COOMARASWAMY

The Door in the Sky

Coomaraswamy on Myth and Meaning

SELECTED AND WITH A PREFACE BY

RAMA P. COOMARASWAMY

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Preface

The myth is not my own, I had it from my mother.

—Euripides

From the myth to the epic to the novel, quelle déringolade.

—Ananda K. Coomaraswamy

The myth is always true (*or else no true myth*).

—Ananda K. Coomaraswamy

Modern academics have propounded a plethora of theories about the nature and origin of myths. Historians seek in them clues to prehistory. Anthropologists see them as examples of primitive or prelogical thinking. Comparative religionists see them as attempts to explain the forces of nature, and/or as the origin of religious speculation. Psychologists, recognizing their universal character, see them as archetypal concepts rooted in a "collective unconscious." Psychiatrists, knowing that people live by myths, and dissatisfied with the available Urmyths, which—in their opinion—mankind has outgrown, advocate the creation of private myths for people to live by. It is pertinent that all these theories presuppose an evolutionary process involving the maturation of mankind, a concept alien to all true mythology, which looks back to a "golden age" when men were heroes and the gods walked on earth.

Mircea Eliade dates "the scientific study of myth" from 1825, with the publication of Karl Otfried Müller's *Prolegomena zu einer tvissenschaftlichen Mythologie* (Introduction to a Scientific Mythology).[1] This was followed by Max Müller's speculations to the effect that myths were "mythopoeic" expressions of meteorological phenomena. Their ideas gave place to E. B. Tylor's anthropological studies, which labeled myth a product of the human intellect in its "early childlike state." Tylor further felt that the myth was an attempt on the part of primitives to deal with the phenomena of nature, thus explaining the rise of animistic religion.

At the turn of the century the pan-Babylonian school became popular; Ernst Siecke, its main proponent, felt that myths always referred to celestial phenomena, especially those related to the changing character of the moon. W. Robertson Smith, A. M. Hocart, and others elaborated the theory that myths were the interpretation of rituals, the meaning of which had been forgotten. Freud interpreted the Scriptural myth as the narration of a parricide in which a band of brothers killed their father, ate him, and appropriated his women to themselves. The myth was thus the fantasy repetition of a real act that had its origin, like dreams, in the unconscious.

For Jung, mythical images were impersonal, structures of the collective unconscious. They were expressions of a primordial psychic process that may even have preceded the advent of the human race: they were the most archaic structures of the psyche, present in all peoples and races as a potentiality that could be activated at any given moment, and that frequently appeared in dreams.

Among the sociologists and anthropologists mention should be made of Émile Durkheim, Bronislaw Malinowski, Anthony Wallace, Clyde Kluckhohn, and Melford Spiro. For them myth is a way to bind society together, and to satisfy certain social and psychological needs of power and prestige. The ever-popular *Golden Bough* of Sir James Frazer ties myth to the construction and function of literature. Literature, like myth, creates imaginative worlds of meaning and opens the reader to other possible worlds of experience. Claude Lévi-Strauss's "structural" theories are almost impossible to define briefly. For him the myth was the surface expression of the unconscious and was not to be trusted. At the same time, it functioned to enable humans to order and resolve the persistent contradictions of human life. Eliade enumerates many other nuances of these ideas. Common to all of them, however, is the idea that myths were the product of primitives, and were of human rather than divine origin.

Current views of mythology are dominated by the opinions of Mircea Eliade and Joseph Campbell. Eliade holds that mankind needs to interpret and to acquire meaning, and that as a result humans cannot cease questioning life's mysteries and narrating stories about them. Individuals and cultures are incapable of living long in a demythologized state, that is, they cannot remain indifferent to transhistorical paradigmatic models that give pattern and meaning to life. Eliade defines myth in the following terms:

> Myth narrates a sacred history; it relates an event that took place in primordial Time, the fabled time of the “beginnings.” In other words, myth tells how, through deeds of Supernatural Beings, a reality came into existence, be it the whole of reality, the Cosmos, or only a fragment of reality—an island, a species of plant, a particular kind *of* human behavior, an institution. Myth, then, is always an account of a “creation”; it relates how something was produced, began to *be*. Myth tells only of that which *really* happened, which manifested itself completely. The actors in myths are Supernatural Beings. They are known primarily by what they did in the Transcendent times of the “beginnings.” Hence myths disclose their creative activity and reveal the sacredness (or simply the “supernaturalness”) of their works. In short, myths describe the various and sometimes dramatic breakthrough of the sacred (or the “supernatural”) into the World and makes it what it is today. Furthermore, it is a result of the intervention of Supernatural Beings that man himself is what he is today, a moral, sexed, and cultural being.[2]

It would appear that Eliade sees the myth as sacred, but as David Cave has pointed out, “Eliade does not aim to have the modern person [described as ‘unmythologized’ or ‘demythologized’] return to the ways of traditional societies, even if he or she could. What he does advocate is that modern culture adopt a plural, universal, wholistic [sic], and cosmic presence in the world, one informed by exemplary models and archetypes. In this way humanity will approach a meaningful existence and overcome social fragmentation and individual alienation.”[3] Cave’s excellent analysis is too lengthy to reproduce. In essence he holds that Eliade dreamed of establishing a new humanism that recognized the desire in all men (*homo religiosus*) for reality and structure, for meaning, being, and truth, and believed that by providing a syncretist mythological basis this could be brought about. This could only be achieved by recognizing the sacredness and otherworldly character of mythology.

The other contemporary mythologist (though recently deceased) is Joseph Campbell, whose opinions draw from both Mircea Eliade and Carl Jung. His mature opinions are well summarized in his *The Power of Myth*. The power of the myth is the power of metaphor and poetry to capture the imagination of individuals and society. Myth supplies a sense of meaning

and direction that transcends mundane existence while giving it significance. It has several functions. The mystical function discloses the world of mystery and awe, making the universe "a holy picture." The cosmological function "supports and validates a certain social order." Everyone must try to relate to the pedagogic function, which tells us "how to live a human lifetime under any circumstances." America has lost its collective ethos and must return to a mythic understanding of life that will "bring us to a level of consciousness that is spiritual." The myth itself, while literally false, is metaphorically true. Some myths, however, such as the personal lawgiving God of the Jews and Christians or biblical cosmology, are out of date, because they no longer conform to our concepts of the universe or the dignity of man. He also speaks of the need for a shared mythology— now that the earth has come of age, it needs a unifying, nondivisive planetary religious experience based on the underlying unity that is already there, flowing as a universal archetypal stream from collective human experience. The present chaotic state of the world is in great part due to mankinds failure to believe in a shared mythology: different segments of mankind have claimed exclusivity for their own particular form of the Urmyth.[4]

But for Campbell the myth is not a "given," a revelation handed down from time immemorial, but rather has its source in biology or the collective unconscious.[5] As he told Bill Moyers, "heaven and hell . . . and all the gods are within us."[6] He gave clear expression to this in his book *Myths to Live By:* "When these stories are interpreted . . . not as reports of historic fact, but as merely imagined episodes projected onto history . . . the import becomes obvious: namely, that although false and to be rejected as accounts of physical history, such universally cherished figures of the mythic imagination must represent facts of the mind."[7]

In this he borrows to a great extent from Jung, who often gave open expression to his anti-metaphysical bias.[8] Jung held that within the mind of every individual was the vast collective unconscious, containing every type of character in every Shakespearean play, every mythological figure, and more. These constituted the archetypes and the microcosm with which one had to come to terms. This process of coming to terms constituted the process of "individuation," which can be considered a form of "enlightenment." Campbell saw this process as the true hero's journey

depicted in mythology. And since the collective unconscious is shared by everyone (explaining the universality of mythical expression), it could also become the basis for the unity of all religions. Like Eliade, Campbell speaks of the "spiritual" but reduces it to the psychological.

In contradistinction to the various theories reviewed above, Ananda Coomaraswamy (henceforth AKC) saw myth as a metaphysical statement of a truth to be understood. For him, the myth was always true, providing of course that the myth was genuine and not the creation of "fallen" man. As he wrote in a letter to the *New English Weekly,* "it must be remembered that even the myth is a symbol, a representation ('as in a glass darkly') of the reality that underlies all fact but never itself becomes a fact. . . . [A] myth is either true or worthless. ... I can and do believe in the myth far more profoundly than in any historical event which may or may not have taken place. I do not disbelieve in what are called miracles; on the other hand, my 'faith' would remain the same even if it could be proved that the events of the hero-tale never took place as related. 'History' is the least convincing level of truth, the myth and the (genuine) fairy-tale the most convincing."[9]

Even though AKC never devoted an article specifically to mythology, his works abound in references to the subject. For him myth, folklore, symbolism, the social order, and indeed the whole realm of traditional arts and crafts were all of a piece. This is perhaps most clearly brought out in his article on "Primitive Mentality." The myth in the true sense was nothing other than a particular kind of symbol. Myths, like parables—which for him were essentially similar—were symbolic narratives. Thus we must look not only to his often incidental comments on mythology but also to his studies on symbolism if we are to understand his point of view—a point of view that he would never admit as personal but rather as traditional and metaphysical.

His views are well expressed in the following comments: "There is, perhaps, no subject that has been more extensively investigated and more prejudicially misunderstood by the modern scientist than that of folklore. By 'folklore' we mean that whole and consistent body of culture which has been handed down, not in books but by word of mouth and in practice, from time beyond the reach of historical research, in the form of legends, fairy tales, ballads, games, toys, crafts, medicine, agriculture, and other rites, and forms of social organization, especially those that we call 'tribal.' This is a cultural complex independent of national and even racial boundaries, and of

remarkable similarity throughout the world; in other words, a culture of extraordinary vitality. . . . The content of folklore is metaphysical. Our failure to recognize this is primarily due to our own abysmal ignorance of metaphysics and of its technical terms."[10]

And further, "Whoever will study the Urmythos dispassionately and apart from wishful thinking in terms of 'progress,' will be convinced that we cannot separate the content of the myth from the fact of its first enunciation, and will realize that it is only with difficulty that we, from our narrower point of view, can raise ourselves to the level of reference of the prehistoric 'myth-making age.' ... As I have said elsewhere, the symbolic references of traditional and folk art are 'so far abstract and remote from historical and empirical levels of reference as to have become almost unintelligible to those whose intellectual capacities have been inhibited by what is nowadays called a "university education."'"[11]

AKC had little respect for certain aspects of modern scholarship. As he wrote in the *New English Weekly,* "As for Folklore and Mythology, these, indeed, are sources of sacred knowledge, but to understand them requires something more than a collector's or cataloguer's capacities. I have no respect whatever for approaches such as those of Frazer or Lévy-Bruhl, and have often said so."[12] And further, "The truth is that the modern mind, hardened by its constant consideration of 'the Bible as literature' (I prefer St. Augustine's estimate, expressed in the words, 'O axe, hewing the rock'), could, if it would make the necessary intellectual effort, turn to our mythology and folklore and find there, for example in the heroic rescues of maidens from dragons or in (what is the same thing) the disenchantments of dragons by a kiss (since our own sensitive souls are the dragon, from which the Spirit is our saviour), the whole story of the plan of redemption and its operation."[13]

He was fully aware that many academics accused him and those who thought like him of reading into myths and symbols concepts that were purely subjective. To this he would counter that modern academics, imbued with false ideas of progress, were incapable of understanding the true meaning of the material they were dealing with, and that as a result they "read out" or voided their material of meaning. To quote him directly: "those whose thinking is done for them by such scholars as Lévy-Bruhl and Sir James Frazer, the behaviorists whose nourishment is 'bread alone'—'the husks that the swine did eat'—are able to look down with unbecoming

pride on the minority whose world is still a world of meanings."[14] He likened them to modern scriptural scholars who wished to come to the "real" Jesus by removing everything miraculous from the Gospel stories. The end result is typified by the sterility and arid nature of modern scriptural scholarship, which restricts itself to the "letter that kills."

For AKC "the terms of Scripture [myth] and Ritual are symbolic; and merely to submit this self-evident proposition is to say that the symbol is not its own meaning but is significant *of* its referent. Under these circumstances, would it not be a contradiction in terms for one who can say that 'such knowledge as is not empirical is meaningless to us' to claim to have understood the texts, however encyclopedic his knowledge *of* them might be? Must there not be recognized an element of perversity in one who can stigmatize the Brāhmanas as 'puerile, arid, and inane' and yet propose to study or translate such works?[15] Under such conditions, what other results could have been expected than have been actually attained? To take only one example: the whole doctrine of 'reincarnation' and the supposed 'history' of the doctrine have been so distorted by literal interpretation of symbolic terms as to Justify a designation of the doctrine thus presented as 'puerile,' just as the results of the study of Indian mythology by statistical methods may fairly be described as 'arid and inane.' ... It will hardly be out of place to remind the philologist or anthropologist who undertakes to explain a myth of traditional text that it has long been the recognized method of exegesis to assume that at least four valid meanings are involved in any scriptural text, according to the level or reference considered; the possible levels being, respectively, the literal, moral, allegorical, and anagogic. . . . The student, evidently, who deliberately restricts himself to the lowest level and most obvious (naturalistic and historical) level of reference cannot expect to achieve a great exegetic success; he may, indeed, succeed in depicting the myth as he sees it 'objectively'—i.e., as something into which he cannot enter, but can only look at. But in thus describing a myth according to what is, strictly speaking, his 'accidental' knowledge of it, he is really discussing only its 'actual shape' and leaving altogether out of account its 'essential form.'"[16]

For AKC the myth is always the story of the solar hero, the quest for Life and the necessary "sacrifice" involved. Traditional rituals are always "a mimesis of what was done by the First Sacrificers who found in the Sacrifice their Way from privation to plenty, darkness to light, and death to

immortality."[17] "The reader or spectator of the imitation of a 'myth' is to be rapt away from his habitual and passible personality and, just as in all other sacrificial rituals, becomes a god for the duration of the rite and only returns to himself when the rite is relinquished, when the epiphany is at an end and the curtain falls.[18] We must remember that all artistic operations were originally rites, and that the purpose of the rite ... is to sacrifice the old and bring into being a new and more perfect man."[19] The sacrifice is, of course, "essentially a mental operation, to be performed both outwardly and inwardly, or in any case inwardly. It is prepared by the Sacrificer's 'whole mind and whole self.' The Sacrificer is, as it were, emptied out of himself, and is himself the real victim. The true end of the cult is one of reintegration and resurrection, attainable not by a merely mechanical performance of the service, but by a full realization of its significance."[20] "The whole purpose of the ritual is to effect a translation, not only of the object, but of the man himself to another and no longer peripheral but central level of reference."[21] It goes without saying that for AKC the idea that myth originated in primitive ritual was equivalent to putting the cart before the horse.

"From the traditional point of view, the world itself, together with all things done or made in a manner conformable to the cosmic pattern, is a theophany: a valid source of information because itself informed. ... In the dogmatic language of revelation and of ritual procedure this general language is reduced to a formulated science for the purposes of communication and transmission."[22] Thus the arts, which from the traditional point of view are also rituals, derive their origin from an "intellectual or angelic level of reference. . . . When this is mythologically formulated, such a level of reference becomes a 'heaven' above. Then the artist, commissioned here, is thought of as seeking the model there. When, for example (*Mahāvaṃsa,* ch. XXVII), a palace is to be built, the architect is said to make his way to heaven; and making a sketch of what he sees there, he returns to earth and carries out this design in the materials at his disposal. So 'it is in imitation of the angelic works of art that any work of art is accomplished here' (*Aitareya Brāhmana* VI.27). . . . [Similarly, Plotinus] says that all music is 'an earthly representation of the music that there is in the rhythm of the ideal world,' and 'the crafts such as building and carpentry which give us matter in wrought forms may be said, in that

they draw on pattern, to take their principles from that realm and from the thinking there' (Plotinus, *Enneads* v.9.11)." In similar manner, "the Zohar tells us of the Tabernacle that 'all its individual parts were formed in the pattern of that above.'"[23]

The intimate relationship between mythology and symbolism has been stressed. What can be said of the symbol can therefore also be applied to the myth. For AKC, "symbolism is a language and a precise form of thought; a hieratic and a metaphysical language and not a language determined by somatic or psychological categories. Its foundation is in the analogical correspondence of all orders of reality and states of being or levels of reference. . . . The nature of an adequate symbolism could hardly be better stated than in the words of 'the parabolical (Skr. *parōkṣa*) sense is contained in the literal (Skr. *pratyakṣa*). On the other hand, 'The sensible forms, in which there was at first a polar balance of physical and metaphysical, have been more and more voided of content on their way down to us. . . . What we have most to avoid [in symbolic methodology] is a subjective interpretation, and most to desire is a subjective realization. For the meaning of symbols we must rely on the explicit statements of authoritative texts, on comparative usage, and on that of those who still employ the traditional symbols as the customary form *of* their thought and daily conversation." To see a symbol as void of meaning and mere ornamentation is to say that a word is merely a sound and not more eminently a meaning. "It is with perfect consistence that a sentimental and materialistic generation not only ridicules the Eucharistic transubstantiation, but also insists that the whole of any work of art subsists in its aesthetic surfaces, poetry consisting, for example, in a conjunction of pleasurable or interesting sounds rather than in a logically ordered sequence of sounds with meanings."[24] And again, "Traditional symbols are not 'conventional' but 'given' with the ideas to which they correspond."[25]

AKC certainly recognized the universality of myths. Let us consider one example, that of "'walking on water,' a power attributed to some, alike in the Hindu, Buddhist, Christian, and Taoist, and very likely many other traditions. We do infer that such a thing can be done, but are not at all curious as to whether it was or was not done upon a given occasion. . . . The matter of interest is one of significance. What does it mean that this power has been universally attributed to the deity or others in his likeness? To speak of a motion at will on the face of the waters is to speak of a being all

in act, that is, to speak of the operation of a principle wherein all potentiality of manifestation has been reduced to act. In all traditions 'the waters' stand for universal possibility. ... If the Buddha is invariably represented iconographically as supported by a lotus, his feet never touching any physical or local earth, it is because it is the idiosyncrasy of the lotus flower or leaf to be at rest upon the waters; the flower or leaf is universally, and not in any local sense, a ground on which the Buddha's feet are firmly planted. In other words, all cosmic, and not merely some or all terrestrial, possibilities are at his command. The ultimate support of the lotus can also be represented as a stem identical with the axis of the universe, rooted in a universal depth and inflorescent at all levels of reference, and if in Brahmanical art this stem springs from the navel of Nārāyaṇa, the central ground of the Godhead recumbent on the face of the waters, and bears in its flower the figure of Brahma (with whom the Buddha is virtually identified), the universality of this symbolism is sufficiently evident in the Stem of Jesse and in the symbolic representation of the Christian Theotokos by the rose."[26]

Whence comes this universality? One has to postulate a primordial revelation: "Whoever will study the Urmythos dispassionately and apart from wishful thinking in terms of 'progress,' will be convinced that we cannot separate the content of the myth from the fact of its first enunciation, and will realize that it is only with difficulty that we, from our narrower point of view, can raise ourselves to the level of reference of the prehistoric 'myth-making age.'"[27]

The seeking for historical fact in mythology, especially when combined with the rejection of the miraculous, inevitably resulted, as noted above, in the "letter that kills." At the same time, it is to be expected that the metaphysical prototype should be reflected on the factual and historical level of reference. At the same time, "the question of 'truth' in folklore, fairy tale, and myth, is not a simple matter of correlation with the observed fact ... we have seen that the narrative has a true meaning. It is no more necessary that a truth should be expressed in terms of fact, than that an equation should resemble its locus. The symbol must be consistent; it does not have to be historically factual. Scripture is written in a hieratic language and a parabolic style, often requiring a learned commentary."[28]

Thus, as AKC put it, "from our point of view, to speak of the 'lives' of the Buddha or Christ as 'mythical' is but to enhance their timeless

significance. ... To speak of an event as *essentially* mythical is by no means to deny the possibility, but rather to assert the necessity of an *accidental*—i.e., historical—eventuation; it is in this way that the eternal and temporal nativities are related. To say 'that it might be fulfilled which was said by the prophets' is not to render a narrative suspect but only to refer to the fact to its principle. Our intention is to point out that the more eminent truth of the myth does not stand or fall by the truth or error of the historical narrative in which the principle is exemplified."[29] "Wherever it is asserted that a given event, such as the temporal birth of Christ, is at once *unique* and *historically* true we recognize an antinomy; because, as Aristotle perceived (*Metaphysics* VI.2.12, XI.8.3), 'knowledge is of that which is always or usually so, not of exceptions,' whence it follows that the birth in Bethlehem can only be thought of as *historical* if it is granted that there have also been *other* such 'descents'; if, for example, we accept the statement that 'for the establishment of Justice, I am born in age after age' *(Bhagavad Gītā* IV.7, 8).[30]

A word about the immorality of myths: "For as long as men still understood the true nature of their myths, they were not shocked by their 'immorality.' The myths are never, in fact, immoral, but like every other form of theory (vision), amoral. In this respect also they must be distinguished from invented allegories; their pattern may be 'imitated' ritually, where many things are done which might be, humanly speaking, improper. The content of the myths is intellectual, rather than moral; they must be understood. . . . The Solar Spirit, Divine Eros, Amor, is inevitably and necessarily 'polygamous,' both in himself and in all his descents, because all creation is feminine to God, and every soul is his destined bride."[31]

It might well be asked if the teller of folk tales understands the material he is dealing with. "The oral literature of the folk, which may be called the Bible of the unlearned, is by no means of popular origin, but designed to secure the transmission of the same doctrines by and amongst an unlearned folk. For such a purpose the ideas had necessarily to be imagined and expressed in readily imitable forms. The same, of course, applies to the visual art of the people, often misconceived as an essentially 'decorative' art, but which is really an essentially metaphysical and only accidentally decorative art. The necessity and final cause of folk art is not that it should be fully understood by every transmitter, but that it should remain

intelligible, and it is precisely for this reason that its actual forms must have been such as would lend themselves to faithful and conservative transmission."[32] AKC quoted Strzygowski with approval when he stated that: "The peasant may be unconscious and unaware, but that of which he is unconscious and unaware is in itself far superior to the empirical science and realistic art of the 'educated man' whose real ignorance is demonstrated by the fact that he studies and compares the data of folklore and 'mythology' without any more than the most ignorant peasant suspecting their real significance."[33]

Modern critics are apt to maintain that symbolic meanings are "read into" the facts of mythology or symbolism, which originally had no intellectual significance whatever. To this AKC responded that "it is precisely in adopting *this* point of view that we are reading our own mentality into that of the primitive artificer" or teller of myths.[34] "We are not, then, 'reading meanings into' primitive works of art when we discuss their formal principles and final causes, treating them as symbols and supports of contemplation rather than as objects of a purely material utility, but simply *reading their meaning*. For to say 'traditional art' [or mythology] is to say 'the art [or mythology] of peoples who took for granted the superiority of the contemplative to the active life, and regarded the life of pleasure as we regard the life of animals, determined only by affective reactions.'"[35]

In this introduction I have attempted to present the potential reader with a broad outline of AKC's thinking about mythology, fairy tales, symbolism, ritual, and the arts. One can do no better, before encouraging the reader to delve in the texts themselves, than to quote his own words: "Myths are significant, it will be conceded; but of what? . . . Myths are not distorted records of historical events. They are not periphrastic descriptions of natural phenomena, of 'explanations' of them; so far from that, events are demonstrations of the myths. The aetiological myth, for example, was not invented to explain an oddity, as might be supposed if we took account only of some isolated case. On the contrary, the phenomena are *exempla of* the myth."[36]

And further: "We shall only be able to understand the astounding uniformity of the folklore motifs all over the world, and the devoted care that has everywhere been taken to ensure their correct transmission, if we approach these *mysteries* (for they are nothing less) in the spirit in which

they have been transmitted 'from the Stone Age until now'—with the confidence of little children, indeed, but not the childish self-confidence of those who hold that wisdom was born with themselves. The true folklorist must be not so much a psychologist as a theologian and a metaphysician, if he is to 'understand his material.'"[37]

And finally, "What is called the 'marvelous' in folk and epic literature, and thought of as something 'added to' a historical nucleus by the irregular fantasy of the people or that of some individual littérateur, is in reality the technical formulation of a metaphysical idea, an adequate and precise symbolism by no means of popular origin, however well adapted to popular transmission. Whether or not we believe in the possible veridity of the miracles attributed to a given solar hero or Messiah, the fact remains that these marvels have always an exact and spiritually intelligible significance: they cannot be abstracted from the 'legend' without completely denaturing it; this will apply, for example, to all the 'mythical' elements in the nativity of the Buddha, which, moreover, are repetitions of those connected with the nativities of Agni and Indra in the *Rg Veda*."[38]

[1] The following summary is from Mircea Eliade, "Myths and Mythological Thought," in Alexander Eliot, ed., *The Universal Myths* (Meridian, N.Y.: Truman Talley Books, 1990).

[2] Mircea Eliade, *Myth and Reality,* translated by Willard R. Trask (New York: Harper and Row, 1963), pp. 5-6.

[3] David Cave, *Mircea Eliade's Vision for a New Humanism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 72.

[4] Joseph Campbell with Bill Moyers, *The Power of Myth* (New York: Doubleday, 1988), pp. 13, 14, 24, 31.

[5] "Between mythology and biology there is a very close association. I think of mythology as a function of biology; it's a production of the human imagination, which is moved by the energies of the organs of the body operating against each other. These are the same in human beings all over the world and this is the basis for the archetypology of myth." Cited by Wendy Doniger O'Flaherty, review of the *Historical Atlas of World*

Mythology by Joseph Campbell, *New York Times Book Review,* December 18, 1983, p. 25.

[6] Campbell and Moyers, *The Power of Myth,* p. 39.

[7] Joseph Campbell, *Myths to Live By* (New York: Viking, 1972), p. 12.

[8] "I restrict myself to what can be psychically experienced, and repudiate the metaphysical." C. G. Jung, cited in A. K. Coomaraswamy, "On the Indian and Traditional Psychology, or Rather Pneumatology," in *Coomaraswamy,* vol. *2, Selected Papers: Metaphysics,* edited by Roger Lipsey, p. 335 n 7. Bollingen Series LXXXIX (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977) (hereafter *Coomaraswamy* 2).

[9] Letter to the *New English Weekly* (London), July 17, 1941.

[10] "Primitive Mentality" in *Coomaraswamy,* vol. I, *Selected Papers: Traditional Art and Symbolism,* edited by Roger Lipsey, pp. 286, 287. Bollingen Series LXXXIX (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977) (hereafter *Coomaraswamy* 1).

[11] *"Svayamātṛṇṇā*: Janua Coeli," in this volume, pp. 25 and 61 n 97.

[12] Letter to the *New English Weekly,* January 8, 1946. Also in *What Is Civilization?* (Ipswich, Eng.: Galganooza Press, 1989), p. 121.

[13] "Views and Reviews: Mind and Myth," *New English Weekly,* December 24, 1942, p. 83.

[14] "Imitation, Expression, and Participation," in this volume, p. 70.

[15] Quotations in this and the preceding sentence are from the published works of two of the most distinguished Sanskritists. [AKC footnote.]

[16] *"Manas,"* in *Coomaraswamy* 2, pp. 217-18 and n 18.

[17] *"Ātmayajña*: Self-Sacrifice," in this volume, p. 72.

[18] It is in this sense that the Catholic priest becomes an *alter Christus* during the performance of the traditional Mass.

[19] "A Figure of Speech or a Figure of Thought?" in this volume, p. 200.

[20] "An Indian Temple: The Kandarya Mahadeo," in this volume, p. 176.

[21] "The Nature of Buddhist Art," in this volume, p. 171.

[22] Ibid., p. 173.

[23] "The Intellectual Operation of Indian Art," *Coomaraswamy* I, pp. 139, 141. St. Albert the Great is said to have received the plans of Cologne Cathedral directly from the Blessed Virgin.

[24] "The Nature of Buddhist Art," in this volume, pp. 170-71.

[25] "Literary Symbolism," in this volume, p. 185.

[26] "The Nature of Buddhist Art," in this volume, p. 167.

[27] *"Svayamātṛṇṇā*: Janua Coeli," in this volume, p. 25.

[28] "The Symbolism of the Dome," in this volume, pp. 220-21 n 47.

[29] "The Nature of Buddhist Art," in this volume, p. 145 and n 47.

[30] "The Loathly Bride," *Coomaraswamy* I, p. 368 n 43.

[31] Ibid., p. 354 and n 5.

[32] "The Symbolism of the Dome," in this volume, p. 221 n 47.

[33] "Views and Reviews: Mind and Myth."

[34] "The Symbolism of the Dome," in this volume, pp. 208-9.

[35] Ibid., pp. 216-17.

[36] “On the Loathly Bride,” *Coomaraswamy* I, pp. 368-69.

[37] “On the Loathly Bride,” *Coomaraswamy* 1, pp. 369-70.

[38] “The Symbolism of the Dome,” in this volume, p. 230 n 56.

List of Abbreviations and Short Titles

A	*The Book of the Gradual Sayings* (*Aṅguttara-Nikāya),* ed. F. L. Woodward and E. M. Hare, 5 vols., London, 1932-1939 (PTS).
AĀ	*Aitareya Āraṇyaka,* ed. A. B. Keith, Oxford, 1909.
AB	*(= Aitareya Brāhmaṇa*). *Rigveda Brahmanas: The Aitareya and Kauṣītaki Brāhmaṇas of the Rigveda,* ed. A. B. Keith, Cambridge, Mass., 1920 (HOS XXV).
Abhidharmakośa	*L'Abhidharmakośa de Vasubandhu,* tr. Louis de la Vallée-Poussin, 6 vols., Paris, 1923-1931.
Abhinaya Darpaṇa	*The Mirror of Gesture: Being the Abhinaya Darpana of Nandikeśvara,* ed. A. K. Coomaraswamy, with Gopala Kristnaya Duggirala, Cambridge, Mass., 1917.
Aeschylus, *Fr.*	In Nauck (see below).
Ait. Up.	(=*Aitareya Upanisad*). In *The Thirteen Principal Upanishads,* ed. R. E. Hume, 2nd ed., rev., London, 1931.
Angelus Silesius	(Johann Scheffler) *Cherubinischer Wandersmann,* new ed., Munich, 1949. *The Cherubinic Wanderer,* selections tr. W. R. Trask, New York, 1953.
Anugītā	*The Bhagavadgîtâ, with the Sanatsugâtîya, and the Anugîtâ,* ed. Kâshinâth Trimbak Telang, Oxford, 1882 (SBE VIII).
Apuleius	*The Golden Ass,* tr. W. Adlington, revised by S. Gaselee (LCL).
Aquinas	1. *Sancti Thomae Aquinatis, doctoris angelici,*

	Opera omnia ad fidem optimarum editionum accurate recognita. 25 vols. Parma, 1852-1872.
	2. See also *Sum. Theol.* below.
Aristotle	1. *De anima,* tr. W. S. Hett (LCL).
	2. *The Metaphysics,* tr. Hugh Tredennick (LCL).
	3. *The Nichomachean Ethics,* tr. H. Rackham (LCL).
	4. *The Physics,* tr. Francis M. Cornford (LCL).
	5. *The Poetics,* tr. W. Hamilton Fyfe (LCL).
Arthaśāstra	*Kautilya's Arthasśātra,* ed. R. Shamasastry, 2nd ed., Mysore, 1923.
Aryabhata	*Āryabhaṭīya,* tr. Walter Eugene Clark, Chicago, 1930.
'Aṭṭār, Farīdu'd-Dīn	1. Farid ud-Din Attar, *The Conference of the Birds* (Mantiq ut-Tair), tr. C. S. Nott from the French of Garçin de Tassy, London, 1954.
	2. *Mantic Uttair, ou le langage des oiseaux,* tr. Garçin de Tassy, Paris, 1863.
	3. *Salámán and Absál, . . . with a Bird's-Eye View of Faríd-Uddín Attar's Bird-Parliament,* by Edward Fitzgerald, Boston, 1899.
Atthasālinī	*The Expositor (Atthasālinī): Buddhaghosa's Commentary on the Dhammasangaṇi,* ed. P. Maung Tin and C.A.F. Rhys Davids, 2 vols., London, 1920-1921 (PTS).
AV	1. *Atharva Veda,* ed. W. D. Whitney and C. R. Lanman, Cambridge, Mass., 1905 (HOS VII, VIII).
	2. *The Hymns of the Atharva-Veda,* ed. R.T.H. Griffith, 2 vols., 2nd ed., Benares, 1916-1917.
Avicenna	*Metaphysices compendium,* Rome, 1926.
Avencebrol	(Solomon Ibn Gabirol) *Fons Vitae,* see *Fountain of Life,* tr. Alfred B. Jacob, Philadelphia, 1954.
BAHA	*Bulletin de l'Office Internationale des Instituts d'Archéologie et d'Histoire d'Art*.

Baudhāyana Dh. Sū	*Das Baudhāyana-Dharmasūtra,* ed. Eugen Hultzsch, Leipzig, 1922.
BD	*The Bṛhad Devatā of Śaunaka,* ed. A. A. Macdonell, Cambridge, Mass., 1904 (HOS VI).
BÉFEO	*Bulletin de l'École Française d'Extrême-Orient* (Hanoi).
BG	*The Bhagavad Gītā,* ed. Swami Nikhilananda, New York, 1944.
Boethius	*The Theological Tractates and the Consolation of Philosophy,* ed. H. F. Stewart and E. K. Rand (LCL).
Bokhāri	Muhammad ibn-Ismā al-Bukhari. *Arabica and Islamica,* tr. V. Wayriffe, London, 1940.
BrSBh	*(—Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣya) The Vedânta-Sûtras with the Commentary by Saṇkarâkârya,* ed. G. Thibaut, 2 vols., Oxford, 1890-1896 (SBE 34, 38).
BSOS	*Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*
BU	*(= Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*) In *The Thirteen Principal Upanishads,* ed. R. E. Hume, 2nd ed., London, 1931.
Chuang-tzu	*Chuang Tzu: Mystic, Moralist, and Social Reformer,* ed. H. A. Giles, London, 1889.
Cicero	1. *Academica,* tr. H. Rackham (LCL).
	2. *Brutus,* tr. G. L. Hendrickson (LCL).
	3. *De natura deorum,* tr. H. Rackham (LCL).
	4. *De officiis,* tr. Walter Miller (LCL).
	5. *Pro Publio Quinctio,* tr. John Henry Freese (LCL).
	6. *Tusculan Disputations,* tr. J. E. King (LCL).
Claudian, *Stilicho*	*On Stilicho's Consulship,* tr. Maurice Platnauer, London and Cambridge, Mass., 1956.
Clement	1. *Miscellanies,* tr. F.J.A. Hart and J. B. Mayor, London, 1902.

	2. *The Clementine Homilies,* Ante-Nicene Christian Library, vol. XVII, Edinburgh, 1870.
Cloud of Unknowing	*A Book of Contemplation the Which is Called the Cloud of Unknowing in the Which a Soul is Oned with God,* anon., ed. E. Underhill, London, 1912.
Coptic Gnostic Treatise	*A Coptic Gnostic Treatise Contained in the Codex Brucianus,* ed. Charlotte A. Baynes, Cambridge,
CU	1933. *(= Chāndogya Upaniṣad*) In *The Thirteen Principal Upanishads,* ed. R. E. Hume, 2nd ed., London, 1931.
D	(= *Dīgha-Nikāya*) *Dialogues of the Buddha,* ed. T. W. and C.A.F. Rhys Davids, 3 vols., London, 1899-1921 (PTS).
DA	(= *Dīgha-Nikāya Atthakathā*) *The Sumangala-vilāsinī: Buddhaghosa's Commentary on the Dīgha Nikāya,* ed. T. W. Rhys Davids and J. Estlin Carpenter (vol. I), and W. Stede (vols. II and III), London, 1886-1932 (PTS).
Damascene	St. John of Damascus. See Migne, PG, Vols. 94-96.
Dante	1. *Convito* (1529); facsimile edition, Rome, 1932. *Dante and his Convito: A Study with Translations,* W. M. Rossetti, London, 1910.
	2. *Dantis Alighieri Epistolae: The Letters of Dante,* ed. P. Toynbee, Oxford, 1966.
	3. *The Divine Comedy of Dante Alighieri,* tr. Charles Eliot Norton, 3 vols., Boston and New York, 1895-1897. (This is AKC's preferred edition, but he had a dictionary of Dante's Italian and may have done translations on his own in addition to using Norton; he also used the Temple Classics edition.)
Daśarūpa	*The Daśarūpa: a Treatise on Hindu Dramaturgy,* tr. G.C.O. Haas, New York, 1912.
Dh	*The Dhammapada,* ed. S. Radhakrishnan, London, 1950.

DhA	(= *Dhammapada Atthakathā*) *Dhammapada Commentary,* ed. H. C. Norman, 4 vols., 1906-1914 (PTS).
Dionysius	1. *De coelesti hierarchia,* see *La Hiérarchie céleste,* ed. G. Heil and M. de Gandillac, Paris, 1958 (*Sources chrétiennes* LVIII). 2. *De divinis nominibus* and *De mystica theologia* see *The Divine Names* and *The Mystical Theol ogy,* ed. C. E. Rolt, London, 1920. 3. Epistles, see *Saint Denys L'Aréopagite, Oeuvres* ed. Mgr. Darboy, Paris, 1932.
Divyāvadāna	*Divyāvadāna,* ed. E. B. Cowell and R. A. Neil Cambridge, 1886.
Dpv	*Dipavamsa,* ed. H. Oldenberg, London, 1879.
Epiphanius	*Epiphanius (Ancoratus und Panarion),* ed. K. Holl Leipzig, 1915-1933.
Erigena	John Scotus Erigena. See Migne, PL, Vol. 122.
Euripides	1. *Euripides,* tr. A. S. Way (LCL). 2. *Fragments* in Nauck.
Garbha Up.	(=*Garbha Upaniṣad*) In *Thirty Minor Upani shads,* tr. K. Nārāyanasvāmi, Madras, 1914.
Gāruḍa Purāṇa	1. *The Gāruda Puranam,* tr. M. N. Dutt, Calcutta 1908. 2. *The Gāruda Purāṇa,* tr. Ernest Wood and S.U Subrahmanyam, Allahabad, 1911 (SBH IX).
GB	*Gopatha Brāhmaṇa,* ed. R. Mitra and H. Vidyā-bushana, Calcutta, 1872 (Sanskrit only).
Grassmann	H. G. Grassmann, *Wörterbuch zum Rig-Veda* Leipzig, 1873 (cf. also *Rig-Veda*; *übersetzt und mit kritischen und erläuternden Anmerkungen versehen,* 2. vols., Leipzig, 1876-1877).
Greek Anthology	*The Greek Anthology,* tr. W. R. Paton (LCL).
Harivaṃṣa	*Harivamsha,* ed. M. N. Dutt, Calcutta, 1897 (prose English translation).
Haṃsa Up.	(=*Haṃsa Upaniṣad*) In *Thirty Minor*

Upanishads, tr. K. Nārāyaṇasvāmi, Madras, 1914.

Heracleitus, *Fr.* — *Heracliti Ephesi Reliquiae,* ed. Ingram Bywater, Oxford, 1877 (see modern editions by G. S. Kirk and Philip Wheelwright; Coomaraswamy numbers Fragments according to Bywater).

Hermes — *Hermetica: The Ancient Greek and Latin Writings which Contain Religious or Philosophic Teachings Ascribed to Hermes Trismegistus,* ed. W. Scott, 4 vols., 1924-1936.

Hesiod — *Theogony* and *Works and Days,* tr. Hugh G. Evelyn-White (LCL).

Hippocrates — *Works,* tr. W.H.S. Jones (LCL).

HJAS — *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*.

Homer — *The Iliad* and *The Odyssey,* tr. A. T. Murray (LCL).

Homeric Hymns — *Homeric Hymns,* tr. Hugh G. Evelyn-White (LCL).

Horace — *Epistula ad Pisones* (= *Ars Poetica*), tr. H. Rushton Fairclough (LCL).

HOS — Harvard Oriental Series.

IPEK — *Jahrbuch für prähistorische und ethnographische Kunst*.

Isa Up. — (= *Īśā,* or *Īśavāsya, Upaniṣad*) In *The Thirteen Principal Upanishads,* ed. R. E. Hume, 2nd ed., London, 1931.

Itiv — (= *Itivuttaka*) *The Minor Anthologies of the Pali Canon, Part II: Udāna: Verses of Uplift, and Itivuttaka: As It Was Said,* ed. F. L. Woodward, London, 1935 (PTS).

J — *The Jātaka, or Stories of the Buddha's Former Births,* ed. E. B. Cowell, 6 vols., Cambridge, 1895-1907.

Jacob Boehme — 1. *Signatura rerum,* see *The Signature of All Things, and Other Writings,* new ed., London,

	1969 (includes *Of the Supersensual Life* and *The Way from Darkness to True Illumination*). 2. *Six Theosophic Points, and Other Writings,* ed. J. R. Earle, Ann Arbor, 1958. 3. *The Way to Christ,* new ed., London, 1964.
Jāmī	*Lawā'ih, A Treatise on Sufism,* ed. E. H. Whinfield and M. M. Kazvīnī, London, 1906.
JAOS	*Journal of the American Oriental Society.*
JB	1. *The Jaiminīya-Brāhmana of the Samveda,* ed. R. Vira and L. Chandra, Nagpur, 1954 (Sanskrit). 2. *Das Jaiminīya Brāhmana in Auswahl,* text and German translation by W. Caland, Amsterdam, 1919.
JHS	*Journal of Hellenic Studies*.
JISOA	*Journal of the Indian Society of Oriental Art*.
Jan van Ruysbroeck	*The Adornment of the Spiritual Marriage; The Sparkling Stone; The Book of Supreme Truth,* tr. C. A. Wynschenk, ed. Evelyn Underhill, London, 1914.
JRAS	*Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society.*
JUB	(= *Jaiminīya Upanisad Brāhmaṇa*) *The Jaiminīya or Talavakāra Upaniṣad Brāhmaṇa,* ed. H. Oertel, *Journal of the American Oriental Society,* XVI (1896), 79-260.
Kauṣ. Up.	(= *Kauṣītaki Upaniṣad*) In *The Thirteen Principal Upanishads,* ed. R. E. Hume, 2nd ed., London, 1931.
KB	*Kauṣītaki Brāhmaṇa. Rigveda Brahmanas: The Aitareya and Kauṣītaty Brāhmaṇas of the Rigveda,* ed. A. B. Keith, Cambridge, Mass., 1920 (HOS XXV).
Kena Up.	(= *Kena Upaniṣad*) In *The Thirteen Principal Upanishads,* ed. R. E. Hume, 2nd ed., London, 1931.
KhA	(= *Khuddakapāṭha) The Minor Readings, The First Book of Minor Collection*

	(*Khuddatanikāya*), ed. Bhikkhu Nānamoli, London, 1960 (PTS).
Kindred Sayings	See s
KSS	(= *Kathā-Sarit-Sāgara) Kathāsaritsāgara,* ed. C. H. Tawney, Calcutta, 1880-1887; 2nd ed., 1924.
KU	1. (= *Kaṭha Upaniṣad*) In *The Thirteen Principal Upanishads,* ed. R. E. Hume, 2nd ed., London, 1931. 2. *Katha Upaniṣad,* ed. Joseph N. Rawson, Oxford, 1934.
Lalita Vistara *Laṇkâvatâra Sūtra*	*Lalita Vistara,* ed. S. Lefmann, 2 vols., Halle, 1902-1908. *Laṇkâvatāra Sūtra,* ed. Bunyiu Nanjio, Kyoto, 1923.
LCL	Loeb Classical Library.
Lucian	*De Syria Dea,* tr. A. M. Harmon (LCL).
M	(= *Majjhima-Nikāya*) *The Middle Length Sayings* (*Majjhima-Nikāya*), ed. I. B. Horner, 3 vols., London, 1954-1959 (PTS).
Mahavamsa	See Mhv.
Maṇḍ. Up.	(= *Maṇḍūkya Upaniṣad*) In *The Thirteen Principal Upanishads,* ed. R. E. Hume, 2nd ed., London, 1931.
Mantiqu't-Tair	See 'Attar, Faridu'd-Dīm.
Mānasāra	*Architecture of Mānasāra,* tr. Prasanna Kumar Acharya, London, 1933.
Mañjuśrīmūlakalpa	*Mañjuśrī: An Imperial History of India in a Sanskrit Text,* ed. Ven. Rāhula Sāṇkṛtyāyana, Lahore, 1934.
Manu	(= *Mānava Dharmaśāstra) The Laws of Manu,* ed. G. Bühler, Oxford, 1886 (SBE XXV).
Marcus Aurelius	*Marcus Aurelius,* tr. C. R. Haines (LCL).
Markaṇḍeya Purāṇa	*Markaṇḍeya Purāṇa,* ed. J. Woodroffe, London, 1913.
Mathnawī	*The Mathnawí of Jalálu'ddín Rúmí,* ed. R. A. Nicholson, 8 vols., Leiden and London, 1925-1940.

Mbh	1. *Mahābhārata. The Mahabharata of Krishna-Dwaipayana Vyasa,* ed. P. C. Roy, Calcutta, 1893-1894.
	2. *Mahābhārata,* ed. Vishnu S. Sukthankar, Poona, 1933- [24 vols. to date].
Meister Eckhart	1. *Meister Eckhart,* ed. F. Pfeiffer, 4th ed., Göttingen, 1924 (mediaeval German text).
	2. *Meister Eckhart,* ed. C. de B. Evans, 2 vols., London, 1924-1931 (English).
MFA Bulletin	*Bulletin of the Museum of Fine Arts,* Boston.
Mhv	*The Mahāvaṃsa, or The Great Chronicle of Ceylon,* ed. W. Geiger, London, 1908 (PTS).
Migne	Jacques Paul Migne, *Patrologiae cursus completus*
	1. [*P. G.*] *Series Graeca,* Paris, 1857-1866, 161 vols.
	2. [P. L.] *Series Latina,* Paris, 1844-1880, 221 vols.
Mil	*(= Milinda Pañho) The Questions of King Milinda,* ed. T. W. Rhys Davids, 2 vols., Oxford, 1890 (SBE XXXV, XXXVI).
Mīmaṃsā Nyāya Prakaśa	*The Mīmamsā Nyāya Prakpśa of Āpadeva,* ed. F. Edgerton, New Haven, 1929.
MU	(= *Maitri Upaniṣad*) In *The Thirteen Principal Upanishads,* ed. R. E. Hume, 2nd ed., London, 1931.
Muṇḍ. Up.	(= *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad*) In *The Thirteen Principal Upanishads,* ed. R. E. Hume, 2nd ed., London, 1931.
Mv	(= *Mahāvagga) Vinaya Texts,* ed. T. W. Rhys Davids and H. Oldenberg, 2 vols., Oxford, 1881-1882 (SBE XIII, XVII).
Nārāyaṇa Up.	(= *Nārāyaṇa Upaniṣad*) In *Thirty Minor Upanishads,* ed. K. N. Aiyar, Madras, 1914.
Nāṭya Śāstra	*The Nāṭya Śāstra* of Bharata, ed. M. Ramakrishna Kavi, Baroda, 1926 (Sanskrit).
Nauck	

	August Nauck, *Tragicorum Graecorum Fragmenta,* Leipzig, 1856.
NIA	*New Indian Antiquary.*
Nicholas of Cusa	(= Nicolaus Cusanus) 1. (*De visione Dei*) *The Vision of God,* ed. E. G. Salter, London, 1928. 2. *De filiatione Dei,* in *Schriften des Nikolaus von Cues,* Leipzig, 1936-, Vol. II.
Nirutya	*The Nighaṇṭu and Nirukta of Yāska,* ed. L. Sarup, Oxford, 1921.
Origen	*Writings of Origen,* tr. Frederick Cromble, 2 vols., Edinburgh, 1869.
Ovid	1. *Fasti,* tr. Sir James George Frazer (LCL). 2. *Metamorphoses,* tr. Frank Justus Miller (LCL)
OZ	*Ostasiatische Zeitschrift.*
Pañcadaśi	*Pañchadaśi, A Poem on Vedānta Philosophy,* ed & tr. Arthur Venis, in *Pandit,* V-VIII (1883-1886).
Pañcatantra	*The Panchatantra Reconstructed,* ed. Franklin Edgerton, New Haven, 1924. American Oriental Series, III.
Panini	*The Ashtādhyāyi of Pāṇini,* ed. S. C. Vasu, 8 vols., Allahabad, 1891-1898.
Parāśara	*The Parāśara Dharma Samhitā, or, Parāśara Smṛiti* ed. Pandit Vāman Śāstrī Islāmapurkar, 2 vols. Bombay, 1893-1906.
Pausanias	*Pausanias,* tr. W.H.S. Jones (LCL).
PGS	*Pâraskara-gṛhya-sūtras,* tr. H. Oldenberg, Oxford, 1886.
Philo	1. Complete works published in LCL; Vols. I-X ed. F. H. Colson; *Supplements* I, II, cd. R. Marcus. All works cited by full title with exception of: a) *Aet*. (*On the Eternity of the World,* vol. IX); b) *Congr. (On the Preliminary Studies,* vol. IV); c) *Deterius* (*The Worse Attacks the Better,* vol. II); d) *Heres*. (*Who is the Heir,* vol. IV); e)

	Immut. (*On the Unchangeableness of God,* vol. III).
Philostratus, *Vit. Ap*.	Flavius Philostratus, *The Life and Times of Apollonius of Tyana,* tr. Charles P. Ellis, Stanford, 1923.
Pindar	*The Odes of Pindar,* tr. Richard Lattimore, Chicago, 1947.
Pistis Sophia	1. *Pistis Sophia, A Gnostic Miscellany,* ed. & tr. G.R.S. Mead, London, rev. ed., 1921; 1947. 2. *Pistis Sophia,* ed. J. H. Petermann, Berlin, 1851.
Plato	*The Collected Dialogues of Plato, including the Letters,* ed. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns, Princeton, 1961 (Bollingen Series LXXI).
Plotinus	*Plotinus, The Enneads,* tr. Stephen MacKenna. 3rd ed. rev. by B. S. Page, London, 1962.
Plutarch	1. *Moralia,* tr. Frank Cole Babbitt and others; includes *De genio Socratis* (LCL). 2. *Pericles,* in *Lives,* tr. Bernadotte Perrin (LCL).
PMLA	*Publications of the Modern Language Association*.
Praśna Up.	(= *Praśna Upaniṣad*) In *The Thirteen Principal Upanishads,* ed. R. E. Hume, 2nd ed., London, 1931.
Prema Sāgara	*Prema-Sāgara,* ed. and tr. Edward B. Eastwick, Westminster, 1897.
PTS	Pali Text Society Translation Series.
Pythagoras	*Golden Verses,* see *Les Vers d'or pythagoriciens,* ed. P. C. van der Horst, Leyden, 1932.
PugA	*Puggala-paññatti-atthakatha,* ed. G. Lansberg and C.A.F. Rhys Davids, London, 1914 (Pali).
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Quintilian	*Institutio Oratoria,* tr. H. E. Butler (LCL).
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Rūmī, *Dīvān*	*Selected Poems from the Dīvani Shamsi Tabrīz,* ed. R. A. Nicholson, Cambridge, 1898.
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S	*The Book of Kindred Sayings* (*Saṃyutta-Nikāya*), ed. C.A.F. Rhys Davids and F. L. Woodward, 5 vols., London, 1917-1930 (PTS).
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Sa'dī	(Muslih-al-Dīn) *The Bustān of Sadi,* ed. A. H. Edwards, London, 1911.
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Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa	See SB.
Sāyaṇa	*Rg Veda Samhitā, with Sayana's Commentary,* ed S. Pradhan, Calcutta, 1933.
SB SBB	*Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa,* ed. J. Eggeling, 5 vols., Oxford, 1882-1900 (SBE XII, XXVI, XLI, XLII XLIV). The Sacred Books of the Buddhists, London.

SBE	The Sacred Books of the East, Oxford.
SBH	The Sacred Books of the Hindus, Allahabad.
Scott	See Hermes.
Sextus Empiricus	*Sextus Empiricus,* tr. R. G. Bury (LCL).
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Siddhāntamuktāvalī	1. *The Vedānta Siddhāntamuktāvalī of Prakāśananda,* tr. Arthur Venis, in *The Pandit,* Benares. 1890. 2. Tr. J. R. Ballantyne, Calcutta, 1851.
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Sn	*The Sutta-Nipāta,* ed. V. Fausböll, Oxford, 1881 (SBE X).
SnA	*Sutta-Nipāta Atthakathā,* ed. H. Smith, 2 vols., London, 1916-1917 (PTS).
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Śvet. Up.	(= *Śvetāsvatara Upaniṣad*) In *The Thirteen Principal Upanishads,* ed. R. E. Hume, 2nd ed., London, 1931.

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The Door in the Sky

1

Mind and Myth

Some recent discussions in this journal [*The New English Weekly*] of instinct and intellect, together with various articles on myth and folklore, have prompted me to offer the following reflections.

