses which are subjoined to it, and the instruments of the senses, and the whole of its body—I mean this mortal (body). For (the created trinity) is made from God in the image of God *out of* nothing, but its body it creates [itself], though not out of nothing but out of something. For, by the action of the soul, which cements together the incorporeal qualities [and] takes [from quantity] as it were a kind of substrate [for these qualities] and places it under (them), it creates for itself a body in which she may openly display her hidden actions (which) in themselves (are) invisible, and bring (them) forth into sensible knowledge, as has already been discussed in the first book and will be examined yet more closely when we have come to consider the activity of the primordial causes.

ras. R(C) 32 supponente RB: subponente P ocltas RB: occultas P
33-34 ut iam RB: utinam P 34 disputatum est RBP^c: disputationem P*

That the human soul creates this mortal body

de eo quod
humana
anima corpus
hoc mortale
creat

Nunc autem quod instat aperias flagito.

de differentia
operationis
diuinae ac
humanae
trinitatis

N. Huius quaestionis solutio facillima ac pene sine ullo labore mihi uidetur. Summa siquidem trinitas omnium rerum creatrix et a nullo creata omnia quae fecit de nihilo fecit. Proprium enim diuinae bonitatis est ex non existentibus in existentia quae uult fieri uocare. Nam et hoc nomen quod est bonitas non aliunde originem ducit nisi a uerbo greco quod est ΒΩΩ, [hoc est] clamo. ΒΩΩ autem et ΚΑΛΩ, [id est] clamo et uoco, unum sensum possident. Etenim qui uocat saepissime in clamorem erumpit. Deus ergo non inconuenienter bonus dicitur et bonitas quia omnia de nihilo in essentiam uenire intelligibili clamore clamat ideoque grece dicitur deus ΚΑΛΟΣ, id est bonus, ΔΙΑ ΤΟ "ΠΑΝΤΑ ΚΑΛΕΙ ΕΙΣ ΟΥΣΙΑΝ", [hoc est] eo quod omnia uocat in essentiam. Cuncta siquidem quae naturaliter subsistunt de nihilo in essentiam a conditore uocata sunt per quinquepertitum uniuersalis creaturae motum. Quaedam namque uocata sunt ut solummodo essentialiter subsistant, quaedam ut subsistant et uiuant, in quibusdam substantiali uitae sensus est additus, in quibusdam uitali sensui ratio cumulatur, in quibusdam ad praedictorum naturalium motuum perfectionem intellectus superponitur [et est primus motus in corporibus [2naturalibus]2, secundus in ea uita qua ligna herbaeque et uiuunt et crescunt, tertius [2in]2 irrationabilibus animantibus, quartus proprie in humana, quintus <adhuc> in angelica conspicitur natura]. Et his quinque gradibus in condendis de nihilo rebus summae ac sanctae trinitatis bonitas perspicitur ineffabilisque operatio manifestatur.

de duplici
operatione
animae

Ea uero trinitas quae in nostra natura ad imaginem creatoris est condita nihil creat de nihilo, illud enim solius dei est et nullius creaturae. Duplex uero eius actio uidetur. Aut enim ea quae de nihilo suus creator condidit rationabilibus intellectualibusque suis motibus inuestigat et quae in natura rerum puro intelligentiae contuitu cognoscit in intimis rationis suae sedibus disponit omniumque rerum quas potest cognoscere cognitiones aut in unum colligit [—uerbi gratia genera in essentia, formas in genere, numeros indiuiduorum in forma scientiae actu unum facit—] aut multipliciter diuidit, singulas cognitiones singulis rebus quarum cognitiones sunt distribuens, [hoc est, ut eodem exemplo utamur, essentiam in genera, genus in formas, formam in indiuidua gnostica operatione discernens], et haec est principalis summaque rationalis naturae operatio.

Secunda uero est quae ut diximus in creatione sui corporis

2 lemma BP 5 in s.l. R 7 lemma B: cur deus bonus dicatur Rm: 12 OYCIAN RB: OYCIN P 19 perfectionemRBP^c: praefationem P* 20 herbaeque RB: herbaque P 21 in om. P irrationabilibus RB: inrationabilibus P post animantibus rasura in R quartus R^cBP: quintus R* 22 post in (2) rasura in B s. natura erasum est adhuc (C) in B 24 perspiciturRB: aspicitur P 26 est (1) om. P 27 lemma BP: que sunt rationalis nature operationes Rm 33 actu RB: aut P 35 hoc est R^c(C)BP: et R*(C) 35 utamur RB: uitamus P

But now I ask you to embark upon the question before us.

N. The solution to this problem seems to me very simple, and to require hardly any effort. For the most high Trinity, creative of all things and by nothing created, made from nothing all that it made. For it is the prerogative of the Divine Goodness to call forth from non-existence into existence (360) what it wishes to be made. For the name bonitas takes its origin from the Greek verb βωω [that is] 'I cry out.' But βωω and κλω [that is] 'I cry out' and 'I call (361)' have the same meaning. For he who calls very often breaks out into a cry. So it is not unreasonable that God should be called Bonus and Bonitas, because with an intelligible cry He cries out that all things should come from nothing into essence, and therefore God is called in Greek, κλω, that is, good, δια τὸ "πάντα κλει εἰς οὐσίαν" [that is] 'for the reason that He calls all things into essence.' For all things which subsist naturally have been called by the Creator from nothing into essence through the fivefold motion of universal creation. For some are called merely to subsist essentially, some to subsist and live, in some sense is added to their substantial life, in some reason is piled upon sentient life (362), in some intellect is superimposed for (the sake of) perfection (363) of the abovementioned natural motions (364). [And the first motion is (found) in [2natural]2 bodies, the second in that life by which trees and plants both live and grow, the third [2in]2 the irrational animate beings, the fourth in human (nature) as its property, the fifth is <at present> seen (only) in the angelic nature.] And by these five stages in the creation of things out of nothing the Goodness of the most high and holy Trinity is seen and its ineffable operation manifested.

But the trinity which is created in our nature in the image of the Creator creates nothing out of nothing, for that belongs to God alone and to no creature. But its action is seen to be twofold. For either it explores by its rational and intellectual motions those things which its Creator created out of nothing, and deposits in the innermost recesses of its reason the things which by the clear observation of its intellect it gets to know in nature, and it either gathers together into a unity its cognitions of all the things which it can know [for instance, by the operation of its science it unifies genera in essence, species in genus, individuals (365) in species]; or divides them into many, distributing each cognition to the particular thing of which it is the cognition [that is to say, to take the same example, dividing by a gnostic operation (366) essence into genera, genus into species, species into individuals]. And this is the principal and highest activity of the rational nature.

But the second is that which, as we have said, is known in its 36 formam RB^cP: formas B*

Concerning the difference between the operation of the divine and of the human trinity

Why God is called Bonus

Concerning the twofold operation of the soul

cognoscitur inque eius sollicito regimine aperitur. Primo siquidem materiam eius ex qualitatibus rerum sensibilibus accipit eique nullo temporali spatio interposito <formam> uitalem<que> motum accommodat quo ipsam materiem et uiuificat et nutrit inque augmenta perfectae staturae per numeros locorum et temporum prouehit. Sensum quoque exteriorem ei praestat per quem omnium rerum quas extrinsecus attingit phantasias recipit et caetera quae de sollicitudine assidua continentique actione animae circa corpus suum resque corporeas siue sensibus praesens uigilando siue ab eis remota dormiendo imaginesque rerum quas per sensus hauserat secum tractando aut imagines imaginum fingendo aut alimenta corporalia quae extrinsecus in aedificium corporis accipit per oculos uenarum neruorumque meatus quos Graeci ΠΟΡΟ<Y>C uel ΑΠΤΕΡΙΑC appellant distribuendo et cogitari et intelligi possunt. Vt enim summa trinitas uniuersitatem totius creaturae quam de nihilo condidit prouidentiae suae regulis mouet regit ordinat et nihil perire, hoc est paenitus ad nihilum redire, ex his quae condidit sinit, ita nostrae naturae trinitas uniuersitati corporis sui omniumque sensuum eius [incolomitati] prouidet ipsumque uiuificat [et] mouet [et] continet quantum mortalis fragilitas [ipsius] permittit.

Sed uide ne ex his rationibus incipias coniciere animae creationem temporali quodam spatio conditionem corporis <spiritualis ante peccatum> praecedere. Sola siquidem dignitate excellentiaque naturae praecedit anima corpus non autem loco uel tempore. Simul enim ac semel in illo uno homine qui ad imaginem dei factus est omnium hominum rationes secundum corpus et animam creatae sunt. Nullo modo enim iuxta moras temporum essentia animae corporis essentiam sicut nec corporis essentia animae essentiam praecedit. Et ne me existimes primum illud essenziale corpus in paradiso conditum [—sola tamen ratione adhuc factum sicut et ipsa anima. In ipso quippe generali et uniuersali homine ad imaginem dei facto omnes homines secundum corpus et animam simul et semel in sola possibilitate conditi sunt et in ipso omnes peccauerunt priusquam in proprias substantias <spiritualiter sicut angeli> prodirent, hoc est antequam unusquisque secundum angelicam multiplicationem in sua discreta

1 inque R^cBP: in quae R* 3-4 accommodat BP: accomodat R 6 ei om. P omnium RB: nimium P 10 quas om. B* 12 oculos RB: occultos P 13 appellant R^cB: appellant R*: appellarint P 14 glossa conditio[nem] anime non precedere conditionem corporis et in primo cum anima et corpore a deo solo creato homine omnes simul homines animo (sic) et corpore conditos esse sed postquam primus homo peccauit in quo omnes simul peccauerunt ab ipsa anima creatum tunc de terra factum et cotidie fieri quod significant perizomata de foliis ficinis consuta et tunc esse primam diuisionem sexus factam. sed hoc quod uidetur grecorum esse opinio et maxime originis caute est in omni libro isto legendum et latinarum (sic) auctoritas expectanda Rm 16 hoc est in ras. R(C) 17 ita RB: hoc est P 19 post continet add. et P quantum in ras. R

creation of its body, and is revealed in its careful control of it. For first it takes its matter from the qualities of sensible things and, with no temporal interval intervening, applies to it <form and> vital motion by which it both quickens and nourishes that matter and carries it forward through place and time (367) to the increased dimensions of its perfect stature. Also it provides it with the exterior sense through which it receives the fantasies of all things which reach it from without, and the other things which can be thought and understood with reference to the ceaseless care and uninterrupted activity of the soul for her body and for bodily matters, either when in waking she is present in the senses or when she is withdrawn (368) from them in sleep, and by discussing with herself the images of things which she had absorbed through the senses or by fashioning images of the images or by distributing through the hidden channels of the veins and nerves which the Greeks call πόροι or ἀρτερίαι bodily nourishments which she receives from outside for the building up of her body. For as the most high Trinity moves (and) controls (and) orders by the rules of its Providence the totality of everything created which it created out of nothing, and allows nothing of the things that it has created to perish, that is, to return entirely to nothing; so the trinity of our nature exerts providence over the totality of its body and the [safety] of all its senses, and quickens [and] moves [and] preserves it as much as [its] mortal fragility allows.

But see that you do not begin to conjecture from these reasons that the creation of the soul preceded by any temporal interval the creation of the body <which was a spiritual creature before man sinned>. For only by the status and excellence of her nature does the soul precede the body, not in place or time. For at one and the same time in that one man who was made in the image of God were created the reasons of all men in respect both of body and of soul.

For by no means does the essence of the soul precede the essence of the body by intervals of times, as neither does the essence of the body (precede) the essence of the soul. And do not think that I mean that that first essential body created in paradise [—but as yet it was only in its reason that it was created, as also the soul. For in that general and universal man made in the image of God all men, in respect of body and soul, not only have, in potency only, been created once and together, but all in him also have sinned before they proceeded <spiritually like the angels> into their proper substances, that is, before each appeared in his distinct form in a rational soul and spiritual body—which, that is, the body], (as) incorruptible, would

21 coniciere R^cP: coniecere R*B 24-25 ac semel RB: asemel P 25 post est rasura in B 26 et om. P 27 enim om. P 28 nec corporis RB: necorporis P 29 paradiso RB: paradyso P 33 conditi sunt om. P

de
coeternitate
primi cor-
poris et
animae

differentia in anima rationali et spirituali corpore apparet—quod uidelicet corpus] incorruptibile aeternaliter *et* coeternaliter animae adhaereret *si non peccaret*, in quo omnes homines resurrecturi sunt, ab anima creari dixisse. Illud enim ab uno omnium creatore immediate simul cum rationali anima in caelesti beatitudine, [immo ad caelestem beatitudinem] substantialiter conditum est [—substantialiter autem dico quia uniuscuius²que² creaturae uera est substantia sua in primordialibus ²causis² praecognita praeconditaque ratio qua deus diffinit: ‘Sic ²et² non aliter erit.’ Ad <caelestem> beatitudinem quoque dixi, non enim uideo quomodo homo beatitudinem ²perderet² si eam re ipsa plene perfecteque gustaret. Prius enim ut arbitror ad se ipsum quam ad deum conuersus est atque ideo lapsus], *hoc* uero corpus corruptibile ac materiale quod ex limo terrae assumptum est <ut superius diximus> post peccatum merito peccati ad exercitandam in eo negligentem animam erga mandatorum custodiam <suasque operationes reuelandas> ueluti quadam propria *actione* animae et creatum fuisse et cotidie creari affirmare non haesito. Quod enim scriptura sancta deum lutum de terra sumpsisse deque eo corpus homini formasse perhibeat non te mouere debet. Nam et actio creaturae ad eum ex quo omnis naturalis actio incipit non immerito refertur *siquidem* et in caelestibus essentiis a primo ordine qui immediate post deum incipit usque ad extremum gradatim descendentibus quodcunque ordo superior in inferiori se ordine propria quadam actione administrauerit atque perfecit hoc totum ad eum a quo omnis naturalis motus inchoat naturalisque actio a summo usque deorsum descendit refertur. Ipsa enim causa omnium quamuis non per se ipsam—quoniam immutabilis est—sed per subditam sibi creaturam uniuersitatem totius naturae a se conditae creet moueat gubernet, tota tamen diuinae prouidentiae dispensatio in eam refunditur quia causa omnium est.

Quid dicam de ordinibus ecclesiae in hac adhuc mortali uita constitutae, quibus episcoporum ordo praefertur? Numquid omne quod caeterae dispositiones quae *posteriores* sunt in distributis sibi officiis peregerint ad eum reducitur quoniam ab eo posteri ordines quae sibi peragenda sunt accipiunt? Ab eo *siquidem* singula singulis symbolica mynisteria distribuuntur totiusque ecclesiae spiritualis operatio per ipsum refertur in ipsam causam, deum dico, omnium bonarum mysticarumque actionum.

18–19 Gen. ii. 7

3 lemma BP adhaereret . . . peccaret R^c(C)BP: adhaerens R* 8 sua BP: suae R 9 diffinit BP: diffiniuit R 11 plene RB: plenae P perfecteque R: perfectaeque BP 12 atque RB: adque P 13–14 assumptum RB^cP: assumptus B* 15 in eo RB: meo P 16 actione B^c(C)P: operatione RB* 17 affirmare RB^c: affirmari B* adfirmare P 21 siquidem *in ras.* R(C)

have adhered eternally *and* coeternally to the soul had it not sinned, (the body) in which all men will rise again, is created by the soul (369). For that body was substantially created by the one Creator of all things immediately at the same time as the rational soul in heavenly bliss [or rather for heavenly bliss]. [Now, I say ‘substantially’ because the true substance of every creature is its reason, fore-known and pre-created in the primordial ²causes², by which God defines it (saying), ‘It shall be thus ²and² not otherwise.’ And I also said ‘for <heavenly> bliss’ because I do not see how man ²should surrender² (that) bliss had he ever fully and perfectly savoured it as it really is. For, as I think, he turned to himself before he turned to God, and that was why he fell.] But I do not hesitate to say that this corruptible and material body which was taken from the mud of the earth <as we said above> after sin and as a punishment for sin, so that in it the negligent soul might be trained to keep the commandments <and to manifest her operations>, was created and is daily being created as though by some proper *action* of the soul. For it ought not to surprise you that Holy Scripture declares that God took clay of the earth and from it formed a body for man, because it is not unreasonable that the action of the creature should be referred to Him from Whom every natural action originates, *since* even among the celestial essences, descending step by step from the first order which begins immediately after God to the last, whatever (ministration) the higher order performs and completes upon the order below it by some action of its own is wholly referred to Him from Whom every natural motion springs and every natural action descends from the highest to the lowest. For although the Cause of all things, being immutable, does not through itself but through the creature which is subordinate to it create (or) move (or) govern the totality of universal nature which it has established, yet the whole dispensation of the Divine Providence is referred to it because it is the Cause of all things.

What shall I say of the orders of the Church (as it is) constituted in this present mortal life, (and of) which the order of bishops is at the head? Is not everything which the other orders (370) who come after (the bishop) may have performed in the offices to which they are appointed referred to him because it is from him that the subordinate orders receive the functions that they must carry out? For by him is allotted to each his symbolic ministry, and the spiritual operation of the whole Church is referred through him to that Cause of all good and mystical acts, I mean God.

qui B*P: quod RB^c 27 per (2): *s.l.* B 28 creet R^cBP: creat R* 29 gubernet R^cBP: gubernat R* in eam RB: meam P 33 posteriores R^c(C)BP: post eum R* 34 posteri R^cBP: posteriores R* 36 mynisteria RB: ministeria P 37 dico RB: dici P

Concerning
the co-
eternity of
the first body
and the soul

Cur ergo mirum si primus homo ad imaginem dei conditus diu-
 numque praeceptum transgressus ac per hoc de beatitudine paradisi
 expulsus fragile atque mortale de luto terrae sibimet habitaculum
 crearet diuina prouidentia admonitus ut quia caeleste corpus ac
 spirituale ab ipso deo conditum possidere et custodire superbus
 neglexerat congruum sibi suae inoboedientiae merito mortale hospiti- 5
 um ex terrena materia sumptum humiliatus faceret in quo punitus 583c
 poeniteret et exercitatus ad pristinam dignitatem naturae suae redire
 se ipsum recognoscendo et humiliando peteret? Nec de hoc scriptura
 tacet. Nam post praeuaricationem continuo de simplici humana natura 10
 ante peccatum in duplicem sexum diuisa post casum ait: 'Et con-
 'suerunt folia ficus et fecerunt sibi ΠΕΡΙΖΩΜΑΤΑ,' aperte in-
 sinuans foliorum symbolo fragilem atque caducam mortalis huius
 corporis conditionem quam sibi homo post sui ruinam texerat. Nostra
 siquidem mortalia corpora latis fici foliis simillima sunt. Nam quem- 15
 admodum folia illa umbram faciunt radios solis recludunt sic nostra
 corpora et tenebras ignorantiae animabus nostris ingerunt et ueritatis
 cognitionem repellunt. Quae tamen folia, nostra terrena corpora dico, 583D
 terrenarum mortiferarumque deliciarum dulcedine[m] quasi quandam
 fructum undique uallare et obumbrare inque eis nos fallere consue- 20
 scunt. Et ut cognoscas mortalis nostri corporis creationem ad eum
 cuius consilio acta sunt quaecumque erga nostram exercitationem et
 renouationem et salutem leguntur apertissime referri audi eandem 584A
 scripturam dicentem, 'Fecit quoque dominus deus Adae et uxori suae
 'tunicas pellitias et induit eos,' ubi non incongrue intelligimus non 25
 aliud per tunicas pellitias significari praeter quod ΠΕΡΙΖΩΜΑΤΑ,
 mortalia uidelicet corpora, quae sibi iusto conditoris iudicio permittente
 primi homines post transgressionem fecere.

Et num tibi uidetur credibilius dicendum mortalem hominem
 mortalem sibi carnem fecisse quam ipsum deum per se creasse sed 30
 tantum permisisse et admonuisse? Deus enim immortalis est et quod-
 cunque per se ipsum facit immortale est. Omne siquidem mortale
 quodcunque in hoc sensibili mundo esse uidetur et fragile et trans-
 itorium aut nos ipsi facimus nostris irrationabilibus motibus errantes 584B

11-12 Gen. iii. 7 24-25 Gen. iii. 21

1 Cur RB: Cum P 2 paradisi RB: paradysi P 6 post mortale deletum est a in
 P 6-7 hospitium RB: ospitium P 7 punitus RB: punitur P 8 poeniteret
 B^c: peniteret RB*P naturae: nat- in ras. R(C) 11 in om. P diuisa R: diuisam
 BP post casum RB: post easum P 12 ficus om. P 13 lemma B: quid per folia
 P: quid significant folia fici Rm 15 latis R^cBP: l^atis R* 16 glossa quicquid
 a deo fit immortale est mortalia uero aut a nobis fiunt aut permissu dei ab adminis-
 tratoris spiritibus siue bonis siue malis Rm 17 tenebras R^cBP: tenibras R*
 20 obumbrare: ob- s.l. B inque eis RB: inquietis P fallere B: fall*re R: allicere
 affallare P 21 lemma illud primum hominis corpus a deo factum incorruptibile
 esse et ubi sit Rm 23 renouationem RB: reuocationem P 25 pellitias B:

What wonder, then, if the first man, (who was) made in the image
 of God and (who) transgressed the divine commandment and for that
 reason (was) driven from the bliss of paradise, should create for him-
 self from the clay of the earth a fragile and mortal habitation on the
 advice of the Divine Providence, so that, since he had in his pride
 refused to occupy and preserve the heavenly and spiritual body
 created by God Himself, he should in his degradation make for him-
 self, as a punishment for disobedience, a mortal mansion taken from
 earthly matter, and by this punishment be brought to repentance and
 seek in chastened mood, by getting to know himself again and by
 mortifying himself (371), to return to the first state of his nature?

Nor is Scripture silent about this. For concerning the fact that, 26
 immediately after the transgression, human nature, which before its
 sin had been simple, was after its fall divided into two sexes it says:
 'And they sewed fig-leaves together and made for themselves περι-
 ζώματα (372),' clearly intending by the symbol of the leaves the
 fragile and corruptible state of this mortal body, which man wove for
 himself after his fall. For our mortal bodies are very like the broad
 leaves of the fig. For as those leaves cast a shadow (and) shut out the
 rays of the sun, so our bodies both cast upon our souls the darkness
 of ignorance and keep out the knowledge of truth (373).

But these leaves, I mean our earthly bodies, have a way of en-
 circling us on all sides and of overshadowing us with the sweetness
 of earthly and deadly delights like a kind of fruit (374) and of caus-
 ing us to be deceived in them.

And in order that you may learn that the creation of our mortal
 body is most explicitly referred to Him by Whose design is done
 whatever is read concerning our training and renewal and salvation,
 hear the words of the same Scripture: 'The Lord God also made for
 Adam and his wife tunics of skins and clothed them with them,' where
 it is not unreasonable that we should understand that by the tunics
 of skins is signified nothing else but what the περιζώματα (signify),
 namely (375) our mortal bodies, which, in accordance with the
 righteous judgement of the Creator, the first human beings made for
 themselves after their transgression. And surely it must seem to you
 more reasonable to say that mortal man made mortal flesh for himself
 than that God Himself by His own action created it rather than per-
 mitting it and advising it? For God is immortal and whatever is made
 through Him is immortal. For everything mortal that is seen to be
 in this sensible world, being both fragile and transitory, is either made
 by ourselves when we are led astray by our irrational motions or is

pellitias RP 26 pellitias B: pellicias RP 27 conditoris RB: conditionis P
 28 fecere RB^cP: facere B* 30 quam RB: nam P 31 permisisse RP: per-
 mississe B 32 mortale RB: mortali P

What is
 meant by the
 fig-leaves

aut propter delictum nostrum ad usum mortalis uitae nostrae et exemplum fieri sinitur siue bonis uirtutibus administrantibus <et perficientibus> siue malis naturali cursui ne ad suum finem perueniat certis spatiis constitutum inpedientibus. Vitalem nanque motum in seminibus agere ut per generationem in formas uisibiles procedant nullus recte philosophus philosophantium dubitat; sed ipse uitalis motus non semper aequaliter in singulis generibus actionis suae uirtutem manifestat siue propter quaedam accidentia quae seminibus non conueniunt et ex contrariis qualitatibus nascuntur siue propter aduersas ut diximus uirtutes quae naturali motui repugnant, de quibus *nunc disserere et longum est et superfluum quia a multis disputatum*. [Sed fortassis quis dicit: 'Illud primum corpus incorruptibile quod animae si non peccaret adhaereret ubi nunc est? Perire enim incorruptibile non potest.' Huic breuiter respondendum: In secretis humanae naturae sinibus adhuc latet, in futuro autem saeculo apparebit quando mortale hoc in illud mutabitur et 'corruptibile hoc induetur incorruptionem'. Audi apostolum: 'Seminatur corpus animale, surget corpus spirituale. Seminatur in infirmitate, surget in uirtute. Seminatur in contumelia, surget in gloria' immortalitatis uidelicet et incorruptibilitatis siue in bonis siue in malis. Hoc enim generaliter de omni humano corpore dictum esse arbitror. In omnibus enim aeternae immortalitatis non autem beatitudinis aequalis erit gloria. Tota siquidem natura <primordialis cum sibi superadditis in unum> reparabitur.]

A. De hac interim quaestione satis dictum ut opinor et ad considerationem illius trinitatis in qua ad imaginem et similitudinem dei conditi sumus redeundum diligenterque considerandum utrum per omnia imago illa similitudinem illius cuius imago est imitatur an in aliquo dissimilis deficit ad perfectamque imaginem non omnino peruenit. Nam in quantum imitatur in tantum imago recte dicitur, si uero in aliquo uacillauerit ex perfectae imaginis ratione recedit.

N. Hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem dei perfectissime factum et in nullo defecisse in paradiso ante peccatum credimus excepta ratione subiecti. Deus enim per se ipsum subsistens et a nullo precedente se subsistere accipiens hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem suam de nihilo in essentiam adduxit. *Eo itaque notato quod*

16-17 cf. I Cor. xv. 53

17-19 I Cor. xv. 44

4 constitutum: -tum s.l. B motum: m- s.l. B 11-12 nunc-disputatum
B^c(C)P: alius disserendi locus est RB* 11 a om. P 12 dicit RB^cP: dicat
B* 15 sinibus RBP^c: sensibus P* 16 in ante hoc *erasum* in R
18 corpus bis R* spirituale RB^cP: spiritale B* 21 omni R^cBP: omnis R*
22 enim s.l. B(C) 24 reparabitur bis B*(C) 25 interim RB: iterum P
26 in qua RB^cP: inque B* 27 post redeundum *erasum est* ut arbitror in R
28 imago RB: imaginem P est om. P 29 in aliquo RBP^c: mali quo P*
31 uero RB: enim P 32 dei s.l. R 33 lemma nullam dissimilitudinem

permitted to be made on account of our sin, for use and example in our mortal life, whether by the good powers who minister to us <and lead us to perfection> or by the evil powers who hinder our natural course from reaching its proper end which is appointed after certain times. For no philosopher (376) among those who practise philosophy correctly doubts but that the vital motion works in the seeds to the end that they may through generation develop into visible forms; but the vital motion itself does not always show its potentiality for action equally in each genus, either because of certain accidents which are not congenial to the seeds and are born of contrary qualities, or because of hostile powers which operate, as we have said, against their natural motion; *to discuss which now would be a lengthy (task) and an unnecessary (one) since it has been discussed by many*.

[But perhaps someone will ask: 'That first incorruptible body which would have remained attached to the soul if she had not sinned, where is it now? For what is incorruptible cannot perish.' To this there is a short answer: Until now it lies hidden in the secret recesses of human nature, but in the age to come it will appear when this mortal (body) will be changed into it, and 'this corruption will put on incorruption'. Hear then the Apostle: 'It is sown a psychic (377) body, it will rise a spiritual body. It is sown in weakness, it will rise in power. It is sown in ignominy, it will rise in glory,' (the glory,) that is, of immortality and incorruptibility, whether in the good or in the evil. For I take this statement to have a general application to every human body. *For* in all, the glory of eternal immortality will be equal, though not (the glory) of bliss (378). For the whole <primordial> nature <together with what has been added to it> will be restored <into unity>].

A. Enough, I think, has been said about this incidental question, and we must return to the consideration of that trinity in which we have been created in the image and likeness of God, and carefully consider whether that image copies throughout all things the likeness of that of which it is the image or whether it is dissimilar in anything, and does not in every respect attain to a perfect image. For so far as it imitates, thus far it is rightly called image; but if it deviates at any point it falls short of the reason of a perfect image.

N. We believe that man was most perfectly created in the image and likeness of God and that in paradise before his sin he fell short (of that) in nothing except in respect of subject (379). For God, subsisting through Himself and receiving subsistence from nothing that precedes Him, brought Man in His image and likeness out of nothing into essence. *Therefore, once it has been noted* that God, being

igmaginis nostre et principalis forme preter rationem subiecti Rm paradiso RB:
paradyso P 34 a RB: in P 36 eo itaque notato B^c(C)P: notato itaque RB*

deus per se ipsum ANAPXOC, id est sine principio, essentiam suam possidet, homo uero de nihilo creatus habet conditionis suae initium non solum in primordialibus causis in quibus omnia simul creata sunt 585b
 uerum etiam in processionibus in diuersas essentias formasque siue intellectuales siue sensibiles, caetera omnia quae de deo dicuntur et 5
 intelliguntur per essentialem excellentiam omnino in imagine eius perspiciuntur per <naturam> et gratiam. Conditor quippe inuisibilis incomprehensibilis omnem intelligentiam ex<s>uperans imaginem suam in his omnibus sibi similem creauit. Nam et noster intellectus 10
 nec a se ipso cognoscitur quid sit secundum essentiam nec ab alio
 praeter deum <qui solus nouit quae fecit>; sed quemadmodum de
 conditore suo hoc tantum cognoscit quia est non autem percipit quid sit, ita de se ipso solummodo diffinit quia creatus est, quomodo uero 585c
 uel in qua substantia substitutus est intelligere non potest. Si enim
 quid sit aliquo modo intelligeret necessario similitudine creatoris 15
 deuiaret. ΠΡΟΤΟΤΥΠΟΝ [quippe], hoc est principale exemplum, deus est per naturam, imago deus est per gratiam; ΠΡΟΤΟΤΥΠΟΝ diffunditur per omnia distribuens eis essentiam, imago luce gratiae purgata [illuminata perfecta] per omnia discurrit eorum in se ipsa conformans notitiam; ΠΡΟΤΟΤΥΠΟΝ omnia [quae fecit] penetrat dona 20
 sua singulis secundum propriam uniuscuiusque analogiam diuidens, imago omnia lustrat bonorum largitorem ex donis suis innumerabilibus [omnibus distributis] laudans [—alia siquidem sunt dona substantialia <quae proprie data dicuntur>, alia substantiae adiecta, et quemadmodum ΠΡΟΤΟΤΥΠΟΝ imaginem suam creauit in qua 25
 notitiam quandam de se ostenderet ita imago imaginem sibi fecit in qua motus suos per se occultos manifestaret. Anima namque imago dei est, corpus uero imago animae—]; caeteraque quae de similitudine imaginis intelligenda et pronuntianda sunt, de quibus quisquis plenius scire uoluerit legat librum sancti Gregorii NYCEI de Imagine. 30

A. Haec libenter accipio sed uideo aliam differentiam praeter substantialem quae imaginem ex principali forma uidetur diuidere. 586A

N. Dic postulo quae sit illa.

A. Num tibi uidetur parua differentia inter illam naturam quae cognoscit se ipsam et esse et quid sit et illam quae tantum cognoscit se esse non autem intelligit quid sit? Siquidem non negabis ut aestimo ipsum deum se ipsum intelligere quid sit, caeteras uero 35
 30 cf. Greg. Nyss., *De hom. opif.* xvi, PG xlv. 177D sq.

2 conditionis R: cognitionis BP 3 simul s.l. B 6 in RB^c(C)P: om. B*
 imagine R: imaginem BP 11 lemma BP 12 conditore RB: conditori P
 hoc tantum cognoscit RBP^c: cognoscit hoc tantum P* 17 post naturam rasura
 in R ΠΡΟΤΟΤΥΠΟΝ RB: ΠΡΟΤΟΤΥΠΟΝ P 18 post imago rasura in R
 19 purgata RB^c: purgatu B*: purgaret P 20 penetrat RB: penetrat P dona
 om. P 27 qua RB: quo P 32 principali RB: principibus P 34 lemma
 comprobatio per omnes cathogorias deum non se ignorare sed nescire quid sit quia non est quid et quid significet scriptura dicens nescire deum et angelos semper

ἀναρχος, that is, without beginning, possesses His Essence through Himself, while man, created out of nothing (380), has a beginning of his creation, not only in the primordial causes in which all things were created at once, but also in the processions into the diverse essences and species, whether intelligible or sensible, all other things which are said and understood of God through the excellence of His Essence are wholly seen in His image through <nature> and (381) grace. For the Creator (Who is) invisible and incomprehensible and passes all understanding created His image similar to Himself in all these things. For even our intellect is not known as to what it is in its essence either by itself or by any other save God <Who alone knows what He has made>; but as concerning its Creator it knows only that He is but does not perceive what He is (382), so concerning itself it only determines that it is created, but how or in what substance it is constituted it cannot understand. For if in any way it could understand what it is it would necessarily deviate from the likeness of its Creator. [For] the πρωτότυπον, that is, the Principal Exemplar, is God through nature, while the image is God through grace. The πρωτότυπον is diffused through all things, distributing to all things their essence; the image, purified [illuminated (and) perfected (383)] by the light of grace, pervades all things, forming a knowledge of them in itself (384). The πρωτότυπον penetrates all things [that it has made], dividing its gifts to each in the proportion proper for each (385); the image surveys all things, giving glory to the Bestower of good things for His innumerable gifts [He has bestowed upon all—for some gifts, <which are properly called d a t a,> are substantial, others are added to substance; and as the πρωτότυπον created His image so that in it He might reveal some knowledge of Himself, so the image made for itself an image (386) in which it might manifest its motions (which) in themselves (are) hidden. For the soul is the image of God, the body the image of the soul].

And concerning the other things which are to be understood and declared concerning the similitude (387) of the image (388) anyone who desires fuller knowledge may read the book of St. Gregory Νυσσεύς 'On the Image' (389).

A. These (things) I readily accept. But I see another difference besides that of substance which appears to divide the image from its Principal Exemplar (390).

N. Please tell me what it is.

A. Does the difference seem to you slight between the nature which knows of itself both that it is and what it is, and that which knows of itself only that it is but does not understand what it is? For you will not deny, as I think, that God himself understands of discernere Rm Num RB: Non P

Concerning man's likeness to God and the mind's ignorance as to what it is

creatas essentias et substantias se ipsas non negamus intelligere non posse <quid sint> ne uideamur Nazianzeno Gregorio *theologo* impudenter refragare, qui *indubitanter* certis approbat rationibus nullam creatam essentiam a se ipsa uel ab alia quamuis ratione uel intellectu praedita posse diffiniri quid sit. Videsne ergo dissimilitudinem imaginis principalisque suae formae, hoc est humani intellectus et conditoris dei, non solum in ratione subiecti ueram etiam in eo quod ipsa principalis forma cognoscit quid sit, imago uero nec se ipsam quid sit nec suam formam quam imitatur substantialiter diffinire intelligit?

N. Similitudine uerae ratiocinationis deceptum te esse uideo, nec inmerito. Nisi enim quis ea in quibus falli uideris acute ac diligenter circumspexerit non solum uerisimilia [sed etiam] uera esse putabuntur.

A. Explices posco ubi fallor.

N. Num tibi uidetur diuina essentia infinita esse an finita?

A. Hinc dubitare et impium et stultissimum est, praesertim cum non essentia sed plus quam essentia et essentiarum omnium infinita causa et credi debeat et intelligi et non solum infinita sed omnium essentiarum infinitarum infinitas et plus quam infinitas.

N. Recte itaque atque catholice. Omnino igitur infinita est?

A. Hoc dedi nec poenitet me dedisse sed firmissime approbo omnino aliter non esse.

N. Vide ne retrahas.

A. Nil inde suspicandum.

N. Itaque quando interrogamus quid est hoc uel illud num tibi uideatur aliud quaerere nisi aut iam diffinitam substantiam aut diffiniri ualentem?

A. Non aliud. Hoc enim nomen 'quid' dum sit interrogatiuum non quaerit nisi ut illa substantia quam quaerit quodam modo diffiniatur.

N. Si ergo nemo sapientum generaliter de omni essentia inquirat quid sit quoniam diffiniri non potest sed ex circumstantiis suis intra quas ueluti terminos circumscribitur, loco dico et tempore [quanto et quali relatione copulatione statu motu habitu] caeterisque accidentibus, quibus [ipsa] ratione subiecti substantia per se ipsam incognita indiffinibilisque subsistens esse tantum, non autem quid sit, manifestatur, quid theologiae disciplinis eruditus interrogare praesumat

3-5 cf. Greg. Naz., *Orat.* xxviii. 5, ap. Max. Conf., *I Ambig.* xiii, PG xci. 1129B-C11

2 nazianzeno B: nazanazeno R: nazanzeno P theologo B^c(C)P: nuseo que praedicto RB* 3 indubitanter B^c(C)P: unanimiter RB* approbat B^c(C)P: approbant RB* 8 uero om. P 9 diffinire RB: definire P 14 lemma BP (deus om. P) finita RB: infinita P 17 post sed *erasum* est etiam in B 19 post catholice *rasura* in R 20 poenitet B^c: penitet RB*P 25 uidemur R^c(C)BP: uidetur R* post aliud *erasum* est nisi in R 26 diffiniri RB: difiniri P 28 diffiniatur BP: definiatur R 30 diffiniri RB: difiniri P sed s.l. B 32 copulatione: gl. *interlin.* .i. relatione C in B (cf. P) 33 se s.l. B 34 indiffinibilisque R^cB: diffinibilisque R*: indiffinibilisque P subsistens: -ens *addidit*

Himself what He is, whereas we do not deny that the other essences and substances, (which are) created, cannot understand of themselves <what they are> lest we should appear impudently to oppose (391) Gregory Nazianzen *the Theologian* (392), who declares *without hesitation* (and) with sound reasons that no created essence can be defined by itself or by another, even though endowed with reason and intellect, as to what it is. Do you see, then, that the dissimilarity between the image and its Principal Exemplar, that is, between the human intellect and God the Creator is not only in respect of subject but also for the reason that the Principal Exemplar itself knows what it is, while the image does not understand how to define substantially either itself as to what it is or its Exemplar which it copies?

N. I see that you have been misled by an appearance of true reasoning, and it is not surprising. For unless one has keenly and carefully examined from all sides the things in which you seem to be mistaken, they will be considered as not only likely but true.

A. Please explain where I am mistaken.

N. Do you believe that the Divine Essence is infinite or finite?

A. To hesitate over that would be impious and very foolish, especially as it ought to be believed and understood that it is not Essence but More than Essence and the infinite Cause of all essences, and not only infinite but the Infinity of all infinite essence, and More than Infinity.

That God does not know of Himself What He is

N. You speak correctly and in accordance with catholic doctrine. It is, then, in every respect infinite?

A. I have granted this and do not regret having granted it but most firmly declare that it is not otherwise.

N. See that you do not retract.

A. You need have no fear of that.

N. So when we ask of this or that, 'What is it?', does it not appear to you that *we* are seeking for nothing else but a substance which either has been defined or is capable of being defined?

A. Nothing else (but that). For this word, 'What', when it is interrogative, seeks nothing else but that the substance which it seeks be somehow defined.

N. If, then, no wise man asks of all essence in general what it is, since it cannot be defined except in terms of the circumstances which circumscribe it, so to speak, within limits, I mean place and time [quantity and quality, connection, rest, motion, condition] and the other accidents by which the substance [itself], by reason of (being) subject, unknown and indefinable through itself, is shown only as subsisting, but not as to what it is, what man learned in the discipline of the divine word would presume to inquire of the Divine Substance

C in R 35 praesumat RB^cP: praesumant B*

de diuina substantia quid sit cum purissime intelligat de ipsa nec diffiniri posse nec ullum eorum quae sunt esse omniaque quae diffiniri possunt superare? [²Audi Naz(i)anzenum:]² 'Si nihil omnino est' [²inquit]² 'existentium secundum ipsum esse ipsa cumulatio rea quae 'est et dicitur eorum quae a nobis circa illud' quod quaeritur 'et intel- 5
'liguntur et dicuntur, sed alterum quid praeter ea illud circa quod 'haec sunt—continet namque ea, ipsum uero ab his nullo modo 'continetur—, quiescat omnis anima ab omni ratione eorum quae 'circa deum sunt temere' in diffinitionem eius 'insilire sed silentio 'colat tantum ineffabilem et super intellectum omnisque summum 10
'scientiae diuinae essentiae ueritatem.' Si ergo nemo sapientissimorum potest cognoscere existentium substantiae rationes secundum 587B
quas fundatae sunt, quis audeat deum in aliquo diffinire?]

A. Nec hoc quaerere praesumpserim cognoscens ipsam omnino infinitum esse. 15

N. Itaque si deus cognoscit [se ipsum] quid sit nonne se ipsum diffinit—omne siquidem quod intelligitur quid sit a se ipso uel ab alio diffiniri [a se ipso <uel ab alio>] potest—ac per hoc non uniuersaliter infinitus est [sed particulariter si ex creatura solummodo diffiniri non potest, a se uero ipso potest, uel ut ita dicam sibi ipsi finitus 20
creaturae infinitus subsistit]? Et si hoc datum fuerit necessario sequetur ut aut non uniuersaliter deus infinitus sit si a sola creatura non autem a se ipso non recipit diffiniri aut omnino nec a creatura nec a se ipso ut uniuersaliter infinitus sit ullo modo diffinitionem percipit. 587C

A. Praesentis huius ratiocinationis caliginem inaccessibilem esse aestimo et nisi ipse qui quaeritur dextram suam quaerentibus se praetendat nullum in eam introitum facile crediderim. Si enim deus se ipsum non diffinit aut [se] diffinire non possit, quis ignorantiam et impotentiam in eum cadere negarit—ignorantiam scilicet si <se> non intelligit quid sit, impotentiam uero si non potest diffinire quid sub- 30
sistit? [Impotens enim uidebitur esse quando se ipsum in aliquo non potest diffinire.] Si uero et intelligit et diffinit quid ipse sit non omnino infinitus esse probabitur dum a sola creatura diffiniri non potest quia nullo modo ab ea intelligitur, a se uero ipso et diffinitur et cognoscitur quid sit. 35

3-11 Max. Conf., I Ambig. xiii, PG xci. 1225D 1-1228A 3

2 diffiniri (1) RB: difiniri P omniaque quae RB^c: omnia quaeque B*P dif-
finiri (2) RB: difiniri P 4 cumulatio RB: cumalatio P 6 ea om. P 8 post
eorum *uasura in R* 10 colat RB: celat P 13 fundatae RB^cP: fundata B*
14 praesumpserim RB: praesumserim P 16 post quid *erasum est ipse (?) in R*
18 non *s.l.* R 19 lemma BP si *in ras.* R(C) 20 a B^cP: ad RB* 22 se-
quetur RB^c(C)P: sequitur B* 24 ut *om.* P ullo R^cBP: nullo R* 25 ra-
tiocinationis RB^cP: rationis B* 26 dextram RB: dexteram P 28 diffinire
RB: diffinitae P 31 uidebitur RB: uidebit P 32 post intelligit *erasum est se*
34 ipso RB^cP: ipsa B*

what it is when he understands very well concerning it that it cannot be defined, and is not any of the things that are, and surpasses all things that can be defined?

[[²Hear the Nazianzen (393):]² 'If . . . the accumulation of the things which are both understood and said by us about that' which is being sought 'is nothing whatever of the things that exist according to being itself as it is and is spoken of (394), but if that to which these relate—since it contains them (395) while it is in no way contained by them—is something other than they, (then) let every soul refrain from rashly rushing into any speech of the matters that concern God' to define Him (thereby) (396), '. . . but let her reverence in silence (397) only the truth (398) of the Divine Essence (which is) ineffable and beyond understanding and the summit (399) of all science (400).' If, then, there is no one (even) among the wisest who can know the reasons of the substance of existing things as those (reasons) were (first) established, who would dare to find in anything a definition of God?]

A. I would not presume to question this (401) either. For I know that (His Substance) (402) is altogether infinite.

N. If, then, God knows [of Himself] what He is, does He not define Himself—for everything which is understood by itself or by another as to what it is can be defined [by itself <or by another>]—and therefore is not altogether infinite [but partially (so) if by the creature only He cannot be defined whereas by Himself He can be, or, if I may say so, subsists (as) finite to Himself, infinite to the creature]? And if this be admitted, it will necessarily follow that either God is not universally infinite, if it is only by the creature that He does not admit definition and not by Himself; or that, in order to be universally infinite, He does not admit definition at all, either from the creature or from Himself.

That God cannot be defined either by Himself or by another

A. I think that the obscurity of this reasoning is impenetrable and were it not that He Who is being sought Himself extends His aid to those who seek Him I could easily believe that there is no way of entering upon it. For if God does not define Himself, or if He could (403) not define [Himself], who would deny that ignorance and impotence are admitted into His Nature—ignorance if He does not understand <of Himself> what He is, impotence if He is unable to define His Substance? [For He will be seen to be impotent when He can find nothing in which to define Himself.]

On the other hand, if He both understands and defines what He Himself is, this will show that He is not altogether infinite since only by the creature can He not be defined, because by no means is He understood by it, but by Himself He is both defined and known as to what He is.

N. Ne turbere sed magis bono animo esto. Haec enim consideratio
nos ad nos ipsos intelligendos attrahit et ad ea quae pie de deo nostro
cogitanda et intelligenda et pronuntianda sunt ipso praeunte per-
ducit. [Quanto namque in introitu inquisitionis caliginosa [2et
laboriosa]2 putabitur tanto perspicua et fructuosa reperietur. 'Fieri
'enim non potest,' ut ait sanctus Augustinus, 'quadam diuina proui-
'dentia ut religiosis animis se ipsos et deum suum, id est ueritatem,
'pie ac studiose quaerentibus inueniendi facultas desit.']

A. Non perturbor sed magis et merito de obscuritate praesentis
quaestionis moueor eiusque solutionem facilem fieri non opinor.

N. Redeamus itaque ad ea quae in priori libro inter nos discussa et
ad purum ni fallor deducta sunt.

A. Quae sunt illa admoneas quaesso.

N. Recordarisne inter nos ad liquidum consedissee nullam cate-
goriarum denario numero conclusarum de diuina natura ullo modo
proprie praedicari posse?

A. Illud inconcusse et concessum est et stabilitum.

N. Non igitur tam laboriose ut aestimas in huius quaestionis diffi-
cultate soluenda sudabimus si prioris libri ratas conclusiones acute
perspiciamus. Illarum siquidem subtilis ac perspicax utilitas in hoc
loco pulcherrimum fructum [utilissimumque] ferre manifestabitur.

A. Valde est necessarium si sic fuerit.

N. [Erit plane.] Ipsas itaque categorias breuiter in memoriam
reuocare ratiocinationis series uidetur exposcere.

A. Alia inquisitionis non arridet uia. Attamen interrogatiue eas
recapitules uelim.

N. Intentus itaque hunc interrogandi ordinem intueri: Quid?
Quantum? Quale? Ad quid? Quo situ? Quo habitu? Locine? Tem-
porisne? Agit(ne) an patitur? Item si uis Grece: ΤΙ; ΠΟΟΝ;
ΠΟΙΟΝ; ΠΡΟΣ ΤΙ; ΚΕΙΘΑΙ ΑΡΑ; [ΕΧΕΙΘΑΙ ΑΡΑ;] ΠΟΥ; ΠΟΤΕ;
ΠΡΑΤΤΕΙ ΑΡΑ Η ΠΙΧΧΕΙ; Horum itaque nullum de deo proprie
interrogatur quia nullum horum in ipso nec a se ipso nec ab
alio intelligitur. [Haec etenim in his quae sub intellectum seu
sensum cadere probantur proprie considerari possunt.] Quid
enim? si interrogaueris de deo quid sit nonne quandam propriam
substantiam diffinitam quaeres? Et si quis responderit hoc uel illud

5-8 cf. Aug., *De Trin.* xv. 2, 1 ad init.

1 post N. rasura in B 2 pie RB^cP: piae B* 11 discussa RB: discussa P
13 quaesso R^cBP: quaeso R* 15 proprie RB^cP: propriae B* 17 inconcusse:
in- s.l. R stabilitum RB: stabilitatum P 18 in s.l. B 19 ratas RB: raras P
21 utilissimumque R(C)B: utilissimeque P ferre RB: fere P 22 fuerit BP:
fierent R*: fueret R^c 28 ad quid RB: aliquid P 29 grece RBP^c: gerece P*
30 ΕΧΕΙΘΑΙ ΑΡΑ om. BP 31 ΠΡΑΤΤΕΙ BP: ΠΡΑΤΤΕΙ R ΠΙΧΧΕΙ R:
ΠΙΧΧΕΙΤΑΙ BP proprie RB^cP: propriae B* 33 Haec RB: hae P quae
RB: qui P

N. Do not be troubled but rather be of good heart. For this dis-
cussion is drawing us towards an understanding of ourselves, and
teaching us the things which it is right to think and understand and
declare about our God, He being our Guide. [For the more obscure
[2and wearisome]2 it will be thought at the beginning of the inquiry,
the more lucid and fruitful it will turn out to be. 'For', says St.
Augustine, 'by some divine providence it cannot be that religious
minds who devoutly and seriously seek themselves and their God,
that is, the Truth, should lack the ability to find it.']

A. I am not troubled but rather, and with justification, concerned
about the obscurity of the problem that confronts us; and I do not
think that its solution will be an easy one.

N. Let us go back, then, to (the problems) which were debated
between us in the first book, and, unless I am mistaken, were com-
pletely solved.

A. Please tell me what they are.

N. Do you remember that it was settled between us to a certainty
that none of the categories which are included in the decad can by
any means be literally predicated of the Divine Nature?

A. That was conceded and established beyond question.

N. We shall not, then, have to work as hard as you think to resolve
the difficulty of this problem, if we look keenly at the valid conclusions
of the first book. For their subtle and penetrating usefulness will now
be shown to bear most fair [and useful] fruit.