Instincts are natural appetites, which move us to what seem to be, and may be, desirable ends; to behave instinctively is to behave passively, all reactions being in the strictest sense of the word passions. We must not confuse these appetitive reactions with acts of the will. The distinction is well known: 'Acts of the sensitive appetite . . . are called passions; whereas acts of the will are not so called' (St. Thomas, *Sum. Theol*. I. 20. I ad I); 'the Spirit is *willing*, but the flesh is *weak*'. Moreover, as Aristotle points out (*De Anima,* III. 10) appetite may be right or wrong; desire as such always looks to the present, not considering consequences; only mind is always right.

In speaking of 'mind', however, it must be remembered that the traditional dicta always presuppose the distinction of 'two minds', the one 'apathetic' (i.e. independent of pleasure-pain motivation), the other 'pathetic' (i.e. subject to appetitive persuasion); it is only the First Mind (in Scholastic philosophy, *intellectus vel spiritus)* that, just because it is disinterested, can judge of the extent to which an appetite (instinct) should be indulged, if the subject's real good, and not merely immediate pleasure, is to be served.

So, then, Hermes (*Lib*. XII. I. 2-4) points out that 'In the irrational animals, mind co-operates with the natural-instinct proper to each kind; but in men, Mind works against the natural-instincts ... So that those souls of which Mind takes command are illuminated by its light, and it works against their presumptions . . . But those human souls which have not got Mind to guide them are in the same case as the souls of the irrational animals, in which mind co-operates (with the appetites), and gives free

course to their desires; and such souls are swept along by the rush of appetite to the gratification of their desires . . . and are insatiable in their craving.' From the same point of view, for Plato, the man who is governed by his impulses is 'subject to himself', while he who governs them is 'his own master (*Laws,* 645, *Republic,* 431, etc.).

The instinctive appetites of wild animals and of men whose lives are lived naturally (i.e. in accordance with human nature) are usually healthy; one may say that natural selection has taken the place of Mind in setting a limit to the gratification of these appetites. But the appetites of civilised men are no longer reliable; the natural controls have been eliminated (by the 'conquest of Nature'); and the appetites, exacerbated by the arts of advertisement, amount to unlimited wants, to which only the disinterested Mind can set reasonable bounds. Mr. Romney Green is only able to defend the instincts (1) by forgetting that these are really appetites or wants and (2) because he is really thinking of those desires of which his Mind does, in fact, approve. Captain Ludovici, on the other hand, is entirely right in saying that our instincts must be regulated by a higher principle. If we are to trust our instincts, let us be sure that they are not just any instincts, but only those that are proper to Man, in the highest sense of the word.

I was much interested in Mr. Nichols' review of Waley's translation, 'Monkey'. He is very right in saying that it is characteristic of this kind of literature to 'give the deepest significance in the most economical everyday form': that is, in fact, one of the essential values of all adequate symbolism. Where, however, he is mistaken is in calling such a work 'a mine of *popular* fantasy'. That is just what it is not. The material of 'folklore' should not be distinguished from that of myth, the 'myth that is not my own, I had it from my mother', as Euripides said; which is not to say that my mother's mother made it. What we owe to the people themselves, and for which we cannot be too grateful in these dark ages of the mind, is not their lore, but its faithful transmission and preservation. The content of this lore, as some (though all too few) learned men have recognised, is *essentially* metaphysical, and only accidentally entertaining.

In the present case the 'river', the 'bridge' and the 'boat' are universal symbols; they are found as such in the literature of the last three millennia and are probably of much greater antiquity. The episode quoted appears to be an echo of the *Mahākapi Jātaka* ('Great Monkey Birthstory'), in which the Bodhisattva (not Boddhi-, as Mr. Nichols writes) is the king of the

Monkeys, and makes of himself the bridge by which his people can cross over the flood of sensation to the farther shore of safety; and that is an echo of the older *Samhita* text in which Agni (who can be equated on the one hand with the Buddha and on the other with Christ) is besought to be 'our thread, our bridge and our way', and 'May we mount upon thy back') while in the *Mabinogion* we have the parallel 'He who would be your chief, let him be your bridge' *(A vo penn bit bont,* Story of Branwen), with reference to which Evola remarked that this was the 'mot d'ordre' of King Arthur's chivalry. St. Catherine of Siena had a vision of Christ in the form of a bridge; and Rūmī attributed to Christ the words 'For the true believers I become a bridge across the sea'. Already in the *Ṛg Veda* we find the expression 'Himself the bridge, he speeds across the waters', with reference to the Sun, i.e. Spirit. And so on for the other symbols; the Tripitaka is, of course, the well known designation of the *Nikāyas* of the Pali Buddhist Canon, and here stands for 'Scripture', taken out of its literal sense and given its higher meaning. The floating away of the dead body reminds us that a catharsis, in the Platonic sense, i.e. a separation of the soul from the body, or in Pauline terms, of the Spirit from the 'soul', has taken place.

Vox populi vox Dei; not because the word is theirs, but in that it *is* His, viz. the 'Word of God', that we recognised in Scripture but overlook in the fairy-tale that we had from our mother, and call a 'superstition' as it is indeed in the primary sense of the word and *qua* 'tradition', 'that which has been handed on'. Strzygowski wrote, 'He (i.e. the undersigned) is altogether right when he says, "The peasant may be unconscious and unaware, but that of which he is unconscious and unaware is in itself far superior to the empirical science and realistic art of the 'educated man', whose real ignorance is demonstrated by the fact that he studies and compares the data of folklore and 'mythology' without any more than the most ignorant peasant suspecting their real significance".' *(Journal of the Indian Society of Oriental Art,* v. 59).

The truth is that the modern mind, hardened by its constant consideration of 'the Bible as literature' (I prefer St. Augustine's estimate, expressed in the words 'O axe, hewing the rock'), could, if it would make the necessary intellectual effort, turn to our mythology and folklore and find there, for example in the heroic rescues of maidens from dragons or in (what is the same thing) the disenchantments of dragons by a kiss (since our own

sensitive souls are the dragon, from which the Spirit is our saviour), the whole story of the plan of redemption and its operation.

2

Svayamātṛṇṇa: Janua Coeli

> Ἀμὴν ἀμὴν λέγω ὑμῖν, ὅτι ἐγώ εἰμι
> ἡ θύρα τῶν προβάτων.
>
> John 10:7

> *Eine grosse Weltlinie der Metaphysik zieht sich durch aller Völker hindurch.*
>
> J. Sauter

> The coincidences of tradition are beyond the scope of accident.
>
> Sir Arthur Evans

The "second building" (*punaściti)* of the Fire Altar consists essentially in the laying down of three "Self-perforated 'bricks' " (*svayamātṛṇṇā*), representing these worlds, Earth, Air, and Sky; the seasonal bricks, representing the Year; and the Universal-Light bricks representing Agni, Vāyu, Āditya (ŚB IX.5.1.58-61). As a part of the construction of the regular Fire Altar, this "second building" or rather "super-structure" of the Akar is described in detail in ŚB VII.4.2 ff. and TS v.2.8 ff. Here we propose to discuss only the nature of the three "Self-perforates" (*svayamātṛṇṇā*) which represent Earth, Air, and Sky, and with the three intervening "Universal Lights" representing Agni, Vāyu, Āditya (Fire, Gale of the Spirit, and Sun) compose the vertical Axis of the Universe, the passageway from one world to another, whether upwards or downwards. The three Self-perforates, of which the lowest is a hearth and the uppermost[1] the cosmic luffer, form in effect a chimney, *disons cheminée, à la fois* caminus *et chemin* ("hearth" and "way") *par laquelle Agni s'achemine et nous-mêmes devons nous acheminer vers le ciel*.[2]

The Self-perforates are referred to as "stones" or "dry stones" (*śarkare, śuṣkāḥ śarkarāḥ*)[3] in ŚB vlll.7.3.20 and vlll.7.4.1, and J. Eggeling rightly thinks of them as "natural stones," which may have been larger than the ordinary bricks (SBE, XLIII, 128, n. 2). It is evident that "perforated" does not mean "porous,"[4] but rather annular or like a bead, since the Self-perforates are not only "for the upward passage of the breaths" (*prāṇānām utsṛṣṭyai*)[5] but "also for vision of the world of heaven" (*atho suvargasya,*[6] *lokasyānukhyātyai,*[7] TS v.2.8.1, 3.2.2, and 3.7.4). They are, moreover, the Way by which the Devas first strode up and down these worlds, using the "Universal Lights" (*viśvajotis* "bricks," Agni, Vāyu, Āditya) as their stepping stones (*samyānayah,* ŚB vlll.7.1.23),[8] and the Way for the Sacrificer now to do likewise (SB vlll.7.2.23 and VII.4.2.16), who as a Comprehensor (*evaṃvit*) "having ascended to the Beatific Spirit (*ānandamayam-ātmānam upasaṃkramya*), traverses these worlds, 'eating' what he will, and in what shape he will" (*imān Iokān kāmānī kāmarūpy anusaṃcaran,* TU III.10.5; cf. JUB I.45.2 and III.28.4), as in John 10:9, "shall be saved, and shall go in and out, and find pasture," and *Pistis Sophia*.[9] From all this it follows that the Self-perforates of the Fire Altar must have been "ring-stones," like the well-known example at Śatruñjava, called a "Door of Liberation (*mukti-dvāra*)" through which people are still passed, and like the many ring-stones of all sizes that have been found on Indus Valley sites.[10]

The Self-perforates are these worlds (ŚB IX.5.1.58, etc.) in a likeness. What is common to them is the "whole Breath (*sarvah prāṇaḥ)*," of which the three aspects are that of the aspiration (*udāna*) proper to Agni, transspiration (*vyāna*) proper to Vāyu, and spiration (*prāna*) proper to the Sun (SB VII.1.2.21).[11]

We have here to do with the *sūtrātman* doctrine, according to which all things are connected with the sun in what is literally a common con-spiracy. The Self-perforates, then, are quickened with the Breath of life by the Sunhorse, which is made to kiss them (*aśvam upaghrāpayati, prāṇam evāsya dadhāti,* TS v.2.8.1, 3.2.2, and 3.7.4);[12] for "That 'horse' is yonder Sun, and those 'bricks' are the same as all these offspring (*prajā)*; thus, even as he makes it kiss [snuffle at] them, so yonder Sun kisses these offspring.[13] And hence, by the power of [that solar] Prajapati,[14] each one thinks 'I am' (*aham asmi*)[15]... and again, why he makes it kiss [snuffle at]: that horse is yonder Sun,[16] and those Self-perforates these worlds; and even

as he makes it kiss [snuffle at], so yonder Sun strings these worlds to himself on a thread (*sūtre samāvayate)*. . . . Now that thread is the same as the Gale (*vāyu*)" ŚB vII.3.2.12-13 and VIII.7.3.10; "Verily, he bestows the Breath upon it" (TS v.2.8.1, etc.). This, indeed, is the middle term of a large group of texts beginning with RV I.115.1, "The Sun is the Spirit (*ātman)* of all that is in motion or at rest"; and continuing, AV x.8.38, "I know the extended thread (*sūtram)* wherein these offspring are inwoven: the thread of the thread I know; what else but the 'Great' (*mahat,* the Sun), of the nature of Brahman?"; BU III.7.1-2, "He who knows that thread and the 'Inward Ruler' (*antaryāminam iti)*,[11] knows the Brahman, knows the worlds, knows the Devas, knows the Vedas, knows himself, knows All . . . By the Gale, indeed, O Gautama, as by a thread, are this and yonder world and all beings strung together";[18] JUB III.4.13—III.5.1, "Even as the thread of a gem (*maṇisūtram)* might be threaded through a gem, even so is all this strung thereupon [upon the Sun, Vāyu, Prāṇa, Brahman], to wit, Gandharvas, Apsarases, beasts, and men"; BG VII.7, "All this is strung on Me, like rows of gems upon a thread."[19]

It can hardly be doubted that the well-known "cotton-bale" (Figure 1A) symbol of the Indian punch-marked coins (with which may be compared a number of similar forms to be met with on Babylonian seals, e.g., Figure 1B) is a representation of the Three Worlds in the shape of the Self-perforates, connected by a common thread, which is that of the Breath, Sunpillar, and Axis of the Universe.[20] The three Self-perforates are, furthermore, manifestly comparable to the naves of wheels; they are, indeed, the navel-centers (*nābhi)* of the worlds (*cakra*) which they represent. It is upon their axis that the three-wheeled cosmic chariot of the Aśvins turns. These are the three holes in the naves of the chariot wheels through which Indra draws Apālā, so that her scaly skins are shed, and she is made to be "Sunskinned" (RV VIII.91, JB I.220, etc.) ;[21] the Moon, the Gale, and the Sun, "opened up like the hole of a chariot wheel or a drum" for the ascent of the deceased Comprehensor (BU v.10-11), who, "when he departs thus from this body, ascends with these very rays of the Sun. ... As quickly as one could thither direct his mind, he comes to the Sun.[22] That is verily and indeed the world-door, a progression for the wise, but a barrier for the foolish" (*lokadvāraṃ prapadanaṃ vidūṣāṃ nirodho'vidūṣam,* CU vIII.6.5).[23] Each of these holes is a birthplace (*yoni*), whoever passes

through such a hole dying to a former and inferior state of being and being regenerated in another and higher; in this the openings answer to the three birthplaces of JUB III.8.9-III.9.6, AĀ II.5, and Manu II.169. Whoever has thus not only been born but born again after repeated deaths and is duly "qualified to pass through the midst of the Sun" (*ādityam arhati samaya*



Figure IA. The So-Called "Cotton-Bale" Symbol

As it appears on early Indian punch-marked coins: three "Self-perforates" or "beads" are strung on a "pole."

Figures IB-L Related Motifs from Western Asiatic Seals

Figure IJ. Symbol on a Coin from Hierapolis

Recalls Figure IA. “The Assyrians themselves speak of a symbol, but they have assigned to it no definite name” (Lucian, *De Syria Dea,* 33).

itum, JUB I.6.1) has either virtually broken out of the cosmos while still in the flesh[24] or will for the last time be reborn at death, so as to be “altogether liberated through the midst of the Sun” (*ādityam samayātimucyate,* JUB I.3.5); [see also *Garuḍa Purāṇa* x.56-59, on rebirth from the pyre].

We shall now consider more especially the uppermost Self-perforate, which is at once the roof of the cosmic house, the crown of the cosmic tree, and the skull of the cosmic Man. It is the hole in this firmament of the sky that chiefly concerns us; this opening is variously referred to as a hole, chine, foramen, mouth, or door (*kha,*[25] *chidra, randhra, mukha, dvāra*). To have ascended these worlds as one might a ladder or a tree and to have escaped the jaws of Death is to have passed through this strait gate. JUB I.3.5—I.7.5 continues, “That is heaven’s chine (*divaś chidram*); as might be the hole in the nave of a cart or chariot (*yathā khaṃ vānasas syād rathasya*),[26] even so is this ‘heaven’s chine.’ It is seen all covered over by rays (*raśmibhis saṃchannam*). . . .[27] Thus ‘through the midst of Him,’ who knows that ? If verily when these waters are all about him, he indeed invokes the Gale,[28] He verily disperses the rays (*raśmīn . . . vyūhati)* for him. . . .[29] Thereupon he separates himself from death, from evil. Who knows what is beyond the Sun *(yat pareṇādityam),* what beneath this homeless atmosphere (*idam anālayam antarikṣam avarena)*?[30] That is just immortality!”

In the light of all this it is easy to understand the prayer of Isa Up. 15-16 (and parallel texts, BU v.15.1 and MU VI.35), “The Gate of Truth (*satyasya . . . mukham*) do thou, O Pūsan, uncover, that I, who am of the quality of Truth[31] (*satyadharmāya*)*,* may see [thy fairest form]. . . . The rays dispel (*raśmīm vyūha),* unify the fiery energy (*samūha tejas),* that I may see thy fairest form”; and possible, too, to understand statements to the effect that it is a sign of death “when sun and moon are opened up *(yihīyete),*[32] when the sun looks like the moon, when its rays are not seen (*drśyate na raśmayah)*[33] . . . when the sun is seen as if it were a chine (*chidra ivādit　yo dṛśyate*), and looks like the nave of a chariot wheel” (*ratha-nābhir iva,* AĀ III.2.4; cf. SA VIII.6.7 and XI.3.4).

All that is under the Sun is in the power of Death (ŚB x.5.1.4),[34] the Sun (SB x.5.2.3, XI.2.2.5, etc.) "whose shadow is both immortality and death" (RV x.121.2); and, "inasmuch as the Sun is Death, his offspring here below are mortal,[35] but the Devas are beyond and therefore undying" (SB II.3.3.7); "Whatever is embodied is in the power of Death, but whatever incorporeal, immortal" (JUB III.38.10, cf. ŚB x.4.3.9). The whole intention of the Vedic tradition and of the sacrifice is to define the Way (*mārga*) by which the aspirant (here in the literal sense of "upbreather" rather than the psychological sense of one who has mere ambition) can ascend these worlds and escape altogether through the midst of the Sun, thus crossing over from mortality to immortality. Like all other "passages," this passing over is at the same time a death and a rebirth (regeneration), and equally so whether the "death" be sacrificial and initiatory (in which case a return to "life" is provided for in the ritual) or that real death following which the man is laid on the funeral pyre and "reaches the Sun, the world door, as quickly as one could direct the mind to Him" (CU VIII.6.5).

We find accordingly in the literature a conception of the World-tree in which the trunk, which is also the Sunpillar, sacrificial post, and *axis mundi,* rising from the altar at the navel of the earth, penetrates the World-door and branches out above the roof of the world (*tiṣṭhaty uttaraṃ divaḥ,* AV x.7.3) as the "nonexistent [unmanifested] branch that yonder kindreds know as the supernal" (AV x.7.21), i.e., Yama's *supalāśa* of RV x.135.1, the *aśvattha* of AV v.4.3. This conception is directly reflected in the form of the hypaethral tree-temples which in India were originally Yakṣa holysteads and subsequently Buddhist temples;[36] in all of these *rukkha-cetiyas* and *bodhi-gharas* the sacred tree rises through the open temple roof and branches above it, an arrangement that is not in any way uniquely Indian.[37]

Connected with these conceptions we find in the literature that the ascent of the spirit is often described in terms of tree climbing, and in the ritual we meet with a variety of explicit climbing rites. Thus in JUB I.3.2, "As one would keep climbing up a tree[38] by steps (*yathā vṛkṣam ākramaṇair ākramāṇaḥ iyād*) ... he keeps ascending these worlds (*imāṇ lokān rohann eti*)"; cf. ŚB I.9.3.10, "ascending (*samāruhya)* these worlds, he reaches that goal, that support" (*etāṃ gatim etāṃ pratiṣṭhāṃ gacchati),* even as the Sun himself climbed: "I know that of thine, O Immortal, namely thy climb (*ākramaṇam)* in the sky, thy station in the uttermost empyrean" (AV

XIII.1.44). Further references to the ascent and descent of the Tree will be found in PB IV.7.10, XIV.1.12-13, xvIII.10.10; JUB III.1.3.9; Mbh, *Udyoga Parvan* 45: those who reach the summit, if still callow, fall down, if fully fledged fly away (cf. *pennuto* in Dante, *Purgatorio* XXXI.61).



Figure 2. Han Hypaethral Tree Shrines

Climbing rites are enacted in connection with the sacrificial post (*yūpa*), one of the most characteristic aspects of the *sfambha* or *axis mundi,* and coincident with the "Bridge": "Verily the Sacrificer makes it a ladder and a bridge to attain the world of heaven (*ākramaṇam eva tat setum yajamāna kurute suvargasya lofasya samaṣṭyai,* TS VI.6.4.2)."[39] The rites themselves are described in TS I.7.9, where the Sacrificer mounts on behalf of himself and his wife; he climbs by means of steps (*ākramana)* and on reaching the summit stretches out his arms and says, "We have come to heaven, to the Devas: we have become immortal": similarly ŚB v.2.1.5, where the Sacrificer climbs and "rises by a head above the post, saying, 'We have become immortal,' and thereby wins the world of the Devas." In TS v.6.8, the "mounting after Agni (*agner anvārohaḥ)*"[40] is a part of the construction of the altar itself, in other words, it is by means of the aforesaid "stepping stones"; and "were he [the Sacrificer] not to mount after Him [Agni], he would be excluded from the world of heaven"; cf. CU VIII.6.5, *nirodho'vidūṣām*. AB IV.20-22 (cf. KB xxv.7) describes the "difficult mounting (*dūrohaṇa*)": "Verily thus he mounts the world of heaven, who is in this matter a Comprehensor. . . . He mounts with the verse in which are the words 'The Gander. . . .'[41] 'Like a ship let us mount';[42] verily thus he mounts it for the attainment of heaven, the winning, the reaching the world of heaven. .. . He mounts by 'feet'[43] . . . and descends like one holding on to a branch. . . .[44] Thus having obtained the world of heaven, the sacrificer finds support [again] in this world. For those who desire only the one, viz.

heaven, he [the priest] should mount in the forward direction only; they will win the world of heaven, but they will not have long to live in [this] world." In ŚB v.I.5.1 and TS I.7.8, the priest on behalf of the Sacrificer mounts a wheel set up on a post, navel high, and mimes the driving of horses; he makes the wheel revolve three times. The whole of a race is enacted, while the priest, still seated on the nave of the wheel, chants verses in which are the words, "Hasten, ye steeds, for the prize . . . attain the goal the Sunpillar, or Sun)."[45] All this belongs to a regular ritual sequence, consisting first of an actual race by which this earth is won, then of the mounting of the wheel by which the airworld is won, and finally the mounting of the sacrificial post, as in TS I.7.9 cited above, whereby heaven is won.

The citation from AB IV.21 shows us that the rite, involving as it does an initiation and symbolic death, is a dangerous one. The initiated Sacrificer is ritually dead, no longer a man but a Deva; "if he did not descend again to this world, he would either have gone to the suprahuman world, or he would go mad"[46] (PB XVIII.10.10), "would either go mad or perish" (TS VII.3.10.4); "if he did not relinquish the operation, the sacrificial fire [in which he has symbolically immolated himself] would be apt to consume him" (TS I.7.6.6).[47] Supremely important as the ritual death may be, in which the Sacrificer's final attainment of his immortal goal is prefigured, it is still of utmost importance (as explained in ŚB x.2.6.7-8, where also suicide is expressly condemned) that he should live out his full term of life on earth, for the "hundred years" of his earthly life corresponds to the "thousand years" of his heavenly life (the "thousand years" is a round number: "a thousand means everything," ŚB *passim*).[48] He therefore "relinquishes the rite," either by means of the formal "descents" and the use of inverted chants, or, as in ŚB I.9.3.23, with the words, "Now I am he whom I actually am" (taken from VS II.28b). For in undertaking the operation he becomes as if nonhuman (a Deva): and as it would be inconvenient for him to say, "I enter into untruth from the Truth," which is how the matter really stands, and as, in fact, he now again becomes a human being, he therefore relinquishes the operation with the text, "Now am I he that actually am," i.e., So-and-so by name and family. By means of such reversals the sacrificer, having virtually left the body[49] and virtually broken out of the cosmos, nevertheless "secures whatever full measure of life remains for him here" (VS II.18). The logic of the whole procedure is superb.

It will have been remarked that a qualification is a necessary condition of admission by the Sundoor: "Who is qualified (*arhati*) to pass through the midst of the Sun?" (JUB I.6.1), "Who is able (*arhati*) to know that God?" (KU II.21). It was by their qualification (*arhaṇā)* that the Ādityas in the beginning partook of immortality (*amṛtattvam ānaśuh,* RV x.63.4). In order to complete our understanding of the Vedic tradition of the Sundoor, we must ask in what such a qualification consists. The qualification is primarily one of likeness, and consequently of anonymity; anonymity, because whoever still is anyone cannot be thought of as entering in, as like to like, to Him "who has not come from anywhere nor become anyone" (KU II.18). "One should stand aloof from intention, from concepts, and from the conceit of 'self.' This is the mark of liberation (*mokṣa)*. This is the track,[50] here and now, that leads to Brahman. This is the 'opening of the door'[51] here and now. By it one reaches the farther shore of this darkness. Here, indeed, is the 'consummation of all desires.' . . . There is no attainment of the goal by a bypath here in the world. This is the road to Brahman here and now. Breaking through the Sundoor (*saurṃ dvāraṃ bhitvā*),[52] the Marut (Brhadratha) made his exit, having done what was to be done.[53] In which connection they cite: 'Endless are the rays of Him . . . and by that[54] of these that breaks through the solar Orb (*sūrya-maṇḍalaṃ bhitvā*),' overstriding into the Brahma-world, one reaches the supreme goal" (MU VI.30). At world's end[55] the way is barred by the Sun, the Truth, the Janitor of Heaven (*apaṣedhantī,* JUB I.5.1; *viṣṇur vai devānām dvārapaḥ,* AB I.30; *nirodho'vidūṣām,* CU vIII.6.5; *yatra avarodhanaṃ divaḥ,* RV IX.113.8; "and the door was shut," Matt. 25:10; Agni, *nāstuto'tisrakṣya,* AB III.42). But whoever comes to Him as like to like, as very Truth to very Truth, worshipping him as Spirit, cannot be rejected[56] (JUB I.5.3, *neśe yad enam apasedhet*; AB III.42, *stuto atyasarjata, satyena labhyas . . . ātmā*; Muṇḍ. Up. III.I.5). "Open unto me in whom the Truth abides" (Īśā Up. 15, *apāvṛṇu satyadharmāya*; cf. BU v.15.1 and MU VI.35) is the password; "disconnected with both well done and ill done (*visukṛto viduṣkṛtaḥ),*[57] the Comprehensor of Brahman goes on to Brahman" (Kauṣ. Up. I.4); "they pass over by way of the Sundoor" (*sūryadvāreṇa prayānti,* Muṇḍ. Up. I.2.11); "The Janitor opens that door for him" (*dvārapah, sa evāsmā etad dvāraṃ vivṛṇoti,* AB I.30).

What is really involved when we speak of “passing through the midst of the Sun” is already apparent in the cited texts to the effect that this is not a matter of salvation by works or merit. It is stated, more plainly perhaps than anywhere else, in JUB III.14.1—5, “him that has reached [the Sundoor] He asks ‘Who art thou?’ In case he announces himself by his own or by a family name, He says to him, ‘This self of thine that hath been in Me, be that now thine.’[58] Him arrived in that self, forsooth, caught by the foot on the threshold of success, the Seasons drag away.[59] Day and Night take possession of his ‘world.’ But to Him he should answer thus, ‘Who I am is the Heaven thou art. As such unto Thee, heavenward, am I come unto Heaven.’ ... He says to him, ‘Who thou art, that am I; and who I am, that art thou (*yo’ham asmi sa tvam asi*). [60] Come.’ ” Of the many parallels to this great passage, the most literal occurs in Rūmī’s *Mathnawī* I.3055: “Whosoever is uttering 'I' and ‘we’ at the door, he is turned back from the door and is continuing in *not*. A certain man came and knocked at the friend’s[61] door: his friend asked him, ‘Who art thou, O trusty one?’ He answered, ‘I.’ The friend said ‘Begone.’ Save the fire of absence and separation, who will cook that raw one?[62] The wretched man went away, and for a year in travel and separation he was burned with sparks of fire. That burned one was cooked. ... He knocked at the door. . . . His friend called to him, ‘Who is at the door?’ He answered, ‘Tis thou art at the door, O charmer of hearts.’ ‘Now,’ said the friend, ‘since thou art I, come in, O myself:[63] there is not room in the house for two “I”s. The double end of the thread is not for the needle: inasmuch as thou art single, come into (the eye of) this needle. . . . Tis the thread that is connected with the needle: the eye of the needle is not suitable for the camel.’ ”[64]

We have now before us a fairly complete account of the Indian doctrine of the Sundoor at World’s End, and of how it may be passed. Attention has already been called to the universality of the doctrine, of .which the Christian and Islamic forms have been noted. We shall conclude with some account of the doctrine as it is similarly developed in the Chinese, Siberian, Egyptian, and Hebrew traditions.

In China we shall be concerned with only two rather than three stone objects, which we can speak of, for the sake of uniformity, as “Perforates”: these objects of jade are symbols of Earth and of Heaven, and are employed

as such in the Imperial worship of Heaven and Earth.[65] Of these two "Perforates," the *ts'ung,* or Earth symbol, is internally tubular and externally square (Figure 3), while the *pi,* or Heaven symbol, is a perforated circular disk or ringstone (Figure 4). The Way (the most essential meaning of *tao*) is thus open from below upwards and from above downwards. The *ts'ung* is not a disk, but rather a cylinder of some height, and can readily be assimilated to the first *and* second of the Indian Self-perforates by regarding it as consisting of two disks, a lower and an upper, connected by a continuous passage. It is of great interest that these *ts'ung* are regularly thought of as "cart wheels" or "wheel hubs": for example, in the *Ku yü t'u p'u,* where the illustrated examples are all described as "wheel hubs of the ancient jade chariot." The interior is, in fact, "uniformly hollowed out into a cylindrical cavity, into which the end of the axle would be run" (B. Laufer, *Jade,* Chicago, 1912, p. 125). Archaeologists have been disturbed by the fact that jade *ts'ung* are nevertheless by no means very like the actual bronze wheel naves (or rather axle ends, Skr. *āni)* which have come down to us from the Chou period. But "ancient jade chariot" no more implies an actual chariot used by human rulers than do the Vedic chariot of light or Biblical chariot of fire refer to vehicles that might be unearthed by the excavator's spade. Jade in China (cf. "adamant") stands for immortality: "to eat in the perfection of jade" is "to obtain immortal life" (Laufer, *Jade,* p. 297); just as gold in India means light and immortality (ŚB III.2.4.9, v.4.I.12, etc.). A chariot of jade *(yü lu)* is hardly more conceivable as an actuality than one of gold *(kin lu),* and if "great vehicles *(ta lu)"* called by these names were reserved for "the Emperor, the Son of Heaven" (Laufer, *Jade,* pp. 125,126; Hentze, "Le Jade 'pi,' " p. 208), one may well inquire, Who is the Emperor, the Son of Heaven, in principle?[66] The "ancient jade chariot" is rather the archetype of the earthly vehicle than vice versa.[67] The *ts'ung,* as a hollow cylinder, is indeed intended to receive an axle tree, but an axle of purely spiritual (pneumatic) substance, not made by hands, and in fact the Axis Mundi.[68] In the funerary use of the six jades *(pi, ts'ung, chang, hu, huang, kuei,* respectively blue, yellow, green, red, white, black, and representing heaven, earth and the quarters E., S., W., and N.), the *ts'ung* is laid on the abdomen (note the association of "earth" with "navel" here), the *pi* under the back, and the images of the quarters so that N. and S. are head and feet and E. and W. the left and right hands (the body therefore facing south), so that the whole body is enclosed in what is called the

“brilliant cube” *(Chou Li,* ch. XVIII, cited by Laufer, *fade,* p. 120).[69] The evident intention is to provide the deceased with a new and adamantine cosmic body of light. In later Taoist tradition, the “new man” born of initiation *(ju shé,* Skr. *dīkṣā*) is actually called the “Diamond Body” (grig *gan shen,* cf. Skr. Buddhist *vajra-kāya),* initiation prefiguring the transformation to be actually and forever realized at death.[70] A jade cicada placed in the mouth of the corpse of the deceased is the symbol of his resurrection in this state of transformed being,[71] in which he is set free from the limitations of human individualization.

Figure 3. Jade ts’ung



Figure 4. Jade pi

The Siberian Shaman symbolism corresponds even more closely with the Indian, as U. Holmberg ("Der Baum des Lebens," Helsinki, 1922-1923, p. 31) has not failed to observe. We meet again with a pair of annular symbols, of which the one is a perforated disk representing the Earth (Holmberg, "Der Baum des Lebens," fig. 13), and the other the luffer above the central hearth of the *yurt,* which is also the opening in the roof of a hypaethral temple, through which passes the stem of the World-tree to branch above. We shall quote the most pertinent passages from Casanowicz and Holmberg.[72] The Dolgans and Yenisei-Ostiaks erect World-pillars surmounted by a horizontal transom representing the sky and a double-headed "Bird lord" described as "all-seeing."[73] Sacrifices are offered by the

Lapps to the "World-man," represented by a tree set up in a roofed shrine. In the Shaman rites of Altai races, a green birch tree is set up in a *yurt,* its crown rising above the smoke-hole;[74] within the *yurt* the stem is made to slope so as to leave space for a hearth situated beneath the smoke-hole or luffer, and "this birch symbolizes the Door-god (*udeśi-burchan)* which opens for the Shaman the way into heaven";[75] the Shaman climbs this birch, and so out on to the roof of the *yurt,* and there invokes the gods. As Holmberg comments (p. 30), "The reference of the luffer in the roof of the yurt, amongst the Altai races and the Buriats, is evidently to a heavenly prototype. The Ostiaks speak of the house of heaven as provided with a golden luffer." The opening is identified with the Pole Star, or takes its place; it is a "hole through which it is possible to pass from one world to another": Shamans and spirits, and the heroes of folktales who ride on eagles or thunder-birds, are said to slip through the series of similar holes situated under the Pole Star, and thus (as our Indian texts would express it) pass up and down these worlds.[76] There is a corresponding hole in the earth, which leads down into the nether world.[77]

The climbing rites referred to above are especially striking, constituting as they do a ritual *Himmelfahrt* of just such a sort as is described in the Brāhmaṇas. The essentials of the rite may be summarized as follows (Casanowicz, "Shamanism of the Natives of Siberia," *Smithsonian Report for 1924,* pp. 427 ff.): "In the yurta a young birch tree with the lower branches lopped is set up. . . . At the bottom of the tree nine steps [*tapty* = Skr. *ākramaṇa*] are cut with an axe. Round the yurta a penfold[78] is made ... a birch pole with a noose of horsehair is set up. Then a horse agreeable to the deity is chosen. . . . The Shaman waves a birch twig over the horse's back, thus driving its soul to Ulgan [Bai Ulgan, who dwells in the sixteenth heaven, and is next in rank to Kaira Kan, the highest god], accompanied by the holder's soul. . . . The Shaman goes outside the yurta, sits down on a scarecrow in form of a goose [Skr.

Figure 5. Han Grave Slab

Sacrificial horse, *t'ao t'ieh* mask and ring, the mask and ring like a door knocker.

haṃsa!] stuffed with hay and covered with cloth, and moving both arms rapidly like wings, sing in a loud voice:

Below the white sky,
  Above the white cloud
Below the blue sky,
  Above the blue cloud—
Mount a bird to the sky.[79]

"The goose replies by quacking. . . . On this feathered steed the Shaman pursues the soul [*pura* = Skr. *ātman*] of the horse,[80] imitating the horse's neighing. . . . He drives to the birch pole . . . after much straining and drawing . . . the Shaman incenses the animal with juniper, blesses it . . . and kills it. The dead animal is skinned and cut up in a very elaborate manner[81] so that the bones are not broken. . . . On the second evening . . . the Shaman's journey to Bai Ulgan in heaven is enacted. . . . He circles several times the birch tree in the yurta, then he kneels in front of the door and asks the imaginary porter spirit to grant him a guide. ... At last begins the ascent to heaven . . . the Shaman passes into ecstasy. Then he suddenly places himself on the first step cut in the trunk of the birch tree. . . . He is rising to the sky. From heaven to heaven he passes, riding on the goose. ... At each stage he tells the audience what he has seen and heard. And finally having reached the ninth or even the twelfth heaven, he addresses a humble prayer to Bai Ulgan. . . . After this interview with Ulgan the ecstasy or delirium of the Shaman reaches its climax, he collapses and lies motionless. After a while he gradually rouses himself, rubs his eyes and greets those present as if after a long absence." A closer correspondence with the Indian rites could scarcely be imagined.

The old Egyptian doctrine of the Sundoor and its passage is essentially the same as the Indian, except that the door is thought of as rectangular. Citations following are from E.A.T. Wallis Budge, *Book of the Dead* (London, 1895), PP- cxvii-cxviii and 12-14.[82] The sky is thought of as a metallic "ceiling of the earth and floor of heaven," to reach which "a ladder was thought to be necessary."[83] This is the "ladder of Horus . . . who is the

Lord of the Ladder," and the deceased, entering "in *His* name of 'Ladder' . . . the ceiling of the heavens unbolteth its gates" to him when the welcoming word is uttered, "Come forth then, to heaven, and enter therein in *thy* name of 'Ladder.' "[84] Admission depends upon the result of a psychostasis[85] in which the "heart" is weighed against the feather Maat, the symbol of Right and Truth. The deceased "is sponsored by Horus who says, 'His heart is righteous; it hath not sinned against any God or Goddess. Thoth hath weighed it... it is most true and righteous. Grant that cakes and ale[86] may be given unto him, and let him appear in the presence of the God Osiris; and let him be like unto the followers of Horus for ever and ever." And in turn he says,[87] "I have not knowingly spoken that which is not true,[88] nor have I done aught with a false heart. Grant thou that I may be like unto those favored ones who are in thy following, and that I may be an Osiris, greatly favored of the beautiful God and beloved Lord of the World." Illustration to the Book of the Dead show us the World door with the Sun-god seated within it, or represented by a disk above it (Figure 6), in either case as if to say



Figure 6. Egyptian World Door and Sundoor

A. The open door, guarded by the Sun God in anthropomorphic form; B. the open door, with the Sundisk above (cf. T. Dombart, "Der zweitürmige Tempel-Pylon" in *Egyptian Religion* I [1933], 93, abb. 7, the closed door surmounted by the winged disk); C. the closed door, also a representation of sunset (the Sun has "gone home," *aṣtaṃ yatra ca gacchati,* KU IV.9).

again, "I am the door, by me if any man enter in, he shall be saved," a formula expressed or implied in every branch of the universal tradition that we have studied; and again the door, shut and bolted, as in Matt. 25:10,

"and the door was shut."[89] We have only to add that for those who fail to pass the test of the psychostasis there lies in wait the crocodileheaded monster called Āmām, the Devourer, or Āmmit, the Eater of the Dead.[90] We cannot enter here into a more general comparison of Egyptian with Indian mythology, and shall only remark that both Horus and Osiris are "falcon gods," like Agni (and Gawain, *Gwalchmai*), and point out the equivalence of the concepts of the Egyptian Amon-Rā' and Indian Indra-Vāyu, or Sūrya = Ātman, with the Christian "God is a Spirit: and they that worship him must worship him in spirit and in truth. . . . Even the Spirit of Truth" (John 4:24, 14:17).

In conclusion, we cite from the *Zohar* (Vayaqhel, pp. 211-216): "There is, besides, in the center of the whole of the heavens, a door called G'bilon. . . . From that door again there is a path mounting ever higher and higher until it reaches the Divine Throne. . . .[91] In the center of that firmament there is an opening (G'bilon) facing the opening of the supernal Palace on high and forming the gateway through which the souls soar up from the Lower Paradise unto the Higher Paradise by way of a pillar that is fixed in the Lower Paradise reaching up to the door on high. ... The garments of the Lower Paradise are made of men's actions; those of the Celestial Paradise of the devotion and earnestness of his spirit."[92]

Not only is the symbolism with which we are already familiar clearly recognizable here, but we also meet with it in a remarkable work of the fifteenth-century Christian painter Hieronymus Bosch (Figure 7), for which the words "gateway through which the souls soar up from the Lower Paradise unto the Higher Paradise by way of a pillar that is fixed in the Lower Paradise" might have served as the prescription (*dhyāna mantram)*. We are already familiar in many contexts with the ascent "by way of a pillar": more remarkable is the manner in which the "Ascent to the Celestial Paradise" is depicted by Bosch, which might as well have been based upon BU v.12.10, "He reaches the Sun; it opens out there for him like the hole of a drum. Through it he mounts higher."

It is one of the most distinctive traits of the "primitive mentality" that objects, beings, phenomena in general, can be for it at one and the same time what they "are" and something other than themselves.[93] *We* see only the aesthetic surfaces, or facts, of phenomena, whether natural or artificial: but for primitive metaphysics the words of St. Thomas hold good, that "this

science has the property, that the things signified by the words have also a signification" (*Sum. Theol.,* I.I.10). Primitive art depicts not what the artist sees, but what he knows; it is algebraic rather than arithmetical. It is not a question of abilities; we know very well that the primitive artist, old Egyptian or Aurignacian, for example, could be wonderfully realistic when he had this intention, just as we know that it was not an artistic inability that can be evoked to explain the absence of an anthropomorphic imagery in early Christian or early Buddhist art.

Figure 7A. Hieronymus Bosch:

Entrance to the Celestial Paradise
"He reaches the Sun, it opens out for him like a hole in a drum," BU V.10.

Figure 7B. Hieronymus Bosch: The Earthly Paradise

If our children also draw what they know and mean, rather than what they see, it does not follow that the primitive artist (who held, like Augustine, that it is by their ideas that we judge of what things ought to be like and "really" are like) was a child by comparison with us, who very soon demand of our children to "correct" their drawing by the "model." To draw

what one means, just as to make noises that embody meanings and are not merely onomatopoetic, may be simply human: and our endeavor to subtract meaning from representation, our "subtract" rather than "abstract" art, may be less than human, and even devilish, implying as it does a will to live by bread alone.

We have collated above what may be called a symbolic text, preserved in many recensions, both visual and verbal, in all of which a definite pattern can be clearly recognized. Where formulations are thus precise and perfectly intelligible, it can only be presumed that an understanding of their meaning coexisted with their promulgation and use. One does not first discover a mathematical equation and afterwards read a meaning into it; if a diagram of the fifth proposition of Euclid should appear on the surface of Mars, we should infer the existence there of beings already acquainted with geometry. If we assume that a language is understood by those who speak it,[94] we must assume that a doctrine is coeval with the symbolic formulae in which it is expressed. If now we examine the symbols, verbal or visual (we often overlook that no distinction in principle can be made between aural and visible or tangible symbols), in which our text and the Urmythos to which it is intrinsic is stated, it will be seen at once that none of these imply a "civilization" in any literal sense of the word, but only a culture of such a sort as the American Indian or Eskimo possessed (we must be careful not to prejudice our judgment of "primitive man" by an exclusive study only of what are evidently degenerate races, such as the Veddas). Of all our symbols, the chariot with its axle and wheels, etc., and harnessed horses, is the most complex. But even this form was already a widely distributed actuality as early as the beginning of the fourth millennium B.C. and among peoples who still made use of stone implements, although acquainted with metal. Of the others, few or none could not have been naturally used by Paleolithic man, who, as we now know, already possessed his circular hut with central hearth and a hole in the roof for the escape of smoke, and could therefore perfectly well have said that "like a builder hath Agni upheld his pillar of smoke, upheld the sky" (RV IV.6.2), and thought of Him accordingly as the missal priest by whom man's sacrifice is conveyed to the gods beyond. Primitive man already possessed his needle and thread of sinew, and just because his thread was of sinew could have felt in a designation of the act of kind as a sewing (cf. RV II.32.4 cited above, and *syūti* as both "sewing" and "offspring"), and in the expression "unstrung"

applied to the body at death—-and hence analogically to that of the cosmos at the end of the world—an image even more vivid than at a later time, when thread was of cotton.[95] The principal word for "Way" in the theological sense is *mārga,* a derivative of *mṛg,* to "hunt" by following in the track of the pursued, as in Eckhart's "following the spoor of her quarry, Christ." The Vedic and Christian Eucharist alike preserve the values of cannibalism. If, in fact, we should subtract from the most spiritual and intellectual forms of religious doctrine all that is in the last analysis of prehistoric origin, if we decide to reject "participation," and to think not really but only logically (to reverse the Scholastic "logically but not really"), very little will be left of what we are accustomed to think of as spiritual values. If we entertain such values still, it is because we have inherited them, not because we have created them. Whoever will study the Urmythos dispassionately and apart from wishful thinking in terms of "progress," will be convinced that we cannot separate the content of the myth from the fact of its first enunciation, and will realize that it is only with difficulty that we, from our narrower point of view,[96] can raise ourselve, to the level of reference of the prehistoric "myth-making age."[97]

Notes

[1] *Uttara,* cf. English "utter," is not only "uppermost," "highest," "superior," "last," but means also "northern," and in this connection it may be remarked that the *devayāna* is constantly described as a "northern" way. We are primarily concerned with a solar symbolism in the present article. But it must not be overlooked that the polar and solar symbolisms are almost inseparably combined in the Vedic tradition, and that this is inevitable in any universal tradition, not exclusively polar. The Axis Mundi is naturally thought of as vertical. This is only literally a north and south axis for an observer at the north pole, while for one at or near the equator, it is evidently the sun that is overhead. "Ce qu'il importe essentiellement de remarquer à cet égard est ceci: l'axe vertical, en tant que joignant les deux pôles, est évidemment un axe Nord-Sud; dans le passage du symbolisme polaire au symbolisme solaire, cet axe devra être en quelque sorte projeté sur le plan zodiacal, mais de façon de conserver une certaine correspondance, on pourrait même dire une équivalence aussi exacte qu'il est possible, avec l'axe polaire primitif. . . . Les solstices sont véritablement ce qu'on peut appeler les pôles de l'année; et ces pôles du monde temporel, s'il est permis de s'exprimer ainsi, se substituent ici, en vertu d'une correspondance réelle et nullement arbitraire, aux pôles du monde spatial . . . et ainsi se trouvent reliées l'une à l'autre, aussi clairement que possible, les deux modalités, symboliques dont nous avons parlé" (Rene Guénon, *"La Sortie de la caverne," Études traditionnelles,* XLIII, 1938, 149-150). In the same way our "polarity," although implying

originally a north-south orientation, has a more general application to the correlation of any two opposite states, and "pole" is not merely "north pole" but also any upright "post." Ontologically there are, of course, three distinguishable polarities, (1) east-west, (2) north-south (these two with reference to the daily and yearly motion of the sun), and (3) axial (polar, in the primary sense, and as at the north pole). Of these three polarities, the connection of the first is with birth (hence in the *Agnicayana,* the Golden Person is laid down with his head to the East; cf. VS XIII.3, "The Brahman firstborn in the East, from the limit [*sīmatas*]"; *see* ŚB VII.4.114-18, and the corresponding Ait. Up. III.11-12, *sa etam eva sīmānaṃ vidāryaitayā dvārā prapadyata, saiṣā vidṛtir nāma dvāḥ,* "Cleaving that 'limit,' he proceeded by that door; the name of that door is the 'cleft' "). The connection of the second is with life (standing up, erection, *utthāna*; and motion, *caraṇā),* and that of the third is with sleep and death (one sleeps with the head to the north, the *devayāna* is a Northern Path, the Buddha's death bed is "headed north [*uttara-sīso*]," D II. 137).

2 It is not without significance in this connection that it is by the chimney that Santa Claus ascends and descends. I try to bring out a hermeneutic association of ideas by means of a play on words. The actual relations of *chemin* and *cheminée* are not quite so simple. Latin *caminus,* of Greek origin, is "hearth," as was also "chimney," when as yet no chimneys in our sense existed; at the same time Spanish and Italian *camino* are "way."

3 *Śarkara* is, broadly speaking, "gravel," i.e., water-worn stones mixed with sand, but when the word is used in the dual or plural, or as a proper name, only "stone" can be meant. The occurrence of natural "ring-stones," of concretionary origin and with decayed centers, is not unknown, but it is quite likely that in practice holes were artificially bored, and only in theory "self-bored."

A baetylic origin of ś*arkarāḥ,* of which a ritual use is made, is predicated in TS *v.2.6.2* (perhaps the oldest text extant in which such stones are thought of as "thunder-bolts"); the variant in ŚB I.2.4.1 assigns the same origin to arrows *(śara*), cf. Part II of Coomaraswamy, "The Symbolism of the Dome" [in this volume—ed.].

Śaḍvimsa Brāhmaṇa I.7.2 derives *śarkarā (= sikatā)* from the eyes of the Sādhya deities; *sattram āsīnānāṃ sādhyānāṃ devānām akṣasuś śarkarā jajñire*. If these eyes are understood to be the sun and moon, this would not be inconsistent with the connection of Śarkara with Agnīṣomau as developed below, nor with that of perforated stones.

"Śarkara" can also be connected with the Self-perforates, and particularly the uppermost *svayamātṛṇṇā,* in another way. Śarkara is the name of the Ṛṣi Śiśumāra (*śiśumāra,* "crocodile," and literally "killer of children" = *jhaṣa, makara, graha, grāha*) in a version of the Flood Legend referred to in PB VIII 6.8-9 and XIV.5.14-15; JB I.174, 175 and III.193; and AB II.19.3: "He ascended to heaven; he is that Sarkara who rises *(udeti)* there . . . whoever is a Comprehensor thereof, attains to heaven." Cf. TS IV.6.3.4, where the sun is a "spangled stone set in the midst of the sky" (*madhye divo nihitaṃ pṛṣṇir aśmā),* and ŚB IV.6.5.1, "The *graha,* indeed, is he who glows yonder," i.e., the sun. The Śimśumārī (probably m. from *-mārin)* is identified with the Yajñayajñīya Sāman (in *Śaḍvimsa Brāhmaṇa* I.3.16, "the head of the sacrifice") and with Agni Vaiśvānara, and is described as lying in wait "on the sacrificer's path" or as "lurking with yawning jaws in the one-way, countercurrent" (*ekāyane śiṃśumārī pratīpaṃ vyādāya tiṣṭhati),* in which connection it should be remembered that "the way to heaven is countercurrent" *(pratīpam, pratikūlam,* Pali *paṭisoto, uddhaṃsoto*; cf. RV X.28.4, TS VII.5.7.4, PB and JB *passim,* S 113. 6 f., etc., and especially TS VI.6.5.4, If he should offer that to Varuṇa along the stream of the waters, Varuṇa would seize his offspring; he offers facing north on the south side against the

stream of the waters, to prevent Varuṇa seizing his offspring"). [In ŚA III.5 the head bar *(śirsaṇya)* of the throne of Brahma, the Breath, is identified with the Sāmans Bhadra and Yajñayajñiya, while in actual construction the two ends of this bar are *makara* heads, presumably the auspicious and inauspicious aspects of the solar *śiṃśumāra (śiṃśumāra,* the "devourer of babes": the initiate and the deceased on their way to rebirth are "babes").

Varuṇa's "maw *(kākuda)"* into which the Seven Rivers flow (RV VIII.69.12) is the Sea as man's last "home *(astam),"* wherein the individual's "name and likeness" are dissolved *(bhidyate),* and it is called only the Sea (Praśna Up. VI.5 = Ud 55). For Varuṇa as Viśvāyus and Graha, cf. JUB IV.I.7; for Agnīṣomau as the jaws of death, see ŚB III.6.3.19.] So the Brahmans of yore used to wonder, "Who will today be delivered from *(atiproṣyata)* the Śimsumārī's open jaws," the answer being that he who places the properly worded chant as a sop in his mouth, comes safely through *(tasyānnādyam eva mukhato'pidhāya svasty atyeti,* JB I.174, where *tasya . . . mukhato . . . atyeti* == KU I.11, *mṛtyu-mukhāt pramuktam)*; cf. VS X.10, *avaṣṭa dandaśūkāḥ,* and ŚB V.4.I.1, *sarvān . . . mṛtyūn atimucyate . . . tasya jaraiva mṛtyur bhāvati*—the Sacrificer's ritual death and liberation prefiguring his ascent from the pyre when he literally "dies." The Yajñayajñiya as "head of the sacrifice" can be identified with Makha-Soma (-Vṛtra, etc.): cf. ŚB XIV.I.1 and XIV.I.2.17, etc., and also Coomaraswamy, "Angel and Titan," 1935, p. 318; for the "mouths" of Sóma-Prajāpati, cf. Kauṣ. Up. II.9.6. The intention is, then, the same as in ŚB III.3.4.21, where "Agni and Soma (-Viṣṇu) have seized him who is initiated (and therefore an 'infant,' *garbha, siśu)* . . . and is himself the offering: thus they have seized him between their jaws; and by the victim he now redeems himself"; "in it he sees himself" (TS VI.6.7.2), and "thus ransoming self by self, having become free of debt, he sacrifices" (KB XIII.3; cf. TS III.3.8). The sacrifice of self is represented by that of the victim, King Soma, who is always "slain" (TS VI.6.9.2, ŚB XIII.2.8.2, etc.), and thus the rite is performed as it was in the beginning when the Devas "sacrificed with the sacrifice (*yajñena yajñam ayajanta,* RV X.90.16)," and as in the Christian sacrifice (the Mass) where Christ is the victim, with whom the participant identifies himself (cf. Bede Frost, *The Meaning of Mass,* London, 1934, pp. 66-67).

It will not be overlooked that it is as a solar station that ś*arkara* is translated to heaven (JB III.193), becoming in fact the constellation Capricorn. The contrasted aspects of the Janua Coeli (opened or shut, to admit or exclude, as in CU VIII.6.5 and Matt. 25:10-12) are in the Pythagorean tradition (see Guénon, "Le Symbolisme du zodiaque chez les Pythagoriciens," *Études traditionnelles,* XLIII, 1938) the two separate gates of Capricorn and Cancer, of which the former corresponds to the Hindu *devayāna,* in which the passage of the Sun is achieved, and the latter to the *pitṛyāna,* by which there is no breaking out of the cosmos. These *yānas* or courses are, respectively, northern and southern, inasmuch as the apparent motion of the sun, which the sacrificer follows, is an ascent northward starting from Capricorn, and a descent southward starting from Cancer.

Thus ś*arkara* appropriately designates the uppermost *svayamātṛṇṇā,* not only in its sense of "stone," but also in that of *graha:* the Sundoor is either the Gate of Life or the Jaws of Death, all depending on the Sacrificer's understanding, who if he thinks of himself as So-and-so, "thinking 'He is one, and I another,' is not a Comprehensor, but as it were a beast to be sacrificed to the gods" (BU I.4.10). All "passages" (from one state of being to another) are in this sense "dangerous"; and there can be no doubt that the *makara (= śiṃśumāra)* placed over doorways, and known in Java as *kāla-makara (kāla* "Time," being one of the well-known names of Death) has a like significance; cf. J. Scheftelowitz, *Die Zeit als Schicksalsgottheit in der indischen und iranischen Religion,* Stuttgart, 1929. The

kāla-makara head is called in India and Ceylon both "makara face *(makara vaktra)*" and the "lion's jaws *(siṃha-mukha),"* and it is noteworthy that in what is perhaps the earliest reference to this motif, KhA 172, the *sīha-mukha* is an "ornament at the side of the nave of the king's chariot," evidently as in the Chinese example, B. Laufer, *fade* (Chicago, 1912), pl. xvi, fig. 1.

An author (I have mislaid the reference) describing a Phrygian gravestone of the second century A.D., remarks that the lion represented on it "als Hüter der Todestür im Bogen über der Tür erscheint," and that "als Sinnbild der Macht ist der Löwe wohl auch an Toren aufzufassen." It will not be overlooked that Christ, who says of himself that "I am the door," is the "Lion of Judah" as well as the "Sun of Men."

The Indian and universal theory of art assumes a mimesis of angelic prototypes. The king's palace, for example, reproduces the forms of the celestial city. A remarkable illustration of this is afforded by the palace-fortress of Sīhagiri in Ceylon, described as "hard of ascent for human beings *(durārohan manussehi,* Mhv XXXIX.2; cf. the *dūrohana* of AB IV.21)." Here Kassapa constructed a "stairway in the form of a lion *(sīhākārena . . . nisseṇi-gehāṇi)* . . . and built a sightly and delightful royal palace like a second Alakamaṇḍa (Celestial City, D II.147, 170) and dwelt there like Kuvera" *(ibid.,* 3-5). The main ascent must have led, in fact, through the jaws of the colossal brick and stucco lion, from which the fortress takes its name and of which portions are still extant *(Archaeological Survey of Ceylon, Annual Report,* 1898, p. 9, and *Cūḷavaṃsa,* tr. Wilhelm Geiger and C. M. Rickmers, 2 vols., Oxford, 1929, 1930, p. 42, n. 2). An assimilation of the palace-fortress to a divine prototype and of the ascent to a *Himmelfahrt* was manifestly intended.

The place and the nature of the crowning mask of a *makpra toraṇa* (e.g., Coomaraswamy, *History of Indian and Indonesian Art,* 1927, fig. 225) are the same: the *toraṇa* functions, indeed, as the niche of an image, but it is *toraṇa* by name because the niche is essentially a portal and to be understood as part of the frontal aspect of the deity whose image fills the gateway. The back of the image is concealed, and generally left unfinished and relatively formless, not without sound metaphysical reasons. There can be no doubt of the similarity between this kind of figure and the radiate figures of Christ in Majesty (a complex conception, often connected with the psychostasis and Last Judgment) set over the portals of Romanesque cathedrals as if to say, "no man cometh to the Father but by me," and, "except ye be born again"; such are figures of the Sun of Men, who divides the sheep from the goats at the "parting of the ways." The figure above the portal prefigures that of the Pantakrator (Figure 8) which fills the circle of what is really the "eye" of the dome ("The central dome was reft by the stupendous frown of Christ Pantakrator, the sovereign judge," Robert Byron and David Talbot Rice, in *The Birth of Western Painting,* London, 1930, p. 81; Vincent of Beauvais speaks of Christ's *ferocitas)*. The Way to the "eye" of the dome is horizontal *(tiryak)* until the altar, the navel of the earth, has been reached, and thereafter it is vertical *(ūrddhvam);* or to say the same in other words, the way into the Church prefigures the entrance into Heaven. In Muslim architecture the same principles are implied by the circular opening which, in very many cases, surmounts a niche or doorway.

The well-known Chinese "ogre mask," which appears in so many characteristic ways on the earliest Chinese bronzes, is certainly formally related to the *"makara* face" of the Indian tradition. It cannot but be recognized that the relation is one not only of form but also of significance, and that the designation *t'ao t'ieh,* meaning "glutton" (cf. Agni as *grasiṣṇu, krauyāt,* etc., and such texts as BU I.2.1, *taṃ jātam abhivyādadāt),* although

given by Chinese scholars to the "ogre mask" very long afterwards, was appropriately given (see also n. 78). A similar interpretation can be given of the devouring monsters of the Indonesian sword grips, which have been so brilliantly studied by R. Heine-Geldern; these, however, we should not so much attach to a particular legend, but rather see in them an illustration of the general principle that is reflected in such legends. In JISOA, V (1937) and in IPEK (1925), Heine-Geldern connects the forms of these sword grips, where a monster is devouring a human being, often a child, with the *Sutasoma Jātaka,* no. 537, in which a king Brahmadatta (alias Kalmāṣapāda) of Benares is the incarnation of a cannibal *yakkha,* and becomes a cannibal in this life until converted by his own son Sutasoma, the Bodhisattva. But this legend is itself only a pseudohistorical and transparently euhemerized version of the Urmythos: Brahmadatta ("Theodore") is an incarnation of the Brahman-Yaksa of the Vedas and Upaniṣads, and plays the part of Death (Mṛtyu, Mara, Yama) as Overlord of the World (represented as usual by "Benares"), until overcome by Sutasoma (as Mara is overcome by Gautama, Aṇgulimāla converted by the Buddha, etc.). The monster of the sword grips is essentially Death, and the reference only accidentally, if at all, to the *Jātaka*. The application of the "Death's head" to the handle of a weapon is as appropriate as that of the *siṃha-mukha* and *"t'ao t'ieh"* to the hub of a wheel, noted above and in n. 77. The "Death's head," whether in a leonine, aquiline, reptilian, or "glutton" form, is the Face of God who both "kills and makes alive." As Carl Hentze has rightly seen, "Die *T'ao-t'ieh*-Darstellungen verbinden Nacht- und Dunkelheitssymbole . . . mit Licht und Erneuerungssymbolen. . . . Der *T'ao-t'ieh* ist gerade derjenige Dunkelheitsdämon, der Licht und Leben aus sich entstehen lässt," thus combining lunar and solar characters (*Frühchinesische Bronzen- und Kulturdarstellungen,* Antwerp, 1937, p. 85). This is the unity of Mitrāvaruṇau, Love and Death: "The Divine Dark is the inaccessible Light ... all who enter are deemed worthy to know and see God" (Dionysius, *Ep. ad Dor. Diac*.); "And the deep of the darkness is as great as the habitation of the light; and they stand not one distant from the other, but together in one another" (Jacob Boehme, *Three Principles of the Divine Essence,* tr. John Sparrow, London, 1910, XIV.76).

Figure 8. Christ Pantakrator, Daphni

The same relations can be studied in the Ravenna sarcophagus of Figure 9, in which the rectangle of the Cosmos is surmounted by the vault of the supra-solar Paradise, the Sun and Face of God being represented by the lionmask *(siṃha-mukha)* placed at the center of the roof of the worlds below and base of the heavens above. We recognize in descending order Lion, Dove, and Cross, i.e., Sun, Spirit, Christ—or, in Sanskrit, Āditya, Vāyu, Agni. The Cross is supported in and rises from a vessel *(kumbha* of RV VII.33.13) which, insofar as this is specifically a representation of the Baptism, signifies Jordan (as was pointed out by J. Strzygowski), but also the Nether Waters impregnated by the descending ray, or, in

other words, the Theotokos, Mother Earth. The more detailed our knowledge of Vedic ontology and its later iconography, the more obvious will be the parallels. Here, as regards the Theotokos, we can merely allude to the birth of Agni from the Waters, which is also that of the Prophet Vasiṣṭa in the lotus = vessel = (earth-) ship (RV VII.33.11-12 and 88.4), and to the frequent iconographic representation of Śrī Lakṣmī by the Brimming Vessel *(pūrṇa-kumbha,* etc.) in early Indian art. More immediately pertinent to the present study is the fact that the Lion's open mouth is the Janua Coeli, the uppermost Self-perforate, from which the Spirit proceeds; and the mouth of the vessel below, the corresponding terrestrial Self-perforate, the birthplace of the Son, who is also himself the Lion and whom it is for us to follow in his return to the Father through the Lion's jaws. It is, of course, the point of intersection of the arms of the Cross that corresponds to the intermediate Self-perforate of the Vedic altar.

Figure 9 Sarcophagus from Ravenna

In the rectangle of the cosmos the Baptism of Christ is represented symbolically by the dove (Spirit), Cross (Christ), and Vessel (Jordan); John and the angel by affronted doves. The open mouth (the "strait gate") of the Lion-mask of the Sun (the Sun of Men, Skr. *sūryo nṛn),* at the junction of this rectangle with the vault of the Celestial Paradise above, is the passageway from the one to the other state of being. The axial Descent of the Dove is the Sun's spiration *(sūrya ātmā,* RV I.115.1) and the Sun-kiss, as much as to say, "This is my beloved son" *(ātmā tvam putra,* Kauṣ. Up. II.11, cf. n. 15). The forms below are repeated in principle above, where however we do not see the Spirit, for "the Gale blows only on this side of the sky" (ŚB VIII.7.3.9-12).

Analogous forms occur in more remote areas. The handle of an Aztec sacrificial knife, for example, is composed of a Garuḍa having a man's head, in this context assuredly the victim's, in its open mouth (P. Radin, *The Story of the American Indian,* New York, 1927, facing p. 108). We say "Garuḍa" only descriptively and without begging the question of formal sources or influences; the representation is in any case of the Sunbird in its rapacious aspect. It would be farfetched to invoke the Jātaka here, and rash to take for granted a specifically Indian influence; reasonable, however, to explain the Indian (see "The Rape of a Nāgī" [*Coomaraswamy* 1]), Chinese (see Carl Hentze, *Objets rituels, croyances, et dieux de la Chine et de I'Amérique,* Antwerp, 1936), and American Indian (Radin, Hentze) formulae in accordance with the universal principle most explicitly stated in Vedic contexts, but not less clearly expressed by Eckhart (Pfeiffer ed., p. 399) when he says that the soul is swallowed up by God "als diu sunne die morgenroete in sich ziuhet, daz si ze nihte wirt." For in every sacrifice, a God is "fed"; or, in other words, the soul, or rather spirit, of the victim is returned to its source; in the last analysis, it is himself *(proprium)* that the sacrificer kills, and himself *(esse)* that he returns alive to Him that gave it. Hence the question asked in the Upaniṣads, "Which is the self? *(katama ātmā,* BU IV.3.7)," "Which one is it?" (MU 11)1,. and the corresponding Buddhist, "By which self *(ken'attanā)* does one attain the Brahma-world?" (Sn 508), i.e., whether by the "lesser" or the "greater" self of A I.240; cf. Luke 17:33, Matt. 16:25, John 12:25; Song of Songs 1:8 *(si ignoras te, egredere);* and also n. 58.

[4] J. Eggeling uses this word in SBE, XLIII, 155, n. 8, but in ŚB VIII.4.2.2, where *svayamātṛṇṇā* is explained, he renders correctly that it is so called because the Breath thus "bores itself *(svayam ātmānam ātṛntte)." Ātṛd* is used of "piercing the ears." In RV III.30.10, *alātṛṇah,* derived by Yāska from *tṛd (Nirukta* VI.2), can best be understood if taken to be, in accordance with Sāyana's first explanation of *alātṛṇāsah* in I.166.7, *anātṛṇaḥ, ātardana-rahitah,* "not pierced." Here the Maruts are "not pierced" in the simple sense of "unwounded": in III.30.10, Vala, about to be opened up by Indra (cf. II.24.3, *abhinat valam . . . acakṣayat svar)* is "not yet pierced." Max Müller's explanations in SBE, XXXIII, 227-228, are implausible.

[5] For the return of the spirit to its source.

[6] *Suvarga = svarga,* heaven or light-world; and/or *su-varga,* goodly fellowship, from *vṛj* as in *vṛjana,* "fold, camping ground," etc.

[7] *Ad visionem coeli coelesti. Anukhyātyai* corresponds to *dṛṣṭaye* in Īśā Up. 15 and parallel texts. In TS V.2.8.1, Keith's "to reveal" is correct, but in V.3.2.2, "for the lighting up of" misses the point. It is just as when one looks through the door of the Sadas or the

Havirdhāna (ŚB IV.6.7.9-10), "freely one may look through the door, for the door is made by the gods."

[8] *Samyānī = ākramaṇaḥ* in JUB I.3.2, etc. In TS V.3.9, special bricks are laid down as stepping stones: ŚB regards this as inordinate, the Universal-Light bricks being all that is required. The symbolism of the cosmic ladder is unmistakable. Cf. Gen. 28:12, 17-18: "He dreamed, and behold a ladder set up on the earth, and the top of it reached to heaven: and behold the angels of God ascending and descending on it. . . . And he was afraid, and said, 'How dreadful is this place: this is none other but the house of God, and this is the gate of heaven. And Jacob rose up early in the morning, and took the stone,. . . and set it up for a pillar." [Cf. Figure 10.] Meister Eckhart cites this ladder as an example of the first class of parables (symbols), in which "every word, or virtually every word of the parable considered by itself has a symbolic meaning," and says that "this ladder signifies and expresses parabolically and in a likeness the one entire universe and its chief parts" *(Expositio sancti evangelii, secundum Johannem,* 175). Cf. also J. ben Gorion as cited by U. Holmberg, "Der Baum des Lebens," *Annales Academiae Scientiarum Fennicae,* XVI (1922-1923), 28, n. 2.

In DhA III.225 the Buddha is described as descending from the Trayastriṃśa heavens on a ladder *(sopāna),* his intention being to "tread the human path" *(manussapathaṃ gamissāmi)*. From the top of this ladder can be seen upward into all the Brahmalokas, downward into the depths of hell, and round about the whole extent of the universe in the four directions. The foot of the ladder is at the gate of the city of Saṃkassa ("Place of manifestation"), where there is a shrine called "Immovable *(acalacetiya)*." This ladder is illustrated in reliefs at Bhārhut and Sāñcī.

D I.243 describes a ladder *(nisseṇi)* erected "as if at four crossroads" (sc. at the navel of the earth) and leading to an unseen palace (cf. the *nisseṇi-gehāni* at Sīhagiri described in n. 3). The reference (although intended contemptuously) is to such means of ascent as have been cited above from various Brāhmaṇa sources.

[9] Such a descent is told of in JUB III.29, where Uccaiśravas Kaupeyaya ("Clarion-voice, the Child of the Well"—i.e., of the *Fons Vitae),* who has "shaken off his bodies and found the Warden of the World," appears to his still-living nephew in a recognizable shape. This is not, of course, a "spiritualistic" manifestation but a resurrection, or *avataraṇa*. The nephew, indeed, can hardly believe that the uncle has appeared to him here on earth, since it is commonly understood that "when anyone manifests himself *(āvir bhavati),* the fact is that others [to whom he manifests] ascend to *his* world [not that he descends to theirs]." Uccaiśravas explains that it is as one that has found God that he is a "Mover at Will"; he can, therefore, assume the form once worn on earth as readily as any other.

[10] See Sir John Marshall, *Mohenjo-Daro and the Indus Civilization,* 3 vols. (London, 1931), I, 62, with further references (for ERE ii, read *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics,* XI), and Coomaraswamy, "The Darker Side of Dawn," 1935, n. 21. At Dabhoi a stone slab with a circular opening is used for ordeals: the stoutest man, if innocent, can pass through it; the guilty, however thin, cannot. For the Śatruñjaya stone see Forbes, *Ras Mala* (1878), p. 574, and for the Śrīguṇḍi stone at Malabar Point, which absolves from guilt, p. 576.

[11] The Universal Lights are laid down "in proper order" *(saṃyañcī),* so that Agni shines upward and the Sun glows downward, and the Gale blows between (athwart, *tiryan)* in the midspace (ŚB VIII.7.I.20). In RV x.85.2 the *vyāna* is the axis *(akṣa)* of the cosmic chariot —i.e., Axis Mundi. The *vyāna (vi-āna)* is so called both as being the distributive Breath

whereby the Gale blows everywhere and with reference to omnipresence *(vibhava),* and disjunctively, inasmuch as it separates heaven and earth (which are as one beyond the Sun, "where no Gale blows" (SB VIII.7.3.9), and "where heaven and earth embrace" (JUB I.5.5). The disjunctive function of the trans-spiration is, of course, the same as that of the Spirit when the latter is thought of as a bridge which not only connects but also separates heaven from earth, as in BU IV.4.22, *eṣa setur vidharaṇa eṣāṃ lokānām,* and similarly CU VIII.4.2; cf. Acts of John 99, "This cross, then, is that which fixed all things apart."

Figure 10. The Heavenly Ladder, Byzantine, early 12th century (from a Klimax MS)

[12] This life-giving kiss is both a breathing and a shining, between which there is no distinction *in divinis,* but only logically. “Light is generation” *(jyotiḥ prajananam,* ŚB

VIII.7.2.16-17; Witelo, *Liber de intelligentiis* ix, "Lux in omne vivente est principium motus et vitae"). A like conception is implied when Aditi is addressed as "O thou breathed on by Vivasvat" *(vivasvad-vāte,* TS IV.4.12). It is in this way that the "sole Saṃsārin" (Śaṇkara on *Vedānta Sūtra* I.I.5*)* is universally born: "It is as the Breath that the Provident Spirit *(prajñātman)* grasps and erects the flesh" (Kauṣ. Up. III.3); "inasmuch as the Breath indwells the extended seed, so It takes birth" *(sambhavati,* JUB III.10.5); "it is by the rays *(raśmibhih)* that all these offspring are imbued with the breaths-of-life" *(praṇeṣu abhihitaḥ,* ŚB II.3.3.7). "The power of the soul, which is in the semen, through the spirit enclosed therein fashions the body" *(Sum. Theol.* III.32.1). "That divine Truth is the Light, and its expressions *(expressiones = sṛṣṭayah)* with respect to things are, as it were, luminous rayings *(quasi luminosae irradiationes = raśmaya iva),* albeit inward *(licet intrinsicae = antar-nihitā api),* and which particularizations *(determinata = bhāgāḥ)* lead and point the way to that which is expressed" *(id quod exprimitur,* St. Bonaventura, *De scientia Christi* 3c, concl. 4, = *tatra nayanti yatra sarjaḥ)*. Or, as Plotinus expresses it, "Under the theory of procession by powers, souls are described as rays" (Plotinus VI.4.3). "The Light is progenitive" *(jyotiḥ prajananam,* ŚB VIII.7.I.17); the many rays of the Sun are his sons (JUB II.9.10); the pharaoh speaks of himself as "Thy child who came forth from the rays" (James H. Breasted, *Dawn of Conscience in Egypt,* New York, 1933, P-291); in Navaho ritual, virgins are simply "non-sunlight-struck girls."

Cf. *Mathnawī* I.3775 ff., "When the time comes for the embryo to receive the spirit, at that time the sun becomes its helper. This embryo is brought into movement by the sun, for the sun is quickly endowing it with spirit. ... By which way did it become connected in the womb with the beauteous sun? By the hidden way that is remote from our sense-perception."

13 "And the Lord God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and man became a living soul" (Gen. 2:7). See Coomaraswamy, "The Sunkiss," 1940. "It is the breath of life in the nostrils to behold thy rays" (Egyptian hymn to the Sun-god, Breasted, *Dawn of Conscience,* p. 291).

14 Primarily the Keeper or Herdsman *(gopa)* of the Worlds, Prajāpati in JUB III.2.10-11 = Agni in RV I.164.31, *ā ca parā ca pathibiś carantaṃ bhuvaneṣv antaḥ,* to be considered with JUB III.37.3, *tad ye ca ha vā ime prāṇa amī ca raśmaya etāir ha vā eṣa etad ā ca parā ca pathibiś carati* ("Now verily what these breaths here and those rays there are, it is by these 'paths that he comes and goes hitherwards and hence' "). For "ray" as "path" cf. JB I.49.9, *ṛtūnām efo . . . raśminā pratyavetya,* "one of the Seasons having descended by means of a ray." Cf. "converse ascent by means of a ray" in MU VI.30 and JUB III.37.3, where breaths and rays are paths. In Egyptian religion the Sun-god is also the "Valiant Herdsman," as in Christianity the "Sun of Man" is the "Good Shepherd."

15 That is, as Sāyaṇa says, feels that he is *labdhātmaka,* has gotten a "self"; cf. Sāyaṇa on RV X.72.6, *susaṃrabdhaḥ = suṣṭhu labdhātmanaḥ. Labh* here in the common sense of "know" and "be aware of" = *vid* in BU I.4.10, where it is "inasmuch as It knew Itself *(ātmānam evāvet),* that 'I am Brahman' *(ahaṃ brahmāsmi,* 'I am that I am'), It became the All." In the same way, whatever is quickened by the Breath can say "I am" such and such, in accordance with the extent of its knowledge, partial or total, of "itself," or the Spiritual Self; cf. BU I.2.1, ā*tmanvī syām,* where the Godhead assumes essence.

The Sunkiss is the archetype of the so-called sniff-kiss (see E. W. Hopkins, JAOS, XXVIII, 1908, 120-134). Of this kiss, which is quite distinct from the erotic kiss called the "joining of mouth to mouth" (BU VI.4.9), there is a description in Kauṣ. Up. II.II.7; cf. ŚA

IV.10, where "a father who has been abroad, on returning should kiss *(abhijighret,* V.l. *abhimṛṣet,* 'should touch' *[anugraha,* 'grace']) his son's head, saying 'Indeed, my son, thou art myself *(ātmā tvam putra)*: live thou a hundred autumns long.' . . . Then he grasps *(gṛhṇāti)* him, saying 'Wherewith Prajāpati grasped *(paryagṛhnāt)* his offspring for their weal *(ariṣṭyai),* therewith I grasp *(parigṛhṇāmi)* thee.' He 'grasps' *(gṛhṇāti)* his name. . . . Thrice he should kiss *(avajighret)* his head." "Wherewith Prajāpati grasped"—i.e., as above and Kauṣ. Up. III.3, where it is the Breath *(prāṇa),* the Provident Spirit *(prajñātman)*, that "grasps and establishes the body" *(śarīram parigṛhya utthāpayati)* [cf. ŚB I.6.3, where Indra grasps Vṛtra, limb to limb]. Thus AV XI.4.10-15 (summarized), "the Breath, the Gale, Prajāpati, Death, indwells *(anuvasati;* not 'clothes'—cf. RV VIII.3.24, *ātmā pitus tanūr vāsaḥ;* AV XI.4.20, *pitā putraṃ pra viveśa;* AB VII.13, *jāyāmā praviśati . . . tasyām punar navo bhūtva jāyate,* etc.) his offspring, as a father a dear son. Within the womb he both expires *(apānati = mriyate* in JUB III.9.1) and comes to life *(prāṇati = carati* in AV X.8.13 and XI.4.20). When thou, O Breath, quickenest *(jinvasyatha*—i.e., makest to be a *jīva,* 'living soul,' as in Genesis 2:7 [cf. MU II.6]), then is He born again" (viz. the Person, sole Saṃsārin, Agni as in RV VIII.43.9, *agne . . . garbhe saṃjāyase punaḥ*; the Sun in AV XIII.2.25, *sa yonim aiti sa ujāyate punaḥ*). As Schiller also realized, "es ist der Geist der sich den Körper (baut) schafft" (*Wallenstein,* 2nd ed., rev., New York, 1901, III.13).

The so-called sniff-kiss is a *salutatio* as distinct from an *osculatio*. It is either a communication of being or an acknowledgment of an essential identity (*ātmā tvaṃ putra,* for example). It is rather a ritualistic gesture of blessing than an expression of personal feelings. The "holy kiss" or "kiss of charity" of the New Testament and early Christianity may have been of this sort; at any rate, St. Cyril of Jerusalem ("Catechetical Lectures, Lecture XXIII: On the Mysteries, V. On the Sacred Liturgy and Communion," 3) says, "This kiss is the sign that our souls are united and that we banish all remembrance of injury," and if it is to this "union of souls" that Clement refers when he speaks of this kiss as a "mystery," the parallel with the Indian greeting would be close. Some trace of its "originally" salutary significance survives in the expression, "kiss the place to make it well." Closely related to this is the American Indian hunter's practice, when a bison has been killed, of smoking the ritual pipe (calumet) and directing the smoke (ordinarily blown toward the six directions of space) toward the muzzle of the slain animal in order to compensate for the taking of life by a gesture implying the gift of life. Analogous rites have been recognized among the Siberians, Ainus, and African Pygmies, and one may say with ŚB XIII.2.8.2 that the slayer of the victim "thereby lays the vital airs into it, and thus offering is made by him with this victim as a living one," in accordance with the principle enunciated in ŚB III.8.2.4, "the food of the gods is living . . . and thus that food of the gods becomes truly alive, becomes immortal for the Immortals."

That the sni f-kiss, although a breathing upon and not an inhalation, involves a smelling of *(ghrā,* "to smell," as in JUB II.3.9, *apānaḥ: surabhi ca hy enena jighrati durgandhi ca;* and in BU III.2.2, *apānena hi gandhan jighrati,* where the meaning "exhalation" for *apāna* is assured by JUB III.5.6, *pa ity evāpānyāt,* "He should simply breathe out saying '*pa*'"), is not a difficulty from the Indian and traditional point of view, according to which senseperception depends upon an extension of the sense powers to their objects, rather than upon any reaction effected by the sense organs, which are merely the channels of perception and not themselves percipients. This depends, in the last analysis, on the doctrine (BU iii.7.23; MU II.6d, etc.) that the sensepowers, as distinguished from the sense-organs, are those of the indwelling Spirit, whose perceptions are not determined, but

only accompanied, by the physical and in themselves completely unintelligent reactions of the sense organs, which exist merely for the sake of their objects, as stated explicitly in KU iv. 1 and MU II.6. Hence it is not the sensations themselves that one should try to understand, but Him whose means of perception they are (Kauṣ. Up. III.8).

[16] Identified with the Breath (TS VII.2.7.2, PB VI.10.5, ŚB VIII.4.2.6, JUB IV.24, MU vi. 1, etc.) and commonly also with Brahman and Ātman.

[17] Sāyaṇa adds that He who is the Inner Controller by means of this thread moves all things, as a puppet master moves his puppets. The outward man, the psycho-physical vehicle of the Spirit, has not *as such* any freedom, but this name and appearance are not his real being; he has only to know himself as he really is to be altogether free. The doctrine of the Inner Controller *(antaryāmin* = Gnostic ἡγεμών; cf. Scholastic "synteresis") is expounded at length in BU III.7: "He is the unseen Seer, the unheard Hearer, the unthought Thinker, the uncomprehended Comprehensor, other than whom there is no seer, no hearer, no thinker, no comprehensor. He is your spirit *(ātman),* the Inner Controller, the Immortal." Note that *yo antaro yamati* = Yama = Mṛtyu. *Ya enaṃ veda . . . apa punar-mṛtyuṃ jayati, nainam mṛtyur āpnoti, mṛtyur asyātmā bhavati* (BU I.2.7).

Plutarch describes the intellectual *daimon* of a man as a being floating in a higher world but connected by a cord with the soul below (vision of Timarchus, *De genio Socratis* 59ID ff.). A Canadian Catholic once told me that she was taught by a priest that the soul is connected with God "as if by a rubber thread to a rubber ball."

[18] Hence at the end of the world there is a "severance of the wind-ropes" *(vraścanaṃ vāta-rajjūnām,* MU I.4), and microcosmically, "They say of a man departed [from this life] that 'His limbs are unstrung *(vyasraṃsiṣatāsyāngāni*)'; for it is by the Gale, indeed, as thread, that they are tied together" *(samdṛbdhāni,* BU III.7.2), or that he has been "cut off" (ŚB X.5.2.16). This is also the "thread" that is spun by the Greek Fates and Scandinavian Norns (Past, Present, and Future); when the thread is cut, the man dies.

[19] Cf. *Tripura Rahasya,* tr. M. S. Venkataramaiah, 2nd ed. (Tiruvannamalai, 1952), V.119: "This *Mr. Motion,* the friend of *Mr. Inconstant,* is most powerful and keeps them all alive. Though single, he multiplies himself, manifests as the city and the citizens, pervades them all, protects and holds them. Without him, they would all be scattered and lost like pearls without the string of the necklace. He is the bond between the inmates and myself; empowered by me, he serves in the city as the string in a necklace. If that city decays, he collects the inmates together, leads them to another and remains their master." Here the speaker, Hemalekhā, is clearly the voice of the *paramātman;* Mr. Motion the *sūtrātman,* and Mr. Inconstant the *jīvātman*.

Unmistakable traces of the *sūtrātman* doctrine survive in Pāli Buddhist literature. Thus, in M II.17 (echoing ŚA XI.8, "Man is the jewel, breath the thread, food the knot," etc.), the body with its consciousness (the psychophysical individuality) is compared to a transparent gem, and "even as a man with eyes to see needs only to handle it to see that 'this is such and such a gem (and strung) on such and such a thread,' even so have I taught my disciples the Way whereby to have such an understanding of the body and its consciousness"; in D II.13 the unborn Bodhisattva is visible in the womb, just as the colored thread on which a gem is strung can be seen within it; and in DhA III.224, where Moggallāna ascends to speak with the Buddha, then in the Trayastriṃśa heaven, "Diving into the earth right there, he willed that his ascent might be visible to the assembled multitude. Then he climbed up the center of Mt. Meru [*sineru-majjhena*; Bloomfield's 'side of' misses the point], in

appearance like a thread of a yellow blanket strung through a gem, and the multitude beheld him." More often, such an ascent is represented as a levitation and breaking through the roof-plate of a building [a survival of which is found, for example, at J II.79 and IV.200, and Vin 1003, where, in order to escape from a deadly disease, the person wishing to secure health and life for himself has to make a hole in the roof or the wall and then run away]. In either case, of course, the miracle is primarily one of interior disposition, and ascent from lower to higher levels of reference, the exercise of such powers being always dependent on contemplation. In the *Sarabhanga Jātaka (*V.130*),* the Bodhisattva, "Keeper of the Light" *(jotipāla),* is a "targetcleaver" (*akkhaṇa-vedhin,* not without a side glance at *vedhin* in the epistemological sense of the word "penetrating"; cf. Vedic *vedhas* in this sense and Muṇḍ. Up. II.2.2-3, *viddhi,* the imperative here of *vyadh* but often of *vid)*. Stationed in the middle of a stricken field, he attaches a scarlet thread to his arrow and shoots it so as to pierce *(vijjhitvā)* four plantain trees set up at the four corners of the field. The arrow passes through these four and a second time through the one that was first pierced (thus completing the round) and finally returns with the thread to his hand. This is called the "threading of the circle" *(cakka-viddham)*. We have no doubt that the authors of these texts understood their ultimate significance, though it may well be that those who related them, like the scholars who read them today, did not. We agree with C.A.F. Rhys Davids (JRAS, 1937, p. 259) that the Buddha took the *ātman* doctrine for granted and that, while *ātman* used reflexively must be rendered by "self," it is unfortunate that in those contexts where the rendering "Self" has been customary, "we have not consistently and persistently used, not soul or self, but spirit" *(What Was the Original Gospel in "Buddhism"?,* London, 1938, p. 39; cf. also Coomaraswamy, "The Re-interpretation of Buddhism," 1939).

[20] Cousens' suggestion that the Indus Valley ring-stones may have been "threaded to form columns" (Marshall, *Mohenjo-Daro,* p. 61) is by no means altogether irrelevant, though it need not be taken to mean that pillars of actual buildings were thus constructed. Earthenware rings superimposed to form a columnar finial have been found at Paharpur *(Archaeological Survey of India, Annual Report,* II, 1934, pl. 53d). The very varied scale of the Indus Valley ring-stones is no objection in principle (they vary from half an inch to four feet in diameter), because symbolic constructions do not depend on scale for their significance; as, for example, in the case of miniature carts, which cannot be thought of as having been merely toys (cf. R. Forrer, "Les Chars cultuels préhistoriques et leurs survivances aux époques historiques," *Préhistoire,* I, 1932, 122 ff.), any more than the gigantic processional cars of today are toys. In any case, the ring-stones of our texts were thought of as threaded on a spiritual pole.

[21] See Oertel in JAOS, XVIII (1897), 26 ff., and Coomaraswamy, "The Darker Side of Dawn," 1935.

[22] It will be seen that in the Indian eschatology the "end of the world" is reached and the "last judgment" pronounced immediately; this appears to have been the doctrine taught by Christ himself, for in Matt. 24:44 we find the words "in such an hour that ye think not the Son of Man cometh" immediately followed by the parable of the wise and foolish virgins in which the former are admitted by a door that is shut upon the latter.

[23] *Nirodha* here = *avarodhanaṃ divaḥ* (RV IX.113.8). This *nirodha* as "barrier" corresponds to the Islamic *jidāriyya,* or "murity," which separates the inward aspect *(al-bāṭin, al-'amā* = Skr. *avyakta, asat,* Para Brahman, Varuṇa) from the outward aspect *(al-*

ẓāhir, aḥadiyya = Skr. *sat, satyam, mahat,* Apara Brahman, Mitra) of the Supreme Identity *(al-dhāt* = Skr. *tad ekam, sadasat, vyaktāvyakta,* Brahman, Mitrāvaruṇau). It is the line of demarcation between the hidden *(guhā)* and manifested *(āvis)* operations *(vrata)*. It is the "wall of Paradise by which none can pass but those who have overcome the Reason that guards its gate" (Nicholas of Cusa, *De visione Dei* ix, where "Reason" = *satyam* in JUB I.5.3, *satyam haiṣā devatā)*. As cited above, CU VIII.6.5 corresponds to Matt. 25:10, "they that were ready went in with him to the marriage: and the door was shut."

It may be observed that in Buddhist contexts, e.g., A II.48-50, *loka-nirodho (= lokānta)* is the "end of the world" as much in a temporal as in a spatial sense: "there is no surcease from sorrow until world's end is reached"; and it is emphasized that world's end is "within you." The end is similarly temporal in JUB iv. 15.1, "I will tell thee that, which knowing, ye perceive the door of the world of heaven *(svargasya lokasya dvāram = januam coeli),* and having successfully come unhurt to the end of the Year, shall speedily attain the world of heaven" *(eṣyathe,* "shall speedily attain," from *is,* suggests the motion of the Aśvins, compared to arrows in RV I.184.3, and the symbolism of Muṇḍ. Up. II.2.3-4, where the Brahman is the target "to be penetrated" and one makes of oneself the arrow); cf. śB X.2.6.4, "it is thus the immortal that lies beyond this" (Year, temporal existence, the 101-fold Prajapati of ŚB X.I). The connection of the "end of the Year" with the "door of heaven" will be evident from the Capricorn symbolism described in n. 3. Cf. ŚB I.6.I.19, "He alone gains the Year who knows its doors; for what were he to do with a house who cannot find his way inside? . . . Spring is a door and likewise Winter is a door thereof. This same Year the sacrificer enters as the World of Heaven." Consider also JUB I.35, where the "two ends of the Year are Winter and Spring": just as these are united, making the Year "endless" or "infinite" *(ananta),* so is the "Endless Chant." The separation of these "ends" is the sundering of Heaven from Earth, the Sun from the Moon, Essence from Nature; their reunion, effected by the Comprehensor, the perfect circle of eternity ("die Schlange, die sich in den eigenen Schwanz beisst, stellt den Äeon dar").

[24] And is thus in Rūmī's sense "a dead man living" *(Mathnawī* VI.744, "Walking on the earth, like living men; yet is he dead and his spirit gone to heaven"); Skr. *jīvanmukta*. So also Eckhart, "The kingdom of heaven is for none but the thoroughly dead. . . . These are the blessed dead, dead and buried in the Godhead." For initiation as a death, cf. JUB III.7-9, as well as ŚB III.8.I.2, *yo dīkṣate tasya riricāna ivātmā bhavati*. The *saṃnyāsin,* or "truly poor man," is one for whom the funeral rites have already been performed *(Sannyāsa Upaniṣhad* 1; cf. Paul Deussen, *Philosophy of the Upanishads,* tr. A. S. Geden, Edinburgh, 1906, p. 375; *René Guénon,* "De la mort initiatique," *Le Voile d'lsis,* XXXIX, 1934; *The Great Liberation,* tr. Arthur Avalon, 2nd ed., Madras, 1927, p. LXXXV; Hermes, II, 370; Firmicus Maternus, describing pagan mysteries, says that the initiand is spoken of as *homo moriturus*—see van der Leeuw, "The ΣYMBOΛA in Firmicus Maternus," *Egyptian Religion,* I, 1933, 67). It need hardly be said that no one who still is anyone is qualified to pass through the midst of the Sun (JUB III.14.1-5 and *Mathnawī* I.3055 ff.). This "ableness" *(arhaṇa),* as the author of the *Cloud of Unknowing* expresses it, "is nought else but a strong and deep ghostly sorrow . . . and well were him that might win to this sorrow. All men have matter of sorrow; but most specially he feeleth matter of sorrow, that wotteth and feeleth that he is" (ch. 44). This "sorrow" corresponds to Skr. *vairāgya,* and "ableness" corresponds both to *arhaṇa* and to the root meaning of *dikṣā* ("initiation"), from *dakṣ* "to be able," the *dīkṣita* being precisely "enabled" (cf. the series of articles on initiation by Rene Guénon in É*tudes traditionelles,* XL, XLI, 1935, 1936).

On the other hand, we have seen, and for excellent reasons, that the Sacrificer, who departs from himself and during the ritual operation is no longer himself, by name So-and-so, actually says, when he redescends to earth and finds it inconvenient to say in so many words that this is a descent from reality to unreality, "Now am I again 'myself,' " and thus, as we might express it, returns from the supersensual to his senses, the world of "common sense."

[25] Cf. Coomaraswamy, *"Kha* and Other Words Denoting 'Zero' in Connection With the Metaphysics of Space" [in *Coomaraswamy 2*]. *Tṛd,* "to pierce or perforate" (the root of *svayamātṛṇṇā),* is commonly found with *kha,* e.g., KU IV.I, *parāñci khāni vyatṛṇat svayambhūḥ,* "The Self-existent pierced the holes outwards," i.e. *(adhidaivatam)* opened the doors of perception by which the transcendent Spirit surveys all things from without and at the same time *(adhyātman)* opened the doors of the senses by which the immanent spirit looks forth. It is in the former sense that It surveys all things through the eagle Eye of the Sun (RV *passim)*. These two (the *prajñātman* of the solar Eye and *antarātman* that looks out through the microcosmic eye) being one for the Vedas, as for Eckhart, it is not "I" that see, but "God's Eye that sees in me." There is no other seer than He (JUB I.28.8, BU III.7.23), just as there is no other agent (JUB I.5.2 and IV.12.2, BG *passim),* no other transmigrant except the Lord (Śaṇkara on *Vedanta Sūtra* I.I-5).

The *khāni* are likewise the floodgates through which the imprisoned waters are let run free, as in RV II.15.3, *khāny atṛṇaḥ nadīnām,* "opened the sluices of the streams," and VII.82.3, *anu apāṃ khāny atṛntam,* "Ye, Indrāvaruṇā, have pierced the sluices of the waters."

In Plato, *Republic* X.614 ff., there are two holes, εἰς τόπον τινὰ δαιμόνιον, and two on earth below, all of which are called χάσματα, the etymological equivalent of *khāni*. Of the two above, one on the right is for the entry and ascent of the righteous, and one on the left for the exit and descent of the unrighteous; the latter corresponds to the jaws of Āmmit in the Egyptian and those of Hell in the Christian Judgments, and to the unfavorable aspect of the Śiṃśumāra-graha in the Indian. The two openings on earth from which the unrighteous from (Hell) below and the righteous from (Heaven) above are reborn may be compared to the *gārhapatya* and *āhavanīya* hearths, by which one is born respectively of the flesh and of the spirit. It is noteworthy that the passage of the former is an ordeal; only those whose sins have been purged below can come forth, while the most evil tyrants are kept below (cf. the Dabhoi ring-stone used for ordeals, as mentioned in a previous note). Cf. also the interpretation of Numenius, cited by Émile Bréhier, *La Philosophic de Plotin* (Paris, 1928), p. 28, as follows: "Le lieu de jugement devient le centre du monde; le ciel platonicien devient la sphere des fixes; le 'lieu souterrain' où sont punies les âmes, ce sont les planètes; la 'bouche du ciel' par laquelle les ames descendront a la naissance, est le tropique de Cancer; et c'est par le Capricorne qu'elles remontent." Capricorn is significant here in connection with what has been said above regarding the Śiṃśumāra, the ultimate reference being, no doubt, to the Sun in Capricorn. Finally, it may be remarked that the rebirth is thought of as taking place at the commencement of an aeon, as follows from the "thousand years" that intervenes between the death and rebirth of the individual principles. See further René Guénon, "Les Portes solsticiales" and "Le Symbolisme solsticial de Janus," *Études traditionelles* XLIII (1938), 180-185 and 273-277.

[26] RV VIII.9I.7, *khe rathasya khe'nasaḥ khe yugasya*.

[27] *Mathnawī* VI.1203, "The veil before the face of the Sun, what is it but excess of brilliance and intensity of splendor?" The multiplicity of the rays conceals the unity of their

source.

[28] RV X.16.3, *sūryaṃ cakṣur gacchatu, vātam ātmā;* X.92.13, *ātmānaṃ vasyo abhi vātam arcata;* X.168.4, *ātmā devānām . . . tasmi vātayā haviṣa vidhema;* BU V.10-11, *yadā vai puruṣo'smāl lokāt praiti sa vāyum āgacchati, tasmai sa tatra vijihīte yathā-cakrasya khaṃ, tena sa ūrdhvam ākramate ādityam āgacchati . . . paramaṃ haiva lokaṃ jayati ... ya evaṃ veda*. All this is implied also in the "ascent after Agni" *(agner anvārohaḥ,* TS V.6.8.1), for *yadā vā agnir udvāyati vāyum apyeti*.

A Vikarṇī brick representing the Gale is laid down with the last and uppermost Self-perforate and immediately north of it, for the Gale "blows only on this side of the Sky" (ŚB VIII.7.3.9-12). That the Gale of the Spirit, which "goeth as it listeth" *(yathā vaśaṃ carati,* RV X.168.4), "never sets" *(nimlocantīhānyā devatā na vāyuḥ*) "nor ever goeth 'home'" *(anastam itā devatā yad vāyuḥ,* BU I.5.22), just as "Death does not die" (SB X.5.2.3, *mṛtyur na mriyate),* is whereby He is "the one whole Godhead" *(ekā ha vāva kṛtsna devatā),* and that He never "goeth" home is because He *is* the "home" to which all other Persons of the deity return *(sa haiso' staṃ nāma . . . tam etam evāpitah,* JUB III.I.I-II). "Whence the Sun arises, and where he goeth home (*astaṃ yatra ca gacchati)* . . . beyond that nonesoever goes" *(na atyeti,* AV X.8.16, KU IV.9; cf. M II.39, etc., *nāparam itthatāyāti);* "From the Breath he rises, verily, and in the Breath he goeth home" *(prāṇe' stam eti,* BU I.5.23, *prāṇa* corresponding to *vāyu* in I.5.22). "Verily, when one finds a ground in that invisible, despirated, homeless *(anilāyana)* [non-being of the Godhead], he has passed beyond all fears" (TU II.7). It is in the same sense that "the Red Bird has no nest" (RV X.55.6) and that "the Son of Man hath not where to lay his head" (Luke 9:58), being himself *our* bed and pillow. To JUB III. I.1, *ekā ha vāva kṛtsna devatā,* corresponds BU 1.4.7, where insofar as the Brahman is designated by what are "merely the names of his actions *(karmanāmāny eva),"* he is "incomplete" *(akṛtsna),* and "one should worship Him as 'Spirit' only (*ātmety evōpasīta*)*,* wherein verily all these are unified" (*ekam bhavanti—* i.e., *tad ekaṃ,* as in RV x. 129.2): "God is a Spirit: and they that worship Him must worship Him in spirit and in truth" (John 4:24).

With respect to the deceased Comprehensor, Sn 1175-1176 asks, "Has he 'gone home,' or is he no more?" and answers "He who thus 'goes home' is without measure *(na pamāṇam atthi)*. There is nothing by which he can be named. This unification of all qualities *(sabbesu dhammesu samūhatesu)* involves the unification of all wordways *(samūhatā vādapathā pi sabbe)."* "Just as a spark blown away by the wind 'goes home' *(atthaṃ paleti)* and is inconnumerable *(na upeti saṇkham),* so the Sage, released from a name and a body, 'goes home' and is inconnumerable" (Sn 1074).

[29] Whereas Oertel's rendering assumes in this sentence *vā . . . vā . . . vai,* ours is based on *vai* throughout. *Vyūhati* here is "disperses" in the sense of "does away with," not as in *vyūha* in the sense of "distributor, emanation, manifestation."

[30] That immortality lies beyond the Sun is regular; the second part of the sentence is not altogether clear to me. Cf. BG II.28, "Beings are unmanifested in origin, manifest in their middle state, unmanifest again in their dissolution." All that is logically "knowable" lies within the cosmos, between the limits of heaven and earth; what lies beneath and what lies beyond are equally inexplicit *(anirukta)*. All within the cosmos is in the power of Death, all creatures are his food. The atmosphere is the abode of creatures *(antarikṣāyatandh paśavah,* ŚB VIII.3.I.12), but has no "place" of its own as if it were one of these. All that is external to the cosmos is continuous and immortal; whether we think of an indefinite "below" or an infinite "above" or of nether and upper waters, these are only our logical

distinctions, invalid for the Supreme Identity, circumambient and interpenetrant, "manifested and unmanifested" *(vyatāvyakta)*.

[31] Cf. JUB I.5, where the Sacrificer who has ascended these worlds, as one would climb a tree by steps (JUB I.3), is accepted by the Sun, who is the Truth inasmuch as he, the Sacrificer, tells him truth and thus invokes the Truth. The identification of the Sun with Truth or Real Being *(satyam)* recurs throughout the tradition (RV X.12I.9 and X.139.3, TS V.I.8.9, ŚB IV.2.I.26 and V.3.3.8, Muṇḍ. Up. I. 2.13 and III.I.5-6, etc.). This Truth, which must be literally penetrated *(veddhavyam,* hence *vedhas,* "penetrating"; in many texts, the equivocation *viddhi,* imperative equally of *vid,* "to know," and of *vyadh,* "to pierce or penetrate," is very significant), is the outward aspect of the Sun and the same as his disk, light, or rays, as is clearly seen in BU I.6.3, where *satyena channam* corresponds to *raśmibhis saṃchannam* in JUB I.3.6. It is through the Sun, the Truth, that whoever would "win beyond the Sun" (CU II.10.5, *paramād adityāj jayati = BU* III.3.2, *apa punar mṛtyuṃ jayati ya evaṃ veda)* must find his way. All this is as in Christianity, where Christ, the Sun of men, is "the way [*marga, satyam, prāṇa],* the truth, and the life: no man cometh unto the Father, but by me" (John 14:6), and "the door: by me if any man enter in, he shall be saved" (John 10:9; cf. *sūryadvāra, mukti-drāva);* and as in Shaman theology where, just as in Vedic climbing rites, a tree is set up in connection with a fire altar, and "this birch symbolizes the 'Door-god' (*udeśi-burchan)* who opens the entrance to heaven for the Shaman" (Holmberg, "Der Baum des Lebens," p. 28; cf. pp. 30, 142). Christ is in precisely this sense assuredly the "Door-god" (*per passionem Christi aperta est nobis janua regni caelestis, Sum. Theol*. III.49.5c; cf. Micah 2:13, "He who opens the breach will *go* up before them," etc.); as is Agni ("Agni rose aloft touching the sky: he opened the door of the world of heaven . . . him he lets pass who is a Comprehensor thereof," and "Were the Sacrificer not to ascend after him, he would be shut out from the world of heaven" (AB III.42 and TS V.6.8.1); or Viṣṇu ("Viṣṇu, indeed, is the Devas' Janitor; He opens that door for the sacrificer," AB I.30). Similarly, Heimdallr, the Sun ("his teeth were of gold, his horse hight Gulltoppr") who, in the *Prose Edda* 27, "abideth in the place hight Himinbiörg by Bifraust [Asa-bridge], he is warder of the gods, and sitteth there at heaven's end to keep the bridge against the Hillogres; he needeth less sleep than a bird . .." (cf. George Webbe Dasent, tr., *The Prose or Younger Edda,* London and Stockholm, 1842). Cf. *Bokhāri* LXXXI.48, "The bridge that is set between Paradise and Hell. It is there that men pay the price of their misdeeds. . . . When they have settled their account and are purified, they are allowed to enter Paradise."

Note that *channa,* cited above from BU I.6.3, is also "thatched" and "thatch." It is clear from UdA 56, *tasmā channaṃ vivaretha,* "So open up the thatch," that the Buddha's constant epithet *vivata-chadda* means "whose roof is opened up"—i.e., for whom the way out of the worlds is open; cf. J I.76 [and Dh 154], *gahakūṭaṃ visaṇkhitam,* "the roof-plate shattered"; Sn 19, *vivaṭā kuṭi, nibbuto gini,* "the hut is opened up, the fire slaked" *[vivata chadda,* Sn 1003]; and KU II.13, "An open house (*vivṛtaṃ sadma),* methinks, is Naciketas." ["The roof of the house is, as it were, a veil over the sun's beauty. Make haste to demolish the roof with the mattock of divine love" (Rūmī, *Dīvān,* Nicholson's commentary, p. 218).] On the Buddhist *arhat* "breaking through the roof," see also "The Symbolism of the Dome" [in this volume—ed.].

With *veddhavyam* and *viddhi,* cited above from Muṇḍ. Up. I.2, cf. Ud 9, *yadā ca attan'āvedi . . . pamuccati,* Woodward's rendering of *āvedi* being "hath pierced (unto the truth)," where, however, I would omit the "unto."

[32] *Vihīyete,* "are opened up," from *vihā,* as in RV V.78.5 *vijihīṣva,* "be opened up"; AV XII.1.48, *vijihīte,* "opens itself" (Whitney); and BU V.10, *ādityam āgacchati, tasmai sa tatra vijihīte yathā lambarasya kham,* "he reaches the Sun, it opens out for him there like the hole of a drum." Keith's rendering of *vihīyete* in AĀ III.2.4 by "are separated" is indeed "not very logical." "The fissure of the moon typifies nothing else but renunciation of the external for the internal" *(Dabistān,* III, 201, quoted in Rūmī, *Dīvān,* Nicholson's commentary, p. 224).

"Are opened up" because the Sundoor is normally "closed"—e.g., JUB I.3.6, *saṃchannam;* Iśā Up. 15, *apihitam*. In JUB III.2I.3, the Sun is said to "close the opening *(devānām bilam apyadhāh),"* which "opening" is another designation of the World-door, as in CU III.15.1, where the "opening atop of the World-chest is the sky *(dyaur asyottaraṃ bilam)*"-the "sky," that is, as represented in the construction of the Fire Altar by the uppermost Self-perforate (ŚB VIII.7.I.17, *dyaur vā'uttamā svayamātṛṇṇā)*. With the symbolism of the world as a box or chest in CU III. 15, cf. W. R. Lethaby, *Architecture, Mysticism and Myth* (New York, 1892), p. 13, "this vast box whose lid is the sky."

[33] "When one is about to go forth *(utkramiṣyan bhavati)* he sees that Orb quite clean *(śuddham),* nor do its rays any more reach him" (BU V.5.2); cf. *vimalo hoti sūryo* as an omen of future Buddahood in J I.18. Many of the signs listed in AĀ III.2.4 recur in ŚA VIII.7 and XI.3, 4. These are not "old folklore ideas" in Keith's sense (AĀ, p. 251, n. 5), but the technical language of the *sūtrātman* doctrine according to which, as Plotinus expresses it, "souls are described as rays" (Plotinus VI.4.3). Cf. Coomaraswamy, "The Nature of 'Folklore' and 'Popular Art,' " in *Why Exhibit Works of Art?,* 1943.

[34] Similarly in the Christian tradition: Ecclesiastes, *passim; Sum, Theol*. I.103.5 *ad* I, "These things are said to be 'under the sun' which are generated and corrupted," and m. Supp., 9I.1 *ad* 1, "The state of glory is not under the sun."

[35] The Sun, Prajāpati, "who slays and quickens" *(yo mārayati prāṇayati,* AV XIII.3.3, which hymn is closely related to RV IV.53.3). Similarly, in ŚB X.5.2.13, Death, the Person in the Solar Orb, who is the Breath, plants his feet in the heart and, when he withdraws them, the creature dies. The "feet" are the same as the "rays" of the Sun *(hṛdaye pādāv atihatau,* corresponding to MU VI.30, *ananta raśmayas dīpavad yaḥ sthito hṛdi)*. Cf. BG XIII.16, *taj jñeyam grasiṣṇu prabhaviṣṇu ca;* Deut. 32:39, "I kill, and I make alive"; similarly I Sam. 2:6 and 11 Kings 5:7.