A. If this turns out to be the case, it is certainly necessary (that we
should do so).

N. [It will certainly be so.] The train of our reasoning seems to
require that we should briefly recall to our memory the categories
themselves.

A. No other way of inquiry suggests itself. But I should like you
to recapitulate them in interrogative form.

N. Consider carefully, then, this order of interrogation: What?
How great? Of what kind? In relation to what? In what position?
With what possession? Is it in place? Is it in time? Does it act; or is
it acted upon? Or, if you prefer the Greek terms: τί; πόσον; πόιον;
πρός τί; κείσθαι ἄρα; [ἔχεσθαι ἄρα;] πού; πότε; πράττει ἄρα ἢ πάσχει;
Of these (interrogatives), then, there is none that can properly be
asked of God because none of them is understood in Him either by
Himself or by any other. [For these can properly be considered only
in things which are shown to fall within the scope of intellect or
sense.] For if you ask of God what He is will you not be seeking a
proper defined substance? And if one should reply (that He is) this
or that, will he not seem to be defining a certain and circumscribed
[substance]? But if anyone were to assert this of Him as a truth, or

nonne certam quandam circumscripamque uidebitur diffinire [substantiam], quod si quis ueraciter de ipso pronuntiauerit uel ipse de se ipso intelligit primum categoriarum locum iure obtinebit [qui certis diffinitisque tribuitur subiectis in quibus et circa quae omnia uersantur et continentur accidentia] ac per hoc non translative sed proprie
5
prima de eo praedicabitur categoria? Siue enim ab intellectuali creatura siue a se ipsa in aliqua diffinita essentia intelligatur diuina natura non omnino est infinita et incircumscripata [omnique accidenti carens] *ideoque* non ultra omne quod dicitur et intelligitur ueraciter
588D
remota esse creditur quoniam intra quosdam terminos diffinitae naturae intelligitur. Omne enim de quo potest praedicari uel intelligi
10
quid sit eorum quae sunt numerum non potest excedere sed ueluti pars in toto uel totum in partibus uel forma in genere uel genus in formis uel indiuidui numeri in specie uel species in indiuiduis uel
589A
praedictorum omnium quaedam in quandam unitatem ex multis collectio iure aestimabitur esse, quod longe distat ex diuinae
16
naturae simplici infinitaque ueritate quae nihil horum quae sunt subsistit. Non enim totum est neque pars, totum tamen et pars dicitur quoniam ab ea omne totum et omnis pars et omnia tota et omnes partes condita sunt. Similiter neque genus est neque forma
20
neque species neque numerus neque OYCIA siue generalissima siue specialissima subsistit et tamen haec omnia de ea praedicantur quoniam ab ea subsistendi facultatem accipiunt. Nec non uniuersitas horum omnium dicitur dum totius creaturae uniuersitatem infinitate
25
suae excellentiae superat quoniam ab ea uniuersalis uniuersitas creata est.

Quomodo igitur diuina natura se ipsam potest intelligere quid sit cum nihil sit? Superat enim omne quod est quando nec ipsa est esse
589B
sed ab ipsa est omne esse, quae omnem essentiam et substantiam uirtute suae excellentiae supereminet. Aut quomodo infinitum potest
30
in aliquo diffiniri a se ipso uel in aliquo intelligi cum se cognoscat super omne finitum et infinitum et finitatem et infinitatem? Deus itaque nescit se quid est quia non est quid, incomprehensibilis quippe in aliquo et sibi ipsi et omni intellectui, *et cum* ipsa ueritas intelligibili uoce in puris intellectibus haec uerissime de deo dici proclamat nemo
35
pie cognoscentium inque diuina mysteria introductorum audiens de deo se ipsum intelligere non posse quid sit aliud debet existimare nisi ipsum deum qui non est quid omnino ignorare in se ipso quod ipse
589C

18-26 cf. p. 4, 4-13 supra

1-2 lemma substantia Rm 2 se R: om, BP 3 locum RB: lacum P
4 subiectis RB: subiectos P 7 a om. P 8 incircumscripata RB: circumscripata P
9 ideoque in ras. R(C) omne RB: omnem P 14 specie RB^cP: speciae B*
15 praedictorum RB: praedictam P in RB: ita P 16 esse RB^c(C)P: om. B*
17 naturae: -tu- s.l. R 24 infinitate R^c(C)B: infinitat*

if He Himself understands this of Himself, He will rightly occupy the first place of the categories (404) [which is allotted to certain and defined subjects in which and about which all accidents are associated and contained] and thus the first category will be predicated of Him not figuratively but literally. For if the Divine Nature, whether by the intelligible creature or by itself, is understood (to be) in some defined essence, it is not altogether infinite and uncircumscribed [and free from all accident], *and therefore* is not believed to be truly removed from everything which is said and understood, since it is understood (to be) within certain limits of a defined nature. For nothing of which it can be predicated or understood as to what it is can overstep the limit of (405) the things that are, but will rightly be considered *to be* as though a part in a whole, or a whole in its parts, or a species in a genus, or a genus in its species, or individuals in a species, or a species in its individuals, or some collection of all these things out of many into one; and this is far from the simple and infinite truth of the Divine Nature, which is nothing of the things that are. For it is neither whole nor part, although it is called whole and part because by it every whole and every part, and all wholes and all parts, are created. Similarly it is neither genus nor form nor species (406) nor individual nor *ὀυσία*, whether the most general or the most specific; and yet all these are predicated of it because from it they receive their ability to subsist. Moreover it is called the totality of all these although by the infinity of its excellence it surpasses the totality of all creation, because by it the total totality is created.

How, therefore, can the Divine Nature understand of itself what it is, seeing that it is nothing? For it surpasses everything that is, since it is not even being but all being derives from it, and by virtue of its excellence it is supereminent over every essence and every substance. Or how can the infinite be defined by itself in anything or be understood in anything when it knows itself (to be) above every finite (thing) and every infinite (thing) and beyond finitude and infinity? So God does not know of Himself what He is (407) because He is not a 'what', being in everything incomprehensible both to Himself and to every intellect; *and since* Truth Itself in intelligible language proclaims in pure intellects that this is most truly said of God, no one of the men of pious learning or of the adepts in the Divine Mysteries, hearing of God that He cannot understand of Himself what He is, ought to think anything else than that God Himself, Who is not a 'what', does not know at all in Himself that which He Himself is

R*: infinitae P 28 omne RB: omnem P 31 post cognoscat rasura in B
super in ras. R 32 finitatem RB^cP: infinitatem B* post infinitatem erasum est
esse in B 33 incomprehensibilis R^cBP: incomprehensibiles R* 34 ipsi
RB^cP: ipse B* et cum B^c(C)P: et si RB* 35 uerissime de deo RB: de
deo uerissime P 36 pie RB^cP: pie B*

non est. Se ipsum autem non cognoscit aliquid esse. Nescit igitur quid ipse est, hoc est nescit se quid esse, quoniam cognoscit se nullum eorum quae in aliquo cognoscuntur et de quibus potest dici uel intelligi quid sunt omnino esse. Nam si in aliquo se ipsum cognosceret non omnino infinitum et incomprehensibilem [innominabilemque] se ipsum indicaret. [Vt quid interrogas, inquit, nomen meum? Et hoc est mirabile. Aut nonne hoc uere est mirabile nomen quod est super omne nomen, quod innominabile, quod omni supercollocatum nomini nominato siue in saeculo hoc siue in futuro? Si ergo increpat nomen suum quaerere quia super omne nomen est innominabile, quid si quis quaerat eius substantiam quae si in aliquo finito esset finito nomine non careret? Quoniam uero in nullo substituitur quia infinitus, omni nominatione caret quia innominabilis est.] Omne siquidem quod in aliquo substantialiter intelligitur ita ut proprie de eo praedicetur quid sit neque modum neque mensuram excedit. Aliquo nanque modo quo finitur concluditur, aliqua mensura quam superare non potest lineatur. Si enim infimum in natura rerum obtinuerit locum quo omnia corpora continentur, inferius naturae suae mensuram non potest extendere quia nihil inferius est; nec superius potest ascendere, finitur enim in ipso uitali motu quo nutritur et augetur atque ideo ultra ipsam non prouehitur. Si uero in sublimitate uniuersae creaturae subsistit ut intellectualis cognoscatur suis finibus coartari necesse est. Non enim potest ascendere in altiore se creaturam quia altius illo in rebus creatis nil esse uidetur; inferius item non potest *remitti* propter sequentes se substantias. Si uero in medio libramine locum obtineret nec ad inferiora se relaxaretur nec ad superiora se extenderetur sed naturalem suum mediumque obtineret statum. [Ac per hoc nulla creatura est siue uisibilis siue inuisibilis quae non intra terminos propriae naturae in aliquo coartetur in mensura et numero et pondere.]

de eo quod est deus supra infra et intra et extra omnia
Deus autem in nullo eorum intelligit se esse sed cognoscit se supra omnes naturae ordines [esse] suae sapientiae excellentia et infra omnia suae uirtutis altitudine et intra omnia suae prouidentiae inuestigabili dispensatione et omnia ambire quia in ipso sunt omnia et extra ipsum nihil est. [Solus enim ipse est mensura sine mensura,

6 Iud. xiii. 18 (Vet. Lat.) 7-8 Phil. ii. 9

8 innominabile RB: innobinabile P omni RB: omnis P 9 saeculo RB: secundo P 10 quaerere: -rere in ras. B innominabile RB: innobinabile P quid RB^cP: quod B* 11 in: -n s.l. R 12 post infinitus *rasura in R* 13 innominabilis RB: innobinabilis P 14 proprie RB^cP: propriae B* 16 lineatur RB: lineat P 22 post intellectualis *erasum est natura in R* 24 remitti R^c(C)B^cP: mitti B* 26 relaxaretur RB: relaxaret P extenderetur RB: extenderet P 26-27 sed-statum om. P 28 uisibilis RB^cP: uisibiles B* 28-29 propriae RB: proprie P 29 coartetur RB: coarctet P in mensura RB: immensura P 30 lemma BP 31 omnes-esse RB: omnes esse naturae ordines P 34 post mensura (2) *rasura in B*

not. But He does not recognize himself as being something. Therefore He does not know what He Himself is, that is, He does not know that He is a 'what', because He recognizes that He is none at all of the things which are known in something and about which it can be said or understood what they are. For if He were to recognize Himself in something He would show that He is not in every respect infinite and incomprehensible [and unnameable]. Thus He says: ['Why do you ask My Name? For it is wonderful (408).'] Or is not this Name indeed wonderful, which is above every name, which is unnameable, which is set above every name (that is) named whether in (this) world or in the world to come? If, then, He disapproves the asking of His Name because it is unnameable above every name, what if one were to inquire of His Substance, which, were it in any finite thing, would not be without a finite name? But as He subsists in nothing because (He is) infinite, He lacks all naming (409) because He is unnameable].

For (410) nothing that is understood to be substantially in anything in such a way that it can be literally predicated of it what it is exceeds its proportion and measure. For it is enclosed within some proportion by which it is limited (and) is circumscribed by some measure which it cannot overstep. For if it occupies the lowest place in the nature of things, in which all bodies are contained, it cannot descend further below the measure of its nature because below (it) there is nothing; and it cannot ascend above (it) because it is limited to that vital motion from which it receives nourishment and growth, and therefore it is not carried beyond itself. On the other hand, if it subsists at the highest level of all creation, it is necessary that it should be confined within its limits so that it may be recognized as intellectual (411). For it cannot ascend to any creature above itself because there is seen to be nothing among created things that is higher than itself; likewise it cannot be *thrust* further down because of the substances that come after it. Finally, if it should occupy a place posed in the midst, it would neither be permitted to fall to the (regions) below it nor to extend to the (regions) above, but would hold to its natural position at the centre. [And therefore there is no creature, whether visible or invisible, which is not confined in something within the limits of its proper nature by measure and number and weight.]

But God understands that He is in none of those things but recognizes that He [is] above all the orders of nature by reason of the excellence of His Wisdom, and below all things by reason of the depth of His Power (412), and within all things by the inscrutable dispensation of His Providence, and encompasses all things because all things are within Him, and without Him there is nothing. [For He alone is the measure without measure, the number without number,

That God is above and below and within and without all things

numerus sine numero, pondus sine pondere, et merito quia a nullo nec a se ipso mensuratur numeratur ordinatur nec in ulla mensura in ullo numero in ullo ordine intelligit se esse quoniam in nullo eorum substantialiter continetur cum solus uere in omnibus super omnia infinitus existat.]

Et ne mihi opponas [quare dixerim] ordinem corporum in altiores se naturas extendi non ualere [cum] credamus omnia corpora in incorporeas qualitates atque substantias esse transitura. Quando enim hoc erit corpora esse cessabunt. Adhuc autem dum corpora sunt nec inferius nec superius suae naturae terminos possunt transgredi, *de qua parte* philosophiae dum *de reditu* rerum [in causas] considerabimus diligentius tractabitur. Nunc [autem] de eo quod instat, hoc est de hoc quod deus quid sit non intelligit, [intueamur et] utrum tibi probabile uideatur quod conamur [de hoc] suadere quid tibi uideatur non te pudeat fateri.

A. De hac mirabili diuina ignorantia qua deus non intelligit quid ipse sit quae a te dicta sunt quamuis caliginosa non tamen falsa sed uera uerique similia mihi uideri fateor. Non enim suades deum se ipsum ignorare sed solummodo ignorare quid sit, et merito quia non est quid. Infinitus quippe est et sibi ipsi et omnibus quae ab eo sunt [ac per hoc in hac specie ignorantiae apertissime pulcherrimeque summa et ineffabilis arridet sapientia. Stultum enim dei sapientius est hominibus].

N. Quid itaque? Si quis de deo interrogauerit quantus uel qualis sit num tibi recte uidebitur responderi tantus et talis? *Non illam dico quantitatem* [et qualitatem] *de qua propheta dicit: 'Magnus dominus et laudabilis nimis et magnitudinis eius non est finis.'* *Vide quam alte theologus loquitur! 'Magnus,' inquit, 'dominus,' sed ne quis finita quantitate eum finire* [putaret] *continuo addit: 'Et magnitudinis eius non est finis.'* *Item ne quis qualitatem finitam in eo esse opinaretur, non dixit simpliciter, 'et laudabilis,' sed subiunxit 'nimis.' Nimis autem dicitur quod omnem modum excedit. Non illam itaque ut dixi quantitatem infinitam nomino nec illam qualitatem quae est nimis—haec namque non incongrue de deo cogitantur—sed quantitatem et qualitatem quae secundum accidens in subiecto dicuntur.*

1 numerus sine numero: cf. supra, lib. i. 72, p. 208, 13-14; De praed., ii. 3, PL cxxii. 362B 9-10 22-23 stultum-hominibus: 1 Cor. i. 25 26-29 Ps. cxlv. 3

1 numerus sine om. P numero RBP^c: numerus P* 6 dixerim RB: dixeriore P 7 extendi RB: extendere P 8 post incorporeas rasura in R 9-10 nec inferius nec superius RB: non inferius neque superius P 10-11 glossa de hac quaestione in quarto et in quinto disputatur B^cP: de hac quinto disputatum est B* de qua parte R^c(C)BP: quam partem R* 11 de reditu R^c(C)BP: reditum R* 13-14 deus-quod om. BP 14 conamur RB: conantur P de hoc om. P suadere: sua- in ras. R(C) 16 hac RB: hoc P quid RB: quod P 18 uerique RB: utrique P 21 in om. P specie RB^cP: speciae B* pulcherrimeque B^c: pulcerrimeque R: pulchrimeque B*:

and the weight without weight (413). And rightly so; for He is not measured or numbered or ordered by anything or by Himself, and He understands that He is not confined by any measure or number or order since in none of these things is He substantially contained, for He alone truly exists in all things, being infinite above all things.]

And do not oppose my (414) [statement] that the order of bodies cannot be extended into the natures that are above it [on the ground that] we believe that all bodies shall pass into incorporeal qualities and substances. For when this happens they will cease to be bodies. But at present, as long as they are bodies, they cannot overstep either the upper or the lower limits of their nature. *But this part* of philosophy will be more carefully treated when we come to consider the return of things [into their causes]. Now [however] let us [attend to] the topic before us, that is, the proposition (415) that God does not understand what He is; [and] do not be afraid to say openly how it seems to you (416), whether what we are trying to teach [about this] seems plausible to you.

A. I confess that what you have said of this wonderful Divine Ignorance by which God does not understand what He is, although obscure, yet does not seem to me false, but true and likely. For you do not teach that God does not know Himself but only that He does not know what He is; and rightly so, because He is not a 'what'. For He is infinite both to Himself and to all things that are from Him [and therefore there is most clearly and beautifully revealed in this form of ignorance the supreme and ineffable Wisdom. For the foolishness of God is wiser than men.]

N. What then? If one asks of God how great He is or of what kind, will 'so great' or 'such' seem to you the right reply? *For I do not mean that quantity* [and quality] *of which the Prophet says: 'Great (is) the Lord and exceeding worthy to be praised, and there is no end of His greatness.'* *See how profoundly the theologian speaks: 'Great,' he says, (is) 'the Lord,'—but lest anyone [should suppose] that He is limited by finite quality he at once adds: 'and there is no end of His greatness.'* *Also, lest anyone should hold that there is in Him finite quality, he does not simply say, 'and worthy to be praised', but adds, 'exceeding'. But 'exceeding' is said of what exceeds every proportion. So, as I say, I am not referring to that infinite quantity nor to that quality which is 'exceeding'—for it is not inappropriate that these be thought of God—but to the quantity and quality which are said (to be) in the subject as accidents (417).*

pulcherrimeque P 24 lemma quantitas et qualitas Rm 25-35 non-dicuntur in ras. R(C) 26 propheta BP: profeta R(C) 29 eum RB: cum P 30 opinaretur RB: opinaret P 31 subiunxit B: subiunxit RP post omnem rasura in B 33 haec B: haec R(C)P incongrue RB: incongruo P 34 quantitatem et qualitatem RB: qualitatem et quantitatem P

A. Non recte quidem. Vbi enim non inuenitur diffinita substantia uel ut ita dicam diffinitum subiectum ibi quantitatem et qualitatem quaerere et firmare stultum ualde risuque dignum mihi uidetur ac per hoc dum in deo nec ipse nec alius intellectus ullam diffinitam substantiam uel ut ita dicam diffinitum subiectum secundum quod dici uel intelligi ualeat quid sit reperire non potest, nonne limpidissime claret nullam finitam uel infinitam quantitatem, nullam qualitatem finitam uel infinitam in ipso cognosci a se ipso uel ab alio ualere? Si enim omnem finitam et infinitam substantiam infinita et plus quam infinita propriae uirtutis excellentia superexaltat, quis non continuo ac sine ulla dubitatione erumpat ut aperte fateatur atque exclamet nullam finitam uel infinitam quantitatem uel qualitatem in eum cadere aut ullo modo quid omnino esse? [Nam ubi inuenitur quid ibi confestim quantum et quale, ubi uero non est quid ibi quantum et quale impossibile est reperiri. Si ergo in rerum generibus neque quid neque quantum neque quale neque ullum accidens intelligitur quoniam simplicia sunt, haec uero in indiuiduis solummodo quaeruntur, quis nisi stultus in deo quid uel quantum uel quale audeat quaerere?]

de eo quod
nulla
kategoria
proprie
dicitur de
deo

de eo quod
in generibus
rerum neque
quid neque
quantum
neque quale
inuenitur

N. Quid igitur? Num in eo aestimas esse relationem quae a Grecis dicitur ΠΡΟΣ ΤΙ?

A. Ne hoc quidem dixerim. Vbi enim diffinita substantia non potest intelligi ibi nullam relationem fieri posse non ambigo. [Non enim est secundum naturam sed secundum quandam copulam habitudinemque duorum seu plurium subiectorum. Nam quod in diuinae bonitatis trinitate sub relatiua forma pater filii dicitur et filius patris plus mihi possessionis habitum quam relationis uicissitudinem uidetur significare. Non autem accidens est patri possidere filium uel filio possidere patrem.]

N. De caeteris categoriis per singula superfluum uidetur dicere ut aestimo. Nam si deus ipse se ipsum in nulla diffinita substantia seu quantitate seu qualitate seu relatione intelligit, cui luce clarius non apparebit nullum situm habitumue [nullum] locum seu tempus [nullum] agere uel pati omnino ei accidere ac per hoc nullum eorum nec a se ipso nec ab alio in se ipso intelligi posse? Siquidem diffinita substantia in eo non reperta neque intellecta nullum accidentium diffinitae substantiae ei accidere rudium est dubitare. Vbi enim deficit diffinitum subiectum ibi nullum accidens intelligitur adiunctum [uel separatum uel ullo modo natura subiecti discretum]. Sed, ut breuiter de singulis dicamus de quibus in superiori libro copiose

25-26 plus-significare: cf. lib. i, p. 72, 16-20

10 propriae B: proprie RP lemma BP (de eo ex deo B kategoria B: categoria P) 11 ulla om. P fateatur RB*P: facteatur B* 15 lemma BP impossibile BP: impossibile R 19 post N. rasura in B 20 lemma ad aliquid Rm 22 relationem RB*P: rationem B* 28 singula RB: singulas P 29 se s.l. B 31 situm RB: secum P 32 accidere RB: accederet P 35 rudium RB: rectum P 38 copiose RB: copiosa P

A. Not right at all (418). For where defined substance or, as I might say, a defined subject is not found, there it seems to me very foolish and ridiculous to seek for or assert quantity and quality; and therefore since in God neither He Himself nor any other mind is able to discover any defined substance or, so to say, defined subject with reference to which it can be said or understood what He is, is it not abundantly clear that no finite or infinite quantity (and) no finite or infinite quality can be recognized in Him by Himself or by another? For if He transcends every finite and infinite substance by the infinite and more than infinite excellence of His proper Power, who will not at once and without any hesitation break out with an open acknowledgement and exclamation that no finite or infinite quantity or quality is attributable to Him or that He is a 'what' of any kind whatsoever? [For where a 'what' is found, there at once is a 'how much' and an 'of what sort'; but where there is no 'what', there 'how much' and 'of what sort' cannot be found. If, then, in the genera of things neither a 'what' nor 'how much' nor 'of what kind' nor any accident is understood (to be), because they are simple, but these are sought for only in individuals, who but a fool would dare to seek for a 'what' or 'how much' or 'of what kind' in God?]

That no
category can
be predicated
of God
literally

That in the
genera of
things there
is found
neither
'what?' nor
'how much?'
nor 'of what
kind?'

N. What then? Do you think there is in Him relation, which is called by the Greeks πρὸς τι?

A. I would not say that either. For I have no doubt but that where defined substance cannot be understood, there there can be no relation. [For it does not exist by nature but by a kind of link and possession of two or more subjects. For that in the Trinity of the Divine Goodness the Father is said to be (the father) of the Son and the Son (the son) of the Father under the form of relation seems to me to signify rather a permanent possession than a chance relationship. For it is not an accident in the Father to possess the Son or in the Son to possess the Father (419).]

N. It seems superfluous, as I think, to speak severally of the other categories. For if God Himself understands Himself (to be) in no defined substance or quantity or quality or relation, to whom will it not be clearer than day that no position or possession, [no] place or time, [no] action or passion at all is an accident in Him; and that therefore none of these things can be understood (to be) in Himself either by Himself or by another? For if defined substance is not found or understood (to be) in Him, it is foolish to doubt but that none of the accidents of defined substance (420) are in Him as accidents. For where a defined subject is lacking, there no accident is understood to be associated or separated [or in any way distinct from the nature of the subject] (421). But, to speak in short of each (of the categories) which we treated at length in the first book, who would attribute position to the Divine Nature when even (that Nature) itself

tractauimus, quis diuinae naturae situm dederit dum et ipsa in se ipsa
 nullum situm cognoscit? Situs enim aut partium in toto est, uerbi gratia
 situs humani corporis est ordo membrorum *quo omne membrum* in 592B
 suo ordine finitur. Situs quoque dicitur totius corporis positio, uerbi
 gratia stat sedet iacet, quibus omnibus omnino diuinae essentiae 5
 uirtutem carere nemo recte philosophantium ignorat. Non enim
 totum est neque pars [neque] sedet ueluti fatigata neque iacet ut
 prostrata neque post ullum motum stat. [Ad dextram patris sedere
 filius dicitur. Totus filius, uerbum et caro, dextra patris est, potentia
 patris, fortitudo patris. Ipse itaque filius dextra patris est. Vbi igitur 10
 sedet in se ipso sedet consubstantialis patri manens iudicans omnia
 quietus. Stat Stephano militibus compugnans suis dans eis uirtutem
 ut uincant in terris. Dextra domini fecit uirtutem, largiens eis coronam
 consesionis sibi in caelis. Vide quomodo sedet, quomodo stat. Situs 592C
 iste mysticus est, non corporeus non localis sed spiritualis. Talem 15
 situm diuinae naturae cognosce.]

Quis ei habitum adiunxerit dum in se ipsa nullum percipit habi-
 tum? Ipsa siquidem sibi ipsi ad habendum sufficit nec ulla uirtus ei
 accidit quoniam in se ipsa simplicissima uirtus et plus quam uirtus
 subsistit et fons omnium uirtutum et quaecumque substantia uirtutem 20
 possidet non aliunde habet nisi ex participatione generalium uirtutum
 quas omnium causalis uirtus in primordialibus suis condidit principiis.

Omni loco caret diuina natura quamuis intra se ipsam omnia quae
 ab ea sunt collocet ideoque omnium locus dicitur, se ipsam tamen non
 nescit locare quia infinita est et incircumscripita et a nullo intellectu 25
 neque se ipsa locari, id est diffiniri, et circumscribi permittit. Ab ipsa
 siquidem infinita et plus quam infinita omnia finita et infinita pro-
 cedunt inque ipsam infinitam et plus quam infinitam redeunt. 592D

Tempore caret ea natura quae se ignorat principium habere uel
 finem et omnem motum quo mouetur omne quod a principio ad finem 30
 et in finem mouetur. Nescit in se incrementa quae fiunt per numeros
 locorum et temporum uel detrimenta quoniam in se ipsa plena atque 593A
 perfecta est.

Quid de agere et pati dicendum? Num ineptum incongruumque
 est si quis putauerit agere uel pati ipsi naturae accidere quae in se

11-12 Actus vii. 55-56

12-13 Ps. cvii. 16

1 ipsa in RBP^c: ipsam P* 2 nullum RB: nullam P 3 lemma situs Rm quo
 omne R^c(C)BP: omne enim R* membrum: -um in ras. R(C) 4 finitur MSS.
 Cambridge Trin. Coll. O 5 20 et Oxford Bodl. Auct. F. III 15: sinitur RPB situs RB:
 si uis P dicitur s.l. P 6 lemma habitus Rm uirtutem RB: uirtutum P
 recte RB: tamen P philosophantium BP: filosofantium R*: filosofantium R^c
 6-8 ignorat-ullum om. P 8 lemma B ad dextram RB: Adexteram P 9 di-
 citur RB: dei P 12 stat om. P 14 consesionis RB: confessionis P
 situs RB: sicut P 15 mysticus RB: misticus P post sed rasura in R
 spiritualis RB: specialis P 17 habitum (1) RB^cP: abitum B* 23 lemma locus
 Rm post caret add. et P 24 collocet R^c(C)BP: collocat R* locus R^cBP:

recognizes no position in itself? For position is either of parts in the
 whole, for example, the position of the human body is the order of
 the members *by which every* member is confined (422) within its
 own order; or the attitude of the whole body is called position,
 for example, it stands, it sits, it lies. But none of those who practise
 philosophy aright is ignorant that the Power of the Divine Essence
 is quite without any of these (positions). For it is not a whole nor a
 part (423) [nor] is it sitting down as though weary nor lying down
 as though prostrated nor does it come to a stand after any motion.

[The Son is said to sit at the right hand of the Father. The Son in
 His totality, Word and flesh, is the Right Hand of the Father, the
 Power of the Father, the Strength of the Father. Therefore the Son
 is Himself the Right Hand of the Father. Therefore in sitting He
 sits in Himself, remaining consubstantial with the Father, judging
 all things, at rest. For Stephen He stands battling with His hosts,
 endowing them with power that they may conquer on earth. The
 Right Hand of the Lord made power, bestowing upon them the
 reward (424) of sitting with Him in heaven. See how He sits, how He
 stands. This position is mystical, not corporeal, not local, but spiritual.
 Learn that such is the position of the Divine Nature.]

Who would attach possession to it when it perceives no possession
 in itself? For itself is sufficient possession to itself (425), and no virtue
 is in it as an accident since in itself, as being most simple, subsist
 virtue and more-than-virtue and the source of all virtues, and whatever
 substance possesses virtue that possession comes to it (426) from no
 other source than the participation in the general virtues which the
 causal Virtue of all virtues has created in their primordial principles.

The Divine Nature is without any place, although it provides
 place within itself for all things which are from it, and for that reason
 is called the Place of all things; but it is [not] (427) unable to provide
 place for itself because it is infinite and uncircumscribed and does
 not allow itself to be located, that is, defined and circumscribed, by
 any intellect nor by itself. For from it, being infinite and more than
 infinite, all finites and infinites proceed, and to it, being infinite and
 more than infinite, they return.

There is no time for that Nature which knows that it has no begin-
 ning nor end nor any motion by which everything moves that moves
 from a beginning towards an end and into its end. It knows in itself
 no increases which occur at particular places and times, nor any
 decreases, for in itself it is full and perfect.

What is to be said of acting and being acted upon? Would it not
 be inappropriate and incongruous were one to think that acting and

locis R* ipsam RB: ipsun P 25 a nullo RB: in ullo P 26 ipsa (1) RB: ipsi P
 29 lemma tempus Rm Tempore RB: Temporum P 34 lemma agere et pati Rm

ipsa nullum motum ad agendum nullum habile ad patiendum percipit? Non enim sicut in nobis aliud est substantia aliud accidens substantiae, hoc est actio et passio, ita ipsa in se ipsa cognoscit compositionem quandam substantiae et accidentium. His enim in se ipsa caret nec inesse sibi cognoscit. Est enim simplicissima omnique compositione aliena. Voluntas siquidem sua quae est ipsa substantialiter [et plus quam substantialiter et plus quam uoluntas] actio et passio eius est. Agere enim dicitur quia uult omnia fieri et sunt, pati autem quia uult ab omnibus amari [et se ipsam amat in omnibus— ipsa enim est substantialis et uerus amor et plus quam substantialis amor—], et amant quaecumque amant siue sciant quia amant siue nesciant, hoc est siue motu intelligibili rationabiliue amant ducente gratia siue simplici appetitu naturae. Nihil enim ab ea est creatum quod non eius habeat desiderium.

conclusio de eo quod nullam kathegoriam deus in sua natura subsistere cognoscit

Videsne igitur quod omnia quae intra decem categoriarum terminos amplexantur non inmerito deus dicitur in sua natura subsistere ignorare quando omnino ea altitudine uirtutis suae et infinitate probatur excellere? Quod enim infinitum est omni ratione et modo infinitum est per essentiam per uirtutem per operationem per utrosque fines, sursum dico et deorsum, hoc est secundum principium et finem. *Incomprehensibile* enim secundum essentiam et inintelligibile secundum uirtutem et secundum operationem incircumscriptum et sine principio desursum et sine fine deorsum est infinitum, et simpliciter dicendum ac uerius per omnia infnritum.

A. Plane uideo uerumque esse ac uerae ratiocinationis conclusionibus munitum perspicio. Sed ualde me mouet qua ratione ignorantia in deum cadat quem nihil latet aut in se ipso aut in his quae a se sunt.

N. Esto itaque intentus et ea quae dicta sunt diligenter inspice. Si enim puro mentis contuitu uirtutem rerum atque uerborum consideraueris apertissime reperies nulla obstante caligine nullam in deum ignorantiam cadere. Ipsius enim ignorantia ineffabilis est intelligentia et ut ex praedictis hoc conemur approbare uerborum uirtutem intuere. Num tibi uidemur aliud suadere dum dicimus deum se ipsum [quid sit ignorare quam] in nullo eorum quae sunt [se] esse intelligere? Quomodo enim in se ipso potest cognoscere quod non potest in se ipso esse? [Si enim rationes rerum quas ipse in se ipso, hoc est pater in filio, creauit in ipso unum indiuiduum sunt nullam-

1 ipsa RB: ipsam P ad (1) RB: id P patiendum RB: paciendum P 3-4 compositionem RB: et positionem P 11 et amant R*B^c: et amant eam R^c(C): et eam amant B*: et eum amant P 13 post gratia rasura in B post siue rasura in B 14 desiderium RB: desidesiderium P 15 lemma BP (kathegoriam B: catagoriam P cognoscit B: recognoscit P) 18 excellere R^cBP: excellentia R* 20 post finem rasura in B 21 incomprehensibile B^c(C)P: incapabile RB* inintelligibile RB: intelligibile P 23 est RB: et P 25 uerae RB: uere P 27 quem RB^cP: quae B* 29-30 consideraueris R^cB*: consideraberis R*B^cP 30 nulla RB: nullo P 31 lemma BP

being acted upon were accidents to that Nature which in itself perceives no motion towards acting, and nothing capable of being acted upon? For not as with us substance is one thing (and) the accident, that is, acting and being acted upon, of substance is another, (not) so does it recognize in itself a sort of composition of substance and accidents. For it is without the latter and knows that they are not in it. For it is most simple, and foreign to all composition. For its Will, which is Itself substantially [and more than substantially and more than Will], is its activity and its passivity. For it is said to act because it wills all things to be made and they are, but it is said to be acted upon because it wills to be loved by all [and it loves itself in all (428), for it is substantial and true Love and more than substantial Love], and whoever love it love it whether they know they love or do not know, that is, whether by an intelligible and rational motion they love it under the guidance of grace, or by the simple appetite of nature. For there is nothing that has been created by it that does not have desire for it.

Do you then see that it is not without reason that God is said to know that nothing which is embraced within the terms of the ten Categories subsists in His Nature, seeing that it is shown wholly to surpass them all by the depth of its Power (429) and by its infinity? For that which is infinite is infinite in every respect and in every manner, in essence, in power, in operation (430), at both extremes, I mean the upper and the lower, that is, in respect of its beginning and its end. For it is *incomprehensible* in essence and unintelligible in power and uncircumscribed in operation; and it is infinite without beginning above and without end below, and to speak plainly and more truly, it is infinite throughout all things.

A. I see (it) clearly, and I see that it is true as well as supported by the conclusions of sound reasoning. But I very much wonder why ignorance is attributed to God, from Whom nothing is hidden either in Himself or in the things which are from Him.

N. Pay attention, then, and examine carefully what has been said. For if you have considered with an open mind the force of things and words, you will most surely find, unclouded by any doubt, that no ignorance is attributed to God. For His ignorance is an ineffable understanding; and in order that we may attempt to prove this from what has been said, mark carefully the force of the words.

Do you think that when we say that God [does not know] of Himself [what He is] we mean anything else [than] that He understands that [He] is not in any of the things that are? For how can He recognize in Himself that which cannot be in Himself? [For if the reasons of nature which He Himself in Himself, that is, the Father

35 ipso RB: ipse P 37-p. 154, 1 nullamque RB: nanque P

Conclusion that God recognizes no category in His nature

On the ignorance of God which is true wisdom

que diffinitionem propriae substantiae per proprias differentias seu
accidentia recipiunt—haec enim in effectibus suis non autem in se
ipsis patiuntur—, quid de ipsius ineffabilique incomprehensibilique
natura existimandum? Quis in ea aliquod finitum termino, dis-
tentum spatio, partibus discretum, substantiis accidentibusque com-
positum cogitarit? Ipsa itaque ignorantia summa ac uera est
sapientia.

Tale autem est quod dicimus ueluti si quis nostrum de se
ipso dicat: 'Lapidem me esse insensatum omni uitali motu carentem
'omnino non intelligo,' hoc est me lapidem insensatum uitali motu
carentem omnino me non esse intelligo. Item: 'Vllum hominem
[uiuum in carne] sensu ac ratione carere [non] intelligo [quia omnem
'uiuentem hominem in carne sensu ac ratione non carere cognosco].'
Item: 'Vllum irrationabilem motum naturaliter in anima mea sub-
'sistere [non] intelligo,' [id est nullum irrationabilem motum natura-
liter animae meae inesse certissime sapio]. Et hoc a sancta scriptura
possumus approbare. Nam et in euangelio legimus dominum in futuro
iudicio reprobis responsurum: 'Non noui uos,' hoc est, Non noui uos
in rationibus omnium rerum quas pater in me condidit [quoniam
intelligo non esse uos in eis], non in quantum naturaliter substitui uos
sed quantum ex legibus naturae uerae cecidistis. Non enim quod in
uobis feci non noui uero quod non feci ideoque non punio nec rece-
dere a me iubeo quod in me noui sed quod in me non noui illud punio
et a me recedere praecipio. [Ignorat itaque deus in impiis peccatoribus-
[²que]² quod non fecit, illorum uidelicet malignos irrationabilesque
motus.]

Est etiam alia species ignorantiae in deo quando ea quae praesciuit
et praedestinauit ignorare dicitur dum adhuc in rerum factarum
cursibus experimento non apparent. Inde ipse in euangelio, 'De die
'autem illa,' inquit, 'et hora illa nemo scit neque angeli in caelo neque
'filius hominis nisi pater solus.' In quibus uerbis non est mirum si
futuri iudicii scientia humanos animos adhuc mortali carne depressos
lateat neque etiam omnino de angelis negandum adhuc ignorantiae
esse capaces cum sancta scriptura eos semper discere perhibeat, teste
sancto Dionysio Ariopagita in septimo capitulo de Celesti Ierarchia

18 Matth. xxv. 12 29-31 Matth. xxiv. 36

2 enim in ras. B 3 ipsius RB: ipsis P incomprehensibilique B^c(C)P:
incapabilique RB* (cf. p. 152, 21) 4 natura RB: naturae P ea RB: eo P
6 cogitarit RB: cogitant P 8 est RB: eo P 9 lemma BP (formae B:
forma P) 10-11 hoc-intelligo om. P 11 ullum RB^cP: nullum B*
12 non s.l. R(C)B 13 hominem om. P 14 ullum s.l. B 18 noui
(1): no- s.l. B 21 uerae RB: nostrae P cecidistis RB^cP: caecidistis
B* 22 ideoque RB: ideque P 28 praedestinauit RB: praedistinauit P

in the Son, created are in Him an indivisible unity (431) and admit
no definition of proper substance by proper differences or by accidents
—for these they suffer in their effects, not in themselves—, what must
we think of His ineffable and incomprehensible Nature itself? Who
would suppose that there was in it anything that was defined by a
limit, extended in space, separated into parts, or composed of sub-
stances and accidents? Therefore this ignorance is the highest and
truest wisdom (432).

What we are saying is like what one of us might say of himself: 'I
do not understand at all that I am an insensible stone deprived of all
vital motion,' that is, I fully understand that I am not an insensible
stone deprived of all vital motion. Again: 'I do [not] understand
that any man [living in the flesh] is deprived of sense and reason'
[because I know that no man living in the flesh is deprived of sense
and reason]. Again: 'I do [not] understand that irrational motion
subsists naturally in my soul' [that is, I most certainly know that no
irrational motion subsists naturally in my soul]. And this we can
demonstrate from Holy Scripture. For also in the Gospel we read
that the Lord will, at the Judgement that is to come, reply to the
reprobate, 'I know you not,' that is, I know you not in the reasons
of all things which the Father created in Me (433) [because I under-
stand that you are not in them], not in so far as I substantiated you
naturally, but in as much as you have fallen away from the laws of
your true nature. For it is not that which I made in you that I do
not know, but that which I did not make, and therefore I do not
punish (434) or command to depart from Me that which I know in
Me, but that which I do not know in Me is what I punish and com-
mand to depart from Me. [So God does not know, in the wicked
[²and in]² sinners, that which He did not make, namely their evil
and irrational motions.]

There is also another kind of ignorance in God, wherein He is
said not to know the things which He has foreknown and predestined
before they have been revealed to experience in the evolution of
created things. Thus He himself says in the Gospel: 'But concerning
that day and that hour nobody knows, neither the angels in heaven
nor the Son of Man but only the Father.' What is surprising in these
words is not that knowledge of the future Judgement is concealed
from human minds which are still encumbered with mortal flesh,
nor even is it to be altogether denied that the angels are said to be
still capable of ignorance, since Holy Scripture declares that they
are still learning, according to St. Dionysius the Areopagite in the
7th chapter of the 'Celestial Hierarchy' where he says (435): 'The

30 inquit RB: quit P*: quid P^c 31 filius BP: illius R*: fillius R^c 32 de-
pressos R^cBP: depressos R* 35 dionysio RB: dionisio P

Analogies
which
demonstrate
knowledge
under the
form of
ignorance

dicens: 'Theologi aperte declarant suppositas quidem caelestium
'essentiarum dispositiones ex superfirmatis orate erudiri deificas
'scientias, omnium uero altiores ab ipsa diuinitate quantum fas doc- 594D
'trinas illuminari . . . et eas ipsum Iesum immediate docentem prae-
'largiens eis manifestam suam humanam benignitatem. "Ego," enim 5
'inquit, "disputo iustitiam et iudicium salutaris." <Item>, 'Miror,'
inquit, 'quia et caelestium essentiarum primae et simul omnes super-
'eminet diuinas illuminationes' et 'ut mediat<a>e quaestiones reueren-
'ter petunt. Nonne inde interrogant: "Quare tui rubra uestimenta?" 595A
'Apud se ipsas uero deliberant ante interrogare, ostendentes quidem 10
'quia discunt et deificam scientiam appetunt.' Si ergo teste patre
praedicto caelestes uirtutes discunt necessario non omnis ignorantiae
expertes sunt, et si ita est non mirandum futuri iudicii mysteria adhuc
[eas] ignorare posse. Quod uero de se ipso dominus dicit: 'Neque
de ignorantia filii de die iudicii
'filius hominis nisi pater solus,' obscurissimam efficit quaestionem. 15
Quomodo enim filius ignorat quod pater scit, praesertim de die
iudicii cum iudicium specialiter ad filium pertineat? Pater enim, ut
ipse ait, non iudicat quenquam sed omne iudicium dedit filio. Cali-
ginem tamen huius quaestionis sanctus Epifanius Constantiae Cypri
episcopus in libro quem de Fide scripsit elegantissime acutissimeque 20
aperuit dicens patrem solummodo nosse futurum iudicium non solum 595B
per praescientiam sed etiam per experimentum—pater siquidem per
experimentum cognoscit iudicium, iam enim re ipsa omne iudicium
dedit filio [omnino enim pater peregit iudicium dum omne illud dedit
filio]—, filius uero et scit et nescit iudicium, praescientia nanque scit 25
nondum tamen experimento et ideo experimento nescit quia nondum
re ipsa factum est iudicium, hoc est segregatio reprobatorum ab electis,
siquidem adhuc messis ecclesiae frumento et zyzaniis mixta est. <Non
ignoramus <2tamen>2 sanctum Augustinum tropice hunc locum
explanare ut filius hominis nescire dicatur diem iudicii quia nos 30
nescire sinit.>

Audi quoque apostolicam ignorantiam de qua scriptum est in
Actibus Apostolorum Paulo maledicente summo sacerdoti Annaniae 595C
et dicente: 'Nesciebam, fratres, quia princeps sacerdotum est.

1-11 Ps.-Dionys., CH vii. 3, PG iii. 290A 3-B 13 5-6 Is. lxiii. 1
9 Is. lxiii. 2 14-15 Matth. xxiv. 36 17-18 pater-filio: Ioh. v. 22
20-28 cf. Epiphanius, Ancoratus xxi, PG xliii. 56A 14-B 6 (GCS 25 = Epiphanius I,
p. 29, ubi uerba Eriugena ad calcem adnotantur) 28-31 hoc apud Augustinum
non inueni 34-p. 158, 1 Actus xxiii. 5

1 theologi aperte RB: theologia per te P 3 scientias RB (cf. PG iii. 290A 6):
essentias P 6 item in ras. B(C) 8 illuminationes: gl. interlin. .i. ordines
angelicos C in B, quam ante illuminationes in textu inclusit P mediate R^cB:
med*te R*: meditate P: lege mediatae 10 ostendentes R^cBP: ostendentes R*
11-12 patre praedicto RB: praedicto sopho P 14 lemma BP: de die illa et hora
nemo scit nisi solus pater Rm quod R^cBP: quid R* 18 ait: a- in ras.
R(C) 19 epifanius RB: epyphanius P 20 elegantissime BP: elegantissime

thelogians (436) explicitly declare that the inferior orders (437) of the
celestial essences are fittingly instructed by those that are above them
(439) in the theurgic sciences (440), while those that are higher than all
are illuminated in the doctrines (441) by the Divinity itself in so far
as that may be . . . and that Jesus Himself gives them direct instruc-
tion, revealing to them first of all (442) His humane goodness (443).
For He says: "I preach justice and the judgement of salvation."'
Again (St. Dionysius) says: 'I marvel that even the first of the cele-
stial essences and those that at the same time (444) excel them all
reverently seek the divine illuminations (445), as do the intermediary
orders (446). Thus, do they not ask (447): "Wherefore are Thy
garments red? (448)" But (449) they first deliberate among them-
selves before asking, showing indeed (450) that they are learning and
seeking the theurgic science (451).' If, then, as this father says, the
celestial powers are learning, they are not free from all ignorance,
and if so, we should not be surprised that at present [they] can be
ignorant of the future Judgement. But that (452) the Lord should
say of Himself: 'Nor the Son of Man but the Father only' raises
a very difficult problem. For how can the Son not know what the
Father knows, particularly about the Day of Judgement, for judge-
ment belongs specifically to the Son? For the Father, as He Himself
says, does not judge any man but has given all judgement to the Son.
However, the obscurity of this problem has been most eloquently and
ingeniously dissipated by St. Epiphanius, Bishop of Constantia in
Cyprus, in the book which he wrote 'On Faith', where he says that
the Father alone knows the future Judgement not only by fore-
knowledge but by experience, for the Father knows the Judgement
by experience since it was already a reality when He gave all judge-
ment to the Son [for the Father completely effected the Judgement
when He gave all (judgement) to the Son]. The Son, on the other
hand, both knows and does not know the Judgement. For He knows
it by foreknowledge but not yet by experience; and the reason why He
does not know it by experience is that judgement, that is, the se-
gregation of the reprobate from the elect, is not yet an accomplished
fact, for the harvest of the Church is still a mixture of wheat and
tares. <<2But>2 we are not unaware that St. Augustine interprets this
text in the figurative sense that the Son of Man is said not to know
the day of Judgement because He does not allow us to know it.>

Hear also the ignorance of the Apostle which is described in the 'Acts
of the Apostles', where Paul reviles the high priest Annanias and says:
'Brethren, I did not know that he is the chief of the priests. For it is

R 22 praescientiam RB^cP: praesentiam B* 22-23 pater-experimentum om.
P 23-24 iam-peregit iudicium om. P 28 zyzaniis B: zizaniis RP 33 male-
dicente R^cBP: maledicens R* 34 lemma B

Concerning
the Son's
ignorance of
the Day of
Judgement

Concerning
the ignorance
of Paul

'Scriptum est enim "Principem populi tui non maledices."' Num tibi uidetur sapientissimus apostolus et in lege peritissimus Annaniam summum sacerdotem fuisse sicut caeteri Iudaei non cognouisse, quod nullo modo est aestimandum? Sed ideo ipsum ignorasse dixit quoniam a deo fuisse ordinatum non uidit. 'Ignorabam, fratres,' inquit, 5
'quia princeps sacerdotum est' quia cognosco quod nec ex deo nec secundum legem sed secundum Iudaicam superstitionem constitutus est ideoque ignoro eum principem sacerdotum esse quoniam uere cognosco eum non sic esse. Si enim principem populi uerum ac legitimum eum esse cognoscerem profecto ei non maledicerem. 595D
Quoniam uero ignoro eum principem esse in ueritate propterea non me penitet ei maledicere. 11

Aliam eiusdem cognosce ignorantiam: 'Scio,' inquit, 'hominem 'raptum usque ad tertium caelum nescio in corpore an extra corpus 'nescio, deus scit.' 'Nescio,' ait, 'in corpore' quoniam scio non in 15
corpore, 'an extra corpus nescio' quoniam extra corpus me raptum de raptu Pauli
[non] fuisse cognosco. Non enim operationibus animae per corporeos sensus neque eiusdem operationibus extra corpus raptus sum in 596A
tertium caelum sed operatione diuinae gratiae absque ullius creaturae administratione super omnem creaturam raptus me fuisse apertissime scio. Nescio ergo in corpore an extra corpus quia scio quod nec in corpore nec extra corpus raptus sum. 20

Et ne diutius in eadem re immoremur—prius enim deficiet tempus quam diuinae ignorantiae siue in scriptura siue in rerum natura exempla—, hoc solummodo nosse arbitror sufficere, diuinae ignorantiae 25
tres principales species esse: primam quidem per quam malum non cognoscit quia eius cognitio simplex est et a solo substantiali bono, hoc est a se ipso, formatur. Solus enim ipse est substantiale bonum per se ipsum, caetera uero bona ipsius participatione bona sunt. 596B
Deus itaque malum nescit. Nam si malum sciret necessario in natura rerum malum esset. Diuina siquidem scientia omnium quae sunt causa est. Non enim ideo deus scit ea quae sunt [quia] subsistunt [sed ideo subsistunt] quia ea deus scit. Eorum enim essentiae causa est diuina scientia ac per hoc si deus malum sciret in aliquo substantialiter intelligeretur et particeps boni malum esset et ex uirtute et 35

1 Exod. xxii. 27 5-6 Actus xxiii. 5 13-15 2 Cor. xii. 2 32-33 cf. Aug., De Trin. xv. 22, PL xlii. 1076; De Gen. ad litt. v. 18, CSEL xxviii. 1, p. 161, 8-9

1 populi RB: populum P 3 summum RB^cP: summam B* 5 a deo in ras. R(C) 8 est om. P 8-9 sacerdotum-principem om. R* 10 eum om. P 12 penitet RB: paenitet P ei om. P 16 lemma B an RBP^c: ant P* quoniam R^cBP: quia R* 18 lemma quatuor esse species diuine ignorantie Rm (cf. lin. 24 et p. 160, 10 infra) 23 deficiet B^cBP: deficiat R* 24 lemma BP 27 i in marg. RsBP principales: princi- s.l. R 28 formatur RB: formauit P

written, "Thou shalt not revile the chief of thy people." ' Do you suppose that the Apostle, most wise and most learned in the Law, did not know as well as the other Jews that Annanias was the chief priest? That is quite unthinkable. But the reason why he said that he did not know (it) was that he did not see that he had been ordained by God. 'Brethren,' he says, 'I did not know that he is the chief of the priests' because I know that he has not been established either by God or in accordance with the Law, but by the superstition of the Jews, and so I do not know that he is the chief of the priests because I truly know that he is not so. For did I know that he was the true and legitimate chief of the people, then certainly I would not revile him. But since I do not know that he is in truth the chief, therefore I do not repent of reviling him.