[36] In the Vedic tradition the primordial Yakṣa, the "one-fold," is the Brahman, and the tree the Brahma-vṛkṣa. The Buddha can still be called a Yakkha, and the Bodhi-rukkha in at least one passage *(Kāliṅgabodhi Jātaka,* J IV.228) is defined as the only kind of *cetiya* that is not in the last analysis a "groundless and fanciful" substitute for the Buddha's visible person as a recipient of offerings *(pūjaniya-ṭṭhāna)*. For *Yakṣa* = Brahman see Coomaraswamy, "The Yakṣa of the Vedas and Upaniṣads," 1938. [Cf. Figure **II—-ED.]**

[37] For the forms of *bodhi-gharas* see Coomaraswamy, "Early Indian Architecture: I. Cities and City Gates, II. Bodhi-gharas," 1930. For similar representations of hypaethral *yakkha-cetiyas* see Coomaraswamy, "Yakṣas" [Pt. 1], 1928, pl. 20 on the lower left, and *Archaeological Survey of India, Annual Report,* 1928-1929, pl. XLIXa; for Chinese examples see Figure 2.

[38] The ascent is to a marriage: as the commentator on TS VII.4.19P *te'agra vṛkṣasya rohataḥ* expresses it, *maithunam-artham-ekam . . . ārohataḥ*. As in Matt. 25:10, "they that were ready went in with him to the marriage," where "ready" corresponds to *arhati* in our

texts. The true union prefigured by the rite is a nuptial fusion apart from the consciousness of "I" and "thou": "As a man embraced by a darling bride is conscious neither of a 'within' nor a 'without,' so the Person embraced by the Providential-spirit knows naught of a 'within' nor a 'without'" (BU IV.3.21); "Prepare thyself as a bride to receive a bridegroom, that thou mayst be what I am and I what thou art" (Irenaeus, I.13.3, quoting the Gnostic Markos; cf. F. R. Montgomery Hitchcock, tr., *The Treatise of Irenaeus of Lugdunum against the Heresies,* London, 1916); "The expressions 'this' and 'that' have no meaning of themselves. 'I' and 'thou' also are meaningless. *Thou* art the same as *he*. . . . Resignation from thinking, speaking, acting from oneself ... is resurrection" (*Kalāmi Pīr,* VII.8 [ed. and tr. W. Iwanow, London, 1935]); "each is both" (Vidyāpati).

Figure 11. Solar Tree (aśvattha, Ficus religiosa), *with Sun-Disk and Guardian Dragons*.

39 We propose to treat in detail the doctrine of the "Bridge" later. [See W. Haftmann, "Die Bernwardsäule zu Hildesheim," *Zeitschrift für Kunstgeschichte,* viii (1939), 150-158.] We wish to say here only that although the rainbow can be regarded as a bridge (e.g., Bifraust in the Eddaic tradition), the Indian "Bridge of the Spirit," with Christian and other European parallels, is by no means the rainbow, but the Axis Mundi, also thought of as a ladder, or, to express this architecturally, by no means a rafter of the World-roof, but the king-post of the cosmic structure—"eam columnam a qua culmen sustentatur, quam Firstsul [elsewhere 'Irminsul'] vocant" *(Monumenta Germanica, leges* III.308, cited by J. Strzygowski, *Early Church Art in Northern Europe,* New York, 1928, p. 85).

40 For Agni's ascension, see AB III.42 and TS V.6.8.1, cited in a previous note.

41 RV IV.40.5, "The Gander seated in the Light, the Vasu whose seat is in the air, the Priest whose seat is at the altar, the Guest whose seat is in the house," referring to forms of Agni and the Sun. The Gander is regularly the Sunbird, with particular reference to his movement in the worlds, who plunges even into the waters and again rises aloft: "To and from the outer hovers the Gander ... the Gander unique in the midst of the world" (Śvet. Up. III.18 and VI.15); "the Golden Bird indwelling heart and Sun" (MU VI.34); "the Golden Person" of BU IV.3.11, at the same time *Oiseau-soleil et oiseau-âme*.

42 In the same connection, "Just as men set sail on the ocean, so they set sail who perform a year or a twelve-day rite; just as men desiring to reach the other shore mount a

ship well found, so do they mount the Triṣṭubhs [chants].”

[43] “Feet,” both as metrical units or, rather, quarter verses, and as “steps.”

[44] As in PB XVIII.10.10, “Just as he would descend holding on to branch after branch, so thereby he descends to this world, to obtain a support therein.”

[45] PB IX.I.35, “Then they made the Sun their goal *(kāṣṭhām)* and ran a race” (viz. in the beginning; it is this race that is imitated in the rite). KU III.11, “Beyond the Person there is no more, that is the goal, the last step *(sā kāṣṭhā sā parā gatiḥ)”* = Eckhart, “On reaching God all progress ends.” *kāṣṭhā* (like *sīmā,* as cited in n. 1) is “terminus” in the designation Jupiter Terminus. In the same way Ra or Re, the name of the Egyptian Sungod (whose symbol is a post) is literally “End.” On *kāṣṭhā* see Coomaraswamy, “Notes on the *Kaṭha Upaniṣad,”* 1938, p. 107, n. 2 [see JUB I.10.9, sky-supporting *sthūṇa,* and RV X.5.6, *cīyor skambham pathaṃ visarge].*

[46] “When there is dementation, that is the last step” (MU VI.34, *yadā amanībhāyaṃ, tādā tat paraṃ padam);* Eckhart, “This knowledge dements the mind” (Evans ed., I, 370). And just as the Sacrificer, not wishing to die prematurely, makes due provision for a converse descent from the height of truth that has been attained, so he is careful not to let go of his “mind” beyond recall. He looks at the victim, which is by symbolic intention himself, and that he can do so is proof that he is still “alive,” for “He who cannot see himself would be dead ... he should look at it, for in it he sees himself. . . . He whose mind has departed should look at (the victim, saying), ‘That mind of mine which hath gone away, or which hath gone elsewhere, by means of King Soma, we keep within us’; verily (thus) he keeps his mind in himself, his mind has not departed” (TS VI.6.7.2). The cited text, “That mind of mine, etc.,” summarizes the content of RV X.57-58 and its application in TS explains this content.

[47] Similarly, “metaphysically [i.e., in a manner disguised] they employ the *anuṣṭubh,* and that is, verily, Prajāpati [cf. PB IV.5.7 and AB III.13]: if they literally employed the *anuṣṭubh,* they would go unto Prajāpati,” PB IV.8.9; i.e., as Sāyaṇa explains, would attain *prajāpateh sāyujam,* which is indeed their “last end,” but an end which they do not propose to reach prematurely. The distinction between the sacrificial and the actual death of the sacrificer correspond! to that of *nibbāna* from *parinibbāna* in Buddhism.

[48] This principle, so often enunciated in the Brāhmaṇas, explains why it is that the Sacrificer, although desiring to *go* to heaven, does not think of doing so until the natural term of life has been reached, and similarly explains the traditional prohibition of suicide. The Brāhmaṇa formula recurs in the same words in the *Kalāmi Pīr* (W. Iwanow, ed.), “A hundred in this world in the next life will become a thousand.”

[49] “No one becomes immortal with the body” (ŚB X.4.3.9; cf. JUB III.38.10). In JUB III.29-30, Uccaiśravas Kaupayeya, who “has found the Keeper of that world” *(tasya lokasya goptāram;* cf. III.37.2, *prāṇo vai gopah,* and III.38.3, *prāṇo vai brahma)* cannot be taken hold of, for “a Brahman who was a Comprehensor of the Chant sang a Mass (*udgītha)* for me with the Chant, by means of the ‘Incorporeal Chant’ he shook off my bodies *(śarīrāṇy adhunot).”* One should employ as a chanter only one who is thus a Comprehensor *(evamvit,* JUB III.14.12). In place of “shaking off,” one can say either “cuts off” (PB IV.9.20-22, here “part by part,” as in JUB III.39.1), or “redeems” *(spṛṇvate,JB* II.374).

[50] *Padavī = padanīya* in BU I.4.7, in accordance with the well-known parable of the tracking of the Hidden Light by its spoor (*vestigium pedis).*

[51] *Dvāra-vivarah*. The door that was opened by Agni *(dvāram apāvṛṇot,* AB III.42), by the Buddha *(aparuta tesaṃ amatassa dvārā,* D II.33, etc.), by the Christ (*per passionem Christi aperta est nobis janua regni caelestis,* as cited above), and which must be opened by Everyman ascending after them but is "shut" for those who have not trimmed their lamps (Matt. 25:7-12)— i.e., the light of the Spirit in the heart (RV IV.58.11 and VI.9.6; TS V.7.9; CU VIII.3.3; MU VI.30, *ananta raśmayās tasya dipavadyah sthito hṛdi;* BU IV.3.6, ā*tmaivāsya jyotir bhavati,* etc.), as also implied in D II.100, "Be ye such as have the Spirit for their lamp . . . such as have the Truth for their lamp" *(attadīpā viharatha . . . dhammadīpā).*

[52] Like k*aṇṇikā-maṇḍalaṃ bhinditvā,* DhA *III.66,* and *pāsāda-kaṇṇikam dvidhā katvā, J* III.472 = *pandens,* as in Micah 2:13. For a fuller account of the departure of Buddhist *arhats* by way of the k*aṇṇikā,* or "roof plate," see Coomaraswamy, "The Symbolism of the Dome" [in this volume—ed.].

[53] *Kṛtakṛtyaḥ,* here and elsewhere, like k*ataṃ karaṇīyam* in Buddhist texts, is "having reduced all potentiality to act." Cf. *kṛtyā* as "potentiality" regarded as a coil to be rid of, RV X.85.28.

[54] "By that"—i.e., by that one of the seven rays of the Sun which is called the "seventh and best"; see "The Symbolism of the Dome."

[55] World's end, end of the road, end of the Year, etc., and Heaven's end (= beginning, if considered from below). For example, JUB I.5.5, *divo'ntaḥ: tad ime dyāvapṛthivī saṃśliṣyataḥ*; IV.15.4, *svargasya lokasya dvāram anuprajñayānartas svasti saṃvatsarasyo' dṛsaṃ gatvā, svargaṃ lokam āyan;* KU III.9, *adhvanaḥ pāraṃ . . . viṣṇoḥ paramaṃ padam,* where there is the Well at the World's end, RV I.154.4, *viṣṇoḥ pade pade parame madhva utsaṃ,* which never fails; RV VIII.7.16, *utsam duhantoakṣitam,* Varuṇa's place where the Rivers of Life arise; RV VIII.4I.2, *sindūnām upodaye,* the source of the Sarasvatī (JB III.124, *sarasvatyai śaiśavam = hrada* in ŚB IV.I.5.12), in which Cyavāna is rejuvenated.

The expression "World's end" and its import survive in Buddhism, vividly in A II.48-49 (S I.61-62, a version of the Rohita story of AB VII.15): "There is no release from sorrow unless World's End is reached (*na ca appatvā lokantam)*. So should a man become . . . 'world-ender' (*lokantagū) . . .* being assuaged (*samitāvi*)*."* In Sn 1128-1134, in a series of solar epithets, the Buddha is spoken of as *lokantagū*. Note that *samitāvi,* "quieted," is from Skr. *śam,* "to quiet," "give a quietus," "kill," and implies what Eckhart means when he says "the soul must put itself to death." The derivative ś*ānti,* "peace," always implies a death in some sort—a profound and poignant truth [see Nicholas of Cusa, *De visione Dei* ix]. The use of *samitāvi* (*= nibbuto)* in the present context echoes the position of the Brahmaṇas, where it is repeatedly explained that the Sacrificer is really offering up *himself',* similarly, in the Christian sacrifice (the Mass), *Quicumque quaesieret animam suam saluam facere perdet illum* (Luke 17:33).

[56] What is metaphysically an infallible necessity ("ask and ye shall receive"; "knock, and it shall be opened") becomes, when Deity is considered in a more personal way ("thinking, He is one and I another"), a "being justified freely by His grace" (Rom. 3:24).

[57] CU VIII.4.2, *naitam setum . . . tarato . . . na sukrtam na duskrtam,* and many similar statements elsewhere. Whoever breaks out of the cosmos through the Sundoor leaves his

good and evil deeds behind him as a bequest (JB I.50.5, *dāya,* and BU I.5.17 and Kauṣ. Up. II.15, *sampratti, sampradānam)*. Being beyond the Sun is supra-individual, superhuman *(amānava,* CU IV.15.5-6). To conceive that "I" have done either good or evil belongs to human egotism (*aham ca mama ca;* Buddhist *anattā, na me so attā;* Bernard's *proprium)* and would lead to a belief in salvation by merit. To have realized the Truth *("Thou* art the doer thereof") is therefore an indispensable condition of acceptance by the Sun (JUB I.5.2-3). "If any man come to me . . . and hate not his own life *(psyche, anima)* also, he cannot be my disciple" (Luke 14:26); "By their works they cannot go in again. ... If man is to come to God he must be empty of all work and let God work alone ... all that God willeth to have from us is to be inactive, and let Him be the Working Master" (Johannes Tauler, *The Following of Christ,* London, n.d., pt. II.16-17); "For in truth the teaching by which we receive a command to live soberly and rightly is 'the Letter that killeth,' unless the 'Spirit that giveth life' be present" (Augustine, *On the Spirit and the Letter* 6); RV VIII.70.3, *nakis-tam karmaṇā naśat . . . na yajñaih,* "No man getteth Him by works or sacrifices"—but only those who know Him, hence JUB I.6.1, k*a etam ādityam arhati samayāi'turn,* "Who is able to go through the midst of the Sun?" (= KU II.21, k*as tam . . . devam jñatum arhati,* "Who is able to know that God?").

[58] He does not know himself as he is in God, but only as he is in himself, and is accordingly rejected and literally dragged away by the factors of Time. "He answered and said ... I know you not" (Matt. 25:12; cf. JUB II.14.2); *si ignoras te . . . egredere* (Song of Solomon 1:7, Vulgate = "if thou knowest not thyself, depart"). Eckhart, "As long as thou knowest who thy father and thy mother have been in time, thou art not dead with the real death. . . . All scripture cries aloud for freedom from self" (Meister Eckhart, Evans ed., I, 323, 418). "'Know,' he replied, 'that I am harsh for good, not from rancor or spite. Whoever enters saying "Tis I," I smite him in the face' " (Rūmī, *Dīvān,* p. 115).

The two "selves" (cf. JB I.17.6, *dvyātmā;* AĀ II.5, *ayam ātmā . . . itara ātmā)* are the "soul" and the "spirit" of St. Paul, Heb. 4:12, "The word of God is quick and powerful, and sharper than any two-edged sword, piercing even to the dividing asunder of soul and spirit." See also the conclusion of n. 3.

[59] *Tasmin hātman pratipattaṃ ṛtavas sampalāyya padgṛhītam apakarsanti*.

[60] "That art thou" (*tat tvam asi,* CU VI.9.4). Cf. TS I.5.7.5, "That thou art, thus may I be." Hermes, *Lib*. V.II, "Am I other than thou? Thou art whatsoever I am." Eccles. 12:7, "the spirit shall return unto God who gave it"; St. Paul, 1 Cor. 6:17, "But he that is joined unto the Lord is one spirit."

[61] The regular Sūfī use of the designations "Friend" and "Comrade" as names of God parallels the similar use of the words *mitra* and *sakhi* as epithets of Agni, the Sun, and Indra throughout the Vedic tradition.

[62] The metaphor of maturation or cooking *(√pac* covering both ideas, whether of fruit as ripened by the sun or food as cooked by fire) is used throughout the Vedic and Buddhist literature in the same way.

[63] Marie Saint-Cécile de Rome (1897-1929) speaks of hearing Jesus address her as *Ma petite Moi-même;* see the *Vie Abregée* published at Sillery, Quebec.

[64] *Mathnawi* I.2936, "Thou art the end of the thread," as in the *sūtrātman* doctrine and the symbolism of the Sun and Spider. The camel and needle recall Luke 18:25, but are not necessarily derivative. The camel is the outer and existent man, So-and-so, as distinguished from the "thread" or "ray" of the spirit, which alone is his veritable essence and by which

alone he can return through the “eye” of the needle, which is also the solar “eye,” to the source of his life (cf. the Sun as Varuṇa’s all-seeing eye, RV *passim)*. The phallic significance of the Spirit *(ātman =*. Eros) in the Indian and Christian ontology has been touched on in a previous note. For the “needle” as a phallic aspect of the Axis Mundi (and in this respect analogous to the plowshare and planting stick) cf. RV II.32.4, *sīvyatv apaḥ sūcyācchidyamānayā, dadātu vīram (putrām),* Sāyaṇa’s *yathā vastrādikaṃ sūcyā syutam,* pointing to RV VIII.3.24, *ātmā pitus tanūr vāsah;* similarly, Loki “Nadelsohn” (see L. von Schroeder, *Arische Religion,* Leipzig, 1916, II, 556); for Axis Mundi as “nail,” see Holmberg, “Der Baum des Lebens,” pp. 10-11, 18, and 23. The widespread prehistoric use of *Ringnadeln,* or pins with annular heads, may also be remarked.

Such are the “mysteries” of needlecraft and weaving. The “eye” of the “needle” through which the “thread” is passed is always the Sundoor; the “thread,” the Spirit or Breath. Hence the talismanic significance of tied threads, “sacred threads,” and girdles (cf. AV VI. 133.5, *sā tvam pari ṣvajasva māṃ dīrghāyutvāya; mekhale,* used in the *upanāyana* ceremony, correlating *pari ṣvajasva* with BU IV.3.21, *prajñenātmanā sampariṣvaktah),* and strings of beads (“All this universe is strung on me like rows of gems upon a thread,” BG VII.7; and JUB I.35.8, where the *niṣkas samantaṃ grīvā abhiparyaktaḥ,* the necklace of which both ends meet about the neck, is a symbol of *anantatā,* literally “in-finity”). [Also note ŚA XI.8 and XII.33.]

It is accordingly in or as this thread (DhA III.224, as cited in a previous note) or by the thread, as if by a rope ladder, that one climbs the Tree that is also the Needle and reaches its top or eye. This is the *paramārthika* significance of the “rope-trick.” Almost all traditional “jugglery” has in this way symbolic values, which it is much more profitable to understand than it is to ask whether such tricks are “really” performed. So in story no. 377 of E. Chavannes, *Cinq cents contes et apologues extraits du Tripitaka chinois* (Paris, 1910-1934), II, 377, the snared or lassoed wolf, not yet realizing what had happened, “veut faire croire que '*la corde*' au bout de laquelle il se trouve *est une échelle qui lui permettra de monter au ciel*" (italics mine). The ropetrick itself is described in J IV.324, where the performer, producing an appearance of “Vessavaṇa’s Mango, ‘Nonpareil,’ ” throws up into the air a ball of thread *(sutta-gula)* and, making it hang to a branch of the tree, “climbs up by the thread” *(suttena . . . abhirūhi)*. Vessavaṇa’s servants cut the body to pieces and throw them down; the other performers put them together, sprinkle them with water, and the first performer stands up alive again (cf. the Old Irish version in S. H. O’Grady, *Silva Gadelica,* London and Edinburgh, 1892, II, 321, where the performer is Manannan). It is impossible not to recognize in this narrative a demonstration of the doctrine of PB XIV.I.12-13, “Of those who ascend to the top of the great Tree, how do they fare thereafter? Those that are winged fly off, those without wings fall down. The Comprehensors are winged and the foolish those without wings,” and TS V.6.2.1-2, “The waters are the ‘Water of Life’; therefore they sprinkle with water one who is faint; he does not go to ruin, he lives all his life, for whom these are set down, and who knows them thus”—i.e., understands their formality. This “understanding” corresponds to “having faith” in many of the miracle contexts of the New Testament—e.g., Luke 7:50, “thy faith hath saved thee,” and Luke 17:19, “thy faith hath made thee whole”; for “through faith we understand” (Heb. 11:3), and “The nature of faith . . . consists in knowledge alone” *(Sum. Theol*. 11-II.47.13 *ad* 2).

From an Indian point of view, the question of whether such phenomena are “real” (in the modern sense of the word) is of little or no interest; the world of “facts” (in the same sense) is one of appearance only, the work of a Master Magician, and it cannot be said of any of

these appearances that they "are" what they seem. It is taken for granted, in fact, that the magician's performance is "unreal" (MU VII.10, *satyam ivānṛtaṃ paśyanti indrajālavat).* What matters is the meaning-and-value *(artha)* of the appearance, a thing in this sense being more "really" what it means than what it "is," just as the bread and wine of the Eucharist are more really the flesh and blood of Christ than they are bread and wine, although the Catholic knows perfectly well that both have been made by human hands and will be digested like any other food. And this is all that the famous "participation" of Lucien Lévy-Bruhl's "primitive mentality" amounts to: an intellectual ability to operate on more than a single (and that the lowest) level of reference at one and the same time. It is precisely the man "who knows what is mundane and what not mundane, whose purpose it is to obtain the immortal by means of the mortal," that in AB II.3.2 is distinguished as a "Person" (in the classic sense of Boethius' definition) from those "others, animals whose keen discrimination is merely in terms of hunger and thirst," or, in other words, such as are literalists and pragmatists, for whom "such knowledge as is not empirical is meaningless." If we accept Lévy-Bruhl's designation of "primitive mentality" as collective and prelogical, and of "civilized mentality" as individual and logical, it may well be asked how it can be possible from such a point of view to speak of "progress." The comparison of primitive man to a child and civilized man to an adult is essentially only self-congratulatory. "Civilized man" is much rather senile than adult. The old "animists," as distinguished from the "psychologists," were right in assuming the constancy of the form of humanity: but in whom is this form most clearly manifested—in the "primitive" metaphysician or in the "civilized" "nothing-morist" (Skr. *nāstika)?* See Coomaraswamy, "Primitive Mentality" [in *Coomaraswamy* I].

[65]H. Blodgett, "The Worship of Heaven and Earth by the Emperor of China," JAOS, XX (1899), 58-69 (an admirable account); L. C. Hopkins, "On the Origin and History of the Chinese Coinage," JRAS (1895); Laufer, *Jade,* pp. 120-168 (he rightly speaks of *pi* and *ts'ung,* together with the four other jades that represent the Quarters, as "images" of the cosmic deities); R. Schlosser, "Chinas Münzen als Kunstwerke," OZ N.S. II (1925), 283-305 (on p. 298 "cash" or ring-money is called *pi* because of its likeness to the jade symbols of the same form and name); E. Erkes, "Idols in Pre-Buddhist China," *Artibus Asiae,* III (1928), 5-12 (*pi* and *ts'ung* are images of the Sungod and Earth Goddess; cf. Laufer, *Jade,* p. 144); C. Hentze, "Le Jade 'pi' et les symboles solaires," *Artibus Asiae,* III, 119-216 (comparison of the *pi* with neolithic flattened mace-heads and spindle-whorls and with solar symbols from various sources; the *pi* "n'est point l'image directe du soleil . . . mais de la roue solaire," a sound observation, since the wheels of the solar chariot are Heaven and Earth, and it is Heaven rather than the Sun that is represented in a likeness by the *pi*. The Sun itself should be represented by an unperforated disk or by a disk containing a central point which represents the "seventh or best ray" of the Sun's "seven rays," which ray alone passes through the Sun and thus out of the cosmos; "le jade *pi* était symbole de ciel, objet de sacrifice et de présent").

Quite in the Upanisad style is the text of the Chung Yung (*The Chinese Classics,* trans. James Legge, 2nd ed., Oxford, 1893-1895, 1, 404), "He *who understands* the rites of the sacrifices to Heaven and Earth, and the *meaning* of the several sacrifices to ancestors, would find the government of a kingdom as easy as to look into the palm of his hand."

[66] "Only the Emperor can perform the rites; and if he sits on his throne, but is without virtue, he will be unable to give effect to the ritual offices and the music. . . . The Emperor is not, indeed, 'The Son of Heaven' because of his political position; it is the effective

guardian of the Tao that is really the 'Son of Heaven,' possessing inwardly the virtue of holiness, and outwardly the 'becoming' [hermeneia of *we,* 'becoming,' '*werden*', and *we* 'throne'] of a sovereign" (E. Rousselle, "Seelische Führung im lebenden Taoismus," *Chinesisch-Deutscher Almanach,* Frankfurt, 1934, p. 25). Is not the Tao itself, in fact, a rider in the "ancient jade chariot," in the sense of KU III.3, *atmānam rathinaṃ viddhi,* "know that the Spirit is the charioteer" [and J VI.242]? ["The wise ruler practices inaction, and the empire applauds him. . . . Charioted upon the universe, with all creation for his team, he passes along the highway of mortality," Chuang-tzu, ch. 23].

[67]Cf. Forrer, "Les Chars cultuels préhistoriques," p. 119, "L'invention du char est due aux idées religieuses que l'homme préhistorique au debut de l'âge de métal s'est faites sur le soleil, sa nature et ses qualités bienfaisantes." Practical values are, normally speaking, secondary applications of metaphysical principles, to which applications the name of "inventions" or "findings" is properly given; a later age resorts to the more uncertain method of experiment ("trial and error"). In the present connection, another good illustration of the application of metaphysical principles is afforded by Vedic k*ha,* originally the "chasm" represented by the Sundoor and World-door, and subsequently the mathematical zero (cf. Coomaraswamy, *"Kha* and Other Words Denoting 'Zero' in Connection with the Metaphysics of Space" [in Coomaraswamy 2], and the discussion by Betty Heiman in JISOA, V, 91-94), and in ethics the source of good and evil *(su-kha, duḥ-khd)*. In the same connection, see *Tao Te Ching* XI, "it is on the space where there is nothing that the utility of the wheel depends."

[68] Cf. E. Rousselle, "Die Achse des Lebens," *Chinesisch-Deutscher Almanach,* Frankfurt, 1933. *Shēn-tao* (Shinto) = *devayāna*.

[69] The ritual *fang-ming,* to which the body of the deceased is thus assimilated by the placement of the six jades, is itself a six-sided, probably cubic slab, marked with six colors representing the six directions and on which six jades are placed, apparently in the same way as described above. In the expression itself, *fang* means "square," or "plane," in the sense of a direction (quarter, airt), and *ming* means "light," especially the light of dawn or day. There can be no doubt that the *fang-ming* is an image of the cosmos; cf. *szu fang,* "the four quarters"—i.e., the rest of the world outside China; *wu fang,* "the four quarters and center"—i.e., the outer world and China; and *fang wai,* "extracosmic" or "supramundane." The intention is therefore literally to "universalize" the body of the deceased, and thus to provide for the deceased a cosmic body of light. It may be added that the T'ang Commentary which Laufer cites but does not name is the well-known *Chou li chu su* of Chia Kung-yen; I have been able to make use of this only by the kind help of my learned colleague, Miss Chie Hirano.

[70] E. Rousselle, "Seelische Führung im lebenden Taoismus," *Chinesisch-Deutscher Almanach,* Frankfurt, 1934, pp. 42-43. It may be observed that instead of treating the six jades as the centers of limiting planes, we treat them as points and connect them by lines; the figure of a diamond replaces that of a cube, while the axes (which are the same as those of the "Cross of Light") remain unchanged. Cf. Coomaraswamy, "Eckstein," 1939.

[71] Cf. Hentze, *Frühchinesische Bronzen- und Kulturdarstellungen,* pp. 13-16.

[72] The following citations are taken from Holmberg, "Der Baum des Lebens," and Casanovicz, "Shamanism of the Natives of Siberia," *Smithsonian Report for 1924* (Washington, D.C.); cf. Uno Holmberg, *Finno-Ugric, Siberian Mythology* (Boston and Oxford, 1927), Vol. 4 of *Mythology of All Races*.

[73] "The Dolgans call the square column, the apex of which is topped by the image of the eagle which represents heavenly powers, the 'never failing support' *(tüspät turū)* and they imagine that its counterpart, which 'never alters nor falls,' stands before the dwelling place of the high god. One often sees, in addition, below the bird image on these columns a sheltering roof which represents heaven" (Holmberg, "Der Baum des Lebens," p. 15).

[74] Just as, in the *Volsunga Saga* (tr. E. Magnusson and William Morris, London, 1901), "King Volsung let build a noble hall in such wise, that a big oak-tree stood therein, and that the limbs of the tree blossomed fair out over the roof of the hall, while below stood the trunk within it, and the said tree did men call 'Branstock' [i.e., 'Burning Bush']." Indian hypaethral temples were similarly constructed; cf. illustrations in Coomaraswamy, "Early Indian Architecture: II. Bodhi-gharas." For the corresponding cults in Greece, see Arthur Evans, "Mycenaean Tree and Pillar Cult," JHS (1901), p. 118, "Wooden columns . . . often take over their sanctity from the sacred tree out of which they are hewn" (see also p. 173, "the Sun-god as a pyramidal pillar," etc.). For climbing rites cf. Lucian, *De Syria dea* 28-29 (cf. John Garstang, tr., *The Syrian Goddess,* London, 1913, pp. 66-69). Climbing rites are illustrated in later European tradition by St. Simon Stylites, and in the popular milieu by the sport of climbing a greased pole in order to secure a prize attached to its summit. For some further references to climbing rites, see P. Mus, *Barabuḍur* (Hanoi, 1935), p. 318 [and R. A. Nicholson, *Studies in Islamic Mysticism* (Cambridge, 1921), pp. 105, III].

[75] Cf. Janus (whence *janua,* "gate," "ingress," cf. Skr. *yāna),* so called *quod ab eundo nomen est ductum,* Cicero, *De natura deorum,* II.27.67. With Janus as two-faced (one essence and two natures), cf. the Indian double-headed Sunbirds, Eagle or Gander, and the Sun as symbolized in the Vedic rites by the Golden Disk that shines downward, and the Golden Person laid upon the Disk, face upward (SB VII.4.I.7-13, VIII.3.I.11, and X.5.2.8, 12, etc.)— "The one so as to look hitherwards and the other so as to look away from here" (ŚB VII.4.I.18). For the Janus type cf. P. Le Gentilhomme, "Les Quadrigati Nummi et le dieu Janus," *Revue numismatique,* ser. 4, XXXVII (1934), ch. 3, "Les Doubles Têtes dans l'art antique"; for the "two faces" as spiritual and temporal power, and the assimilation of Christ to Janus, see Rene Guénon, *Autorité spirituelle et pouvoir temporel* (Paris, 1930), p. 125, and "Le Symbolisme solsticial de Janus." For Marduk, a Janus type, with reference to the course of the sun by day and night *(ab extra* and *ab intra:* Mitrāvaruṇau), cf. S. H. Langdon, *Semitic Mythology* (Boston and Oxford, 1931), p. 68, Vol. 5 of *Mythology of All Races*.

[76] Similar formulations are found among the North American Indians. It may be added that among these there are some tribes who regularly enter their houses by the smoke-hole and a stepped ladder (C. Wissler, *The American Indian,* 3rd ed., New York, 1950, p. 113). Attention may also be called to the post-mortem perforation of skulls, no doubt to facilitate the ascent of the spirit of the deceased, as in India, by way of the cranial foramen *(brahmarandhra, sīma, dṛti);* see Wilbert B. Hinsdale and E. F. Greenman, "Perforated Indian Crania in Michigan," *Occasional Contributions from the Museum of the University of Michigan,* No. 5 (1936). Similar post-mortem perforations of the skull have been observed in European and African Neolithic cultures. See Alexandra David-Neel, *Magic and Mystery in Tibet* (New York, 1932), p. 208. [Analogous to the perforation of skulls is that of bowls and vases, which, in the case of examples from the Mimbres Valley (New Mexico), "were generally perforated or 'killed' before being buried with the dead . . . the thought, as we know from certain Pueblo Indians, being to allow the escape of the breath

body or spirit of the bowl in order to permit it to accompany that of the former owner to the land of shades." When the body is buried sitting, such bowls "are placed on the cranium like a cap" (J. Walter Fewkes, IPEK, 1925, p. 136).]

[77] Cf. the remarkable account of a descent into the nether world in Peter Freuchen, *Arctic Adventure (New* York, 1935), pp. 132-137, where the practitioner is spoken of as having trained himself to "swim through the rocks" and, on his return journey, as "fighting his way up through the granite"; an exact equivalent is the "power" *(siddhi),* ascribed in numerous Pāli Buddhist texts (e.g., A I.254 ff., S II.212 ff. and S V.254 ff.) to the arhat who is perfected in the practice of the Four Contemplations, of "plunging into and emerging from the earth as though it were water." Associated "powers" are those of walking on the water, levitation, and ascent in the body even as far as the Brahmaloka.

The Christian tradition is also acquainted with One who "can" *(arhati)* descend into hell or ascend to heaven at will.

[78] This "penfold" corresponds to the stable (of *aśvattha* wood) put up for the sacrificial horse at or near the offering ground (TB III.8.2, Commentary).

The word *aśvattha,* denoting the tree of which the sacrificial post is typically made in the Indian rite, means "horse-stand," and is equivalent to *aśśvastha* in this sense—that of TS IV.1.10.1, where the offering is made to Agni kindled at the navel of the earth, "as it were unto a standing horse *(aśvāyena tiṣṭhante),*" It is, accordingly, noteworthy that in the Yakut saga cited by Holmberg, "Der Baum des Lebens," p. 58, the World-tree, of which the roots strike deep into the earth and the summit pierces the seven heavens, is called the "Horse-post of the High-god Ürün-ai-Tojon."

For analogous relationships of horse and tree or post in China, see Hentze, *Frühchinesische Bronzen- und Kulturdarstellungen,* pp. 123-130. The very remarkable Han grave relief reproduced in Figure 1 may be said to illustrate at the same time Indian, Siberian, and Chinese formulations. A horse, designated royal by the umbrella on its head, is tied to a sacrificial post that *rises* from an altar. Above is a *t'ao t'ieh* mask holding a ring. Cf. A. Salmony, "Le Mascaron et l'armeau," *Revue des arts asiatiques,* VIII (1934). Like a *pi,* it is assuredly through this ring that the spirit of the horse, when it has been slain, must pass to heaven. The ring is held or guarded by the *t'ao t'ieh,* just as in the previously cited case of the bronze axle or hub (Laufer, J*ade,* pl. xvi, fig. I). The relief itself is more eloquent than any description of it could be. And as Janse comments, "Tous ces monuments ont ceci de commun: leur décor témoigne de croyances et de légendes relatives à la vie, à la mort, à 1'idee de l'immortalite, croyances . . . qui ont dû être très répandues parmi les gens d'alors, car souvent l'artiste s'est contenté d'évoquer des scenes entières par quelques elements isolés. Souvent nous ignorons encore le sens exact du decor, mais, d'autre part, il y a de nombreux elements qui sont faciles à determiner" ("Briques et objets céramiques," p. 3).

It may be added that this Han relief interpreted above throws a vivid light upon the traditional form of even our own door knockers, so often composed of an animal mask holding a ring. It would seem that no more appropriate or significant form could have been found. The more, indeed, we learn of the origins of the forms of traditional and folk art, the more we realize that their application is inevitable and see that they are neither products of convention nor of "artistic" choice, but simply *correct: ars recta ratio factibilium.*

[79] In TS I.7.9, the *mantra* "We have come to the heaven, to the gods; we have become immortal; we have become the offspring of Prajāpati" is enunciated by the Sacrificer on reaching the top of the post, where he stretches out his arms, no doubt in imitation of a

bird; cf. JUB III.13.9, "Verily he who without wings goes up to the top of the Tree, he falls down from it. But if one having wings sits at the top of the Tree, or on the edge of a sword, or on the edge of a razor, he does not fall down from it. For he sits supported by his wings . . . sits without fear in the heavenly world, and likewise moves about"—i.e., as a k*amācārin,* a "mover at will." See also PB XIV.1.12-13. The bird of the Shaman's song corresponds to "the Gander whose seat is in the Light" (KU V.2); "to and from the external hovers the Gander" (Śvet. Up. III.18); "the Golden Bird, indwelling heart and Sun" (MU VI.34); etc. As for the "quacking" of the goose, it is, of course, the Shaman that quacks; insofar as the Shaman is beside himself and is in the spirit, he *is the goose,* and is flying; cf. PB V.3.5, "as a ś*akuna* the Sacrificer, having become a bird, soars to the world of heaven."

Horse and bird are essentially one, as is explicit in ŚB XIII.2.6.15. Mahīdhara on this passage "identifies the horse with the horse-sacrifice [as in BU I.2.7] which, in the shape of a bird, carries the sacrificer up to heaven" (J. Eggeling; cf. SBE, XLIII, xxi-xxii).

[80] ŚB XIII.2.8.1, "NOW the Devas, when ascending, did not know the way to the world of heaven, but the horse knew it," and more fully in XIII.2.3. [Cf. TS VI.3.8, on grasping the victim as guide on the way to heaven; the victim is the psychopomp. It is similar for Christ in the Christian sacrifice, and in the "mounting after Agni."]

[81]Cf. TS V.2.11-12 and AB VII.1 with its elaborate account of the ritual dissection of the horse.

[82] Verbatim, except that italics and some capitals are mine.

[83] In addition to previously cited references to the ladder, cf. Vis 10, *saggaārohana-sopāna*.

" 'L'Échelle du Ciel,' suivant une formule toute byzantine d'inspiration, était représentée sur le manuscrit de l''Hortus deliciarum' de l'abbesse Herrade de Landsberg: un chevalier, un clerc, un moine, un ermite gravissent les echelons, mais, attirés par les vices, ils s'ont précipités dans le gouffre; seuls quelques élus, protégés par des anges qui battaillent contre les demons tirant des flèches, reçoivent la couronne tendue par le main divine" (Louis Bréhier, *L'Art chrétien,* Paris, 1918, p. 294). For the earlier history of the representations of the Christian "Heavenly Ladder" see Charles R. Morey and Walter Dennison, *Studies in East Christian and Roman Art,* 2 vols. (New York, 1914-1918), pp. 1-28. It is from this ladder (κλίμαξ) (that St. John Climacus takes his name.

[84] The deceased assuming the name of the God, to whom he thus enters as like to like. Cf. RV X.6I.16, "Himself the bridge"; the Shaman "Door god"; St. Catherine's Christ "in the form of a bridge"; the Bodhisattva *attdnāṃ saṃkamaṃ katvā* (J III.373), with TS VI.6.4.2, *akramanam eva tat setuṃ yajamāna kurute suvargasya lokasya samaṣṭyai*.

[85] The psychostasis survives in Christian iconography, where St. Michael plays the part of Thoth; cf. e.g., Émile Male, *L'Art religieux du XIIIe siècle en France* (Paris, 1893), fig. 237; Louis Bréhier, *L'Art chrétien,* Paris, 1918, p. 293. Cf. Koran 7:8: "The balance of that day is true, and whosesoever's scales are heavy, they are prosperous; but whosesoever scales are light, it is they who lose themselves." Maat, as Truth and Daughter of the Sun, corresponds to Vedic Sūryā-Vāc and Neoplatonic and Christian Sophia.

[86] The beatitude of the blessed dead is represented in terms of feasting in all traditions—e.g., RV X.135.1, *sampibate;* Matt. 22:4, "Behold, I have prepared my dinner." As remarked by St. Thomas, " 'The ray of divine revelation is not extinguished by the sensible imagery wherewith it is veiled,' as Dionysius says" (*Sum. Theol.* I.I.9 *ad* 2), and as

"Avalon" has remarked, those who comprehend the eternal truths are not disturbed by the symbols by which they may be expressed.

[87] "He," in this context "Osiris-Ani"—i.e., the deceased Ani, now assimilated to Osiris and entering as like to like.

[88] So also Ikhnaton "regularly appended to the official form of his royal name in all his state documents, the words 'Living on Truth' " (Breasted). In the same way, the Comprehensor speaks of himself as *satya-dharmah* (Īśā Up. 16).

[89] For Egyptian representation of the Sundoor, open and closed, see H. Schäfer, *Aegyptische und heutige Kunst und Weltgebäude der alten Ägypter* (Berlin, 1928) p. 101, Abb. 22-24 (here Figure 2), and T. Dombart, "Der zweitürmige Tempel-Pylon," *Egyptian Religion,* I (1933), 92-93, Abb. 7 (the closed door surmounted by the winged disk and guarded by Isis and Nepthys). As Dombart remarks, "The Egyptian temple as a whole appears accordingly in monumental architecture as the microcosmic image of the earthly world structure in which the deity dominates, above all the sun god who can here live and reign as ruler of the world." Dombart rightly protests against the customary interpretations of monumental architectural forms in Egypt and elsewhere as *bloss-dekorative* or even as merely functional; cf. in this connection, my review [in *Coomaraswamy* I] of W. Andrae, *Die ionische Säule: Bauform oder Symbol?* See also Lethaby, *Architecture, Mysticism and Myth,* ch. 8, "The Golden Gate of the Sun." It may be added that just as Javanese gateways are guarded by the solar Kālamakara (Kāla, "Time," being one of the names of Death as the "Ender," Antaka), so also Mexican lintels bear a mask which, if it occurred in an Indian context, could only be called a *makara* (e.g., Herbert Joseph Spinden, *Ancient Civilizations of Mexico and Central America,* 2nd rev. ed., New York, 1922, fig. 21).

In Christian art the closed door is represented already at Dura-Europas in the third century A.D.; see Pijoan in *Art Bulletin,* XIX (1937), fig. 3, facing p. 595. In this composition the Bridegroom is represented by the risen Sun ("I am the door"). The virgins with their lighted candles ("The spirit indeed is their light," BU IV.3.6) are entering into the Kingdom of Heaven by this door (if the building resembles a tomb, this accords with Eckhart's "The Kingdom of Heaven is for none but the thoroughly dead" and Rom. 6:8, "if we be dead with Christ")—"through the midst of the Sun . . . there Heaven and Earth embrace *[saṃśliṣyatah,* JUB I.5.5]."

[90] This Āmmit, with whom as "devourer" cf. *agni kravyāt,* evidently corresponds on the one hand to the jaws of hell that await the Christian soul that is weighed in the balance and found wanting, and on the other to the "crocodile" that lurks in the way of the Indian sacrificer's heavenward ascent, with respect to whom they ask, "Who will today be delivered from the Śimśimāri's jaws," as noted above.

[91] Indian *aśaikṣa mārga*. On this path, described in Kauṣ. Up. I.3-7, the guide is the "non-human Person," and those who proceed therein never again return to the human condition (CU iv. 15.5-6).

[92] In the *Paradiso,* accordingly, Virgil cannot act as Dante's guide beyond the Lower Paradise. The distinction of a lower heaven attainable by merit and a higher attainable only by *gnosis* is one of the basic formulae of the Philosophia Perennis and is strongly emphasized in the Upaniṣads,

[93] This no more implies any vagueness of thought or confusion of two things than when we say of a portrait, "That's me." We do not mean (in fact, of course, we no longer know what we mean by such expressions and many others of like origin) that this pigment is my

flesh, but that the "form" (principle, idea, essence) of this representation *is* my form; we are not identifying natures, but essences. At the same time we are distinguishing our "real" self (which we no more identify with the flesh than with the pigment) from its accidents. The pigments themselves are not the picture, but only its vehicle or support. If, then, it is a "portrait" of God with which we are dealing, we say with perfect logic that worship paid to it is paid to the archetype and not to the aesthetic surfaces themselves. In the case of the Eucharist, our modern inability to believe is an inability to believe what no one has ever believed, that a carbohydrate becomes a protein when certain words are spoken over it. Vagueness of thought and confusion of different things are products not of the primitive but of our mentality; *we* read the words, "This is my body" and "I am that bread of life" and overlook that "is" and "am" assert a formal and not an accidental identity—"This is that bread which came down from heaven: not as your fathers did eat." "He that eateth of this bread shall live for ever. ... He that eateth Me, even he shall live by Me": "paroles dont le symbolisme ne serait pas possible s'il ne se référait pas à une réalite correspondant à leur sens immédiat et littéral" (Frithjof Schuon, "Du Sacrifice," *Ētudes traditionelles,* XLIII, 1938, 141). And, as Jesus also asked, "Does this offend you?" It does, indeed. *Our* anthropomorphism prevents us from recognizing the formality of the bread, as it does from recognizing the informality of the actual flesh, whether that of the Christ or of anyone else; *our* refinement prevents us from acknowledging that "on ne peut affirmer que l'anthropophagie, par exemple, constitue par elle-même une déviation . . . qu'elle soit, au contraire, susceptible d'une signification positive et élevée" (Schuon, "Du Sacrifice," p. 140). Cf. ŚB XIV.i.i, where Indra swallows Makha-Soma, the Sacrifice, the victim, and thus obtains his qualities, and the corresponding rite described in AB VII.31, where men partake of the Soma, not literally but metaphysically "by means of the priest, the initiation, and the invocation," just as in the Eucharist men partake of the body of Christ by means of the priest, the consecration, and the invocation.

[94] I.e., who speak it originally and with awareness. A language, verbal or visual, can be misunderstood only by those who speak it later on, symbols then surviving as art-forms or clichés of which the whole or part of the meaning has been forgotten. Then it appears to those who have forgotten that those who remember are arbitrarily reading meanings into forms that never had one, whereas the fact is that those who have forgotten and for whom the symbol is nothing but a literary ornament or decorative motif have, by a progressive substitution of sensible for intellectual preoccupations (commonly described, in connection with the Renaissance, as an awakening of a curiosity with respect to the "real" world), gradually subtracted meanings from the expressions that were once alive. It is only in this way that a "living" language can come to be a dead one, while what is called a dead language remains alive for the few who still think in it.

[95] More vivid, too, inasmuch as "in Indian vehicles the different parts are held together by cords" (Eggeling on ŚB XIII.2.7.8), and *ratha* as the typical "vehicle" is employed throughout the Indian tradition as a valid symbol of the bodily "vehicle" of the Spirit.

[96] "On ne saurait trop admirer la solennelle niaiserie de certaines declamations chères aux vulgarisateurs scientifiques, qui se plaisent à affirmer à tout propos que la science moderne recule sans cesse les limites du monde connu, ce qui est exactement le contraire de la vérité: jamais ces limites n'ont été aussi étroites qu'elles le sont dans les conceptions admises par cette prétendue science profane, et jamais le monde ni l'homme ne s'étaient trouvés ainsi rapetissés au point d'être réduits à de simples entités corporelles, privées, par

hypothèse, de la moindre communication avec tout autre ordre de réalité!" (Guénon, *Études traditionelles,* XLIII, 1938, 123-124).

[97] We have, for example, no right to boast that "owing to mental development, the values of ritual as practiced today by the Christian Church are different from those possessed by ceremonial among primitive peoples. Christian ritual is largely symbolic" (Alan Wynn Shorter, *An Introduction to Egyptian Religion,* New York, 1932, p. 36); the final statement here, to the effect that other rituals are not "symbolic," is a pure *niaiserie,* as should be evident on the limited basis of materials collected in this paper alone. Is Shorter writing as a missionary, as a serious scholar, or merely as one of those "observers [who] note the differences which mark off their 'religion' from ours, and cautiously apply some other term, describing the beliefs as magical or taboo, or secret or sacred" (A. E. Crawley, *The Tree of Life,* London, 1905, p. 209), or simply as one of those who think that wisdom was born yesterday? Equally reprehensible and even more ridiculous are the remarks of Jacques Maritain, who distinguishes the "common sense" of first principles "from the common sense of primitive *imagery,* which conceives the earth as flat, the sun as revolving round the earth, height and depth as absolute properties of space, etc., and has no philosophical value whatsoever" *(St. Thomas Aquinas: Angel of the Schools,* J. F. Scanlan, tr., London, 1933, p. 165, note). However wounding it may be to our conceit, the truth is that, as expressed by J. Strzygowski, "the ideas of many so-called primitive peoples are essentially more thoroughly infused with mind and spirit *(durchgeistiger)* than those of many so-called cultured peoples. We must indeed altogether dispense with the distinction between natural and cultural peoples in religion," and that, as he also says of the Eskimo, "they have a much more abstract image of the human soul than the Christians" *(Spuren indogermanischen Glaubens in der bildenden Kunst,* Heidelberg, 1936, p. 344); that "when we sound the archetype, then we find that it is anchored in the highest, not the lowest. . . . Sensible forms, in which there was once a polar balance of physical and metaphysical, have been more and more emptied of content on their way down to us; so we say, this is an 'ornament'; and as such it can indeed be treated and investigated in the formalistic manner" (W. Andrae, *Die ionische Säule,* Berlin, 1933, pp. 65-66). In other words and *for us,* a "superstition" (cf. W. Andrae, "Keramik im Dienste der Weisheit," *Berichte der Deutschen keramischen Gesellschaft,* XVII, 1936, 623-628). As I have said elsewhere, the symbolic references of traditional and folk art are "so far abstract and remote from historical and empirical levels of reference as to have become almost unintelligible to those whose intellectual capacities have been inhibited by what is nowadays called a 'university education.' " "Later ages . . . have, in more senses than one, made an error of identification, and have taken the Tree of Knowledge for the Tree of Life" (Crawley, *Tree of Life,* p. viii).

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3

Imitation, Expression, and Participation

πιστούμεθα δὲ πρὸς τοὺς τεθαυμακότας ἐκ τῶν μετειληψότων

—Plotinus, *Enneads* VI.6.7.

As Iredell Jenkins has pointed out,[1] the modern view that "art is expression" has added nothing to the older and once universal (e.g., Greek and Indian) doctrine that "art is imitation," but only translates the notion of "imitation, born of philosophical realism, into the language and thought of metaphysical nominalism"; and "since nominalism destroys the revelation doctrine, the first tendency of modern theory is to deprive beauty of any cognitive significance."[2] The older view had been that the work of art is the demonstration of the invisible form that remains in the artist, whether human or divine;[3] that beauty has to do with cognition;[4] and that art is an intellectual virtue.[5]

While Jenkins' proposition is very true, so far as expressionism is concerned, it will be our intention to point out that in the catholic (and not only Roman Catholic) view of art, *imitation, expression,* and *participation* are three predications of the essential nature of art; not three different or conflicting, but three interpenetrating and coincident definitions of art, which is these three in one.

The notion of "imitation," (μίμησις,*anukṛti, pratimā,* etc.) will be so familiar to every student of art as to need only brief documentation. That in our philosophic context imitation does not mean "counterfeiting" is brought out in the dictionary definition: imitation is "the relation of an object of sense to its idea; . . . imaginative embodiment of the ideal form"; form being "the essential nature of a thing . . . kind or species as distinguished from matter, which distinguishes it as an individual; formative principle;

formal cause" (Webster). Imagination is the conception of the idea in an imitable form.[6] Without a pattern (παράδειγμα, emplar), indeed, nothing could be made except by mere chance. Hence the instruction given to Moses, "Lo, make all things according to the pattern which was shewed to thee on the mount."[7] "Assuming that a beautiful imitation could never be produced unless from a beautiful pattern, and that no sensible object (αἰσθητόν, 'aesthetic surface') could be faultless unless it were made in the likeness of an archetype visible only to the intellect, God, when He willed to create the visible world, first fully formed the intelligible world, in order that He might have the use of a pattern wholly divine and incorporeal":[8] "The will of God beheld that beauteous world and imitated it."[9]

Now unless we are making "copies of copies," which is not what we mean by "creative art,"[10] the pattern is likewise "within you,"[11] and remains there as the standard by which the "imitation" must be finally judged.[12] For Plato then, and traditionally, all the arts without exception are "imitative";[13] this "all" includes such arts as those of government and hunting no less than those of painting and sculpture. And true "imitation" is not a matter of illusory resemblance (ὁμοιότης) but of proportion, true analogy, or adequacy (αὐτὸ τὸ ἴσον, i.e., κατ' ἀναλογίαν), by which we are reminded[14] of the intended referent;[15] in other words, it is a matter of "adequate symbolism." The work of art and its archetype are different things; but "likeness in different things is with respect to some quality common to both."[16] Such likeness *(sādṛśya)* is the foundation of painting;[17] the term is defined in logic as the "possession of many common qualities by different things";[18] while in rhetoric, the typical example is "the young man is a lion."

Likeness *(similitudo)* may be of three kinds, either (I) absolute, and then amounting to sameness, which cannot be either in nature or works of art, because no two things can be alike in all respects and still be two, i.e., perfect likeness would amount to identity, (2) imitative or analogical likeness, *mutatis mutandis,* and judged by comparison, e.g., the likeness of a man in stone, and (3) expressive likeness, in which the imitation is neither identical with, nor comparable to the original but is an adequate symbol and reminder of that which it represents, and to be judged only by its truth, or accuracy (ὀρθότης, *integritas*); the best example is that of the words that are "images" of things.[19] But imitative and expressive are not mutually

exclusive categories; both are images, and both expressive in that they make known their model.

The preceding analysis is based upon St. Bonaventura's,[20] who makes frequent use of the phrase *similitudo expressiva*. The inseparability of imitation and expression appears again in his observation that while speech is expressive, or communicative, "it never expresses except by means of a likeness" (*nisi mediante specie, De reductione artium ad theologiam* 18), i.e., figuratively. In all serious communication, indeed, the figures of speech are figures of thought (cf. Quintilian IX.4.117); and the same applies in the case of visible iconography, in which accuracy is not subordinated to our tastes, but rather is it we ourselves who should have learned to like only what is true. Etymologically, "heresy" is what we "choose" to think; i.e., private (ἰδιωτικός) opinion.