Take another example of the ignorance of the same (apostle). 'I know', he says, 'a man rapt into the Third Heaven; I do not know (that it was) in the body and (453) I do not know (that it was) out of the body (454); God knows.' 'I do not know,' he says, '(that it was) in the body' because I know (that it was) not in the body, 'and I do not know (that it was) out of the body' because I know that I was [not] rapt out of the body. For I was not rapt into the Third Heaven by the soul's operations through the bodily senses nor by her operations outside the body, but I most clearly know that (it was) by the operation of Divine Grace without the help of any creature that I was rapt above every creature. Therefore I do not know (that it was) in the body or (that it was) out of the body, because I know that it was neither in the body nor out of the body that I was rapt.

And, lest we should linger too long over the same topic—for time itself will run out before the examples of the Divine Ignorance whether in Holy Scripture or in the nature of things (are exhausted)—, it is, I think, sufficient to know only this: that there are three principal forms of the Divine Ignorance. The first (is that) by which God does not know evil because His knowledge is simple (455) and formed (456) only by the substantial good, that is, by Himself (457). For He alone is through Himself the substantial Good, whereas other goods are good by participation in Him. Therefore God does not know evil. For if He knew evil, evil would necessarily be in the nature of things, because God's knowledge is the cause of all things that are (458). For God does not know the things that are [because] they subsist [but they therefore subsist] because God knows them. For the cause of their being is the divine knowledge, and therefore if God knew evil, evil would be understood (to exist) substantially in something and would be a participant in the Good, and vice and wickedness

substantiale R^cBP^c: substantile R*: substantiale P* 31 omnium RB: omnia P 33 ea om. P*

Concerning the rapture of Paul

Concerning the three modes of God's Ignorance I

bonitate uitium et malitia procederent, quod impossibile esse uera edocet ratio.

ii Secunda species est per quam dicitur deus ignorare [alia] praeter ea quorum rationes in se ipso aeternaliter et fecit et cognoscit. Quorum enim naturaliter habet uirtutem eorum essentialiter possidet scientiam. 5

iii Tertia est per quam dicitur deus ignorare ut praediximus ea quae nondum experimento actionis et operationis [in effectibus] manifeste apparent, quorum tamen inuisibiles rationes in se ipso a se ipso creatas et sibi ipsi cognititas possidet. 10

iiii His praedictis quarta species additur, de qua nunc tractare ordo disputationis poscebat, qua deus dicitur ignorare se esse in numero rerum quae ab eo facta sunt quas intra denariam quantitatem praedicamentorum philosophi conantur concludere; ac per hoc uniuersaliter dicendum quod in nullo eorum quae intra decem genera rerum a philosophis comprehenduntur neque eorum quae extra illa diligentior inquisitio inuenit siue secundum substantiam siue secundum accidens sint neque eorum quae in nulla substantia uel accidenti possunt inueniri siue in rationibus occultis siue in possibilitatibus siue in impossibilitatibus sint deus intelligit se subsistere quoniam se cognoscit nullum eorum esse dum omnia ineffabili essentiali sua uirtute et plus quam uirtute et incomprehensibili sua infinitate intelligit se excellere.

Propterea autem dixi diligentiolem inquisitionem posse quaedam inuenire in rerum natura praeter ea quae decem praedicamentis comprehenduntur—nam et illa a philosophis reperta sunt—ne quis minus capacium existimet rerum diligentem indagacionem ultra praedictam categoriarum quantitatem [non] posse progredi. Generaliora enim genera eorum comprehendit ratio. Siquidem in motu et in statu sunt, item status et motus uniuersali essentia colliguntur quae in infinitum diuisionem sui patitur. Ea namque substantia quae primum in categoriis obtinet locum finita est et accidentibus subiecta, ea uero uniuersalis essentia nullum in se accidens recipit. In suis quippe subdiviisionibus usque ad indiuidua peruenientibus accidentium capax est, ipsa uero in se ipsa simplex est nullique accidentium subiecta <cui motus ille generalissimus nullique kathegoriae obnoxius quo omnia de nihilo in esse procedunt, status quoque in quem

de generalioribus generibus intra quae decem kathegoriae continentur

3 ii in marg. RsBP 7 iii in marg. RsBP 11 iiii in marg. RsBP additur
RB: arditur P 12 post disputationis rasura in R 16 philosophis
RB: phylosophis P diligentior RB: diligentiora P 18 neque in ras. R(C)
19 in possibilitatibus RB^c: in possessibilitatibus B^{*}: impossibilitatibus P in (3) s.l.
B 20 lemma esse supra .x. generalissima aliquid generalius et esse quod nec
accidens sit nec substantia Rm impossibilitatibus B^cP: impossibilitatibus R: im-
possessibilitatibus B^{*} intelligit se RB: se intelligit P 25 praeter ea P: prop-
terea R^{*}: propter ea R^c: praeter aea B 26 philosophis RP: phylosophis B
28 praedictam RB: praedicta P progredi RB: praegredi P lemma BP (kathegoriae

would proceed from virtue and goodness; which right reason shows to be impossible.

The second form is (that) by which God is said not to know [other things] besides those of which he both has created and knows the reasons eternally in himself. For the things of which He naturally has the power, of those things he essentially possesses the knowledge (459).

The third is (that) by which it is said that God does not know, as we said above, the things that are not yet manifestly apparent [in their effects] by experience of their actuality (460) and operation, although He possesses in Himself, created by Himself and known to Himself, their invisible reasons.

To these I add a fourth form which the order of our discourse required us to discuss at this point: (that) by which God is said not to know that He is in the number of the things which have been made by Him (461), which the philosophers try to include within the deced of the Categories; and therefore we must say generally that in none of the things which are comprehended by the philosophers within the ten genera of things, nor in any of those things which a closer inquiry discovers outside them, whether they exist as substance or as accident, nor in any of those that cannot be discovered in any substance or accident, whether they exist in the hidden reasons or in possibilities or in impossibilities, does God understand that He subsists; for He knows that He is none of them, but understands that He excels (them) all by His ineffable essential Power and More-than-Power, and by His incomprehensible Infinity.

Now, the reason why I said that a closer inquiry could discover certain things in nature in addition to those which are comprehended within the Ten Categories—for those too have been discovered by the philosophers—was that no one of the less able should suppose that a thorough investigation of things could [not] get further than the above-mentioned quantity of Categories. For their reason (462) comprehends more general genera. For they are in motion and at rest (463), and rest and motion are brought together under universal essence, which allows division of itself to infinity. For that substance which has the first place among the Categories is finite and subject to accidents, but that universal essence admits in itself no accident. For while it is receptive of accidents in its subdivisions which extend as far as the individuals, in itself it is simple and subject to none of the accidents <and in it there is a division into that most general motion which is subject to no Category, by which all things proceed from nothing into being (464), and the rest in which all things shall

Of the more general genera within which the Ten Categories are contained

B: categoriae P 30 quae in ras. B 35 est post uero erasum est in B
36 kathegoriae B(C): categoriae P 37 quo B: quae P

omnia motuum sui terminum constituent qui etiam nulli categoriae succumbit, subdiuiduntur).

Quod autem addidi in natura rerum esse quaedam quae nec in substantia nec in accidentibus cognoscuntur, hoc est quae nec substantiae nec accidentia sunt, de rationibus adhuc in nulla re apparentibus siue substantialiter siue secundum accidens sensui uel intellectui dictum esse intellige. Possibilia quoque et impossibilia in numero rerum computari nemo recte philosophantium contradicet; quae nulla alia ratione esse dicuntur nisi quia possibilia possunt in aliqua re fieri etsi non sint, impossibilia uero sola uirtute impossibilitatis continentur. Eorum enim esse est impossibilitas in aliqua re intellectuali seu sensibili apparere <—et possibilium quidem exemplum fiat: Quidam homo potest prolem gignere sed amore uirginitatis detentus spernit prolem habere; impossibilium uero: Rationabile animal impossibile est irrationabile esse aut conuersim—>, de quibus quisquis plene uoluerit percipere legat Periermenias [hoc est De Interpretatione] Aristotelem in qua aut de his solis, hoc est possibilibus et impossibilibus, aut maxime a philosopho disputatum est. Nunc itaque ad ea quae restant consideranda transeamus si tibi de speciebus [diuinae ignorantiae] quibus dicitur deus ignorare satis uidetur discusum.

A. Satis quidem superque ac diutius in eis morari non necessarium uideo. Solari namque radio lucidius patefactum diuinam ignorantiam nil aliud intelligendum esse nisi incomprehensibilem infinitamque diuinam scientiam. Nam quod sancti patres, Augustinum dico et Dionysium, de deo uerissime pronuntiant—Augustinus quidem ‘qui ‘melius’ [inquit] ‘nesciendo scitur’, Dionysius autem ‘cuius ignorantia ‘uera est sapientia’—non solum de intellectibus qui eum pie studioseque quaerunt uerum etiam de se ipso intelligendum opinor. Sicut enim qui recto ratiocinandi itinere inuestigant in nullo eorum quae in natura rerum continentur ipsum intelligere possunt sed supra omnia sublimatum cognoscunt ac per hoc eorum ignorantia uera est sapientia et nesciendo eum in his quae sunt melius eum sciunt super omnia quae sunt et quae non sunt, ita etiam de ipso non irrationabiliter dicitur in quantum se ipsum in his quae fecit non intelligit subsistere in tantum intelligit se super omnia esse ac per hoc ipsius ignorantia

11 Eorum—impossibilitas: cf. lib. i, p. 36, 26–7 17–18 cf. Boethius, *In lib. de interpretatione, editio secunda*, iii, 9, ed. Meiser, ii, pp. 185–250 26–27 Aug., *De ord.* ii, 16, 44, PL xxxii, 1015 27–28 cf. Dionys., *DN vii*, 3, PG iii, 872A 14–15

1 kathgoriae B(C): categoriae P 9 ratione RB: rationi P possunt RB*P: posset B* 10 sola s.l. R 16–17 hoc—interpretatione sC 19 consideranda RB: considerata P 20 diuinae ignorantiae sC 21 discusum RB: discussum P 26 dionysium R: dyonisium B: dionisium P 27 inquit sC dionysius R: dyonisius B: dionisius P 28 lemma BP 28–29 studioseque

establish the end of their motions, which is likewise subject to no category (465)).

But as to what I further said, that there are in the nature of things certain things which are known neither in substance nor in accidents, understand that this was said with reference to the reasons which at present are not manifest in anything either to sense or to intellect, whether as substance or as accident.

Again, that possibles and impossibles (466) are reckoned in the number of things none of those who practise philosophy aright will dispute; and these are said to be for no other reason than that the possibles can come into being in something even if they are not, while the impossibles are contained (467) within the virtue of their impossibility alone. For their being consists in the impossibility of their appearing in any intelligible or sensible thing. <And let this be an example of the possibles: A certain man has the possibility of begetting offspring but, restrained by love of virginity, scorns the getting of offspring; and this of the impossibles: It is impossible for a rational animal to be irrational, and vice versa.> But if anyone wishes to make a full study of these (468), let him read Aristotle *περὶ ἑρμηνείας* [that is, ‘De Interpretatione’], in which the philosopher has devoted his discussion exclusively or mainly to them, that is, to the possibles and impossibles.

So let us now turn to what is left to be considered, if you think that the forms [of the Divine Ignorance] by which God is said not to know have been sufficiently discussed.

A. Sufficiently and more (than sufficiently); and I see that it is not necessary to dwell upon them further. For it is plainer than daylight that the Divine Ignorance is to be understood as nothing else than the incomprehensible and infinite Divine Knowledge. For what the Holy Fathers, I mean Augustine and Dionysius, most truly say about God—Augustine [says] that He is better known by not knowing, Dionysius that His ignorance is true wisdom (469)—should, in my opinion, be understood not only of the intellects which reverently and seriously seek Him, but also of Himself. For as those who pursue their investigations along the right path of reasoning are able to understand that He is within none of the things which are contained within nature, but know that He transcends them all, and therefore their ignorance is true wisdom, and by not knowing Him in the things that are they know Him the better above all things that are and are not: so also it is not unreasonably said of (God) Himself that to the extent that He does not understand Himself to subsist in the things which He has made, to that extent does He understand that He transcends

RB: studiosaeque P 29 ipso om. P 30 recto RB: recte P 34 de ipso BP: de se ipso R

uera est intelligentia et in quantum se nescit in his quae sunt *comprehendi* in tantum se scit ultra omnia exaltari atque ideo nesciendo se ipsum a se ipso melius scitur. Melius enim est se scire ab omnibus remotum esse quam si sciret in numero omnium se constitui.

N. Recte intelligis et quod de talibus ratio suadet pure ac indubitanter te perspicere sentio nec iam cernis ut opinor ullam *differentiam* imaginis et principalis formae praeter rationem subiecti. Summa siquidem trinitas substantialiter per se ipsam subsistit et ex nulla causa creata est, trinitas uero nostrae naturae de nihilo facta est ab ipsa quae per se ipsam aeterna est ad imaginem et similitudinem suam. Et si aliqua dissimilitudo praeter hoc imaginis et principalis exempli reperta fuerit non ex natura hoc processit sed ex delicto accidit, neque ex creatricis trinitatis inuidia sed ex creatae imaginis culpa. Totum nanque quod de deo <dicitur> uel intelligitur secundum essentiae uirtutem de eius imagine in his in quibus purgatur illuminatur perficitur et dici et intelligi potest secundum creationis gratiam eo ut praediximus excepto quod diuina natura deus est excellentia essentiae, humana uero deus est diuinae gratiae largitate et quod illa creatrix sit et a nullo creata, ista uero ab illa creata est et ea quae suae naturae infra se adhaerent creat, corpus hoc mortale dico post peccatum animae adiunctum, quod etiam imago imaginis uocatur <ut saepe diximus>. Nam quemadmodum animam ad imaginem suam deus creauit ita anima corpus ueluti instrumentum quoddam quodam modo sui simile efficit.

Sed ad diuinae trinitatis quae causa omnium est theoriam redeundum si tibi quae de talibus dicta sunt sufficiunt.

A. Sufficiunt sane.

N. In summa itaque ac singulari uniuersorum causa ex qua et in qua et sunt et condita sunt totius creaturae principia, hoc est primordialia causae, considerandum arbitror utrum ipsa dum sit unitas et trinitas—diuina siquidem bonitas est una essentia in tribus substantiis et tres substantiae in una essentia uel, si secundum usum Romanae linguae dicendum, una substantia in tribus personis et tres personae in una substantia—in se ipsa causas quodam modo differentes <sicut substantias> a se inuicem habeat, hoc est utrum sicut de ipsa praedicatur una essentia in tribus substantiis ita etiam una essentialis causa in tribus subsistentibus causis et tres subsistentes causae 21–22 ut saepe diximus: cf. p. 134, 27–28 *supra*

1–2 *comprehendi in ras.* R 5 *lemma conclusio principalis trinitatis uel igmaginis nostre* Rm 6 *ullam RB^cP: illam B* differentiam B^c(C)P: dissimilitudinem RB** 11 *lemma et sicut est una essentia in tribus personis et tres persone in una essentia sic una causa in tribus causis* Rm 14 *dicitur* *suppleui* 15 *imagine in RB: imaginem P* 17–18 *excellencia—est recentiore manu in marg. suppleuit P* 19 *est om.* R* 20 *adhaerent RB: adhaerente P* 27 *lemma* BP 31–32 *in tribus—essentia om.* P 36 *in tribus substantiis deest in R**

them all, and therefore His ignorance is true understanding; and to the extent that He does not know Himself to be comprehended in the things that are, to that extent does He know Himself to be exalted above them all, and so by not knowing Himself He is the better known by Himself. For it is better that He should know that He is apart from all things than that He should know that He is set in the number of all things.

N. You understand correctly, and I perceive that you have a clear and unwavering view of what reason teaches about these matters; and you no longer see, I think, any *difference* between the image and its principal Exemplar except in respect of subject (470). For the most high Trinity subsists substantially through itself and is created out of no cause, while the trinity of our nature is made by it, Which through Itself is eternal, out of nothing, in Its image and likeness.

And if any dissimilarity but this is found between the image and the principal Exemplar it has not come from Nature but is an accident produced by sin; and not from the envy of the creative Trinity but from the fault of its created image. For everything which <is said> (471) or understood of God with regard to the power of His Essence (472) can be said and understood of His image in those in whom it is purified, illuminated, and perfected (473) with regard to the grace of creation, with the above-mentioned exception that the Divine Nature is God by the excellence of its Essence, while human nature is God by the munificence of Divine Grace; and that the former is creative and created by nothing while the latter is created by it and creates those things which being below it adhere to its nature, I mean this mortal body (474) attached to the soul after it had sinned, which is called also an image of an image (475) <as we have often said>. For as God created the soul in His image, so the soul makes the body as a kind of instrument somehow similar to herself.

But we must return to the consideration of the Divine Trinity which is the Cause of all things, if you are satisfied with what has been said on these matters.

A. I am quite satisfied.

N. So in (the matter of) the most high and unique Cause of all things, from which and in which the beginnings of the whole creation, that is, the primordial causes, both are and have been created (476), I think it must be asked whether, being Unity and Trinity—for the Divine Goodness is One Essence in Three Substances and Three Substances in One Essence, or according to the usage of the Roman tongue we must say (477), One Substance in Three Persons and Three Persons in One Substance—, it has within itself the causes differentiated <as are the Substances> from one another, that is, whether, as there is predicated of it One Essence in Three Substances, so also

An inquiry into the Cause of all things

in una essentiali causa credendum est et intelligendum, et quid de huius modi theoria sana fide cogitandum sit et praedicandum non incongruum orthodoxae fidei contemplationibus explanare.

A. Immo congruentissimum et fidelium animarum saluti necessarium.

N. Quid igitur? Num debemus hoc de causa omnium et credere et quantum datur intelligere et praedicare et essentialem causam unam in tribus substantialibus causis et tres substantiales causas in una essentiali causa?

A. Quid hoc prohibet intelligi et praedicari non mihi occurrit. Si enim deus causa omnium est nonne sequitur ut et causa omnium deus cognoscatur? At si deus causa et causa deus nonne consequens est ut et omne quod de deo credere debemus similiter sine ulla discrepantia de causa non dubitemus intelligere? *Nam si* unum deum per se existentem in tribus substantiis per se subsistentibus fides fatetur catholica quid obstat ne similiter dicamus unam causam per se existentem in tribus causis per se subsistentibus?

N. Pie et orthodoxe. Est igitur una causa in tribus causis et tres in una.

A. Iam et concessum est et datum.

N. Nunc *itaque* ad theologiam redeamus quae pars prima est et summa sophiae, nec immerito quia aut sola aut maxime circa diuinæ naturae uersatur speculationem, et diuiditur in duas partes, in affirmationem dico et negationem quae grece appellantur ΑΠΟΦΑΤΙΚΗ et ΚΑΤΑΦΑΤΙΚΗ, quarum una in primo libro usi sumus ubi certis rationibus decem categorias omniaque rerum genera et formas numerosque et accidentia de deo proprie praedicari negauimus et iterum in praesenti libro eandem, ΑΠΟΦΑΤΙΚΗΝ dico, serie quaestionum exigente repetiuimus dum ipsum deum nullum eorum quae sunt et quae non sunt in sua essentia intelligere diximus quia omnem superat essentiam ipsumque quid ipse sit quoniam nullo modo diffinitur et quantus et qualis sit quia nihil ei accidit et in nullo intelligitur omnino ignorare ac per hoc se ipsum in his quae sunt et quae non sunt comprehendi paenitus negare [quae species ignorantiae omnem scientiam superat et intellectum]. Iam uero alteram, ΚΑΤΑΦΑΤΙΚΗΝ dico, conamur inspicere eo duce qui quaeritur et qui quaerit se quaeri et se quaerentibus occurrit et inueniri desiderat. Et

1 credendum . . . intelligendum R^c(C): credenda . . . intelligenda R*BP 3 (glossa P) ΟΡΘΟΔΟΞΑ fides dicitur quia recte uidet. A uerbo greco diriuatur ΟΡΘΟΔΟΚΩ (ΟΡΘΟΔΟΚΟ P) id est recte uideo mutata K in Z C in marg. BP 14 nam si R^c(C): si enim R*BP 16 catholica RP: catholica B 21 lemma theologiam primam et summam esse de tribus partibus philosophiae et subtilissima per katafatiken disputatio de sancta trinitate et quomodo intelligatur pater maior me est Rm itaque R^c(C)BP: igitur R* ad theologiam redeamus RB^cP: ad theologiare ***dam B* 26 categorias P: cathogorias R: chategorias B: 31 post quoniam rasura in R 32 diffinitur RB: definitur P

it is to be believed and understood that there is one essential Cause in three subsistent Causes and three subsistent Causes (478) in one essential Cause; and I think it would not be incongruous with the orthodox faith to expound in our contemplations what, without straying from the Faith, can be thought and taught of such a theory.

A. On the contrary, most congruous, and necessary for the salvation of faithful souls.

N. What then? Ought we to believe, as well as, to the best of our ability, understand and teach, this of the Cause of all things, that it is both one essential Cause in three substantial Causes and three substantial Causes in one essential Cause?

A. I see nothing against believing and teaching this. For if God is the Cause of all things, does it not follow that the Cause of all things should be recognized as God? But if God is the Cause and the Cause is God, does it not follow that whatever we ought to believe of God we should also similarly, without any discrepancy, have no hesitation in understanding of the Cause? For if the Catholic Faith professes one God existing through Himself in three Substances subsisting through themselves, what stops us from saying in the same way that there is one Cause existing through itself in three Causes subsisting through themselves?

N. A pious and orthodox (opinion). Therefore there is one Cause in three Causes and three Causes in one.

A. This has now been conceded and granted.

N. Let us *then* now return to theology, which is the first and highest part of wisdom; and rightly so, for it is concerned wholly or for the most part with speculation about the Divine Nature. And it is divided into two parts, I mean into affirmation and negation, which are called in Greek ἀποφατική and καταφατική (479), one of which we employed in the first book, where by sound arguments we denied that the ten categories and all the genera and species and individuals and accidents of things can be literally predicated of God; and again in the present book we were brought back to the same (part) again, I mean ἀποφατική, by the course of our inquiry when we said that God Himself understands that in His Essence (there is) none of the things which are and are not, because He surpasses all essence, and that He does not know of Himself at all what He Himself is because He is in no way defined; nor how great He is nor of what sort He is because nothing in Him is accident, and in nothing is He understood; and thus He absolutely denies that He is comprehended in the things that are or in the things that are not. [And ignorance of such sort surpasses all knowledge and all understanding.]

But now we are attempting to examine the other, I mean καταφατική, under the guidance of Him Who is being sought and Who

ea pars est quae contemplatur quid de diuina natura ueluti proprie proferendum cauteque et rationabiliter intelligendum.

de A. De parte negatiua in prioribus satis mihi est suasum; nunc uero
ΚΑΤΑΦΑΤΙΚΗ de affirmatiua quid explices ardens exspecto.

N. Iam inter nos non temere ut censeo ad purum est deductum 5
omne quod de deo catholica fide approbante datur intelligi de causa 600A
omnium similiter pie philosophantes oportere fateri.

A. Hoc inconcuse stabilitum est.

N. Num igitur diuinitatem ingenitam et gignentem et deitatem 10
genitam et deitatem procedentem credimus et dum sit una et insepa-
rabilis diuinitas differentias tamen substantiales recipit? In patre enim
deitatem ingenitam, in filio deitatem genitam, in spiritu sancto deitatem
procedentem accipimus et religiose credimus et sancti Dionysii Ario-
pagitae aliorumque patrum sanissima auctoritate utentes approbamus.

A. Quisquis in hoc haesitat longe a ueritate distat. 15

N. Est igitur substantialis causa ingenita et gignens et est sub-
stantialis causa genita (et non gignens), item substantialis [est]
causa procedens (et non ingenita nec genita nec gignens), et tres
causae (substantiales) unum sunt et una causa essentialis. 600B

A. Ex praedictis rationibus hoc necessario conficitur. 20

N. In causa itaque omnium est causa praecedens et sunt causae
sequentes. Pater siquidem praecedit filium et spiritum. Ab eo enim
filius est genitus et spiritus sanctus est procedens ac per hoc causa
causarum pater non incongrue creditur. Est enim causa nascentis
causae et procedentis causae. Paternitas enim praecedit filioli-
tatem, filioli- 25
tatem uero paternitatem praecedere nemo recte sapientium
dixerit. Hinc et ipse de se ipso filius ait: 'Pater maior me est.' Maior
quippe pater est filio non secundum naturam sed secundum causam.
Pater nanque causa est filii, non autem filius causa est patris. [Neque 600C
hic reciprocam nominum relationem sed substantiarum uirtutem 30
consideramus. Aliter enim inspicimus in substantiis uel personis
relationum habitudinem, aliter (ex ingenito) generationem uel pro-
cessionem. Illic quidem quomodo ad se inuicem denominentur, hic
uero quomodo inter se inuicem differuntur.] Filius itaque ex patre est,

14 aliorumque patrum: cf. Greg. Naz. Orat. xxxi. 8, PG xxxvi. 141B; Max. Conf. Opusc.
theol. et polem. xx, PG xci. 249B 5-6 27 Ioh. xiv. 28 27-28 maior me
-causam: cf. Max. Conf., I Ambig. xxi, PG xci. 1264C 7 34-p. 170, 1 filius-filio:
cf. ibid. 1264C 8-9

1 ueluti RB: ueluti P 2 rationabiliter RB: rationabilis P 3 lemma BP
(ΚΑΤΑΦΑΤΙΚΗ B: ΚΑΤΑΦΑΤΙΚΗ P) 7 philosophantes RB: phylosophantes P
8 inconcuse RB: inconcuse P 9 Num RB: Nunc P 13 dionysii R:
dionysii B: dionysii P 16 est (2) s.l. B(C) 21 itaque R(C)BP: igitur R*
25 enim R(C)B: siquidem R*: om. P 25-26 filioli- igitur RB*
filioli- filiatem filiatem B*: filiatem filietas P 29 nanque R(C)BP: enim R*
30 sed RB: uel P uel substantiarum uirtutem bis P 32 habitudinem: gl. interlin. .
i. relationem C in B (cf. P) 33 denominentur in ras. B 34 differuntur B(C):

seeks to be sought and comes to meet those who seek Him and desires
to be found. And this is the part which contemplates what is to be
said as though literally of the Divine Nature, and cautiously and
reasonably understood.

A. I am sufficiently convinced about the negative part by what has
gone before; but now I await eagerly your explanation of the affirmative. Concerning
καταφατική

N. It has already been clearly concluded between us, not without
caution as I think, that everything that we are given to understand
of God on the authority of the Catholic Faith those who practise
philosophy piously ought in like manner to profess of the Cause of
all things (480).

A. This has been unshakeably established.

N. Do we believe, then, of the Unbegotten and Begetting Divinity
and the Begotten Deity and the Proceeding Deity that even although
it is one and indivisible Divinity it yet admits substantial differences?
For we accept and religiously believe and use the authority of St.
Dionysius the Areopagite (481) and other Fathers to prove that in
the Father the Deity (is) unbegotten, in the Son the Deity (is) be-
gotten, in the Holy Spirit the Deity proceeds.

A. Anyone who hesitates here is far from the truth.

N. There is, then, a substantial Cause (which is) unbegotten and
begets; and there is a substantial Cause (which is) begotten (and does
not beget); (and) also [there is] a substantial Cause which proceeds
(and is not unbegotten nor begotten nor begetting); and the three
(substantial) Causes are one, and one essential Cause.

A. This is the necessary conclusion of the foregoing arguments.

N. Therefore in the Universal Cause there is a preceding Cause
and there are subsequent Causes. For the Father precedes the Son
and the Spirit, since from Him the Son is begotten and the Holy
Spirit proceeds; and therefore the Father is not inappropriately
believed (to be) the Cause of Causes. For He is the Cause of the
Cause that is born and of the Cause which proceeds. For fatherhood
precedes sonship, and none of the truly wise would say that sonship
precedes fatherhood. Hence even the Son Himself says of Himself,
'The Father is greater than I.' For the Father, not in nature but as
cause, is greater than the Son. For the Father is the Cause of the Son
but the Son is not the cause of the Father. [And here we are not
considering the mutual relationship of the names, but the power
(482) of the substances. For we look at the possession (483) of relations
in the Substance or Persons from one point of view, at the generation
or procession (from the Unbegotten) from another. In the former
(we see) how they are named in relation to each other, in the latter
how they differ from each other.] So the Son is from the Father,
subsistunt RB*: differunt P

non autem pater ex filio. In deo etenim non humanarum generationum considerantur relationes sed ineffabilium substantiarum substantiales habitudines.

Maior *quidem* est pater filio secundum causam. Prius etenim sancta theologia habitudinem patris ad filium considerat ac deinde filii ad patrem; et ut hoc certius et intelligas et credas ad Gregorii theologi auctoritatem recurre, qui in primo sermone De Filio contra Arrianos disputans maiorem esse patrem filio iuxta causam sapienter edocet 'quippe ex patre existere filium et non ex filio subsistere patrem 'diffiniens.' Nec tamen hoc dicimus illorum sensum respicientes qui dominum nostrum de se ipso secundum humanitatem dixisse asserunt 'Pater maior me est.' Vterque siquidem intellectus sana fide recipiendus est.

A. Etiam. Quamuis enim non eiusdem sint subtilitatis atque altitudinis neuter tamen a catholica professione recedit.

N. Non idipsum igitur patri naturaliter subsistere et filii sui causam esse; non enim natura patris causa est filii. Vna siquidem eademque est patris et filii natura quia una eademque est amborum essentia ac per hoc idipsum est patri patrem esse et causam filii; non enim secundum naturam quae una atque eadem est [in patre et filio] non enim iuxta naturam haec nomina de patre praedicantur et filio sed secundum habitum gignentis ad genitum et causae praecedentis ad causam consequentem quemadmodum non secundum naturam de filio dicitur filius aut causa genita sed secundum habitum filii [ad patrem] et causae genitae ad causam gignentem.

A. Haec iam etiam in priori libro suasa sunt et nunc iterum non irrationabiliter repetita.

N. Causa itaque filii pater est et spiritus sancti, filius uero causa est conditionis principaliter causarum, earundem autem [causarum] distributionis spiritus sanctus causa est.

A. Illud etiam fateri a ueritate non abhorreere perspicio, sed mihi talia cogitanti atque credenti de trina omnium causa alia caligo occurrit. Non enim clare considero utrum solus pater causa est spiritus sancti an pater et filius, ut quemadmodum fides fatetur catholica a 9-10 Max. Conf., *I Ambig.* xxi, PG xci. 1264c 7-9; cf. *lib. i*, p. 70, 15-72, 20 pp. 70, 15-72, 20

4 quidem R^c(C)BP: itaque R* 7 recurre RB^cP: recurrere B* 9 subsistere RP: subsistere B 12 sana R^cBP: sanae R* 14 subtilitatis R^cBP: subtilitatis R* 18 patris-est om. P 19-20 non enim RB: nam P 20 post naturam *erasum est eorum in R* 24 filii RB: fili P 25 causae RB: causa P 26 suasa R*BP: suassa R^c 28 spiritus R^cBP: spiritum R* 31 abhorreere R^c(C)BP: obhorreere R* 33 lemma BP: de spiritus sancti processione C in R: utrum spiritus sanctus a patre procedit et filio ut latini credunt an ut greci a patre solum uel a patre per filium et unam causam ex duabus non fluere per coniecturam naturalium iiii^{or} simplicium elementorum Rm clare R^cBP: dare R* 34 ut R*BP: ita ut R^c(C)B*

but not the Father from the Son. For in God it is not the relations of human generations that are considered, but the substantial possessions of ineffable Substances.

The Father is *indeed* greater than the Son as Cause. For the holy word of God considers first the possession of fatherhood with regard to the Son, and then that of sonship with regard to the Father; and so that you may more certainly both believe and understand this, have recourse to the authority of Gregory the Theologian, who in his First Discourse on the Son (484), where he is disputing with the Arians, wisely teaches that the Father is greater than the Son as Cause 'making the distinction that the Son exists from the Father but the Father does not subsist from the Son'. But in saying this we do not reject the interpretation of those who assert that it was with reference to His Humanity that Our Lord said of Himself, 'The Father is greater than I', for either interpretation may be accepted without straying from the Faith.

A. Yes. For although they are not of equal subtlety and profundity, yet neither conflicts with the Catholic Faith.

N. Therefore the Father's natural subsistence and His being the Cause of His Son are not the same thing; for it is not the Father's Nature that is the Cause of the Son. The Nature of the Father and of the Son is, of course, one and the same because both have one and the same Essence, and therefore it is the same thing for the Father to be the Father and to be the Cause of the Son; for it is not in respect of His Nature, which is one and the same [in the Father and in the Son] [for it is not in respect of nature] (485), that these names are predicated of the Father and the Son (486), but in respect of the possession of the Begetter with regard to the Begotten, and of the preceding Cause with regard to the Cause that follows, just as it is not in respect of His Nature that it is said of the Son that He is the Son or the Begotten Cause, but in respect of the possession of sonship [with regard to the Father] and of that of the Begotten Cause with regard to the Begetting Cause.

A. This was already argued in the first book, and is not unreasonably repeated again now.

N. Therefore the Father is the Cause of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, while the Son is the Cause of the creation of the causes in the Beginning whereas the Holy Spirit is the Cause of the distribution of the same [causes].

A. I also see that to admit this does not conflict with the truth, but even as I consider (487) and believe these arguments concerning the threefold Cause of all things, another difficulty occurs to me. For I am not sure whether the Father alone is the Cause of the Holy Spirit or the Father and the Son, in which case, as the Catholic Faith

31
Another inquiry into the Cause of all things

patre et filio eum procedere ita etiam credamus duas suae [processionis] causas possidere. Si enim ex duabus personis seu, ut Graeci dicunt, ex duabus substantiis spiritus sanctus procedit quid mirum aut uerae religioni contrarium ex duabus causis ipsum procedere fateri? Et hanc caliginem mihi reseras flagito.

N. Vere uere densissima caligo [[²est]²et] non solum te sed et me ipsum inuoluit et nisi ipsa lux mentium nobis reuelauerit nostrae ratiocinationis [studium] ad eam reuelandam nil proficiet. Ad cumulum [quoque] obscuritatis augetur quod symbolum catholicae fidei secundum Graecos [a Nicaena synodo traditum] a patre solummodo spiritum sanctum procedere profiteatur [teste Epiphano Cypri episcopo in libro suo De Fide], iuxta uero Latinos a patre et filio—quamuis in quibusdam Graecorum expositionibus eundem spiritum a patre per filium procedere reperiamus; ideoque praesentis quaestionis difficultate repercussus contrariis cogitationum fluctibus allidor. Delibero enim quid mihi de hac sit agendum: utrum silentio eam honorificemur [dum uires intentionis nostrae superat] an quodam modo prout diuinus radius [in] animo refulserit *conabimur quippiam* inter nos de ipsa non temere diffinitum intueri.

A. Noli expauescere. Non enim ille qui quaeritur quaerentes se deserit nec inueniendi se possibilitatem pie atque humiliter inuestigantibus denegat. Ipse siquidem ait: 'Petite et dabitur uobis, quaerite et inuenietis, pulsate et aperietur uobis. Omnis enim qui petit accipit et qui quaerit inuenit et pulsanti aperietur.'

N. Primo igitur de his quae in hac quaestione sibimet uidentur contradicere dicendum arbitror.

A. Nec alia uia quaerendi est. [Nemo enim concordantia copulabit nisi prius discordantia diiudicauerit.]

N. Num tibi uidetur rectae fidei conuenire ut credamus filium ex una causa, patre uidelicet, nasci, sanctum uero spiritum ex duabus, patre scilicet ac filio, procedere? Ex duabus nanque causis unam causam confluere rationi non facile occurrit—praesertim in simplici natura et plus quam simplici et ut uerius dicatur in ipsa simplicitate omni diuisione et numerositate carente—, ab una autem causa multas causas erumpere multis exemplis potest approbari. Omnibus nanque rite philosophantibus perspicue patet ex uno genere multas formas

11-12 cf. Epiphanius, *Ancoratus* cxviii, GCS i. 147, 12; PG xliii. 232D
e.g., Ioh. Damasc., *De fide* i. 12, PG xciv. 849A; Max. Conf., *Quaest. ad Thalass.* lxiii, PG xc. 672C
13-14 22-24 Luc. xi. 9-10

3 lemma de spiritu sancto Rm 8 post proficiet *erasum est et in* R 10 synodo RB: sinodo P 11 epiphano B: epifanio R: epyphanio P 17 honorificemur B^cP: honorificemus RB* 18 conabimur quippiam *in ras.* R(C) 20 expauescere RB^cP: expauesce B* 24 aperietur RB^cP: aperitur B* 25 quae om. P 27-28 nemo—diiudicauerit om. P 28 diiudicauerit B: deiudicauerit R(C) 29 Num RB: Non P

professes that He proceedeth from the Father and the Son, so also we should believe that He has two Causes of His [procession]. For if the Holy Spirit proceeds from two Persons or, as the Greeks say, from two Substances, what would be strange or contrary to the Faith in professing that He proceeds from two Causes? And I beg you to solve this difficulty for me.

N. Truly, truly [[²it is]²] a most obscure problem [and] one in which I am involved as well as you; and unless the Light of Minds (488) reveals it to us, the [zeal] of our reasoning will achieve nothing towards revealing it. The difficulty is[, moreover,] brought to a peak by the fact that the Symbol of the Catholic Faith according to the Greeks [handed down from the Council of Nicaea] professes that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father only [according to the evidence of Epiphanius the Bishop of Cyprus in his book 'De Fide']; but according to the Latins, from the Father and the Son—although in some commentaries of the Greeks we find that the same Spirit proceeds from the Father through the Son (488a); so, recoiling from the difficulty of the present inquiry I am dashed against the waves of contrary opinions. For I ask myself what I must do about it: whether we should respect it in silence [as being beyond the power of our thought] or attempt by some means, so far as the divine illumination [in] our mind is alight, cautiously to formulate between us a definition, and then examine it.

A. Have no fear. For He Who is sought does not abandon those who seek Him, nor refuse to those who pursue their investigation in a spirit of piety and humility the possibility of finding Him. For He Himself says: 'Ask, and it shall be given you; seek, and ye shall find; knock, and it shall be opened unto you. For everyone who asketh receiveth and everyone who seeketh findeth and to him that knocketh it shall be opened.'

N. First, then, I think we must speak of the factors in this problem which seem to contradict each other.

A. There is no other way of inquiry. [For no one will bring together the points that agree until he has separated the points that conflict.]

N. Do you think that it is in accordance with the true faith that we should believe that the Son is born from one Cause, namely the Father, but that the Holy Spirit proceeds from two, namely the Father and the Son? For reason does not easily accept that one cause should flow from two—especially in a Nature which is simple and more than simple and, to speak more truly, is Simplicity itself, which is without any division or plurality—, but it can be proved from many examples that many causes break forth from a single cause. For it is perfectly clear to all those who practise philosophy aright that many

de eo quod nasci, ex monade multos numeros, ex centro multas lineas. Formae
 ex una causa iterum diuersae quae ex uno genere nascuntur causae fiunt specierum
 multae indiuiduarum [ex quibus et in quibus multitudines quantitatesque
 causae solent nasci qualitates differentiaeque nascuntur], numeri ex monade procedentes
 diuersarum proportionum causae sunt, [proportiones uero propor- 5
 tionalitatum, proportionalitates armoniarum,] lineae ex uno centro
 progredientes angulorum et laterum latitudinis et altitudinis causae 602c
 dinoscuntur [quae iterum geometricorum corporum occasiones fiunt].

Quid dicam de igneo elemento quod cum sit unum atque simplex
 in se ipso et per se ipsum consideratum caloris simul et lucis causa est? 10
 Calor autem ardentibus ardendi est causa, lux similiter splendentibus
 causa [splendenti] constituitur. [Splendor diuersos gignit colores.]
 Aeris elementum diuersarum uocum occasio, diuersae uoces diuer-
 sorum tonorum origines fiunt. Aquae elementum cum sit in se simplex 15
 et unum umorum diuersorum causa est, qui iterum ex se diuersas
 qualitates [odorum saporum uiriditatum] emittunt. Ex una terra
 diuersorum corporum diuersae quantitates nascuntur—*quantitatem*
nunc dico non ipsam incorpoream sed ipsam molem quam diuersarum 602D
partium compositionem esse nemo ambigit—, et caetera id genus
 eadem ratione in natura rerum siue uisibilem siue inuisibilem 20
 exempla reperiri est facillimum.

A. Filium ex una causa, id est ex patre suo, nasci nullus fidelium
 dubitat; spiritum uero sanctum utrum ex una causa, patre uidelicet, 603A
 an ex duabus, hoc est ex patre et filio, procedit nec affirmare nec
 negare temere ausim ac per hoc rectae fidei professionibus non con- 25
 uenire non satis uideo cum spiritum sanctum patris et filii spiritum
 dici frequentissime inuenerim. Est enim spiritus amborum quoniam
 ex patre per filium procedit et est donum utriusque quoniam ex patre
 per filium donatur et est amor utriusque patrem et filium coniungens
 ut sanctus edocet Augustinus in libris quos de summa ac uera edidit 30
 trinitate ipsius imaginem in humana natura mirabili indagatione
 quaerens luculentissimaque inuentione ostendens, interioris nostrae
 naturae, hoc est rationabilis animae, trinitatem ad imaginem dei 603B
 conditam approbans esse mentem, principalem scilicet animae par-
 tem, et notitiam sui qua se ipsam cognoscit, et amorem quo se ipsam 35

1 ex monade—lineas: cf. Ps.—Dionys., DN v. 6, PG iii. 820D 3—821A 3 27—29 spi-
 ritus—donatur: cf. Aug., De trin. ix. 17 29—p. 176, 1 amor—coniungit: Aug.,
 De trin. ix. 1—5

1 lemma BP multos R^cBP: multas R* centro BP: puncto R 6 propor-
 tionalitates armoniarum om. P uno om. P centro BP: puncto R 8 di-
 noscuntur RB^cP: dinoscit B* 10 lucis s.l. R 11 ardendi RBP^c: ardenti P*
 lux similiter splendentibus in ras. R 12 constituitur R^cBP: est constitutum R*
 colores RB: calores P 13 elimentum RB^cP: elimentorum B* 13—14 diuer-
 sorum tonorum R^c(C)BP: diuersarum armoniarum R* 15 umorum RB:
 humorum P 16 uiriditatum RB: uiridatum P terra RB: materia P
 17—19 quantitatem—compositionem in ras. R 21 reperiri B^cP: repperiri RB*
 22 fidelium RB^cP: fidelium B* 24 affirmare BP: adfirmare R 25 rectae

species are born of a single genus, many numbers from the monad, That it is a
 many radii from the centre. The different species in their turn which common
 are born of one genus become the causes of the individuals [from thing for
 which and in which are born multiplicities and quantities and quali- many causes
 ties and differences]; the numbers which proceed from the monad to be born
 are the causes of diverse proportions [and the proportions of pro- of a single
 portionalities, the proportionalities of harmonies]; the radii which cause
 proceed from one centre are recognized (as) the causes of angles and
 sides, of breadths and depths [which in their turn are the causes of
 the geometrical bodies].

What shall I say of the fiery element which, although considered
 in itself and through itself is one and simple, is the cause of heat as
 well as of light? Moreover, heat is the cause of burning in burning
 (objects) while light is the cause [of shining] in objects that shine.
 [The shine gives birth to the diverse colours.] The element of air is
 the origin of diverse voices; the diverse voices become the origins of
 diverse tones. The element of water, although in itself it is simple and
 one, is the cause of diverse humours, which in their turn emit from
 themselves diverse qualities [of odours, tastes, (and) freshness]. From
 the one earth are born the diverse quantities of diverse bodies—by
 quantity I here mean not the incorporeal quantity (489), but material
 bulk which, as no one disputes, is a composition of diverse parts—;
 and it is very easy by the same reasoning to find other examples of
 this kind in the nature of things visible or invisible.

A. That the Son is born from one Cause, that is, from His Father,
 no one of the faithful doubts; but whether the Holy Spirit proceeds
 from one Cause, namely the Father, or from two, that is, from the
 Father and the Son, I would not dare hastily either to affirm or deny;
 and therefore it is not sufficiently clear to me that it is in conflict with
 the professions of the True Faith as I have very often found the
 Holy Spirit called the Spirit of the Father and of the Son. For He
 is the Spirit of both because He proceeds from the Father through
 the Son, and He is the Gift of each because He is given from the
 Father through the Son, and He is the Love of each because He
 unites the Father and the Son, as St. Augustine teaches in the books
 which he produced concerning the most high and true Trinity, where
 he searches by a wonderful investigation into its image in human
 nature and most ingeniously demonstrates it, proving that the trinity
 of our inner nature, that is, of the rational soul, created in the image of
 God, consists of the mind, which is the chief part of the soul; and
 its knowledge of itself by which it knows itself; and the love by which
 Concerning
 the trinity of
 the inner
 man accord-
 ing to
 Augustine

RB: recte P 27 inuenerim R^c(C)BP: inuenio R* 28 per om. P 29 per
 om. P donatur RB: dona est P coniungens RB: iungens P 30 edocet
 RB: docet P 32 lemma BP luculentissimaque RB: luculentissimaque P
 34 animae RB^cP: animam B* 35 notitiam: -am in ras. B

suique notitiam coniungit. Humana siquidem mens notitiam suam
qua se ipsam cognoscit ueluti quandam prolem sui de se ipsa gignit
 et est sui notitia aequalis sibi quia se ipsam totam nouit ad similitu-
 dinem dei et patris qui de se ipso filium suum qui est sapientia sua
 gignit qua se ipsum sapit et aequalis ei est quia se ipsum totum intel- 5
 liget et coessentialis ei est quia de se ipso gignit et quem gignit.

Ex humana mente procedit appetitus quidam quo se ipsam quaerit
 ut suam notitiam pariat, qui appetitus uel inquisitio dum ad inuen-
 tionem notitiae perfectam peruenit amor efficitur qui mentem noti-
 tiamque sui coniungit et est aequalis menti mentisque notitiae quoniam 10
 totam se amat totamque notitiam suam et est coessentialis menti atque 603C
 notitiae quoniam ipse amor qui mentem notitiamque *eius* copulat non
 aliunde nisi de ipsa mente procedit ad imaginem sancti spiritus qui de
 patre procedens patrem et filium ineffabili caritatis uinculo coniungit.

Quod autem dixisti: 'Ex duabus causis unam causam fluere uel 15
 'procedere rationi non facile occurrit', non iam plane uideo, uerbum
 autem quod est fluere quare posuisti pro eo quod est procedere pure,
 ni fallor, perspicio. Nam et spiritus sanctus flumen in sanctis appel-
 latur scripturis et aqua, *unde et* ipse dominus ait: 'Qui credit in me 20
 'sicut dicit scriptura flumina de uentre eius fluent aquae uiuae' de qua 20
 'si quis biberit non sitiet in aeternum,' sicut Samaritanae mulieri 603D
 dictum est. Ipse quoque fons paradisi qui in quattuor principalia
 flumina diuiditur dum typice consideratur spiritum sanctum signi-
 ficare nemo sapientum denegat, ex quo ueluti principali et unico et
 inexhausto fonte quattuor principales uirtutes in paradyso rationabilis 25
 animae manant, prudentiam dico temperantiam fortitudinem et
 iustitiam, ex quibus iterum omnia omnium uirtutum fluenta profluunt
 et in eas irrigata et foecundata humanae naturae superficie refluunt.
 Merito ergo spiritus sanctus seu a patre solo seu a patre et filio fluere 604A
 dicitur quia fons et origo est omnium uirtutum et in ipsum ineffabili 30
 meatu per oculos naturae nostrae poros redeunt.

N. Recte intelligis de spiritualibus fluentis. Sed dicas quaeso quid
 tibi obstat ne perspicias intelligas quod a nobis dictum, hoc est 'Vnam
 'causam ex duabus causis fluere rationi non facile occurrit'.

1-6 Humana-gignit: Aug., *De trin.* ix. 11 7 Ex-appetitus: cf. Aug. *De trin.* ix.
 11, PL xlii. 972, 24-25 15-16 cf. p. 172, 31-32 *supra* 19-20 Ioh. vii. 38
 20-21 Ioh. iv. 14 22-23 Gen. ii. 10

2 qua R^c(C)BP: cum R* 3 quia RB: qua P 6 *post est deletum est* quia
 de se ipso filium suum qui est sapientia sua gignit qua se ipsum sapit et aequalis ei
 est in R quia s.l. B 7 ipsam RB: ipsum P 8 ad om. P 9 peruenit
 RB^cP: perueniat B* 9-10 notitiamque R^cBP: notiamque R* 11 co-
 essentialis: co- in ras. B 12 notitiamque R^cBP: notiamque R* eius in ras. R
 13 de ipsa R^cB: de se ipsa R*P 16 occurrit BP: occurrit R 18 ni RB^cP:
 nisi B* 18-19 appellatur RB: appellatur P 19 unde et R^c(C)BP: nisi R*
 22 paradisi RP: paradysi B 23 typice RP: tipice B 25 inexhausto RB^cP:

it unites itself and its knowledge of itself (490). For the human mind
 begets from itself as a kind of offspring of itself the knowledge of
 itself by which it knows itself, and the knowledge of itself is equal
 to itself because it knows itself as a whole, in the likeness of God the
 Father Who begets from Himself His Son Who is His Wisdom by
 which He knows Himself, and (His Son) is equal to Him because
 He understands Him as a whole, and is co-essential with (the Father)
 because Whom (the Father) begets He begets from Himself (491).