But in saying with St. Bonaventura that art is expressive at the same time that it imitates, an important reservation must be made, a reservation analogous to that implied in Plato's fundamental question: about *what* would the sophist make us so eloquent?[21] and his repeated condemnation of those who imitate "anything and everything."[22] When St. Bonaventura speaks of the orator as expressing "what he has in him" *(per sermonem exprimere quod habet apud se, De reductione artium ad theologiam* 4), this means giving expression to some idea that he has entertained and made his own, so that it can come forth from within him originally: it does *not* mean what is involved in our expressionism (viz. "in any form of art . . . the theory or practice of expressing one's inner, or subjective, emotions and sensations [Webster]"), hardly to be distinguished from exhibitionism.

Art is, then, both imitative and expressive of its themes, by which it is informed, or else would be informal, and therefore not art. That there is in the work of art something like a real presence of its theme brings us to our last step. Lévy-Bruhl[23] and others have attributed to the "primitive mentality" of savages what he calls the notion of a "mystic participation" of the symbol or representation in its referent, tending towards such an identification as we make when we see our own likeness and say, "that's me." On this basis the savage does not like to tell his name or have his portrait taken, because by means of the name or portrait he is accessible, and may therefore be injured by one who can get at him by these means; and it is certainly true that the criminal whose name is known and whose likeness is available can be more easily apprehended than would otherwise

be the case. The fact is that "participation" (which need not be called "mystic," by which I suppose that Lévy-Bruhl means "mysterious") is not in any special sense a savage idea or peculiar to the "primitive mentality," but much rather a metaphysical and theological proposition.[24] We find already in Plato[25] the doctrine that if anything is beautiful in its kind, this is not because of its color or shape, but because it participates (μετέχει) in "that," viz. the absolute, Beauty, which is a presence (παρουσία) to it and with which it has something in common (κοινωνία). So also creatures, while they are alive, "participate" in immortality. [26] So that even an imperfect likeness (as all must be) "participates" in that which it resembles.[27] These propositions are combined in the words "the being of all things is derived from the Divine Beauty."[28] In the language of exemplarism, that Beauty is "the single form that is the form of very different things."[29] In this sense every "form" is protean, in that it can enter into innumerable natures.

Some notion of the manner in which a form, or idea, can be said to be *in* a representation of it may be had if we consider a straight line: we cannot say truly that the straight line itself "is" the shortest distance between two points, but only that it is a picture, imitation or expression of that shortest distance; yet it is evident that the line coincides with the shortest distance between its extremities, and that by this presence the line "participates" in its referent.[30] Even if we think of space as curved, and the shortest distance therefore actually an arc, the straight line, a reality in the field of plane geometry, is still an adequate symbol of its idea, which it need not resemble, but must express. Symbols are projections of their referents, which are in them in the same sense that our three dimensional face is reflected in the plane mirror.

So also in the painted portrait, my form is there, *in* the actual shape, but not my nature, which is of flesh and not of pigment. The portrait is also "like" the artist ("Il pittore pinge se stesso,")[31] so that in making an attribution we say that "That looks like, or smacks of, Donatello," the model having been my form, indeed, but as the artist conceived it.[32] For nothing can be known, except in the mode of the knower. Even the straight line bears the imprint of the draughtsman, but this is less apparent, because the actual form is simpler. In any case, the more perfect the artist becomes, the less will his work be recognizable as "his"; only when he is no longer

anyone, can he see the shortest distance, or my real form, directly and as it is.

Symbols are projections or shadows of their forms (cf. n. 19), in the same way that the body is an image of the soul, which is called its form, and as words are images (εἰκόνας, *Cratylus* 439A; εἴδωλα, 234c) of things. The form is in the work of art as its "content," but we shall miss it if we consider only the aesthetic surfaces and our own sensitive reactions to them, just as we may miss the soul when we dissect the body and cannot lay our hands upon it. And so, assuming that we are not merely playboys, Dante and Aśvaghosa ask us to admire, not their art, but the *doctrine* of which their "strange" or "poetic" verses are only the vehicle. Our exaggerated valuation of "literature" is as much a symptom of our sentimentality as is our tendency to substitute ethics for religion. "For he who sings what he does not understand is defined as a beast.[33] . . . Skill does not truly make a singer, but the pattern does."[34]

As soon as we begin to operate with the straight line, referred to above, we transubstantiate it; that is, we treat it, and it becomes for us, *as if*[35] it were nothing actually concrete or tangible, but simply the shortest distance between two points, a form that really exists only in the intellect; we could not use it *intellectually* in any other way, however handsome it may be;[36] the line itself, like any other symbol, is only the support of contemplation, and if we merely see its elegance, we are not using it, but making a fetish of it. That is what the "aesthetic approach" to works of art involves.

We are still familiar with the notion of a transubstantiation only in the case of the Eucharistic meal in its Christian form; here, by ritual acts, i.e., by the sacerdotal art, with the priest as officiating artist, the bread is made to be the body of the God; yet no one maintains that the carbohydrates are turned into proteins, or denies that they are digested like any other carbohydrates, for that would mean that we thought of the mystical body as a thing actually cut up into pieces of flesh; and yet the bread is changed in that it is no longer mere bread, but now bread with a meaning, with which meaning or quality we can therefore communicate by assimilation, the bread now feeding both body and soul at one and the same time. That works of art thus nourish, or should nourish, body and soul at one and the same time has been, as we have often pointed out, the normal position from the Stone Age onwards; the utility, as such, being endowed with meaning either

ritually or as well by its ornamentation, i.e., “equipment.”[37] Insofar as our environment, both natural and artificial, is still significant to us, we are still “primitive mentalities”; but insofar as life has lost its meaning for us, it is pretended that we have “progressed.” From this “advanced” position those whose thinking is done for them by such scholars as Lévy-Bruhl or Sir James Frazer, the behaviorists whose nourishment is “bread alone”— “the husks that the swine did eat”—are able to look down with unbecoming pride on the minority whose world is still a world of meanings.[38]

We have tried to show above that there is nothing extraordinary, but rather something normal and proper to human nature, in the notion that a symbol participates in its referent or archetype. And this brings us to the words of Aristotle, which seem to have been overlooked by our anthropologists and theorists of art: he maintains, with reference to the Platonic conception of art as imitation, and with particular reference to the view that things exist in their plurality by participation in (μέθεξις) the forms after which they are named,[39] that to say that they exist “by imitation,” or exist “by participation,” is no more than a use of different words to say the same thing.[40]

Hence we say, and in so doing say nothing new, that “art is imitation, expression, and participation.” At the same time we cannot help asking: What, if anything, has been added to our understanding of art in modern times? We rather presume that something has been deducted. Our term “aesthetics” and conviction that art is essentially an affair of the sensibilities and emotions rank us with the ignorant, if we admit Quintilian’s “Docti rationem componendi intelligunt, etiam indocti voluptatem!”[41]

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[1] “Imitation and Expression in Art,” in the *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism,* V (1942). Cf. J. C. La Driére, “Expression,” in the *Dictionary of World Literature* (New York, 1943), and R. G. Collingwood, *The Idea of Nature* (Oxford, 1944), pp. 61-62 (on participation and imitation).

[2] “Sinnvolle Form, in der Physisches und Metaphysisches ursprünglich polarisch sich die Waage hielten, wird auf dem Wege zu uns her mehr und

mehr entleert; wir sagen dann: sie sei 'Ornament.'" (Walter Andrae, *Die ionische Säule: Bauform oder Symbol?* Berlin, 1933, p. 65). See also Coomaraswamy, "Ornament" [in *Coomaraswamy* 1].

[3] Rom. 1:20; Meister Eckhart, *Expositio sancti evangelii secundum Johannem,* etc.

[4] *Sum. Theol.* I.5.4 ad I,I-II.27.1 *ad* 3.

[5] *Ibid.,* 1-II.57.3 and 4.

[6] "Idea dicitur similitudo rei cognitae," St. Bonaventura, *I Sent.,* d.35, a.unic., q.Ic. We cannot entertain an idea except in a likeness; and therefore cannot think without words or other images.

[7] Exod. 25:40, Heb. 8:5. "Ascendere in montem, id est, in eminentiam mentis," St. Bonaventura, *De dec. praeceptis* II.

[8] Philo, *De opificio* 16, *De aeternitate mundi* 15; cf. Plato, *Timaeus* 28AB and *Republic* 601. For the "world-picture" (Sumerian *gish-ghar,* Skr. *jagaccitra,* Gk. νοητὸς κόσμος, innumerable references could be cited. Throughout our literature the operations of the divine and human demiurges are treated as strictly analogous, with only this main difference that God gives form to absolutely formless, and man to relatively informal matter; and the act of imagination is a vital operation, as the word "concept" implies.

[9] Hermes, *Lib.* i.8b, cf. Plato, *Timaeus* 29AB. The human artist "imitates nature (Natura naturans, Creatrix Universalis, Deus) in her manner of operation," but one who makes only copies of copies (imitating Natura naturata) is unlike God, since in this case there is no "free" but only the "servile" operation. [Cf. Aristotle, *Physics* II.2.1943.20.]

[10] Plato, *Republic* 601.

[11] Philo, *De opificio 17* ff., and St. Augustine, Meister Eckhart, etc., *passim.*

[12] *Laws* 667D ff., etc.

[13] *Republic* 392c, etc.

[14] *Phaedo* 74F: Argument by analogy is metaphysically valid proof when, and only when, a true analogy is adduced. The validity of symbolism depends upon the assumption that there are corresponding realities on all levels of reference—"as above, so below." Hence the distinction of *le symbolisme qui sait* from *le symbolisme qui cherche*. This is, essentially, the distinction of induction (dialectic) from deduction (syllogism): the latter merely "deducing from the image what it contains," the former "using the image to obtain what the image does not contain" (Alphonse Gratry, *Logic* [La Salle, Ill., 1944], IV.7; cf. KU II.10, "by means of what is never the same obtaining that which is always the same").

[15] *Phaedo* 74, *Laws 667D ff*.

[16] Boethius, *De differentiis topicis,* III cited by St. Bonaventura, *De scientia Christi,* 2.c.

[17] *Viṣṇudharmottaram* XLII.48.

[18] S. N. Dasgupta, *History of Indian Philosophy* (Cambridge, 1922), I, 318.

[19] Plato, *Sophist* 234c. Plato assumes that the significant purpose of the work of art is to remind us of that which, whether itself concrete or abstract, is not presently, or is never, perceptible; and that is part of the doctrine that "what we call learning is really remembering" *(Phaedo* 72ff., *Meno* 81 ff.). The function of reminding does not depend upon visual resemblance, but on the adequacy of the representation: for example, an object or the picture of an object that has been used by someone may suffice to remind us of him. It is precisely from that point of view that representations of the tree under which or throne upon which the Buddha sat can function as adequate representations of himself (*Mahāvamsa* I.69, etc.); the same considerations underlie the cult of bodily or any other "relics." Whereas we think that an object should be represented in art "for its own sake" and regardless of associated ideas, the tradition assumes that the symbol exists for the sake of

its referent, i.e., that the meaning of the work is more important than its looks. Our worship of the symbols themselves is, of course, idolatrous.

[20] Citations in J. M. Bissen, *L'Exemplarisme divin selon Saint Bonaventure* (Paris, 1929), ch. I. I have also used St. Thomas Aquinas, *Sum. Theol.* I.4.3, and *Summa contra gentiles* I.29. The factors of "likeness" are rarely considered in modern works on the theory of art.

[21] *Protagoras* 312E.

[22] *Republic* 396-398, etc.

[23] For criticism of Lévy-Bruhl see O. Leroy, *La Raison primitive* (Paris, 1927); J. Przyluski, *La Participation* (Paris, 1940); W. Schmidt, *Origin and Growth of Religion,* 2nd ed. (New York, 1935), pp. 133-134; and Coomaraswamy, "Primitive Mentality" [in *Coomaraswamy* I].

[24] "Et Plato posuit quod homo materialis est homo . . . per participationem" *(Sum. Theol.* I.18.4; cf. I.44.1), i.e., in the Being of God, in whose "image and likeness" the man was made. St. Thomas is quoting Aristotle, *Physics* IV.2.3, where the latter says that in the *Timaeus* (51A) Plato equated ὕλη (primary matter, void space, chaos) with τὸ μεταληπτικόν participate, viz. in form).

[25] *Phaedo 100*D; cf. *Republic* 476D. The doctrine was later expounded by Dionysius, *De div. nom.* IV.5, "pulchrum quidem esse dicimus quod participat pulchritudinem." St. Thomas comments: "Pulchritudo enim creaturae nihil est aliud quam similitudo divinae pulchritudinis in rebus participata." In the same way, of course, the human artist's product participates in its formal cause, the pattern in the artist's mind.

The notion of participation appears to be "irrational" and will be resisted only if we suppose that the product participates in its cause materially, and not formally; or, in other words, if we suppose that the form participated in is divided up into parts and distributed in the participants. On the contrary, that which is participated in is always a total presence. Words, for example, are images (Plato, *Sophist* 234c); and if to use homologous words, or

synonyms, is called a “participation” (μετάληψις, *Theatetus* 173B, *Republic* 5390), it is because the different words are imitations, expressions, and participations of one and the same idea, apart from which they would not be words, but only sounds.

Participation can be made easier to understand by the analogy of the projection of a lantern slide on screens of various materials. It would be ridiculous to say that the form of the transparency, conveyed by the “image-bearing light,” is not *in* the picture seen by the audience, or even to deny that “this” picture *is* “that” picture; for we see “the same picture” in the slide and on the screen; but equally ridiculous to suppose that any of the material of the transparency is in what the audience sees.

When Christ said “this is my body,” body and bread were manifestly and materially distinct; but it was “not bread alone” of which the disciples partook. Conversely, those who find in Dante’s “strange verses” only “literature,” letting their theory escape them, are actually living by sound alone, and are of the sort that Plato ridicules as “lovers of fine sounds.”

26 RV I.164.21.

27 *Sum. Theol.* I.4.3.

28 Aquinas, *De pulchro et bono,* in *Opera omnia,* Op. VII.4, I.5 (Parma, 1864).

29 Meister Eckhart, Evans ed., I, 211.

30 [All discourse consists in “calling something by the name of another, because of its participation in the effect of this other (κοινωνία παθήματος),’ P"lato, *Sophist* 252B.]

31 Leonardo da Vinci; for Indian parallels see Coomaraswamy, *The Transformation of Nature in Art,* 2nd ed., 1935, n. 7.

32 From this consideration it follows that imitation, expression, and participation are always and can be only of an invisible form, however

realistic the artist's intention may be; for he can never know or see things as they "are," because of their inconstancy, but only as he imagines them, and it is of this phantasm and not of any *thing* that his work is a copy. Icons, as Plato points out *(Laws* 931A) are represervations not of the "visible gods" (Helios, etc.), but of those invisible (Apollo, Zeus, etc.) [Cf. *Republic* 510de; *Timaeus* 51E, 92; *Philebus* 62b].

[33] Skr. *paśu,* an animal or animal man whose behavior is guided, not by reason, but only by "estimative knowledge," i.e., pleasure-pain motives, likes and dislikes, or, in other words, "aesthetic reactions."

In connection with our divorce of art from human values, and our insistence upon *aesthetic* appreciation and denial of the *significance* of beauty, Emmanuel Chapman has very pertinently asked: "On what philosophical grounds can we oppose Vittorio Mussolini's 'exceptionally good fun' at the sight of torn human and animal flesh exfoliating like roses in the Ethiopian sunlight? Does not this 'good fun' follow with an implacable logic, as implacable as a bomb following the law of gravity, if beauty is regarded only as a name for the pleasure we feel, as merely subjective, a quality projected or imputed by the mind, and having no reference to things, no foundation whatsoever in existence? Is it not further the logical consequence of the fatal separation of beauty from reason? . . . The bitter failures in the history of aesthetics are there to show that the starting-point can never be any subjective, *a priori* principle from which a closed system is induced" ("Beauty and the War," *Journal of Philosophy,* XXXIX, 1942, 495).

It is true that there are no timeless, but only everlasting, values; but unless and until our contingent life has been reduced to the eternal now (of which we can have no sensible experience), every attempt to isolate knowing from valuation (as in the love of art "for art's sake") must have destructive, and even murderous or suicidal consequences; "vile curiosity" and the "love of fine colors and sounds" are the basic motives of the sadist.

[34] Guido d'Arezzo, ca. A.D. 1000; cf. Plato, *Phaedrus* 265A.

[35] *The Philosophy of "As If,"* about which H. Vaihinger wrote a book with the subtitle *A System of the Theoretical, Practical and Religious Fictions of Mankind,* (English ed., London, 1942), is really of immemorial antiquity. We meet with it in Plato's distinction of probable truth or opinion from truth itself, and in the Indian distinction of relative knowledge *(avidyā,* ignorance) from knowledge *(vidyā)* itself. It is taken for granted in the doctrine of multiple meaning and in the *via negativa* in which all relative truths are ultimately denied because of their limited validity. The "philosophy of 'as if' " is markedly developed in Meister Eckhart, who says that "that man never gets to the underlying truth who stops at the enjoyment of its symbol," and that he himself has "always before my mind this little word *quasi,* 'like' " (Evans ed., I, 186, 213). The "philosophy of 'as if' " is implicit in many uses of ὥσπερ (e.g., Hermes, *Lib*. x.7), and Skr. *iva*.

[36] Cf. Plato, *Republic* 510DE.

[37] Cf. Coomaraswamy, "Ornament" *[Coomaraswamy* 1]. We say above "either ritually or by ornamentation" only because these operations are now, and according to our way of thinking, unrelated: but the artist was once a priest, "chaque occupation est un sacerdoce" (A. M. Hocart, *Les Castes,* Paris, 1938); and in the Christian Sacrifice the use of the "ornaments of the altar" is still a part of the rite, of which their making was the beginning.

[38] The distinction of meaning from art, so that what were originally symbols become "art forms," and what were figures of thought, merely figures of speech (e.g., "self-control," no longer based on an awareness that *duo sunt in homine,* viz. the driver and the team) is merely a special case of the aimlessness asserted by the behavioristic interpretation of life. On the modern "philosophy of meaninglessness . . . accepted only at the suggestion of the passions" see Aldous Huxley, *Ends and Means* (New York, 1937), pp. 273-277, and I. Jenkins, "The Postulate of an Impoverished Reality" in *Journal of Philosophy,* XXXIX (1942), 533. For the opposition of the linguistic (i.e., intellectual) and the *aesthetic* (i.e., sentimental) conceptions of art, see W. Deonna, *"Primitivisme et classicisme, les deux faces de I'histoire de l'art,"* BAHA, IV (1937); like so many of our contemporaries, for whom the life of the instincts is all-sufficient, Deonna sees in the "progress" from an art of ideas to an art of sensations a favorable

"evolution." Just as for Whitehead "it was a tremendous discovery—how to excite emotions for their own sake!"

39 That things can be called after the names of the things impressed upon them is rather well illustrated by the reference of J. Gregory to "coins called by the name of their Expresses, as . . . saith Pollux καὶ ἐκαλεῖτο βοῦς ὅτι βοῦς εἰκών εν-τετυρόμενον, from the figure of an ox imprinted," *Notes and Observations upon Several Passages in Scripture* (London, 1684). Any absolute distinction of the symbol from its referent implies that the symbol is not what Plato means by a "true name," but arbitrarily and conventionally chosen. But symbols are not regarded thus, traditionally; one says that the house *is* the universe in a likeness, rather than that it is a likeness *of* the universe. So in the ritual drama, the performer becomes the deity whose actions he imitates, and only returns to himself when the rite is relinquished: "enthusiasm" meaning that the deity is in him, that he is ἔνθεος (this is not an etymology).

All that may be nonsense to the rationalist, who lives in a meaningless world; but the end is not yet.

40 *Metaphysics* I.6.4. There can be little doubt that Aristotle had in mind *Timaeus* 51A, where Plato connects ἀφομοιόω with μεταλαμβάνω. That the one implies the other is also the opinion to which Socrates assents in *Parmenides* 132E, "That by participation in which (μετέχοντα)'like' things are like (ὅμοια), will be their real 'form,' I suppose? Most assuredly." It is not, however, by their "likeness" that things participate in their form, but (as we learn elsewhere) by their proportion or adequacy (ἰσότης), i.e., truth of the analogy; a visual likeness of anything to its form or archetype being impossible because the model is invisible; so that, for example, in theology, while it can be said that man is "like" God, it cannot be said that God is "like" man.

Aristotle also says that "thought thinks itself through participation (μετάληψις) in its object" *(Metaphysics* XII.7.8). "For participation is only a special case of the problem of communion, of the symbolizing of one thing with another, of mimicry" (R. C. Taliaferro, foreword to Thomas Taylor, *Timaeus and Critias,* New York, 1944, P. 14).

For the sake of Indian readers it may be added that "imitation" is Skr. *anukaraṇa* ("making according to"), and "participation" *(pratilabha* or *bhakti);* and that like Greek in the time of Plato and Aristotle, Sanskrit has no exact equivalent for "expression"; for Greek and Sanskrit both, an idea is rather "manifested" (δηλόω,*pra-kāś, vy-añj, vy-ā-khyā)* than "expressed"; in both languages words that mean to "speak" and to "shine" have common roots (cf. our "shining wit," "illustration," "clarify," "declare," and "argument"). Form (εἶδος as ἰδέα) and presentation (φαι-νόμενον) are *nāma* (name, quiddity) and *rūpa* (shape, appearance, body); or in the special case of verbal expressions, *artha* (meaning, value), *prayojana* (use), and ś*abda* (sound); the former being the intellectual *(mānasa,)* νοητός) and the latter the tangible or aesthetic *(spṛśya, dṛśya,* αἰσθητικός, ὁρατός) apprehensions

[41] Quintilian IX.4.117, based on Plato, *Timaeus* 80B, where the "composition" is of shrill and deep sound, and this "furnishes pleasure to the unintelligent, and to the intelligent that intellectual delight which is caused by the imitation of the divine harmony manifested in mortal motions" (R. G. Bury's translation, LCL).

4

Ātmayajña: Self-Sacrifice

Svasti vaḥ parāya tamasa parastāt

Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad, II.2.6[1]

When a man vows to Almighty God all that he has, all his life, all his knowledge, it is a holocaust.

St. Gregory, XX Homily on Ezekiel

Just as Christianity turns upon and in its rites repeats and commemorates a Sacrifice, so the liturgical texts of the Ṛ*g Veda* cannot be considered apart from the rites to which they apply, and so are these rites themselves a mimesis of what was done by the First Sacrificers who found in the Sacrifice their Way from privation to plenty, darkness to light, and death to immortality.

The Vedic Sacrifice is always performed for the Sacrificer's benefit, both here and hereafter.[2] The immediate benefits accruing to the Sacrificer are that he may live out the full term of his life (the relative immortality of "not dying" prematurely) and may be multiplied in his children and in his possessions; the Sacrifice ensuring the perpetual circulation of the "Stream of Wealth" *(vasor dhārā),*[3] the food of the gods reaching them in the smoke of the burnt offering, and our food in return descending from heaven in the rain and thus through plants and cattle to ourselves, so that neither the Sacrificer nor his people shall die of want. On the other hand, the ultimate benefit secured to the Sacrificer who thus lives out his life on earth and in good form is that of deification and an absolute immortality. These distinctions of temporal from eternal goods correspond to that which is sharply drawn in the Brāhmaṇas between a mere performance or patronage of the rites and a comprehension of them, the mere participant securing only the immediate, and the Comprehensor *(evaṃvit, vidvān, viduḥ)* both ends of

the operation *(karma, vrata)*. This is likewise the well-known distinction of the *karma kāṇḍa* and k*arma mārga* from the *jñāna kāṇḍa* and *mārga*—a division of *viae*[4] that is ultimately resolved when the whole of life is sacrificially interpreted and lived accordingly.

To know Indra as he is in himself is the *summum bonum* (Kauṣ. Up. III.I, cf. AĀ II.2.3); and already RV VIII.70.3 points out that "none attaineth Him by works or sacrifices" (*na . . . karmanā . . . na yajñaih* [cf. ŚB X.5.4.16]). If it is not by any mere activity nor by any ritual means, it is clear that it can only be by an understanding or verification of what is done that he can be found. Here, then, we propose to ask not what is enacted outwardly, but what is accomplished inwardly by the understanding sacrificer.

The Brāhmaṇas abound with evidence that the victim is a representation of the sacrificer himself, or as the texts express it, *is* the sacrificer himself. In accordance with the universal rule that initiation *(dīkṣā)* is a death and a rebirth, it is explicit that "the initiate is the oblation" *(havir vai dīkṣitaḥ,* TS VI.I.4.5; cf. AB II.3), "the victim (*paśu*) substantially *(nidānena)* the sacrificer himself" (AB II.11).[5] This was to be expected, for it is repeatedly emphasized that "We [the sacrificers here and now] must do what was done by the gods [the original sacrificers] in the beginning." It is, in fact, himself that the god offers up, as may be seen in the prayers "O Agni, sacrifice thine own body" *(yajasva tanvaṃ tava svām,* RV VI.II.2; cf. I.142.11, *avasṛja upa tmanā),* and "sacrifice thyself, augmenting thy body" *(svayaṃ yajasva tanvaṃ vṛdhānah,* RV X.81.5), ["Worship thyself, O God" *(yajasva tanvaṃ,* RV X.7.6, VI.II.2)]. To sacrifice and to be sacrificed are essentially the same: "For the gods' sake he chose death, for his offspring's [the same 'gods'] sake chose not immortality: they made Bṛhaspati the sacrifice, Yama gave up (*arirecīt,*[6] poured or emptied out) his own dear body" (RV X.13.4). [So in ŚB 16..3.21, "Me (Soma) shall they offer up to all of you." Prajāpati at his own sacrifice "gave himself up to the gods" (ŚB XI.1.8.2ff.; the sacrificer "gives himself up to the gods, even as Prajāpati gave himself up to the gods ... for the (Sacrifice) becomes an oblation to the gods"; cf. ŚB VIIII.6.1.10.] And so it is "by the Sacrifice that the gods offered up the Sacrifice" (*yajñena yajñam ayajanta devaḥ,* RV X.90.16): we shall see presently why, and how correctly, Sāyaṇa says in commenting on the last passage that "the gods" are "Prajāpati's breath-forms" (*prāṇarūpā;* see n. 56).

The sacrificer's offering up of himself is ritually enacted in various ways. The *prastara,* for example, which represents the sacrificer, is thrown into the Fire, and he only saves himself from an actual immolation by an invocation of the Fire itself (SB I.9.2.17, cf. III.4.3.22): one who ritually approaches either the household or the sacrificial Fire does so reflecting that "that Fire knows that he has come to surrender himself to me" (*paridāṃ me,* ŚB II.4.I.11, cf. IX.2.1.17, IX.2.3.15, 17, IX.4.4.3, AB II.3), and if, indeed, "he did not expressly make this renunciation of himself (*ātmanaḥ paridāṃ na vadeta*)*,* the Fire would deprive him of it" (ŚB IX.5.1.53). 6 [7]

Otherwise stated, "the Sacrificer casts himself in the form of seed[8] (represented by grains of sand[9]) into the household Fire (*ātmānaṃ . . . retobhūtaṃ siñcati,* ŚB VII.2.1.6) to ensure his rebirth here on earth, and into the sacrificial altar with a view to his rebirth in heaven,[10] employing verses containing the verb *āpyai,* "to grow,"[11] and referring to Soma, for "Soma being the Breath" *(prāṇaḥ),* he thus introduces Breath into the effused seed and so quickens it (ŚB VII.3.1.12, 45, 46); the verses (VS XII.112, 113) concluding "growing, O Soma, unto immortality, gain thou thy highest glory in the Sky," i.e., that of the Moon (ŚB m.4.3.13).

This introduces us to "Soma," of whom we shall have much to say. For he too, King Soma, is the victim: Agni the eater, Soma the food here below, the Sun the eater, the Moon his food and oblation above (ŚB XI.1.6.19, X.6.2.1-4, and *passim*). We cannot pursue this relationship here at full length except to say that "when eater and food (*adya = puroḍāśa,* sacrificial cake) unite (*ubhayaṃ samāgacchati),* it is called the eater, not the food" (ŚB X.6.2.1), i.e., there is an assimilation in both senses of the word; that this assimilation is also the marriage effected on the night before the new moon's rising (*amāvāsya,* "cohabitation,"[12] *Pāṇini* III.1.122) when she enters into (*praviśati)* him (JUB I.33.6); that the Sun and Moon are the divine and human worlds, Oṃ and Vāc (JUB III.13, 14), [i.e., Self and self, *le soi* and *le moi*]; and again, that the Sun is Indra, the Moon Vṛtra, whom he swallows on that night before the new moon appears (ŚB I.6.4.18, 19). It appears, indeed, from a correlation of this passage with ŚB II.4.4.17-19, that Vṛtra is the solar Indra's bride— cf. RV X.85.29, where the Sun's bride, who enters into him (*viśati patim),* is originally ophidian, acquiring feet only on her marriage (as in the marriage of a mermaid to a human); and that there are more ways than one of "killing" a dragon. All this expresses the

relationship of the Breath to the "elemental self," Eros to Psyche, the "Spirit" to the "soul," and is paralleled in Meister Eckhart's "The soul, in hot pursuit of God, becomes absorbed in Him ... just as the sun will swallow up and put out the dawn" (Evans ed., I, 292; cf. Dante, *Paradiso* XXVII.136-138), who is herself a "snake" (*apād)* in the beginning (RV I.152.3, VI.59.6).[13]

Into the details of the Soma Sacrifice (an indispensable part of the Agnihotra, oblation to Agni, burnt-offering), we need not enter here, except to remind ourselves that the shoots (*aṃśu*) of the Soma plant, or any plant that represents Soma and of which the stems or fruits are used, are "pressed" (*suta*)—i.e., crushed and ground—and that the strained and purified juice is offered in the Fire, and also partaken of by the priests and the sacrificer. There is a real analogy of the Soma mill to the wine-press, and of Soma juice to the "pure blood of the grape" (Deut. 32:14), and of the rite to the "drink offering" of the wine in the Fire (Lev. 23:13), *noster deus consumens* (Deut. 4:24), and of the slaying of Soma to the killing of the grain when it is threshed and ground. According to Plutarch (*Moralia* 353), the Egyptians thought of wine as "the blood of those who had once battled against the gods, and from whom when they had fallen and had been mingled with the earth, they believed vines to have sprung."

As to this last, "barley stalks are Soma stems" (ŚB XII.7.3.13); "barley is Varuṇa" (ŚB XIII.3.8.5),[14] as was Soma tied up before his pressing (TS VI.I.II.2, 5); and brandy (*surā,* fermented liquor prepared from rice and barley) is one of the substances that can be made to be Soma by rites of transubstantiation (ŚB XII.7.3.11). The grains contain the sacrificial essence *(medha)* that had been in Man *(puruṣa,* cf. RV X.90), from which it passed to the horse, etc., and finally into the earth, whence it is regained by digging (cultivation). The grain is threshed, husked, winnowed, and ground. In the kneading and cooking the sacrificial cake *(puroḍasa)* acquires the animal qualities of hair, skin, flesh, bone, and marrow, and "the Man whom they had offered up becomes a mockman" *(kiṃpuruṣa)*.[15] The cake becomes the sacrificial animal, and contains the sacrificial essence of the former animal victims. It can hardly be doubted that, like our "gingerbread men," the cake was made in the shape of a man.[16] The whole procedure is expressly equated with the sacrifice of a living victim; the threshing and grinding are, like the slaying of Vṛtra and Soma, sins requiring expiation; the flour that has been "killed" by the mortar and pestle and millstones is ritually

quickened in order that the gods may be given the "living food"[17] they require (ŚB I.I.4.6-I.2.3.9 and AB II.8, 9). ["Verily, living he goes to the gods" (TS V.6.6.4); cf. Rom. 12:1, "present your bodies a living sacrifice."] The traces of the passion of the "Vegetation Spirit" survive in popular[18] agricultural rites all over the world, and notably in the words of the song "John Barleycorn," whose awns, like those of the rice in AB II.9, are his "beard," the mark of his manhood, and who, although they treat him so "barbarously," springs up again.

The polarity of Soma is like Agni's. The Soma when bought and tied up (in the form of a man, to represent the sacrificer himself, ŚB III.3.2.18) is of Varuṇa's nature, and must be made to be a Friend (Mitra) with the words, "Come unto us as the Friend (Mitra) creating firm friendships for pacification" (*śāntyai,* TS VI.I.II, I.2.7).[19] It must never be forgotten that "Soma was Vṛtra" (ŚB III.4.3.13, III.9.4.2, IV.4.3.4), and it needs no proof here that Vṛtra = Ahi, Pāpman, etc. Accordingly, "Even as Ahi from his inveterated skin, so [from the bruised shoots] streams the yellow rain, prancing like a horse" (RV IX.86.44), "even as Makha thou, Soma, goest prancing to the filter" (RV IX.20.7).[20] "The Sun, indeed, is Indra, and that Moon none but Vṛtra, and on the new-moon night he, Indra, completely destroys him, leaving nothing remaining; when the Sun devours *(grasitvā)* him,[21] he sucks him dry and spits him out *(taṃ nidhīrya nirasyati*); and having been sucked out *(dhītaḥ),* he grows again *(sa punar āpyāyate);* and whoever is a Comprehensor of this [myth or doctrine] in the same way overcomes all Evil *(pāpman),* leaving naught of it remaining" (ŚB I.6.4.13, 19, 20; cf. TS II.5.2.4, 5, JUB 1-33.6 [and *vṛtram ahim . . . āvayat,* RV X.113.8]). The stone, in fact, with which Soma is pressed and slain, is identified with the Sun (Āditya Vivasvant, ŚB III.9.4, 8), what is enacted here corresponding to what is done there. And as *in divinis (adhidevatam)* and in the ritual mimesis, so "within you" *(adhyātmam)*: the powers of the soul (sight, hearing, etc.) that are Brahma's immanent forms are called his "swallow" or "sink" *(giri)*; and conversely the Comprehensor of this himself "swallows" or "sinks" *(girati)* the hateful, evil foe *(dviṣantaṃ pāpmānaṃ bhrātṛvyam* = Vṛtra),[22] and "becomes with Self" *(bhavaty ātmanā),* and like Brahma "one whose evil foe is as refuse" *(parāsya,* a thing to be cast out, spat out, rejected or refused, AĀ II.I.8); the cycle is reversed and completed when in sleep (or in *samādhi* or at death) the Breath

(prāṇaḥ, immanent deity, Sun, Brahma) itself "swallows up" *(jagāra)* the "four great selves,"[23] viz. these same powers of sight, hearing etc. (JUB III.2).

So also in terms of the animal sacrifice offered to Agnīṣomau, who, when they have been united, jointly "overcome the Sacrificer," who is born in debt to Death (SB III.6.2.16) and is only redeemed by the actual victim, "or rather [i.e., more truly], they say: 'Unto Agnīṣomau Indra slew Vṛtra'" (TS VI.I.II.5;[24] similarly ŠB III.3.4.21). Thus "ransoming Self by self" (KB XIII.3),[25] "by self he enters into Self" (VS XXXII.11). The like holds good in terms of the supplementary sacrifice of the Cake *(puroḍasa),* which contains the sacrificial property *(medha)* that was originally in the human victim (ŚB I.I.4.8, 9, III.8.3.1-3).

Or rather, it is not Soma himself, but only his evil *(pāpman)* that is slain (ŚB III.9.4.17, 18).[26] For "Soma is the Regnum" *(kṣatra,* ŚB V.3.5.8); and it is precisely that he may be enthroned, and rule indeed, that he is "slain" (ŚB III.3.2.6). The guilt from which Soma is cleansed is that he oppressed Bṛhaspati, his Purohita, or that he was even capable of thinking of such a thing (ŚB IV.1.2.4); his passion is an assimilation to and a marital reunion with the Sacerdotum. The whole pattern underlies and is reflected in the rites of royal initiation *(rājasūya = varuṇa-sava)*—"This man is *your* king, Soma the king of us Brahmans" (VS X.18). The prince dies that the king may be born of him; there remains no evil, nothing of his Varuṇya nature in the king; it is not himself but his evil that is killed. The beating with sticks (ŚB V.4.4.7) may be compared to the pressing of Soma and to the threshing of grain by which it is separated from the husks. As Indra slew Vṛtra, so the king overcomes his own hateful, evil foe (ŚB V.2.3.7).

In the beginning, Indra overcomes Vṛtra for the sake of Agni and Soma, whom he has swallowed; in the Sacrifice Agni and Soma overcome the sacrificer, or rather what in him is of Vṛtra nature, and so the circle is completed. Thus: Tvaṣṭṛ cast the residue *(yad aśiṣyata)*[27] of the Soma upon his sacrificial Fire, saying, "Wax great as Indra's foe." Then, "whether it was what was falling *(pravaṇam,* lit. 'on the slope')[28] or what was on the Fire *(adhy agneḥ),* that coming into being *(sa sambhavan,* i.e., as Vṛtra) overcame *(abhisamabhavat)* Agni and Soma," and then Vṛtra "waxed" and, as his name implies, "enveloped *(avṛṇot)*" these worlds (TS II.4.12, cf. II.5.2). Whereas in the Sacrifice "they bring forward the Soma (juice), and

when he is established in Agni [the *regnum* in the *sacerdotum],* they coexisting *(sambhavantau)* overcome *(abhisambhavataḥ)* the sacrificer[29] [represented by the victim, TS VI.6.9.2, etc.]. Now the initiate *(dīkṣitaḥ)* has been hitherto holding himself in readiness to serve as the sacrificial essence; but *(eva)* in that Agni and Soma receive a victim, that is his redemption. . . . Or, rather [i.e., more truly] they say: 'Indra smote Vṛtra for Agni and Soma.' Inasmuch as the sacrificer offers up a victim to Agni and Soma, it verily becomes 'his Vṛtra-slayer'" *(vārtraghna evāsya sa,* TS VI.I.II.6). The Comprehensor who offers the full and new moon offering does so *with* Indra (TS II.5.4.1); as Indra repelled Vṛtra, the Evil One, by the new moon offering, so does the sacrificer (ŚB VI.2.2.19). "Agni, the Lord of the operation, makes him who has slain his Vṛtra to operate [sacrifice] for a year; thereafter he may sacrifice at will" (TS II.5.4.5). "At will," for when the purpose of the Sacrifice has been accomplished, there is nothing more that *must* be done; such an one is now a k*āmācārin,* he is no longer under the law but delivered from the law of obedience to that of liberty, and to him it can be safely said, *Lo mai piacere omai prende per duce*. The Buddha no longer makes burnt offering (as he had done in former states of being), he does what he likes *(kāmakāro,* Sn 350) just because he has overcome and dispossessed *his* Vṛtra.

The word *giri* (AĀ II.I.8), rendered above by "swallow" (n.), lends itself to a far-reaching exegesis. Keith translates it by "hiding place" (of Brahma), and in a note says very rightly that "it is called *giri,* because *prāṇa* is swallowed up and hidden by the other senses."[30] In a note on AĀ II.2.1, he adds, "The sun and *prāṇa* are as usual identified, the one being the *adhidaivatam,* the other the *adhyātman* representation. The former attracts the vision, the latter impels the body."[31] It is, in fact, within us that the deity is "hidden" *(guhā nihitam, passim),* there that the Vedic ṛ*sayah* sought him by his tracks, there in the heart that the "hidden Sun" *(sūryam gūlham,* RV V.40.6, etc.) is to be "found." "For this in ourself is hidden *(guhādhyātmam),* these deities (the breaths); but manifest *in divinis" (āvir adhidaivatam,* AĀ I.3.3), speech being "manifest" as Agni, vision as the Sun, etc. (AĀ II.I.5, etc.). These are the "two forms of Brahma, the formed *(mūrta,* i.e., visible) and the unformed *(amūrta)* . . . presented *(sat)* and immanent *(tya),"*[32] respectively the visible Sun disk and the eye, and the unseen Persons in the disk and in the eye (BU II.3).

With *giri* (√ *gir,* "swallow") compare *gṛha* (√ *grah,* "grasp"); both imply enclosures, resorts, a being within something. At the same time, *giri* is "mountain"; and *garta* (from the same root) both "seat" and "grave" (one can be "swallowed up" in either). The semantics is paralleled in Ger. *Berg,* "mountain," and its cognates Eng. *barrow,* (i) "hill" and (2) "burial mound," *burgh,* "town," *borough,* and finally *bury;* cf. Skr. *stūpa,* (1) "top," "height," and (2) burial mound. *We* are then, the "mountain" in which God is "buried," just as a church or a *stūpa,* and the world itself, are His tomb and the "cave"[33] into which He descends for our awakening (MU II.6, *pratibodhanāya;* cf. AV XI.4.15, *jinvasyatha)*. What all this leads to, bearing in mind that both the Maruts and Soma shoots are equated with the "breaths" (ŚB IX.3.1.7, AB III.16, and TS VI.4.4.4), is the probability that *giri* in the Ṛ*g Veda,* although translatable by "mountain," is really rather "cave" *(guhā)* than "mountain," and *giriṣṭha* "in the mountain" rather than upon it, and tantamount to *ātmastha* (KU V.12, MU III.2), notably in RV VIII.94.12, where the Marut host is *giriṣṭha,* and IX.85.12 and V.43.4 where Soma and Soma juice *(rasa)* are *giriṣṭha*. Just the same is implied in RV V.85.2, where Varuṇa is said to have put "Counsel in hearts, Agni in the waters, the Sun in the sky, and Soma in the rock" *(adrau,* Sāyaṇa *parvate)*.[34] "The Soma oblation ... is incorporeal" (AB II.14). No wonder that "of him the Brāhmans understand by 'Soma' none ever tastes, none tastes who dwells on earth" (RV X.85.3, 4).

Soma's death is his procession; he is slain in the same sense that every initiand, *homo moriturus,* dies, to be born again. "A man is unborn insofar as he does not sacrifice" (JUB III.14.8), to sacrifice is to be born (KB XV.3), Vṛtra slaughter is Indra's birth (as Mahendra, ŚB I.6.4.21). The Sacrificer, participating in Soma's passion, is born again of the sacrificial Fire in the sense that "except a man be born again . . ." and "Except a corn of wheat fall into the ground and die . . ." (John 3:3 and 12:24).

We observed that Yama "gave up," or much more literally, "emptied out" *(arirecīt)* his body. In the same way the Person, the One whom the gods make manifold, is said to have been poured out completely, or have been "all emptied out" *(aty aricyata,* RV X.90.5, Sāyaṇa *atirikto'bhūt);* it is often stated that Prajāpati, desiring to be many, and emanating offspring *(prajā sṛṣṭvā),* was emptied out *(riricānaḥ,* ŚB III.9.1.2, and *passim)*. In the same way, Vṛtra, in whom the streams had been covered up (RV VII.100.7), and from whom Indra and Viṣṇu win "that by which he is these worlds" (TS

II.4.12), is like a leather bottle "drained" *(niṣpītaḥ)*[35] of his contents (ŚB I.6.3.16); just as, conversely, in "sleep" these same powers are "drunk in" (ā*pītā bhavanti)* by the Breath (ŚB X.5.2.14-15). That all This (Universe) was in Vṛtra is the very *raison d'être* of the Sacrifice (ŚB V.5.5.1).

All this is reflected in the ritual, as if in a mirror, inversely. Whereas Prajāpati divides himself, pours out his offspring, makes himself many and enters into us in whom he is swallowed up and hidden, so in his turn the sacrificer "draws in *(uddhṛtya,* √ *hṛ)* these breaths with Oṃ, and sacrifices them in the Fire without evil" (MU VI.26). As Prajāpati "emanated offspring, and thought himself emptied out" *(riricāno'manyata),* so "the sacrificer as it were emanates offspring and is thereupon emptied out as it were" *(riricāna iva,* TS VI.6.5.1): "With his whole mind, his whole self *(sarveṇevātmanā),* indeed, the initiate *(dikṣitaḥ)* assembles *(sambharati)* and would collect *(saṃ ca jihīrṣati,* √ *hṛ)* the Sacrifice; his self, as it were, is emptied out" *(riricāna ivātmā bhavati,* ŚB III.8.I.2, KB X.3). That the sacrificer thus "collects" *(saṃharati,* √ *hṛ)* himself is the active equivalent on his part of what is done to him by the Spiritual Self itself at death (or in sleep, or in *samādhi)* "when the breaths *(prāṇdḥ,* i.e., *indriyāṇi,* τῆς ψυχῆς δυνάμεις) unite with it *(abhisamdyanti)* and it, taking complete possession of those measures of fire[36] *(etā tejo-mātrāḥ samabhyādadāno')* descends into the heart *(hṛdayam evānvakrāmati)*[37]

. . (and thus) striking down the body, dispelling its ignorance, collects itself *(ātmānaṃ saṃharati)* in order to pass on" (BU IV.4.1, 3);[38] the equivalent on his part of what is done by the departing Breath *(prāṇaḥ)* when it "extracts" *(saṃvṛh,* BU VI.I.13) or "impresses" *(saṃkhid,* CU V.1.2, i.e., "levies") the breaths, as a horse might tear out the pegs by which it is tethered.

This takes place in any case when "the dust returns to the dust as it was: and the spirit unto God who gave it" (Eccl. 12:7).[39] The burning question for us is, "In whom, when I go forth, shall I be going forth? On whose ground shall I be standing?" (Praśna Up. VI.3).[40] Shall I *be collected* or shall I *collect myself?* Shall I be passively repossessed or actively self-possessed? "Whoever departs from this world, not having seen his very own world *(svaṃ lokam adṛṣṭvā),*[41] he unaware of it no more profits than one might from the Vedas unrecited or a deed undone" (BU I. 4.15);

whereas, "One who knows that contemplative, ageless, youthful Self has nothing to fear from death" (AV X.8.44).

The relationship of the breaths to the Breath, like that of the Maruts (identified with the breaths in ŚB IX.3.1.7, etc.), is that of subjects *(viśah, svāḥ)* to their king or duke. They are, accordingly, his legitimate "food," he lives *on* them. They are, in fact, his "divisions." As he (Bhagavan), distributing his powers, divides himself *(ātmānaṃ vibhajya, passim)* in them, so are they his devoted supporters *(bhaktāḥ)* in that it is theirs to "support" him, in every sense of the word, but especially inasmuch as it is theirs to render him his "share" *(bhāgam)*. This feudal relationship is repeatedly stated in the words "We are thine and thou art ours" (RV VIII.92.32, BU IV.4.37, etc.; cf. Plato, *Laws* 904B). That they "feed" him is constantly stated in the phrase, "they bring him tribute" *(baliṃ haranti* or *bharanti)*.[42] In BU VI.1.3, when the superiority of the Breath has been acknowledged, he, addressing the breaths, says, "In that case, pay me tribute" *(me baliṃ kuruta);* each, accordingly, makes acknowledgment that its particular function is not its own, but his; in the case of speech *(vāc),* for example, "That wherein I am the 'worthiest' (f.) *(yad vā ahaṃ vasisthāsmi),* that 'worthiest' (m.) art thou" *(tvaṃ tad vasiṣṭho'si)*.[43] They, in other words, *contribute* offerings to him that are in reality his *attributes (ābharaṇa)*; they acknowledge that they are "only the names of his acts" (BU I.4.7, cf. 1.5-.21, I.6.3; BG III.15, etc.).

In TS II.4.12.5, 6 and ŚB I.6.3.17, Vṛtra enters into Indra by agreement. The fire is, indeed, the consumer of food both for gods and men (JUB IV.II.5-7). Or rather, that part of the bisected Vṛtra which was of Soma's nature becomes the Moon, and that part of him which was Asurya (i.e., the ophidian part, the tail) became the belly, "to kindle *(indhīya)* him" and "for his enjoyment *(bhogāya),"* and is in men the tyrannical appetite to which these creatures *(imāḥ prajāḥ,* sc. *prāṇāḥ,* sensitive powers of which the individual is a host) pay tribute *(baliṃ haranti)* whenever they are hungry. So men say that "Vṛtra is within us"; and the Comprehensor of this doctrine, that Vṛtra is the consumer, slays man's enemy, privation or hunger. As to this, one recalls on the one hand that the bowels are of a serpentine aspect and, as it were, headless; and on the other that for Plato, and traditionally, the bowels are the seat of the emotions and appetites.[44] We must, of course, beware of understanding "food" in any restricted sense; in

all our texts, “food” is whatever can be desired, whatever nourishes our existence, whatever feeds the fires of life; there are foods for the eye and foods for the mind, and so forth. Vṛtra fire is the source of our *voluptas* when we seek in works of art nothing but an “aesthetic” experience, and of our *turpis curiositas* when we “thirst for knowledge” for its own sake. Of the “two birds,” one eats, the other oversees but does not eat (RV I.164.20, Muṇḍ. Up. III.1.1, etc.).

Hence, in the significant verses of MU VI.34, “As fire deprived of fuel *(nirindhaḥ)*[45] is extinguished in its own hearth *(svayonāv upaśāmyate),* so when its emotions[46] have been killed *(vṛtti-kṣayāt)* the will is extinguished in its own seat *(cittaṃ svayonāv upaśāmyate)*. It is from the love of Truth *(satyakāmatas)* that the mind *(manas)* is extinguished in its own seat; false are the actions and the wantings that haunt *(karmavasdnugdh)* one bemused by the objects of the sensitive powers *(indriydrtha-vimddhasya)*. Transmigration *(samsāra)* is nothing but our willing *(cittam eva);* purge it *(śodhayet)* carefully, for ‘As is one’s willing, so one comes to be’ *(yac cittas tanmayo bhavati)*.[47] . . . The mind is said to be twofold, clean and unclean *(śuddhaṃ cāśuddham eva)*; unclean by connection with wanting *(kāma),* clean when dissevered from wanting. . . . ‘The mind, indeed, is for human beings *(manuṣyānām)* the means alike of bondage and of freedom, of bondage, when attached to objects *(viṣayd),* and of release *(mokṣa)* when detached therefrom.’” And “Hence, for those who do not perform the Agnihotra (do not make burnt-offering), who do not edify the Fire, who do not know and do not contemplate, the recollection of Brahma’s empyrean abode is obstructed. So the Fire is to be served with offerings, to be edified, lauded, and contemplated.”[48]

In other words, the appetitive soul, the greedy mind, is the Sacrifice; we, as we are in ourselves, seeking ends of our own, are the appropriate burnt-offering: “The chariot of the gods (i.e., the body born of the Sacrifice) is yoked for the world of heaven, but that of man for wherever his purpose *(artha)* is fixed; the chariot of the gods is the Fire” (TS V.4.10.1, cf. AĀ II.3.8 *fin.)*. We see why it is always assumed that the Sacrifice, even of an animal, is a voluntary one; there could be no inner meaning of an unwilling victim.[49] We see what is really accomplished by the heroic Indra (who, be it remembered, is an immanent deity, as the “Person in the right eye,” and so *our* real Person) when he “crushes, rends and cuts to pieces Vṛtra seat

(yoni) and lair *(āsaya),*[50] and it becomes this offering," and so recovers the Vedas (SB v.5.5.4-6). Now as we have already seen, the sacrificer is the oblation *(havis)*. He is identified with the *prastara,* which is anointed with the words, "May they (the gods) eat, licking the anointed bird" (VS II.16 —"licking," because Agni is their mouth, his flames their tongues), thus "making it a bird and to fly up from the world of men to the world of the gods"; the *prastara* is like "any other corpse," except that it is to be touched with the fingers only, not with sticks (ŚB I.8.3.13-23). The sacrificer's "death" is at the same time his salvation; for the Self is his reward:[51] "They who take part in a sacrificial session *(sattra)* go to the world of heavenly light. They kindle (vivify) themselves with the initiations and cook (mature) themselves with the sacrificial seances. With two they cut off their hair (except the topknot), with two their skin, with two their blood, with two their flesh, with two their bones, with two their marrow. In the sacrificial session the Self is the guerdon *(ātma-daksiṇam);* verily receiving the Self as their guerdon, they go to the world of heaven. They cut off the topknot at last for success *(ṛddhyai),* thinking, 'More quickly may we attain to the world of heaven'" (TS VII.4.9, cf. PB IV.9.19-22, ŚB I.8.3.16-19).[52]

The mortal, psychophysical self *(ātman)* that the sacrificer immolates, whether as above ritually, or when he actually dies and is made an oblation *(āhuti,* AB II.4; ŚB II.2.4.8, XII.5.2.13; BU VI.2.14, 15, etc.) in the Fire (the sacrificial rite prefiguring his final resurrection from the Fire), while it acts as a unity (AĀ III.2.1, JUB IV.7.4, Kauṣ. Up. III.2, 8) is not one member (cf. 1 Cor. 12:12 ff.) but a compound *(saṃhata, saṃdeha, sambhūti,* σύγκριμα, etc.), or "host of elemental beings" *(bhūtagaṇa),* called "elemental self" *(bhūtātman)* and, as such, distinguished (as in Plato) from "its immortal Self" *(amṛto'syātmā,* ψυχή ψυχῆς), the impassible and un-affected Inner Man *(antaḥpuruṣaḥ = prajñātman,* solar Self; cf. MU III.2, 3). In view of what has already been said of the Soma sacrifice, a symbolic self-immolation, it will not now surprise us to find that this passible "elemental self" is identified with Soma *(soma saṃjño'yam bhūtātmā,* MU VI.10). Not, of course, the Soma that *"was* Vṛtra," or Varuṇya, but the Soma that still is Vṛtra, or Varuṇya; not Soma the Friend *(mitra)* but Soma the Titan *(asura,* ŚB XII.6.1.10, 11); not Soma the immortal, but the Soma that is to be pressed and slain and from whom the immortal extract is to be separated out. In MU VI.10 we are, accordingly, further reminded that Soma is the food and Fire the eater [it is with this Fire and not with the Soma that the

Sacrificer identifies his Self], and that the Comprehensor of the equation Soma = *bhūtātman* is a truly poor man *(sannyāsī),* a harnessed man *(yogi),* and a "self-sacrificer" *(ātmayāji),* i.e., "one who himself officiates as his own sacrificial priest, as distinguished from the *devayājī,* for whom the sacrifice is performed by another, notably by the god (Agni, *devayaj,* ŚB *passim)*[53] as missal priest: the Sacrificer's immolation of himself, the "elemental self," is his "self-sacrifice" *(ātmayajña)*.