From the human mind proceeds an appetite by which it seeks
 itself so that it may bring forth knowledge of itself; and when this
 appetite or search attains to the perfect discovery of knowledge it
 is made into the love which unites the mind and its knowledge of
 itself, and is equal to the mind and the mind's knowledge because it
 loves itself as a whole and its knowledge of itself as a whole, and is co-
 essential with the mind and with the knowledge because the love which
 unites the mind and its knowledge proceeds from nothing else but the
 mind itself; after the image of the Holy Spirit Who, proceeding from
 the Father, unites the Father and the Son in a bond of ineffable charity.

But why you should say: 'The reason does not easily accept that
 one cause should flow or proceed from two causes', I do not yet see
 clearly, though, unless I am mistaken, I fully understand why you
 put the word 'flow' in place of the word 'proceed'. For the Holy Spirit
 is called both river and water in Holy Scripture. Hence the Lord
 Himself *also* says: 'He who believes in Me, as the Scripture says, there
 shall flow out from his belly streams of living water' which 'if anyone
 shall drink he shall never thirst again,' as was said to the woman of
 Samaria. Moreover, none of the wise denies that that source in
 paradise which is divided into the four cardinal rivers, interpreted
 typologically, signifies the Holy Spirit, from Whom, as from their
 principal and unique and inexhaustible source flow the four cardinal
 virtues in the paradise of the rational soul, I mean prudence, tem-
 perance, courage, and justice, and from these in their turn flow forth
 all the streams of all the virtues, which, when they have irrigated and
 fertilized the surface of human nature, flow back into them again.
 Rightly then is the Holy Spirit said to flow, whether from the Father
 alone or from the Father and the Son, because He is the Source and
 Origin of all the virtues, and by an ineffable course through the hidden
 channels (492) of our nature they return to Him.

N. You have a correct understanding of the spiritual rivers. But
 please tell me what prevents you from understanding clearly what
 was said by us, namely, 'Reason does not easily accept that one cause
 should flow from two'.

inexhausto ex inauso B* 30 dicitur RBP^c: dicatur P* 31 oculos RB:
 occultos P 32 quaeso BP: quaeso R 33 intelligas RB: intelligis P

A. Multa exempla mihi obstare uideo. Nam et *exempla* quae ex quattuor mundi elementis introduxisti satis ut arbitror edocent unam causam ex duabus causis fieri posse. Ignis siquidem dum sit caloris et luminis fons ex duabus causis nasci uidetur. Igneum namque elementum ex caliditate et siccitate conficitur quae duae qualitates ueluti duae causae unam ex se gignunt. Similiter et de caeteris elementis est dicendum. Nam dum sint suorum effectuum causae ex superioribus se causis duplicibus nasci sapientes mundi dixerunt. Sicut enim ut praediximus ignis ex calido et sicco ita aer ex calido et umido, aqua ex humido et frigido, terra quoque ex frigido et sicco componitur. Quid igitur? Num negandum est unam causam ex duabus causis confluere dum praedicta exempla, ut de caeteris sileam, ad hoc approbandum sufficient?

N. Satis miror et admiratione dignum cur cum caetera acute et probabiliter uideas in his falleris exemplis.

A. Dic deprecor in quo et quomodo decipior.

N. Num tibi a philosophis suasum est mundum istum uisibilem quattuor uniuersalibus atque simplicibus constare elementis, igne uidelicet aere aqua et terra, quorum unumquodque propriam et singularem sui qualitatem possidet? Est enim ignis caliditas, aeris humiditas, aquae frigiditas, terrae siccitas.

A. Haec mihi [fere] ab infantia notissima sunt.

N. Dic itaque. Quis est ille ignis, ut uno utamur exemplo, qui ueluti una causa ex duabus causis manat, ut ais? Illene qui simplex et inuisibilis et per se ipsum incomprehensibilis omnia uisibilia penetrat atque mouet an ille uisibilis et corporalis tangibilisque et materialiter nutritus?

A. Illum simplicem et incomprehensibilem omnia corpora implentem et efficientem non dixerim. Nam et primordialis [est sensibillum] et quarta omnium corporum causa, iste uero sensibilis et materialis et caliditate et siccitate procedere ueluti ex duabus causis mihi uidetur.

N. Num in prioribus dedisti caliditatem non alterius elementi propriam qualitatem esse nisi solius ignis, siccitatem uero nullius nisi terrae solius? Singula enim singulis dantur, id est propriae qualitates suis singulis [substantialibus] elementis.

A. Iam dedi. Aliter *nanque* philosophi non me sinunt intelligere.

3-11 Ignis siquidem—conponitur: cf. *Annot. in Marc.*, p. 4, 10-15 Lutz 19-21 quorum—siccitas: cf. *ibid.*, p. 4, 5-7

1 exempla R^c(C)BP: ea R* 10 umido RB: humido P humido R^cBP: umido R* sicco RB*P: sico B^c 11 conponitur R^c(C): conflatur R*: componitur BP 11 num RB: non P 17 Num RB: Nunc P 18 constare R^cB*P^c: constat R*P*: constrare B* 21 frigiditas R^cB: frigiditatis R*: frigiditas P siccitas R^cB^c: siccitas R*B*P 22 fere sC in R 24 illene R^c(sC)BP: utrum ille R* 29 nam et in ras. R(C) 34 post solius rasura in R propriae RB: proprie P 36 dedi BBP^c: dedi* P* nanque R^c(C)BP: enim R* non me RB: nemo P

A. I see many examples that prevent me. For even *the examples* which you have introduced from the four elements of the world adequately teach, as I think, that one cause can be made from two causes. For although fire is the source of heat and light, it is seen to be born of two causes. For the fiery element is made from warmth and dryness, and these two qualities are as two causes which beget out of themselves one. The same must be said of the other elements as well. For although they are the causes of their effects, yet the natural philosophers (493) have said that they are born of double causes prior to themselves. For as fire is composed of the warm and the dry, as we said just now, so air is composed of the warm and the moist, water of the moist and the cold, and earth of the cold and the dry (494). What then? Is it to be denied that one cause may flow from two causes, when these examples, to say nothing of the others, are sufficient to prove this?

N. I rather wonder, and it is something worthy to be wondered at, why, while you have a clear and reasonable view of everything else, you are misled by these examples.

A. Tell me, pray, in what and how I am deceived.

N. Have you not been convinced by the philosophers that this visible world consists of four universal and simple elements, namely, fire, air, water, and earth, each one of which possesses its proper and unique quality? For fire has warmth, air moisture, water coldness, earth dryness.

A. These things have been very well known to me [almost] from my infancy.

N. Say, then: What is that fire, to take one example, which appears to be one cause flowing from two causes, according to you? Is it that which, simple and invisible and incomprehensible through itself, penetrates and moves all visible things, or that (which is) visible and corporeal and tangible and fed on material things?

A. I would not say that it is that (which is) simple and incomprehensible and which fills and makes all bodies, *for it [is] both* the primordial cause [of sensible things] and one of the four causes of all bodies; but it seems to me that it is the sensible and material fire that proceeds from warmth and dryness as though from two causes.

N. Did you not admit earlier that warmth is the proper quality of no other element but fire alone, and dryness of none other but earth alone? For each is given its own, that is to say, each one of the [substantial] elements is given its own proper quality.

A. I have already admitted (this). *For* the philosophers do not allow me to understand otherwise.

N. Dic itaque: Vtrum aliud est ignis et aliud caliditas an unum atque idem?

A. Duo quaedam esse mihi uidentur. Ignis siquidem substantia est, caliditas uero ipsius substantiae qualitas et propria qualitas.

N. Quid ergo? Num substantia causa est qualitatis an qualitas causa substantiae an neque qualitas causa est substantiae neque substantia qualitatis quoniam ex eodem genere non sunt?

A. Quod ultimum posuisti approbo. Quamuis enim qualitas in substantia contineatur—nulla siquidem qualitas per se subsistit—non tamen causam qualitatis substantiam esse dixerim; etenim omnis species suum genus sequitur quoniam a suo genere nascitur et in eo immutabiliter custoditur ac per hoc omnis substantia ex generali essentia defluit, omnis autem qualitas ex generali qualitate.

de substantiis
et
accidentibus

N. Ignis itaque quia substantia est non ab alia causa descendit nisi a generalissima essentia. Similiter caliditas quia qualitas est non ab alia causa procedit nisi a generalissima qualitate.

A. Quicumque huic conclusioni contendit rationibus philosophiae uidetur resistere.

N. Cur igitur ignem siue simplicem siue materialem ueluti unam causam ex duabus causis, id est caliditate et siccitate confluere ausus es pronuntiare cum uideas substantiam non solum <ab> aliena qualitate quae est siccitas et terrenae substantiae propria, uerum etiam a sua quae est caliditas nasci non posse?

A. Nunc uideo me deceptum in eo quod dixi caliditatem et siccitatem ueluti duas causas unius causae, id est ignis, subsistere. Multos tamen eodem errore seductos cognoui qualitatum et substantiarum differentias [naturasque] non satis discernentes. Et iam nullum locum fugiendi uideo. Nam si dixerero ignem et caliditatem unum et idipsum esse continuo me redargues dicturus: Quare ergo eandem rem suimet esse causam aestimas? Dixi siquidem ignem ex caliditate et siccitate componi. Si dixerero mundum istum uisibilem non ex quattuor substantialibus elementis sed ex quattuor solummodo simplicibus qualitibus constare, caliditate uidelicet umiditate frigiditate et siccitate, quoniam et hoc multis uisum est, fortassis a me quaeras: Si ergo quattuor qualitibus totus hic mundus cum suis corporibus a summo usque deorsum constat, ipsae qualitates quibus substantiis continentur? Si enim qualitates sunt per se subsistere non posse uera edocet ratio. Et non potero inuenire quid respondeam, hoc est quibus substantiis ipsae primordiales et generales qualitates quibus mundus

1 utrum RB: uerum P
qualitas RB^cP: anne qualitas B*
17 philosophiae: -so- s.l. B
eorum P
28 dixerero RB: dixerit P
34 fortassis RB: fortassis P
38 potero RB^cP: petero B*

4 propria P: proprie RB
10 omnis RB: omnes P
20 caliditate RP: calitate B
30 aestimas RBP^c: aestimas P*
39 ipsae RB: ipse P mundus RB^cP: modis B*

6 an neque
13 lemma B
26 eodem RB:
33 umi-
37 uera RB: uere P

N. Say, therefore: Is fire one thing and warmth another, or are they one and the same?

A. They seem to me to be two things. For fire is a substance, whereas warmth is the quality of that substance, and its proper (495) quality.

N. What then? Is the substance the cause of its quality or the quality the cause of the substance or is neither the quality the cause of the substance nor the substance of the quality, seeing that they are not of the same genus?

A. I agree with your last suggestion. For although the quality is contained within the substance—for no quality subsists through itself—, yet I would not say that the substance is the cause of the quality because every species follows its own genus since it is born of its genus and is immutably preserved within it; and therefore every substance flows down from general being, but every quality from general quality.

Concerning
substances
and accidents

N. So fire, because it is a substance, descends from no other cause but the most general being. Similarly warmth, because it is a quality, proceeds from no other cause but the most general quality.

A. Who ever disputes this conclusion would seem to reject the reasons of philosophy.

N. Why, then, did you dare to assert that fire, whether simple or material, flows as one cause from two causes, that is, from warmth and dryness, when you see that not only can its substance not be born of the foreign quality which is dryness and is proper to the earthly substance, but cannot even be born from its own, which is warmth?

A. I see now that I was mistaken in saying that warmth and dryness subsist as two causes of one cause, that is, fire. And yet I know that many have been led into the same error through not sufficiently discerning the differences [and natures] of qualities and substances. And now I see no way of escape. For if I say that fire and warmth are one and the same, you will at once refute me by asking: Why in that case do you think that (what is) the same thing is the cause of itself (496)? For I said that fire was composed of warmth and dryness (497). If I say that this visible world consists not of the four substantial elements but only of four simple qualities, namely, warmth, moisture, cold, and dryness—this too is what many believe—, you may perhaps ask me: If then this whole world with its bodies, from the highest to the lowest, consists of four qualities, in what substances are those qualities contained? For true reason teaches us that if they are qualities they cannot subsist through themselves. And I shall not be able to find the answer, that is, by what substances these primordial and

constituitur fulciuntur, et ueris rationibus constrictus fateri compellar
quattuor substantialia mundi elimenta subsistere in quibus quattuor
principales qualitates consistunt quarum coitu omnia corpora composita efficiuntur. Sed unum adhuc restat quo in eadem mea sententia
qua dixi unam causam ex multis fluere mihi uideor posse permanere. 5

N. Quid est illud unum uelim detegas.

A. Num omnes philosophi de mundo isto tractantes unanimiter
suadent et ad purum ducere uidentur omnia corpora composita ex
quattuor simplicibus elimentis eorumque propriis qualitatibus
quattuor componi? Et si ita est non solum ex duabus uerum etiam
ex multis causis singulorum corporum efficitur compositio. 10

N. Hunc locum fugiendi fortassis habere potuisses si moles has
corporum compositas et corruptibiles et solutioni habiles aliorum
effectuum infra se sequentium causas esse uera ratione assereres. Iam
uero quoniam nihil inferius est corpore composito nullius sequentis
se neque aequalis sibi naturae causa esse potest, et nunc de causis
agimus siue principalibus siue sequentibus [et concatenatis] et omnibus
causa nec uere nec recte causa dici potest—quoniam uere causa non
est—quae in effectus suos erumpere nescit. [Omnino enim effectibus
propriis caret quorum causa merito posset uocari.] Corpora autem
corruptibilia nullius effectus causa sunt quoniam nullam naturam
de se gignunt cum omnium naturarum extremum atque infimum ac
prope nihil obtineant locum. Spiritualia autem corpora <adhuc>
simplicia sunt ac per hoc insolubilia [et manentia] donec totus iste
mundus cum partibus suis dum ad suum finem peruenerit soluatur. 25
Et haec corpora incorruptibilia et insolubilia non nisi in quattuor
principalibus et catholicis purissimisque in se ipsis et simplicibus et
dicuntur et intelliguntur elimentis, caetera uero corpora quae uidentur
ex eorum qualitatibus composita quoniam et componi et solui possunt
non inter causas sed inter extremos effectus qui de se nihil efficiunt
a sapientibus computantur. 30

Simplicissima etiam et purissima ac sensum corporeum fugientia
quattuor huius mundi elimenta ad unam simplicem et indiuiduam
causam solique intellectui perfectissimorum sapientum cognitam
referuntur, hoc est ad generalissimam et in se ipsa semper manentem
substantiarum omnium ad uisibiles effectus procedentium essentiam.
Similiter et de quattuor eorum primordialibus ac propriis qualitatibus
non incongrue intelligitur. Cum enim ipsae sibimet contrariae 35

3 qualitates RB: qualitatis P 4 quo RB^cP: co B* 6 illud s.l. B 7 un-
animiter RB^c: unianimiter B*P 8 corpora RB: corpore P 12 fortassis RB:
fortassis P 14 assereres RB: asserere P 15 sequentis R^cBP: sequenti
R* 19 effectus: ef- s.l. B nescit: -escit in ras. R(C) 20 causa RB: causae P
21 sunt RB^cP: est B* 23 autem R^c(C)BP: enim R* 24 sunt RB^cP: sit B*
et om. P 26 post corpora erasum est adhuc in B 27 principalibus-
purissimisque RB: catholicis principalibus purissimisque P 28 corpora

general qualities by which the world is constituted are supported;
and I shall be compelled by the force of true reasons to admit four
substantial elements of the world in which subsist the four principal
qualities by combination of which all composite bodies are made.
But there still remains one reason why it seems possible for me to
abide by my opinion wherein I said that one cause may flow from
many.

N. I should like you to reveal what that one is.

A. Do not all philosophers who treat of this world unanimously
teach and seem clearly to demonstrate that all composite bodies are
made up of the four simple elements and their four proper qualities?
And if that is the case the composition of every body is effected not
by two causes only, but by many.

N. This might have been a way of escape for you if you were to
assert with good reason that these bulks of bodies, composite and
corruptible and susceptible to dissolution, are the causes of other
effects below them. But as it is, since there is nothing lower than the
composite body it cannot be the cause of any nature coming after it
or of any nature equal to it; and we are now dealing with causes,
whether primary or secondary [and interrelated]: and no cause can
truly or correctly be called a cause—since it is not truly a cause—
which cannot break out into its effects. [For it altogether lacks effects
of its own by virtue of which it could be called a cause.] But corrup-
tible bodies are not the cause of any effect since they do not beget any
nature out of themselves because they occupy the place (which is) the
last and lowest of all natures and next to nothing. But spiritual
bodies are <still> simple and therefore indissoluble [and permanent]
until this whole world with its parts, having attained its end, is done
away. And these incorruptible and indissoluble bodies are said and
understood (to be) nowhere but in the four principal and general
elements (which) in themselves are most pure and simple. But the
other bodies, which are seen to be composed of the qualities of these,
since they can be composed and decomposed, are not reckoned by
the wise among the causes but among the last effects, which make
nothing out of themselves.

Moreover, the four elements of the world, most simple and most
pure and eluding the bodily sense, are traced back to one cause, simple
and indivisible and known only to the understanding of the most
perfectly wise, that is, to the most general being of all substances
proceeding into visible effects, which always abides in itself. And it
is not inappropriate to understand the same thing of their four pri-
mordial and proper qualities. For although these seem to be contrary

RB^c(C)P: om. B* 29 eorum qualitatibus B^c(C)P: eis RB* 30-36 qui de
se-effectus om. P 34 solique R^c(C)B: et soli R* 38 ipsae RB: ipse P

uideantur—nam caliditas frigiditati opponitur, umiditati siccitas—ad unam tamen secretissimam ac solummodo rationi subiectam redeunt causam, ad generalissimam dico omnium qualitatum qualitatem ex qua mirabili naturae opere ad efficienda haec corpora corruptibilia ac solutioni obnoxia procedunt et in qua ineffabili uniuersalis naturae pacifica concordia sibi inuicem remota omni contrarietate consentiunt. 5 607A

A. Hac ultima conclusione undique septum me uideo nullamque uiam euadendi remanere ac per hoc priori ex te prolatae sententiae consentire cogor ut et ego dicam: 'Vnam causam ex duabus causis fluere non facile rationi occurrit.' 10

N. Quid igitur dicemus? Num spiritum sanctum, quem distributionis donorum diuinae bonitatis siue eorum quae secundum substantiam sunt siue quae secundum gratiam infinitam et inexhaustam largissimamque et plus quam largissimam causam esse catholice confitebimur, ex una causa, hoc est ex patre, an duabus causis, patre et filio, procedere profiteri debemus? 15

A. Illa exempla quae ex natura rerum protulimus hoc dicere omnino prohibent [hoc est non ex duabus sed ex una procedere] nisi forte quis dicat rationem summae atque confestim ineffabilis diuinae trinitatis naturae conditae exempla superare. 20

N. Si quis hoc dixerit confestim interrogandus erit: Vnde ergo diuinae bonitatis trinitatem in unitate et unitatem in trinitate quaerere et inuestigare possumus ut aliquid de ea quo eam laudemus uerisimile credamus et quantum datur intelligamus nisi prius quasi quibusdam gradibus exemplis naturae ab ea conditae ad eam ascendamus ea duce atque praecipiente, 'Quaerite et inuenietis'?—praesertim diuino Paulo testante: 'Inuisibilia enim eius,' [inquit,] id est patris, 'a creatura mundi per ea quae facta sunt intellecta conspiciuntur. Sempiterna quoque eius uirtus,' hoc est filius, 'et aeternitas,' hoc est spiritus sanctus. Ita enim hunc locum sanctae scripturae beatus Maximus exponit. 25 607C 31

A. Quid si quis dixerit patrem et filium non duas causas esse sed unam et inseparabilem causam, ipso filio dicente: 'Ego et pater unum sumus'?

N. Huic quoque respondendum: 'Tres causae diuinae bonitatis de quibus nunc agimus non in ipsa essentia quae una atque eadem est 35

9-10 cf. p. 172, 31-32 supra 26 Luc. xi. 9 27-30 Rom. i. 20
30 cf. p. 96, 22-23 supra 33-34 Ioh. x. 30

1 umiditati RB^c: humiditati B^{*}: umiditatis P 7 me RB^cP: meum B^{*}
8 prolatae RB: prolata P 12 siue R^cBP: suae R^{*} 13 post siue *erasum*
est omnia in R 14 catholice R^cBP: catholicae R^{*} 15 confitebimur
R^c(sC)B: confitemur R^{*}P 18 non *om.* P una RB: uno P procedere
R^cBP: procederet R^{*} 22 in (1) *s.l.* B 24 nisi RB: si non P 25 ascendamus RB: ascendimus P 29 uirtus RB^cP: uirtutes B^{*} 33 ipso RB: ipse P

to one another—for warmth is opposed to cold, to moisture dryness—yet they return to one cause, most secret and accessible to the reason alone, I mean to the most general quality of all qualities, from which by a wonderful operation of nature they proceed into the making of these bodies which are corruptible and susceptible to dissolution; and in which, by the ineffable pacific concord of universal nature, they agree together, with all contrariety removed.

A. By this last conclusion I see that I am wholly fenced around, and that no way of escape remains; and so I am compelled to agree with the first opinion which you set forth, so that I too say: 'Reason does not easily accept that one cause may flow from two.'

N. What, then, shall we say? Ought we to profess that the Holy Spirit, Whom as Catholics we shall confess to be the infinite and inexhaustible and most munificent and more than munificent Cause of the distribution of the gifts of the Divine Goodness, whether of those which are of substance or of those which are of grace, proceeds from one Cause, that is, the Father, or from two Causes, the Father and the Son?

A. Those examples which we took from the nature of things altogether prohibit (us) from saying the latter [that is, (they require us to say) that He proceeds not from two causes but from one (498)], unless perhaps one could say that the reason of the most high and [at once] (499) ineffable Divine Trinity surpasses the examples of created nature (500).

N. If anyone says this he will at once have to be asked: By what means then can we inquire into and investigate the Trinity in Unity and Unity in Trinity of the Divine Goodness so as to have some likely belief of it by which we may adore it, and such understanding of it as we are capable of, unless under its guidance and precept, 'seek and ye shall find', we begin our ascent to it by employing as steps examples from the nature which has been created by it?—especially as the divine Paul testifies: 'For' [he says (501)] 'the invisible things of Him,' that is, of the Father, 'are seen by the creature of the world (502) through understanding the things that are made. Also his everlasting Power,' that is, the Son, (is seen or understood by the creature in this way) 'and His Eternity,' that is, the Holy Spirit. For that is how the blessed Maximus explains this passage from Holy Scripture.

A. How if one should say that the Father and the Son are not two causes but the one indivisible Cause, since the Son Himself says: 'I and the Father are one'?

N. To this too must be given the answer: 'The three Causes in the Divine Goodness which we are now discussing are sought not in the Essence, which is one and the same, but in the Trinity of

'sed in ipsa ipsius essentiae substantiarum uel personarum trinitate
'quaeruntur.' Non enim confundit dualitatem personarum dum dicit:
'Ego et pater unum sumus.' Nam non ait: 'Ego et pater unum sum,'
sed 'sumus,' ostendens et essentiae unitatem et substantiarum dif-
ferentiam. Et si quidem diceret: 'Ego et pater et spiritus unum sumus,'
non aliter intelligeremus nisi trium substantiarum trinitatem in
eiusdem essentiae unitate subsistentem et quamuis sic dictum esse
non reperiamus uerissime tamen ita esse intelligimus. Pater enim et
filius et spiritus sanctus unum sunt et tres unum. A patre siquidem
filius est genitus et ab eo (dem patre) spiritus est procedens, ac per
hoc dum sancta scriptura praedicante et suadente audio gignentem et
genitum et procedentem tres substantias seu personas unius essentiae
quantum mihi conceditur intelligo. Siquidem impossibile est ut et
gignens et genitus et procedens unus sit, tres autem esse naturalis
admonet ratio secundum substantias dum sunt unum secundum
essentiam. Nam et Abraam et Isaac et Iacob unum sunt iuxta
naturalem essentialitatem, tres uero secundum substantialem dif-
ferentiam, et hoc exemplum in omnibus generibus et formis et in
indiuuiduis facillime ueritatis inquisitor inueniet.

A. Quid itaque de hac praesenti quaestione multumque difficili
conceptum in animo habeas detege si placet ne tam diu in eisdem locis
demoremur dum ad caetera quae restant exponenda debeamus
accelerare.

N. Dicis peto: Num tibi uidetur ex igne radium nasci et ex radio
splendorem procedere?

A. Quisquis hoc dixerit ex naturae rerum diligenti consideratione
non discrepat ut arbitror. Ignis enim cum sit per se inuisibilis uisi-
bilem de se radium gignit qui etiam per se inuisibilis esset naturae
suae simplicitate subsistens si corpulentis crassisque naturis non
immisceretur. Aiunt enim philosophi radium solis animalium sensibus
incomprehensibilem esse naturae ipsius subtilitatem non ualentes
sentire; dum autem gradatim a solari corpore ad inferiora elementa
descendit paulatim incipit apparere, primum quidem in aethere
purissimo uix lucere inchoat quoniam ipsius aetheris natura ipsi
simillima est, progrediens uero longius ad superioris huius aeris partes
paulatim clarescit, ac deinde in quantum crassiores naturas penetrat
deorsum uersus in tantum lucidius elucet sensibusque corporeis
comprehensibilem se praestat. Verum ex ipso radio splendor

2 dualitatem RB: qualitatem P 3 non s.l. R 4-5 differentiam RB:
differentiae P 8 reperiamus B^cP: repperiamus R^c(C)B*: repperimus R*
intelligimus RB: intelligamus P 12 unius RBP^c: unus P* 13 lemma BP
14 procedens: -n s.l. R unus RB: una substantia P 15 sunt RB^cP: sit B*
16 abraam RB: abraham P 22 restant: n s.l. B debeamus BP: dibeamus R^c:
di*eamus R* 24 radium R^c(C)BP: radius R* 25 lemma BP (radio
B: ratio P): ex igne radium nasci. ex radio splendorem procedere quod est
optimum et ad superiora sufficiens et aptum sancte trinitatis misterium continens

Substances or Persons of that Essence.' For He is not confusing
the duality of the Persons when He says: 'I and the Father are one.'
For He does not say: 'I and the Father am,' but 'are one,' showing the
unity of the Essence as well as the difference of the Substances. And
if He were to say: 'I and the Father and the Spirit are one,' we should
understand this not otherwise than as the Trinity of the three Sub-
stances subsisting in the Unity of the same Essence, and although we
do not find this said, yet we understand that it is very true. For Father
and Son and Holy Spirit are one, and the one (is) three. For from the
Father the Son is begotten, and from (the same Father) the Spirit
is proceeding; and therefore when I hear from the preaching and
teaching of Holy Scripture that (God is) begetting and begotten and
proceeding, I understand, as much as it is granted me (to do so), three
Substances or Persons of one Essence. For it is impossible that
Begetter, Begotten, and Proceeding should be one, but natural
reason (503) suggests that they are three as substances while they are
one in essence. For Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob also are one in their
natural essentiality but three in their substantial difference (504); and
the seeker after truth will very easily find this example in all genera
and species and individuals (505).

A. Please reveal what you have conceived in your mind concerning
this present very difficult inquiry, lest we linger so long over the same
topics when we ought to be hurrying on to expound the others that
remain.

N. Tell (me), pray: Does it seem to you that the ray is born from
fire, and that brightness proceeds from the ray?

A. Anyone who says this is not deviating from a careful considera-
tion of the nature of things, as I think. For fire, although through
itself it is invisible, begets from itself a visible ray, which again would
be through itself invisible (while) subsisting in the simplicity of its
nature, if it did not mingle with corporeal and gross natures.

For the philosophers say that the sun's ray is incomprehensible
to the senses of animals, which cannot perceive the subtlety of its
nature; but as it gradually descends from the body of the sun to the
lower elements it begins little by little to manifest itself: first in
the ether, which is the purest, it (only) just begins to shine because the
ether's nature is very similar to itself; but as it proceeds further into
the parts of this upper air, little by little it becomes clear; and after
that, the grosser the natures it penetrates in its downward path the
more brightly does it shine and present itself to the comprehension
of the bodily senses. But from the ray itself is emitted a brightness

Rm splendorem R^c(C)BP: splendor R* 30 philosophi RP: phylosophi B
31 non ualentes s.l. B: lege non ualentibus 35 simillima RB^cP: simillama B*
37 lucidius RB^cP: lucilius B*

de una
essentia
et tribus
substantiis

de igne et
radio et
splendore

Concerning
the one
Essence and
the three
substances

32
Concerning
fire and ray
and bright-
ness

luculentissimus totum mundum implens et ex omnium corporum superficie resiliens diuersasque colorum species detegens emittitur. Ipse quoque naturali sua tenuitate corporales sensus effugeret si non se corporalioribus elementis temperaret.

N. Ita est et naturarum inquisitio non aliter fieri posse perdocet. 5
Numquid ergo cogimur ut ipsum splendorem qui per nascentem radium ab igne procedit duas causas habere dicamus? Quamuis enim ab igne per radium procedit ignis tamen solummodo causa ipsius est, non radius. Sicut enim ipse radius per se non subsisteret si de causa sua quae est ignis non nasceretur, ita splendor per radium non esset 608D
nisi prius ex ipsius radii causa procederet. Vides itaque nullam rationem 11
exigere ut splendor ex duabus causis procedat quamuis ex igne per radium manare intelligatur, uerum ex una eademque causa et radium nasci et splendorem procedere ac per hoc et splendorem ex igne radioque proce<de>re natura ipsa magistra non tacet. 15

Et adhuc uirtutem eiusdem exempli intentus perspice. Radius ipse 609A
ex igne nascens non ita nascitur ut gignentem se ignem deserat aut aliquo modo relinquat sed ita gignitur ut uirtus ignea quae eum gignit semper et ubique inseparabiliter et inmutabiliter in eo permaneat tota 20
in toto et totus in tota et unum duo et duo unum. Et quamuis uideatur splendor de radio exire non tamen ex ipso radio in quantum radius est sed ex ipsa uirtute procedit ex qua radius nascitur et quae tota et totum radium et totum splendorem penetrat atque implet.

Ac per hoc naturale exemplum ad causam omnium quae trina et una est quoniam trinitas in unitate et creditur et intelligitur esse 25
possumus ascendere ut cognoscamus patrem et filium et spiritum sanctum tres causas et unam causam—tres enim unum sunt—, patrem 609B
autem causam gignentem nascentis de se filii sui unigeniti qui causa est omnium primordialium causarum in se ipso [a patre] conditarum, eundem uero patrem causam procedentis a se <per filium> 30
sancti spiritus qui spiritus causa est diuisionis et multiplicationis distributionisque causarum omnium quae in filio a patre factae sunt in effectus suos et generales et speciales et proprios secundum naturam et gratiam. Et quamuis sanctum spiritum a patre per filium credamus 35
et intelligamus procedere non tamen duas causas eundem spiritum habere debemus accipere sed unam eandemque causam, patrem scilicet, et nascentis de se filii et procedentis ex se <per filium> spiritus

5 Ita RB^cP: Ista B* 6 cogimur RB: cogemur P 7-8 duas—procedit om. P 12 procedat RB: precedat P 13 manare RB^cP: manere B* 15 ipsa RB: ista P 16 post uirtutem rasura in B 22 ex (1) om. P 24 omnium quae RB^cP: omniumque B* 27 lemma BP 35 marginalia illegibilia recenti manu in P

of the utmost splendour which fills the whole world and which is reflected from the surface of all bodies and reveals the diverse species of the colours. This too, on account of its natural tenuousness, would elude the corporeal senses did it not mingle itself with more corporeal elements.

N. So it is, and an inquiry into natures teaches thoroughly that it cannot be otherwise. Must we then say that that brightness which proceeds from the fire through the nascent ray has two causes? For although it proceeds from the fire through the ray, yet the fire only is its cause, not the ray. For as the ray itself would not subsist through itself if it were not born of its cause, which is fire, so there would be no brightness through the ray if it did not first proceed from the cause of the ray. You see, then, that no reason requires that the brightness proceed from two causes, although it is understood to flow from the fire through the ray; but nature, our teacher, herself declares (506) that from one and the same cause both the ray is born and the brightness proceeds, and that therefore the brightness proceeds from the fire as well as from the ray (507).

And consider carefully the force of the same example yet further. The ray itself, born of fire, does not by being born depart from, or in any way abandon, the fire that begets it, but is begotten in such a way that the fiery force which begets it always and everywhere inseparably and immutably remains in it, whole in the whole (ray) and the whole (ray) in the whole (of it), and (they are) a one (that is) two and two (that are) one. And although the brightness seems to come out of the ray, yet it proceeds not from the ray itself as ray, but from that force out of which the ray is born and which wholly penetrates and fills both the whole of the ray and the whole of the brightness.

And by means of this natural example we can ascend to the Cause of all things which is trinal and one because it is believed and understood to be Trinity in Unity, so that we know that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are three Causes and one Cause—for the Three are One—; the Father (is) the begetting Cause of His only begotten Son born of Him, Who is the Cause of all the primordial causes which have been created in Him [by the Father]; but the Father (is) also the Cause of the Holy Spirit Who proceeds from Him <through the Son>; and the Spirit is the Cause of the diuision and multiplication and distribution of all the causes which have been made in the Son by the Father into their general and specific and individual effects by nature and by grace. And although we believe and understand that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father through the Son, we ought not to accept that the same Spirit has two causes, but one and the same Cause, namely the Father, both of the Son Who is born of Him and of the Holy Spirit Who proceeds from Him <through the

Concerning
the Trinal
and One
Cause

sancti. Vt enim propterea splendorem ex igne per radium procedere 609c
dicimus quoniam ignis ipse totus in toto radio subsistit ex quo per
radium splendor emittitur, ita et spiritum sanctum a patre per filium
procedere catholica fides praedicat quoniam ipse pater qui principalis
causa est et sola procesionis sancti spiritus totus in toto filio est sicut 5
et totus filius in toto patre ex quo patre per filium spiritus sanctus
procedit; et quemadmodum tota uirtus ignea in toto radio de se genito
permanet et ipse radius totus et tota uirtus ignea de qua gignitur in
toto splendore et totus splendor ex uirtute ignea per radium procedens
in toto ipso radio tota[que] ipsa uirtute ex qua procedit existit, ita 10
totus pater gignens in toto filio genito et totus filius genitus in toto
patre gignente et totus pater gignens et totus filius genitus in toto 609D
spiritu sancto a patre per filium procedente et totus spiritus sanctus
a patre per filium procedens in patre a quo procedit et filio per quem
procedit, et tres unum sunt per intellectam trinitatem in unitate. 15

Et hoc totum ipse filius homo factus et incarnatus apertissime
insinuat dicens: 'Ego in patre et pater in me,' ubi subintelligendum
reliquit ac si aperte diceret: Et sicut ego in patre et pater in me, ita 610A
[et] ego et pater in spiritu sancto sumus et spiritus sanctus in nobis
est quia nobis coessentialis et coequalis et tres unum sumus—tres 20
uidelicet substantialiter, essentialiter unum. Et uide quomodo ipse
filius spiritum sanctum ad solum patrem unicam quippe sui causam
refert dum dicit: 'Paraclytus autem spiritus sanctus quem mittit pater
'in nomine meo.' [Non enim dixit: 'Quem mitto in nomine meo,' sed:
'Quem mittit pater in nomine meo,' quanquam et alibi se ipsum 25
mittere spiritum dicat dum ait: 'Si ego exiero mittam eum ad uos.']
Missio eius processio eius est. Processio autem eius a patre <per
filium> solummodo est substantialiter, non localiter non temporaliter
uerumtamen in nomine filii quoniam spiritus patris et filii est. 610B

Item alibi ad discipulos ait: 'Non uos estis qui loquimini sed 30
'spiritus patris qui loquitur in uobis.' Item psalmista spiritum
sanctum a patre petit dicens: 'Et spiritum sanctum tuum ne auferas
'a me.' His et huiusmodi testimoniis sancta scriptura referta est.

A. Haec omnia plane et pleniter perspicio fideliterque accipio

17 Ioh. xiv. 10 23-24 Ioh. xiv. 26 26 Ioh. xvi. 7 30-31 Marc.
xiii. 11 32-33 Ps. li. 11

3 splendor emittitur *s.l.* R 5 procesionis RB: processionis P 6 patre (2)
om. P 17-18 ubi-me *om. P* 23 paraclytus R^cBP: paracletus R*
mittit RB: mittet P 26 ego exiero *codd.*: autem abiero *Vulg.* 27 processio
. . . processio BP: procesio . . . procesio R 27-28 a patre per filium *om. P*
29 uerumtamen B: ueruntamen R: uerum autem P 32 sanctum (2) *s.l.* B

Son). For as we say that the brightness proceeds from the fire
through the ray because the whole of the fire itself subsists in the
whole of the ray and from it through the ray the brightness is emitted,
so too the Catholic Faith teaches that the Holy Spirit proceeds from
the Father through the Son because the Father Himself Who is the
principal and sole Cause of the procession of the Holy Spirit is wholly
in the whole of the Son just as the Son also is wholly in the whole
of the Father, and from the Father through the Son the Holy Spirit
proceeds; and as the whole of the fiery force remains in the whole
of the ray which is begotten of it, and the whole of the ray itself and
the whole of the fiery force of which it is begotten exist in the whole
of the brightness, and the whole of the brightness, proceeding from
the fiery force through the ray, exists in the whole of the ray itself
[and] the whole of the force itself from which it proceeds, so the
whole of the Father Who begets (is) in the whole of the Begotten
Son, and the whole of the begotten Son is in the whole of the Father
Who begets, and the whole of the Father Who begets and the whole
of the begotten Son are in the whole of the Holy Spirit Who proceeds
from the Father through the Son, and the whole of the Holy Spirit
Who proceeds from the Father through the Son (is) in the Father from
Whom He proceeds and (in) the Son through Whom He proceeds,
and the Three are One through the Trinity understood in Unity.

And all this the Son himself made man and incarnate most clearly
shows when He says: 'I (am) in the Father and the Father in Me,'
where He leaves it to be understood, as though He were explicitly
saying: And as I (am) in the Father and the Father in Me, so [both]
I and the Father are in the Holy Spirit and the Holy Spirit is in Us
because He is co-essential and co-eternal with Us, and We Three (are)
One—that is, three substantially, essentially one. And see how the
Son Himself refers the Holy Spirit to the Father alone as His unique
Cause, where He says: 'But the Paraclete (508), the Holy Spirit Whom
the Father sends in My Name.' [For He did not say: 'Whom I send
in My Name' but 'Whom the Father sends in My Name', although
in another place He also says that He Himself sends the Spirit when
He says: 'If I go away I shall send Him to you.'] The sending of Him
is His procession. But His procession from the Father <through the
Son> is substantial only, not local, not temporal, but in the Name of
the Son because he is the Spirit of the Father and of the Son.

Again, in another place He says to His disciples: 'It is not you who
speak but the Spirit of the Father Who speaketh in you.' The Psalmist
also requests the Holy Spirit from the Father when he says: 'And
take not Thy Holy Spirit from me.' Holy Scripture is full of these
and similar evidences.

A. All these things I clearly and fully perceive and faithfully accept

quoniam omnino ueritati conueniunt ualdeque miror quomodo illa
 quaestio quae primum ueluti insolubilis nobis uidebatur tandem
 apertissimis rationibus exemplorum et testimoniorum argumentatione
 introducta soluta est et ad purum quod non facile sperabamus
 reuelata. Et ut mihi uidetur interioris nostrae naturae trinitatis
 similitudine hoc ipsum possumus approbare. Mens etenim et notitiam
 sui gignit et a se ipsa amor sui et notitiae suae procedit quo et ipsa
 et notitia sui coniunguntur. Et quamuis ipse amor ex mente per
 notitiam sui procedat non tamen ipsa notitia causa amoris est sed
 ipsa mens ex quo amor inchoat esse et antequam ad perfectam noti-
 tiam sui mens ipsa perueniat. Nam et mens amat se ipsam cognoscere
 priusquam cognitionem suam de se ipsa pariat ueluti prolem suam—
 non quod mens humana unquam se uel non nosset uel non amaret
dum haec tria unum sunt secundum naturam uel essentiam et unum
 tria secundum rationis considerationem—tria siquidem ratio con-
 siderat in una et simplici natura animae esse nosse amare, est enim
 mens et se ipsam nouit et amat se ipsam et sui notitiam—, sed quia
 merito praeuaricationis naturae humanae in primo homine accidit
 ut mens nesciat se ipsam nosse dum naturaliter se ipsam nouit et
 nesciat se ipsam amare dum naturaliter et se ipsam et notitiam sui
 amat; ac per hoc rationis uiribus nil aliud appetit nisi ut cognoscat
 qualiter et quantum se ipsam nouit et se ipsam et notitiam sui amat et
 dum hoc totum ad cognitionem et amorem creatoris sui conuertit
 perfectissima imago eius efficitur. Et hic est maximus ac paene solus
 gradus ad cognitionem ueritatis, id est humanam naturam se ipsam
 prius cognoscere et amare ac deinde totam cognitionem suam totumque
 amorem ad laudem creatoris et cognitionem et dilectionem referre. Si
 enim quod in se ipsa agitur nescit, quomodo ea quae supra se sunt
 nosse desiderat? Sed dum de hac quaestione tractamus alia mihi non
 spernenda ut opinor in mente superuenit.

N. Quae est illa?

A. Vtrum quemadmodum spiritum sanctum a patre per filium
 procedere credimus symbolum Romanae linguae sequentes, ita filium
 ex patre nasci per spiritum profiteri ualeamus quamuis hoc in ipso
 symbolo nec secundum Graecos nec secundum Latinos scriptum *non*
 reperiamus nec in diuina scriptura aperte promulgatum ut aestimo.

N. In ipsa ineffabili ac supernaturali diuinae bonitatis foecunditate

2 lemma item aliud trinitatis exemplum ad idem proficiens quod est quod nouit quod
 amat Rm 4 sperabamus RB: spectabamus P 9 notitiam: -ti- s.l. B
 10 quo (*lege* qua) amor RB: quattuor P et om. BP 11 se s.l. R 14 dum
 in ras. R(C) 18 praeuaricationis: -ua* s.l. R 19-20 se ipsam nouit-naturaliter
 om. BP 21 nil R^cBP: nihil R* nisi om. P 22 quantum RB^cP: quantum
 B* 24 et hic RB: hinc P 25 gradus RB^cP: gradualis B* id est s.l.
 R 26 totam RB: coram P totumque RB: totamque P 27 referre
 RB: referret P 28 nescit R^cBP: nescio R* sunt s.l. R 34 lemma BP:
 filium secundum carnem de spiritu sancto conceptum et natum Rm 35 non

because they altogether agree with the truth, and I am really astonished
 to see how that problem which at first seemed to us almost in-
 soluble has in the end been most evidently solved by arguments
 taken from examples and evidences, and so has been made clear,
 which we hardly hoped for. And, as it seems to me, we can prove the
 same thing from the analogy of the trinity within our nature. For the
 mind begets the knowledge of itself and from it proceeds the love of
 itself and of the knowledge of itself, by which itself and its knowledge
 of itself are united (509). And although the love itself proceeds from
 the mind through (the mind's) knowledge of itself, yet (it is) not the
 knowledge itself (which is) the cause of the love, but the mind itself,
 from which the love begins to be even before the mind itself arrives
 at perfect knowledge of itself. For the mind already loves to know
 itself before it brings forth from itself like an offspring the knowledge
 of itself—not that the human mind at any time did not know itself or
 love itself, for these three are one in nature or essence, and the one
 three as contemplated by reason—for the reason considers being,
 knowing, and loving as three in the one and simple nature of the
 soul; for mind is, and knows itself, and loves itself and its knowledge
 of itself—, but because as a penalty for the transgression of human
 nature in the first man it happens that the mind does not know that
 it knows itself although naturally it knows itself, and does not know
 that it loves itself although naturally it loves both itself and its know-
 ledge of itself; and therefore it seeks by the powers of reason nothing
 else but to learn in what way and how much it knows itself and loves
 itself and its knowledge of itself, and when this whole (510) is con-
 verted to the knowledge and love of its Creator, (then) the most per-
 fect image of Him is achieved. And this is the greatest and perhaps
 the only step towards knowledge of the truth, namely, that human
 nature should first know and love itself and then refer the whole of its
 knowledge of itself and the whole of its love of itself to the glory and
 knowledge and love (511) of its Creator. For if it does not know what
 is at work in itself, how can it desire to know the things that are
 above it? But while we have been debating this question, another has
 overtaken it in my mind, which I think I must not dismiss.

N. What is that?

A. Whether, as we believe, following the Creed in the Roman
 version, that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father through the
 Son, so we could profess that the Son is born of the Father through
 the Spirit, although we do *not* find this written in the Creed itself
 either according to the Greeks or according to the Latins, nor openly
 taught in Divine Scripture, as I think.

N. The Catholic Faith instructs us to confess that in the ineffable

R*(C)B: *erasum* R^c: om. P

37 foecunditate B^c: fecunditate RB*P

32
 The question
 whether, as
 the Holy
 Spirit pro-
 ceeds from
 the Father
 through the
 Son, so the
 Son is born
 of the Father
 through the
 Holy Spirit

qua ex corde, hoc est ex secretis sinibus, dei et patris filius nascitur et spiritus sanctus procedit eundem spiritum sanctum ex patre et filio uel ex patre per filium procedere fides catholica nos praecipit confiteri. Filium uero a patre per spiritum nasci nec in illo symbolo utriusque linguae nec in alia scriptura repperi et cur hoc nec per me ipsum [adhuc] quaesiui nec ab aliquo quaesitum et inuentum legi. Dum autem de inhumanatione filii dei, hoc est de incarnatione uerbi, et scriptura sancta et symbolum a sancta Niceae urbis Bithiniae synodo traditum et contra omnes haereses munitum consulitur manifestissime nobis aperitur ac sine ulla ambiguitate docetur quia uerbum de spiritu sancto est conceptum. Angelus quoque ad Mariam: 'Spiritus sanctus,' inquit, 'superueniet in te et uirtus altissimi obumbrabit tibi.' Idem ad Ioseph: 'Ioseph fili Dauid noli dimittere coniugem tuam. Quod enim in ea natum est de spiritu sancto est.' Ex his atque similibus testimoniis nonne credere et intelligere datur filium secundum carnem de spiritu sancto fuisse conceptum et natum? Itaque secundum foecunditatem diuinam spiritum sanctum a patre per filium procedere, secundum uero carnis assumptionem filium de spiritu sancto conceptum fuisse et natum non dubitamus. Quod enim in ea natum est de spiritu sancto natum est.

Sed et iuxta aliam theoriam filium de spiritu sancto et per spiritum sanctum concipi et nasci inuenies. Dum enim unusquisque fidelium baptismatis subit sacramentum quid aliud ibi peragitur nisi dei uerbi in eorum cordibus de spiritu sancto et per spiritum sanctum conceptio atque natiuitas? Cotidie igitur Christus in utero fidei ueluti castissimae matris uisceribus et concipitur et nascitur et nutritur.

Et fortassis ideo a Nicena synodo spiritus sanctus ex patre solummodo procedere traditur ne talis quaestio uentilaretur. Inquisitor siquidem sollicitus sanctae theologiae spiritum sanctum a patre per filium audiens procedere mox diuino studio admonitus quaerit et dicit: 'Si ergo spiritus sanctus a patre per filium procedit, cur non similiter filius a patre per spiritum nascitur? Si autem filius a patre per spiritum non nascitur, cur spiritus sanctus a patre per filium procedere dicitur? Nam quod de spiritu sancto catholice creditur cur non etiam de filio <similiter crederetur?>—nisi forte quis dixerit praedictarum naturalium similitudinum uirtutem considerans: 'Ab igne

11-13 Luc. i. 35 13-14 Matth. i. 20

4 confiteri RB: conficere P 6 lemma quod adscriptis ad p. 192, 2 hic repetit Rm aliquo R^c(C)BP: alio R* et om. P 7 inhumanatione RB^cP: in humana natione B* 8 bithiniae RB: bythiniae P 9 synodo in ras. R(C) munitum R^cBP: monitum R* 10 post quia rasura in R 12 inquit RB^cP: in quid B* 13-14 ad-sancto est desunt in R* 23 lemma BP 27 fortassis RB: fortassis P 28 uentilaretur R^cBP: uentiletur R* 32 si autem RB^cP: sin B* 35-p. 196, 6 similiter crederetur—non sunt idonea B(C)P: similiter non sunt crederetur R

and supernatural profusion of the Divine Goodness, by which the Son is born and the Holy Spirit proceeds from the heart, that is, from the secret recesses, of God the Father, the same Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son, or from the Father through the Son. But that the Son is born of the Father through the Spirit I have found neither in that Creed in either language nor in any other scripture; and why this (is so) I have never [until now] asked myself, nor read anyone who asked or answered it. But when Holy Scripture and the Creed (which was) delivered by the Holy Synod of Niceaea, the city of Bithynia, and safeguarded against all heresies, are consulted concerning the taking of human nature by God the Son, that is, concerning the Incarnation of the Word, it is most openly revealed to us and taught without any ambiguity that the Word was conceived from the Holy Spirit. Also the angel says to Mary: 'The Holy Spirit shall come upon thee and the Power of the Most High shall overshadow thee.' And to Joseph the same (angel) says: 'Joseph, son of David, do not put away thy wife. For that which is born in her is from the Holy Spirit.' From these and similar evidences are we not given to believe and understand that the Son was conceived and born in the flesh from the Holy Spirit? Therefore we do not doubt that in the divine profusion the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father through the Son, but in the taking on of flesh the Son was conceived and born from the Holy Spirit.

But you will find that according to another theory too the Son is conceived and born from the Holy Spirit and through the Holy Spirit. For when each of the faithful submits to the sacrament of baptism, what else is there performed but the conception and birth of the Word of God in their hearts from the Holy Spirit and through the Holy Spirit? Daily then is Christ conceived, born, and nourished in the womb of Faith as in the womb of a most chaste mother.