In the same way we shall now be able to understand how in MU VI.35 the powers of the soul are equated with Soma shoots: here "of the Fire that is hidden within the Sky it is but a little measure that is the Water of Life *(amṛtam)* in the midst of the Sun, of which the growing shoots *(āpyay-aṇkurāh)*[54] are Soma or the Breaths *(soma prāṇā vā)."* The equation of the breaths with Soma shoots is even more explicit in TS VI.4.4.4, *prāṇā vā aṃśavaḥ,* "the breaths are Soma shoots." Now we have seen that "Soma was Vṛtra," and that he emerges from these shoots "as the Serpent from his skin"; the powers of the soul, the collective soul itself are, then, Vṛtra "seat and lair" from which the offering *(isti)* is extracted (SB V.5.5.1, 6, cited above). The real Soma sacrifice is the bruising of these shoots, the breaths, the elemental self or soul: "One withdraws *(uddhṛtya)* these breaths (from their objects)[55] and sacrifices them in the Fire" *(prāṇān . . . agnau juhoti,* MU VI.26); "the (immanent) deities[56] are the breaths, mind-born and mind-yoked, in them one sacrifices metaphysically" *(prāṇā vai devā, manojātā manoyujas, teṣu parokṣaṃ juhoti,* TS VI.1.4.5, cf. JUB I.40.3). [57]

"Mind-born and mind-yoked": in the ever-recurrent simile of the chariot,[58] i.e., the bodily vehicle in which the solar spiritual Self takes up its stand as a passenger for so long as the chariot lasts, the sense organs are the steeds and the reins are held by the directing mind *(manas,* νοῦς) on behalf of the passenger; "Savitṛ yokes the gods *(devāḥ = prāṇāḥ)* with mind, he impels them *(yuktvāya manasā devān . . . savitā prasuvati tān,* TS IV.1.1)." When the horses willingly obey the rein, the chariot conducts the passenger to his proper destination; but if they pursue their own ends, the natural objects of the senses, and the mind yields to them, the journey ends in disaster (it must be remembered that the mind is "twofold," bound by the senses or independent of them, MU IV.34, cf. Philo, *Legum allegoriae* I.93). The man whose senses are under control, or "yoked" *(yuktāḥ, yujaḥ),* i.e., the yogi, can say accordingly "I yoke myself, like an understanding horse

(svayam ayuji hayo na vidvān, RV v.46.1)"; which is only another way of referring to those who "offer up all the workings of the senses and the breaths in the Fire of the *yoga* of self-control, kindled by gnosis" (BG IV.27).

It is now also clear why we are told in RV X.85.3-4 that though "they fancy when they crush the plant that they are drinking very Soma; yet of him the Brahmans understand by 'Soma' none ever tastes, none tastes who dwells on earth."[59] The extracted juice is not immediately, not really Soma (Sāyaṇa, *na ca sa sāksāt somaḥ)*. The drinking of Soma, in other words, is a rite of transubstantiation; "it is metaphysically *(parokṣam)* that the Kṣatriya obtains the Soma drinking, it is not immediately *(pratyakṣam = sākṣat)* partaken of by him . . . (but only) through the High Priest *(purodhas),* through the initiation *(dīkṣā),* and the ancestral invocation" *(pravara,* implying "apostolic succession"), AB vII.31; cf. ŚB III.6.2.9, where the Soma pressing stones are Initiation *(dikṣā)* and Ardor *(tapas);* "they collect *(āhṛtyd)* the plant *uśānā* and press it, and by means of the initiation *(dīkśā)* and the seances *(upasads,* sacrificial sittings-in), by the Tānūnaptra (-covenant) and the 'making to grow' *(āpyāyana),* they make it to be 'Soma'" (ŚB III.4.3.13); "by Faith, the daughter of Surya, he makes it *(surā,* brandy, properly the drink of the Asuras and loathsome to Brahmans) to be Soma juice" (SB XII.7.3.11); that which was taken away from Namuci (Vṛtra) by the Aśvins is now drunk as Soma (ŚB xII.8.I.3-5), the "Supreme Offering" (VS XIX.2, ŚB xII.8.2.12).

Such is the significance of what is called the "Subjective Interior Burnt-offering" *(ādhyātmikam āntaram agnihotraḥ),* of which ŠA x.I ff. affirms that "if one sacrifices, knowing not *this* Agnihotra, it is for him as though he pushed aside the coals and made oblation in the ashes."

The assumption of the Fire is described in ŚB II.2.2.8-20, of which the following is a summary. The gods *(devāḥ)* and titans *(asurāḥ)* were both the children of Prajāpati, both alike devoid-of-any-spiritual-Self *(an āt man ah)* and consequently mortal: only Agni was immortal. Both parties set up their sacrificial Fires. The titans performed their rite externally (profanely); but "the gods then set up that Fire in their inward self *(enam . . . antarātman ādadhata),* and having done so became immortal and invincible and overcame their mortal and vincible foes." In the same way now the sacrificer sets up the sacrificial Fire within himself. As to this Fire thus

kindled within him he thinks, "herein will I sacrifice, here do the good work." Nothing can come between him and *this* Fire;[60] "Surely, as long as I live, that Fire that has been set up in my inward self does not die down in me." He feeds that flame who utters right *(satyam),* and more and more becomes his own fiery force *(tejas);* he quenches it who utters wrong *(anṛtam)*[61] and less and less becomes his fiery force. Its service is just "right."

Accordingly, "being about to edify Agni (build up the Fire-altar) the sacrificer apprehends him in himself *(ātmann agniṃ gṛhṇīte);* for it is from himself that he brings him to birth *(ātmano . . . adhijāyate,* ŚB VII.4.I.1)." The true Agnihotra is, in fact, not a rite to be merely performed at fixed seasons, but within you daily,[62] after the primordial pattern of the thirty-six thousand Arka-Fires that were of mental substance and mentally edified by the first sacrificers: "mentally *(manasā)*[63] were they edified, mentally were the cups of Soma drawn, mentally they chanted. . . . These Fires, indeed, are knowledge-built *(vidyācita evd)*; and for the Comprehensor thereof all beings *(sarvāṇi bhūtāni,* all the powers of the soul) build up these Fires, even while he is asleep." And so "by knowledge *(vidyayā)* they ascend to where desires have migrated *(parāgatāh);* it is not by guerdons *(daksiṇābhiḥ)* nor by ignorant ardour *(avidvaṃsaḥ tapasvinaḥ)* . . . but only to Comprehensors that that world belongs" (ŚB X.5.4.16). This last passage states explicitly what is clearly implied by RV VIII.70.3, cited above.

A distinction is thus clearly drawn between mere performance and the understanding of what is done, performance as such and performance as the support of contemplation; and between an objective performance on stated occasions and a subjective and incessant performance. The first of these distinctions is made again in ŚB X.4.2.31, "Whosoever as a Comprehensor performs this sacred work, or even one who is a Comprehensor (but does not actually perform the rites), puts together again this (divided) Prajāpati, whole and complete" (and therewith at the same time reintegrates himself); and again in ŚB xIII.1.3.22, where the distinction is drawn between those who are merely "seated at a sacrificial session" *(sattrasadaḥ)* and those who are "seated in reality" *(satisadaḥ),* only those who thus sacrifice in truth being "seated amongst the very gods" *(satisu devatāsu sidantaḥ).*

The *satisad* is the same as the Ātmayājī referred to above, namely one who is his own priest. The *ātmayāji* is "one who knows, 'this (new) body of mine hath been integrated *(saṃskriyatd),* hath been superimposed

(upadhīyate) by that body (of the Sacrifice)': and even as Ahi from his skin, so does he free himself from this mortal body, from the evil *(pāpmanas,* i.e., from Vṛtra), and as an offering *(āhuti),*[64] as one composed of the Three Vedas, so he passes on to the world of heavenly light. But the Devayājī (for whom another officiates), who merely knows that 'I am sacrificing this (victim) to the gods, I am serving the gods,' is like an inferior who brings tribute to *(baliṃ haret)* a superior ... he does not win so much of a world" (ŚB XI.2.6.13, 14) . [65] The distinction is of active and passive *viae,* of "salvation" from "liberation." The Ātmayājī is "one who sacrifices in himself" *(ātmann eva yajati,* MU VII.9). "Seeing the Self[66] impartially in all beings and all beings in the Self, the Ātmayājī obtains autonomy" *(svarājyam, Mānavadharmaśāstra* xII.91; cf. CU vIII.I.I-6, BG VI.29).

The foregoing interpretation of the Sacrifice as an exhaustive series of symbolic acts to be treated as supports of contemplation *(dhiyālamba)* reflects a traditional assumption that every practice (*πρᾶξις*) implies and involves a corresponding theory (*θεωρία*).*(*The observation of ŚB IX.5.I.42 that the building of the Fire (-altar) includes "all kinds of works" *(viśvā karmāṇi)* assimilates the sacrificer to the archetypal sacrificer, Indra, who is preeminently the "All-worker" *(viśvakarmā)*. It is just because the Sacrifice, if it is to be correctly performed (and this is quite indispensable), demands the skilled cooperation of all kinds of artists, that it necessarily determines the form of the whole social structure. And this means that in a completely traditional society there is no real distinction of sacred from profane operations; rather, as the late A. M. Hocart expressed it, "chaque occupation est un sacerdoce";[67] and it is a consequence that in such societies, "the needs of the body and the soul are satisfied together."[68] In view of this, it will not surprise us to find what in any investigation of the "caste system" must never be overlooked, namely, that the primary application and reference of the verb kṛ *(creo,* *κραίνω*), to do or make, and the noun k*arma,* action or making, is to sacrificial operation (cf. Grassmann, s.vv., *insbesondere, opfern, Opfer-wverk;* and Lat. *operari = sacra facere)*. It will be as true of every agent as it is for the king that whatever he does of himself, unsupported by any spiritual reason, will be to all intents and purposes "a thing not done" *(akṛtam)*. What might otherwise seem to our secular eyes a revolutionary principle, viz. that the true Sacrifice ("making sacred," *ἱεροποία*) is to be performed daily and hourly in each and every one of

our functionings—*teṣu parokṣaṃ juhoti,* TS VI.I.4.5—is really implicit in the concept of action *(karma)* itself; it is, in fact, only *inaction,* what is *not* done, that can be thought of as unholy, and this is explicit in the sinister meaning of the word *kṛtyā* "potentiality" personified; the perfect man is "one who has done what there is to do" *(kṛtakṛytaḥ),* the Arhat *kataṃ karaniyam*. The sacrificial interpretation of the whole of life itself, the *karma mārga* doctrine of the *Bhagavad Gītā,* is implicit in texts already cited, and explicit in many others, e.g., JUB IV.2, where the man is the Sacrifice, and his breaths, the powers of the soul, acting as Vasus, Rudras, and Ādityas, carry out the morning, midday, and evening pressings (i.e., the Soma sacrifice) during his first 24, second 44, and last 48 years of a life of 116 years. Similarly CU III.16, followed by III.17, where privation is equated with initiation, enjoyments with the sacrificial sessions and chantings, the virtues with the guerdons, generation with regeneration, and death with the last ritual ablution. In the same way in the "thousand years" operation of the all-emanating *(viśvasṛjaḥ)* deities, "Death is the slayer" *(śamitṛ,* PB XXV.18.4), who *dispatches* the resurrected victim to the gods.[69]

In Kauṣ. Up. II.5, in Hume's version appropriately entitled "A person's entire life symbolically a Soma-sacrifice," it is affirmed with respect to the Interior Burnt-offering *(āntaram agnihotra)* that our very breathings in and out *(prāṇāpānau:* the two primary breaths or lives, which include and represent all those of sight, hearing, thought, and speech, etc., AĀ II.3.3) "are two endless ambrosial oblations *(nante amṛtāhutī)* that whether waking or sleeping one offers up *(juhoti)* continuously and without a break; and whatever other oblations there are, have an end *(antavatyas tāḥ),* for they amount to no more than activity as such *(karmmamayo hi bhavanti)*. And verily the Comprehensors thereof in former time abstained from making actual burnt offerings *(agnihotraṃ na juhuvāṃ cakruḥ)."* It is from the same point of view that the Buddha, who found and followed the ancient Way of the former Fully Awakened (S II.106, etc.) and expressly denies that he taught a doctrine of his own invention (M I.77), pronounces: "I pile no wood for altar fires; I kindle a flame within me *(ajjhatam = adhyātmikam),* the heart the hearth, the flame thereon the dominated self" *(attā sudantā,* S I.169; i-e-> *saccena danto,* S I.168 = *satyena dantaḥ)*. We have seen already that one who has slain his Vṛtra, i.e., dominated self, and is thus a true autocrat *(svarāj),* is liberated from the law according to which the Sacrifice is factually performed (TS II.5.4.5); and in the same way in AĀ

III.2.6, the Kāvaṣeyas who (as in Kauṣ. Up. II.5, cf. BG IV.29) sacrifice the incoming breath when they speak and the outgoing breath when they remain silent, ask: "To what end should we recite the Veda (cf. BG II.46), to what end should we sacrifice externally)?"[70]

In the sacrificial interpretation of life, acts of all kinds are reduced to their paradigms and archetypes, and so referred to Him from whom all action stems; when the "notion that I am the doer" *(ahaṃkāra, karto'ham asmīti)* has been overcome, and acts are no longer "ours," when we are no longer any one *(vivo autem, jam non ego sed Christus in me,* Gal. 2:20), then we are no longer "under the law," and what is done can no more affect our essence than it can His whose organs we are. It is in this sense only, and not by vainly trying to do nothing, that the causal chain of fate *(karma* with its *phalāni)* can be "broken"; not by any miraculous interference with the operation of mediate causes, but because "we" are no longer part and parcel of them. The reference of all activities to their archetypes (essentially a *reductio artium ad theologiam)* is what we ought to mean when we speak of "rationalizing" our conduct; if we cannot give a true account (ratio, λόyos) of ourselves and our doings it will mean that our actions have been "as you like it *(vṛthā),"* reckless *(asaṃkhyānam)* and informal *(apratirūpam)* rather than to the point *(sādhu)* and in good form *(pṛatirūpam)*.[71]

For one who has completely realized the sacrificial implications of every action, one who is leading not a life of his own in this world but a transubstantiated life, there are no compulsory forms. This must not be understood to mean that he must adopt the role of a nonconformist, a "must" that would be altogether incompatible with the concept of "freedom." If, in the last analysis, the Sacrifice is a mental operation even for the *Ṛg Veda,* where the ritual acts are mentally performed *(manasā, passim)* but it is not to be inferred that there is no manual procedure, it is also true that an emphasis on the ultimate inwardness of the Burnt-offering by no means necessarily involves a disparagement of the physical acts that are the supports of contemplation. The priority of the contemplative does not destroy the real validity of the active life, just as in art the primacy of the free and imaginative *actus primus* does not remove the utility of the manual *actus secundus*. In the k*arma mārga, karma* retains, as we have seen, its sacrificial implications. A mere and ignorant performance of the rites had always been regarded as insufficient *(na karmaṇā . . . na yajñaiḥ,* RV VIII.70.3). If the *karma* of the *Bhagavad Gitā* is essentially

(svabhāvaniyatam, XVIII.47 = *Κατὰ φύσιν*) a work to which one is called by one's own nature or nativity, this had been equally true in the Vedic period when the sacrificial operation involved "all kinds of works" and the acts of the carpenter, doctor, fletcher, and priest had all been regarded as ritual "operations *(vratāni)*." And so as BG IV.15, reminding us of several contexts cited above, affirms and enjoins, "Understanding this, the sacrificial work was performed even by the ancients desirous of liberation *(kṛtaṃ karma pūrvair api mumukṣubhiḥ);* so do thou do work *(kuru karma)* even as by the ancients of old it was done." It is true that, as the Vedanta consistently maintains, man's last end is unattainable by any means, whether sacrificial or moral, but it is never forgotten that means are dispositive to that end: "This Spiritual Self is not to be taken hold of *(labhyaḥ)* by the weak, nor in arrogance, nor by ardor without its countersign (of poverty); but he who being a Comprehensor labors *(yatate)* with these means *(upāya),* that Self dwells in Brahma-home" (Muṇḍ. Up. III.2.4).

We have seen that the conquest of Ahi-Vṛtra, the slaying and eating[72] of the Dragon, is nothing but the domination of the self by the Self; and that the Burnt-offering is the symbol and should be the fact of this conquest. "He who makes the Burnt-offering *(agnihotram)* tears up the snare of greed, cuts down delusion and disparages anger" (MU VI.38); and so, "transcending the elemental powers and their objects ... he whose bowstring is his solitary life[73] and whose arrow is his lack of the conceit of self-existence,[74] fells the keeper of the first of Brahma's palace-gates, whose crown is delusion . . . and who slays all these beings with the arrow of wishful thinking," and may enter Brahma's palace, whence he can look down upon the revolving wheel as may the charioteer upon the turning wheels of his vehicle; "but for one who is smitten and enflamed by darkness and passion, a body-dweller attached to son or wife or kindred, no, never at all!" (Kauṣ. Up. I.4 and MU VI.28).[75] This "keeper" is assuredly the Dragon on the Hero's path and the Guardian of the Tree of Life; in other words, the Death that every Solar Hero must overcome. We hope to show elsewhere that Indra's defeat of Ahi-Vṛtra and the Bodhisatta's conquest of Māra are relations of one and the same universal mythos. Here we have only proposed to emphasize that the Dragon, or Giant—by whatever name, whether we call him Ahi, Vṛtra, Soma, Prajāpati or Puruṣa, or Osiris or Dionysos or Ymir—is always himself the Sacrifice, the sacrificial victim;

and that the Sacrificer, whether divine or human, is always himself this victim, or else has made no real sacrifice.

In sacrificing himself in the beginning, the Solar Hero, having been single, makes himself—or is made to be—many for the sake of those into whom he must enter if they are to find their Way "from darkness to light, death to immortality" (BU I.3.28). He divides himself, and "Except ye eat the flesh of the Son of man, and drink his blood, ye have no life in you" (John 6:53); and as we have seen, he is swallowed up in us, like a buried treasure. In this cosmic crucifixion the Sacrifice is "extended"; and insofar as we think and act in terms of the pairs of opposites, think of him in the noumenal and phenomenal aspect under which he enters into the world (ŚB XI.2.3.4, 5), we "crucify him daily." If his sacrifice is an act of grace, and it is because of his love *(preṇā)* for his offspring that he enters into them (TS v.5.2.1) in whom as only Samsārin (BrSBh I.I.5) he submits to repeated deaths (JUB III.11.1 ff., cf. RV x.72.9), it is, on the other hand, a murder that is committed by whoever, human or divine, sacrifices another; the slaying and dismemberment of Vṛtra is, in fact, on Indra's part an original sin *(kilbiṣa)* because of which he is often excluded from the Soma drinking, and for which atonement must be made (TS II.5.3.6, AB VII.31, KB xv.3; cf. ŚB I.2.3, III.9-4-17, XII.6.1.40, etc.).[76]

"We" are aggregates of the functional powers that are the offspring *(prajāḥ)* of Prajāpati (Brahma, Ātman, Prāṇa, Sun) and the names of his acts; it is the universal Self that operates in each of our many selves, seeing, thinking, etc., into which it is divided; it is this Self that collects itself when we die, and that passes on to other habitations, the nature of which is predetermined by its own former activities. Whether or not "we" survive this passage will depend upon whether our consciousness of being—not to be confused with our "waking" powers of perception, of which nothing survives the transition[77]—is in him, or in "ourselves." It remains, however, for this Wanderer, and for us if we have known him and not merely ourselves, to "collect himself" once and for all and to return from this round of becomings to himself; having been many, he must again become one; having died again and again, he must be resurrected once and for all. The second phase of the Sacrifice, then, and from our present position in the manifold the most essential part of it, consists in the putting together *(saṃdhā)* again of what had been dismembered, and the building up *(saṃskṛ)* of another and unitary Self that shall be our Self when this present

self is no more. This unification and "coming into one's own" is at once a death, a rebirth, an assimilation, and a marriage.

We must not, however, suppose that "we" are the heroes of this cosmic drama: there is but One Hero. It is the God that "fetters himself by himself like a bird in the net" laid by the huntsman Death, and the God that breaks out of the snare,[78] or, otherwise stated, crosses over the torrent of life and death to its further shore by the bridge that is made of his own Spirit, or as one climbing reaches the top of the tree to rest on his eyrie or soar at will. He, and not this man So-and-so, is my Self, and it is not by any acts of "mine," but only by knowing Him (in the sense that knowing and being are one), by knowing Who we are that "we" can be set free. That is why all traditions have insisted upon the primary necessity of self-knowledge: not in the modern psychologist's sense, but in that of the question "Which self?" that of the oracle "Know thyself," and that of the words *Si ignoras te, egredere*. "By the Self one findeth manhood, by comprehension findeth immortality; great is the destruction if one hath not found Him here and now! *(ātmanā vindate vīryaṃ, vidyayā vindate'mṛtam . . . na ced ihā'vedīn mahati vinaṣṭiḥ,* JUB IV.19.4, 5)." "With himself he indwells the Self, who is a Comprehensor thereof" *(saṃviśaty ātmanātmānaṃ ya evarṃ veda,* VS XXXII.II). "What thou, Agni, art, that may I be!" (TS I.5.7.6).

Appendix 1: On Peace

> *"What is the best thing of all for a man, that he may ask from the gods?"*
> *"That he may be always at peace with himself"*
>
> *Contest of Homer and Hesiod,* 320.

Soma's "pacification" is his *quietus* as a Varuṇya principle. Cf. TS II.I.9.2, where by means of Mitra the priest "pacifies" *(śamayati)* Varuṇa, and thus frees the sacrificer from Varuṇa's noose; and TS v.5.10.5, where the dangerous deities might suck in *(dhyāyeyuḥ)* the sacrificer and he "appeases" *(śamayati)* them with the oblations. The ritual slayer is a *śamitṛ,* one who gives the quietus (RV v.43.4, ŚB III.8.3.4, etc.). In the same way, the sacrifice of the Christian victim is for atonement, to make peace with the angry Father. And while appeasement implies a satisfaction or gratification of the person appeased, it must never be overlooked that peace

(śānti) can never be made with an enemy; in one way or another he must be put to death as an enemy (although "it is his evil, not himself that they slay") before he can be made a friend of. So when the will is pacified *(upaśāmyate,* MU VI.34) it is "stilled," and when the psychophysical self is "conquered and pacified *(jita . . . praśāntaḥ,* BG VI.7)" by the Supreme Self, it has been sacrificed. Desire cannot survive the attainment of its object; only the "dead" who do not desire, because their desire is realized, are at peace, and hence the frequent association of the words *akāma* (without desire) and *āptakāma* (with desire attained), e.g., BU IV.3.21 and IV.4.6.

There is similarly in Lat. *pax* a sinister significance (well seen in the case of imperalistic wars of "pacification"); the connections of the word are with *pangere, paciscor,* and Skr. *pāśa,* "fetter," esp. of Death. Eng. dispatch (esp. in the sense to "kill") contains the same root; the victim's is a "happy dispatch" precisely because he is released or unleashed from the fetter or penalty imposed by the Law. A treaty of peace is a thing *imposed* (primary sense of *pangere)* on an enemy: it is only insofar as the enemy, presumed a rebel (the war being just and the victory that of right rather than might, as is assumed in all traditional ordeals including those of single or other combat), repents and willingly submits to the bonds into which he enters, that the "peace" is really an "agreement," the *śānti* a *samjñāna,* and that is why the "consent" of the sacrificial victim is always secured; cf. ŚB XIII.2.8.2, where that "they make it consent *(saṃjñāpayanti)* means that they kill the victim." In this case the "enemy" is really resurrected as a "friend"; or in other words, it is not himself but his evil that is "killed."

There is thus a kind of peace (which I have elsewhere called "internecine") that can be only too easily understood; but also another "that passeth all understanding." It is only the peace by agreement that is real and that can endure; and it is for this reason that Gandhi would rather see the English relinquish, i.e., sacrifice, their hold on India of their own free will than see them compelled to do so by force. The same applies to the holy war of the Spirit with the carnal soul; if there is to be "unity in the bond of peace" (Eph. 4:3), the soul must have "put *itself* to death," and not simply have been suppressed by *force majeure* of violent asceticism and penances. And similarly in the case of the "war of the sexes," which is only a special case of war of the Spirit with the Soul.

TS II.4.12, *yad aśiṣyata* = RV I.28.9, *ucchiṣṭam,* not the "dregs" of Soma, but what is "left" when the Soma has been extracted from the now dry twigs or husks. In this inexhaustible *ucchiṣṭam* (as in Vṛtra) all things are contained (AV XI.7), "everything is synthesized within it *(ucchiste . . . viśvam antaḥ samāhitam,* AV XI.7.1)"; "plenum is That (Brahma), plenum This (All), when plenum is out-turned *(udacyate)* from plenum, (e.g., This All from Vṛtra) plenum remains" *(avaśiṣyate,* BU V.5), ". . . yea, That may we know today whence This was poured out" *(uto tad adya vidhyāma yatas tat parisicyate,* AV X.8.29; Whitney's "that . . . whence that" for *tad ... yatas tat* betrays the literal and the logical sense). Brahma, in other words, is infinite *(anantaram),* the *brahma-yoni* inexhaustible.

Yad aśiṣyata = Śeṣa, i.e., Ananta, the World Serpent, the Swallower in whom all possibilities whatever are latent and from whom all possibilities of manifestation are extracted; and this endless *(ananta)* circle is precisely that of Midgardsworm *(Gylfiginning,* 46-48) [see *Edda Snorra Sturlusonar med Skáldatalt,* ed. Gudni Jónsson (Reykjavik, 1935)— ED.], that of "der Schlange, die sich in den eigenen Schwanz beisst, [und die] stelk den Äon dar" (Alfred Jeremias, *Der Antichrist in Geschichte und Gegenwart,* Leipzig, 1930, p. 5), that of Agni "footless and headless, hiding both his ends *(apād asīrṣā guhamāno antā)* when first born in the region's ground *(budhne rajasaḥ,* i.e., as Ahi Budhnya), from his womb *(asya yonau,* RV IV.I.II; cf. X.79.2, *guhā śiro nihitaṃ rdhag afṣī),"* Prajāpati "sightless, headless, recumbent *(apaśyam amukhaṃ śayānam,* JUB III.38)," Vṛtra-Kumāra "handles and footless *(ahastam . . . apādam,* RV X.30.8)." In the same way Brahma "was the one and only Endless *(eko'nantaḥ,* MU VI.17)," Brahma has no ends *(anto nāsti yad brahma,* TS vII.3.1.4), "footless he came into being erst *(apād agre samabhavat,* AV X.8.21),"[79] "as an Asura *(so'gre asurābhavat)*": he (Akṣara) is a "blind (-worm) and deaf (-adder) having no interval *(acakṣuṣkam a'srotram . . . anantaram,* BU III.8.8)"; "both blind and deaf, without hands or feet *(acakṣuḥśrotraṃ tad apāṇy apādaṃ . . . bhūtayonim,* Muṇḍ. Up. I.2.6)"; the "endless *(anantam)"* Chant is like a necklace "of which the ends come together *(samantam)"* a serpent constricting its coils *(bhogān samāhṛtya,* meaning also "assembling its enjoyments"), and the Year,[80] "endless" because its two ends, Winter

and Spring, are united *(saṃdhataḥ,* JUB I.35.7/1.). The Buddha is "footless *(apadam,* Dh 179)," like Māra (A IV.434, M I.180).

"What is the beginning, that is the end" (Keith), or rather "He who is the coming forth is also the returning *(yo hy eva prabhavaḥ sa evapyayaḥ, AĀ* III.2.6; cf. KU VI.II, Maṇd. Up. 6, and BG XVIII.16)." "His before and after are the same" *(yad asya pūrvam aparam tad asya,* AB 14131);. in other words, "He is fontal and inflowing" (Eckhart), his departure when we end is "the flight of the alone to the alone" (Plotinus). And accordingly "That" is what remains there *(atra pariśiṣyate)* when the body-dweller *(dehinaḥ,* not my "soul" but my Self) is untied and liberated from the body (KU V.4); what then remains over *(atisisyate)* is the immortal Self *(ātman,* CU vIII.1.4-5). As it is in and as this Self that the Comprehensor is reborn from the pyre, the "transcendent residue *(atiśeṣa)"* is the analogue there of the "residue *(śeṣa)"* that he leaves behind him *here* to inherit the character from which, as *brahmavit* and *brahmabhūta,* he has now been released from mortal manifestation to immortal essence without distinction of *apara* from *para brahma*. Therefore the Serpent *(nāga)* is the interpretation *(nirvacanam)* of the "religious whose issues have ceased *(khiṇāsava bhikkhu,* M I.142-45)": as is Brahma *akṣara*. "The last step to fare without feet"; "in me is no I and no we, I am naught, without head without feet" (Rūmi, *Divan,* pp. 137, 295). Thus "we are brought face to face with the astounding fact [less astounding, perhaps, in view of what has been said above] that Zeus, father of gods and men, is figured by his worshippers as a snake," and the correlative fact that "all over Greece the dead hero was worshipped in snake form and addressed by euphemistic titles akin to that of Meilichios" (Jane Harrison, *Prolegomena to the Study of the Greek Religion,* Cambridge, 1922, pp. 18, 20, 325 fl.). [81] God is the undying, or rather ever renascent Serpent, with whom every Solar Hero must do battle, and to whom in turn the Hero is assimilated when he tastes of the great antagonist's flesh and blood. We take this opportunity to call attention to the Story of King Karade in the "Alsatian Parzival," [82] a legend that recalls in more than one detail the Indian versions of the enmities of Indra and Vṛtra. In the Karade story, the sorcerer Elyafres, who himself performs the Green Knight's feat, allowing himself to be decapitated and later reappearing uninjured, is the Queen's lover and the natural father of the King's supposed son Karados. Elyafres has been decapitated by Karados, and when he reappears at the end of a year to return blow for blow, in place of any

physical blow he reveals to Karados his true paternity. Karados, however, takes the side of his legal father. The Queen then persuades Elyafres to create a serpent, to be the destroyer of Karados, just as Vṛtra is created to be Indra's mortal enemy, with the same result in both cases, the intended victor becoming either directly or indirectly itself the sufferer. The serpent winds itself about Karados' arm, and cannot be undone. Karados is only saved by his betrothed, Guingenier, and her brother; Guingenier exposes her breast to the serpent's gaze, and when it extends itself towards her, the brother cuts it to pieces. We shall not attempt to analyze the whole of this most interesting myth here, but point out that the sorcerer Elyafres corresponds to Tvaṣṭṛ, the Māyin; Karados to Indra, who is Tvaṣṭṛ's son and enemy as Karados is Elyafres'; the serpent to Ahi-Vṛtra; and that the motif of the coils corresponds to the event as related in TS V.4.5.4, where Vṛtra "ties up Indra in sixteen coils *(soḍaśabhir bhogair asināt)."* From these coils Indra can only be freed by Agni, who burns them. In the Indian mythology, Agni is Indra's brother; in the Karade story, it is not, indeed, the hero's brother, but it is his brother-in-law that destroys the serpent.

APPENDIX 3: NAKULA: Ὀφιομάχης

In AV VI.139.6, we find a love charm, "as the mongoose, having cut to pieces a snake, puts it together again, so do thou, herb of virility, put together again what of love was cut to pieces *(yathā nakulo vichidya saṃdadhāti ahim punaḥ, eva . . .)*." The mongoose is, indeed, a killer of snakes, an *ahihan,* but it has not been recorded by naturalists that it can put them together again. Perhaps we should have said, "as the Mongoose, having cut Ahi (-Vṛtra) to pieces, puts him together again." In order to solve this riddle, we shall go far afield before returning to it.

In Lev. 11:22, the word ḥ*argal,* one of four creatures presumed to be insects and permitted to be used as food, is rendered in the Revised Version by "beetle" and in the Septuagint by ὀφιομάχης, lit. "snake-fighter." Philo *(De opificio mundi* I.39) says that "this is an animal (ἑρπε- τόν)[83] having legs above its feet, with which it springs from the ground and lifts itself into the air like a grasshopper." This is a fair description of the behavior of a mongoose or ichneumon in the presence of a snake, and is also justified by the derivation of *ḥargal* from √ ḥ*arag,* to leap suddenly; that is what a mongoose does

when struck at by a snake, thus avoiding the blow; in any case the Hebrews did not eat beetles, but might eat quadrupeds "which have legs above their feet, to leap withal upon the earth" (Lev. 11:21), i.e., having legs long enough to do so, and there is nothing in the text of vv.21, 22 to show that all four of the creatures listed in v.22 must have been insects. However, we shall not say anything more about ḥ*argal,* as it is sufficient for our purpose that it is rendered in the Septuagint, which Philo follows, by ὀφιομάχης, and in the Vulgate by *ophiomachus*.

According to Hesychius, ὀφιομάχης is ἰχνεύμων, and also a kind of wingless locust. This ambiguity can be explained by the fact that there is an "ichneumon fly," a kind of wasp, doubtless so called because it lays its eggs in caterpillars and so kills them,[84] and hence might be called a "snake killer" if we bear in mind that snakes are traditionally "worms." But such wasps are neither edible nor wingless, and there can be no doubt that our ὀφιομάχης is an ichneumon, i.e., the Egyptian mongoose, *Herpes ichneumon,* an animal that "tracks" (as the word ἰχνεύμων implies)[85] crocodiles and eats their eggs, and also kills and eats snakes (as the word ὀφιομάχης implies). Plutarch, *Moralia* 380F, quite rightly says that the Egyptians "revered" (ἐτίμησαν) the ichneumon. For as Adolf Erman tells us, in an account of the divine animals of Egypt, "amongst these is the ichneumon rat into which Atum (the Sun god) changed himself when fighting against Apophis" *(Die Religion der Ägypter,* Berlin and Leipzig, 1934, p. 46), i.e., Apophis-Seth, the Egyptian Serpent or Dragon god, the constant enemy of the Sun, in a word the "Egyptian Vṛtra." Thus Daressy, discussing an inscription on the statue of the Pharoah "Zedher le Sauveur" (4th century B.C.), reads "lusāāt, the eye of Rā, became an animal of 46 cubits in order to combat Āpap in his fury . . . ," the text proceeding to say that he may be invoked in cases of snake poisoning *(Annales du Service des Antiquités de I'Egypte,* XVIII, 116,117). Sethe takes up the matter again in "Atum als Ichneumon" in *Aegyptische Sprache und Altertumskunde,* LXIII (1928), 50: "Re' changed himself into a *'d* animal of 46 ells, to slay the serpent Apophis as he raged." He further cites and illustrates a sculptured representation of the Egyptian mongoose, bearing the inscription "Atum, the guardian God of Heliopolis," and concludes that the ichneumon and the Sun god "share a common name *('nd)* because they are both victors in the dangerous battle with the snake." A more detailed account of "Das Ichneumon in der ägyptischen Religion und Kunst" is given by Gunther Roeder in *Egyptian Religion,* IV (1936): in

several statuettes of the erect type, the Sun and Uraeus are represented on the ichneumon's head.

Can we assume that the Indian mongoose *(nakula)* had also been a symbol and type of the solar Indra as Ahihan? We have no direct evidence for this, beyond the implications of AV VI.139.5 already cited. But there is rather cogent indirect evidence in the fact that the female mongoose *(nakulī),* equated with the tongue, was certainly a type of the feminine principle in the cosmos, namely, Vāc (Sarasvatī, Earth, etc.). In RV I.126.6, Svanaya (whom Indra has aided, probably the Sun) says that "She who is clasped and clipt, who like the she-mongoose *(kaśikā,* Sāyaṇa *nakulī)* conceals herself *(jaṇgahe),* she moistened gives me the hundred joys of rutting"; she, who in her reply calls herself Romaśā (hairy) and says that she is fleeced like a Gandharan ewe, is, according to Sāyaṇa, "Brhaspati's daughter." She must be, in fact, the "tongue" *(juhu,* i.e., Vāc), Bṛhaspati's wife in RV X.109.5 and the she-mongoose of AĀ III.2.5, "the mistress of all speech, shut in by the two lips, enclosed by the teeth *(oṣṭā apinaddhā nakulī dantaiḥ parivṛtā sarvasyai vāca īśānā),"* *apinaddhā* and *parivṛtā* corresponding to *āgadhitā* and *parigadhitā* in I.126.6 and explaining *jaṇgahe* (middle intensive from √ *gah,* "sich verstecken").[86] The point of all this is that *nakulī* being Vāc, etc., her masculine counterpart must have been thought of as *nakula,* the male mongoose, and may have been so spoken of in some lost text (as in the case of other pairs with corresponding names, such as Sūrya, Sūryā; Vaśa, Vaśī; Rukma, Rukmā; Mahiṣa, Mahiṣī, etc.). The "mongoose" (m.) would thus have been a type *(rūpa)* of Indrābṛhaspatī or of either Bṛhaspati or Indra as "snake-fighter." Bṛhaspati and Indra are preeminently sacrificers. And what is the essential in the Sacrifice? In the first place, to divide, and in the second to reunite. He being One, becomes or is made into Many, and being Many becomes again or is put together again as One. The breaking of bread is a division of Christ's body made in order that we may be "all builded together in him." God is One as He is in Himself, but Many as He is in His children (SB X.5.2.16). Prajāpati's "joints are unstrung" by the emanation of his children, and "he, whose joints were unstrung, could not put them together again *(sa visrastaiḥ parvabhiḥ na śaśāka saṃhātum,* ŚB I.6.3.36 = *prajāḥ . . . tābhyah punaḥ sambhavituṃ nāśaknoti,* TS V.5.2.1)";[87] the final purpose of the Sacrifice is to put him together again and it is this that is done in the Sacrifice by himself *(sa chandobhir ātmānaṃ samadadhāt,*[88] AĀ III.2.6, etc.) or by the gods or any

sacrificer, who reintegrate themselves with him at one and the same time (ŚB *passim)*. Prajāpati is, of course, the Year *(saṃvatsara, passim);* as such, his partition is the distinction of times from the principle of Time; his "joints *(parvāṇi)"* are the junctions of day and night, of the two halves of the month, and of the seasons (e.g., Winter and Spring, see Appendix 2 for the "united ends of the endless Year"), ŚB I.6.3.35, 36. In the same way Ahi-Vṛtra, whom Indra cuts up into "joints *(parvāṇi,* RV IV.19.3, VIII.6.13, VIII.7.23, etc.)" was originally "jointless" or "inarticulate[89] *(aparvaḥ,* RV IV.19.3)," i.e., "endless *(anantaḥ)."* In the same way, Indra divides Magha-Vala (RV III.34.10, TB II.6.13.1), i.e., Makha (the Sacrifice, PB vII.5.6, and *saumya,* cf. RV IX.20.7 *makho na . . . soma)* "whom so long as he was One the Many could not overcome" (TA V.I.3).

We have already seen that the Indian texts interpret the slaying of Ahi-Vṛtra metaphysically and identify Vṛtra with the aesthetic, passible, emotional "elemental self" that is seated in the "bowels." I cannot cite Egyptian texts to the same effect, but there can be no doubt that for the Egyptians the conflict of the Sun with Apophis-Seth was one of light against darkness, good against evil. For the Hebrews, the Serpent who persuaded the mother of all mankind to eat of the fruit of the tree is certainly the type of evil and the enemy above all others; while "the word *[nefeṣ = anima]* translated 'soul' so often in our English version meant ... for all Hebrews, the lower, physical nature, the appetites, the psyche of Paul. It was used also to express 'self,' but always with that lower meaning behind it" (D. B. Macdonald, *The Hebrew Philosophical Genius,* Princeton, 1934, p. 139, cf. p. 99) .[90] The serpent is explicitly this "soul" for Philo and Plutarch. Philo says that "the snake-fighter (ὀφιο- μάχης) is, I think, nothing but a symbolic representation of self-control (ἐγκράτεια), waging a fight that never ends and a truceless war against incontinence and pleasure. . . . For if serpentlike pleasure is a thing un-nourishing and injurious, sanity, the nature that is at war with pleasure, must be most nutritious and a saving power. . . . Therefore set up mind (γνώμη), the snake-fighter, against it, and contend to the last in this noblest contest" *(Legum allegoriae* I.39, 85, 86); and Plutarch that "Typhon (Seth) is that part of the soul which is passible and titanic (παθητι- κὸν καὶ τιτανικόν) irrational (ἄλογον) and forward, and of the bodily part the perishable, diseased and disordered, as is shown in abnormal seasons and temperatures, and by eclipses of the sun and disappearances of the moon, eruptions as it were and lawless acts on the part of Typhon . . .

whose name signifies 'restraint' or 'hindrance'" *(Moralia* 371 B.C.).[91] In Christianity, the "Serpent" is still the "Tempter."

The Indians *may* have thought that the mongoose not only bit to pieces the snake but also put it together again, somewhat as the weasel of folklore is supposed to revive its dead mate by means of a life-giving herb. It may be, and probably is, with an "herb of virility" that the mongoose of AV 139.6 puts the "snake" together again and so "heals *(bheṣajati)"* it as they "heal" the divided Year in ŚB I.6.3.35, 36; and we can even say that the Ahi identified with the "soul" (the "double-tongued" Aditi-Vāc of ŚB III.2.4.16) *is* the "mate" of the Nakula identified with the divine Eros who, assuredly, "puts together again whatever of love is divided." But bearing in mind that supernatural no more means unnatural than superessential means nonessential, we say that it is not as natural history but as myth that the acts of the mongoose are to be understood. The *nakula-ὀφιόμάχης* is a type or exemplum of the divine or human sacrificer; the snake "a symbol of magic healing."[92]

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[1] "Welfare to ye in crossing over to the farther shore of darkness!"

[2] "For the winning of both worlds," TS VI.6.4.1; "that 'life's best' that has been appointed by the gods to men for this time being and hereafter," Plato, *Timaeus* 90D.

[3] TS V.4.8.1, V.7.3.2, 3; ŚB V.4.I.16, VII.3.I.30, IX.3.2, etc.; MU VI.37, BG III.10 ff. The *vasor dhārā* is represented iconographically in the Cakravartin compositions at Jaggayapeta, cf. James Burgess, *Buddhist Stûpas of Amarâvatî and Jaggayapeta* (London 1887), pl. LV, fig. 3, etc.

[4] The *locus classicus* for the *viae, affimativa* and *remotionis,* is MU IV.6. These are also the *śaikṣa* and *aśaikṣa* paths, of those who are and are no longer under the law. Those who attempt to take the latter before the first has been followed to its end are certain to lose their way.

[5] Cf. TS VI.I.5.4, ŚB I.2.3.5 with Eggeling's note (SBE, Vol. 12, p. 49) and ŚB III.3.4.21.

[6] √*ric* is to "pour out" or "flood," and with *ati-,* to "overflow," the passive "to be emptied out over" having often the same value. A superabundance in the source and deficiency in the recipient are implied, hence *ūnātiriktau* = minus and plus, *pudendum muliebre et membrum virile* (cf. Caland on PB XIX.3.9). To be "spent, or emptied out, as it were" *(riricāna iva,* PB IV.10.1 and *passim*) follows emission: only "as it were," however, *in divinis,* because "the Single Season is never emptied out (*nātiricyate,* AV VIII.9.26)." In RV X.90.5, the sacrificial Person "is poured out over, i.e., overflows the Earth from East to West" *(atyaricyata paścād bhūmin atho puraḥ*); cf. JUB I.54.7, *atyaricyata,* and I.57.5, *ubhayato vāca atyaricyata*.

[7] *Qui enim voluerit animam suam salvam facere, perdet eam,* Mark 8:35.

[8] Just as also, in being initiated, the sacrificer had been made to pass through all the stages of insemination, embryonic development in the womb, and birth; see AB I.3, where we have *saretasam . . . kṛtvā* "having made him possessed of seed," the seed from which he will arise as a new man (cf. Eckhart's "He who sees *me,* sees *my child*").

[9] The Kuṣāna coins, notably Kaniṣka's, on which the king is shown standing left with his right hand over a small altar, are probably representations of this ritual action, and as much as to say that the king has performed the Rājasūya sacrifice and is, if not a god, in any case a ruler by divine sanction.

[10] Sexual intercourse, ritually understood, is a kind of Soma sacrifice (BU VI.2.13, VI.4.3). The household Fire is identified with the wife, of whom one is born again here; the sacrificial Fire is the divine womb into which one pours (*siñcati)* himself, and from which a solar rebirth ensues. The Comprehensor of this doctrine, making the Burnt Offering (*agnihotra*), has therefore two selves, two inheritances, human and divine; but one who offers, not understanding, has but one self, one inheritance, viz. the human (JUB I.17.18). "That which is born of the flesh is flesh; and that which is born of the Spirit is spirit" (John 3:6). With the sowing of one self as seed into

the Fire and the quickening of this seed by the Breath, cf. Rom. 6:4 ff.: “We are buried with him [Christ] by baptism unto death . . . planted together . . . our old man is crucified with him, that the body of sin might be destroyed. For he that is ‘dead’ is freed from sin. Now if we be dead with Christ we believe that we shall also live with him.”

11 At the full moon offering there are references to the slaying of Vṛtra (the moon, ŚB I.6.4.18), “because Indra smote Vṛtra with the full moon offering. In that they have references to waxing at the new moon offering, it is because then the moon passes away (*kṣapaṃ . . . gacchati*) and verily thus does he cause it to grow and wax” (KB III.5).

12 Sun and Moon, Breath and Substance, are a progenitive pair (Praśna Up. I.4.5, cf. Plutarch, *Moralia* 368D). Their marriage is probably implied in RV LXXXV.18, 19 (cf. A. A. Macdonell and A. B. Keith, *Vedic Index of Names and Subjects,* London, 1912, S.V. *candra),* and by the word *amāvāsya* itself. For comparative material cf. Ernest Siecke, *Die Uebesgeschichte des Himmels,* Strasbourg, 1892. Love and Death are one person. There are inseparable connections between initiation, marriage, and death, and alimentary assimilation; the word “marriage” itself seems to contain *mer* (Skr. *mr* to die, cf. *maryaḥ,* marriageable youth); and very many of the words used in our texts with respect to the unification of the many in the one imply both death and marriage, e.g., *api-i, eko bhū, sambhū, saṃgam, samdhā*; cf. τελέω to be perfected, be married, die.

13 Cf. Coomaraswamy, “Two Passages in Dante’s *Paradiso*" and “The Rape of a Nāgī” [both in *Coomaraswamy 2*].

[From another point of view, the coition *(samāgamana) of* the Sun (Mitra) and Moon (Varuṇa) on the night of their dwelling together (*amāvāsya*), called a marriage of the full and waning moons, the (full) moon being identified with Varuṇa and the waning moon identified with Mitra (see ŚB II.4.4.17-19): precisely because the waning moon is assimilated by the Sun, and that which is eaten is called by the name of the eater (ŚB X.6.2.1, with specific reference to the Sun and Moon). This is the same thing as the solar Indra’s swallowing up the lunar Vṛtra on “the night of dwelling together” (cf. KB III.5); Vṛtra is therefore to be seen as Indra’s wife—“Potentiality

hath gotten feet (i.e., shed her ophidian nature) and as a wife *jāyā* with her Lord" (RV x.85.29). In erotic parlance, to be "slain" and to be *in gloria* are one and the same thing. Now we see just what it is that the "hero" failed to do in the story of the Lady of the Land in The Earthly Paradise. And we see again that marriage is an assimilation of hostile principles, and that to be assimilated is to die. It is precisely in all these senses that the soul (which must as Eckhart says, "put itself to death") is to be thought of as the Bride of Christ. Can we wonder that Vincent of Beauvais spoke of Christ's *ferocitas?*]

[14] For the inauspiciousness of Varuṇa's uncultivated barley ("wild oats") cf. KB v.3 (those who eat of it are Varuṇa's prisoners); RV vii.18.5-10 (the *yavasa of* the unherded kine), and *per contra* the Aryan barley that the liberated kine enjoy, x.27.8.

The agricultural symbolism survives in our word "culture." The rocky ground of the soul must be opened up if it is to yield fruit; and this is a matter of spadework and sweat. Cf. Philo, *Legum allegoriae,* I.48 (on Gen. 2:4, 5), Mind as the laborer in the field of sense perception.

[15] Analogous to the mock man (*kimpuruṣa, anaddha-puruṣa)* made "in the place of a man" (Sāyaṇa, *puruṣasthāne)*, and no doubt in human form, to represent the chthonic *(purīṣya)* Agni (ŚB vi.3.1.24, 3.3.4, 4.4.14) and "heaped up for to be the sacrificial essence, to be food" *(ciyamāna . . . medhāyety annāyeti,* ŚB vii.5.2.32). The untamed soul is indeed a *kimpuruṣa,* a mockery of the real Man.

[16] The shape of the sacrificial cake may depend on the context. In ŚB iii.8.3.1, the *purodāsa* is certainly a round cake, representing a man's head, or rather face, and the Sun's disk; seven other cakes, representing the "seven breaths" (ears, eyes, nostrils, and mouth) are arranged about it to complete it. As these "breaths" are also "glories" *(śriyah),* this is made the basis of the hermeneutic etymology of "head" (*śiras*). Cf. Philo, *De opificio mundi,* I.29 (κεφαλή . . . ἑπτά χρῆται, δυσὶν ὀφθαλμοῖς, etc.) and I.33 (πρόσωπον, ἔνθα τῶν αἰσθήσεων ὁ τόπος, etc.) cf. I.51 (ἐν προσώπῳ τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἐδημούργει). Philo says that the divine power is infused "by means of the median breath" (διὰ τοῦ μέσου πνεύματος); this median

breath is precisely the *madhyamah prānaḥ* and *madhye vāmana* of the Āraṇyakas and Upaniṣads.

[17] On the "living food" of the gods, cf. Coomaraswamy, "The Sun-kiss," 1941, p. 55, n. 26.

[18] It may be noted that *lokyam* in AB II.9 is *not* "the people's" (Keith), but "conducive to the sacrificer's world," i.e., the "world" *(lokaḥ) of* ŚB X.5.2.12, X.5.4.16; KB VIII.3; BU I.4.15, 1.5.17; MU VI.24, etc., i.e., the world of the Self, world of the gods, Brahmaloka, heaven.

Popular agricultural rites are no more, generally speaking, of popular origin than are the narrative forms of folklore. It is a mistake to suppose that scripture ever makes use of "old folklore ideas pressed into its service" (Keith, AĀ, p. 251, n. 5). On the contrary, as Professor Mircea Eliade has very justly observed, "La mémoire collective conserve . . . des symboles archaïques d'essence purement metaphysique. ... La mémoire populaire conserve surtout les symboles qui se rapportent à des 'theories' même si ces théories ne sont plus comprises" ("Les Livres populaires dans la littérature roumaine," in *Zalmoxis,* 11, 1939, p. 78). Cf. Coomaraswamy, "Primitive Mentality" [in *Coomaraswamy* 1].

[19] See Appendix 1.

[20] It is the general rule that the Ādityas have been originally Serpents, and have vanquished Death by the sloughing of their inveterated skins (PB XXV.14.4). Cf. the procession (*udāsarpaṇī*) of the *sarparṣir mantrakṛtah . . . āśiviṣaḥ* Arbuda in AB VI.I; it is curious that just as Soma is strangled with a turban (*uṣnīṣa*), ŚB III.2.18, so Arbuda (whose glance is baleful) is blindfolded with a turban in AB. On Soma's "prancing" or "playing" (*krīḍā*) cf. Coomaraswamy, "Līlā," 1941 [in *Coomaraswamy* 2].

[21] As Brhaspati "eats" *(ādat)* Vala, RV X.68.6. Cf. n. 72.