And perhaps the reason why it is declared (512) by the Nicene Synod that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father alone is to prevent public discussion of such a subject. For if a careful student of the holy word of God hears that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father through the Son his studies in divinity will soon prompt him to ask: 'If, then, the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father through the Son, why is it not equally true that the Son is born of the Father through the Spirit? But if the Son is not born of the Father through the Spirit, why should it be said that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father through the Son? For why should that which as Catholics we believe of the Holy Spirit not be <believed likewise> of the Son?'—unless, perhaps, bearing in mind the force of the analogies from nature which were mentioned above, one should say: 'We see that

Concerning baptism

'per radium splendorem procedere uidemus, non autem ab igne per
'splendorem radium nasci. Similiter ab animo per rationem sensum
'interiorem mitti, non autem per ipsum sensum rationem ab animo
'gigni naturalis theoriae edocet ordo.' Sed de diuinarum substan- 612B
tiarum generatione et processione suadenda seu affirmanda fortassis 5
exempla naturae non sunt idonea—), ac per hoc quod in sancto
symbolo secundum Grecos canitur hac quaestione liberum omnino
est atque absolutum. Dicit enim filium EK TOY ΠΑΤΡΟΣ ΓΕΝΕ-
ΘΕΝΤΑ, hoc est ex patre genitum, spiritum uero EK TOY ΠΑΤΡΟΣ
ΠΟΡΕΥΟΜΕΝΟΝ, id est ex patre procedentem. Sed si quis sanctos 10
patres qui in latino symbolo addiderunt de spiritu: 'Qui ex patre
'filioque procedit,' consuleret rationabiliter ut credo responderent
et causam ipsius additionis non tacerent. Et fortassis consulti
sunt et responderunt, sed quid eis uisum est de hac re nondum in
manus nostras peruenit atque ideo de huiusmodi quaestione nil temere 612C
conamur diffinire nisi forte quis dicat: 'Non inmerito hoc additum 16
'est quoniam multis sanctae scripturae locis approbatur. Nam et ipse
'dominus dicit: "Quem pater mittit in nomine meo." Videtur enim
'filius mittere spiritum quem pater mittit in nomine eius. Ipse
'quoque filius spiritum ueritatis spiritum sanctum uocat. Filius autem 20
'ueritas est, ipso testante, "Ego sum uia et ueritas et uita." Si ergo
'spiritus ueritatis est profecto spiritus sanctus spiritus filii est.
'[Mulierem quoque ΑΙΜΟΡΡΟΥΣΑΜ, hoc est fluxum sanguinis
'patientem, sanans, "Sensi", inquit, "exisse de me uirtutem," et
'quod paulo ante diximus: "Si ergo abiero mittam eum ad uos."] 25
'Item apostolus: "Misit deus spiritum filii in corda nostra in quo
'clamamusa bba pater." Item psalmista: "Verbo domini caeli firmati sunt 612D
'et spiritu oris eius omnis uirtus eorum." His itaque atque huiusmodi
'testimoniis quis catholicorum non possit approbare spiritum sanc-
'tum a patre et filio procedere?' 30

A. De hac quaestione non nimium haesito. Quoquo enim modo quis
ecclesiasticum symbolum pronuntiauerit sine naufragio sanae fidei
recipio, hoc est siue spiritum sanctum a patre solummodo procedere
dixerit siue a patre et filio, salua illa ratione qua et credimus et intelli- 613A
gimus eundem spiritum ex una causa, id est ex patre substantialiter 35
procedere. Est enim pater causa nascentis de se filii et procedentis ex

18 Ioh. xiv. 26 21 Ioh. xiv. 6 23-24 mulierem-uirtutem = p. 96, 24-26
24 Luc. viii. 46 25 Ioh. xvi. 7 26-27 Gal. iv. 6 27-28 Ps.
xxxii. 6

7 symbolo RB: synodo P 9 ΠΑΤΡΟΣ: A s.l. R 12 consuleret RB:
consulerat P 13 fortassis RB: fortassis P 14 eis RB: ei P 15 lemma P
20 lemma Item aliud Rm 24 inquit RP: in quid B 26 misit RB:P: misit B*
30 et in ras. R(C) 32 lemma utrum ex una atque communi essentia et natura
trium personarum an ex propria persona patris nascitur filius procedit spiritus sanctus
Rm sanae BP: sane R

the brightness proceeds from the fire through the ray, but not that
the ray is born of the fire through the brightness. Similarly the natural
order of contemplation teaches that the interior sense is sent forth
from the mind through the reason, but not that the reason is begotten
by the mind through that sense.' But it may be that examples from
nature do not supply adequate doctrine and affirmation concerning
the generation and procession of the Divine Substances—). And
for this reason (513) that which is recited in the Creed according to
the Greeks is entirely unaffected by this problem and unconnected
with it. For it says that the Son is ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς γεννηθέντα, that
is, 'begotten of the Father', but that the Spirit is ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς
πορευόμενον, that is, 'proceeding from the Father'.

But should one consult the Holy Fathers who in the Latin Creed
have added concerning the Spirit (514): 'Qui ex patre filioque
procedit', they would give a reasonable reply, as I believe, and would
not be silent concerning the cause of that addition. And perhaps they
have been consulted and have given their reply, but their opinion on
the matter has not yet come into our hands, and therefore we make no
rash definition about this kind of question, unless perhaps (515) some-
one should say: 'Not without reason was this addition made, for it is
'supported by many passages of Holy Scripture. For the Lord Him-
'self says: "Whom the Father sends in My name." For it is apparent
'that whom the Father sends in the Son's Name the Son sends. And
'the Son Himself also calls the Holy Spirit the Spirit of Truth. The
'Truth, however, is the Son, as He Himself testifies: "I am the Way
'and the Truth and the Life." If then the Holy Spirit is the Spirit of
'Truth, it follows that He is the Spirit of the Son. [Also when He is
'healing the αἱμορροῦσα, that is, the woman afflicted with an issue of
'blood, He says: "I perceived power go out of Me;" and that which
'we quoted a little earlier (516): "If I go away I shall send Him to
'you."] Also the Apostle (says): "God sent the Spirit of His Son into
'our hearts, in Whom we cry Abba Father." Also the Psalmist (says):
'By the Word of God the heavens were established, and all the virtue of
'them by the Spirit of His mouth." Who among Catholics would not
'be able to prove from these and similar evidences that the Holy
'Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son?' Concerning the proces-
sion of the Holy Spirit from the Son

A. I am not too preoccupied with this question. For in whichever
way one recites the Church's Creed I accept it without endangering 34
sound faith: that is, whether one should say that the Holy Spirit
proceeds from the Father alone or from the Father and the Son,
provided that we both believe and understand that the same Spirit
proceeds substantially from one Cause, that is, from the Father. For
the Father is the Cause of the Son Who is born of Him and of the
Spirit Who proceeds from Him. But I should still like to ask you

se spiritus. Sed adhuc uelim a te quaerere ex essentiane patris an substantia et filius natus et spiritus sanctus procedens.

N. De hoc ambiguo facile purgaberis si prius pure cognoscas quid sit inter essentiam et substantias diuinae bonitatis.

A. De differentia diuinae essentiae atque substantiarum docuit me 5
 theologia ex sanctis patribus utriusque linguae, graecae uidelicet atque 10
 latinae, tradita. Sanctus quidem Dionysius Ariopagita et Gregorius 15
 theologus eorumque elegantissimus expositor Maximus differentiam
 esse dicunt inter oysian, id est essentiam, et ΥΠΟΤΑΞΙΝ, id est 613B
 substantiam, ΟΥΚΙΑΝ quidem intelligentes unicam illam ac sim- 10
 plicem diuinae bonitatis naturam, ΥΠΟΤΑΞΙΝ uero singularum
 personarum propriam et indiuiduam substantiam. Dicunt enim
 ΜΙΑΝ ΟΥΚΙΑΝ ΕΝ ΤΡΙΧΙΝ ΥΠΟΤΑΞΙΝ, hoc est unam 15
 essentiam in tribus substantiis. Sanctus quoque Augustinus caeteri-
 que sancti patres latialiter scribentes fidem sanctae trinitatis ex- 15
 primunt dicentes unam substantiam in tribus personis, significantes
 unitatem diuinae naturae eo nomine quod est substantia, trinam uero
 substantiarum proprietatem trium personarum uocabulis, quod etiam
 moderni Graecorum recipiunt; dicunt enim ΜΙΑΝ ΥΠΟΤΑΞΙΝ,
 id est unam substantiam, et τρία ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ, id est tres personas. 20
 Vna eademque fides est in omnibus quamuis significationum diuer- 613C
 sitas uideatur. Itaque secundum Grecos dicimus: Vna eademque est
 ΟΥΚΙΑ patris et filii et spiritus sancti sed non una eademque est
 ΥΠΟΤΑΞΙΣ. Habet enim pater suam propriam ΥΠΟΤΑΞΙΝ quae
 neque filii neque spiritus sancti est sed solius patris. Similiter 25
 filius suam propriam ΥΠΟΤΑΞΙΝ quae neque patris neque
 spiritus sancti est sed solius filii. Eodem modo de sancto spiritu
 dicendum propriam ΥΠΟΤΑΞΙΝ habere quae neque patris est
 neque filii sed solius spiritus sancti. Neque aliud praeter hoc latina
 uox edocet tres personas in una substantia pronuntians. Subsistit ergo 30
 pater per se, subsistit filius, subsistit spiritus sanctus, et tres sub-
 stantiae in una essentia subsistunt quoniam tres unum sunt.

N. Inter orthodoxae fidei participes hanc fidem computandam 613D
 arbitror. Iam igitur luculenter potes dinoscere propositam quae- 35
 stionem. Dixisti enim te dubitare ex essentiane an ex substantia patris
 et natus filius et procedens spiritus sanctus ac si aperte diceres utrum

7 Dionysius: cf. DN i. 4, PG iii. 592A 7-8 Gregorius-Maximus: cf. Max. Conf., I Ambig., lxix, PG xci. 1260C-1261A 12-14 Dicunt-substantiis: cf. Aug. de trin. v. 8, 10 35-36 cf. ll. 1-2 supra

7 dionysius R: dyonysius B: dionysius P 9 lemma B oysian RB: ΟΥΚΙΑΝ P
 10 quidem RB^cP: quid est B* 13 ΟΥΚΙΑΝ RBP^c: ΟΙΚΙΑΝ P* 17 trinam
 RB^cP: triunam B* 19 ΥΠΟΤΑΞΙΝ B^c(C)P: ΟΥΚΙΑΝ RB* 20 post
 est (1) erasim est una in B tria RB^cP: triam B* ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ RB: ΠΡΟΣΟΠΑ P
 22 est om. B* 27 spiritus sancti BP: sancti spiritus R solius RB^cP: solus B*
 30 subsistit RB: substat P 31 subsistit (1) RB: substat P subsistit (2) s.l.

whether it is from the Essence or from the Substance of the Father that the Son is born and the Holy Spirit proceeds.

N. You will easily be released from doubt about this once you clearly know the difference between the Essence and the Substances of the Divine Goodness.

A. Concerning the difference between the Divine Essence and the Substances the divine word handed down from the Holy Fathers of both tongues, that is, the Greek and the Latin, has instructed me. St. Dionysius the Areopagite and Gregory the Theologian and their most subtle commentator Maximus say that there is a difference between οὐσία, that is, essence, and ὑπόστασις, that is, substance; understanding by οὐσία that one and simple Nature of the Divine Goodness, and by ὑπόστασις the proper and individual Substance of each of the Persons. For they say: *μίαν οὐσίαν ἐν τρισὶν ὑποστάσεσιν*, that is, One Essence in Three Substances. Also St. Augustine (517) and the other Holy Fathers who write in Latin expound their belief in the Holy Trinity by saying: One Substance in Three Persons, indicating the Unity of the Divine Nature by the name of Substance, and the threefold property of the Substances by the names of three Persons; and this is accepted by the modern writers among the Greeks too; for they say: *μίαν ὑπόστασιν*, that is, One Substance, and three *πρόσωπα*, that is, Three Persons. For all believe the same thing even if they express it in different terms. So, following the Greeks we say: The οὐσία of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit is one and the same, but the ὑπόστασις is not one and the same. For the Father has His own proper ὑπόστασις which belongs neither to the Son nor to the Holy Spirit but to the Father alone. Likewise the Son (has) His own ὑπόστασις which belongs neither to the Father nor to the Holy Spirit but to the Son alone. And of the Holy Spirit in the same way it must be said that He has His proper ὑπόστασις which belongs neither to the Father nor to the Son but to the Holy Spirit alone. And the teaching of the Latin version is no different from this when it declares that there are Three Persons in One Substance. Therefore the Father subsists through Himself and the Son subsists (through Himself) and the Holy Spirit subsists (through Himself); and the Three Substances subsist in One Essence, because the Three are One.

N. I think that this is to be counted among the beliefs of those who share the orthodox Faith. So now you can plainly see the answer to the question you have asked. For you said that you were uncertain whether it was from the Essence or the Substance of the Father that the Son is born and the Holy Spirit proceeds, as though you had

RB: substat P 32 subsistunt RB: substant P 33 orthodoxae BP:
 orthodoxae R 34 lemma BP 35 essentiane RB^cP: essentia ne B*

The difference between Essence and Substance

Whether it is from the Essence or the Substance of the

quid inter essentiam an substantiam

utrum ex essentia an substantia patris filius

nascitur et procedit spiritus sanctus ex una atque communi essentia uel natura trium substantiarum uel personarum nascitur filius et procedit spiritus sanctus an ex propria substantia patris uel persona. Essentia siquidem diuinae bonitatis neque propria substantia est patris neque filii neque spiritus sancti sed una atque communis substantiarum trium natura, pater autem suam propriam habet substantiam, similiter et filius, similiter et spiritus sanctus suas possident substantias. 614A

Si igitur diuina essentia quia una est atque eadem neque pater est neque filius neque spiritus sanctus sed communis eorum natura, sequitur non ab ea nasci filium neque spiritum sanctum procedere. Nam si ex ea filius nascitur non ex patre nascitur; ipsa enim, ut diximus, pater non est. Similiter si ex eadem spiritus sanctus procedit non ex patre procedit. Si autem catholica fides firmissime atque sanissime et credit et docet filium ex patre natum, spiritum uero sanctum ex eodem patre procedentem, nonne consequens est ut credamus et intelligamus ex substantia patris et nasci filium et procedere spiritum sanctum? Non igitur ex essentia sed ex substantia patris et filius nascitur et spiritus sanctus procedit. Nam et apud homines non dicimus ex communi natura sed ex propria natura filios nasci. Propriam autem naturam dico uniuscuiusque personae indiuiduam substantiam. Nam si ex communi natura homines nascerentur nullus pater proprium filium sicut nullus filius proprium patrem possideret. 614B

Sed haec altius ac uerius cogitantur quam sermone proferuntur et altius ac uerius intelliguntur quam cogitantur, altius autem ac uerius sunt quam intelliguntur; omnem siquidem intellectum superant. Nam quaecunque de simplicissimae bonitatis trinitate dicuntur seu cogitantur seu intelliguntur uestigia quaedam sunt atque theophaniae ueritatis, non autem ipsa ueritas quae superat omnem theoriam non solum rationalis uerum etiam intellectualis creaturae. Neque enim talis unitas est seu trinitas qualis ab ulla creatura potest excogitari seu intelligi seu aliqua fantasia quamuis lucidissima et uerisimillima formari—haec enim omnia fallunt dum in eis finis contemplationis ponitur—siquidem plus quam unitas est et plus quam trinitas. Iubemur tamen aliquid de ea dicere et cogitare et intelligere quantum intellectus eam adtingit sancta theologia duce atque magistra ut quodam modo materiam habeamus laudandi eam atque benedicendi. 614C

Nam et summos angelos proximasque ei uirtutes ueluti pedes et

38-p. 202, 1 Is. vi. 2

3 diuinae R^cBP: diuina R* 16 credamus RB^cP: aedamus B* 16-18 et nasci-patris om. P 20 lemma intellectus sancte trinitatis omnem superat intellectum unde proxime ei uirtutes pedes et facies alis suis dicuntur uelare Rm 24-25 et altius-intelliguntur om. P 25 cogitantur R^cBP: cogitanturque R* 27 trinitate R^cBP: trinitata R* 29 theoriam: -i- s.l. B 32 fantasia B: phantasia RP 34-35 iubemur RB: habens P 37 habeamus RB^cP: habemus B*

openly asked whether it is from the one and common Essence or Nature of the Three Substances or Persons that the Son is born and the Holy Spirit proceeds, or from the proper Substance or Person of the Father. For the Essence of the Divine Goodness is neither the proper Substance of the Father nor of the Son nor of the Holy Spirit, but is the one and common Nature of the Three Substances; while the Father has His own proper Substance, as likewise the Son also and likewise the Holy Spirit possess their proper Substances.

If then the Divine Essence, which is one and the same, is neither the Father nor the Son nor the Holy Spirit, but is the Nature which They have in common, it follows that it is not from that (Nature) that the Son is born or the Holy Spirit proceeds. For if the Son is born of that (Nature), He is not born of the Father; for, as we have said, it is not the Father. Similarly, if the Holy Spirit proceeds from that same (Nature), He does not proceed from the Father. But if the Catholic Faith most firmly and most wholesomely both believes and teaches that the Son is born of the Father while the Holy Spirit proceeds from the same Father, does it not follow that we should believe and understand that it is from the Substance of the Father that both the Son is born and the Holy Spirit proceeds? Therefore it is not from the Essence but from the Substance of the Father that both the Son is born and the Holy Spirit proceeds. For even in the case of human beings we do not say that sons are born from their common nature but each from his proper nature. Now, by the proper nature of each I mean the individual substance of each person. For if men were born of their common nature no father would have his own son and no son would have his own father.

But these are things which are contemplated at a deeper and truer level than they are expressed in speech, and understood more deeply and more truly than they are contemplated, and are deeper and truer than they are understood to be; for they pass all understanding. For whatever things are said or contemplated or understood of the Holy Trinity of the most simple Goodness are but traces and theophanies of the Truth, not the Truth itself, which surpasses all contemplation not only of the rational but also of the intellectual creature. For it is not that kind of unity or trinity which can be thought of or understood from any creature, or be shaped by any fantasy however clear and close to the truth it may be—for all these things deceive as long as this is made the end of our contemplation—, because it is more than unity and more than trinity. But we are charged to say something of it and to contemplate it and to understand it as far as, under the guidance and tutelage of the holy word of God, our intellect may approach it, so that we may somehow have matter for our praise and benediction of it.

For the holy word of God affirms that even the highest angels

Father that the Son is born and the Holy Spirit proceeds

facies alis suis uelare sancta confirmat theologia, nobis insinuans
 caelestes uirtutes summae trinitati atque unitati semper et immuta-
 biliter adhaerentes timere ea quae supra se sunt ac reuerenter con-
 templari. Alae siquidem earum theoriae sunt quibus pedes suos
 uelare formantur et facies, timentes intueri quomodo sancta trinitas
 et inseparabilis unitas a summo usque deorsum per omnia defunditur
 et quomodo omnem superat intellectum et ab omni creatura uisibili et
 inuisibili in infinitam naturae suae altitudinem remota. Verum-
 tamen et homines puri et angeli semper et incessanter eam conspiciere
 appetunt quod contemplari per se ipsum nequeunt et hoc per medi-
 arum alarum uolatum significatur. Hinc scriptura dicit: 'In quem
 concupiscunt angeli perspicere.'

Est enim infinitum quod quaerunt et incomprehensibile quod
 appetunt et super omnem intellectum quod concupiscunt et ab omni
 creatura exaltatum. Attamen ad hoc summa atque diuina unitas mouet
 se ipsam in intellectibus angelicis seu humanis ut de ea materiam
 laudis suae et intelligentiae suae quantum creaturae conceditur in-
 ueniant trinitatem in unitate percipientes, sicut ait sanctus theologus
 Gregorius in primo sermone De Filio. 'Propterea,' inquit, 'monas a
 principio in dyada mota usque triada stat,' quam sententiam beatus
 Maximus exponit dicens: 'Mouetur namque in acceptiuo sui intellectu
 siue angelico siue humano per ipsam et in ipsa inquisitiones de ipsa
 faciente et, clarius dicendum, docet ipsam in prima acie impartite
 de monade rationem ut non separatio in primo causali introducatur.
 Promouet uero ipsam' rationem 'etiam diuinam et ineffabilem ipsius
 causalis foecunditatem accipere, dicens mystice atque occulte ipsi
 intellectui 'non oportere infoecundum esse unquam sapere illud opti-
 mum uerbi ac sapientiae uel sanctificatiuae uirtutis coessentiarumque
 in substantiis, non ut compositum ex his suscipiatur diuinum quasi
 accidentibus et non in eis subsistens . . . credatur. Mouere itaque
 diuinitas dicitur causa quippe est per quem modum subsistit in-
 quisionis. Nam sine illuminatione intueri deitatem impossibilium est.
 Item dicitur moueri per manifestationem particulariter perfectioris
 de ipsa rationis secundum sanctam scripturam ab inchoante patrem

11-12 1 Pet. 1 12 (CTr, Patres) 19-20 Greg. Naz., *Orat.* xxix. 2, PG xxxvi.
 76B ap. Max. Conf., *I Ambig.* xix, PG xci. 1257C 6-8 19-p. 204, 4 Max. Conf.,
loc. cit., 1260C 14-1261A 10

1 uelare RB: uolare P confirmat B^c: conformat RB^{*}: conforme P 3 reuerenter
 RP: reuertenter B 4 earum om. P 5 formantur: fortasse legendum firman-
 tur, cf. confirmat l. 1 supra 9 eam s.l. R 16 in om. P 19-20 monas-
 stat in ras. alia manus scripsit in P 19 monas: -s s.l. P 20 usque RP:
 usquae B 21 mouetur RB: mouet P acceptiuo sui RB: acceptiuos in P
 22 inquisitiones RB^cP: inquisitione B^{*} 23 impartite RB^cP: imparte R^{*}
 24 primo RB: prima P 25 promouet uero RB^cP: primo uetere B^{*} 26 foe-
 cunditatem RB^c: fecunditatem B^{*}P occulte RB: occultae P 27 infoecundum

and the powers that are nearest to it veil, as it were, with their wings
 their feet and their faces, thereby telling us that the heavenly powers
 which are eternally and immutably in the presence of the most high
 Trinity and Unity fear the things that are above them and contem-
 plate them with reverence. For their wings are the contemplations
 by which they are represented (?) to veil their feet and their faces,
 fearing to behold the manner in which the Holy Trinity and Indi-
 visible Unity is poured down through all things from the highest to
 the lowest, and how it passes all understanding, and is removed from
 every creature, whether visible or invisible, into the infinite heights
 of its Nature. And yet purified human beings as well as angels are
 always and incessantly seeking to behold it, a thing which in itself
 (518) they cannot contemplate, and it is this which is signified by the
 flight of the medial wings (519). This is why Scripture says: 'Upon
 Whom the angels desire to gaze.'

For that which they seek to know is infinite, and that which they
 seek to grasp is incomprehensible, and that which they desire passes
 all understanding and transcends every creature (520). But to this
 end the most high and divine Unity moves in intellects whether
 angelic or human: that they may find matter for praise of it and such
 understanding of it as is permitted to the creature, beholding the
 Trinity in Unity, as St. Gregory the Theologian says in his first
 discourse On the Son. 'Wherefore,' he says, 'the Monad, after moving
 from the beginning into the Dyad, comes to rest in the Triad,' a
 passage which the blessed Maximus expounds as follows: 'For He
 moves in the mind, whether angelic or human, which receives Him
 and, through Him and in Him (521), makes inquiries (522) about
 Him, and, to put it more clearly, He teaches it (523) as undivided (524)
 at the first encounter (525) the monadic principle (526) that no differ-
 ence should be admitted into the First Cause, He then leads' the
 reason (527) on to receive in addition the divine and ineffable fertility
 (528) of that Cause, saying in a mystic and hidden way that it' (i.e.,)
 the intellect, 'must never suppose that the Good (529) is infertile
 (530) of the Word and Wisdom (531) or of the sanctifying Power (532),
 and of co-essences in substances (533)—but not so as to understand
 that the Divine is a composite of these, as if they were its accidents,
 and to believe that it did not subsist (534) in them (535). The Divinity
 is therefore said to move as being the Cause of the inquiry into the
 mode of its existence. For without illumination (536) sight of the
 Divinity (537) is one of the impossible things (538). Again, it is said
 also to move through the partial revelation of the more perfect under-
 standing of it in Holy Scripture, beginning from the confession of the

RB: infecundum P 28 coessentiarumque RB^c: coessentiarum quae B^{*}: co-
 essentiaequae P 31 quippe in ras. R(C) 33 perfectioris RB^cP: perfectiori B^{*}

confiteri et promouente in confitendum cum patre filium et cum
'patre et filio spiritum sanctum accipiendum et coadorare eruditus
'pulsante trinitatem perfectam in unitate perfecta, id est unam essen-
'tiam et deitatem et potentiam et operationem in tribus substantiis.'

His itaque de summa omnium causa causarum secundum parui-
tatem nostrae intentionis quoquo modo sint inuestigatis, non autem
temere diffinitis, ad primordiales causas circa quas nostra disputatio
uersatur redeundum.

A. Redeundum sane. Sat nam de his est actum.

repetitio
primordia-
lium
causarum
N. Causae itaque primordiales sunt [—quod et in praecedentibus
dixeram—] quas Graeci ΙΔΕΑC uocant, hoc est species uel formas
aeternas et incommutabiles rationes secundum quas et in quibus
uisibilis et inuisibilis mundus formatur et regitur, ideoque a Gre-
corum sapientibus ΠΡΟΤΟΤΥΠΑ appellari meruerunt, hoc est
principalia exempla quae pater in filio fecit et per spiritum sanctum
in effectus suos diuidit atque multiplicat. ΠΡΟΟΡΙCΜΑΤΑ quoque
uocantur, id est praedestinationes. In ipsis enim quaecumque diuina
prouidentia et fiunt et facta sunt et futura sunt simul et semel et
incommutabiliter praedestinata sunt. Nil enim naturaliter in creatura
uisibili et inuisibili oritur praeter quod in eis ante omnia tempora et
loca praediffinitum et praeordinatum est. Item a filosofis ΘΕΙΑ
ΘΕΛΗΜΑΤΑ, id est diuinae uoluntates, *nominari solent* quoniam omnia
quaecumque uoluit deus facere in ipsis primordialiter et causaliter
fecit et quae futura sunt in eis ante saecula facta sunt, ac per hoc
principia omnium dicuntur esse quoniam omnia quaecumque in
creatura siue uisibili siue inuisibili sentiuntur uel intelliguntur eorum
participatione subsistunt, ipsa uero unius uniuersorum causae, sum-
mae uidelicet ac sanctae trinitatis, *participationes sunt* atque ideo per
se dicuntur esse quia nulla creatura inter ipsa et unam omnium causam
interposita est et in ipsa dum immutabiliter subsistunt primordiales
causae aliarum causarum sequentium se [sunt] usque ad extremos
totius naturae et in infinitum multiplicatae terminos—in infinitum
dico non creatori sed creaturae; finis enim multiplicationis creatur-
arum soli creatori cognitus est <quia ipse et non alius est>.

10-11 cf. p. 14, 15 supra 11-22 cf. p. 14, 9-15 supra 16-22 cf. p. 212, 1-5
infra 22 cf. Ps.-Dionys., DN v. 8, PG iii. 824c 13; Max. Conf., I Ambig., iii,
PG xci. 1085A 8-9

10 lemma BP: conclusio de primordialibus causis que etiam idee quippe (?) sum-
mae cause .i. sancte trinitatis participationes sunt Rm 12 aeternas P: aeternae
RB 14-16 ΠΡΟΤΟΤΥΠΑ—multiplicat om. B* 14 ΠΡΟΤΟΤΥΠΑ RB:
ΠΡΟΤΥΝ P 16 post quoque *erasum est* uocant in R 17 praedestinationes
RB: praedestinationes P ipsis RB: his P 19 nil RB*P: nihil B* naturaliter
RB*P: natura**liter B* 21 a filosofis in ras. R(C) filosofis R: phylosophis
B: filosofis P 21-22 ΘΕΙΑ ΘΕΛΗΜΑΤΑ: -ΕΙΑ ΘΕΛΗΜΑΤΑ in ras. B

'Father, and moving on to the recognition of the Son with the Father,
'and to the acceptance of the Holy Spirit together with the Father and
'the Son, and compelling the instructed to the joint adoration of
'perfect Trinity in perfect Unity, that is to say, One Essence and
'Divinity and Power and Operation in Three Substances.'

Having therefore, as far as the feebleness of our thought will allow,
in a measure investigated, though not rashly defined, the most high
Cause of all causes, we must return to the primordial causes with
which our discourse is concerned.

A. Certainly we must. For we have dealt sufficiently with these
matters.

N. The primordial causes, then [—as I had also said in what went
before—] are what the Greeks call *ιδέαι*, that is, the eternal species
or forms (539) and immutable reasons after which and in which the
visible and invisible world is formed and governed; and therefore
they were appropriately named by the wise men of the Greeks
πρωτότυπα, that is, the principal exemplars which the Father made
in the Son and divides and multiplies into their effects through the
Holy Spirit.

They are also called *προορίσματα* (540), that is, predestinations.
For in them whatever is being and has been and shall be made by
Divine Providence (541) is at one and the same time and immutably
predestined. For nothing naturally arises in the visible and invisible
creation except what is predefined and pre-ordained in them before
all times and places. *They are also customarily called by the philosophers*
θεϊα θελήματα (542), that is, divine volitions, because everything
that God wished to make He made in them primordialiter and causaliter;
and the things that are to be have been made in them before the ages,
and therefore they are said to be the principles of all things because
all things whatsoever that are perceived or understood whether in
the visible or in the invisible creation (543) subsist by participation
in them, while they themselves *are participations* of the one Cause of
all things, namely, the most high and holy Trinity; and they are said
to be through themselves for the reason that no creature is interposed
between them and the one Cause of all things; and while they subsist
immutably in it they [are] the primordial causes of other causes
which come after them, to the uttermost bounds of the whole of
nature, even multiplied to infinity—to infinity, I mean, not in
relation to the Creator, but to the creature; for the limit of the
multiplication of creatures is known only to their Creator <because
He Himself and none other is (544)>.

22 nominari solent in ras. R(C) 23 ipsis RB: ipsum P 28 ac RB: et P
participationes sunt: -ationes sunt in ras. R(C) 33-34 creaturarum RB:
creaturarum P

Sunt igitur primordiales causae quas rerum omnium principia 616c
 diuini sapientes appellant per-se-ipsam bonitas per-se-ipsam essentia
 per-se-ipsam uita per-se-ipsam sapientia per-se-ipsam ueritas
 per-se-ipsam intellectus per-se-ipsam ratio per-se-ipsam uirtus per-
 se-ipsam iustitia per-se-ipsam salus per-se-ipsam magnitudo per-
 se-ipsam omnipotentia per-se-ipsam aeternitas per-se-ipsam pax et
 omnes uirtutes et rationes quas semel et simul pater fecit in filio et
 secundum quas ordo omnium rerum a summo usque deorsum textitur,
 hoc est ab intellectuali creatura quae deo post deum proxima est usque
 ad extremum rerum omnium ordinem quo corpora continentur. 10
 Quaecumque enim bona sunt participatione per-se-boni bona sunt
 et quaecumque essentialiter et substantialiter subsistunt participatione
 ipsius per-se-ipsam essentiae subsistunt, quaecumque uiuunt parti-
 cipatione per-se-ipsam uitae uitam possident, similiter quaecumque
 sapiunt et intelligunt et rationalia sunt participatione per-se-ipsam
 sapientiae et per-se-ipsam intelligentiae et per-se-ipsam rationis
 participatione sapiunt et intelligunt et ratiocinantur. Eodem modo de
 caeteris dicendum. Nulla siquidem uirtus siue generalis siue specialis
 in natura rerum inuenitur quae a primordialibus causis ineffabili 617A
 participatione non procedat. Sed ne quis aestimet quae de prim-
 ordialibus causis diximus nullius auctoritatis munimine fulciri
 quaedam ex libro sancti patris Dionysii De Diuinis Nominibus huic
 operi inserere non incongruum duximus. 20

A. Nil aptius nil ueris rationibus conuenientius subiungitur quam
 sanctorum patrum inconcusa probabilisque auctoritas. 25

N. Ait ergo in undecimo praedicti sui libri capitulo: 'Quid autem
 'omnino, inquis, quod per-se-ipsam esse dictum est aut per-se-ipsam
 'uita aut quaecumque absolute et principaliter esse . . . exposuimus?
 'Hoc dicimus: Non est prauum sed rectum et simplicem declaratio-
 'nem habet. Non enim essentiam quandam diuinam uel angelicam esse
 'dicimus per-se-ipsam existendo existendi . . . quae sunt causam— 30
 'solummodo enim existendi omnia quae sunt et' <subsistendi> 'ipsum
 'esse superessentiale principium et essentiae causale—neque uitae
 'parentem aliam deitatem praeter superdiuinam omnium quaecum-
 'que uiuunt et editae uitae causam uitam . . . sed per-se-ipsam esse 35
 'et per-se-ipsam uitam et per-se-ipsam deitatem dicimus, principaliter

26-p. 208, 20 Ps.-Dionys., DN xi. 6, PG iii. 953c 8-956b 10

3 ipsam (2) s.l. B 4 ipsum R^cBP: ipsam R* 13-14 quaecumque—possident
 om. B* 15 rationalia RB: rationabilia P 15-16 per se ipsam sapientiae
 in ras. B 19-21 ineffabili-causis om. B* 22 dionysii R: dyonysii B:
 dionysii P 23 incongruum RBP^c: congruum P* 25 inconcusa RB: in-
 concussa P 27 per (1) s.l. B 28 absolute RB^cP: absolutae B* 29 post
 hoc erasum est non esse in R 30 essentiam quandam RB: essentia in quan-
 dam P diuinam: glossa diuinam dicit essentiam superiores caelestium uirtutum
 ordines B(C)P (glossa om. P) 31 dicimus RB: dicamus P existendo gl. interlin.

Therefore the primordial causes which the divine sages call the prin-
 ciples of all things are Goodness-through-itself, Being-through-itself,
 Life-through-itself, Wisdom-through-itself, Truth-through-itself,
 Intellect-through-itself, Reason-through-itself, Power-through-
 itself, Justice-through-itself, Health-through-itself, Magnitude-
 through-itself, Omnipotence-through-itself, Eternity-through-itself,
 Peace-through-itself, and all the powers and reasons which once and
 for all the Father made in the Son and after which the order of all
 things is woven from top to bottom, that is, from the intellectual
 creature which is next to God after God to the lowest order of all
 things in which bodies are contained. For whatever things are good
 are good by participation in the Good-through-itself, and whatever
 things subsist as beings and substances subsist by participation in
 Being-through-itself, whatever things are alive possess life by parti-
 cipation in Life-through-itself, similarly whatever things are wise and
 understanding and rational are wise and understanding and practise
 reason by participation in Wisdom-through-itself and Understanding-
 through-itself and Reason-through-itself. And the same applies
 to the rest. For there is not found in the nature of things any
 power, whether general or specific, which does not proceed by an
 ineffable participation from the primordial causes. But lest anyone
 should suppose that what we have said of the primordial causes rests
 on the support of no authority, we have thought it not inappropriate
 to insert into this work some (passages) from the book of the Holy
 Father Dionysius On the Divine Names.

A. There is no more apt insertion that you could make, nor any
 that goes better with sound reason than the unshakeable and tried
 authority of the Holy Fathers.

N. He says, then, in the eleventh chapter of the aforesaid book
 of his: 'But what, you ask, (is it) at all (545) which is called (546)
 'Being-through-itself (547), or Life-through-itself (548), or whatever
 'we have expounded (to be) absolute and primary being (549) . . . ?
 'We say this: It is not a tortuous (problem) but a straightforward one,
 'and has a simple explanation (550). For we do not say that Being-
 'through-itself, (which is) the cause that (all things) are (551), is some
 'divine or angelic essence—for it alone is the superessential principle
 'and' <subsistence> 'of all things that are and the causative (principle)
 'of their essence (552)—nor that there is any other lifegiving (553)
 'divinity save the superdivine Life which is the Cause (554) of all
 'things which live and of the life which proceeds (from it) (555) . . .
 'but by Being-through-itself and Life-through-itself and Deity-
 'through-itself (556) we mean, (speaking of them) indeed as principles'

.i. dum existit C in B 33 essentiae R^cB^cP: essentiam R^cB* 35 ipsum
 RBP^c: ipsam P*

'quidem' et 'deiformiter et causaliter, unum omnium superprincipale
'et superessentiale principium et causam, participaliter autem editas
'ex deo non participante prouidas uirtutes, . . . per-se-ipsam deifica-
'tionem quas existentia proprie sibimet participant, et existentia et
'uiuentia et diuina sunt et dicuntur, et alia similiter. Proinde et 5
'primarum ipsarum optimus substitutor dicitur esse, . . . deinde
'particularium ipsarum, deinde totarum ipsas participantium, 617C
'deinde particulariter eas participantium. Et quid oportet de his
'dicere? Quando quidam diuinorum nostrorum sacrorum magistrorum
'per-se-ipsam bonitatis et deitatis substitutricem aiunt plus quam 10
'optimam et plus quam diuinam, per-se-ipsam bonitatem et diuini-
'tatem dicentes esse beneficam et deificam ex deo procedentem
'donationem, et per-se-ipsam formam per-se-ipsam formificam
'fusionem, et totam formam et particularem formam, et uniuersaliter
'bona . . . et quaecunque alia secundum eundem dicta sunt et dicuntur 15
'modum, declarantia prouidentiam et bonitatem participatas ab
'existentibus, ex deo non participante prouenientes et copiosa fusione
'et superscatentes, ut diligens omnium causalis summitas omnium et
'superessentiale et supernaturale . . . omnino superexcellit ea quae 617D
'sunt secundum qualemcumque essentiam et naturam?' 20

Item ex eodem libro capitulo quinto: 'Principia existentium omnia
'ipsius esse participantia et sunt et principia sunt; et prima sunt,
'deinde principia sunt. Et si quis uult uiuentium ut uiuentium prin-
'cipium dicere per-se-ipsam uitam et similitum ut similitum per-se-
'ipsam et similitudinem et unitorum ut unitorum per-se-ipsam 25
'unitatem et ordinatorum ut ordinatorum ut ordinatorum per-se-ipsam 618A
'ordinationem et aliorum quaecunque huius siue huius, siue amborum
'multorum<ue> participantia, hoc aut hoc, aut ambo aut multa sunt,
'per-se-ipsa participia inuenies ipsius esse primum ea participantia,
'et [ab] eo esse primum quidem existentia, deinde huius aut huius 30
'principia existentia, et participando eo esse existentia participata. Si
'autem haec participatione esse sunt multo magis eorum participantia.'

21-p. 210, 1 Ps.-Dionys., DN v. 5, PG iii. 820B 8-c 8; cf. p. 66, 28-30 supra

1 glossa dum deum dicit superprincipale principium, prouidas uero uirtutes primor-
diales causas, subsistentia autem effectus causarum qui etiam diuini dicuntur quia
ex deo procedunt C in B 4 existentia glossa interlin. .i. effectus erasa C in B
5 diuina gl. interlin. .i. effectus erasa C in B 10 substitutricem RB: substantiam
P 15 alia s.l. B 21 gl. primordiales causas principia uocat B(C)P 22 ipsius:
gl. interlin. .i. dei C in B participantia RP: partipantia B prima: lege primo
23 quis RB: que P ut RB: et P 27 huius siue huius: glossa hoc est solius
per se essentiae ut ea quae solummodo sunt uel solius per se uitae ut sunt quae
solummodo uiuunt quarum essentia uita est aut amborum ut sunt ea quae per
se essentiam et per se uitam simul participant aut multorum ut sunt quae per se
essentiam et per se uitam et per se sapientiam participant in ras. in marg. C in B
29 ipsa RBP: ipsam P* participia: gl. interlin. .i. primordiales C in B ipsius:
gl. interlin. .i. dei 30 ab deest in R*BP 31 eo om. P 32 partici-
patione: glossa hoc dicit quia in quantum principia et principiorum participantia

and 'as Godlike things and causes (557), the one Principle beyond
'principle (558) and being, and the (one) Cause of all things; but
'(speaking of them) as participable (559), providential Powers (560)
'proceeding from the unparticipating (561) God . . ., Deification-
'through-itself, things that have their proper existence in themselves
'participate, and are and are called existent and living and divine, and
'other things of this sort (562). Therefore He is said to be the Good
'Substantiator (563) even of the first (orders) of them, . . . then of their
'parts, then of the things which participate in them as wholes (564),
'then of those which participate in them partially. And what is to be
'said of these? When indeed certain of our holy masters (565) say
'that He that is more than Good and more than God (566) is the
'Substantiator (567) of Goodness-through-itself (568) and of Divinity,
'calling the gift of making the Good and of making God, which pro-
'ceeds from God, Goodness-through-itself and Divinity (569); and
'the outpouring of the making-of-beauty-through-itself Beauty-
'through-itself (570) and Beauty in its totality and partial beauty, and
'the things which are wholly good (571) . . ., and whatever other things
'are spoken of or shall be spoken of in this manner and show that the
'Providence and Goodness (572) in which beings participate proceed
'and (573) overflow (574) in an abundant outpouring from the God
'Who is unparticipating (575), so that the loving (576) Cause of all
'things transcends all things (577), and the Superessential (578) and
'Supernatural . . . is in every respect beyond the things which exist
'after whatever mode of existence or of nature?'

And from chapter five of the same book: 'All principles of existing
'things, since they participate in being (579), both are, and are prin-
'ciples; and first they are, and then they are principles. And if one likes
'(580) to say that the principle of living things as living is Life-through-
'itself, and of like things as like Likeness-through-itself (581), and
'of unified things as unified Unification-through-itself, and of ordered
'things as ordered (582) Order-through-itself, and of any other things
'which by participation in this or that or both <or> many, are this or
'that or both or many, you will find (583) that the participants-through-
'themselves (584) are first participants in Being and first take their
'existence (585) [from] that Being, then are principles of this or that,
'and that it is by their participation in Being (586) that they both are
'and are participated in (587). But if it is by their participation in
'Being that they are, much more (is this the case with) the things which
'participate in them.'

deo appropinquant minus esse dicuntur quia minus intellectu comprehenduntur. in
quantum autem ab ipso elongantur in tantum esse uidentur quia plus intellectibus seu
sensibus patefiunt sicut idem dyonisius in libro de caelesti ierarchie (sic) docet C in B

Et paulo post: 'Etenim in monade omnis numerus . . . ante sub-
 'sistit et habet omnem numerum monas in semet ipsa singulariter et
 'omnis numerus unitur quidem in monade, quantum autem monade
 'prouenit tantum discernitur et multiplicatur. Et in centro omnes
 'circuli lineae secundum primam unitatem consubstitutae sunt et 618B
 'omnes habet signum in semet ipso simplas lineas uniformiter unitas 6
 'ad se inuicem et ad unum principium ex quo procedunt et in ipso
 'quidem centro uniuersaliter adunantur, breuiter autem eo distantes
 'breuiter discernuntur, magis autem recedentes magis, et simpliciter
 'quantum centro proximiores sunt tantum et ipsi et sibi inuicem 10
 'adunantur et quantum eo tantum et a se inuicem distant. Sed et in
 'tota omnium natura omnes secundum singula naturae rationes
 'conuolutae sunt per unam inconfusam unitatem et in anima uni-
 'formiter secundum partes omnium prouidiae totius corporis uirtutes.
 'Nil ergo inconsequens ex obscuris imaginibus in omnium causale 15
 'ascendentes supermundanis oculis contemplari omnia in omnium
 'causali et sibi inuicem opposita uniformiter et unite. Principium enim 618C
 'est existentium ex quo et ipsum esse et omnia utcunque existentia
 'omne principium omnis finis' <et> 'omnis uita omnis immortalitas
 'omnis sapientia omnis ordo omnis armonia omnis uirtus omnis cus- 20
 'todia omnis collocatio omnis distributio omnis intellectus omnis
 'ratio omnis sensus omnis habitus omnis status omnis motus omnis
 'unitas omne iudicium omnis amicitia omnis compactio omnis dis-
 'cretio omnis terminus et alia' <nominatim> 'quaecunque ab esse
 'existentia existentia omnia caracterizant.' 25

Et post aliquanta: 'Si enim iuxta nos sol sensibilibus essentias et
 'qualitates et quidem multas et quidem multas et discretas existentes,
 'tamen ipse unus existens et uniformis illuminans lux renouat et
 'nutrit et custodit et perficit et discernit et unit et refouet et foecunda
 'esse facit et auget et mutat et collocat et plantat et remouet et 618D
 'uiuificat omnia et omnium unumquodque proprie sibi eundem et 31
 'unum solem participat et multorum participantium unus sol causas
 'in se ipso uniformiter praeambit, multo magis super terrae et ipsius
 'et omnium causalis praetexuisse in se omnium existentium para-
 'digmata secundum unam superessentialem unitatem concedendum, 35

1-25, Ps.-Dionys., DN v. 6-7, PG iii. 820D 3-821C 2
 Dionys., DN v. 8, PG iii. 824B 10-C 15

1 post omnis rasura in R 7 ipso RB: ipse P 8-9 breuiter . . . breuiter
 RB: paulisper . . . paulisper P 13 conuolutae RB^cP: conuolutae B* 14 pro-
 uidae B: prouide RP 17 unite RB: unitate P 19 omne RB: omnem P
 et B^c: ac P deest in RB* 21 omnis (2) . . . omnis (3) RB: omnes . . . omnes P
 25 existentia: (2) super gl. interlin. Nam primordiales causae erasam .i. accus(atius)
 scripsit C in B glo Nam primordiales causae in deo existentes aliorum existen-
 tium exemplaria sunt C in marg. B 29 foecunda B^c: fecunda RB*P
 31 unumquodque: unum- s.l. B 34 omnium causalis RB: omnia causalis P

And a little later: 'For in the Monad every number . . . is presub-
 'stantiated (588), and the Monad possesses in itself every number
 'under a unitary mode (589), and every number is one in the Monad,
 'but the further it issues (590) from the Monad the more it falls into
 'division and multiplicity (591). And all the lines of a circle co-subsist
 '(592) at the centre in their first (593) unification, and the point (594)
 'holds in itself all simple lines (595) unified in the mode of unity with
 'one another and with the one principle from which they proceed
 '(596); and while at the centre they are wholly unified, when they are
 'distant (597) a little from it they are a little divided, and when they
 'recede (598) further from it (they are) more (so); and, (to put it)
 'plainly, the closer they are to the centre the closer they are to unifica-
 'tion both with it and with one another, and the further (they are) from
 'it, the further they are from one another also. But as in the whole
 'nature of all things (599) all the reasons of nature as individuals (600)
 'are brought together (601) in one unconfused unification (602), so
 'also in the soul under a unitary mode are the powers of the whole
 'body which provide for all things separately (603). It is not unreason-
 'able therefore that, ascending from imprecise images to the causal
 '(principle) of all things (604), we should with a vision that penetrates
 'beyond earthly things contemplate all things in the causal (principle)
 'of all things, and the things which are opposed to one another as under
 'one form and as unified (605). For it is the Principle of existing
 'things, from which proceed both Being itself and everything what-
 'soever that exists, every beginning, every end,' <and> 'all life, all
 'immortality, all wisdom (606), all order, all harmony, all virtue, all pro-
 'tection (607), all gathering together (608), all distribution, all under-
 'standing (609), all reason, all sense, all condition, all rest, all motion, all
 'unification, all judgement (610), all friendship, all agreement (611), all
 'division, all determination, and all other' <several> 'things which,
 'deriving their existence from Being, impress it upon everything that
 'exists.'

And a little later: 'For if the sun of our world, although (612) the
 'essences and qualities of sensible objects (613) are (614) many (615)
 'and diverse while itself is one and shines upon them all with a uniform
 'light (616), yet renews and nourishes and protects and perfects and
 'distinguishes and unites and cherishes and makes fertile and augments
 'and changes and gathers together and establishes and moves (617)
 'and quickens all things, and if each of them partakes of the same sun
 'in the manner appropriate to itself, and if the one sun predefines
 '(618) as a unity in itself the causes of the many things that participate
 'in itself, then we should be all the more ready to allow that the Cause
 'of the earth and of it and of all things preformed on high in itself the
 praetexisse *codd.*: *corr.* Schmitt in se R: ipse BP

'deinde et essentias adducit iuxta ab essentia egressionem. Paradigmata 619A
'autem dicimus esse ipsas in deo existentium substantificas et uni-
'formiter praetextas rationes quas theologia praedestinationes uocat
'et diuinas et optimas uoluntates existentium discretiuas et factiuas
'secundum quas ipse superessentialis existentia omnia et praedestin- 620A
'auit et adduxit.' 6

Et iam huic libro terminus est imponendus ut arbitrator.

A. Ita fiat.

1-5 cf. p. 204, 16-22 supra

3 praedestinationes RB: praedestinationes P 5-6 praedestinauit RB: praedis-
tinauit P 7 Et iam RB: Item P imponendus RB: impunendus P

'exemplars of all existents in one superessential unity, and it then brings
'forth the essences by an emanation from Essence (619). Now by the
'exemplars we mean the reasons in God which substantiate (620)
'existing things and were preformed after a unitary mode, (and)
'which the divine word calls predestinations (621) and divine and
'good (622) volitions (623) which determine and make (624) the
'existents (625), (and) after the pattern of which the Superessential
'has both predestined and brought forth all existent things.'

And now I think we should bring this book to an end.

A. Let it be so.

NOTES ON TEXT AND
TRANSLATION

1. *formas*, species. For this meaning of *forma* see Bk. I, p. 152, 34; Bk. II, p. 142, 13 *et al.*

2. *non enim deus genus . . . neque deus species . . . non est totum . . . neque pars*. Cf. Albinus, *Didasc.* x. 4, οὐτε γένος ἐστὶν οὔτε εἶδος . . . οὔτε μέρος τινὸς οὔτε ὡς ὅλον ἔχον μέρος.

3. *intelligibili-contemplatione*. The division of whole into parts (partition) is a sensible, that of genus into species a rational, that of universal nature into its aspects an intellectual operation.