[22] When Indra casts his bolt "at the evil hateful foe" (*pāpmane dviṣate bhrātrvyāya),* it is "Vṛtra the Evil One" (*vṛtram pāpmānam*) that he smites (ŚB IV.3.3.5): "brotherhood" expressing "enemy" because the Asuras are

the “elder brothers” of the Devas *(jyeṣṭha,* “elder,” from √*jya,* to “oppress.” We have argued elsewhere *(Spiritual Authority and Temporal Power in the Indian Theory of Government,* 1942, n. 22) that throughout the sacrificial texts the “Enemy” is primarily Vṛtra, Pāpman, Mṛtyu (Buddhist Māra, Pāpivant), and that any application of the formulae to other and human enemies is always secondary; that it is only when the King has overcome his own Devil that he is empowered to overcome other devilish rebels. Keith is clearly right in saying that a magical application of the rites is foreign to the *Ṛg Veda,* but as certainly wrong in saying that “the sacrifice in the Brāhmaṇas is a piece of magic pure and simple” *(Religion and Philosophy of the Veda and Upanishads,* London, 1925, p. 454).

[23] The breaths or powers of the soul are so many “selves” or “persons” (the seeing man, the hearing man, etc.), but act unanimously as the man himself, for or against his real Self, the Breath, their Head and Leader (AĀ II.3.5,6, m.2.1; JUB IV.7.4; CU VIII.12.4 ff.; Kauṣ. Up. III.2,8, IV.2D), sóurce and last end.

[24] Not as Keith renders it (against the Commentary) *“by* Agni and Soma,” but *for* them because they are in Vṛtra, from whom they can escape only when Indra makes him yawn (TS II.5.2.3, 4), only when “Indra forced the Engulfer to disgorge, compelled the panting Dānava” *(jigartim indro apajagurāṇaḥ prati śvasantam dānavam han,* RV V.29.4; cf. VIII.21.11, ś*vasantam,* and note *śvas, śus,* in “Šuṣṇa”). Vṛtra is the Sacrifice; it is in the same way that Indra and Agni are brought forth from the Person, the Sacrifice, in RV X.90.13, and that “as from a fire laid with damp fuel ... so from this great being *(bhūta,* viz. ā*tman)* were the Vedas, worlds and all things breathed forth” *(niśvasitam,* BU IV.5.11, MU VI.32; cf. JUB I.47.3, “The All, that is his breathing forth”). Beyond all question the “Great Being” from whom all these things are breathed out is the Vṛtra from whose mouth (when Indra made him yawn) “went forth all gods, all sciences, all glory, all food, all weal,” leaving him drained (ŚB I.6.3.15.16); just as Śeṣa *(yad aśisyata,* see Appendix 2) = Ātman, so here also Ātman. Mahābhūta = Vṛtra. For just as “Him being One they call by many names” (RV I.164.46, etc.), so the one Urmythos *(bhāvavrtta,* Genesis) has been told and retold in many ways, and that not only in India, but all over the world where *“in den*

verschiedenen Kulturen findet man die Dialekte der einen Geistessprache" (Alfred Jeremias, *Altorientalische Geisteskultur,* Berlin, 1929, foreword).

[25] Cf. Lev. 1:4.

[26] "That the body of sin might be destroyed," Rom. 6:6.

[27] *Yad aśiṣyata = śeṣa,* see Appendix 2.

[28] Cf. RV IX.17.1, *pra nimnena,* Sāyana *pravaṇena*.

[29] "The initiate enters the jaws of Agnīṣomau; in that on the fast day he offers a victim to them, this is a redemption of himself" (KB X.3). Similarly, ŚB III.3.4.21 and III.6.3.19, where "the initiated is the oblation offered to the gods" *(havir vā'eṣa devānām bhavati),* i.e., their food, and must redeem himself from Soma, that is to say from Varuṇa's noose *(ibid.,* 20) or curse (III.3.2.2), for Soma was Varuṇya—in other words, from the jaws of Death into which the sacrificer would be swallowed up at every stage of the sacrifice if he did not in one way or another redeem himself. The Soma sacrifice is a "mysterious rite" *(gambhiram adhvaram,* ŚB III.9.4.5 *adhvara,* lit. "not-a-slaying," "no doubt referring to the nature of the sacrifice, in which the victim is slain but revivified, and the sacrificer would die were he not redeemed). "Such, indeed, are the forests and ravines of the sacrifice *(yajñāranyāni yajña-kṣātrāni* [? for k*hātrānī])* . . . and if any enter into them ignorantly, then hunger and thirst, ill-doers and devils harass them . . but if Comprehensors enter into them, they pass on from one task to another, as from one stream to another, from one refuge to another, and obtain well-being, the world of heaven" (ŚB XII.2.3.12); "dangerous are the ways between heaven and earth" (ŚB II.3.4.37); "the sacrifice is razor-edged, and swiftly he (who sacrifices) becometh holy or he perishes" *(punyo vā bhavati pra vā mīyate,* TS II.5.5.6).

[30]The "other senses" (sight, hearing, etc.) identified with the *giri* of Brahma are extensions or sendings *(prahitāh,* AĀ II.I.5 = *hitāḥ,* Upaniṣads *passim, guhāśayā nihitāh* in Muṇḍ. Up. II.I.8, *prativihitāḥ* in Kauṣ. Up. III.5, and as the *iṣṭāni of* the Ṛṣis are *vihitāni,* RV I.164.15, and the Maruts *hitāh* in I.166.3) of the central Breath *(prānah)* or Spirit *(ātman)* from which they originate

and to which they return. Hence his name of "Gṛtsamada": *gṛtsa,* "greedy," because as *prāṇah* he breathes in, and as *madaḥ,* "pleasure," he breathes out these powers (AĀ II.2.1). That is, God is swallowed up in us when he proceeds, and we in him when he recedes.

[31] "The Sun's body is seen by everyone, its soul by no one. And the same is true of the soul of any other body . . . embracing all the senses of the body, but only knowable by the mind. . . . Soul (as charioteer) drives the Sun about . . . (and) moves us about in all ways," Plato, *Laws* 898D-899A; cf. AV X.8.14, "Him all see with the eye, not all know with the mind"; and for the "chariot" (bodily vehicle), MU II.6, etc.

[32] *Tya* is not "yonder" (Hume); it is the manifested God, the visible Sun that is "yonder"; *tya,* as the following verses show, refers to the transcendent principle that is invisibly in the Sun and within you. Cf. *tyasya = mama* in BU I.3.24.

[33] Cf. Plato's "cave," and the "cavernous" quality of early traditional architecture, floor, space, and roof corresponding to earth, air, and sky equally in a cavern and in a chamber; cf. *guhā,* "cave," "hiding place," and "hut." Brahma is indeed *guhyam* (KU V.6), the spirit *nihito guhāyam* (KU II.20), "hidden" in us, as a "cave-dweller."

That God is "buried" in us underlies the Vedic metaphor of digging for hidden treasure, and that of mining in MU VI.29. The powers of the soul (τῆς ψυχῆς δυνάμεις, which Hermes calls δαίμονες,*Lib*. XVI.14 ft.) are "elementals" *(bhūtāh),* and their concern is with the "elements" *(bhūtāni)* or "ores" *(dhātavah)*. *Bhūtāh,* "beings," are likewise elves, sprites (spirits), fairies, or dwarfs, who may be either good or evil; it is not without reason that these beings, the Sidhe for example, are so often thought of as living in "fairy mounds"—or when the "little people" are thought of as dwarfs or gnomes, then in mountains. The head and leader of these psychic *Bergleute,* thought of as dwarfs, is himself the immanent Dwarf, Vāmadeva, Vāmana, the "Dwarf enthroned in the midst whom all the gods serve *(madhye vāmanam āsīnam viśve devā upāsate,* KU V.3); the "gods," in accordance with Sankara's inevitable explanation, being the powers of the soul ("vision, etc.," i.e., the "breaths"), bringing tribute *(balim upaharantaḥ)* to their head,

the “Other One” of verse 5, who is beyond all question the median “Breath,” as is explicit in AĀ II.2.1. Thus the dwarfs and gnomes of the European tradition, digging for treasure in the mountains, are the projected images and trace in folklore of our own elemental powers. In one of our best known *Märchen,* the formulation is very precise: it is the natural function of the “seven dwarfs” to serve and protect Snow White, who is herself Psyche; Snow White is poisoned by the “fruit of the tree,” and that this is the tree of good and evil is clear from the fact that the apple is parti-poisonous and parti-wholesome (the fruit of the tree is wholesome for those who eat to live, but deadly for those who live to eat; cf. ŚB II.4.2.1-6). Of themselves the dwarfs can protect but cannot heal her; this is done by the solar hero, a “Prince Charming” (i.e., in the full sense of the word, “enchanting”: the solar Hero is the master of enchantment—blessed are those whom this magician enchants), and it is only when the tasted apple falls from her lips that she awakens from her deadly sleep.

In an alternative symbolism, the cave becomes a laboratory and the workers alchemists seeking for the philosopher’s stone; or a smithy in which ores are refined and beaten into shape—“as a goldsmith taking a piece of gold draws out of it *(tanute,* √ *tan,* also to sacrifice and to propagate) another, newer and fairer form, so the Spirit . . .” (BU IV.4.4).

[34]In this context *adrau* is, like the other words *hṛtsu,* etc., a locative of place *in:* in TS VI.I.II, where the text is cited, Keith renders rightly “in the hill.” In the same way Soma is “shut up in the rock” *(aśnāpinaddham,* RV X.68.8); and in JUB IV.5.2, *aśnasu somo rājā* is rendered rightly by Oertel “in the stones King Soma.” In ŚB III.4.3.13 and III.9.4.2, we are reminded that “Soma was Vṛtra” (= Ahi, described in RV I.32.2 as “having his lair in the mountain,” *parvate śiśrayānam,* i.e., in a cave; one recalls that dragons always live in caves, and not on mountaintops), and we are told that “Soma’s body (‘body’ is that *in* which the subject lives) was the mountains and the rocks *(tasyaitacchañram yad giriyo yad aśmānas),* thence is born that plant called ‘Uśānā’ *(tad eṣośānā nāmauṣad hir jāyate),* . . . which they collect thence and press” *(tām etad āhṛtyāhhiṣuṇvanti)*. We naturally think of plants as growing on mountains, and so they do; but things are *born* from what *contained* them, plants are *in* the earth before they spring up. Sāyaṇa’s commentary, moreover, makes it clear that by “mountains” are to be

understood "beings" *(soma-śarīra-bhūtesu . . . atas tām eva girāv utpannām . . . abhiṣuṇvanti)*, i.e., the Soma = *bhūtātman,* as in MU VI.10, cited below; and that the plant that is actually collected is "not really Soma" *(na sākṣāt somam),* but only ritually made to be Soma. Thus Vṛtra (= Vala) is the rock that Indra smites and from which Indra (or Brhaspati or both) releases cattle, streams, and all those things that had been covered up and hidden away *(vṛtam = verbergt, verhüllt,* "hilled") in the beginning.

Not only then is *giri* (mountain) to be connected with *gir* to "swallow" (not *gir* to "sing"), but there can be no doubt that Indian hermeneutists connected *aśman* (and doubtless *aśna)* with *as,* to "eat"; e.g., Mahidhara glosses VS XVII.i *aśman* by *aśnātīty, aśma; he aśman, sarvabhaksaka agne*. In AV XVIII.4.54 *aśmānnānam adhipatyam jiyāma,* Whitney renders *aśman* by "stone" but Böhtlingk and Roth by *"Esser."* The hermeneutist might in the same way derive *adri* from *ad,* to "eat." I by no means assert that all these hermeneia are etymologically valid; what they nevertheless point to is that early man (the troglodyte) thought of a mountain as a place to live not *on,* but *in,* and as a depository of treasure—a manner of thinking that survives in the concept of the "house" which is not that of a solid mass but that of a "dome" *(dama)* in which things are housed and hidden, and in which, indeed, the owner himself is "swallowed" up when he enters its doorway *(mukham = ostium),* disappearing when he "goes home" *(astam gacchati)* and reappearing when he comes out of doors *(prādur bhavati)*. We are such "houses."

35 As the powers of the soul are "drunk in" *(āpītāḥ)* in ŚB X.5.2.12, when they "enter into" *(apiyanti,* Kauṣ. Up. III.3, etc.) the Breath in "sleep," in *samādhi,* or at death.

The roots *apī* (go in to), *āpi* (drink in), *āp* (possess), ā*pyai* (swell) must be very carefully distinguished in all texts having to do with the procession and recession of the powers of the soul; in AV X.8.5, Whitney's Index is certainly wrong in reading ā*pitvam,* Lanmann right in reading *apitvam*.

[36] The breaths or "sense powers" are "fires." Cf. Coomaraswamy, "Measures of Fire" [in *Coomaraswamy* 2].

[37] As in ŚB x.5.2, where the ἱερός γάμος of Indra and Indrāṇī is consummated in the heart. Indrāṇī (Psyche) is the sum of the *indriyāni,* as Śacī is the person of Indra's ś*acīh,* Śri the person of many ś*riyah,* and in Buddhist contexts Sudhammā = *sudhammā, cf.* Victoria, properly n. pl. of *victor,* but as a person f.

[38] In this whole context (BU IV.4.1-7), it is especially important to bear in mind that He who is the only seer, only hearer, only thinker, only comprehensor in us (BU III.7.23), He who wanders from womb to womb (AV X.8.13), the charioteer who sets us agoing (MU II.6, etc.), is by the same token the only transmigrant; as Śaṇkara puts it, "Of a truth, the Lord is the only transmigrant" *(satyam, ne'svarād anyaḥ saṃsārin,* BrSBh I.I.5). Neither in the Brahmanical nor in the Pāli Buddhist texts can any doctrine of the "reincarnation" of an individual be found, except in the sense that a man is reborn in his children.

[39] "The spirit *(akh)* is for heaven, the body (khet) for the earth" (K. H. Sethe, "Saqqarah Pyramid Texts," in Margaret A. Murray, *Saqqara Mastabas,* London, 1905, 474): to become this *akh,* or *ka,* at death, is to become a God, an Immortal (A. Moret, *The Nile and Egyptian Civilization,* London, 1927, pp. 169, 182, 183).

[40]Cf. the answers in CU III.14.4, Kauṣ. Up. II.14, and Praśna Up. IV.7, and cf. AV X.8.44. The resurrection is the "birth out of doubt" of ŚB II.2.4.9, and accordingly to faith, JUB III.11.7.

[41] See n. 18, first paragraph.

[42]AV X.7.39, *yasmai devāḥ sadā baliṃ haranti;* X.8.15, *mahadyakṣaṃ* (Brahma) . . . *tasmai baliṃ rāṣṭrabhṛto bharanti;* XI.4.19, *prajā imā balim harān;* Kauṣ. Up. II. 1, *ayācamānāya* (without his asking) *balim haranti;* JUB IV.23.7, *balim hareyuh;* MU VI. 18, *pratyāhāra* (= later *devāhāra, amṛta),* as in BG II.58, *yadā saṃharati indriyānindriyārthebhyah.*

In the same way, ritually, *bali* offerings are made at Yakṣa shrines, and politically subjects offer tribute.

If the king "plunders" his subjects' cattle *(pecunia!)* it is because what seems to be theirs is really his; just as God plunders us, all of whose great possessions are borrowed from Him (PB XXI.1.1). Therefore "Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's and unto God the things that are God's." It is for Caesar as for God to redistribute the "food." The reciprocal relations of the powers of the soul to the Spirit in the individual microcosm and the circulation of money *(pecunia!)* in the political microcosm correspond to that of the "shower of wealth" *(vasor dharā)* in the macrocosm. It is not by demanding tribute and service, but by failing to expend his revenues for his people's good, that a king becomes ungodly, a Vṛtra rather than an Indra.

[43]Vasiṣṭha, the primal Brahman of RV VII.33.11, is regularly Agni; who "abides in beings as speech *(vāc)* in the speaker" (AV II.I.4) and is *in divinis* what speech is in us, just as the Sun is *in divinis* what the power of vision is in us *(passim)*. Hence she is Vasiṣṭhā to him as Vasiṣṭha. These traditional correspondences underlie the connection between the tongues of fire and the speaking with tongues in Acts 2:3; see Coomaraswamy, "Līlā [in Coomaraswamy 2]." *wamy* 2].

[44] Hence the necessity for a purgation, katharsis, ś*uddha karaṇa,* of the mind *(manas, kratu, νοῦς)* in order to eliminate these waste products.

[45] To have extinguished the fire of life by withholding its fuel becomes a common Buddhist metaphor. In this broader sense, fasting and continence mean far more than mere abstention from concrete foods or sexual acts.

[46]For *citta-vṛtti* I believe that "emotions" is a more accurate rendering than is Woods' "fluctuations." Note that *vṛtti* assimilates the *aśuddham kāmasarnparkaṃ manas* (MU VI.34) to the Vṛtra of ŚB I.6.3.9, so called because he was "on the move" *(avartayat)*.

[47] Cf. AĀ II.I.3, k*arma kṛtam ayaṃ puruṣo brahmaṇo, lokaḥ,* "this Person is what he does, he is the Brahma-world"; BU IV.4.5, *yathākārī yathā cārī tathā bhavati . . . sa yathākāmo bhavati . . . tad abhisampadyate,* "As he (this Person) acts, as he conducts himself, so he becomes; what he wants . . . that he attains"; Plato, *Laws* 904c, "Such as are the trend of our desires

and the nature of our souls, just such each of us becomes"; and similarly for Hermes, whose δαίμονες are the innate tendencies or powers and the nature or "fate" of the soul, "the being of a daimon consists in his working" (δαίμονος γὰρ οὐσία ἐνέργεια, *Lib*. XVI.14); a man cannot be and yet be doing nothing, God himself *is* what he does *(Lib*. XI.2.12b, 13a). At the same time, the *act* of being is one of self-knowledge (BU I.4.10); and so "to know and to be are the same" (τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ νοεῖν ἐστίν τε καὶ εἶναι, Hermann Diels, *Fragmente der Vorsokratiker,* Berlin, 1903, 18B5).

[48] Cf. Muṇḍ. Up. I.2.3. The supposed opposition of the Upaniṣads to the observance of rites is largely a figment of the imagination; and similarly in Buddhism, where the Buddha says that so long as the Vajjians observe their ancient customs "and honor *(sakkaronti,* lit. 'verify'), esteem *(garukaronti,* lit. 'treat as weighty'), respect *(mānenti)* and serve *(pūjenti)* the Vajjian (Yakkha-) shrines within or without the city, and do not withhold the tribute *(balim no parihāpenti)* formerly given and duly rendered, ... so long may they be expected not to decline, but to prosper" (D II.75).

It is only for those already liberated and already in a "state of grace" that observances are unnecessary, though they may still remain convenient. What is always necessary to liberation is to understand and be fully aware of what one is doing.

"All rites are *rites de passage*. . . . Rite opens the portals through which none may pass but the dead. ... At each of the crises which usher in the successive phases of great lives, the vital tide rises and falls, first at its ebb in the mystical *(sic)* state of ritual death, then at the moment of annihilation, suddenly at flood, inflowing miraculously to a higher level of life" (Andrew Rugg Gunn, *Osiris and Odin,* London, 1940, pp. 152, 153). For, as Meister Eckhart has said, "He who would be what he ought to be must stop being what he is."

"He is a truly poor man *(sannyasi),* he is a harnessed man *(yogi)* who does what ought to be done *(kāryam karma karoti),* regardless of consequences; not such is one who kindles no sacred fire and performs no rites" (BG via).

[49] See further above and Appendix 1.

[50] "Seat" or "womb," as in MU VI.34.1,2, cited above; and "lair" *(āśaya),* hardly to be distinguished from "womb" (cf. Pāli *abbuda = arbuda,* as "foetus"), that in which the sense powers are *guhāśaya nihitāḥ,* Muṇḍ. Up. II.I.8. It is inasmuch as Varuṇa "lies" *(āśaye)* in them that Varuṇa, like Agni who makes them his seat, knows all the births of the gods, i.e., their births as the powers of the soul and all their workings (RV VIII.41.7). In RV I.32.7, that dissevered Vṛtra lair is in many places *(purutrā vṛtro aśayad vyāṣṭahj* suggests the Agni of III.55.4 *(vibhṛtaḥ purutra śaye)*: cf. "I am the Spirit, my station in the lair *(aśaya)* of all beings. . . . Ananta am I of snakes" (BG X.20, 29). The cavern *(guhā)* from which the streams and all other living principles are released can be equated with the "bellies of the mountains" in RV I.32.1 and I.54.10. Cf. Isa. 51:1, "Look unto the rock whence ye are hewn, and to the hole of the pit whence ye are digged."

The "Person in the right eye" is regularly equated with "the Person in the Sun," of whom it is said that "He who is yonder, yonder Person in the Sun, I myself am he" (MU VI.35). It is only to my real Self, this "inward Person" *(antah puruṣa),* that the words "That art thou" can be applied; not to "this man" who still knows in the worldly sense who he is, by name and family descent.

[51] Cf. JUB III.11.3, *yad dikṣate . . . dakṣiṇām abhijāyate*. Any reception of material gifts by Brāhmans participating in a sacrificial session *(sattra)* is condemned in the strongest possible terms (TS VII.2.10.2). Guerdons *(dakṣiṇā)* may and ought to be given only when the priests are sacrificing on behalf of others than themselves (ŚB IV.3.4.5), just as a Christian priest saying a Mass on another's behalf properly receives a fee.

[52] All this corresponds to the removal of the *annamaya* and other "sheaths" *(koṣa)* of Brahma, to the "shaking off of bodies" (JUB I.15.5, III.30.2, etc.), essential because "no one becomes immortal with the body" (ŚB X.4.3.9). It is symbolized also in the Vaiṣṇava *vastra-haraṇa*. Love reminds us that "across my threshold naked all must pass." This is Philo's "noble nudity" (ἀρίστη γύμνωσις, *Legum allegoriae* I.77).

[53] Cf. RV I.142.11, *devān yakṣi, vanaspate*.

[54] This is my own reading of the text, avoiding all emendation.

[55] As in MU VI.19, BG II.58, IV.27, etc. and in all contemplative practice leading to synthesis *(samādhi)*. Cf. Psalms 51:16, 17, "Thou delightest not in burnt offering. The sacrifices of God are a broken spirit."

[56] "All these deities are in me" (JUB I.14.2); "they make their home in me" (ŚB II.3.2.3); they are neither in heaven nor on earth, but in breathing creatures, i.e., living beings *(prāṇinaḥ,* VS XVII.14). Strictly speaking, Prajāpati's children (his "breath forms" as Sāyaṇa calls them, cf. BU I.5.21 where it is after him Prajāpati, the Breath, and as his forms, *rūpāṇi,* that the powers of the soul are called "breaths") are gods and titans, competing in these worlds for possession of them; the sense organs of speech, scent, hearing, vision, and thought sang for the gods all fruition *(bhogān)* and for themselves whatever was beautiful *(kalyāṇam),* until the titans infected them with evil—that is, whatever is done by any of them informally *(apratirūpam)*. Only the Breath remained immune to this infection, and he translates *(atyavahat)* the senses, striking off their evil, their mortality, so that each becomes its macrocosmic equivalent, speech becoming Agni, smell Vāyu, vision the Sun, hearing the Quarters of heaven, mind the Moon. The Breath then shares out the nourishment that it sings for itself (the Breath is the organ-blower, the breaths the Maruts that move in the bodily organ-"pipes, *nāḍyaḥ"* into which they have been "put, *hitāḥ"),* playing the part of host to the breaths that take up their places round about him as a regiment of the "King's Own *(svāḥ)"* that at the same time forms his bodyguard and is fed by him. The Breath is identified with (Agni-) Bṛhaspati-Brahmaṇaspati, i.e., the Spiritual Power in which the Temporal Power inheres (BU I.3, cf. JUB II.8). It is in this sense that the gods were originally mortal (TS VII.4.2.1, ŚB II.2.2.8, etc.), and only by Agni's counsels, or by the sacrifice, or by making the *brahma* their own, attained their present dignity *(arahatta),* immortality *(amṛtatva),* and victory *(jiti)*, RV VI.7.4, X.63.4, ŚB III.4.3.15, XI.2.3.6, etc.

[57] That is to say that when the sacrificer, in whom these powers are immanent, ceasing to use them for improper *(apratirūpa)* ends, i.e., the pursuit of pleasure, returns himself with the immanent deities to their source, then "he" becomes an immortal. It is not his personality but his

Person that then survives after death, when "we who, in our junction with our bodies are mixtures and have qualities, shall not exist, but shall be brought into the rebirth, by which, becoming joined to incorporeal things, [we] shall become unmixed and without qualities" (Philo, *De cherubim,* 113 ff.). The TS passage sums up in a few words the whole thesis of "self-sacrifice," i.e., the sacrifice of oneself by oneself to one's Self, "this selfs immortal Self" (MU III.2). Whoever will not make this sacrifice is "damned": "Whosoever hath not [possessed his Self], from him shall be taken away even that [self] he hath," Matt. 13:12.

[58] The symbol of the chariot is employed by Plato and the Platonists in exactly the same way. To exhibit the collation in full would require a separate article, but we may point out that the notion of a *yoking* of the senses is conspicuous in Hermes, *Asclepius* I.5 ff.

[59] An explicit warning that the Elixir of Life is not a physical medicine of any kind; it is no more than the *fons vitae* to be found outside ourselves. Cf. AB II.14, ". . . the Soma oblation is one of ambrosia. These oblations are incorporeal (i.e., invisible and intangible); it is with those oblations that are incorporeal that the sacrificer wins immortality."

[60]Cf. AB vII.12, where if anything passes between the sacrificer and his ritual fires he may ignore it, because his fires "have been set up within himself *(ātmany asya hitā bhavanti)*"

[61] For *satyam (ṛtam)* and *anṛtam* our words "truth" and "untruth" have a too definitely ethical and empirical significance to be entirely adequate; just as our word "sin" is too ethical to represent what is implied by Sanskrit and Greek terms meaning "incorrect," or more literally, "missing the mark." Properly speaking, "sin," as defined by St. Thomas Aquinas, is *"any* departure from the order to the end," and not merely moral error. *Satyam* and *anṛtam* are nearer to "correct" *(integer)* and "incorrect." In the same way, virtue *(kauśalam,* Pāli *kusalam),* like wisdom (σοφία), is radically "skill"; and the beautiful *(kalyāṇa,* καλός) not what we like, but whatever is appropriate or "in good form *(pratirūpa),*" as opposed to what is ugly, improper, or more literally "informal *(apratirūpa)"*; nor are these merely "aesthetic" values, for *kalyāṇa* and *kauśala, kusala,* are both opposed to

pāpa, "evil" or "foul," as in Scholastic philosophy *pulcher* is opposed to *turpis,* whether as "ugly" or as "disgraceful." Only what is correct is effective; and hence the great emphasis laid on the correct, i.e., beautiful, performance of the sacrificial rites, and the necessity for expiation in the case of any error (Brāhmaṇas, *passim).* Whenever the conduct of life is sacramentally envisaged, this perfectionism is carried over into every possible field of doing or making: in the single concept of skill, "prudence" and "art" coincide. "Skilful performance is Yoga *(yogah karmasu kauśalam,* BG II.50)."

[62] Similarly AĀ II.3.8 (the 36,000 days of a man's life), and KU IV.8 *(dive diva iḍyo . . . haviṣmadbhir manusyebhir agniḥ,* "The Fire should be served every day with human oblations"). In this sense human sacrifice is essential to salvation.

[63] *Manasā,* "with the mind as instrument" or "mentally," occurs some 80 or more times in RV, frequently in connection with the Sacrifice—e.g., I.172.2, *stomo . . . hrdā taṣṭau manasā;* II.40.3, *rathaṃ . . . manasā yujyamānam* (cf. V.46.1, *svayam ayuji);* VII.64.4, *gartaṃ manasā taksat;* VII.67.1, *haviṣmata manasā yajñiyena;* similarly VI.16.4, *havir hrdā taṣṭam.* We have no reason to suppose that the Sacrifice had ever been a merely mechanical operation.

[64] "Having come into being from Agni, the womb of the gods (cf. JB I.17) from the oblation, with a body of gold (= light, immortality) he proceeds to the world of heavenly light" (AB II.14); and similarly in ŚB XII.2.2.5-6, and many like contexts.

[65] Cf. JUB I.14.1, "He should not be one whose gods are far away. Verily, it is insofar as he approaches the gods with himself *(ātmanā devān upāste,* i.e., is an *ātmayāji)* that become gods for him"; and BU I.4.10, "So whoever approaches a deity as being other, thinking 'He is one, and I another,' does not comprehend; he is a mere victim for them." Similarly Meister Eckhart, "Some there are so simple as to think of God as if He dwelt *there,* and of themselves as being *here.* It is not so, God and I are one" (Pfeiffer ed., p. 206).

[66]The solar Self of RV I.115.1 and AV X.8.44.

[67] *Les Castes,* Paris, 1938, p. 27.

[68] R. R. Schmidt, *Dawn of the Human Mind,* London, 1936, p. 167. That manufacture should serve the needs of body and soul at one and the same time was also Plato's demand; and wherever there is not this intention, man is attempting to live an atrophied existence, by "bread alone."

[69] On the "happy dispatch," cf. Appendix 1.

[70] It is, no doubt, in their character as nonsacrificers that the Kāvaṣeyas of RV vII.18.2 are enemies of Indra, whose very *raison de devenir* is sacrificial operation. They have, by their repudiation of the divine activity and imitation of the divine idleness, become again Asuras, and are no longer the loyal subjects of the king of this world.

[71] Cf. notes 56 and 61. Right offering is whatever is neither excessive nor defective in the Sacrifice (ŚB XI.2.3.9).

[72] The eucharistic meal is of extreme importance in the Sacrifice. The essential and only indispensable part of the victim is the heart, for this is the mind, the life-breath and the "very self" of the victim; it is basted with *ghī* on a spit, and so made to be that living food of which the gods partake. In the Edda, Sigurd understands the language of birds ("angels," cf. Rene Guénon, *"La Langue des oiseaux," Voile d'Isis,* XXXVI, 1931) when he tastes of Fafnir's heart.

[73] The *parivrājaka's* quest (a Grail quest, like that of the Vedic *ṛṣayaḥ)* is strictly analogous to that of the knight errant and to that of the solar hero in our fairy tales. There must be no looking back (SB xII.5.2.15).

[74] Cf. Muṇd. Up. II.2.3, where the arrow is oneself, Brahma the target. ["Such a blind shot with the sharp dart of longing love may never fail of the prick, which is God," *Epistle of Discretion,* by the author of the *Cloud of Unknowing* (cf. Edmund Gardner, ed., *The Cell of Self-knowledge,* London, 1910, for text of the Epistle).]

[75] "If any man come to me, and hate not his father and mother, and wife, and children, and brethren, and sisters, yea, and his own life (ψυχή, soul) also, he cannot be my disciple" (Luke 14:26).

[76]Just as in the slaying of Soma, Mitra does a "cruel deed" (TS VI.4.8.1).

[77] "After death there is no consciousness" *(na pretya samjnāsti,* BU II.4.12): "the dead know not anything" (Eccl. 9:5).

[78] "Liberation is for the Gods, *not for man"* (A. H. Gebhard-L'Estrange, *The Tradition of Silence in Myth and Legend,* Boston, 1940, p. 7). In the Philosophia Perennis, this is as strictly orthodox as Sankara's "Verily, there is no other transmigrant than the Lord" (BrSBh I.I.5).

[79] Cf. "Inasmuch as he came into being footless *(apād),* he (Vṛtra) was the Serpent (Ahi)," ŚB I.6.3.9. The Commentary on AV IV.6.1 equates the prime-born Brahma, who drank the Soma and made its poison harmless, with Takṣaka (Śeṣa).

AV IV.6.3 makes Garutman the first drinker of the poison. This Garutman is probably that one of the two Suparṇā of RV I.164.20 that eats of the fruit of the tree; there may be a real connection of *visa,* poison, and *visaya,* object of perception. In any case these legends are perhaps the prototypes for the Puranic myth of Siva's drinking of the poison produced at the Churning of the Ocean.

[80] Cf. AV X.8.12, "Ending, indeed, but endless inasmuch as his (Brahma-Prajāpati's) ends are united," or "finite, indeed, but infinite because of confinity *(anantam . . . antavac cā samante);* these two (ends, confines) the Keeper of the Vault, comprehending what hath been and shall be *(bhūtam uta bhavyam)* thereof, goes on distinguishing *(carati vicinvan)."* This is the "entering in of time from the halls of the outer heaven," the bisection or decapitation of Makha-Vṛtra, the "act of creation," and the first act of the Sacrifice of which the last end is to reunite the "head" with the "body."

[81] The "beards" of the Greek snakes perhaps represent the "spectacle marks" of a cobra.

[82] Cf. E. K. Heller, "The Story of the Sorcerer's Serpent," *Speculum, xv* (1940), 338 If., and literature there cited.

[83] The rendering of ἑρπετόν by "reptile" (Colson and Whitaker in LCL) is impossible. Philo cannot have meant this, as he would have known very well that the Hebrews did not eat reptiles; the original sense of ἑρπετόν, despite the etymology, identical with that of "serpent," is merely that of "quadruped" as distinguished from "biped" (H. G. Liddell and R. Scott, *A Greek-English Lexicon),* and it is certainly in this sense that Philo used the word.

[84]The Indians were aware of this, and though they did not quite understand what actually takes place in nature, used the simile, "as the worm becomes the wasp" (losing its own nature and taking on that of its slayer), as an exemplum of deification, of what takes place when the liberated self *devo bhūtvā devān apyeti* (BU IV.I.2); this θέωσις implying, in the words of Nicolas of Cusa, an *ablatio omnis alteritatis et diversitatis*.

[85] Skr. *mrg* and Gk. ἰχνεύω are used alike in the Vedic texts and by Plato with reference to the "tracking" of the Hidden Light or the Truth.

Lat. *calcatrix* = cockatrice is also properly the "Tracker" (if not rather "Treader"), and according to Webster "originally an ichneumon" but also a "water snake," sometimes confused with the crocodile but an enemy of crocodiles. The heraldic Cockatrice or Basilisk, a winged Griffin, with a serpent's tail, is sometimes thought of as an asp, sometimes as a bird. The Hebrew *tsefar* (Isa. 11:8, Vulgate *regulus)* seems to have been a bird, and as enemy of reptiles must be thought of as a Sunbird, perhaps a vulture, which actually tramples on its ophidian prey. The heraldic Cockatrice, with its combination of avian and ophidian characters, should be a type of the Supreme Identity of the two contrasted principles, divine and titanic, which can only be characterized as "good and evil" when they are in opposition, i.e., in the world with its "pairs of opposites," which opposites are, properly speaking contraries rather than contradictories.

[86] Other interpretations of *jangahe* are possible and even plausible. Our purpose has been to show that *nakuīi* is, in fact, a type of the feminine half

of the divine syzygy, *nakula* by implication a type of the male half. If *nakula* can be equated with Indra as Ahihan, as is intrinsically plausible, this would also serve to explain Kubera's *nakula* as his purse, the inexhaustible source of his wealth, Indra being always the great dispenser.

[87] Having fettered himself by himself, like a bird in the net, MU II.2, VI.30.

[88] Becoming thus again *samāhita,* "in *samādhi,"* converse of *hita, prahita, prativihita, nihita,* etc.

[89] "Inarticulate," here "continuous," "undivided"; but also just as in another sense the silent *(aśabda)* Brahma is inarticulate *(anirutyta,* etc.), and the expressive *(śabda)* Brahma articulate *(nirufya,* etc.).

[90] It is one of the chief defects of this interesting book that the author speaks of "Plato's *psyche"* as if this had been one single and altogether divine principle (pp. 99, 139). Plato, in fact, always speaks of two souls, appetitive and rational, the former corresponding to Hebrew *nefes* and St. Paul's *psyche,* and the latter to Hebrew *ruah* and St. Paul's *pneuma* (as also to the Indian *śarīra* and *aśarira ātman, bhūtātman* and *antaḥ puruṣa).* Macdonald does not see that inasmuch as the Hebrew could "speak with himself and reason with himself" (p. 139), this involves two "selves," as was demonstrated once for all by Plato *(Republic* 430EF, 436s, 604B, etc.), these two being *nefes* and *ruaḥ*. The latter, which comes from God and is reabsorbed in him (of which Ecclesiastes "is heartily glad, for it means a final escape for man" [p. 128], i.e., if he knows *who* he is and in *which* self he will be departing at death) is the "one and only Saṃsārin" of the Vedanta.

[91] "Self-government" *(svarāj),* i.e., "inward government of the worse by the naturally better part" of us (Plato, *Republic* 431AB, etc.).

[92]Cf. Grimm, *Märchen,* 16, "Die drei Schlangenblätter," and the snake that Asklepios was, which later survives coiled about his staff.

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1946).—ED.]

5

A Figure of Speech or a Figure of Thought?[1]

Ἐγὼ δὲ τέχνην οὐ καλῶ, ὃ ἂν ᾖ ἄλογον πρᾶγμα.

Plato, *Gorgias* 465A[2]

We are peculiar people. I say this with reference to the fact that whereas almost all other peoples have called their theory of art or expression a "rhetoric" and have thought of art as a kind of knowledge, we have invented an "aesthetic" and think of art as a kind of feeling.

The Greek original of the word "aesthetic" means perception by the senses, especially by feeling. Aesthetic experience is a faculty that we share with animals and vegetables, and is irrational. The "aesthetic soul" is that part of our psychic makeup that "senses" things and reacts to them: in other words, the "sentimental" part of us. To identify our approach to art with the pursuit of these reactions is not to make art "fine" but to apply it only to the life of pleasure and to disconnect it from the active and contemplative lives.

Our word "aesthetic," then, takes for granted what is now commonly assumed, viz. that art is evoked by, and has for its end to express and again evoke, emotions. In this connection, Alfred North Whitehead has remarked that "it was a tremendous discovery, how to excite emotions for their own sake."[3] We have gone on to invent a science of our likes and dislikes, a "science of the soul," psychology, and have substituted psychological explanations for the traditional conception of art as an intellectual virtue and of beauty as pertaining to knowledge.[4] Our current resentment of meaning in art is as strong as the word "aesthetic" implies. When we speak of a work of art as "significant" we try to forget that this word can only be used with a following "of," that expression can be significant only *of* some thesis that was to be expressed, and we overlook that whatever does not

mean something is literally *in-significant*. If, indeed, the whole end of art were "to express emotion," then the degree of our emotional reaction would be the measure of beauty and all judgment would be subjective, for there can be no disputing about tastes. It should be remembered that a reaction is an "affection," and every affection a passion, that is, something passively suffered or undergone, and not—as in the operation of judgment—an activity on our part.[5] To equate the love of art with a love of fine sensations is to make of works of art a kind of aphrodisiac. The words "disinterested aesthetic contemplation" are a contradiction in terms and a pure non-sense.

"Rhetoric," of which the Greek original means skill in public speaking, implies, on the other hand, a theory of art as the effective expression of theses. There is a very wide difference between what is said for effect, and what is said or made to be *effective,* and must *work,* or would not have been worth saying or making. It is true that there is a so-called rhetoric of the production of "effects," just as there is a so-called poetry that consists only of emotive words, and a sort of painting that is merely spectacular; but this kind of eloquence that makes use of figures for their own sake, or merely to display the artist, or to betray the truth in courts of law, is not properly a rhetoric, but a sophistic, or art of flattery. By "rhetoric" we mean, with Plato and Aristotle, "the art of giving effectiveness to truth."[6] My thesis will be, then, that if we propose to use or understand any works of art (with the possible exception of contemporary works, which may be "unintelligible"[7]), we ought to abandon the term "aesthetic" in its present application and return to "rhetoric," Quintilian's "bene dicendi scientia."

It may be objected by those for whom art is not a languge but a spectacle that rhetoric has primarily to do with verbal eloquence and not with the life of works of art in general. I am not sure that even such objectors would really agree to describe their own works as dumb or ineloquent. But however this may be, we must affirm that the principles of art are not altered by the variety of the material in which the artist works— materials such as vibrant air in the case of music or poetry, human flesh on the stage, or stone, metal, clay in architecture, sculpture, and pottery. Nor can one material be called more beautiful than another; you cannot make a better sword of gold than of steel. Indeed, the material as such, being relatively formless, is relatively ugly. Art implies a transformation of the material, the impression of a new form on material that had been more or less formless;

and it is precisely in this sense that the creation of the world from a completely formless matter is called a "work of adornment."

There are good reasons for the fact that the theory of art has generally been stated in terms of the spoken (or secondarily, written) word. It is, in the first place, "by a word conceived in intellect" that the artist, whether human or divine, works.[8] Again, those whose own art was, like mine, verbal, naturally discussed the art of verbal expression, while those who worked in other materials were not also necessarily expert in "logical" formulation. And finally, the art of speaking can be better understood by all than could the art of, let us say, the potter, because all men make use of speech (whether rhetorically, to communicate a meaning, or sophistically, to exhibit themselves), while relatively few are workers in clay.

All our sources are conscious of the fundamental identity of all the arts. Plato, for example, remarks that "the expert, who is intent upon the best when he speaks, will surely not speak at random, but with an end in view; he is just like all those other artists, the painters, builders, shipwrights, etc.";[9] and again, "the productions of all arts are kinds of poetry, and their craftsmen are all poets,"[10] in the broad sense of the word. "Demiurge" (δημιουργός) and "technician" (τεχνίτης) are the ordinary Greek words for "artist" *(artifex),* and under these headings Plato includes not only poets, painters, and musicians, but also archers, weavers, embroiderers, potters, carpenters, sculptors, farmers, doctors, hunters, and above all those whose art is government, only making a distinction between creation and mere labor art (τέχνη)(δημιουργία)(ἄτεχνος τριβή).(χειρουργία), and artless industry [11] All these artists, insofar as they are really makers and not merely industrious, insofar as they are musical and therefore wise and good, and insofar as they are in possession of their art (ἔντεχνος, cf. ἔνθεος) and governed by it, are infallible.[12] The primary meaning of the word σοφία,"wisdom," is that of "skill," just as Sanskrit *kauśalam* is "skill" of any kind, whether in making, doing, or knowing.

Now what are all these arts for? Always and only to supply a real or an imagined need or deficiency on the part of the human patron, for whom as the collective consumer the artist works.[13] When he is working for himself, the artist as a human being is also a consumer. The necessities to be served by art may appear to be material *or* spiritual, but as Plato insists, it is one and the same art—or a combination of both arts, practical and philosophical

—that must serve both body and soul if it is to be admitted in the ideal City.[14] We shall see presently that to propose to serve the two ends separately is the peculiar symptom of our modern "heartlessness." Our distinction of "fine" from "applied" art (ridiculous, because the fine art itself is applied to giving pleasure) is as though "not by bread alone"[15] had meant "by cake" for the elite that go to exhibitions and "bread alone" for the majority and usually for all. Plato's music and gymnastics, which correspond to what we seem to intend by "fine" and "applied" art (since one is for the soul and the other for the body), are never divorced in his theory of education; to follow one alone leads to effeminacy, to follow only the other, to brutality; the tender artist is no more a man than the tough athlete; music must be realized in bodily graces, and physical power should be exercised only in measured, not in violent motions.[16]

It would be superfluous to explain what are the material necessities to be served by art: we need only remember that a censorship of what ought or ought not to be made at all should correspond to our knowledge of what is good or bad for us. It is clear that a wise government, even a government of the free by the free, cannot permit the manufacture and sale of products that are necessarily injurious, however profitable such manufacture may be to those whose interest it is to sell, but must insist upon those standards of living to secure which was once the function of the guilds and of the individual artist "inclined by justice, which rectifies the will, to do his work faithfully."[17]

As for the spiritual ends of the arts, what Plato says is that we are endowed by the gods with vision and hearing, and harmony "was given by the Muses to him that can use them intellectually (μετὰ νοῦ), not as an aid to irrational pleasure (ἡδονὴ ἄλογος), as is nowadays supposed, but to assist the soul's interior revolution, to restore it to order and concord with itself. And because of the want of measure and lack of graces in most of us, rhythm was given us by the same gods for the same ends";[18] and that while the passion (πάθη) evoked by a composition of sounds "furnishes a pleasure-of-the-senses (ἡδονή) to the unintelligent, it (the composition) bestows on the intelligent that heartsease that is induced by the imitation of the divine harmony produced in mortal motions."[19] This last delight or gladness that is experienced when we partake of the feast of reason, which is also a communion, is not a passion but an ecstasy, a going out of ourselves and

being in the spirit: a condition insusceptible of analysis in terms of the pleasure or pain that can be felt by sensitive bodies or souls.

The soulful or sentimental self enjoys itself in the aesthetic surfaces of natural or artificial things, to which it is akin; the intellectual or spiritual self enjoys their order and is nourished by what in them is akin to it. The spirit is much rather a fastidious than a sensitive entity; it is not the physical qualities of things, but what is called their scent or flavor, for example "the picture not in the colors," or "the unheard music," not a sensible shape but an intelligible form, that it tastes. Plato's "heartsease" is the same as that "intellectual beatitude" which Indian rhetoric sees in the "tasting of the flavor" of a work of art, an immediate experience, and congeneric with the tasting of God.[20]

This is, then, by no means an aesthetic or psychological experience but implies what Plato and Aristotle call a k*atharsis,* and a "defeat of the sensations of pleasure" or pain.[21] *Katharsis* is a sacrificial purgation and purification "consisting in a separation, as far as that is possible, of the soul from the body"; it is, in other words, a kind of dying, that kind of dying to which the philosopher's life is dedicated.[22] The Platonic *katharsis* implies an ecstasy, or "standing aside" of the energetic, spiritual, and imperturbable self from the passive, aesthetic, and natural self, a "being out of oneself" that is a being "in one's right mind" and real Self, that "in-sistence" that Plato has in mind when he "would be born again in beauty inwardly," and calls this a sufficient prayer.[23]

Plato rebukes his much-beloved Homer for attributing to the gods and heroes all-too-human passions, and for the skillful imitations of these passions that are so well calculated to arouse our own "sym-pathies."[24] The k*atharsis* of Plato's City is to be effected not by such exhibitions as this, but by the banishment of artists who allow themselves to imitate all sorts of things, however shameful. Our own novelists and biographers would have been the first to go, while among modern poets it is not easy to think of any but William Morris of whom Plato could have heartily approved.

The *katharsis* of the City parallels that of the individual; the emotions are traditionally connected with the organs of evacuation, precisely because the emotions are waste products. It is difficult to be sure of the exact meaning of Aristotle's better-known definition, in which tragedy "by its imitation of pity and fear effects a *katharsis* from these and like passions,"[25] though it is

clear that for him too the purification is *from* the passions (παθήματα); we must bear in mind that, for Aristotle, tragedy is still essentially a representation of actions, arid not of character. It is certainly not a periodical "outlet" of—that is to say, indulgence in—our "pent-up" emotions that can bring about an emancipation from them; such an outlet, like a drunkard's bout, can be only a temporary satiation.[26] In what Plato calls with approval the "more austere" kind of poetry, we are presumed to be enjoying a feast of reason rather than a "break-fast" of sensations. His *katharsis* is an ecstasy or liberation of the "immortal soul" from the affections of the "mortal," a conception of emancipation that is closely paralleled in the Indian texts in which liberation is realized by a process of "shaking off one's bodies."[27] The reader or spectator of the imitation of a "myth" is to be rapt away from his habitual and passible personality and, just as in all other sacrificial rituals, becomes a god for the duration of the rite and only returns to himself when the rite is relinquished, when the epiphany is at an end and the curtain falls. We must remember that all artistic operations were originally rites, and that the purpose of the rite (as the word τελετή implies) is to sacrifice the old and to bring into being a new and more perfect man.

We can well imagine, then, what Plato, stating a philosophy of art that is not "his own" but intrinsic to the Philosophia Perennis, would have thought of our aesthetic interpretations and of our contention that the last end of art is simply to please. For, as he says, "ornament, painting, and music made only to give pleasure" are just "toys."[28] The "lover of art," in other words, is a "playboy." It is admitted that a majority of men judge works of art by the pleasure they afford; but rather than sink to such a level, Socrates says no, "not even if all the oxen and horses and animals in the world, by their pursuit of pleasure, proclaim that such is the criterion."[29] The kind of music of which he approves is not a multifarious and changeable but a canonical music;[30] not the sound of "poly-harmonic" instruments, but the simple music (ἁπλότης) of the lyre accompanied by chanting "deliberately designed to produce in the soul that symphony of which we have been speaking";[31] not the music of Marsyas the Satyr, but that of Apollo.[32]

All the arts, without exception, are imitative. The work of art can only be judged as such (and independently of its "value") by the degree to which the model has been correctly represented. The beauty of the work is

proportionate to its accuracy (ὀρθότης= *integritas sive perfectio),* or truth (ἀλήθεια= *veritas)*. In other words, the artist's judgment of his own work by the criterion of art is a criticism based upon the proportion of essential to actual form, paradigm to image. "Imitation" (μίμησις), a word that can be as easily misunderstood as St. Thomas Aquinas's "Art is the imitation of Nature in her manner of operation,"[33] can be mistaken to mean that that is the best art that is "truest to nature," as we now use the word in its most limited sense, with reference not to "Mother Nature," Natura naturans, Creatrix Universalis, Deus, but to whatever is presented by our own immediate and natural environment, whether visually or otherwise accessible to observation (αἴσθησις). In this connection it is important not to overlook that the delineation of character (ἦθος))^in literature and painting is, just as much as the representation of the looking-glass image of a physiognomy, an empirical and realistic procedure, dependent on observation. St. Thomas's "Nature," on the other hand, is that Nature "to find which," as Meister Eckhart says, "all her forms must be shattered."

The imitation or "re-presentation" of a model (even a "presented" model) involves, indeed, a likeness (ὁμοία,*similitudo,* Skr. *sādrśya),* but hardly what we usually mean by "verisimilitude" (ὁμοιότης). What is traditionally meant by "likeness" is not a copy but an image akin (συγγενής) and "equal" (ἴσος) to its model; in other words, a natural and "ad-equate" symbol of its referent. The representation of a man, for example, must really correspond to the idea of the man, but must not look so like him as to deceive the eye; for the work of art, as regards its form, is a mind-made thing and aims at the mind, but an illusion is no more intelligible than the natural object it mimics. The plaster cast of a man will not be a work of art, but the representation of a man on wheels where verisimilitude would have required feet may be an entirely adequate "imitation" well and *truly* made.[34]

It is with perfect right that the mathematician speaks of a "beautiful equation" and feels for it what we feel about "art."[35] The beauty of the admirable equation is the attractive aspect of its simplicity. It is a single form that is the form of many different things. In the same way Beauty absolutely is the equation that is the single form of all things, which are themselves beautiful to the extent that they participate in the simplicity of their source. "The beauty of the straight line and the circle, and the plane and solid figures formed from these ... is not, like that of other things, relative, but always absolutely beautiful."[36] Now we know that Plato, who

says this, is always praising what is ancient and deprecating innovations (of which the causes are, in the strictest and worst sense of the word, aesthetic), and that he ranks the formal and canonical arts of Egypt far above the humanistic Greek art that he saw coming into fashion.[37] The kind of art that Plato endorsed was, then, precisely what we know as Greek Geometric art. We must not think that it would have been primarily for its decorative values that Plato must have admired this kind of "primitive" art, but for its truth or accuracy, *because* of which it has the kind of beauty that is universal and invariable, its equations being "akin" to the First Principles of which the myths and mysteries, related or enacted, are imitations in other kinds of material. The forms of the simplest and severest kinds of art, the synoptic kind of art that we call "primitive," are the natural language of all traditional philosophy; and it is for this very reason that Plato's dialectic makes continual use of *figures* of speech, which are really figures of thought.

Plato knew as well as the Scholastic philosophers that the artist as such has no moral responsibilities, and can sin as an artist only if he fails to consider the sole good of the work to be done, whatever it may be.[38] But, like Cicero, Plato also knows that "though he is an artist, he is nevertheless a man"[39] and, if a free man, responsible as such for whatever it may be that he undertakes to make; a man who, if he represents what ought not to be represented and brings into being things unworthy of free men, should be punished, or at the least restrained or exiled like any other criminal or madman. It is precisely those poets or other artists who imitate anything and everything, and are not ashamed to represent or even "idealize" things essentially base, that Plato, without respect for their abilities, however great, would banish from the society of rational men, "lest from the imitation of shameful things men should imbibe their actuality,"[40] that is to say, for the same reasons that we in moments of sanity (σωφροσύνη) see fit to condemn the exhibition of gangster films in which the villain is made a hero, or agree to forbid the manufacture of even the most skillfully adulterated foods.

If we dare not ask with Plato "imitations of what sort of life?" and "whether of the appearance or the reality, the phantasm or the truth?"[41] it is because we are no longer sure what kind of life it is that we ought for our own good and happiness to imitate, and are for the most part convinced that

no one knows or can know the final truth about anything: we only know what we "approve" of, i.e., what we *like* to do or think, and we desire a freedom to do and think what we like more than we desire a freedom from error. Our educational systems are chaotic because we are not agreed for what to educate, if not for self-expression. But all tradition is agreed as to what kind of models are to be imitated: "The city can never otherwise be happy unless it is designed by those painters who follow a divine original";[42] "The crafts such as building and carpentry . . . take their principles from that realm and from the thinking there";[43] "Lo, make all things in accordance with the pattern that was shown thee upon the mount";[44] "It is in imitation *(anukṛti)* of the divine forms that any human form *(śilpa)* is invented here";[45] "There is this divine harp, to be sure; this human harp comes into being in its likeness" *(tad anukṛti);*[46] "We must do what the Gods did first."[47] *This* is the "imitation of Nature in her manner of operation," and, like the first creation, the imitation of an intelligible, not a perceptible model.