4. Interpolation of the text, and interpolation of the interpolation, overburden the sentence, and prevent a translation that will be both literal and fluent. *Nunc* (line 15) answers the opening *Quoniam* and introduces the main sentence.

5. *formam uel speciem*. Species, which properly belongs to rational division, is here applied by analogy to intellectual division, where the proper term is *consideratio* (see p. 8, 36 below), 'aspect'.

6. The formal resemblance of this digression to the normal type of interpolation suggests that it too was originally an interpolation which would have been introduced into the prototype of R. If all this interpolated material be removed, it will be seen that the primitive text would have opened with two strictly parallel sentences:

p. 4, 3-15

Quoniam . . . de uniuersalis naturae uniuersali diuisione . . . breuiter diximus, nunc eandem naturae diuisionem latius si uidetur repetamus.

p. 6, 2-15

Quoniam . . . de oppositionibus praedictarum naturae formarum breuiter . . . dictum est . . . nunc de similitudine earum deque differentia considerandum esse arbitror.

7. *de ipsa*, 'of her'. P's reading would give 'of itself' (i.e. 'of our intelligence'), which is clearly wrong. *Se*, therefore, has not been translated.

8. Universal nature is here described under its second aspect as that which both creates and is created.

9. See notes 4 and 6.

10. *distare uidetur*, 'appears to be remote from'. The correction from *distat* reflects St. Maximus' identification of the First with the Final Cause which is to be mentioned shortly.

11. *Ἀναλυτική*. In the *Periphyseon* and in the *Expositiones* (PL cxxii. 184c-185b), Dialectic is divided into two parts, Division (*διαλεκτική*) and Collection (*ἀναλυτική*); previously, in the *De praedestinatione* (358A 4-15) Eriugena had divided it into four: *διαλεκτική*, which by division descends from the general to the particular; *ὀριστική*, which by definition distinguishes the substance from its accidents; *ἀποδεικτική*, which by induction proceeds from the known to the unknown; and *ἀναλυτική*, which reduces composites to simple, and species to genus. This classification derives from Albinus (*Didasc.* iii. 2), but Eriugena's terminology is slightly different and is found elsewhere only in two Alexandrian writers, the unknown Christian author of the Preface to Porphyry's *Isagoge* preserved in MS. Paris Coislin

387 (J. A. Cramer, *Anecdota Graeca e codd. manuscr. Bibl. Regiae Parisiensis*, iv, Oxford 1841, 430) and David in his Commentary on the *Isagoge* (MS. Paris Bibl. Nat. gr. 1939; Cramer, *op. cit.* 442).

The quadripartite division survives into Bk. I of the *Periphyseon*, but thereafter horistic and apodeictic disappear and Eriugena returns to the pure Platonic conception of Dialectic as the combined operation of division and collection (cf. Plato, *Phaedrus* 265D 3-266C 1; 273D 7-E 4; 277B 5-8; *Sophist* 253DE). The change is due to the Neoplatonic influence of Eriugena's Greek patristic sources. Dialectic, from being simply a branch of philosophy, becomes in Neoplatonism, through the process of analogy, the whole of philosophy, where the roles of horistic and apodeictic are secondary because its first principles are indefinable and unknowable. Division, on the other hand, is the process by which the descent is made from the One to the Many, and analytic the means by which the ascent or return is made from the Many to the One; that is to say, they are the descent from, and the return to, a Principle which remains always what it was. Dialectic and its Source, which is also its End, thus comprise the triad *μονή, πρόοδος, επιστροφή*, by which the Neoplatonists reconciled the transcendence with the immanence of God. But the thoroughness with which Eriugena applies the principles of Dialectic to the whole of reality finds no parallel in the system of any predecessor. He looks back to no authority, Latin or Greek. If he learnt from the Ps.-Dionysius and St. Maximus that the same triad is the common principle both of the cosmos and of knowledge about the cosmos, the final step of identifying analytic with deification is his own: *diuina in omnia processio ἀναλυτική dicitur, hoc est resolutio; reuersio uero θέωσις, hoc est deificatio* (Dedicatory Epistle to the *Versio Maximi*, 1195C 6-1196A 2), where, however, *ἀναλυτική*, with a different derivation in mind than what we find here, is used for *διαλεκτική*.

12. *in genera*. Characteristically P has lost the trend of the argument. Eriugena is speaking of the two forms of division mentioned at the beginning of the book: of genus into species, and of whole into parts. This interpolation introduces a third, that of essence into genera, which is irrelevant.

13. *Nulla enim in ipsa contemplatur*: cf. with this passage on the kinds of division Boethius' version of Porphyry's *Isagoge*, pp. 35, 18-36, 12 Busse: 'Cum igitur tres species differentiae considerantur, et cum hae quidem sint separabiles, illae uero inseparabiles, et rursus inseparabilium cum hae quidem sint per se, illae uero per accidens, rursus earum quae sunt per se differentiarum aliae quidem sunt secundum quas diuidimus genera in species, aliae uero secundum quas haec quae diuisa sunt specificantur; ut cum per se differentiae omnes huiusmodi sint, animati et inanimati, sensibilis et insensibilis, rationalis et irrationalis, mortalis et immortalis, ea quidem quae est animati et sensibilis differentia constitutiuae est substantiae animalis—est enim animal substantia animata et sensibilis—, ea uero quae est mortalis et immortalis differentia et rationalis et irrationalis diuisiuae sunt animalis differentiae—per eas enim genera in species diuidimus—, sed hae quidem quae diuisiuae sunt differentiae generum completiuae fiunt et constitutiuae specierum; diuiditur enim animal rationali et irrationali differentia et rursus mortali et immortalali differentia, sed ea quae est rationalis differentia et mortalis constitutiuae fiunt hominis, rationalis uero et immortalis dei, illae uero quae sunt irrationalis et mortalis inrationabilium animalium.' The ninth century glossator who in the colophon to his glossary gives his name as 'Icpa***' noticed the affinity between the two passages, for against the words 'sed hae quidem—specierum' he has commented 'lege peri physeon'

(Cl. Bäumker and B. S. Walterhausen, *Frühmittelalterlichen Glossen des angeblichen Jēpa zur Isagoge des Porphyrius = Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters*, xxiv, 1 [Münster 1924], gl. 130, p. 43, 27). For 'Icpa' see Sheldon-Williams, 'A list of works doubtfully or wrongly attributed to Johannes Scottus Eriugena', *Journal of Ecclesiastical History*, xv, pp. 82-3. Eriugena's 'partitio' (line 32) represents the Greek term *μερισμός*. See note 75 *infra*.

ea quae-contemplatur (lines 32-3), 'those divisions which right reason contemplates therein', are the four aspects of universality, for which Eriugena can find no proper term; cf. p. 4, 13-14 *intelligibili quadam uniuersitatis contemplatione*. See also note 5 above.

14. Lit. 'principle'.

15. Thus *ἀνάλυσις* is associated with the first (and more correct) translation, 'resolve', *ἀναλυτική* with the second, 'return'. But in the passage from the *Versio Maximi* quoted at the end of note 11 *ἀναλυτική* is also associated with the first translation and therefore assumes the meaning usually expressed by *διαρετική*.

16. i.e. the primordial causes. Cf. p. 12, 35.

17. The Cause of Being is the Divine Wisdom or Providence because the existence of things is the effect of God's knowledge of them. Similarly at 628B the Cause is called *bonitas* because things exist because they are good, and not vice versa. *Sapientia* and *Prudentia* = the Logos, in Whom the primordial causes are unified.

18. Lit. 'and ends in the same'.

19. *itaque*, 'then', takes up the argument from p. 6, 36, from which it is separated by the interpolation.

20. *reditiua*, 'regressive': cf. *Expos.*, 185A 3.

21. Lit. 'consideration', i.e. aspect under which the universe is considered.

22. *lux mentium*, 'Light of Minds', i.e. God. Cf. Bk. I, p. 38, 9.

23. *subtilitas*, simplicity or economy, suggesting the notions of elegance and neatness. Cf. Cic., *Or.* xxiii. 76; *Brutus* lxxxiv. 291; *De or.* iii. 7, 28; *Ad fam.* iv. 4, 1.

24. The creature is inherently a genus containing two species; the Creator is not so inherently, but appears so to the mind which contemplates Him because the mind itself is a creature and can only contemplate God as Himself a creature.

25. i.e. of the four 'species' or aspects of nature.

26. i.e. the primordial causes; cf. note 16.

27. *et conuersim*, 'and vice versa,' is redundant because here only reference to the Return in a discourse on the Procession is in question.

28. *quaestionis* is inserted to bridge the interpolation by taking up *secundam naturae formam quaeramus* (p. 12, 24-25); *formae* would have been more appropriate.

29. The concept of primordial causes derives both from the *rationes aeternae* of St. Augustine (cf. *De Gen. ad litt.* i. 9, 17, PL xxxiv. 252) and from the Dionysian presentation of the Platonic Forms (cf. *DN* v, 8 *ad fin.*; Max. Conf., *I Ambig.* iii, PG xci. 1085A). Since the Forms were, from the time of Plotinus at least, held by pagan and Christian alike to reside in the Mind of God, Henry of Ostia held it as one of the three principal errors of Eriugena that he taught that they were created.

30. *πρωτότυπον* occurs in this sense in Pollux, *Onom.* v. 12, and was probably known to Eriugena from some glossary. *προόρισμα* is given by Hesychius as a synonym for *οὐρός*, 'trench', and confused with *οὔρος* = *δρος*.

For some reason Eriugena substitutes it for *προορισμός*, which, like *θεῖα θελήματα*, is the term used by the Ps.-Dionysius and Maximus Confessor in the passages to which Eriugena is here referring (*DN* v. 8, PG iii. 824c 12-13; *I Ambig.* iii, PG xci. 1085A 8-9). Maximus identifies the *θεῖα θελήματα* of the Ps.-Dionysius with the *logoi*, a name given them, he says, in 'the circle of Pantaenus' (*οἱ περὶ Πάντανον*), which probably means by Pantaenus himself (P. Sherwood, *The Earlier Ambigua of St. Maximus the Confessor*, Rome 1955, p. 175 n. 70). The doctrine is specifically associated with Clement of Alexandria, who by its help would explain the mode of God's knowledge. Intelligible beings know after an intelligible mode, and sensible beings after a sensible mode (cf. Plato, *Parmenides* 134B sq.), but God is neither intelligible nor sensible, and therefore cannot know by either of these modes. He can only know things as he wills them to be (cf. p. 154, 18 sq.). Therefore the Divine Volitions are the cause of the divine knowledge of creatures, and therefore of the creatures themselves (Max. Conf., *I Ambig.* iii, PG xci. 1085B 7-12). Maximus adds on his own account (Sherwood, *loc. cit.*) the corollary that what God does not will He cannot know (*ibid.*, B 12-c 6), a mode of the Divine Ignorance discussed by Eriugena at pp. 136-65. See also note 295.

31. Cf. p. 204, 11; *Comm. in Boeth. Cons. Phil.* iii met. 9, 59 Silvestre (*ab illo exemplari quod fuit in mente diuina . . . quod uocant Graeci philosophi ydeas, id est formas*). See also Chalcidius, *In Tim.* cclxxi. 239; cccii. 246; cccxxvii. 251 Waszink; St. Aug., *De quaest.* lxxxiii. 46 (*de ideis*), PL xl. 29-31. For *species* and *forma* as synonyms see note 1.

32. The *incommutabiles rationes* are the principles according to which all creatures are constructed, the *logoi* of Plotinus, of which Eriugena knew through St. Augustine (cf. *De Gen. ad litt.* i. 9, 17, PL xxxiv. 252; *De diuersis quaestionibus octoginta tribus* xlvi, PL xl. 30; Plotinus, *Enn.* iv. 4, 16, 5-6). A primordial cause is common to all its effects, a *logos* is proper to one effect, and it is because each effect has its own *logos* that all the effects of a primordial cause are not identical. See also Bk. I, note 34.

33. Cf. Bk. I, p. 170, 29-32; Bk. II, p. 48, 35-36; p. 70, 20-p. 72, 28.

34. The *priusquam* clause has no verb.

35. *sicut-demonstrant* is dependent on *subdiuidit* from which it has become separated by the interpolation *quartamque-discernit*.

36. P. 16, 1-p. 42, 4 is a self-contained commentary on the whole of this chapter of the *Ambigua*.

37. *accipiunt*, 'receive', for *λαβόντες*, 'who have received'.

38. *distributa*, 'which are handed down': *διαδοθέντα*.

39. *eorum quae sunt eruditi scientiam* = *τῶν ὄντων μηθέντων γνῶσιν*.

40. *substantiam* = *ὑπόστασιν*.

41. *segregari* = *διελήφθαι*.

42. Creation is presented as a dialectic of five divisions: the division of nature into Uncreated (God) and created; of created nature into the intelligible and sensible worlds; of the sensible world into heaven and earth (angel and man); of earth into the Earthly Paradise and the inhabited earth (prelapsarian and postlapsarian man); and of postlapsarian man into male and female. The first four divisions are the distributory operations of the Holy Spirit directed towards the creation of man to be a link and medium of reunification of opposites at each stage, intermediate between the created and the Uncreated because he has the matter of the former but the form of the latter, between sensible and intelligible because he is composed of body and soul, between earth and heaven because created in the former he aspires to the

latter, between the habitable globe and the Earthly Paradise because abiding now in the former he has his proper abode in the latter, and therefore the means by which, at each stage, the division is reunified in man (see note 227 below).

But man employed the free will inherent in the proper creative power involved in his being created in the image of his Creator to produce a situation which resulted in the fifth division of his nature into male and female. Therefore the Return, or progressive reunification, must begin by overcoming the division of the sexes, upon which follow in reverse order the overcoming in turn of each of the other divisions until the created nature is brought back entire to the Uncreated, and the unity of nature is restored. This process is the redemptive work of Christ, Who, by being born of a Virgin, suppresses the division of human nature between male and female (Max. Conf., *I Ambig.* xxxvii, PG xci. 1309A 3-4; cf. V. Lossky, *Théologie mystique de l'Église d'Orient*, p. 133; that the unification of human nature means the elimination of sexual differentiation was the third fundamental error in the *Periphyseon* detected by Henry of Ostia); by His death and resurrection reunites Paradise with the inhabited globe (cf. p. 24, 12-13; p. 28, 28 below); by His ascension into heaven reunites heaven and earth; by ascending above the heavens to the right hand of God He brings the sensible world into one with the intelligible; and finally, by presenting to the Father the totality of the universe unified in His humanity, he unites the created to the Uncreated.

Through the Holy Spirit all men potentially, and some actually (to the limit of the capacity of the creature) are followers in the same path: the Holy Spirit is present to all men without exception as Conserver of all things and Lifegiver to the natural seeds; is present to those who possess the Law as the means by which they know the Law; is present to Christians through baptism by which each individual is a son of God; as Bestower of wisdom is present to the reasonable ones, that is, to those who, by their labours in God's service, become the dwelling-places of the Spirit (for no one who does not accomplish the will of God has a reasonable heart): and as Deifier is present to the Saints who enter into union with God (Max. Conf., *Capita theologica et economica* i. 73, PG xc. 1029A).

43. Lit. 'the origin of his division'.

44. *fecisse* = *πεποιηκότα*. See next note.

45. Eriugena inserts *simul* in order to restore to *nanque* (line 15) a significance obscured by the omission, after *dispositionem* (16), of the translation of *μη αὐτόθεν αὐτῇ καταφανῆ γενέσθαι τίνα καὶ ὅποιον εἶναι, τὴν περὶ τοῦτο τὴν κτίσιν τοῦ θεοῦ διακρίνουσαν ἄγνωσαν διαίρεσιν λέγοντες* (PG xci. 1305A 2-4). The complete translation would be: 'For they say that when God had established the splendid disposition of all things, He did not forthwith reveal to it Who or of what Nature He was; and they call this ignorance which separates the creature from God a division.' Cf. p. 22, 20-22.

46. *intelligibilia* = *τὰ νοητά*.

47. *sensibilia* = *τὰ αἰσθητά*.

48. *itidem* = *δέ*.

49. *orbemque terrarum* = *καὶ οἰκουμένην*.

50. *continuatissima officina* = *συνεκτικώτατον ἐργαστήριον*. Cf. 733B, 755B, 760D, 763D, 779A, 782A, 785D, 806D. The *extremitates* (line 23) are the products of each division or difference, male and female, paradise and inhabited globe, heaven and earth, intelligible and sensible, uncreated and created. In each case human nature is the middle term. Therefore man is for all things the agent of unification. *Officina ἐργαστήριον* means literally

'workshop', the place of creation, to which all the raw materials are gathered for the job. The idea, a form of the macrocosm-microcosm theme, comes from Philo, from whom it was adopted by St. Gregory of Nyssa. Cf. Philo, *De opif. mund.* li. 145 *Πᾶς ἄνθρωπος κατὰ μὲν τὴν διάνοιαν ὑπέκλειται λόγῳ θεῷ, τῆς μακαρίας φύσεως ἐκμαγεῖον ἢ ἀπόσπασμα ἢ ἀπαύγασμα γεγονώς, κατὰ δὲ τὴν τοῦ σώματος κατασκευὴν, ἅπαντι τῷ κόσμῳ, συγκέκρται γὰρ ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν, γῆς καὶ ὕδατος καὶ ἀέρος καὶ πυρός*; Greg. Nyss., *De hom. opif.* xvi, PG xliv. 177D 11-13 *Φασὶ γὰρ μικρὸν εἶναι κόσμον τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν τῷ παντὶ στοιχείῳ συνεστηκότα*. The latter, however, regards this as an unworthy view of man, and we shall find that Eriugena applies it to the body only (p. 182, 12-31 sq.). Maximus seems to have been the first to use *ἐργαστήριον* in this sense.

51. *in omnibus* = *ἐπὶ πᾶσιν*.

52. *copulatiuum* = *σχετικῆς*. Eriugena may have read *συνεκτικῆς* (see note 50 *ad. init.*; but also note 69 below); and this has led him astray from the meaning of the Greek which is 'that is to say, naturally possessing, by the mediations of all the extremes through the likeness of like parts by which the extremes are related, the potency towards unification'. See also note 55 below.

53. *adunationis* = *πρὸς ἔνωσιν*.

54. *coniunctio* = *σύνδεσμος*.

55. *per proprias partes* = *διὰ τῶν οἰκείων μερῶν*, i.e. the parts they hold in common. Two terms can only be brought together if they share a common element, e.g. the intelligible and the sensible can come together in man because both share the condition of being created (cf. *Hom. in Prol. Ioann. euang.*, xix. 12-16 Jeaneau). Eriugena's translation is unsatisfactory since *proprius* fails to give this meaning.

56. *multum* = *πολλῶ*, rendered accurately in P. Perhaps P's reading is a rare case of an authentic emendation in this MS (L. B.).

57. *confluunt*. Cf. Duns Scotus, *De anima*, Q. i, n. 7 *homo est quodammodo omnis creatura propter naturalem conuenientiam cum omnibus*.

58. *nulla enim* (p. 18, 5) *-componunt* is printed in PL as part of the quotation. Karsavine (*The Holy Fathers and Doctors of the Church*, Paris 1926, *ap. Lossky, op. cit.* 103) also attributes the words to Maximus, which therefore may come from somewhere else in the *Ambigua*. But I have been unable to locate the passage, and the language seems too straightforward for Eriugena's style of translation.

59. *conexione ordineque* = *ἐρμῶ καὶ τάξει*.

60. *ex omnibus . . . per unitatem* = *διὰ πάντων κατὰ τὴν ἔνωσιν*.

61. *in quo* = *ἐν ᾧ*. The antecedent is *deum* (line 9).

62. *mirabili quadam adunatione*: Plato and Aristotle called man *τὸ σύνθετον* (*Phaedo*, 78C, *Eth. Nic.*, K 7, 1177^b28), and the notion has become a common-place in philosophy and literature. Posidonius seems to have been the first to give it philosophical importance (R. E. Witt, 'Plotinus and Posidonius', *CQ* xxiv [1930], pp. 199-200), and his influence is probably to be found in Sap. xviii. 16, where the Logos is said to touch heaven while it treads upon earth (cf. *Corp. Herm.* x. 25, p. 126, 3-11 Nock; *Asclepius* vi, p. 302, 12 sq.; Ps.-Aristotle, *De mundo* i. 391^a8; and texts cited by Cumont, 'Le mysticisme astral dans l'antiquité', *Bull. Acad. Belg.*, 1909, pp. 256 sq.), and in Philo, *De opif. mundi* cxxxv. where man is said to be on the boundary (*μεθόριος*) between mortality and immortality (Witt, *art. cit.*, p. 199; cf. *Corp. Herm.* i. 15, p. 11, 18-20 Nock). It is also found in Plotinus, who sets man between the gods and the beasts (*Enn.* iv. 8, 4, 31-3), and Nemesius, who sets him on the boundary between the rational and the irrational: *ἐν μεθόροις . . . τῆς ἀλόγου καὶ λογικῆς φύσεως* (*De nat. hom.*, PG xl. 512C). In the *Asclepius* the simple (soul) and the

composite (body composed of the four elements: see note 50) unite in man (*Ascl.* i. 7h, p. 304, 1-6 Nock), which is precisely what Eriugena says. For the Cappadocians see Greg. Naz. *Orat.* xxxviii. ii, PG xxxvi. 231C 4-324A 2 (which Eriugena would have known from Max. Conf., *I Ambig.* iii, PG xci. 1093B 2-1096A 7), where man is a 'mixture' (*μικτόν*) of the visible and invisible worlds, and Greg. Nyss., *De hom. opif.* ii, PG xlv. 133B 12-17, where it is said that God formed man by mingling the divine with the earthly: τῷ γηίνῳ τὸ θεῖον ἐγκαταμίξας.

63. Cf. 863B; *De praed.* iv. 6, 373B.

64. *si-non peccaret*: cf. p. 28, 27; 102, 27-35; 760B, 777A, 795C, 798A, 799A, 836A, *Comm. in Ioann.* 310D; St. Aug., *De Gen. ad litt.* x. 3, 6. The use of the imperfect subjunctive rather than the pluperfect could be explained by the fact that Adam continues to sin in man; but the usage is frequent in early Latin, is even found in Cicero (often explained away by commentators) and again in Late Latin, under the influence of Greek; cf. p. 30, 27 *custodiret* (*ἐφύλαξεν*) and 28-29 *deiceret* (*κατέβαλε*). (L. B.)

65. *rationibus*, 'reasons': see note 32 above.

66. Eriugena takes *κτιναζόμενος* as a future participle of *ἐκτείνω*.

67. *nullo modo pendentem*, 'certainly does not depend'. I retain the reading of RB* because, although B^c has the authority of C, the original reading is a correct translation of Maximus' τὴν μηδαμῶς ἠρτημένην. Moreover, *pendit* (B^c(C)) makes no sense.

68. *in*, 'upon', represents the dative after *ἠρτημένην*, 'inseparably linked with'. Distinction of the sexes is not for all species a necessary prerequisite for reproductive intercourse.

69. *copula* = *σχέσει*. See note 52. It is clear from the gloss that Eriugena understands the reference to be to the unification of all things in man.

70. *naturae* = τῆς φύσεως. The mistranslation of *ἐκτιναζόμενος* left this genitive of separation unaccounted for. It is clear from the gloss that Eriugena took it for a possessive genitive dependent upon *copula*.

71. *ipsius-extenturus* (lines 29-31). The Greek text is as follows: τὴν μηδαμῶς ἠρτημένην δηλαδὴ κατὰ τὸν προηγούμενον λόγον τῆς περὶ τὴν γένεσιν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου θείας προθέσεως κατὰ τὸ θῆλυ καὶ τὸ ἀρσεν ἰδιότητα τῇ περὶ τὴν λείαν ἀρετὴν ἀπαθεσιάζη σχέσει πάντῃ τῆς φύσεως ἐκτιναζόμενος: 'Having everywhere shaken off from his nature the peculiar characteristic of being female and male which, being contrary to the foreordained *logos* of the divine plan for the generation of man, is not at all implicit in the most passionless relationship with the Divine Virtue.' Eriugena employs the word *virtus* not only, as here, to translate *ἀρετή*, the attribute proper to the subject in its perfection, but also, in many cases, to translate *δύναμις*, the capacity or potentiality of the subject. In the latter case *virtus* will normally be translated 'potency' when it relates to the creature (and by a justifiable extension to the Human Nature of Christ), in which it is not necessarily actualized and therefore not necessarily synonymous with *ἀρετή*; but 'power' when it relates to the Creator, in Whom it is always, *sub specie aeternitatis*, actualized and therefore synonymous with *ἀρετή*.

72. *ut ostenderet-solummodo* (lines 31-33): ὥστε δειχθῆναι τε καὶ γενέσθαι κατὰ τὴν θεϊαν πρόθεσιν ἀνθρώπων μόνον: 'so that he was revealed and became in accordance with the divine intention merely man.' Eriugena has translated *δειχθῆναι* as an active, and made *hominem* the subject of the indirect statement dependent upon it: *futurum* <esse> *hominem*. He has omitted τε καὶ altogether. The translation of *ἐκτιναζόμενος* as a future participle (note 66 above) has obliged him to translate *γενέσθαι* also as future: hence *futurum*. By bringing forward *hominem* to connect it with *futurum*, he has separated it from

its epithet *μόνον*, which, isolated in this way, appeared to him to be an adverb.

73. *diuidendum* = *διαιρούμενον*.

74. *per quam rationem* = καθ' ἃν λόγον.

75. *diuisus* for *diuisum* = *μεριζόμενον*. See note 13 above.

76. *adunationem* = *γνώσιν*, for which Eriugena read *ἔνωσιν*. See note 102 below.

77. *ad*, 'with', lit. 'with regard to', *πρός*.

78. The omitted words are *ὡς ἔφη*.

79. *ex uitio . . . locorum*: cf. *uitium aëris* (Virgil, *Ecl.* vii. 57) (L. B.).

80. *adunationem*: see note 76.

81. *Et* continues from p. 22, 1 before the interpolation.

82. *sequetur*: the correction indicates a change of construction, as at pp. 26, 11 (*unificabit*) and 28, 10 (*ostendet*). *Sequetur* was first written in view of *faceret* = *ποιήσειε* (line 36), which has been left unchanged, as also was *acciperet* at p. 18, 12, while at p. 22, 38 the original *patienti* = *παθόντι* was first corrected to *pateretur*. Clearly at one time Eriugena held the mistaken view that the aorist subjunctive or oblique optative of the Greek should invariably be translated by the Latin imperfect subjunctive, but, realizing the awkwardness of this, corrected his subjunctives to futures or, as in the last case, to the present subjunctive, which should have been used throughout since all these verbs depend on 'introducitur . . . homo' (p. 20, 27) (L. B.).

83. *sanctam conuersationem* = *ἀγιοπρεποῦς ἀγωγῆς*.

84. *nulla* = *πρός μηδέν*, which should be taken with *ὑπαγωγῆν* (*subductionem*).

85. *patiatur* = *παθόντι* (*patienti* R*), agreeing with *αὐτῷ* = *in eo* (p. 22, 37). See note 82.

86. *subductionem* = *ὑπαγωγῆν*, a surreptitious leading away. Eriugena offers *separatio* and *segregatio* as alternative translations (p. 24, 24 and 25).

87. *nam in ratione* (line 4)-*appellatio est* is probably an interpolation to the original text.

88. P's interpolation emphasizes the inconvenience of this interpretation.

89. i.e. spiritual.

90. *adiungens* = *ένώσας*.

91. *omnino* = *παντὶ τρόπῳ*, 'in every respect'.

92. *faceret*: see note 82.

93. *a se ipsa* = *πρός εαυτήν*.

94. *in eo* = *αὐτῷ*. Cf. p. 22, 37.

95. *in spatiis* = *τοῖς διαστήμασι*, 'by the intervals of space'.

96. *leui facto spiritu* = *κούφῳ γενομένῳ τῷ πνεύματι*, '(to man) having become light by the pneuma'. Eriugena has missed the significance of the definite article (L. B.).

97. The untranslated words are *πρός γῆν*, which are retained when he repeats the passage at p. 26, 7.

98. In fact *ἀορασία* is to be understood in its correct sense of 'invisibility' as the gloss makes clear. Eriugena seems to have in mind the *ἀγνωσία* of the Ps.-Dionysius, which can have an objective sense. Cf. p. 26, 4-5 below.

99. *sincere-intentione* = *γνησίως πρὸς τὸν θεὸν ἐπειγομένου, καὶ σοφῶς ποιουμένου* τῆς πρὸς αὐτὸν ἀνατάσεως. Eriugena read *ἐπερχομένου* for *ἐπειγομένου*.

100. See note 96.

101. *copulans* = *ένώσας*.

102. *scientiae* = *κατὰ τὴν γνώσιν*. See note 76 above.

103. *unificabit* = *μίαν ποιήσῃ*.

104. *scientiam et ignorantiam* = τὴν γνῶσιν καὶ τὴν ἀγνωσίαν.
 105. *sibi* = αὐτῷ.
 106. *futura* = γενομένης.
 107. *scientia* = ἐπιστήμης.
 108. *indifferenter* = ἀνελλιπῶς, 'perfectly'.
 109. *superueniens* = ἐπιγενομένη.
 110. *infinita donorum effusio* = ἀπειρόδωρος χύσις.
 111. *pure* = ἀκραφνῶς. *de caetero* = λοιπόν, possibly a neuter absolute in apposition to the entire statement: 'this being left'. But it is not in fact the last step on the way to perfect union, which is not reached until p. 28, 7, *Et finis* . . . Eriugena's *de caetero*, like Oehler's *de reliquo* (PG iii. 1307B 4), suggests that λοιπόν should be taken as τὸ λοιπόν, 'from that stage in the process of reunification onwards' (L.B.).
 112. *immediate* = ἀμεστυέντως.
 113. *notitiam* = ἐννοιαν, 'concept'.
 114. Cf. p. 24, 5-6 above.
 115. Cf. Plotinus, *Enn.* v. 9, 6, 3-5.
 116. Cf. p. 76, 29-30, p. 158, 31-32, 632D, 768B. The Greek text is ἡ γνῶσις τῶν ὄντων ἢ ὄντα ἐστίν. Eriugena read ἦ as ἡ (cf. 1073A 15), thus making being identical with the Divine Knowledge instead of consequent upon it.
 117. *sed* balances *non eas res* (p. 26, 25), from which the interpolation now separates it.
 118. *In prioribus* (p. 26, 19) *re ipsa colligi* reflects a dilemma concerning the true nature of man which is encountered both in Platonism and in Judaeo-Christian speculation. In one passage in the *Republic* Plato describes the tripartite soul as a monster in which are combined a many-headed beast which is τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν, a lion which is τὸ θυμοειδές, and a man who is τὸ λογιστικόν, implying that essentially man is the rational soul only (*Rep.* ix. 588CD), and Plotinus says that ὁ ἐν νῷ ἄνθρωπος τὸν πρὸ πάντων τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἄνθρωπον, where a verb expressing inclusion is to be supplied (*Enn.* vi. 7, 6, 11-12: 'scil. amplectitur', Henry-Schwyzler). Similarly Philo says that the man whom God created in His image and likeness, and who is the Platonic Form of Man (*De opif. mundi* xxiii. 69-xxix. 88) is the human Νοῦς: 'Ἡ δὲ εἰκὼν λέλεκται κατὰ τὸν τῆς ψυχῆς ἡγεμόνα νοῦν (*op. cit.* xxiii. 69). In the Hermetists we find the Platonic teaching (as expressed in the passage quoted from the *Republic* above) and the Philonic combined: Διπλοῦς ἐστὶν ὁ ἄνθρωπος, θνητὸς μὲν διὰ τὸ σῶμα, ἀθάνατος δὲ διὰ τὸν οὐσιώδη ἄνθρωπον (*Corp. Herm.* i. 15 *ad init.*): Homo duplex est et eius una pars simplex quae, ut graece aiunt, οὐσιώδης, quam uocamus diuinae similitudinis formam (*Asclep.* vii, p. 304, 2-4 Nock). In their terminology οὐσιώδης is equivalent to νοητός: Τὸ αἰσθητὸν τῆς φύσεως σῶμα πόρρωθεν ἐστὶ τῆς οὐσιώδους γενέσεως· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐστὶ διαλυτὸν, τὸ δὲ ἀδιάλυτον, καὶ τὸ μὲν θνητὸν, τὸ δὲ ἀθάνατον (*Corp. Herm.* xiii. 14); and to πνευματικός (R. Reitzenstein, *Historia Monachorum und Historia Lausiaca* [Göttingen 1916], p. 62, n., *ad fin.*). It is hard to reconcile such a dualistic anthropology with the notion of man as linchpin of the universe which dominates the present discussion. The other alternative, that the whole of man, body and soul, was created in the image of God, was not easily assimilated to the Greek way of thinking about the body.
 119. *finis* = τέλος, adverbial; cf. p. 38, 14 below. Eriugena takes it for the subject of the sentence.
 120. *in omnibus his* = ἐπὶ πᾶσι τούτοις, 'in addition to all these'.
 121. *dilectionem* = ἀγάπης.
 122. *ostendet (ostenderet R)* = δείξειε. See note 82.

123. *totus-deo* = ὅλος ὄλω περιχωρήσας ὀλικῶς τῷ θεῷ.
 124. *omne-deus* = πᾶν εἰ τί πέρ ἐστι ὁ θεός.
 125. *et totum ipsum accipiens a se ipso . . . deum . . .* = καὶ ὅλον αὐτὸν ἀντιλαβὼν ἑαυτοῦ τὸν θεόν, καὶ τῆς ἐπ' αὐτὸν τὸν θεόν. Eriugena ignores the prefix of ἀντιλαβὼν and consequently misconstrues ἑαυτοῦ = 'instead of himself'. He takes this pronoun to refer to God instead of to man. He omits καὶ τῆς ἐπ' αὐτὸν τὸν θεόν which qualifies ἀναβάσεως (*ascensionis*, line 13).
 126. *possessurus* = κτησάμενος taken for a future participle, a common error of Eriugena's. Cf. note 66.
 127. See note 125.
 128. *infinitum-existentm* = ἀόριστόν τε καὶ ἄπειρον ὄντα.
 129. *diuersis extremitatibus*: see note 50.
 130. *congemiscit* (cod. F): *ingemiscit*, vulg. plur.
 131. *in eo esset paradisis*: cf. p. 24, 2-4 above.
 132. *principium* = ἀρχήν.
 133. *nouantur-fit* = καινοτομοῦνται φύσεις καὶ θεὸς ἄνθρωπος γίνεται, the passage from Greg. Naz. which this *Ambiguum* expounds. At this point in the Greek text only the last four words are quoted, but Eriugena is referring back to the beginning of the chapter (PG xci. 1034D 1-2), where the passage is quoted in full.
 134. *in toto* = κατὰ τὸ πᾶν.
 135. *praemonstratas* = προφερομένους, 'being uttered'.
 136. *itaque* = ἀμέλει τοι.
 137. *ipsa . . . adunatione* = τῆς ἐνώσεως, genitive after ἀρξάμενος (*inchoans*, line 23).
 138. *non-consequentia* = τῆς . . . ἀκολουθίας γαμκῆς οὐδόλως εἰς τοῦτο προσδεθῆεις. Having translated ἀκολουθίας ('ceremony') as 'consequence', and understanding the genitive as causal, Eriugena is constrained to omit προσδεθῆεις altogether.
 139. *deo praecognitus* = προεγνωσμένος θεῷ.
 140. *pecudalitatem* = κτηνωδίαν.
 141. *eo modo-potentiis* = τῷ κατὰ παράχρησιν τρόπον τῶν οἰκείων δυνάμεων. *pro-priis potentiis* is an instrumental ablative whereas the Greek phrase it purports to translate is the objective genitive after παράχρησιν, 'the misuse of his own powers'. Eriugena was perhaps misled by the seeming isolation of this genitive from the noun on which it depends (L. B.).
 142. *cuius* = ἧς, genitive after προσεδέθη (*indigebat*, line 31).
 143. i.e. when the division has been reunified.
 144. *deinde-ostendens* paraphrases Max. Conf., *I Ambig.* xxxvii, PG xci. 1309B 6-10.
 145. *quoniam* translates ὡς following δεικνύς, '(showing) that . . .'.
 146. *ipsam . . . rationem . . . qua est* (line 30) = τὸν καθ' ὃν ἐστὶ λόγον.
 147. *quoniam-saluans* (line 29-31) = (δεικνύς) ὡς ἡ γῆ μία ὄσα τυγχάνει πρὸς ἑαυτὴν ἀδιαίρετος, τὸν καθ' ὃν ἐστὶ λόγον τῆς κατὰ τὴν διαφορὰν διαιρέσεως ἐλεύθερον διασώζουσα: '(showing) that the earth happens to be one indivisible with itself, preserving the *logos* in accordance with which it exists free from division by difference.'
 148. *diuersitate-beatitudinis*: cf. 871D, 983CD.
 149. P's addition (*AOPACIAN id est inuisibilitatem*) supplies a noun for the preposition, which in RB has none.
 150. sc. *quo de loco*.
 151. *etenim . . . non* corrected from *non enim* so as to avoid the succession of two sentences beginning with *non*.
 152. *animalem*: endowed with soul, the condition of intellect when associated with corporeality.

153. *per assumptionem* = διὰ ἀναλήψεως. Whereas ἀνάληψις is more frequently used than ἀνάβασις by the Greek Fathers for Christ's ascension, *assumptio*, its Latin equivalent, appears to be found in this sense only in the Latin version of St. Irenaeus, where it no doubt, as here, translates ἀνάληψις.

154. *profecto* = δηλονότι, 'that is'.

155. *connaturali* = ὁμοφυοῦς τε καὶ ὁμοουσίου, 'of one origin and substance'.

156. *unam existentem-sensibilem naturam* = μίαν οὖσαν τῷ κατ' αὐτὴν καθολικωτέρῳ λόγῳ πᾶσαν τὴν αἰσθητὴν φύσιν 'the whole of sensible nature being one with the reason that is more general in relation to it'. By omitting the words τῷ-λόγῳ Eriugena misses the passage of Maximus' thought from the unification of heaven and earth to the unification of the intelligible and the sensible worlds. The intelligible world is καθολικώτερος λόγος because in each case the relationship of the two states that are to be unified is not of two parallel entities but of included effect and inclusive cause.

157. *caelestes diuinosque* = τῶν κατ' οὐρανὸν θείων.

158. *concursum* = σύννευσιν, qualified by πρὸς τὸ ἔν (PG xci. 1309C8), which Eriugena has left untranslated. The omission is probably not deliberate, but due to a subconscious assimilation with *in se ipso* (= ἐν ἑαυτῷ) which immediately follows *concursum*, but qualifies *inseparabilem atque immutabilem*. The translation, 'convergence', is an attempt to repair the damage done to the sense by the omission.

159. *principalissimam eius rationem* = τὸν ἐαυτῆς ἀρχικώτατόν τε καὶ καθολικώτατον λόγον.

160. *immobilem* = ἀστασίαστον, 'not at enmity with itself'. Eriugena must have connected the Greek word with *stabilitas*.

161. *finis*: see note 119.

162. *in omnibus his* = ἐπὶ πᾶσι τούτοις.

163. *secundum intelligentiam humanitatis* = κατὰ τὴν ἐπίνοιαν τῆς ἀνθρωπότητος.

164. *apud ipsum fit deum* = πρὸς αὐτὸν γίνεται θεόν. The force of *apud*, as of the Greek πρὸς, is indicated by the following scriptural quotation, which St. Maximus is merely expressing in another way.

165. *adunauit* = ἐνώσας.

166. *ostendit* = ἀποδείξας.

167. Eriugena found this analogy in St. Ambrose. See 815CD.

168. *propter nos* = δι' ἡμᾶς, 'for us'.

169. *comprehendens* = περιλαβών. This extract, like the preceding one, is part of a very long sentence composed of a series of participial phrases. To be consistent Eriugena should have used a finite tense, cf. *adunauit*, *ostendit* above.

170. *per medietates-extrema*: see note 50.

171. *coniunxit* = διασφίγξας.

172. *iuxta-redditum* = κατὰ τὸν προαποδοθέντα.

173. i.e. not compositely.

174. *Haec enim* (line 21)-*cognatae sunt*. The explanation obscures the meaning. *Cognata* (line 22) refers to the relationship between the *extrema* themselves, not the relationship between the contents of either of them. Eriugena has not understood Maximus' theory, which is that the unification of natures is made possible by the fact that the property of one nature in its extreme form is cognate to the opposite extreme of another. Thus, the human body is an (upward) extreme form of body, and is therefore contingent upon soul, the (downward) extreme form of *Noûs*.

175. *Vita* is soul when it is associated with body. Cf. Aristotle, *De an.* ii. 2, 413^a20 διαρῖσθαι τὸ ἐμφυχὸν τοῦ ἀψύχου τῷ ζῆν. Christ takes upon Himself not

only the part of the soul which operates independently of the body, viz., the rational soul, but also that which operates upon the body, viz., life, from which the body derives the powers of self-nourishment (*κίνησις κατὰ τροφήν*, Aristotle, *loc. cit.*; cf. ii. 4, 415^a22 ἡ θρεπτικὴ ψυχὴ) and growth (*αὔξησης*, *id.*, *op. cit.* ii. 2, 24).

176. *ostendens*: δέξας, agreeing with the subject of ἀνεκεφαλιώσατο (*recapitulauit* p. 40, 3), for the intervening interpolation breaks into the sentence.

177. *simul omnem* = ἅπασαν.

178. *quasi aliquem hominem* = καθάπερ ἄνθρωπον ἄλλον, 'like another man', i.e. the macrocosm. The writing of *aliquem* for *alium* is possibly due to the ambivalence of the Irish *alaili* which may mean either one or the other (L. B.).

179. *intuentem* = νεύουσαν, 'inclining towards'.

180. *indiffinibilem* = ἀπροσδιόριστον.

181. *notitiam* = ἔνοιαν. See note 113. *Iuxta* (line 2) *unam et simplam et indiffinibilem . . . et indifferentem notitiam*: κατὰ τὴν μίαν καὶ ἀπλὴν καὶ ἀπροσδιόριστον . . . καὶ ἀδιάφορον ἔνοιαν. Only an absolutely simple knowledge that does not depend on definitions could apprehend that which is simply and indefinitely one.

182. *ex eo quod non est deductionis* = τῆς ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος παραγωγῆς.

183. *recipere* = ἐπιδέξασθαι.

184. *causam* = λόγον, 'reason'.

185. *in quinto*: cf. 46, 34-5, *sicut in quinto libro tractabimus*. These occasional departures from the fiction of a dialogue usually occur in enlargements apparently added after the completion of the whole work, for they usually refer to Bk. V; not always, however: see the concluding sentence of Bk. I.

186. *Ite-aeternum*: Eriugena uses the version found in cod. Bezae and the African text quoted by African writers including St. Augustine (L. B.). The Vulgate has *descendite* for *ite*. For similar readings see note on 672C.

187. See p. 28, 5-6 above.

188. See Bk. I, p. 42, 4-6.

189. *bonorum hominum-reuocantur*: the true, as opposed to the grammatical, subject is *boni homines*.

190. *sed* refers to what precedes the interpolation.

191. *simpliciter*: see note 173.

192. i.e. those raised at p. 42, 15-p. 44, 7 concerning the dialectic of Maximus. P. 44, 8-p. 46, 27 is a digression and perhaps a concealed interpolation.

193. *sicut-tractabimus*: see note 185.

194. *siquidem-textus* continues from *expetit* (line 29), from which the interpolation now separates it.

195. *lux mentium*: see note 22.

196. *ex ea* can only refer to *diuinis eloquiis* (line 4), and is a sense construction (= *e scriptura*) for *ex eis*.

197. Philo and the Alexandrians.

198. *informitatem*: see p. 50, 7 sq. below.

199. St. Gregory of Nyssa, who taught that the spiritual nature gives existence to the spiritual powers, and these give birth to matter (*De hom. opif.* xxiv, PG xlv. 213B 11-14).

200. St. Basil in the *Hexaëmeron*.

201. Cf. Max. Conf., *Mystagogia* ii, PG xci. 669B 5-10. Πάλιν εἰς ἐστὶ κόσμος τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ μὴ συνδιαιρούμενος μέρεσιν· τοῦναντίον δέ, καὶ αὐτῶν τῶν μερῶν τὴν ἐξ

ιδιότητος φυσικῆς διαφορὰν τῇ πρὸς τὸ ἐν ἑαυτοῦ καὶ ἀδιαίρετον ἀναφορὰ περιγράφων καὶ ταύτων ἑαυτῷ τε καὶ ἀλλήλοις ἀσυγχύτως ἀναλλάξ ὄντας. It does not follow from this comparison that Eriugena knew the *Mystagogia*, for the idea is implicit in all Maximus' teaching (H. U. von Balthasar, *Liturgie cosmique*, Paris 1947, 48-9), and indeed is present in the *Ambiguum* on which Eriugena has just commented.

202. *mihi* . . . *consideranti*: Eriugena's favourite formula for introducing a new subject. Cf. the opening sentence of this work and p. 170, 31-2.

203. It is here seen that the primordial causes are not identical with the intelligibles, but the common cause of intelligibles and sensibles.

204. *informatatem*: see p. 48, 18.

205. The theory introduced in this interpolation was later adopted by David of Dinant in what Bett (*Johannes Scotus Erigena*, Cambridge 1925, p. 178) calls 'a reckless development of Erigena's doctrine'. But since it is put into the mouth of *Alumnus* and is later refuted by *Nutritor*, it cannot be said to be Eriugena's doctrine at all.

206. The reference is to the question which precedes the interpolation.

207. *principio-rationibus*. *Principium* = ἀρχή, uncaused Cause, 'Beginning'; *rationes* = λόγοι, the principles of organization according to which everything is what it is. See Bk. I, note 34.

208. *ex non esse esse*: cf. Bk. I, p. 192, 23.

209. At 729 sq. this *motus* is shown to be the beginning of the *uita communis* which is identified with the World Soul.

210. Cf. Ps.-Avicenna, *In prim. et secund. substantiis*, Venice 1508, f. 54^{vb}: *primordiales cause rerum in sapientia prima facte sunt et nullo modo perfectum appetunt excepto illo immutabili in quo perfecta est forma in qua cause formate sunt. conuerse enim ad hanc conuersione stabili formantur, ut formationem suam deserant nusquam.*

211. P's interpolation is intended to explain *nusquam* and *nunquam* respectively. There can be no change of place, no change of time, because the causes of place and the causes of time are contained within the primordial causes.

212. Cf. Boethius, *de Trin.*, p. 153, 29 Peiper; St. Aug., *Serm.* cxvii. 3; *id.*, *De Gen. ad litt.* iv. 8; Ps.-Eriugena, *In Boeth. op. sacr.*, p. 35, 28 Rand: *est enim forma dei quaedam forma non formata, sed forma omnium rerum formatarum . . . et beatus Augustinus (loc. cit.) dicit deum esse formam informatam, numerum sine numero, pondus sine pondere, mensuram sine mensura.*

213. For the idealist conception of matter see Plotinus, *Enn.* vi. 7, 7; Origen, *De princ.* iv. 4, 7; Greg. Nyss., *De hom. opif.* xxiv, PG xlv. 213AB (Eriugena's immediate source); H. U. von Balthasar, *Présence et pensée* (Paris 1942), p. 20.

214. *inuisibilis et incomposita*: ἀόρατος καὶ ἀκατασκευάστος, the Old Latin (= LXX) version, followed, among others, by St. Augustine (cf. *Conf.* xii. 21, p. 283, 22-3 Knöll) and by Rufinus in his translation of Origen, *De princ.* iv. 1 (who, of course, quotes from the LXX).

215. Cf. 701A below.

216. Cf. Greg. Nyss., *In Hex.*, PG xlv. 80A.

217. Cf. St. Aug., *De Gen. ad litt.* i. 4, 9, PL xxxiv. 249.

218. Cf. St. Basil, *Hex.*, ii, PG xxix. 29AB.

219. *Id.*, *op. cit.*, 29B, ἀόρατον δὲ τὴν γῆν προσεῖπε διὰ δύο αἰτίας· ἢ ὅτι οὐπὼ ἦν αὐτῆς ὁ θεατῆς ἄνθρωπος, ἢ ὅτι ὑποβρύχιος οὖσα ἐκ τοῦ ἐπιπολάζοντος τῇ ἐπιφανείᾳ ὕδατος οὐκ ἠδύνατο καθορᾶσθαι. Cf. St. Ambrose, *Hex.* i. 14, PL xiv. 136D, CSEL xxxii. i, pp. 24-5 Schenkl.

220. St. Basil, *op. cit.* ii. 1, 29C.

221. *chorosque siderum*: cf. Plato, *Tim.* 40C; Plotinus, *Enn.* iv. 4, 33, 6; St. Basil, *op. cit.* ii. 29B χοροῖς τῶν ἀστρῶν, Eriugena's immediate source.

222. See diagram illustrating Eriugena's cosmological theory at 698A.

223. In RB* κοῦφος, *uacuum*, *inane* are applied only to the etherial sphere. Eriugena's insertion in B extends these attributes to both spheres, hence necessitating the alteration of *quoniam* to *sed* at the beginning of the next sentence.

224. The earlier recensions read: 'for that most pure and clear (region) is agreed to be always the most serene'.

224a. *acumen*, 'high pitch.' St. Augustine, Martianus Capella, and especially Boethius all employ *acumen* as the opposite of *grauitas*—Boethius so often in *De inst. mus.* that his editor puts 'passim' against the word in the index. Boethius is chiefly concerned with the tension and relaxation of strings, but towards the end of his work compares the theories of the Pythagoreans, Aristoxenus, and Ptolemy as follows: *Quoniam uero sonum esse omnes consentiunt aëris percussione, grauitatis atque acuminis differentiam diuersa ratione ponebant Aristoxenum secuti et Pythagorici. Aristoxenus quippe sonorum differentias secundum grauitatem atque acumen arbitrabatur in qualitate consistere, Pythagorici uero in quantitate ponebant. Ptolomaeus autem Pythagoricis propior uidetur idcirco, quoniam ipse quoque grauitatem atque acumen non in qualitate putat sed in quantitate constitui. Etenim spissiora ac subtiliora (cf. subtilissimique ignis, line 22) corpora acumen, rariora et uastiora edere grauitatem, ut nihil nunc de intentionis relaxationisque modo dicatur—quantum etiam cum relaxatur aliquid quasi fit rarius atque crassius, cum uero intenditur spissius redditur subtiliusque tenuatur (Boeth., *De inst. mus.* v, 4, p. 355, 19-29 Friedl.). The following passage from Macrobius is noteworthy as it occurs in the context of the 'music of the spheres': *Cum enim casu praeteriret (Pythagoras) in publico fabros ignitum ferrum ictibus mollientes in aures eius malleorum soni certo sibi respondentens ordine repente ceciderunt, in quibus ita grauitati acumina consonabant ut . . . ex uariis impulsibus unum sibi consonans nasceretur (Macr., *In somn. Scip.* ii, 1, 9, p. 26, 23-8 Willis).**

225. *Aera per uacuum saltu iaculabere corpus*: cf. Ouid., *Ibis*, 585 (ed. R. Ellis) 'Aera si misso uacuum iaculabere disco'. Could E. be thinking of this line and be quoting from memory as he sometimes does? The only differences are *salto* for *si misso* (which looks odd to me), *corpus* for *disco*, and the preposition *per*. *Salto* associates easily with the verb *iaculo*; for instance, Eriugena, while trying to recall Ovid's line, may have had at the back of his mind something which Pliny, an author whom he knew, says about the habits of the panther: 'Fera . . . tam auida eorum (excrementorum) ut a pastoribus ex industria in aliquo uase suspensa altius quam ut saltu attingere iaculando se appetendoque deficiat' (viii. 41, 5). By a curious coincidence (it cannot be more) Ellis in his apparatus gives for *Aera* a variant *Fera*.

226. Cf. Bk. I, p. 50, 32-4; 680D, 681A, 898B.

227. *Verbi gratia-retardat*: I have attempted to translate this sentence as it stands in its final form, but it has clearly suffered from the complication of the analogy Eriugena is attempting to draw, and the difficulties he encounters in his attempt to express it. The analogy is essentially between God and the primordial causes on the one hand, and the intellect and its thought on the other, and that would have been sufficient for his argument, which was to show that the primordial causes *per se* share in the incomprehensibility of God. But he was not able to resist introducing the other characteristic

which they share with their Creator, namely, that of being creative themselves, for here too there is an analogy with the intellect and its thought, though it is irrelevant to the present argument. This leads him to include the object of the creative power of thought, namely the intelligible formulation (*cogitatio*) and the sensible expression by which it communicates itself (and the mind which creates itself in it)—which I understand to be the original meaning, before the enlargement was inserted, of *notitiam . . . proferre* ('gives notice of itself' as it were)—by a procession which is both natural (sound) and artificial (sound formed into words) to the perception of other intellects (*in sensus . . . aliorum animorum*). This at least makes sense, although it is digressive; but Eriugena is not content to leave it at that. Whether by accident or design he has, by tracing a progress from intellect (*sapiens animus*) back to *intellect* (*aliorum animorum*), discovered yet another correspondence in his analogy between God—primordial cause—effect and intellect—knowledge—sensation, namely, that in each case the descent from the first to the last is inseparable from the ascent or return from the last to the first. But it is axiomatic with him as with all Neoplatonists that 'the way up is the way down', and that the return should retrace in the reverse direction every step of the descent. As this sentence originally stood this was not the case, for in the return he took a short cut from *sensus* to *animus*, omitting any term to correspond with *cognitio* in the descent. Hence the insertion of the words *deinde—inque*, the effect of which is to describe a descent of three stages, *sapiens animus*, *cognitio*, *in sensus* and a corresponding return of three stages, *in uocum signa*, *in notitiam*, *aliorum animorum*. Unfortunately it has the further effect that *notitiam*, which in the original sentence meant the expression which is the object of *proferre*, must now be taken as the impression in the intellect which receives the communication, which is governed by *inque*, and *proferre* is left without an object, which in the translation has had to be supplied by 'it', standing for the knowledge which is communicated. Grammatically this is the subject, and when the sentence was enlarged *proferre* should have been altered to *proferri*.

228. *ergo* continues from *ita fiat* (line 11), from which it has become separated by the interpolation.

229. As often in the interpolations, the construction is loose. The subject must be *ordo*, and *eam* = *causam omnium*.

230. *simul . . . et semel*: cf. Bk. I, p. 42, 22–5. *Semel et simul* is a frequent formula in Eriugena. Cf. pp. 76, 3; 126, 24–5, 32 *infra*; *Hom.* ix. 7 Jeauneau.

231. *ex non existentibus in existentia*: cf. Bk. I, p. 192, 23.

232. *sed quod* (line 10)—*descendunt*: cf. Ps.-Avicenna, *In prim. et sec. substantiis* f. 65^{ra} *Dicamus ergo quod ordine incomprehensibili omni intellectuali diuina prouidentia omnia ex non existentibus in effectum produxit; unde quadam essentiali dignitate alia aliis preferuntur. ita quod ea que circa uniuersalem causam omnium proxime creduntur et intelligitur* (sic) *esse principalissime uniuersitatis condite, uel conditione creduntur et predicantur. deinde alia ex aliis a summo usque ad deorsum, hoc est ab initio intellectualis creature usque ad infimum omnium quod est corpus.*

233. Cf. Bk. I, p. 68, 7–9.

234. *Nam* = *sed* or, simply, 'and'. See E. Löfstedt, *Philologischen Kommentar zur Peregrinatio Aetheriae* (Uppsala 1911), pp. 34 f. [B.].

235. Cf. Bk. I, p. 68, 4–6; Ps.-Dionys., *DN* v. 2, PG iii. 816C 7–12 τὴν ἐκπεφασμένην ἀγαθοποιὸν πρόνοιαν . . . καὶ ὃν καὶ ζωὴν καὶ σοφίαν, τὴν οὐσιοποιὸν καὶ ζωοποιὸν καὶ σοφοδότιν αἰτίαν τῶν οὐσιῶν καὶ ζωῆς καὶ νοῦ καὶ λόγου καὶ αἰσθησέως μετελήφθων.

The intelligible triad Being—Life—Intellect first appears in Plotinus (cf. *Enn.* v. 4, 2, 2–17; vi. 6, 8), where it represents either three formal aspects of the action of the higher realities on the lower (cf. *Enn.* i. 6, 7, 10–12) or three aspects of *Nous* (cf. *Enn.* v. 4, 2, 43–4; vi. 6, 18, 35) or the stages of the inner development and coming into being of *Nous* (cf. *Enn.* vi. 6, 15, 2). In each case the terms are distinguished not ontologically but logically (Dodds, *Proclus*, 253). But they were hypostatized by his successors, and in the Neoplatonic tendency to triadize all concepts Life became the intermediary between *Nous* and Being. Cf. Porphyry *ap. Procl.*, *In Tim.* iii. 6, 84; Iamblichus *ib.* 45, 5; Theodore of Asine, *ib.* ii. 274, 23; iii. 64, 8; *Comm. in Parm.* ed. Kroll, 14, 15; Syrianus, *In Metaph.* 46, 37; Proclus, *El. theol.* 101; *In Tim.* i. 371, 26–7 ὁ νοῦς . . . τριχῆ, τῷ ὄντι τῆ ζωῆ τῷ νοερῷ. For Plotinus Being is logically prior to all intellectual activity (*Enn.* v. 9, 8, 11) since the thinker must exist in order to think (J. Wahl, *Étude sur le Parménide*, p. 230), and for the same reason is prior to Life, as Life is also prior to *Nous*; but the terms remain co-ordinates. For Proclus, on the other hand, *Nous* 'perfects' Being 'without loss of transcendence' (*El. theol.* 161). All *Nous* is Being, but not all Being is *Nous*. *Τὸ ὄν* is all that is, *Nous* (which here comprises the triad intellect—reason—sense: cf. the Ps.-Dionys., quoted above, and note 319 below) is all that is capable of understanding, i.e. of all wisdom, whether intellectual, rational, or sensible. But that which understands must first be alive, and there must therefore be a Principle less embracing than Being but more so than Wisdom, namely Life. Eriugena alters the traditional and logical order of the triad under the influence of his doctrine of the Trinity, where Being is proper to the Father, Wisdom to the Son, Life to the Holy Spirit.

236. S. Giet, in his edition of the *Hexaëmeron* (*Sources chrétiennes*, 26, Paris 1949, p. 169 n. 3), suggests Theophilus of Antioch.

237. *uerorum doctrinae* = τῆς τῶν ἀληθινῶν ἐπιστήμης.

238. *fouebat*: *συνέβαλλε*, *ἐξωογόνει* were the translations suggested by the Syrian, according to St. Basil. *ζωογόνσις* is used in this context by Theophilus (ii. 13, 132 ed. *Sources chrét.*; see note 236 above). St. Ambrose (*Hex.* i. 8, PL xiv. 139A, CSEL xxxii. 1, pp. 28–9) and St. Augustine (*De Gen. ad litt.* i. 36, 18, PL xxxiv. 260) also took from St. Basil the Syrian's translation. The translation 'fermented' needs some defence since I can find no exact parallel for it. Although Eriugena admits that he is employing a metaphor he means it to be a close one. The evolutionary process (to use modern terms) which the Holy Spirit, *uiuificans*, brings to bear upon the waters is the same as that by which the chicken is hatched from the egg, and has been thought so from time out of mind; hence the primitive and widespread notion of the Cosmic Egg. Life is but an extension of movement, and diversification and multiplication are the concomitants of both. Fermentation, therefore, which is the inauguration of movement, is also the inauguration of life and of diversification. *Spiritus* may denote either the breath (of life) or fermented liquor (which also sometimes takes a name associated with life, as in *cau-de-vie* and *usquebaugh*) or (metaphorically) the Third Person of the Trinity. A parallel could well be drawn between the Holy Spirit's operation upon the primordial waters and the miraculous fermentation of those of Cana. Professor E. L. Mascall, in his Bampton Lectures for 1956, writes: 'In the Christian view the great line of division in the created universe is not between lifeless matter and living creatures, or between plants and animals, but between the realm of matter, living and lifeless alike, on the one hand, and the realm of spirit on the other' (*Christian Theology and Natural Science*, London 1956, p. 265). Eriugena's *fouere* is evidently meant to express the action of

the one upon the other throughout the created universe, living and lifeless. Modern languages express contemporary thought which is conditioned by the dichotomy between living and lifeless and therefore have no such word. Faced with the choice between some such verb as 'quicken' which is normally applied to the animate and 'ferment' which is normally applied to the inanimate, I have opted for the latter since it denotes an act which is more primitive and therefore more comprehensive. The Holy Spirit is the giver of all motion before He is the giver of all life.

239. *facilior*: St. Basil's word is ἐμπατικωτέραν. See p. 68, 19 sq.

240. *per numeros locorum temporumque*: lit. 'through the individuals of times and places'. Since place and time are the prerequisites of a sensible universe (cf. Bk. I, p. 196, 34-5), it is only when each has been dispersed into individual places and times that physical objects can emerge.

241. *ad hoc* (line 16)—*erumpat*. St. Basil merely says κατὰ τὴν εἰκόνα τῆς ἐπιφανείας ὀρθῶς καὶ ζωτικῶς τὴν δυνάμιν ἐνείσει τοῖς ὑποθαλασπομένοις.

242. *principia rerum omnium* = αἱ ἀρχαὶ τῶν ὄντων.

243. *interpretatus-uicina est* = ἔλεγε τοίνυν τὴν τῶν Σύρων φωνὴν . . . διὰ τὴν πρὸς τὴν ἑβραϊδα γεννίασιν.

244. *foecundabat* = ἐξωογόνει.

245. i.e. individuals.

246. P's interpolation is merely a repetition of the last two letters of *uidelicet*.

247. *Ecce habes-declaratas*, i.e. the answer to the double question that Alumnus had asked at the beginning of this chapter, p. 66, 23-5 above: *Quae uerba specialiter praedicta sanctae scripturae primitiuas rerum causas, quae causarum omnium causam uolunt significare*.

248. Cf. St. Aug., *De Gen. ad litt.* iv. 33-4 (52-5), PL xxxiv. 318-20.

249. Cf. Bk. I, p. 50, 33; Bk. II, p. 60, 19; 680D, 681A, 898B.

250. Cf. Bk. I, p. 46, 16-22.

251. The angels see the generation of the Word as we see physical objects.

252. *si tamen* (line 12)—*dicuntur* modifies *nouit* (line 6), from which it is separated by the interpolation.

253. The Father, in begetting his Son, begets His knowledge of the Saints who were to be. *Cognitiones* is passive, 'their being known', or 'His knowledge of them'.

254. Cf. St. Aug., *De Gen. ad litt.* v. 11, 7, PL xxxiv. 330.

255. St. Augustine's *rationes seminales* which God has sown in His unique act of establishing all creatures.

256. Cf. St. Aug., *op. cit.* iv. 33-4 (52-5), PL xxxiv. 318-20, where he says that although various new individuals may come into being in the course of time, God originally created all things together and at once, *omnia simul*.

257. *Quod factum-uita erat*: it is an ancient matter of debate whether the phrase *in ipso* should be taken with *Quod factum est* or with *uita erat*. The Vulgate and the Authorized and Revised English versions favour the latter view so strongly that they punctuate after *Quod factum est* and begin a new sentence with *in ipso*. The variant given in the margin of the Revised Version and the version of the New English Bible, while removing the punctuation mark, similarly take *in ipso* as the complement: 'That which hath been made is life in him', and 'All that came to be was alive with his life.' In his *Hom. in Prol. Ioann.* (ix. 16-30 Jeaneau) Eriugena considers the alternatives and produces a paraphrase which would suit either: 'Omnia itaque quae per uerbum facta sunt in ipso uiuunt incommutabiliter' (x. 1-2). Here, however, it is clear from the context that *in ipso* is to be taken with *factum est*, for *uita* here stands for eternity, the eternity of creation in the Word, which Eriugena

following Maximus, identifies with the Holy Spirit (pp. 96, 22; 184, 29-30 *infra*).

258. Cf. p. 28, 1 sq.; St. Aug., *De Trin.* xv. 22 (viii. 983G of the Paris edition of 1694): *non quia sunt ideo nouit sed ideo sunt quia nouit*.

259. Cf. above, *loc. cit.*, below, (p. 158, 31-3, 632D, 640BC, 768B).

260. *cognitionis*: see note 253.

261. *nam quod per Isaiam—denoscitur constitutum*. This interpretation derives from the Donatist Tyconius, who in his *Liber regularum*, composed some time before 383 (F. C. Burkitt, 'The Book of the Rules of Tyconius', *Texts and Studies*, iii. 1 [Cambridge 1894], p. xviii) writes: 'Diaboli et corporis eius ratio breuiter uideri potest si id quod de domino et eius corpore dictum est in hoc quoque obseruetur. Transitus namque a capite ad corpus eadem ratione dinoscitur, sicut per Esaiam de rege Babylonis: *Quomodo cecidit de caelo lucifer mane oriens!* *Contritrus est in terra qui mittit ad omnes gentes* . . . (Is. xiv. 12-21). In rege Babylonis et omnes reges et omnis populus significatur, unum est enim corpus (*Lib. reg.* vii, pp. 70, 11-71, 7 Burkitt). Pars ergo luciferi, id est aduersum corpus quod est diabolus reges et populus, cadit de caelo (pp. 71, 29-72, 2). Rex ergo Babylonis totum corpus est . . . *Cecidit de caelo lucifer in omne corpus potest conuenire*' (p. 72, 9-11).

Although the earliest (and best) MS. of the *Liber regularum* (MS. Rheims 364, s. ix) formed part of the library of Hincmar of Rheims (Burkitt, *op. cit.*, pp. xii, xxiv-xxv) and was presumably available to Eriugena, his immediate source for Tyconius's interpretation is certainly St. Augustine, who criticized the *Lib. reg.* in his *De doctrina christiana*, iii. 30-7 (42-56), from which all subsequent citations of it, except those contained in the fifth-century African *De promissionibus* (PL li. 731-2), derive. In this work St. Augustine refers to the present passage as follows: *Quod enim scriptum est apud Esaiam, Quomodo cecidit de caelo lucifer mane oriens et cetera quae sub figura regis Babyloniae de eadem persona uel ad eandem personam dicta sunt in ipsa contextione sermonis de diabolo utique intelliguntur, et tamen quod ibi dictum est, Contritrus est in terra qui mittit ad omnes gentes, non totum ipsi capiti congruit. Nam etsi mittit ad omnes gentes diabolus angelos suos, tamen in terra corpus eius, non ipse, conteritur* (*De doct. christ.* iii. 37 (55), 14-22 ap. *Corp. Christ. Ser. Lat.*, xxxii, pp. 114-15).

He returns to it again in the *De Gen. ad litt.*: *Quod ergo per Esaiam prophetam in eum dicitur, Quomodo cecidit de caelo lucifer mane oriens? Contritrus est in terram qui mittebat ad omnes gentes . . . (Is. xiv. 12-15) et cetera quae in figura regis uelut Babylonis in diabolum dicta intelliguntur plura in eius corpus conueniunt, quod etiam de humano genere congregat et in eos maxime qui ei per superbiam cohaerent apostatando a mandatis dei . . . Sicut enim corpus unum est et membra habet multa, omnia autem membra corporis cum sint multa unum est corpus, ita et Christus. Eo modo etiam corpus diaboli, id est impiorum multitudo maximeque eorum qui a Christo uel de ecclesia sicut de caelo decidunt dicitur diabolus et in ipsum corpus figurate multa dicuntur . . . itaque lucifer qui mane oriebatur et cecidit potest intellegi apostatarum genus uel a Christo uel ab ecclesia* (*De Gen. ad litt.* xi. 24, ap. CSEL xxviii, pp. 356, 5-357, 7). A comparison with Eriugena's text, noticing especially the title *prophetam*, absent from Tyconius and the *De doct. christ.*, and the reference to the impious and apostates, reveals that this passage was Eriugena's immediate source, as one would expect, for Eriugena knew the *De Gen. ad litt.* well and draws heavily upon it in the present book. The Vulgate version of the first half of Is. xiv. 12, the only part of the passage commented on by Tyconius which is preserved by Eriugena, is: 'Quomodo

cecidisti de caelo, Lucifer, qui mane oriebaris?' Tyconius used the same Latin version as St. Cyprian (Burkitt, *op. cit.*, p. liii), and in this instance appears to be quoting from it verbatim, since it is a literal translation from the LXX, πῶς ἐξέπεσεν (ἔπεσεν Hippol. i. 2, 13) ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ ὁ εὐσφόρος ὁ πρῶτος ἀνατέλλων; St. Augustine only uses this version when he is citing Tyconius (and the words *uel ad eandem personam* in the passage quoted from the *De doct. christ.* show that he is well aware of its variation from the Vulgate here). By this accident Eriugena is quoting, unawares, from what was probably the earliest Latin version of the Bible (Burkitt, *op. cit.*, p. xi).

262. in *Decadibus*: Cf. Cassiodorus, *In Psalterium praefatio*, PL lxx. 9B 2-7: Memor infirmitatis meae mare ipsius (Augustini) quorumdam psal-morum fontibus profusum, diuina misericordia largiente, in riuulos uadosos compendiosa breuitate deduxi, uno codice tam diffusa complectens quae ille in decades quindecim mirabiliter explicauit; Isidore, *Epist.* iii. 1, PL lxxxiii. 898C 10-11: Postulauit te ut decadem sextam sancti Augustini transmitteres.

263. *N.* (= Nutritor) was originally omitted from the text because in the preceding speech the author, perhaps unconsciously, has allowed Alumnus to take the initiative in the discussion and adopt the tone of preceptor, except in the last sentence, which for that reason RB* introduces with *A* (= Alumnus).

264. *quidem* marks the contrast between *N.*'s opinion and that of the 'Wise' (p. 78, 4), from which it has become separated by the interpolation. The words and phrases interpolated into the following sentence are required to restore the sense, which the interpolation obscures.

265. See note 240.

266. Either *significatur* is impersonal, or the author began the sentence with the intention of using *dicit* or an equivalent.

267. See diagram at 698A.

268. *sub mundo*: According to Festugière (*Révélation d'Hermès Trismégiste*, ii [Paris 1949], p. 244 n. 4 [p. 245], citing Diels, *Vors.* 28A 44), κόσμος in the sense of οὐρανός dates from Pythagoras or Parmenides or Hesiod. He gives a helpful list of references: Philolaus (?) *ap. Aëtium* ii. 7, 7 = *Dox.* 337, 11 = Diels-Kranz, 44 a 16, i, p. 403, 19; Plato, *Tim.* 28 B 3; 40 A 6; 92 C 7; *Epinomis*, 977 B 2; 987 B 6; Isocrates, *Pan.* 179; Aristotle, *De caelo* i. 10, 280^a 21; *Meteor.* i. 2, 339^a 19 (referring to Bonitz for other examples in this work); *Metaph.* K 6, 1063^a 10; *Eth. Eud.* i. 5, 1216^a 11 (Anaxagoras); Timaeus *ap. Polyb.* xii. 25, 7; OGI 56, 47 (Canopus, 238 B.C.). Of these Isocrates (τῆς γὰρ ἀπάσης τῆς ὑπὸ τῷ κόσμῳ κεκμένης) and Timaeus (τῆς γῆς τῆς ὑπὸ τῷ κόσμῳ κεκμένης) are the most relevant. According to Cicero (*De nat. deor.* i. 13, 33), Velleius accused Aristotle of inconsistency in giving the name of θεός both to κόσμος and to αἰθήρ, which is the highest part of the Cosmos; but Aristotle may be absolved on the ground that he was using κόσμος in the sense described here, for αἰθήρ = οὐρανός (Festugière, *op. cit.*, p. 244). Velleius's term for αἰθήρ, according to Cicero, is *ardor caeli* (*id.*, *op. cit.*, p. 243 n. 4), and Cicero himself gives as an equivalent for κόσμος: *mundus lucens* (*Cic. in Tim.* x). This suggests that *mundus*, like κόσμος, could be used to denote heaven as a fiery or lucent element, and goes some way to explaining how Eriugena could substitute *mundo* for the Preacher's *sole*.

269. in *temporibus*: lit. 'in times'.

270. Maximus's words are: τῶν πρώτων δηλαδὴ καὶ τῶν τελευταίων ἐπιμηθεῖς ὡς τῶν αὐτῶν ὄντων καὶ ἀληθῶς ὄντων, τῶν δὲ μέσων καὶ παρερχομένων οὐδόλως κατὰ τὸν τόπον μνηθεῖς.

271. The purpose of P's insertion is presumably to exclude geometrical bodies from this axiom.

272. The subject is the same as that of *peribit* (line 19), i.e. *mundus iste*.

273. This relates to what preceded the interpolation, and perhaps to p. 74, 31, to which *N.*'s next speech (*Coaeterna igitur* . . ., p. 80, 31) seems to refer directly; in which case pp. 74, 31-80, 19 (*non dixit-in eo sunt*) are a long concealed interpolation.

274. Cf. *Hom. in Prol. Euang. Ioan.* viii. 17-19 Jeauneau: *Nihil ei co-aeternum uel consubstantiale intelligitur uel coessentialia praeter suum patrem et suum spiritum a patre per ipsum procedentem.*

275. *nullo modo incipit esse*, lit. 'in no way begins to be'.

276. *quae quodammodo incipit esse*, lit. 'which somehow begins to be'. See previous note.

277. *erat quando non erat*: if these words are to explain the main statement the subject of the first *erat* is the *quando* clause. If, on the other hand, the gloss, written in the authoritative C hand, interprets them correctly, the subject must be *omnis creatura* (see note 278), producing the confused reasoning, '... because there was a time when it was not—(and yet) it was when it was not: it was in the causes when it was not in the effects. Therefore it is not in every respect coeternal with the true eternity.'

278. *Omnis autem creatura-coaeterna est*: cf. Ps.-Avicenna, *In prim. et sec. substantiis*, f. 65^{ra}: *Omnis creatura incipit esse quoniam erat quando non erat. Non est autem uere eternitas modo quodam incipere esse, non igitur uere eternitati omnis creatura coaeterna est.*

279. P's insertion has no other purpose than to insist upon the *flioque* doctrine. It has no bearing on the meaning and destroys the balance of the sentence. Cf. note 507.

280. *rationes*: see Bk. I, note 34. Eriugena is establishing an analogy between *rationes* (*artefacti*) and *occasiones rerum* mentioned just above, the purpose of which is to represent the Son, or Logos, as the pleroma of the Forms, i.e. the Exemplar. His thought is not clear because he is trying to make two points at once with consequent dissipation of emphasis: he is making an allegorical comparison between the operation of God and the operation of the human artist, and a literal comparison between the operation of the Son and the operation of the Holy Spirit; he is saying (a) that as creation consists in the Father creating in the pre-existing Son the *occasiones* (= *rationes*) of all things, so human artefacture consists in the artist creating in the pre-existing art the *rationes* of the artefact he will eventually produce, and (b) that as the Son pre-exists the *rationes*, so the Holy Spirit pre-exists their realizations. The Son is the first *Δύναμις*, the Holy Spirit the first *Ἐνέργεια*.

281. *diuino ore*: perhaps 'from the mouth of God', a common idea, borne out by numerous formulas for introducing biblical quotations. Cf. L. Bieler, 'Bibeltext des heiligen Patrick', *Biblica*, xxviii (1947), pp. 241-3 (L. B.).

282. *deo et patri*, lit. 'to the God and Father'.

283. *proprie*: i.e. they are proper names denoting the Son.

284. *propria unicuique*: cf. 1 Cor. xii. 8-11 in the version used by St. Augustine (*De Trin.* xv. 19, 34). The Vulgate has *singulis*.

285. Cf. p. 66, 7-9; 641C; Ps.-Dionys., *DN* v. 2-3.

286. *dei et patris*: see note 282.

287. *filium dico* is required after the insertion of *patri et*.

288. *ineffabiliter* is to be taken with *natum* which is commonly qualified by its synonym *inenarrabiliter*. Cf. L. Bieler, *Libri s. Patricii*, ii, p. 101 (on *Confessio* 4) (L. B.).

289. See note 279.

290. *facit enim* (p. 88, 35) — *caecitatem*: cf. *Corp. Herm.* xiii. 8–9, p. 204, 3–20 Nock ἤλθεν ἡμῖν γνώσις θεοῦ· ταύτης ἐλθοῦσης . . . ἐξηλάθη ἡ ἄγνοια. ἤλθεν ἡμῖν γνώσις χαρᾶς· παρανομιῆς ταύτης . . . ἡ λύπη φεύεται . . . ὡ δὲ δύναμις ἡδίστη . . . πῶς ἅμα τῷ παραγενέσθαι ἀπόστατο τὴν ἀκρασίαν; τετάρτην δὲ νῦν καλῶ καρτερίαν τὴν κατὰ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας δύναμιν . . . χωρὶς . . . κρίσεως ἴδε πῶς τὴν ἀδικίαν ἐξήλασεν (δικαιοσύνη); . . . ἔκτην δύναμιν καλῶ εἰς ἡμᾶς τὴν κατὰ τῆς πλεονεξίας κοινωνίαν . . . καὶ φεύγει ἀπάτη, ἀλήθεια παραγίνεται . . . τῇ δὲ ἀλήθειᾳ καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐπεγένετο ἅμα ζωῇ καὶ φωτὶ, καὶ οὐκέτι ἐπῆλθεν οὐδεμία τοῦ σκοτόντος τιμωρία. According to Ferguson (Scott, *Hermetica*, iv, Oxford 1936, p. 388), the list of Powers originally totalled seven to counter the seven vices which are the baleful influences of the seven planets, and was increased by the addition of the Good, Life, and Light to bring the total up to the Decad, which belongs to another system. Cf. W. Bousset, *Hauptprobleme der Gnosis* (1907), 364; *Göttingische Gelehrte Anzeigen* (1914), p. 732.

291. *purgatur . . . illuminatur . . . perficitur* express the three stages of the return: subjugation of the soul by the moral virtues, which are cathartic because they do not destroy the body (as in the pagan systems) but purify it of all irrationality so that it becomes one with the rational soul; subjugation of the soul by the theoretical virtues which are an illumination coming not from the soul herself, but descending from her Creator, 'the Father of lights', and which restore her to the state of an intelligible creature; and perfection of the intellect by total assimilation to the Divine Nature. In the Ps.-Dionysius purification, illumination, and perfection are the respective proper functions of the three orders into which each of the Hierarchies is divided. See further below, pp. 108, 28–9; 134, 19; 164, 15–16.

292. *ratio-intellectus*: Eriugena tacitly changes the construction, as if the verb to be understood were *est* or *uenit*, not *accepit* (L. B.).

293. *non quia* continues the argument from line 5 before the interpolation.

294. *Video plane* answers *Videsne* at p. 90, 30.

295. *οὐσία δύναμις ἐνέργεια*: see Bk. I, note 144. To the passage from the *De diuinis nominibus* there cited (*DN* iv. 23, PG iii. 724C 9–10) there is, as is well known, a remarkably close parallel in the *De malorum subsistentia* of Proclus (*De mal. subsist.* 17, 1–4; 18, 4–6; 19, 1–2 Boese) which, without specifically mentioning this triad, seems to indicate that Porphyry, Proclus, and the Ps.-Dionysius were all drawing upon some treatise in which it was applied to the nature of demons. The Ps.-Dionysius and Proclus think of it mostly in connection with the intelligible world (Ps.-Dionys., *CH* xi. 2, PG iii. 284D 5–6 οἱ θεῖοι νόες εἰς οὐσίαν καὶ δύναμιν καὶ ἐνέργειαν; Proclus, *In Tim.* i. 371, 21–2 καὶ τὸ νοητὸν διήρετον τριχῆ, τῇ τε οὐσίᾳ καὶ τῇ δυνάμει καὶ τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ), but for the latter at least it has universal application by analogy: it appears in God as Good–Will–Providence; in *Noûs* as Being–Life–Intellect (see note 235); in Soul as the rationally understood–rational understanding–rational understander (ἐπιστητόν–ἐπιστήμη–ἐπιστήμον) (*In Tim.* i. 272, 1–5); so that, as Damascius was later to say, 'Everything is not one but three: being, power, and operation' (Damasc., *Quaest.* xxxix. 107). John of Scythopolis, in his comment on the passage from the *DN* cited above, says that whereas being is indestructible, power is destroyed by passing into operation, which is therefore the accomplishment or perfection of power (PG iv. 289B 5–6; Bk. I, note 144), showing that the triad is an aspect of the universal permanence–procession–return; cf. Proclus, *In Tim.* i. 371, 22–5 Τῆς μὲν οὐσίας ἐν ἑαυτῇ μονίμως ἡδρασμένης καὶ αὐτοτέλους οὐσης, τῆς δὲ δυνάμεως ἀνεκλείπτου καὶ ἀπειρον πρόδον ἐχούσης, τῆς δὲ ἐνεργείας τελειότητα καὶ οὐσιώδη ποιῆσαν λαχούσης. Essence abides ever in itself, power is a descent from it towards multitudinous dissipation, as when intellect descends into thought, which is

its proper operation (PG iv. 289C 5–6), but every perfect operation is a return, for it leads to God (c 3–4) as every perfect thought leads back to *Noûs* (see note 235). St. Maximus expounds the triad as it is found in God, in the intelligible, and in the sensible world (*I. Ambig.* iii, PG xci. 1084A 14–B 7; xv. 1217C 15–D 3). God by His Nature is; and is omnipotent and therefore has the power for every act; and is perfect and therefore realizes every power in operation. Since He does not act but as He wills, His Power is identical with His will, His *δυνάμεις* are His *θεῖα θελήματα*. *Noûs*, the first formulation of these, a product of the cause of being, by nature is; by will (i.e. potentially) is good; and if it direct its will aright its potentiality for good finds accomplishment in the perfection of eternal being (cf. 112, 26–9) *infra*). The essence of the sensible world is the coming into being (*γένεσις*) conferred upon it by God out of *τὸ εἶναι*; and this is the beginning of a process in space and time, and therefore involves spatio-temporal movement; and since every movement that has its beginning in space and time must also have an end in space and time, every movement is a tendency to rest which is eventually realized in rest. Coming into being is the point at which being passes into well-being, and rest is the point at which well-being passes into eternal being. But being and eternal being are identical, for being extends infinitely 'before' coming into being as eternal being extends infinitely 'after' rest. Rest, then, is the return of well-being into unqualified being, of which it partook at its coming into being and from which it proceeds into its movement towards rest. Again, unqualified being, which is the immediate product of God, proceeds through well-being and returns to God in eternal being. Finally, the whole process of being, whether eternal or contingent, takes place within the Divine Nature, of which it is the Power. It proceeds from It, is sustained by It at every point, and returns to It (cf. Sheldon-Williams, 'The Greek Christian Platonist Tradition from the Cappadocians to Maximus and Eriugena' in A. H. Armstrong's *Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy* [Cambridge 1967], pp. 495–7).

296. *Liberaliter agis*: the question is dismissed as frivolous. For a somewhat similar use of *liberaliter* cf. Cicero, *In Verrem*, act. 11, iii. 196 (L. B.).

297. Cf. St. Aug., *De Trin.* v. 8 (10): *ita ut plerique nostri qui haec Graeco tractant eloquio dicere consueverint μίαν οὐσίαν τρεῖς ὑποστάσεις, quod est Latine unam essentiam tres substantias.*

298. e.g. 1 Cor. i. 24: θεοῦ δύναμις.

299. *aeternitas*: θεϊότης.

300. *sanans*: See note 301.

301. *Nam quod–diuidit sanitatem*: this passage clearly does not belong here, for it implicitly contradicts the previous sentence in which the Divine *Virtus* is equated with the Son. Moreover, the words *mulierem–uirtutem* (lines 24–6) are word for word identical with the first part of the enlargement at p. 196, 23–4 without even alteration to the case of *sanans* which is grammatically correct there but not here. At p. 196, 23–4 the passage is less inappropriate for although *uirtus* is still associated with the Holy Spirit, it is not, as here, considered as the middle term of the triad *Essentia–Virtus–Operatio*. The displacement of a passage from what in our text is an enlargement to a position in the main body of the text suggests that the material from which at least some of the enlargements were drawn already existed in some form before R, the archetypal MS., was written, a theory entertained by Rand although, in my opinion (see Bk. I, Introduction, p. 8), he applied it wrongly. I take this passage, then, to be a concealed enlargement, such as appear to be found elsewhere (cf. Bk. I, notes 65, 99, 107, 173 and note 192

supra), inserted in the wrong place. Part of it was used again where it was more appropriate; the rest should have been rejected as inconsistent with Eriugena's doctrine of the Trinity.

302. i.e. the upper orders of the hierarchy implied at p. 86, 26–32 above, and more precisely at 825B below. *Intellectus* is the form of wisdom proper to the angelic soul, *ratio* that proper to the human soul, *sensus* (*interior*) that proper to the animal (St. Aug., *De lib. arbitr.* ii. 3, 8). For *sensus interior* in St. Augustine see Storz, *Die Philosophie des hl. Augustinus*, 43, 135; Hessen, 'Begründung der Erkenntnis nach dem hl. Augustin', *Beitr. z. Gesch. d. Philos.* xix. 2 (Münster 1916), 39.

303. Eriugena's lost treatise *De uisione dei* opened with the words: *Omnes sensus corporei ex coniunctione nascuntur animae et corporis* ('Bibl.', 221).

304. *est: sit* in the original.

305. *proprietas*, lit. 'property', i.e. (linguistic) peculiarity.

306. i.e. the Latin word 'sensus' can stand for either of the two Greek words *διάνοια* or *αἴσθησις*.

307. *instrumentis significationem praestant*, lit. 'provide their instruments with significations', i.e. names.

308. *est enim simplex*: cf. St. Greg. Nyss., *De hom. opif.* vi. 3, PG xlv. 140A 1–3 *μία γὰρ τίς ἐστι δύναμις, αὐτὸς ὁ ἐγκείμενος νοῦς, ὁ δι' ἐκάστου τῶν αἰσθητηρίων διεξιὼν*; Nemesius, *De nat. hom.* vi. PG xl. 636 *ἔστι δὲ αἰσθητήρια μὲν πέντε, αἰσθήσεις δὲ μία, ἡ ψυχικὴ ἢ γνωρίζουσα διὰ τῶν αἰσθητηρίων τὰ ἐν αὐτοῖς γενόμενα πάθη*.

309. *similitudines* = *φαντασίας*. Cf. p. 98, 18 above.

310. Cf. Chrysippus ap. Calcidium, *Comm. in Tim.* 200, SVF ii. 879 *sensus . . . eorum quae sentiunt nuntios ipsa (anima) de iis quae nuntiauerint iudicat ut rex*. But Eriugena probably derived the simile from St. Augustine. Cf. *Enarr. in Ps. cxlvi.* xliii, PL xxxii. 1907 *caro ista per quinque nuntios quosdam quos appellamus sensus percipit non nisi corporalia*; *Conf.* x. 10, 6, p. 198, 10–14 Knöll: *quid horum est unde quaerere debui deum meum, quem iam quaesieram per corpus a terra usque ad caelum, quousque potui mittere nuntios radios oculorum meorum?* See further 851B, 977C. Varro called the senses the gates, the veins the aqueducts, the intestines the sewers, of the body (*sensus portae, uenae hydragogiae, cloaca intestini*, *Sat.*, fr. 290 Bücheler). For the city–soul analogy see Calcidius, *op. cit.* 233, 269 Wrobel.

311. *motus circa deum*: cf. Max. Conf., *I Ambig.* vi. 3, PG xci. 1112D 7 *περὶ θεὸν κινουμένη*.

312. Cf. Max. Conf., *I Ambig.* vi. 3, PG xci. 1112D 4–5 *τρεις . . . κινήσεις . . . εἰς μίαν συναγομένης*.

313. *itaque* replaces some other word in order to establish a link with the sentence which precedes the interpolation.

314. Cf. Max. Conf., *loc. cit.* 1112D 7, *ἀγνώστως περὶ θεὸν κινουμένη*.

315. *Ibid.*, 1112D 6.

316. i.e. *uitalis motus*.

317. *lux mentium*: see Bk. I, p. 223 n. 12; p. 172, 7 below.

318. *ordo rerum*, lit. 'the order of things'.

319. *Tres uniuersales motus*: According to the Ps.-Dionysius, the three universal motions of Aristotle, the circular, the straight, and the 'mixed' or helicoidal (Aristotle, *Phys.* viii. 8, 1, 261^b28–9; *De cael.* i. 2, 2, 268^b17–18), are present not only to the physical world but to the whole of *Natura*. At *DN* ix. 9, PG iii. 916 (quoted by Eriugena, Bk. I, p. 220, 1–6) they are attributed to God; at *DN* iv. 8, PG iii. 704D 1–705A 2 to the Angels; at iv. 9 to souls (cf. Hermias, *In Platonis Phaedrum Scholia*, pp. 20–1 Couvreur); and at iv. 10,

PG iii. 705B 10–C 4 to bodies. The definition of the three motions in the soul as, respectively, *κατὰ νοῦν*, *κατὰ λόγον*, and *κατὰ αἴσθησιν*, is due to St. Maximus (*I Ambig.* vi. 3, PG xci. 1112D 6), whose teaching Eriugena reproduces in the following pages.

320. *et supra ipsius animae naturam* is not in Maximus. Cf. *intra animae naturam*, line 20 below.

321. *interpretatione caret* = *ἀνερμήνευτον*.

322. *incognitum* = *ἀγνώστως*. Cf. *incognite*, p. 100, 32.

323. *cognoscit* = *ἐπιγιγνώσκει*.

324. *quo-causa* = *κατ' αἰτίαν ὀριστικὴν τοῦ ἀγνώστου*.

325. i.e. it is a motion which belongs to her by nature, whereas the first is bestowed by grace.

326. *operatione-imponit* = *ἐαυτῇ δι' ἐνεργείας κατ' ἐπιστήμην ἐπιτίθεται*.

327. *omnes* (line 21)–*per causam* = *τοὺς ἐπ' αὐτῇ φυσικοὺς πάντας λόγους τοῦ κατ' αἰτίαν μόνου ἐγνωσμένου μορφωτικοῦ*. Eriugena has mistaken the gender of *αὐτῇ* and the case of *ἐγνωσμένου*.

328. *Dum uero* (line 16)–*refert*: cf. Max. Conf., *I Ambig.* vi. 3, PG xci. 1113A 11–B 4 *τὴν μὲν αἴσθησιν ἀπλοῦς διὰ μέσου τοῦ λόγου πρὸς τὸν νοῦν τοὺς τῶν αἰσθητῶν πνευματικῶς λόγους ἔχουσαν μόνους ἀναβιβάσαντες, τὸν δὲ λόγον ἐνοειδῶς κατὰ μίαν ἀπλήν τε καὶ ἀδιαίρετον φρόνησιν πρὸς τὸν νοῦν τοὺς τῶν ὄντων ἔχοντα λόγους ἐνώσαντες, τὸν δὲ νοῦν τῆς περὶ τὰ ὄντα πάντα κινήσεως καθαρῶς ἀπολυθέντα καὶ αὐτῆς τῆς καθ' αὐτὸν φυσικῆς ἐνεργείας ἡμεροῦντα τῷ θεῷ προσκομίσαντες. ab eo . . . in eo . . . a se refer* respectively to Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.

329. The subject of the inserted sentence is Maximus; cf. p. 106, 6 *supra*.

330. *purgatae . . . illuminatae . . . perfectae*: see note on p. 291; *actionem . . . scientiam . . . theologiam*, i.e. the practical, the theoretical, and the theological virtues respectively. The first motion of the soul is that of the soul which has ascended the scale of purgation, illumination, and perfection by the practical, theoretical, and theological virtues.

331. *non enim-moueri*: cf. p. 100, 19.

332. *circularis*: *κυκλικῶς*, Ps.-Dionys., *DN* iv. 8, PG iii. 704D 1.

333. *quid obstat* introduces the apodosis of the conditional sentence of which the protasis is at lines 6–10 before the interpolation.

334. *nam si* (line 6)–20 *sunt*: cf. Ps.-Dionys., *DN* iv. 8, PG iii. 704D 1–3 *Καὶ κρεῖσθαι μὲν οἱ θεοὶ λέγονται νόες, κυκλικῶς μὲν ἐνούμενοι ταῖς ἀνάρχοις καὶ ἀτελευτήτοις ἐλλάμψεσι τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ ἀγαθοῦ*.

335. *non intellexit*, lit. 'did not (i.e. ceased to) understand'.

336. *non solum* (line 17)–*exaltatus*: cf. Greg. Nyss., *Vit. Moys.*, PG xlv. 380A 2–7 *ὁ δὲ κεκαθαμένος τε καὶ ὄξυς τὴν ἀκοὴν τῆς καρδίας, τὴν ἤχηρ ταύτην δεξάμενος, λέγει δὲ τὴν ἐκ τῆς θεωρίας τῶν ὄντων γνωσμένην πρὸς τὴν τῆς θέας δυνάμειν γνώσιν, ὁδηγεῖται δι' αὐτῆς πρὸς τὸ ἐκεῖ διαδύναμι τῇ διανοίᾳ ὅπου ἐστὶν ὁ θεός, et al.* St. Gregory's teaching was that man's pristine state was angelic, but the return is not only to the angelic or intelligible world, which he attains through illumination, but beyond that to the perfection of deification.

337. *existunt . . . bene existunt . . . semper existunt*: see note 295.

338. Since P's interpolation relates to the enlargement it is bracketed with it; it is, however, a superfluous addition. A rare, perhaps unique, case of the interpolator P supplying a Greek Patristic source.

339. *naturalibus-motibus*, i.e. the second and the third motions. The first is not a motion of the soul's nature, but of God upon the soul.

340. *ideoque . . . mentis aciem dirige*, lit. 'and therefore direct the keenness of your mind'.

341. *ita* (line 29)–*percipit*. Cf. 963C where theophany is described as an

exalted kind of phantasy. For the theophanies see Bk. I, pp. 16–20.

342. The subject of *intelligat* is *motus* (line 22), separated from it by the interpolation. The sentence thus qualifies *intellectuarum* (line 27).

343. *sicut-artifex*. Cf. 635C, 768B, and Ps.-Eriug., *Comm. in Boeth. Cons. Phil.* iii *met.* 9, 7, 54–5 Silvestre: *Sicut enim artifex aliquod opus facturum prius figuram eius imaginatur in mente sua, ad cuius similitudinem postea illud opus faciat, ita et deus formam huius mundi semper in ratione sua habuit; Boethius, op. cit., iv. prosa 6, 12: sicut enim artifex faciendae rei formam mente praecipiens mouet operis effectum et quod simpliciter praesentarieque prospexerat per temporales ordines ducit, ita deus prouidentia quidem singulariter stabiliterque facienda disponit, fato uero haec ipsa quae disposuit multipliciter ac temporaliter administrat. The simile recurs several times in St. Augustine's *De Genesi ad litteram*.*

344. *ui et potestate* was evidently inserted to balance the following phrase *actu et opere*, but this is already accomplished by *uniuersaliter atque causaliter*, for universal and causal being is potential being.

345. *quemadmodum-ita intellectus*. Cf. Bk. I, p. 64, 17–20.

346. *generaliora*: i.e. *generaliora quam formas . . . specialissimas*. English usage, which always arranges the series of degrees of comparison in ascending order, forbids the literal translation 'more general'.

347. ΔΙΑΝΟΙΑ . . . *sensus . . . interior*. The equation of *dianoia*, which usually denotes the motion of the soul by which she apprehends the principles of the sciences and especially the mathematical (cf. Plato, *Republic* 511D *et al.*) and therefore almost equivalent to *logos* in this context, with the *sensus interior* seems to be peculiar to Eriugena; but St. Maximus makes it quite clear in his description of the last motion of the soul, which Eriugena is here following, that when he says it is *κατὰ αἰσθησῶν* he means the *sensus interior*, which is inferior to reason but superior to the *sensus exterior*. Since Eriugena knows nothing of the doctrine of the mathematical, *dianoia*, which is inferior to *Noûs*, but superior to *δόξα* (Plato, *loc. cit.*), seems to him to mean the same thing.

348. ΕΝΕΡΓΙΑ: Eriugena is perhaps thinking of Ps.-Dionys., *DN* iv. 9, PG iii. 705A 12–B 3 *ἐλικοειδῶς δὲ ἡ ψυχὴ κινεῖται . . . οὐκ οὐκ συμμικτοῖς καὶ μεταβατικαῖς ἐνεργείαις*. He is, of course, anxious to avail himself of any authority which seems to equate the three motions of the soul with the triad *οὐσία, δύναμις, ἐνέργεια*. Cf. p. 102, 15–16 and p. 114, 36 (*δύναμις*) above.

349. *sensum-interior*. Cf. p. 98, 5–6 above.

350. *procedit per rationem*. Whereas *ratio* is born of *intellectus*, *sensus* proceeds from *intellectus* through *ratio*; for these three are the image of the Holy Trinity in man: *Intellectus* is the Father, *Ratio* is the Son begotten of the Father, *Sensus* is the Spirit proceeding from the Father through the Son according to the formula preferred by Eriugena.

351. *diuidit*, the proper function of the Holy Spirit.

352. *partitur*. Eriugena tends to use this verb to express physical division, reserving *diuidere* for logical division. See p. 6, 32 above.

353. *Idipsum-discernuntur*. A confusion of two constructions. The verb *est* (which takes its singular number from the predicate) has two subjects, *quae-unum sunt* and *sensu-discernuntur*, which should, from the point of view of syntax, be two parallel clauses. Since, however, they are here said to be one and the same thing, they are combined into a single clause.

354. *Hoc est-comprehendit*. The purpose of the insertion is to show that the differences are not imposed by the mind but exist in nature. But Eriugena is not certain about this; cf. lines 21–2 below.

355. *infinitis numeris*. See p. 116, 29 above.

356. *inferioribus effectibus* is probably dative after *distribuit*, but the translation 'in the effects', which is what must be meant, is supported by the *in* inserted by B before *causarum effectibus* at line 34.

357. *speculo*: a favourite simile of St. Gregory of Nyssa.

358. See note 350.

359. *filiouque*, an expression not commonly found in Eriugena.

360. *ex non existentibus in existentia*. Cf. Bk. I, p. 192, 23.

361. *βοῶ-uoco*. Cf. Priscian, i. 2: *uox autem dicta est uel a uocando ut dux a ducendo uel ἀπὸ τοῦ βοῶν*.

362. *uitali sensui*. Literally, 'enlivened sense'.

363. *perfectionem*: for nature is perfected by the addition of reason; intellect is a gift of grace.

364. *quaedam namque* (line 15)–*superponitur*. Cf. Plotinus, *Enn.* iii. 2, 3, 36–8 *καὶ τὰ μὲν τοῦ εἶναι μετέχειν δοκεῖ μόνον, τὰ δὲ τοῦ ζῆν, τὰ δὲ μᾶλλον ἐν τῷ αἰσθάνεσθαι, τὰ δὲ ἤδη λόγον ἔχει, τὰ δὲ πᾶσαν ζωὴν*.

365. *numeros indiuiduorum*, a hendiadys: lit. 'numbers of individuals', i.e. numerically discrete individuals.

366. *scientiae actu* (line 33) . . . *gnostica operatione*. Cf. Olympiodorus christianus, *In Eccl.* i. 16 sq., PG xciii. 492D *σοφία . . . γνώσις θεῶν καὶ ἀνθρωπίνων πραγμάτων . . . γνώσις δὲ ἐστὶ θεωρία τῆς φύσεως τῶν ὄντων*.

367. *per numeros locorum et temporum*, lit. 'through numbers of places and times'.

368. *praesens . . . remota*, in spite of their case, qualify *animae*.

369. *Et ne me* (p. 126, 28)–*dixisse*. The original sentence has been severely distorted by the enlargement. *Et ne me-conditum* (p. 126, 28–9) has become an anacoluthon, and has had to be taken up again by the clumsy device of adding at the end of the enlargement the words *quod uidelicet corpus* (p. 128, 1–2). The original text, preserved in R*, i.e. in Recension A, read as follows: *Et ne me existimes primum illud essenziale corpus in paradiso conditum incorruptibile, aeternaliter coaeternaliter animae adhaerens, in quo omnes homines resurrecturi sunt, ab anima creari dixisse*: 'And do not think that I mean that that first essential body, created incorruptible in paradise, eternally co-eternally adhering to the soul' (i.e. eternally adhering to the soul with which it is co-eternal), 'in which all men will rise again, is created by the soul.'

370. *dispositiones* is Eriugena's word for the Dionysian *διακοσμήσεις*, that is to say, the orders within a hierarchy. Cf. p. 156, 2.

371. *recognoscendo et humiliando*, i.e., by recovering the knowledge of his true spiritual body which leads him to humiliate his fleshly body.

372. ΠΕΡΙΖΩΜΑΤΑ: Gen. iii. 7 LXX. For Eriugena's acquaintance with the Septuagint see note on 672C.

373. *quemadmodum folia . . . sic nostra corpora . . .* Cf. Greg. Naz., *Orat.* xxxix.

374. *quasi quendam fructum*: not one of P's happier additions.

375. *quod ΠΕΡΙΖΩΜΑΤΑ . . . uidelicet*. This addition, however, improves the sense.

376. *philosophus* is redundant.

377. *animale* is a restrictive epithet applicable to that which possesses soul but not intellect. Reason apart, it is appropriate to the kind of body which man shares with the rest of animate nature. Those who speak of 'psychic' phenomena employ a term which is perhaps more apt than they realize.

378. *in omnibus-gloria*. See 979A.

379. *excepta ratione subiecti*: cf. p. 136, 7. The difference is that God has

His Essence of Himself whereas man has his from God. *Subiectum* is the Greek *ὑποκείμενον*, equivalent here to *ὑπόστασις* (*substantia*) cf. below, p. 148, 1-5 and *οὐσία* (*essentia*), which the Stoics replace by *ὑποκείμενον* in their logic (L. B.). In appropriate contexts the difference between 'subject' and 'substance' disappears, as when substance or essence is said to be the subject of which the other nine categories are the accidents (Bk. I, p. 94, 32-4).

380. *de nihilo creatus*. Cf. Bk. I, p. 192, 23, *et al.*

381. *et*. P's insertion is necessitated by the immediately preceding interpolation of *naturam*.

382. *quia est non . . . quid sit*. Cf. Bk. I, p. 40, 6-7.

383. *purgata illuminata perfecta*. See note 291.

384. *in se ipsa conformans notitiam*: the Image's act of knowing corresponds to the Prototype's act of creating: the latter, by passing into all things, forms their essences; the former, by apprehending the essences, forms concepts or phantasies of them.

385. The thrice repeated *πρωτότυπον* (lines, 16, 17, 20) refer respectively to Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. The Father is the source of supernatural being, i.e. grace; the Son of general being; the Holy Spirit of particularized being.

386. *imago imaginem sibi fecit*. Cf. Bk. I, p. 48, 3-4.

387. *similitudine*: the likeness of the image to the *πρωτότυπον*.

388. *caeteraque-sunt*: a loose phrase such as Eriugena often uses to dismiss a subject when he does not wish to exhaust it. It should, of course, be taken as following immediately after *laudans* (line 23).

389. *De Imagine* is the name by which Eriugena knew the *De hominis officio* of St. Gregory of Nyssa, and under which he translated it.

390. *forma* here must have the Platonic sense of 'exemplar'.

391. *refragare*: in Late Latin many deponents have become active, or the two sets of forms are optional (L. B.).

392. *theologo*. B's correction marks the first occasion on which Eriugena treats the two Gregories as one person, which he continues to do henceforward.

393. *Audi Nazianzenum*. In fact the words are those of Maximus. Presumably the text of the *Ambigua* used by Eriugena did not clearly distinguish between the commentary and the passages commented on.

394. *cumulatio-dicuntur*: ὅπερ ἐστὶ καὶ λέγεται τὸ ἄθροισμα τῶν ἡμῶν περὶ αὐτὸ νοουμένων τε καὶ λεγομένων. Cf. Leontius the Hermit, *Adu. argumenta Seueri*, PG lxxxvi. 1932B θεωρημάτων ἄθροισμα ἀλλ' οὐ φύσεων σύνοδον τὸν χριστὸν εἶναι. Eriugena destroys the sense by detaching the ὅπερ clause from αὐτὸ τὸ εἶναι (*ipsum esse*, line 4) and attaching it to ἄθροισμα (hence *quae*, feminine, agreeing with *cumulatio*). I can make nothing of *rea* interpolated in P: it has no meaning, and does not correspond to any word in the Greek text.

395. *continet namque ea* = συνεκτικὸν μὲν τούτων.

396. *ab omni ratione-insilire*: παντὶ λόγῳ τῶν περὶ θεοῦ θρασέως ἐπιπηδᾶν. By taking the indirect object παντὶ λόγῳ as ablative dependent on *quiescat* Eriugena has left himself without an object for *insilire*, which he supplies with *in diffinitionem eius*.

397. *sed silentio* = καὶ σιγῇ, continuing the idea of πανσάσθω παντὶ λόγῳ ἐπιπηδᾶν (*quiescat* . . . *ab omni ratione* . . . *insilire*, lines 8-9). Eriugena's faulty translation breaks the continuity and necessitates the rendering of *καὶ* by *sed*.

398. *ueritatem* = ὀντότητα, 'reality', lit. 'beingness'.

399. *summum* = ἐπέκεινα, a preposition ('beyond').

400. *ineffabilem-scientiae* = τὴν ἀρρήτὸν τε καὶ ὑπὲρ νόησιν καὶ πάσης ἐπέκεινα γνώσεως. The three attributes are in ascending order, denoting respectively

the transcendence of sense, reason, and intellect. With the last cf. the sense of ἐπίγνωσις when contrasted with γνώσις as in St. John Damasc., *c. Manichaeos* i. 78, PG xciv. 1577A γνώσις μὲν γὰρ ἐστὶ τὸ εἶδέναι τὰ ὄντα . . . ἐπίγνωσις δὲ ἐστὶν ἢ μετὰ ψευδῆ ἐπιγνωμένη ἀληθῆς γνώσις. *Scientiae*, genitive = γνώσεως governed by ἐπέκεινα.

401. *hoc*, i.e. that it is impossible to know what the Divine Substance is, implied in the question preceding the interpolation.

402. *ipsam = diuina substantia*. See p. 138, 1-3.

403. *possit* is subjunctive not after *si* (cf. *diffinit*), but because it is the apodosis of another conditional sentence of which the protasis, 'if He so desired', is suppressed.

404. *primum categoriarum locum*, i.e. essence.

405. *numerum . . . excedere*, lit. 'exceed the number of . . . '.

406. *neque forma neque species*. The terms are synonymous. Cf. p. 4, 20 *et al.*

407. *deus- quid est*. This is the refutation of Alumnus' *non negabis ut aestimo ipsum deum se ipsum intelligere quid sit* at p. 134, 36-7.

408. *Et hoc est mirabile*, lit. 'and this is wonderful'. R.V. margin translates 'seeing that it is secret', which would go well with the foregoing argument.

409. *nominatione: nominatio* . . . a figure of speech whereby a thing which has no name or an unsuitable one receives an appropriate one.' Lewis and Short.

410. *siquidem* follows on from line 6 before the interpolation.

411. *ut intellectualis-est*: the intelligences are recognized as such by the fact that they are in the intelligible world.

412. *suae uirtutis altitudine*, i.e. the depth to which His *uirtus* (δύναμις) descends in creating the universe. Cf. p. 152, 17 below.

413. *mensura sine mensura, numerus sine numero, pondus sine pondere*. In created nature every measure, number, and weight can be measured, numbered, or weighed, just as every motion is caused by a mover; God is the unmeasured measure, the unnumbered number, and the unweighed weight, as He is the unmoved Mover. See also Bk. I, p. 208, 13 and Bk. III, 4, PL cxxii.

414. *opponas*: bring forth as an argument against what I have said. Eriugena obviously decided that the sentence as it originally stood: 'do you not oppose (the statement) that the order of bodies cannot be extended into the natures that are above it' was insufficiently clear, and therefore inserted *quare dixerim* which is almost the equivalent of an indirect statement. *Ordinem-non ualere* now becomes the direct object of *dixerim*. The insertion of *cum* (line 7) cannot be a genuine addition to the text; it must have been omitted by sR, and then added as a correction (L. B.). Without *cum* there is no place here for *credamus*. Avranches supplies a clue, for in that MS. the words *credamus omnia corpora* are inserted between the lines, suggesting that at some stage of the text these words, as well as *cum*, were absent; and their omission would leave a perfectly rational sentence with *in incorporeas-esse transitura* as the direct object of *opponas*. In its archetypal form, therefore, the sentence would run: 'Et ne mihi opponas ordinem corporum in altiores se naturas extendi non ualere in incorporeas qualitates atque substantias esse transitura.'—*mihi*: before the addition of *quare dixerim* (with a meaning closely approximating to *quod dixerim*), this would be the indirect object after *opponas*; after the addition, required to indicate that *ordinem-non ualere* expresses not a fact but the statement of a fact, it is better to take it as an 'ethical dative' (L. B.).

415. *de hoc*. I suggest that this is a duplication by P of the *de hoc* interpolated at line 13. In R the words *instat hoc est quod deus quid sit non intelligit intueamur et utrum tibi probabile uidetur quod conamur de hoc* occupy a single line (f. 124^v, line 1), *de hoc* being added at the end of it. sP was undecided as to where these two words were intended to be inserted, and inserted them twice over.

416. *quid tibi uidetur* is a redundant echo of the preceding *utrum tibi . . . uidetur*.

417. *Non illam* (line 24)–*dicuntur*. This passage, written in the text in 'Eriugena's' hand, presumably replaces an earlier recension that has been erased. It is therefore not an enlargement but a correction. Nevertheless, the words, *Non recte quidem*, which follow (p. 148, 1), being so far removed from the question they answer, *num tibi recte uidebitur* (line 24), suggest that in the prototype of R the erased passage was an enlargement.

418. *Non recte quidem*: see previous note.

419. *Nam quod—possidere patrem* is added to justify the insertion of *habitudinemque* (line 24). It recalls a passage in Bk. I (p. 70, 21–2), and the language suggests that Eriugena is the author (e.g. *diuinae bonitatis trinitate*). If so, Eriugena here makes the distinction, which is not clear elsewhere (cf. Bk. I, p. 233 n. 102), between *relatio* and *habitus*. The former is impermanent, the latter permanent.

420. *diffinitae substantiae*. P's insertion draws attention to the fact that the argument has already been taken too far; for all the categories except the first are accidents of the first, and therefore if the first is not found in God then neither are the other nine. But this is also brought out in the next sentence.

421. The insertion blunts the point of the argument which is simply that there can be no accident if there is no subject for it to be attached to. But Eriugena has remembered that there are separated as well as associated accidents.

422. *finitur*, obviously the correct reading, must have been an emendation of the scribe of the 'supplement to the uncompleted copy' from which the Cambridge MS. and that used by the Oxford Epitomist derive.

423. *Non enim totum est neque pars*. Cf. p. 4, 6–8 and p. 142, 18.

424. *coronam*, lit. 'crown', as it might be the crown of martyrdom.

425. *Ipsa . . . sibi ipsi ad habendum sufficit*, lit. 'Itself suffices to itself for condition.' *Habitus* (ἐξέσις) is notoriously difficult to translate into English. It is the verbal noun of *habere* (as is ἐξέσις of ἐχέω) in the sense of 'to possess inalienably', and is therefore the name of that category to which belong all things which have become attached to the subject so as to be inseparable from it. Since the Aristotelian theory of categories has not affected the English idiom it is as inadequate to translate *habere* as 'have' in this context as it is to translate *accidere*, when the subject is an accident, as 'happen'. Throughout this passage the noun *habitus* and the verb *habere* denote the same thing.

426. *non aliunde habet*, lit. 'holds (the condition of virtue) from nowhere else'. See previous note. Virtue in the virtuous soul is the stock example of a 'condition'. It is inseparable from the soul *qua* virtuous, without, however, being of her essence. But if virtue is inseparable from the Deity it is of its essence, for the Deity is 'simple', and nothing can be associated with it which is not itself.

427. *non* is a solecism due to reluctance to ascribe to the Deity any kind of inability.

428. *se ipsam amat in omnibus*. Cf. Bk. I, p. 216, 19–21.

429. *altitudine uirtutis*. See note 412.

430. *essentiam . . . uirtutem . . . operationem*. See note 295.

431. *rationes—indiuuum sunt*: cf. 639D, 669BC.

432. *ignorantia—sapientia*: cf. p. 162, 27–8 below and 689B.

433. *Non noui—condidit*: see note 29.

434. *non punio*: cf. 943C.

435. *dicens*: a sense construction. Strict grammar would require *dicente*.

436. *Theologi*: οἱ θεολόγοι = the writers of the Scriptures. Cf. Bk. I, n. 197.

437. *dispositiones* = διακοσμήσεις. See note 370.

438. *ornate* = εὐκόσμως.

439. *superfirmatis* = ὑπερβεβηκυῶν.

440. *deificas scientias*: τὰς θεωρητικὰς ἐπιστήμας, the sciences necessary to deification, the perfection of the soul's ascent.

441. *doctrinas* = μνῆσεις.

442. *docentem—manifestam* = μνοῦντα καὶ πρωτοδότως αὐταῖς ἐκφαίνοντα. Eriugena, having read *πρωτοδότως* as a nominative singular ('giving beforehand') and forcing it into agreement with the accusative *Iesum*, could not translate ἐκφαίνοντα as a second epithet qualifying Ἰησοῦν, but takes it as an accusative feminine passive (!) qualifying ἀγαθουργίαν (*benignitatem*) which is in fact its object.

443. *suam humanam benignitatem* = τὴν αὐτοῦ φιλόανθρωπον ἀγαθουργίαν, the divine operation of grace (hence φιλόανθρωπον) which condescends to the intelligible operation of θεωργία, and thereby renders it effective.

444. *simul* = τόσον, 'by so much'.

445. *diuinas illuminationes*: τῶν θεαρχικῶν ἐλλάμψεων, the rays that descend from the Thearchy, the 'Father of lights'. If the gloss is Eriugena's, it shows that he treated the phrase as nominative (although translating it as accusative); and this would explain the insertion of *quaestiones* to supply an object for *petunt* (line 9).

446. *et simul omnes supereminet*: although the passage *et eas ipsum—scientiam appetunt* (lines 4–11) translates a continuous passage of the Greek, Eriugena has broken it into three. The first break, marked in Eriugena's text by *Item . . . inquit* (lines 6–7), is between *salutaris* and *Mirror*; the second, marked by Eriugena's *et* (line 8), between *illuminationes* and *ut mediate*. But this second break occurs in the middle of a sentence, and this may have induced Eriugena to translate the participle ὑπερκείμεναι by the finite *supereminet*. The true main verb of the sentence is *petunt* (line 9). Line 8 *ut mediate quaestiones: ὡς μεσοπετεῖς*, 'as (six-winged) beings who use their median pair of wings for flying' (cf. Is. vi. 2). Eriugena must have connected the second part of the compound word (which is a hapax legomenon) with *petere*.

447. *nonne inde interrogant*: καὶ γὰρ οὐκ αὐτόθεν ἐρωτῶσι, 'For it is not on their own initiative that they ask.' By taking οὐκ with the verb instead of with the adverb (which he did not understand) Eriugena has had to make the sentence interrogative.

448. *Quare—uestimenta?* The Ps.-Dionysius follows the tradition of identifying the Vine-harvester with the Messiah, but puts the question into the mouth of the highest order of the celestial hierarchy instead of that of the prophet.

449. *uero* = δέ, balancing οὐκ αὐτόθεν. See note 447.

450. *quidem* = μέν. The quotation ends before the corresponding δέ.

451. *deificam scientiam*: τῆς θεωρητικῆς γνώσεως. Cf. note 443. Eriugena rightly takes *ἐπιστήμη* and *γνώσις* to be synonymous here, and translates both by the same word.

452. *quod uero* answers to *non est mirum* at p. 154, 31.

453. *an*, lit. 'or whether'. See next note.
454. Eriugena's argument can only be sustained by taking *nescio in corpore an extra corpus* as two distinct but parallel negative sentences qualifying *scio* ('I know . . . (but) I do not know . . . nor do I know . . .') instead of a single sentence in which the verb, *nescio*, governs a double indirect question ('I do not know whether . . . or whether'). P's insertion of a second *nescio* is intended to emphasize this, but its effect is to make *an* still more anomalous.
455. *simplex*. Contrast man's composite knowledge which resulted from his eating of the fruit of the Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil.
456. *formatur*. The form of knowledge is its content.
457. *primam-formatur*. This species of ignorance was also enjoyed by man before his transgression. See note 455.
458. *diuina siquidem scientia-causa est*. Cf. p. 28, 1 above.
459. *Quorum-scientiam*. *Naturaliter* and *essentialiter* are to all intents and purposes synonymous. Both the knowledge of all things and the power to create all things are the essence of God, and since that essence is simple, are not other than the essence, nor is either other than the other.
460. *actionis*: actuality. Eriugena is here speaking of the *effects* of the primordial causes. In his philosophy the *rationes* (and *a fortiori* the primordial causes *qua* causes) are the potencies, the effects their actualizations. Things are causes in act. In fact, *actio* is synonymous with *operatio*, and sometimes takes its place in the triad *essentia-uirgus-operatio*; cf. Bk. I, p. 136, 28.
461. *facta*: in both Early and Late Latin *res* can be taken up by a neuter pronoun. See Hofmann-Szantyr, *Latein. Grammatik* II (1965), § 233, II b (L. B.).
462. *eorum comprehendit ratio*. *Eorum* is a neuter plural agreeing with some such noun as *praedicamentorum* or *generum*. The *ratio* of all *genus* involves the principle that there are degrees of *genus*.
463. *in motu et in statu sunt*, i.e. some are in motion, others at rest.
464. *de nihilo in esse*. Cf. Bk. I, p. 192, 23.
465. *ipsa uero* (p. 160, 34)-*subdiuiduntur*. Universal being does not fall within the categories either of rest or of motion, for it is they that are within it; and neither rest nor motion falls within any of the ten categories, for each of these falls within either the category of rest or the category of motion.
466. *Possibilia . . . impossibilia*. Cf. Bk. I, p. 36, 26.
467. *continentur*, i.e. have their being in: such being as they have is their impossibility.
468. *de quibus*. The antecedent is *Eorum* (line 11), i.e. *impossibilia*, which is now separated from it by the interpolation.
469. *ignorantia-sapientia*. Cf. p. 154, 6-7 and 689B.
470. *praeter rationem subiecti*: see note 379.
471. *dicitur* is required before *uel* and is implied by *dici* in line 16. It could easily have dropped out after *de deo* if written *de dō dī*.
472. *secundum essentiae uirtutem*, for of the Essence itself nothing could be said. See p. 166, 31 below.
473. *purgatur illuminatur perficitur*. See note 291.
474. *illa . . . ista . . . ea*. The sequence consists of the first three aspects of nature, that which creates and is not created, that which is created and creates, and that which is created and does not create, here seen to be God (as First Cause), soul, and body respectively.
475. *imago imaginis*. Cf. Greg. Nyss., *De hom. opif.* xii, PG xlii. 164A 13-15 ὁ δὲ νοῦς τῷ κατ' εἰκόνα τοῦ καλοῦ γεγενῆσθαι καὶ αὐτὸς ἔχει τὸ καλῶς εἶναι· ἡ δὲ φύσις

- ἡ ὑπὸ τοῦ νοῦ συνεχομένη καθάπερ τις εἰκὼν εἰκόνας ἐστὶ, cited by Eriugena from his translation at 790A. Cf. also *De hom. opif.* 161C 15-18.
476. *et sunt et condita sunt*. The two verbs refer respectively to the fact that the primordial causes are eternal and that they are created, as Eriugena has shown elsewhere.
477. *secundum usum Romanae linguae dicendum*. The construction is elliptical, and this has prompted the insertion of *si*, giving the meaning 'or if we are to express ourselves according to . . .', but there is no evidence that this is what Eriugena wrote.
478. *subsistentibus . . . subsistentes = substantialibus . . . substantiales*. Cf. p. 166, 8 below.
479. ΑΠΟΦΑΤΙΚΗ et ΚΑΤΑΦΑΤΙΚΗ. Cf. Bk. I, pp. 72, 34-74, 5. The earliest reference to the two parts of theology occurs in the title to Ps.-Dionys., *MT* iii.
480. *Iam inter nos-fateri*. What is said of God by Revelation agrees with what is said of the First Cause by the philosophers.
481. *Dionysii Ariopagitae*. The special mention of the Ps.-Dionysius reminds us that for Eriugena he was the disciple of St. Paul and a sub-apostolic authority.
482. *uirtutem*: the opposition is almost between the name and the reality named, but not quite. 'Reality' for Eriugena is the triad *essentia-uirgus-operatio* (cf. Bk. I, p. 136, 13-18), and the Divine Reality resides not in the Substances (*substantiarum = ὑποστάσεων*), but in the One Essence of the Three Substances (to use the terminology he prefers), which he equates with this triad as it is in the Divine Nature. In any context, human or divine, the name 'Father' is connected to the name 'Son' by the category of relationship, and therefore if it is possible to speak at all of God in terms of Father and Son, it is possible to apply the category of relationship to Him. In the *names* the relationship is a permanent one (*habitus*), and so, on the same condition, *habitus* may be ascribed to the Deity. When, however, we turn from the name to the substance named, the parallelism between the human and the divine natures no longer pertains. Parenthood is accidental in a man, but in God an aspect of His eternal Nature or Reality, for it is never untrue, in the proper context, to call Him by the name of 'Father' or by the name of 'Son'. The permanence of the connection between the Substances named is co-equal and co-existent with the permanence of the connection between the Names; it is another aspect of the same thing, the aspect Eriugena says he is discussing here. What has been said relates to man 'in hac mortali uita'; in man as formed in the Image of God there are no accidents but *habitus* or *habitudines*, and the parallelism between God and man in this sense is defective only by virtue of the difference between Creator and created. According to Eriugena the *habitus* of the soul are the *uirtutes* (Bk. I, p. 108, 37-8), including the spiritual mode of propagation which man would have enjoyed but for the Fall, and which the angels enjoy. It is appropriate, therefore, that when in the Divine Nature he wishes to distinguish the eternal connection between the Divine Persons, which in the following sentence he characterizes as 'generation or procession', from the eternal connection between the Divine Names, he should employ the term *uirtus*, which, so characterized, can appropriately be translated as 'power'.
483. *habitudinem*. See note 425. Not unreasonably P decided that *habitudinem* required qualification and inserted *relationum* before it (cf. p. 170, 2); the resulting phrase means little more than 'the possession of relationship'.
484. *in primo sermone De Filio*, i.e. Greg. Naz., *Orat. theol.* ii. (*orat.* xxix),

PG xxxvi. 93B, known to Eriugena through St. Maximus, as the ensuing quotation shows.

485. *non enim iuxta naturam* is clearly a duplication of *non enim secundum naturam* in lines 19–20.

486. *et filio* is an insertion prompted by the plural *nomina . . . praedicantur* where one would have expected *nomen* (i.e. *pater*) . . . *praedicatur*. Nevertheless, only the Father is in question here; the Son is dealt with in the *quem-admodum* clause.

487. *mihi . . . cogitanti*. See Bk. I *ad init.* and note 202.

488. *lux mentium*, i.e. God. See above, n. 317.

488a. See Additional Note, p. 252.

489. *quantitatem-incorpoream*. Cf. St. Augustine, *De quantitate animae*, iii. 4, PL xxxii 1037.

490. *mentem . . . notitiam . . . amorem*. Cf. Ps.-Eriugena, *Comm. in Boeth. op. sacr.* 39, 10 sq. Rand: *Namque aliud uocatur intellectus, aliud uoluntas, aliud memoria. Memoria nomen est unius ex illis tribus et tamen hoc nomen illius tria ipsa operata sunt. Non enim potuit dici sola memoria nisi operante uoluntate intellectus et memoria, sed intellectus et uoluntas non potest dici nisi operante memoria. Vnumquodque ergo eorum tria fecerunt sed tamen hoc unum quod tria fecerunt non ad tria pertinet sed ad unum tria, siquidem nomen memoriae fecerunt; sed hoc non pertinet nisi ad solam memoriam. Sic tria fecerunt nomen intellectus et nomen uoluntatis; sed haec quoque ad se solum pertinent.*

St. Augustine discusses the triad *mens-notitia-amor* not only at *De Trin.* ix, but also at *Conf.* xiii. 11, p. 303, 2–7: *Esse nosse uelle. Sum enim et scio et uolo; sum sciens et uolens et scio esse me et uelle et uolo esse et scire; and at De ciu. dei, ix. 26A: Hoc est illius summae trinitatis . . . ut sit etiam similitudine proxima. Nam et sumus et nos esse nouimus et id esse ac nosse diligimus. For his teaching on this theme see Schmaus, *Psychologische Trinitätslehre d. hl. Aug.*, 233–64 ('Der Ternar mens notitia amor'). See also p. 192, 6–8 below and 942A, where this triad is equated with *essentia-uirgus-operatio*.*

491. *et* (2): P's insertion is superfluous.

492. *per occultos . . . poros*. Cf. Bk. I, p. 38, 31; Bk. III, PL cxxii, 653A *et al.*

493. *sapientes mundi*, lit. 'men wise about the world'. (*mundi* is objective genitive). Cf. p. 182, 7 below.

494. *ignis* (line 11)–*componitur*. Cf. Bk. I, p. 158, 5–7. These coupled qualities are the *σύμβολα* of Aristotle, *De gen. et cor.* ii. 4, 331^a24, but Eriugena could also have known of them through St. Basil, *Hex.* iv, PG xxix. 89c.

495. *propria*. P's reading is certainly correct.

496. *Quare-aestimas*: a compressed expression of which the general sense is that it cannot be true both that it (warmth) is the same as itself (fire), and that it (warmth) is the cause of itself (fire).

497. *ignem-componi*: i.e. warmth and dryness are the causes of fire.

498. *hoc est non ex duabus sed ex una procedere*. The sense requires that the inserted clause depend not on *prohibent* but on some positive equivalent.

499. *confestim* is a duplication by P from line 21. The word can have no meaning here.

500. *rationem-superare*. The consequence of this would be that analogies drawn from created nature would have no value. It is a denial of the validity of the cataphatic theology.

501. *inquit*: although redundant introduction-formulae for biblical quotations are common (L. Bieler, 'Der Bibeltext des heiligen Patrick', *Biblica*,

xxviii (1947), p. 242), the superfluous 'inquit' appears to have been inserted here because the reviser did not realize that the preceding 'enim' was part of the quotation.

502. *a creatura mundi* = ἀπὸ κτίσεως κόσμου, a temporal phrase. One must suppose, however, that Eriugena took it for an ablative of the agent after the passive *conspiciuntur*, though this makes strange Latin.

503. *naturalis . . . ratio*, i.e. the reason which is of our nature, without support of revelation. The rational demonstration follows immediately with the example of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob.

504. *unum-differentiam*, i.e. they are one by virtue of their common human nature, but three distinct persons.

505. *hoc exemplum-inueniet*: three species of a common genus are one in that genus, and three individuals of a common species are one in that species.

506. *non tacet*, lit. 'is not silent', i.e. does not refrain from saying that . . .

507. P's insertion adds nothing to the argument, and indeed is hardly consistent with what follows. Its purpose seems to be to safeguard the *filioque* doctrine for *radioque* is equivalent to *filioque*, whereas Eriugena favours *per radium* = *per filium*. This trend of P is found elsewhere in the work. Cf. note 279.

508. *paraclytus*: a common Latin and Medieval Latin spelling (L. B.).

509. *mens-coniunguntur*. See note 490.

510. *hoc totum*, i.e. the whole triad *mens-notitia-amor*.

511. *dilectionem*. Like *laudem* and *cognitionem*, this word has an active force. The three words express dispositions which the mind adopts as a consequence of perfect knowledge of the trinity in its own nature. For the meaning of *dilectio* see Bk. I, note 45.

512. *traditur*, handed down as a tradition.

513. *ac per hoc* follows on from *cur non etiam de filio* (p. 194, 34–5).

514. *addiderunt*. In fact, of course, the only addition is *filioque*.

515. *nisi forte* modifies not *nil temere conamur*, but *nondum-peruenit* (lines 14–15); *atque ideo* (line 15)–*diffinire* (line 16) reads like an addition to the original text.

516. *paulo ante*: p. 190, 26.

517. *Augustinus*: e.g. *De Trin.* v. 10; vii. 7.

518. *eam . . . quod . . . per se ipsum*. The text is not improved by the insertion (in R) of *eam*. Omitting it we could read 'incessantly seeking to behold what in itself they cannot contemplate'.

519. *per mediarum alarum uolatum*. With the upper wings they cover their faces, with the lower wings their feet, with the middle wings they fly. Cf. Is. vi. 2 *ad fin.*

520. *quomodo* (line 5)–*exaltatum*. Cf. Ps.-Eriugena, *Comm. in Boeth. Cons. phil.*, 210, 23–211, 13 Silk: *Si ut dicis sentis de deo, facile reuocabo te ad patriam, id est ad montis incolumitatem. Nota quod dicit, Hoc quidquid est quod deus inuisibilis est omnibus rebus. Neque enim ipsi angeli integre ualent eum considerare, de quibus scriptum est, In quem desiderant angeli perspicere. Sciendum est tamen quia secundum aliquid semper uidetur ab angelis. Hinc legimus quia Angeli eorum semper uident faciem patris mei qui in caelis est (Matth. xviii. 10). Et cum idem deus semper ubique sit, nihil tamen esse dicitur quod eius esse ignoratur. Similiter cum ipse sit lux et habitet locum inaccessibilem tenebrae esse asseritur propter considerantium infirmitatem.*

521. *per ipsam et in ipsa*. The subject is *θεότης*.

522. *inquisitiones*: ἐξεράσεις.

523. *ipsam*: αὐτόν, i.e. *intellectum*. Eriugena, by translating the pronoun as a feminine, presumably thought that it agreed with *rationem*, which would make nonsense of the sentence. See note 527 below.
524. *impartite* = ἀμερίστως.
525. *in prima acie* = ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ προσβολῇ, evidently taken by E. to be a military metaphor (L. B.).
526. *de monade rationem* = τὸν περὶ μονάδος λόγον.
527. *ipsam rationem* = αὐτόν, the mind. Eriugena's insertion of *rationem* is an aggravation of the error indicated in note 523 above.
528. *foecunditatem* = γονιμότητα. Cf. Ps. Dionys., *DN* i. 4, PG iii. 589D 6–592A 2 τὴν θεαρχίαν ὁρῶμεν . . . ὡς μονάδα μὲν καὶ ἐνότητα διὰ τὴν ἀπλότητα καὶ ἐνότητα . . . ὡς τριάδα δὲ διὰ τὴν τρισυπόστατον τῆς ὑπερουσίου γονιμότητος ἔκφανσιν.
529. *optimum* = τὸ ἀγαθόν, usually translated so by Eriugena. Cf. pp. 208, 6; 212, 4.
530. *in foecundum* = ἄγονον, referring to the Cause. Cf. Ps. Dionys., *DN* iv. 10, PG iii. 708B 3–7 αὐτὸς γὰρ ὁ ἀγαθόβεργος τῶν ὄντων ἔρως . . . οὐκ εἴασεν αὐτὸν ἄγονον ἐν ἑαυτῷ μένειν, ἐκίνησε δὲ αὐτὸν εἰς τὸ πρακτικεῦσθαι κατὰ τὴν ἀπάντων γενητικὴν ὑπερβολήν, but here the reference is to the Divine Economy, not to the Trinity.
531. *uerbi ac sapientiae* = λόγου καὶ σοφίας, i.e. the Son.
532. *sanctificatiuae uirtutis* = ἁγιαστικῆς δυνάμεως, i.e. the Holy Spirit. Cf. St. Basil, *Epist.* ccxiv. 4, PG xxxii. 789B; *id.*, *Adu. Eun.* iii. 2, PG xxix. 660A.
533. *coessentialiumque in substantiis*, 'and of co-essences in substances', is a meaningless phrase resulting from Eriugena's attempt to impose grammatical form on a misreading of ὁμοουσίω ἐνυποστάτων, which are in apposition to λόγου καὶ σοφίας ἢ . . . δυνάμεως, 'which are coessential with it and hypostases within it'. Cf. St. Cyril of Jerusalem, *Catech.* iv. 7 τὴν σοφίαν θεοῦ καὶ τὴν δυνάμιν . . . ἐνυπόστατον. Eriugena read ἐνυποστάτων as two words, of which in translation he had to make the second ablative after *in*. The only way to fit such a phrase into the sentence was to transpose καὶ and ὁμοουσίω which he took for a noun.
534. *subsistens* = ὑπάρχων. Eriugena omits the following word αἰ, which is required by the sense.
535. *non ut—credatur*: ἵνα μὴ σύνθετον ἐκ τούτων ὑποληφθῆ τὸ θεῖον ὡς συμβεβηκότων καὶ οὐχὶ ταῦτα ὑπάρχον αἰ πιστευθῆ. The intellect is warned against supposing that Logos and Sophia are accidents of the Divine, and against *not* believing 'that It is always Them' (cf. note 482). Eriugena has obscured the sense by translating ἵνα μὴ by *non ut* instead of by *ne* and by omitting the αἰ before πιστευθῆ, and has made nonsense of it by translating ταῦτα by *in eis*.
536. *illuminatione* = ἐλλάμψεως. Illumination is the path from purification to deification, and therefore a *movement* from the beginning to the end of the ascent.
537. *intueri deitatem* = ἐπιβάλλειν θεότητα.
538. *impossibile* = τῶν ἀμηχάνων.
539. *species uel formas*. See note 1.
540. ΠΡΟΟΠΙΣΜΑΤΑ. Cf. p. 14, 13 and note 30.
541. *Diuina prouidentia*. Cf. Ps.-Dionys., *DN* v, PG iii. 816C 1–817A 4.
542. ΘΕΙΑ ΘΕΛΗΜΑΤΑ. Cf. p. 14, 14 and note 30.
543. *in creatura—intelliguntur*, i.e. perceived (by the senses) in the visible, understood in the invisible.
544. *quia—est*. Since there is nothing other than Himself, there is nothing alien and therefore nothing unknown to Him; therefore His knowledge extends to the limits of His creation.

545. *omnino* = ὅλως.
546. *dictum est* = λέγομεν.
547. *per-se-ipsam esse* = τὸ αὐτοεῖναι.
548. *per-se-ipsam uita* = τὴν αὐτοζωήν.
549. *principaliter esse* = ἀρχηγῶς εἶναι. The Greek continues: καὶ ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ πρώτως ὑφειστηκέναι, but the last four words are omitted in the text used by Hilduin and Eriugena, and consequently both leave καὶ ἐκ untranslated.
550. *declarationem*: διασάφην.
551. *per-se-ipsam-causam*: τὸ αὐτοεῖναι τοῦ εἶναι τὰ ὄντα πάντα. Eriugena read τὸ αὐτοεῖναι as a dative, and ignores πάντα.
552. *solummodo enim—essentiae causale* = μόνον γὰρ τοῦ εἶναι πάντα τὰ ὄντα καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ εἶναι ὑπερουσίον ἀρχῆ καὶ οὐσία καὶ αἴτιον. The καὶ presents difficulties. Migne punctuates so as to attach it to αὐτὸ τὸ εἶναι ὑπερουσίον, M. de Gandillac omits it from his translation, while Eriugena takes it as a co-ordinating conjunction which he eventually justifies by supplying the co-ordinate *subsistendi* in his last recension. He was perhaps led to translate καὶ οὐσία καὶ αἴτιον as a hendiadys (*essentiae causale*) from regarding *esse* and *essentia* as synonymous.
553. *uitae parentem* = ζωογόνον.
554. *causam* = αἰτίαν, adj. qualifying ζωήν, 'the life which causes', taken by Eriugena for the accusative of the noun αἰτία.
555. *editae uitae* = τῆς αὐτοζωῆς, 'Life-through-itself'. Eriugena seems to have read τῆς ἀπὸ <αὐτῆς> ζωῆς.
556. *per-se-ipsam esse et per-se-ipsam uitam et per-se-ipsam deitatem* = αὐτοεῖναι καὶ αὐτοζωήν καὶ αὐτοθεότητα.
557. *principaliter—causaliter* = ἀρχικῶς μὲν ὄν, θεϊκῶς καὶ αἰτιατικῶς, adverbs of which the significance is tantamount to that of ἀμεθέκτου below.
558. *superprincipale* = ὑπεράρχιον.
559. *participaliter* = μεθεκτῶς.
560. *prouidas uirtutes* = προνοητικὰς δυνάμεις.
561. *non participante* = ἀμεθέκτου, 'not participated in', passive: cf. line 17 below. By translating it as an active Eriugena conceals the reference to the triad ἀμέθεκτος—μέθεκτος—μετέχων common to the thought of Proclus and the Ps.-Dionys. Cf. Procl., *El. theol.* 24.
562. *Non enim essentiam* (p. 206, 30)—*et alia similiter*: the Greek is as follows: Οὐ γὰρ οὐσίαν τινα θεῖαν ἢ ἀγγελικὴν εἶναι φαμεν τὸ αὐτοεῖναι τοῦ εἶναι τὰ ὄντα πάντα αἰτίαν—μόνον γὰρ τοῦ εἶναι πάντα τὰ ὄντα καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ εἶναι ὑπερουσίον ἀρχῆ καὶ οὐσία καὶ αἴτιον—οὐδὲ ζωογόνον ἄλλην θεότητα παρὰ τὴν ὑπέρθρον πάντων ὅσα ζῆ καὶ τῆς αὐτοζωῆς αἰτίαν ζωήν . . . ἀλλ' αὐτοεῖναι καὶ αὐτοζωήν καὶ αὐτοθεότητα φαμεν ἀρχικῶς μὲν ὄν θεϊκῶς καὶ αἰτιατικῶς, τὴν μίαν πάντων ὑπεράρχιον καὶ ὑπερουσίον ἀρχὴν καὶ αἰτίαν μεθεκτῶς δὲ τὰς ἐκδιδομένας ἐκ θεοῦ τοῦ ἀμεθέκτου προνοητικὰς δυνάμεις, τὴν αὐτοουσίωσιν αὐτοζώωσιν αὐτοθεώωσιν ὄν τὰ ὄντα οἰκειῶς ἑαυτοῖς μετέχοντα καὶ ὄντα καὶ ζῶντα καὶ ἔνθεα καὶ ἔστι καὶ λέγεται, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ὡσαύτως. Eriugena's translation of it is far from happy. He read τὸ αὐτοεῖναι as a dative, giving *per se ipsam existendo*, which his gloss suggests should be taken as an ablative absolute; he translates οὐσία καὶ αἴτιον as a hendiadys, *essentiae causale*, obscuring the logical link between ἀρχῆ καὶ οὐσία καὶ αἴτιον and the later echoing phrases ἀρχικῶς μὲν ὄν θεϊκῶς καὶ αἰτιατικῶς καὶ ὑπεράρχιον καὶ ὑπερουσίον ἀρχὴν καὶ αἰτίαν; he takes αὐτὸ τὸ εἶναι as the subject, and ἀρχῆ καὶ οὐσία καὶ αἴτιον as the complement, of the parenthetical sentence, and is consequently forced to insert *subsistendi* to account for the καὶ which follows τοῦ εἶναι πάντα τὰ ὄντα. In fact the complement is μόνον, 'unique', placed at the beginning of the sentence for emphasis, which Eriugena mistook for the adverb, while the subject is ἀρχῆ καὶ οὐσία καὶ αἴτιον, treated as a single unity and qualified by the singular ὑπερουσίον which

Eriugena, disregarding the gender, takes with ἀρχή alone; while καί joins αὐτὸ τὸ εἶναι to πάντα τὰ ὄντα: 'For there is only one superessential Principle-Essence-Cause of the existence of all that exists and of the existence of existence itself.'; he takes the adjectival αἰτίαν for a noun, so that *uitam* is asyntactical; by inserting *et* after *quidem* (μὲν οὖν) he separates ἀρχικῶς from θεϊκῶς which it qualifies, 'as First God', equivalent to τοῦ ἀμεθέκτου in the second part of the sentence, which he mistranslates *non participante*. The words αὐτοουσίωσιν αὐτοζώωσιν, which, with αὐτοθέωσιν, reflect αὐτοεἶναι καὶ αὐτοζωῆν καὶ αὐτοθεότητα, were missing from Eriugena's exemplar, and consequently are not translated. This explains the harshness of the following *quas* and the fact that although a plurality of *uirtutes* has been mentioned, the function of only one appears to be given. Finally, by translating the participle μετέχοντα as the finite *participant* (cf. note 446), he breaks the single clause ὦν-λέγεται, in which τὰ ὄντα is the subject and μετέχοντα καὶ ὄντα καὶ ζῶντα καὶ ἔνθεα (the last three attributes being related to the first consecutively) is the complement, into two clauses, in the second of which *existentia* is the subject and *et uiuentia et diuina* is the complement.

563. *optimus substitutor* = ὁ ἀγαθὸς ὑποστάτης. Cf. note 529. The words which follow in the Greek, εἶτα τῶν ὄλων αὐτῶν, are lacking from the text used by Eriugena, and the argument is obscured in consequence. It may be summarized as follows: τὸ ἀμεθέκτον is the cause both of τὸ μεθεκτόν (the primordial causes) and of τὸ μετέχον (the effects). The last falls into two categories, of both of which the first is the primary cause: τὰ ὅλως μετέχοντα (genera), and τὰ μερικῶς μετέχοντα (species).

564. *deinde-participantium* = εἶτα τῶν ὄλων αὐτῶν μετεχόντων, according to PG which here agrees with Eriugena's text. But probably we should read with Pera (*Thom. Aqu. in DN, Rome-Turin 1950*) εἶτα τῶν ὄλων αὐτῶν μετεχόντων, which would balance μερικῶς (*particulariter*, line 8). Eriugena has remembered to alter the case of αὐτῶν but has retained that of ὄλων.

565. *diuinarum-magistrorum* = τῶν θεῶν ἡμῶν ἱεροδιδασκάλων.

566. *plus quam optimam et plus quam diuinam*: τὸν ὑπεράγαθον καὶ ὑπέρθρον.

567. *substitutricem* = ὑποστάτην, thought to be feminine—which explains the genders of the adjectives which follow.

568. *per-se-ipsam bonitatis* = τῆς αὐτοαγαθότητος.

569. *beneficam-donationem* = τὴν ἀγαθοποιὸν καὶ θεοποιὸν . . . δωρεάν.

570. *per-se-ipsam-formam-fusionem* = αὐτόκαλλος τὴν αὐτοκαλοποιὸν χύσιν.

571. *et totam-bona* = καὶ ὄλον κάλλος καὶ μερικὸν κάλλος καὶ ὅλως καλά. These must all be objects of the verbal suffix of αὐτοκαλοποιὸν, additional to αὐτοκάλλος implied in the first part of the epithet. Eriugena obscures the meaning by translating καλά (*bona*) differently from κάλλος (*forma*, 'beauty'). By an unhappy chance the words καὶ ἐν μέρει καλά which follow καὶ ὅλως καλά are lacking from the text he is using (cf. note 564 above), so that once again the argument is not fully set forth in his translation. The name αὐτόκαλλος is given generally to all that is produced from the unparticipated source of Beauty: the unparticipated Beauty, τὸ αὐτόκαλλος; the participated Beauty (the primordial cause), ὄλον κάλλος and μερικὸν κάλλος; and the participating beautiful things (the effects), ὅλως καλά and ἐν μέρει καλά.

572. *prouidentiam et bonitatem* = προνοίας καὶ ἀγαθότητας, plurals.

573. *et copiosa fusione et*. Either the first or the second *et* is redundant, and the sense requires that the first, inserted in P, should be retained.

574. *superscatentes* = υπερβλυζούσας.

575. *non participante* = τοῦ ἀμεθέκτου, passive. Cf. note 561.

576. *diligens* = ἀκριβῶς. The reason for this rendering is not apparent.

577. *summitas omnium* = ἐπέκεινα ἢ πάντων.

578. *superessentiale* = τὸ ὑπερουσίον.

579. *ipsius esse* = τοῦ εἶναι; *ipsius* represents the definite article.

580. *si quis uult* = εἰ βούλει, 2nd person.

581. *per-se-ipsam-similitudinem* = τὴν αὐτομοιότητα. P's *et* is redundant.

582. *ut ordinatorum* is duplicated in P.

583. *inuenies*. Here Eriugena retains the 2nd person. Contrast *uult* above (note 580).

584. *per-se-ipsa-participia* = τὰς αὐτομετοχάς, the generic term of which the foregoing are special examples.

585. *ab eo esse-existentia* = τῷ εἶναι πρῶτον μενούσας. Eriugena read μὲν οὐσας perhaps correctly; cf. Tuturro.

586. *eo esse* = τοῦ εἶναι.

587. *existentia participata* = καὶ οὐσας καὶ μετεχομένας.

588. *ante subsistit*: προῦφέστηκε, preceded by ἐνοειδῶς, which Eriugena omits although it is in the text which he used.

589. *singulariter* = μοναχῶς, 'monadically'.

590. *prouenit* = πρόεισι.

591. *discernitur et multiplicatur* = διακρίνεται καὶ πληθύνεται.

592. *consubstitutae sunt* = συνυφαστήκασιν.

593. *primam* = μίαν, 'one'.

594. *signum* = τὸ σημεῖον.

595. *simples lineas* = τὰς εὐθείας, 'the straight lines'.

596. *procedunt* = προῆλθον, past tense.

597. *distantes* = διαστᾶσαι.

598. *recedentes* = ἀποστᾶσαι.

599. *in tota omnium natura* = ἐν τῇ ὅλῃ τῶν ὄλων φύσει.

600. *secundum-rationes* = οἱ τῆς καθ' ἕκαστον φύσεως λόγοι.

601. *conuolutae sunt* = συνειλημμένοι εἰσι. Eriugena supposed the verb to be a part of ἐλίσομαι.

602. *per unam inconfusam unitatem* = κατὰ μίαν ἀσύγχυτον ἔνωσιν.

603. *secundum-uirtutes* = αἱ τῶν κατὰ μέρος πάντων προνοητικῶν τοῦ ὄλου σώματος δυνάμεις.

604. *in omnium causale* = ἐν τῷ πάντων αἰτίῳ.

605. *uniformiter et unite* = μονοειδῶς καὶ ἡνωμένως.

606. *omnis sapientia* = πᾶσα σοφία.

607. *omnis custodia* = πᾶσα φρουρά.

608. *omnis collocatio* = πᾶσα ἱδρυσις, 'all establishment'.

609. *omnis intellectus* = πᾶσα νόησις.

610. *omne iudicium*. Eriugena's text had πᾶσα κρίσις. The correct reading is πᾶσα κρᾶσις, 'all mixture'.

611. *omnis compactio* = πᾶσα ἐφαρμογή.

612. *et quidem* = καίτοι.

613. *sensibiliū essentias* = τὰς τῶν αἰσθητῶν οὐσίας.

614. *existentes* = οὐσας.

615. *et quidem multas*, duplicated in P.

616. *unus-lux* = εἰς ὧν καὶ μονοειδῆς ἐπιλάμπων φῶς. ἐπιλάμπων is transitive and μονοειδῆς φῶς is its object. In Eriugena's version *uniformis lux* is in apposition to *sol* (line 26).

617. *remouet* = ἀνακινεῖ.

618. *renouat* (line 28)—*praeambit* (line 33). The series of verbs roughly corresponds to the series of nouns in lines 19–24.

619. *multo magis* (p. 210, 33)—*egressionem*: working from a faulty text,

Eriugena has produced a version which deviates considerably from the text as found in PG: πολλῶ γε μᾶλλον ἐπὶ τῆς καὶ αὐτοῦ καὶ πάντων αἰτίας προῦφυστάται τὰ πάντα τῶν ὄντων παραδείγματα κατὰ μίαν ὑπερούσιον ἔνωσιν συγχωρητέον· ἐπεὶ καὶ οὐσίας παράγει κατὰ τὴν ἀπὸ οὐσίας ἔκβασιν: 'All the more should it be allowed that above the cause both of it (i.e. the sun) and of all things are presubstantiated all the exemplars of existent things in one superessential unity. For He brings forth substances also by the emanation from the (primordial) substance.' Eriugena's text had γῆς for τῆς, and for αἰτίας it had αἴτιος, upon which γῆς καὶ αὐτοῦ καὶ πάντων seemed to depend as objective genitives, leaving ἐπὶ to be translated as an adverb, and which, being nominative, had to be the subject of προῦφυστάται, of which he took παραδείγματα to be the object. That he connected this verb with ὑφαίνω is shown by the *praetextas* (*προῦφυστώτας*) in the next sentence, and *praetexisse* is a scribal error for *praetexuisse* (A. Schmitt, 'Zwei noch unbenützte Handschriften des Johannes Scotus Erigena', *Programma des k. neuen Gymnasiums in Bamberg für das Schuljahr 1899-1900* (Bamberg 1900), p. 39). The next word *ipse* is probably another scribal error for *ipsa* (Eriugena's normal translation for τὰ), induced perhaps by *omnium* being attracted into the case of *existentium*, which would have left *ipsa* meaningless. R's *in se* represents an earlier attempt at emendation, suggested by *in deo* in the next sentence.

620. *substantificas* = οὐσιοποιούς.

621. *praedestinationes* = προορισμούς. See p. 14, 13 and note 540.

622. *optimas* = ἀγαθὰς. See note 529.

623. *diuinas . . . uoluntates* = θεία θελήματα. See p. 14, 14 and note *ad*

loc.

624. *discretiuas et factiuas* = ἀφοριστικά καὶ ποιητικά.

625. *existentium* = ὄντων, objective genitive.

ADDITIONAL NOTE

Filioque

(pp. 170, 31-198, 2)

The Double Procession has been denied by the majority of the Greek Fathers from the time of Theodore of Mopsuestia (350-428) and Theodoret (393-458), although St. Cyril of Alexandria (ob. 444) in his controversy with the Nestorians would add to the credal formula sometimes 'and the Son' to stress the equality of principle of the three Hypostases, sometimes 'through the Son' to denote the order of origin. On the other hand, it was asserted by the Latins, St. Jerome, St. Ambrose, St. Augustine, but only, apparently, as a private opinion. Eriugena can only give what he supposes it to have been since *quid eis uisum est de hac re nondum in manus nostras peruenit* (p. 196, 14-15).