But such an imitation of the divine principles is only possible if we have known them "as they are," for if we have not ourselves seen them, our mimetic iconography, based upon opinion, will be at fault; we cannot know the reflection of anything unless we know itself.[48] It is the basis of Plato's criticism of naturalistic poets and painters that they know nothing of the reality but only the appearances of things, for which their vision is overkeen; their imitations are not of the divine originals, but are only copies of copies.[49] And seeing that God alone is truly beautiful, and all other beauty is by participation, it is only a work of art that has been wrought, in its kind (ἰδέα) and its significance (δύναμις), after an eternal model, that can be called beautiful.[50] And since the eternal and intelligible models are supersensual and invisible, it is evidently "not by observation" but in contemplation that they must be known.[51] Two acts, then, one of contemplation and one of operation, are necessary to the production of any work of art.[52]

And now as to the judgment of the work of art, first by the criterion of art, and second with respect to its human value. As we have already seen, it is not by our reactions, pleasurable or otherwise, but by its perfect accuracy, beauty, or perfection, or truth—in other words, by the equality or proportion

of the image to its model—that a work of art can be judged as such. That is to consider only the good of the work to be done, the business of the artist. But we have also to consider the good of the man for whom the work is done, whether this "consumer" (χρώμενος) be the artist himself or some other patron.[53] This man judges in another way, not, or not only, by this truth or accuracy, but by the artifact's utility or aptitude (ὠφέλεια) to serve the purpose of its original intention (βούλησις), viz. the need (ἔνδεια) that was the first and is also the last cause of the work. Accuracy and aptitude together make the "wholesomeness" (ὑγιεινόν) of the work that is its ultimate-rightness (ὀρθότης).[54] The distinction of beauty from utility is logical, not real *(in re)*.

So when taste has been rejected as a criterion in art, Plato's Stranger sums up thus, "The judge of anything that has been made (ποίημα) must know its essence—what its intention (βούλησις) is and what the real thing of which it is an image—or else will hardly be able to diagnose whether it hits or misses the mark of its intention." And again, "The expert critic of any image, whether in painting, music, or any other art, must know three things, what was the archetype, and in each case whether it was correctly and whether well made . . . whether the representation was good (καλόν) or not."[55] The complete judgment, made by the whole man, is as to whether the thing under consideration has been both truly *and* well made. It is only "by the mob that the beautiful and the just are rent apart,"[56] by the mob, shall we say, of "aesthetes," the men who "know what they like"?

Of the two judgments, respectively by art and by value, the first only establishes the existence of the object as a true work of art and not a falsification (ψεῦδος) (of its archetype: it is a judgment normally made by the artist before he can allow the work to leave his shop, and so a judgment that is really presupposed when we as patrons or consumers propose to evaluate the work. It is only under certain conditions, and typically those of modern manufacture and salesmanship, that it becomes necessary for the patron or consumer to ask whether the object he has commissioned or proposes to buy is really a true work of art. Under normal conditions, where making is a vocation and the artist is disposed *and free* to consider nothing but the good of the work to be done, it is superfluous to ask, Is this a "true" work of art? When, however, the question must be asked, or if we wish to ask it in order to understand completely the genesis of the work, then the grounds of our judgment in this respect will be the same as for the original artist; we must know of what the work is intended to remind us, and whether it is equal to

(is an "adequate symbol" of) this content, or by want of truth betrays its paradigm. In any case, when this judgment has been made, or is taken for granted, we can proceed to ask whether or not the work has a value for us, to ask whether it will serve our needs. If we are whole men, not such as live by bread alone, the question will be asked with respect to spiritual and physical needs to be satisfied together; we shall ask whether the model has been well chosen, and whether it has been applied to the material in such a way as to serve our immediate need; in other words, What does it say? and Will it work? If we have asked for a bread that will support the whole man, and receivė however fine a stone, we are not morally, though we may be legally, bound to "pay the piper." All our efforts to obey the Devil and "command this stone that it be made bread" are doomed to failure.

It is one of Plato's virtues, and that of all traditional doctrine about art, that "value" is never taken to mean an exclusively spiritual or exclusively physical value. It is neither advantageous, nor altogether possible, to separate these values, making some things sacred and others profane: the highest wisdom must be "mixed"[57] with practical knowledge, the contemplative life combined with the active. The pleasures that pertain to these lives are altogether legitimate, and it is only those pleasures that are irrational, bestial, and in the worst sense of the words seductive and distracting that are to be excluded. Plato's music and gymnastics, which correspond to our culture and physical training, are not alternative curricula, but essential parts of one and the same education.[58] Philosophy is the highest form of music (culture), but the philosopher who has escaped from the cave must return to it to participate in the everyday life of the world and, quite literally, play the game.[59] Plato's criterion of "wholesomeness" implies that nothing ought to be made, nothing can be really worth having, that is not at the same time correct or true or formal or beautiful (whichever word you prefer) *and* adapted to good use.

For, to state the Platonic doctrine in more familiar words, "It is written that man shall not live by bread alone, but by every word of God, .. . that bread which came down from heaven,"[60] that is, not by mere utilities but also by those "divine realities" and "causal beauty" with which the wholesome works of art are informed, so that they also live and speak. It is just to the extent that we try to live by bread alone and by all the other insignificant utilities that "bread alone" includes—good as utilities, but bad as *mere* utilities—that our contemporary civilization can be rightly called

inhuman and must be unfavorably compared with the “primitive” cultures in which, as the anthropologists assure us, “the needs of the body and soul are satisfied together.”[61] Manufacture for the needs of the body alone is the curse of modern civilization.

Should we propose to raise our standard of living to the savage level, on which there is no distinction of fine from applied or sacred from profane art, it need not imply the sacrifice of any of the necessities or even conveniences of life, but only of luxuries, only of such utilities as are not at the same time useful *and* significant. If such a proposal to return to primitive levels of culture should seem to be utopian and impracticable, it is only because a manufacture of significant utilities would have to be a manufacture for use, the use of the whole man, and not for the salesman’s profit. The price to be paid for putting back into the market place, where they belong, such things as are now to be seen only in museums would be that of economic revolution. It may be doubted whether our boasted love of art extends so far.

It has sometimes been asked whether the “artist” can survive under modern conditions. In the sense in which the word is used by those who ask the question, one does not see how he can or why he should survive. For, just as the modern artist is neither a useful or significant, but only an ornamental member of society, so the modern workman is nothing but a useful member and is neither significant nor ornamental. It is certain that we shall have to go on working, but not so certain that we could not live, and handsomely, without the exhibitionists of our studios, galleries, and playing fields. We cannot do without art, because art is the knowledge of how things ought to be made, art is the principle of manufacture (*recta ratio factibilium*), and while an artless play may be innocent, an artless manufacture is merely brutish labor and a sin against the wholesomeness of human nature; we *can* do without “fine” artists, whose art does not “apply” to anything, and whose organized manufacture of art in studios is the inverse of the laborer’s artless manufacture in factories; and we *ought* to be able to do without the base mechanics “whose souls are bowed and mutilated by their vulgar occupations even as their bodies are marred by their mechanical arts.”[62]

Plato himself discusses, in connection with all the arts, whether of potter, painter, poet, or “craftsman of civic liberty,” the relation between the practice of an art and the earning of a livelihood.[63] He points out that the

practice of an art and the wage-earning capacity are two different things; that the artist (in Plato's sense and that of the Christian and Oriental social philosophies) does not earn wages by his art. He *works by* his art, and is only accidentally a trader if he sells what he makes. Being a vocation, his art is most intimately his own and pertains to his own nature, and the pleasure that he takes in it perfects the operation. There is nothing he would rather work (or "play") at than his making; to him the leisure state would be an abomination of boredom. This situation, in which each man does what is naturally (κατὰ φύσιν Skr. *svabhāvatas)* his to do (τὸ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν= Skr. *svadharma, svakarma*), not only is the type of Justice,[64] but furthermore, under these conditions (i.e., when the maker loves to work), "more is done, and better done, and with more ease, than in any other way."[65] Artists are not tradesmen. "They know how to make, but not how to hoard." [66] Under these conditions the worker and maker is not a hireling, but one whose salary enables him to go on doing and making. He is just like any other member of a feudal society, in which none are "hired" men, but all enfeoffed and all possessed of a hereditary standing, that of a professional whose reward is by gift or endowment and not "at so much an hour."

The separation of the creative from the profit motive not only leaves the artist free to put the good of the work above his own good, but at the same time abstracts from manufacture the stain of simony, or "traffic in things sacred"; and this conclusion, which rings strangely in our ears, for whom work and play are alike secular activities, is actually in complete agreement with the traditional order, in which the artist's operation is not a meaningless labor, but quite literally a significant and sacred rite, and quite as much as the product itself an adequate symbol of a spiritual reality. It is therefore a way, or rather *the* way, by which the artist, whether potter or painter, poet or king, can best erect or edify (ἐξορθόω)*himself* at the same time that he "trues" or cor-rects (ὀρθόω) his work.[67] It is, indeed, only by the "true" workman that "true" work can be done; like engenders like.

When Plato lays it down that the arts shall "care for the bodies and souls of your citizens," and that only things that are sane and free and not any shameful things unbecoming free men (ἀνελεύθερα)[68] are to be represented, it is as much as to say that the true artist in whatever material must be a free man, meaning by this not an "emancipated artist" in the vulgar sense of one having no obligation or commitment of any kind, but a man emancipated

from the despotism of the salesman. Whoever is to "imitate the actions of gods and heroes, the intellections and revolutions of the All," the very selves and divine paradigms or ideas of our useful inventions, must have known these realities "themselves (αὐτά) and as they really are (οἷά ἐστιν)": for "what we have not and know not we can neither give to another nor teach our neighbor."[69]

In other words, an act of "imagination," in which the idea to be represented is first clothed in the imitable form or image of the thing to be made, must precede the operation in which this form is impressed upon the actual material. The first of these acts, in the terms of Scholastic philosophy, is free, the second servile. It is only if the first be omitted that the word "servile" acquires a dishonorable connotation; then we can speak only of labor, and not of art. It need hardly be argued that our methods of manufacture are, in this shameful sense, servile, nor be denied that the industrial system, for which these methods are needed, is an abomination "unfit for free men." A system of manufacture governed by money values presupposes that there shall be two different kinds of makers, privileged artists who may be "inspired," and underprivileged laborers, unimaginative by hypothesis, since they are required only to make what other men have imagined, or more often only to copy what other men have already made. It has often been claimed that the productions of "fine" art are useless; it would seem to be a mockery to speak of a society as "free" where it is only the makers of useless things who are supposedly free.

Inspiration is defined in Webster as "a supernatural influence which qualifies men to receive and communicate divine truth." This is stated in the word itself, which implies the presence of a guiding "spirit" distinguished from but nevertheless "within" the agent who is in-spired, but is certainly not inspired if "expressing himself." Before continuing, we must clear the air by showing how the word "inspire" has been scabrously abused by modern authors. We have found it said that "a poet or other artist may let the rain inspire him."[70] Such misuse of words debar the student from ever learning what the ancient writers may have really meant. We say "misuse" because neither is the rain, or anything perceptible to sense, *in* us; nor is the rain a kind of *spirit*. The rationalist has a right to disbelieve in inspiration and to leave it out of his account, as he very easily can if he is considering art only from the aesthetic (sensational) point of view, but he has no right to pretend that one can be "inspired" by a sense perception, by which, in fact,

one can only be "affected," and to which one can only "react." On the other hand, Meister Eckhart's phrase "inspired by his art" is quite correct, since art is a kind of knowledge, not anything that can be seen, but akin to the soul and prior to the body and the world.[71] We can properly say that not only "Love" but "Art" and "Law" are names of the Spirit.

Here we are concerned not with the rationalist's point of view, but only with the sources from which we can learn how the artist's operation is explained in a tradition that we must understand if we are to understand its products. Here it is always by the Spirit that a man is thought of as inspired (ἔνθεος, sc. ὑπὸ τοῦ ἔρωτος)."The Genius breathed into my heart (ἐνέπνευσε φρεσὶ δαίμων) to weave," Penelope says.[72] Hesiod tells us that the Muses "breathed into me a divine voice (ἐνέπνευσαν δέ μοι αὐδὴν θέσπιν). . . and bade me sing the race of the blessed Gods."[73] Christ, "through whom all things were made," does not bear witness of (express) himself, but says "I do nothing of myself, but as my Father taught me, I speak."[74] Dante writes, I am "one who when Love (Amor, Eros) inspires me (*mi spira*), attend, and *go* setting it forth in such wise as He dictates within me."[75] For "there is no real speaking that does not lay hold upon the Truth."[76] And who is it ("What self?") that speaks the "Truth that cannot be refuted"? Not this man, So-and-so, Dante, or Socrates, or "I," but the Synteresis, the Immanent Spirit, Socrates' and Plato's Daimon, he "who lives in every one of us"[77] and "cares for nothing but the Truth."[78] It is the "God himself that speaks" when we are not thinking our own thoughts but are His exponents, or priests.

And so as Plato, the father of European wisdom, asks, "Do we not know that as regards the practice of the arts (τὴν τῶν τεχνῶν δημιουρ- γίαν) the man who has this God for his teacher will be renowned and as it were a beacon light, but one whom Love has not possessed will be obscure?"[79] This is with particular reference to the divine originators of archery, medicine, and oracles, music, metalwork, weaving, and piloting, each of whom was "Love's disciple." He means, of course, the "cosmic Love" that harmonizes opposite forces, the Love that acts for the sake of what it has and to beget itself, not the profane love that lacks and desires. So the maker of anything, if he is to be called a creator, is at his best the servant of an immanent Genius; he must not be called "a genius," but "ingenious"; he is not working of or for himself, but by and for another energy, that of the

Immanent Eros, Sanctus Spiritus, the source of all "gifts." "All that is true, by whomsoever it has been said, has its origin in the Spirit."[80]

We can now, perhaps, consider, with less danger of misunderstanding, Plato's longest passage on inspiration. "It is a divine power that moves (θεία δὲ δύναμις, ἥ . . . κινεῖ)' . . . "[81] even the rhapsodist or literary critic, insofar as he speaks well, though he is only the exponent of an exponent. The original maker and exponent, if he is to be an imitator of realities and not of mere appearances, "is God-indwelt and possessed (ἔνθεος, κατεχόμενος)... an airy, winged and sacred substance (ἱερόν, Skr. *brahma-*); unable ever to indite until he has been born again of the God within him (πρὶν ἂν ἔνθεός τε γένηται)[82] and is out of his own wits (ἔκφρων), and his own mind (νοῦς) is no longer in him;[83] for every man, so long as he retains *that* property is powerless to make (ποιεῖν) or to incant (χρησμῳδεῖν, Skr. *mantrakṛ*). . . . The men whom he dements God uses as his ministers (ὑπηρέται). . . but it is the God[84] him-self (ὁ θεὸς αὐτός) that speaks, and through them enlightens (φθέγγεται) us. . . . The makers are but His exponents (ἑρμηνῆς) according to the way in which they are possessed."[85] It is only when he returns to himself from what is really a sacrificial operation that the maker exercises his own powers of judgment; and then primarily to "try the spirits, whether they be of God," and secondarily to try his work, whether it agrees with the vision or audition.

The most immediately significant point that emerges from this profound analysis of the nature of inspiration is that of the artist's priestly or ministerial function. The original intention of intelligible forms was not to entertain us, but literally to "re-mind" us. The chant is not for the approval of the ear,[86] nor the picture for that of the eye (although these senses can be taught to approve the splendor of truth, and can be trusted when they have been trained), but to effect such a transformation of our being as is the purpose of all ritual acts. It is, in fact, the ritual arts that are the most "artistic," because the most "correct," as they must be if they are to be effectual.

The heavens declare the glory of God: their interpretation in science or art—and *ars sine scientia nihil*—is not in order to flatter or merely "interest" us, but "in order that we may follow up the intellections and revolutions of the All, not those revolutions that are in our own heads and were distorted at our birth, but correcting (ἐξορθοῦντα) these by studying the

harmonies and revolutions of the All: so that by an assimilation of the knower to the to-be-known (τῷ κατανοουμένῳ τὸ κατανοοῦν ἐξομοιῶσαι),[87] the archetypal Nature, and coming to be in *that* likeness,[88] we may attain at last to a part in that 'life's best' that has been appointed by the gods to men for this time being and hereafter."[89]

This is what is spoken of in India as a "metrical self-integration" (*candobhir ātmānaṃ saṃskaraṇa),* or "edification of another man" *(anyam ātmānaṃ*), to be achieved by an imitation (*anukaraṇa)* of the divine forms (*daivyāni śilpāni)*.[90] The final reference to a good to be realized here *and* hereafter brings us back again to the "wholesomeness" of art, defined in terms of its simultaneous application to practical necessities and spiritual meanings, back to that fulfillment of the needs of the body and soul together that is characteristic of the arts of the uncivilized peoples and the "folk" but foreign to our industrial life. For in that life the arts are *either* for use *or* for pleasure, but are never spiritually significant and very rarely intelligible.

Such an application of the arts as Plato prescribes for his City of God, arts that as he says "will care for the bodies and the souls of your citizens,"[91] survives for so long as forms and symbols are employed to express a meaning, for so long as "ornament" means "equipment,"[92] and until what were originally imitations of the reality, not the appearance, of things become (as they were already rapidly becoming in Plato's time) merely "art forms, more and more emptied of significance on their way down to us"[93]—no longer figures of thought, but only figures of speech.

We have so far made use of Oriental sources only incidentally, and chiefly to remind ourselves that the true philosophy of art is always and everywhere the same. But since we are dealing with the distinction between the arts of flattery and those of ministration, we propose to refer briefly to some of the Indian texts in which the "whole end of the expressive faculty" is discussed. This natural faculty is that of the "Voice": not the audibly spoken word, but the ὄργανον by which a concept is communicated. The relation of this maternal Voice to the paternal Intellect is that of our feminine "nature" to our masculine "essence"; their begotten child is the Logos of theology and the spoken myth of anthropology. The work of art is expressly the artist's child, the child of both his natures, human and divine: stillborn if he has not at his command the art of delivery (rhetoric), a bastard if the Voice has been seduced, but a valid concept if born in lawful marriage.

The Voice is at once the daughter, bride, messenger, and instrument of the Intellect.[94] Possessed of him, the immanent deity, she brings forth his image (reflection, imitation, similitude, *pratirūpa,* child).[95] She is the power and the glory,[96] without whom the Sacrifice itself could not proceed.[97] But if he, the divine Intellect, Brahmā or Prajāpati, "does not precede and direct her, then it is only a gibberish in which she expresses herself."[98] Translated into the terms of the art of government, this means that if the Regnum acts on its own initiative, unadvised by the Sacerdotium, it will not be Law, but only regulations that it promulgates.

The conflict of Apollo with Marsyas the Satyr, to which Plato alludes,[99] is the same as that of Prajāpati (the Progenitor) with Death,[100] and the same as the contention of the Gandharvas, the gods of Love and Science, with the mundane deities, the sense powers, for the hand of the Voice, the Mother of the Word, the wife of the Sacerdotium.[101] This is, in fact, the debate of the Sacerdotium and the Regnum with which we are most familiar in terms of an opposition of sacred and profane, eternal and secular, an opposition that must be present wherever the needs of the soul and the body are *not* satisfied together.

Now what was chanted and enacted by the Progenitor in his sacrificial contest with Death was "calculated" *(saṃkhyānam)*[102] and "immortal," and what by Death "uncalculated" and "mortal"; and that deadly music played by Death is now our secular art of the "parlor" (*patnīśālā*), "whatever

people sing to the harp, or dance, or do to please themselves (*vṛthā*)," or even more literally, "do heretically," for the words *"vṛthā"* and "heresy" derive from a common root that means to "choose for oneself," to "know what one likes and to grasp at it." Death's informal and irregular music is disintegrating. On the other hand, the Progenitor "puts himself together," composes or synthesizes himself, "by means of the meters"; the Sacrificer "perfects himself so as to be metrically constituted,"[103] and makes of the measures the wings of his ascension.[104] The distinctions made here between a quickening art and one that adds to the sum of our mortality are those that underlie Plato's *katharsis* and all true puritanism and fastidiousness. There is no disparagement of the Voice (Sophia) herself, or of music or dancing or any other art as such. Whatever disparagement there is, is not of the instrument; there can be no good use without art.

The contest of the Gandharvas, the high gods of Love and Music (in Plato's broad sense of that word), is with the unregenerate powers of the soul, whose natural inclination is the pursuit of pleasures. What the Gandharvas offer to the Voice is their sacred science, the thesis of their incantation; what the mundane deities offer is "to please her." The Gandharvas' is a holy conversation (*brahmodaya*), that of the mundane deities an appetizing colloquy (*prakāmodaya*). Only too often the Voice, the expressive power, is seduced by the mundane deities to lend herself to the representation of whatever may best please them and be most flattering to herself; and it is when she thus prefers the pleasant falsehoods to the splendor of the sometimes bitter truth that the high gods have to fear lest she in turn seduce their legitimate spokesman, the Sacrificer himself; to fear, that is to say, a secularization of the sacred symbols and the hieratic language, the depletion of meaning that we are only too familiar with in the history of art, as it descends from formality to figuration, just as language develops from an original precision to what are ultimately hardly more than blurred emotive values.

It was not for this, as Plato said, that powers of vision and hearing are ours. In language as nearly as may be identical with his, and in terms of the universal philosophy wherever we find it, the Indian texts define the "whole end of the Voice" (*kṛtsnaṃ vāgārtham)*. We have already called the voice an "organ," to be taken in the musical as well as the organic sense. It is very evidently not the reason of an organ to play of itself, but to be played upon,

just as it is not for the clay to determine the form of the vessel, but to receive it.

"Now there is this divine harp: the human harp is in its likeness . . . and just as the harp struck by a skilled player fulfills the whole reason of the harp, so the Voice moved by a skilled speaker fulfills its whole reason."[105] "Skill in any performance is a yoking, as of steeds together,"[106] or, in other words, implies a marriage of the master and the means. The product of the marriage of the player, Intellect, with the instrument, the Voice, is Truth (*satyam*) or Science (*vidyā*),[107] not that approximate, hypothetical, and statistical truth that we refer to as science, but philosophy in Plato's sense,[108] and that "meaning of the Vedas" by which, if we understand it, "all good" (*sakalam bhadram*) is attainable, here and hereafter.[109]

The *raison d'être* of the Voice is to incarnate in a communicable form the concept of Truth; the formal beauty of the precise expression is that of the *splendor veritatis*. The player and the instrument are both essential here. We, in our somatic individuality, are the instrument, of which the "strings" or "senses" are to be regulated, so as to be neither slack nor overstrained; we are the organ, the inorganic God within us the organist. We are the organism, He its energy. It is not for us to play our own tunes, but to sing His songs, who is both the Person in the Sun (Apollo) and our own Person (as distinguished from our "personality"). When "those who sing here to the harp sing Him,"[110] then all desires are attainable, here and hereafter.

There is, then, a distinction to be drawn between a significant *(padārthābhinaya*) and liberating *(vimuktida*) art, the art of those who in their performances are celebrating God, the Golden Person, in both His natures, immanent and transcendent, and the *in-significant* art that is "colored by worldly passion" *(lokānurañjaka)* and "dependent on the moods" *(bhāvāśraya)*. The former is the "highway" *(mārga,* ὁδός) art that leads directly to the end of the road, the latter a "pagan" *(deśī,* ἄγριος*)* and eccentric art that wanders off in all directions, imitating anything and everything.[111]

If now the orthodox doctrines reported by Plato and the East are not convincing, this is because our sentimental generation, in which the power of the intellect has been so perverted by the power of observation that we can no longer distinguish the reality from the phenomenon, the Person in

the Sun from his sightly body, or the uncreated from electric light, will not be persuaded "though one rose from the dead." Yet I hope to have shown, in a way that may be ignored but cannot be refuted, that our use of the term "aesthetic" forbids us also to speak of art as pertaining to the "higher things of life" or the immortal part of us; that the distinction of "fine" from "applied" art, and corresponding manufacture of art in studios and artless industry in factories, takes it for granted that neither the artist nor the artisan shall be a whole man; that our freedom to work or starve is not a responsible freedom but only a legal fiction that conceals an actual servitude; that our hankering after a leisure state, or state of pleasure, to be attained by a multiplication of labor-saving devices, is born of the fact that most of us are doing forced labor, working at jobs to which we could never have been "called" by any other master than the salesman; that the very few, the happy few of us whose work is a vocation, and whose status is relatively secure, like nothing better than our work and can hardly be dragged away from it; that our division of labor, Plato's "fractioning of human faculty," makes the workman a part of the machine, unable ever to make or to co-operate responsibly in the making of any whole thing; that in the last analysis the so-called "emancipation of the artist"[112] is nothing but his final release from any obligation whatever to the God within him, and his opportunity to imitate himself or any other common clay at its worst; that all willful self-expression is autoerotic, narcissistic, and satanic, and the more its essentially paranoiac quality develops, suicidal; that while our invention of innumerable conveniences has made our unnatural manner of living in great cities so endurable that we cannot imagine what it would be like to do without them, yet the fact remains that not even the multimillionaire is rich enough to commission such works of art as are preserved in our museums but were originally made for men of relatively moderate means or, under the patronage of the church, for God and all men, and the fact remains that the multimillionaire can no longer send to the ends of the earth for the products of other courts or the humbler works of the folk, for all these things have been destroyed and their makers reduced to being the providers of raw materials for our factories, wherever our civilizing influence has been felt; and so, in short, that while the operation that we call a "progress" has been very successful, man the patient has succumbed.

Let us, then, admit that the greater part of what is taught in the fine arts departments of our universities, all of the psychologies of art, all the obscurities of modern aesthetics, are only so much verbiage, only a kind of defense that stands in the way of our understanding of the wholesome art, at the same time iconographically true and practically useful, that was once to be had in the marketplace or from any good artist; and that whereas the rhetoric that cares for nothing but the truth is the rule and method of the intellectual arts, our aesthetic is nothing but a false rhetoric, and a flattery of human weakness by which we can account only for the arts that have no other purpose than to please.

The whole intention of our own art may be aesthetic, and we may wish to have it so. But however this may be, we also pretend to a scientific and objective discipline of the history and appreciation of art, in which we take account not only of contemporary or very recent art but also of the whole of art from the beginning until now. It is in this arena that I shall throw down a minimum challenge: I put it to you that it is not by our aesthetic, but only by their rhetoric, that we can hope to understand and interpret the arts of other peoples and other ages than our own. I put it to you that our present university courses in this field embody a pathetic fallacy, and are anything but scientific in any sense.

And now, finally, in case you should complain that I have been drawing upon very antiquated sources (and what else could I do, seeing that we are all "so young" and "do not possess a single belief that is ancient and derived from old tradition, nor yet one science that is hoary with age"[113]) let me conclude with a very modern echo of this ancient wisdom, and say with Thomas Mann that "I like to think—yes, I feel sure—that a future is coming in which we shall condemn as black magic, as the brainless, irresponsible product of instinct, all art which is not controlled by the intellect."[114]

[1]Quintilian IX.4.117, "Figura? Quae? cum orationis, tum etiam sententiae?" Cf. Plato, *Republic* 601B.

[2] "I cannot fairly give the name of 'art' to anything irrational." Cf. *Laws* 890D, "Law and art are children of the intellect" ((νοῦς). Sensation (αἴσθησις) and pleasure (ἡδονή)(are irrational (ἄλογος; see *Timaeus* 28A, 47D, 690). In the *Gorgias*, the irrational is that which cannot give an account of itself, that

which is unreasonable, has no *raison d'être*. See also Philo, *Legum Allegoriarum* I.48, “For as grass is the food of irrational beings, so has the sensibly-perceptible (τὸ αἰσθητόν) been assigned to the irrational part of the soul.” Αἴσθησις is just what the biologist now calls “irritability.”

[3] Quoted with approval by Herbert Read, *Art and Society* (New York, 1937), p. 84, from Alfred North Whitehead, *Religion in the Making* (New York, 1926).

[4] *Sum. Theol.* 1-II.57.3c (art is an intellectual virtue); I.5.4 ad 1 (beauty pertains to the cognitive, not the appetitive faculty).

[5] “Pathology ... 2. The study of the passions or emotions” *(The Oxford English Dictionary,* 1933, VII, 554). The “psychology of art” is not a science of art but of the way in which we are affected by works of art. An affection is pas(πάθημα) sive; making or doing (ποίημα, ἔργον)(is an activity.

[6] See Charles Sears Baldwin, *Medieval Rhetoric and Poetic* (New York, 1928), p. 3. “A real art of speaking which does not lay hold upon the truth does not exist and never will” *(Phaedrus* 260E; cf. *Gorgias* 463-465, 513D, 517A, 527c, *Laws* 937E).

[7] See E. F. Rothschild, *The Meaning of Unintelligibility in Modern Art* (Chicago, 1934), P. 98. “The course of artistic achievement was the change from the visual as a means of comprehending the non-visual to the visual as an end in itself and the abstract structure of physical forms as the purely artistic transcendence of the visual . . . *a transcendence utterly alien and unintelligible* to the average [sc. normal] man” (F. de W. Bolman, criticizing E. Kahler’s *Man the Measure,* in *Journal of Philosophy,* XLI, 1944, 134-135; italics mine).

[8] *Sum. Theol.* I.45.6c, “Artifex autem per verbum in intellectu conceptum et per amorem suae voluntatis ad aliquid relatum, operatur”; I.14.8c, “Artifex operatur per suum intellectum”; I.45.7c “Forma artificiati est ex conceptione artificis.” See also St. Bonaventura, *II Sententiarum* 1-I.I.1 *ad* 3 and 4, “Agens per intellectum producit per formas.” Informality is ugliness.

[9] *Gorgias* 503E.

[10] *Symposium* 205c.

[11] See, for example, *Statesman* 259E, *Phaedrus* 260E, *Laws* 938A. The word *τριβή* literally means "a rubbing," and is an exact equivalent of our modern expression "a grind." (Cf. Hippocrates, *Fractures* 772, "shameful and artless," and Ruskin's "industry without art is brutality.") "For all well-governed peoples there is a work enjoined upon each man which he must perform" *(Republic* 406c). "Leisure" is the opportunity to do this work without interference *(Republic* 370c). A "work for leisure" is one requiring undivided attention (Euripides, *Andromache* 552). Plato's view of work in no way differs from that of Hesiod, who says that work is no reproach but the best gift of the gods to men *(Works and Days* 295-296). Whenever Plato disparages the mechanical arts, it is with reference to the kinds of work that provide for the well-being of the body only, and do not at the same time provide spiritual food; he does not connect culture with idleness.

12 *Republic* 342BC. What is made by art is correctly made *(Alcibiades* I.108b). It will follow that those who are in possession of and governed by their art and not by their own irrational impulses, which yearn for innovations, will operate in the same way *(Republic* 349-350, *Laws* 660n). "Art has fixed ends and ascertained means of operation" *(Sum. Theol*. 11-II.47.4 2,49-5 ad *2)*. It is in the same way that an oracle, speaking *ex cathedra,* is infallible, but not so the man when speaking for himself. This is similarly true in the case of a guru.

[13] *Republic* 369BC, *Statesman* 279CD, *Epinomis* 975c.

[14] *Republic* 398A, 401b, 605-607; *Laws* 656c.

[15] Deut. 8:3, Luke 4:4.

[16] *Republic* 376E, 410A-412A, 521E-522A, *Laws* 673A. Plato always has in view an attainment of the "best" for both the body and the soul, "since for any single kind to be left by itself pure and isolated is not good, nor altogether possible" *(Philebus* 63B; cf. *Republic* 409-410). "The one means

of salvation from these evils is neither to exercise the soul without the body nor the body without the soul" *(Timaeus* 88B).

[17] *Sum. Theol*. I-II.57.3 *ad* 2 (based on Plato's view of justice, which assigns to every man the work for which he is naturally fitted). None of the arts pursues its own good, but only the patron's *(Republic* 342B, 347A), which lies in the excellence of the product.

[18] *Timaeus* 47DE; cf. *Laws* 659E, on the chant.

[19] *Timaeus* 80B, echoed in Quintilian IX.117, "docti rationem componendi intelligunt, etiam indocti voluptatem." Cf. *Timaeus* 47, 90D.

[20] *Sāhitya Darpaṇa* III.2-3; cf. Coomaraswamy, *The Transformation of Nature in Art,* 1934, pp. 48-51.

[21] *Laws* 840c. On *katharsis,* see Plato, *Sophist* 226-227, *Phaedrus* 243AB, *Phaedo 66-67,* 82B, *Republic* 399E; Aristotle, *Poetics* VI.2.1449b.

[22] *Phaedo* 67DE.

[23] *Phaedrus* 279BC; so also Hermes, *Lib*. xIII.3, 4, "I have passed forth out of myself," and Chuang-tzu, ch. 2, "Today I buried myself." Cf. Coomaraswamy, "On Being in One's Right Mind," 1942.

[24] *Republic* 389-398.

[25] [Aristotle, *Poetics* VI.2.1449b].

[26]The aesthetic man is "one who is too weak to stand up against pleasure and pain" *(Republic* 556c). If we think of impassibility (ἀπάθεια, not what we mean by "apathy" but a being superior to the pulls of pleasure and pain; cf. BG II.56) with horror, it is because we should be "unwilling to live without hunger and thirst and the like, if we could not also *suffer (πάσχω* Skr. *bādḥ)* the natural consequences of these passions," the pleasures of eating and drinking and enjoying fine colors and sounds *(Philebus* 54E, 55B). Our

attitude to pleasures and pains is always passive, if not, indeed, masochistic. [Cf. Coomaraswamy, *Time and Eternity,* 1947, p. 73 and notes.]

It is very clear from *Republic* 606 that the enjoyment of an emotional storm is just what Plato does not mean by a *katharsis;* such an indulgence merely fosters the very feelings that we are trying to suppress. A perfect parallel is found in the *Milinda Pañho* (Mil, p. 76); it is asked, of tears shed for the death of a mother or shed for love of the Truth, which can be called a "cure" *(bhesajjam)*—i.e. for man's mortality—and it is pointed out that the former are fevered, the latter cool, and that it is what cools that cures.

[27]JUB III.30.2 and 39.2; BU III.7.3-4; CU VIII.13; Śvet. Up. V.14. Cf. *Phaedo* 65-69.

[28] *Statesman* 288c.

[29]*Philebus 67b*.

[30] *Republic* 399-404; cf. *Laws* 656E, 660, 797-799.

[31] *Laws* 659E; see also note 86, below.

[32] *Republic* 399E; cf. Dante, *Paradiso* I.13-21.

[33] Aristotle, *Physics* II.2.194a 20, ἡ τέχνη μιμεῖται τὴν φύσιν both employing suitable means toward a known end.

[34] Art is iconography, the making of images or copies of some model (παρά-δειγμα), whether visible (presented) or invisible (contemplated); see Plato, *Republic* 373B, 377E, 392-397, 402, *Laws* 667-669, *Statesman* 306D, *Cratylus* 439A, *Timaeus* 28AB, 52BC, *Sophist* 234c, 236c; Aristotle, *Poetics* I.1-2. In the same way, Indian works of art are called counterfeits or commensurations *(anukṛti, tadākāratd, pratikṛti, pratibimba, pratimāna),* and likeness *(sārūpya, sādṛśya)* is demanded. This does not mean that it is a likeness in all respects that is needed to evoke the original, but an equality as to the whichness (τοσοῦτον, ὅσον) and whatness (τοιοῦτον, οἷον)·—or form (ἰδέα) and force (δύναμις)—of the archetype. It is this "real equality" or "adequacy"

(αὐτὸ τὸ ἴσον) that is the truth and the beauty of the work (*Laws* 667-668, *Timaeus* 28AB, *Phaedo* 74-75). We have shown elsewhere that the Indian *sādṛśya* does not imply an illusion but only a real equivalence. It is clear from *Timaeus* 28-29 that by "equality" and "likeness" Plato also means a real kinship (συγγένεια) and analogy (ἀναλογία), and that it is these qualities that make it possible for an image to "interpret" or "deduce" (ἐξηγέομαι, cf. Skr. *am)* its archetype. For example, words are εἴδωλα of things (*Sophist* 234c), "true names" are not correct by accident (*Cratylus* 387D, 439A), the body is an εἴδωλον of the soul (*Laws* 959s), and these images are at the same time like and yet unlike their referents. In other words, what Plato means by "imitation" and by "art" is an "adequate symbolism" [cf. distinction of image from duplicate, *Cratylus* 432].

[35] "The mathematician's patterns, like the painter's or the poet's, must be *beautiful*" (G. H. Hardy, *A Mathematician's Apology,* Cambridge, 1940, p. 85); cf. Coomaraswamy, *Why Exhibit Works of Art?,* 1943, ch. 9.

[36] *Philebus* 51c. For beauty by participation, see *Phaedo* 100D; cf. *Republic* 476; St. Augustine, *Confessions* X.34; Dionysius, *De divinis nominibus* IV.5.

[37] *Laws* 657AB, 665c, 700c.

[38] *Laws* 670E; *Sum. Theol.* I.91.3, 1-II.57.3 *ad 2*.

[39] Cicero, *Pro quinctio* XXV.78.

[40] *Republic* 395c; cf. 395-401, esp. 401BC, 605-607, and *Laws* 656c.

[41] *Republic* 400A, 598B; cf. *Timaeus* 29c.

[42] *Republic* 500E.

[43] Plotinus, *Enneads* V.9.11, like Plato, *Timaeus* 28AB.

[44]Exod. 25:40.

[45] AB VI.27.

[46]ŚA VIII.9.

[47] ŚB VII.2.I.4; cf. III.3.3.16, XIV.I.2.26, and TS V.5.4.4. Whenever the Sacrificers are at a loss, they are required to contemplate *(cetayadhvam),* and the required form thus seen becomes their model. Cf. Philo, *Moses* II.74-76.

[48]*Republic* 377, 402, *Laws* 667-668, *Timaeus* 28AB, *Phaedrus* 243AB (on ἁμαρτία περὶ μυθολογίαν), *Republic* 382BC (misuse of words is a symptom of sickness in the soul).

[49] See *Republic* 601, for example. Porphyry tells us that Plotinus refused to have his portrait painted, objecting, “Must I consent to leave, as a desirable spectacle for posterity, an image of an image?” Cf. Asterius, bishop of Amasea, ca. A.D. 340: “Paint not Christ: for the one humility of his incarnation suffices him” (Migne, *Patrologia graeca* XI.167). The real basis of the Semitic objection to graven images, and of all other iconoclasm, is not an objection to art (adequate symbolism), but an objection to a realism that implies an essentially idolatrous worship of nature. The figuration of the Ark according to the pattern that was seen upon the mount (Exod. 25:40) is not “that kind of imagery with reference to which the prohibition was given” (Tertullian, *Contra Marcionem* II.22).

[50] *Timaeus* 28AB; cf. note 34, above. The symbols that are rightly sanctioned by a hieratic art are not conventionally but *naturally* correct (ὀρθότητα φύσει παρ-εχόμενα, *Laws* 657A). One distinguishes, accordingly, between *le symbolisme qui salt* and *le symbolisme qui cherche*. It is the former that the iconographer can and must understand, but he will hardly be able to do so unless he is himself accustomed to thinking in these precise terms.

[51] The realities are seen “by the eye of the soul” *(Republic* 5330), “the soul alone and by itself” *(Theaetetus* 186A, 187A), “gazing ever on what is authentic” (πρὸς τὸ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἔχον βλέπων ἀεί, *Timaeus* 28A; cf. πρὸς τὸν θεὸν βλέπειν, *Phaedrus* 253A), and thus “by in wit (intuition) of what really is” (περὶ τὸ ὂν ὄντως ἐννοίαις, *Philebus* 590). Just so in India, it is only when the senses have been withdrawn from their objects, only when the eye has been turned

round *(āvṛtta cakṣus),* and with the eye of Gnosis *(jñāna cakṣus),* that the reality can be apprehended.

[52] The contemplative *actus primus* (θεωρία, Skr. *dhi, dhyāna)* and operative *actus secundus* (ἀπεργασία, Skr. *karma)* of the Scholastic philosophers.

[53] "One man is able to beget the productions of art, but the ability to judge of their utility (ὠφελία) or harmfulness to their users belongs to another" *(Phaedrus* 274E). The two men are united in the whole man and complete connoisseur, as they are in the Divine Architect whose "judgments" are recorded in Gen. 1:25 and 31.

[54] *Laws* 667; for a need as first and last cause, see *Republic* 369BC. As to "wholesomeness," cf. Richard Bernheimer, in *Art: A Bryn Mawr Symposium* (Bryn Mawr, 1940), pp. 28-29: "There should be a deep ethical purpose in all of art, of which the classical aesthetic was fully aware. ... To have forgotten this purpose before the mirage of absolute patterns and designs is perhaps the fundamental fallacy of the abstract movement in art." The modern abstractionist forgets that the Neolithic formalist was not an interior decorator but a metaphysical man who had to live by his wits.

The indivisibility of beauty and use is affirmed in Xenophon, *Memorabilia* III.8.8, "that the same house is both beautiful and useful was a lesson in the art of building houses as they ought to be" (cf. IV.6.9). "Omnis enim artifex intendit producere opus pulcrum et utile et stabile. . . . Scientia reddit opus pulcrum, voluntas reddit utile, perseverantia reddit stabile" (St. Bonaventura, *De reductione artium ad theologiam* 13; tr. de Vinck: "Every maker intends to produce a beautiful, useful, and enduring object. . . . Knowledge makes a work beautiful, the will makes it useful, and perseverance makes it enduring.") So for St. Augustine, the stylus is "et in suo genere pulcher, et ad usum nostrum accommodatus" *(De vera religione* 39). Philo defines art as "a system of concepts co-ordinated towards some useful end" *(Congr.* 141). Only those whose notion of utility is solely with reference to bodily needs, or on the other hand, the pseudomystics who despise the body rather than use it, vaunt the "uselessness" of art: so Gautier, "Il n'y a de vraiment beau que ce qui ne peut servir à rien; tout ce qui est utile est laid" (quoted by Dorothy Richardson, "Saintsbury and Art

for Art's Sake in England," PMLA, XLIX, 1944, 245), and Paul Valéry (see Coomaraswamy, *Why Exhibit Works of Art?,* 1943, p. 95). Gautier's cynical "tout ce qui est utile est laid" adequately illustrates Ruskin's "industry without art is brutality"; a more scathing judgment of the modern world in which utilities are really ugly could hardly be imagined. As H. J. Massingham said, "The combination of use and beauty is part of what used to be called 'the natural law' and is indispensable for self-preservation," and it is because of the neglect of this principle that civilization "is perishing" *(This Plot of Earth,* London, 1944, p. 176). The modern world is dying of its own squalor just because *its* concept of practical utility is limited to that which "can be used directly for the destruction of human life or for accentuating the present inequalities in the distribution of wealth" (Hardy, *A Mathematician's Apology,* p. 120, note), and it is only under these unprecedented conditions that it could have been propounded by the escapists that the useful and the beautiful are opposites.

[55] *Laws* 668c, 669AB, 670E.

[56] *Laws* 860c.

[57] *Philebus* 6IB-D.

[58] *Republic* 376E, 410-412, 521E-522A.

[59] *Republic* 519-520, 539E, *Laws* 644, and 803 in conjunction with 807. Cf. BG III.1-25; also Coomaraswamy, "Līlā," 1941, and "Play and Seriousness," 1942 [both in *Coomaraswamy* 2].

[60] Deut. 8:3, Luke 4:4, John 6:58.

[61] R. R. Schmidt, *Dawn of the Human Mind* (*Der Geist der Vorzeit*)*,* tr. R.A.S. Macalister (London, 1936), p. 167.

[62] *Republic* 495E; cf. 522B, 611D, *Theaetetus* 173AB. That "industry without art is brutality" is hardly flattering to those whose admiration of the industrial system is equal to their interest in it. Aristotle defines as "slaves" those who have nothing but their bodies to offer *(Politics* I.5.1254b 18). It is

on the work of such “slaves,” or literally “prostitutes,” that the industrial system of production for profit ultimately rests. Their political freedom does not make of assembly-line workers and other “base mechanics” what Plato means by “free men.”

[63] *Republic* 395B, 500D. Cf. Philo, *De opificio mundi* 78.

[64] *Republic* 433B, 443c.

[65] *Republic* 370c; cf. 347E, 374BC, 406c. Paul Shorey had the naïveté to see in Plato’s conception of a vocational society an anticipation of Adam Smith’s division of labor; see *The Republic,* tr. and ed. P. Shorey (LCL, 1935), I, 150-151, note b. Actually, no two conceptions could be more contrary. In Plato’s division of labor it is taken for granted not that the artist is a special kind of man but that every man is a special kind of artist; his specialization is for the good of all concerned, producer and consumer alike. Adam Smith’s division benefits no one but the manufacturer and salesman. Plato, who detested any “fractioning of human faculty” *(Republic* 395B), could hardly have seen in *our* division of labor a type of justice. Modern research has rediscovered that “workers are *not* governed primarily by economic motives” (see Stuart Chase, *“What* Makes the Worker Like to Work?” *Reader's Digest,* February 1941, p. 19).

[66] Chuang-tzu, as quoted by Arthur Waley, *Three Ways of Thought in Ancient China* (London, 1939), p. 62. It is not true to say that “the artist is a mercenary living by the sale of his own works” (F. J. Mather, *Concerning Beauty,* Princeton, 1935, p. 240). He is not working in order to make money but accepts money (or its equivalent) in order to be able to go on working at his living—and I say “working at his *living”* because the man *is* what he does.

[67] “A man attains perfection by devotion to his own work ... by his own work praising Him who wove this all. . . . Whoever does the work appointed by his own nature incurs no sin” (BG XVIII.45-46).

[68] *Republic* 395c. [See Aristotle on “leisure,” *Nicomachean Ethics* X.7.5-7.1177b.]

[69] *Republic 377E, Symposium* 196E.

[70] H. J. Rose, *A Handbook of Greek Mythology* (2d ed., London, 1933), p. 11. Clement Greenberg (in *The Nation,* April 19, 1941, p. 481) tells us that the "modern painter derives his inspiration from the very physical materials he works with." Both critics forget the customary distinction of spirit from matter. What their statements actually mean is that the modern artist may be excited, but is not inspired.

[71] Eckhart, Evans ed., II, 211; cf. *Laws* 892BC.

[72] Homer, *Odyssey* XIX.138.

[73] *Theogony* 31-32.

[74] John 8:28; cf. 5:19 and 30, 7:16 and 18 ("He that speaketh from himself seeketh his own glory"). A column in *Parnassus,* XIII (May 1941), 189, comments on the female nude as Maillol's "exclusive inspiration." That is mere hot air; Renoir was not afraid to call a spade a spade when he said with what brush he painted.

[75] *Purgatorio* XXIV.52-54.

[76] *Phaedrus* 260E; *Symposium* 201c (on the irrefutable truth).

[77] *Timaeus* 69c, 90A.

[78] *Hippias Major* 288D.

[79] *Symposium* 197A.

[80] Ambrose on 1 Cor. 12:3, cited in *Sum. Theol.* 1-II.109.1. Note that "a quocumque dicatur" contradicts the claim that it is only Christian truth that is "revealed."

[81] *Ion* 533D. For the passage on inspiration, see *Ion* 5330-536D. Plato's doctrine of inspiration is not "mechanical" but "dynamic"; in a later

theology it became a matter for debate in which of these two ways the Spirit actuates the interpreter.

[82] *Ion* 533E, 534B. γίγνομαι here is used in the radical sense of "coming into a new state of being." Cf. *Phaedrus* 279B, καλῷ γενέσθαι τἄνδοθεν, "May I be born in beauty inwardly," i.e., born of the immanent deity (δ' ἐν ἡμῖν θείῳ, *Timaeus* 90D), authentic and divine beauty (αὐτὸ τὸ θεῖον καλὸν, *Symposium* 211E). The New Testament equivalents are "in the Spirit" and "born again of the Spirit."

[83] *Ion* 534B. "The madness that comes of God is superior to the sanity which is of human origin" (*Phaedrus* 244D, 245A). Cf. *Timaeus* 71D-72B, *Laws* 719c; and MU VI.34.7, "When one attains to mindlessness, that is the last step." The subject needs a longer explanation; briefly, the supralogical is superior to the logical, the logical to the illogical.

[84] "The God" is the Immanent Spirit, Daimon, Eros. "He is a maker (ποιητής) so really wise (σοφός) that he is the cause of making in others" (*Symposium* 196E). The voice is "enigmatic" *(Timaeus* 72B), and poetry, therefore, "naturally enigmatic" *(Alcibiades 11* 147B), so that in "revelation" (scripture, Skr. ś*ruti*, "what was heard") we see "through a glass darkly" (ἐν αἰνίγματι, I Cor. 13:12). Because divination is of a Truth that cannot (with human faculties) be seen directly (Skr. *sākṣāt*), the soothsayer must speak in symbols (whether verbal or visual), which are reflections of the Truth; it is for us to understand and use the symbols as supports of contemplation and with a view to "recollection." It is because the symbols are things seen "through a glass" that contemplation is "speculation."

[85] See *Ion* 534, 535. Related passages have been cited in notes 82-84, above. The last words refer to the diversity of the gifts of the spirit; see I Cor. 12:4-11.

[86] "What we call 'chants' ... are evidently in reality 'incantations' seriously designated to produce in souls that harmony of which we have been speaking" (*Laws* 659E; cf. 665c, 656E, 660B, 668-669, 812c, *Republic* 399, 424). Such incantations are called *mantras* in Sanskrit.

[87] *Timaeus* 90D. The whole purpose of contemplation and yoga is to reach that state of being in which there is no longer any distinction of knower from known, or being from knowing. It is just from this point of view that while all the arts are imitative, it matters so much *what* is imitated, a reality or an effect, for we become like what we think most about. "One comes to be of just such stuff as that on which the mind is set" (MU VI.34).

[88] "To become like God (ὁμοίωσις θεῷ), so far as that is possible, is to 'escape' " (*Theaetetus* 176B; φυγή here = λύσις= Skr. *mokṣa)*. "But we all, with open face beholding as in a glass the glory of the Lord, are changed into the same image . . . looking not at the things which are seen, but at the things which are not seen ... the things which .. . *are* eternal" (11 Cor. 3:18, 4:18). "This likeness begins now again to be formed in us" (St. Augustine, *De spiritu et littera* 37). Cf. Coomaraswamy, "The Traditional Conception of Ideal Portraiture," in *Why Exhibit Works of Art?,* 1943.

[89] *Timaeus* 90D.

[90] AB VI.27.

[91] *Republic* 409-410.

[92] See Coomaraswamy, "Ornament" [in *Coomaraswamy* 1].

[93] Walter Andrae, *Die ionische Säule* (Berlin, 1933), p. 65 [cf. Coomaraswamy's review, in *Coomaraswamy* 1]. The same scholar writes, with reference to pottery, especially that of the Stone Age and with reference to Assyrian glazing, "Ceramic art in the service of Wisdom, the wisdom that activates knowledge to the level of the spiritual, indeed the divine, as science does to earthbound things of all kinds. Service is here a voluntary, entirely self-sacrificing and entirely conscious dedication of the personality ... as it is and should be in true divine worship. Only this service is worthy of art, of ceramic art. To make the primordial truth intelligible, to make the unheard audible, to enunciate the primordial word, to illustrate the primordial image —such is the task of art, or it is not art." ("Keramik im Dienste der Weisheit," *Berichte der deutschen keramischen Gesellschaft,* XVII: 12 [1936], 623.) Cf. *Timaeus* 28AB.

[94] ŚB VIII.I.2.8; AB V.23; TS II.5.II.5; JUB I.33.4 (*karoty eva vācā . . . gamayati manasā*). Vāc is the Muse, and as the Muses are the daughters of Zeus, so is Vāc the daughter of the Progenitor, of Intellect (*Manas,* νοῦς)—i.e., *intellectus vel spiritus,* "the habit of First Principles." As Sarasvatī she bears the lute and is seated on the Sunbird as vehicle.

[95] "This the 'Beatitude' *(ānanda)* of Brahmā, that by means of Intellect *(Manas,* νοῦς), his highest form, he betakes himself to 'the Woman' (Vāc); a son like himself is born of her" (BU IV.I.6). The son is Agni, *bṛhad uktha,* the Logos.

[96] RV X.31.2 (*śreyāṇsaṃ dakṣaṃ manasā jagṛbhyāt*); BD II.84. The governing authority is always masculine, the power feminine.

[97] AB V.33, etc. Śrī as *brahmavādinī* is "Theologia."

[98] ŚB III.x4.11; cf. "the Asura's gibberish" (ŚB III.2.1.23). It is because of the dual possibility of an application of the Voice to the statement of truth or falsehood that she is called the "double-faced"—i.e., "two-tongued" (ŚB III.x4.16). These two possibilities correspond to Plato's distinction of the Uranian from the Pandemic (Πάνδημος) and disordered (ἄτακτος) Aphrodite, one the mother of the Uranian or Cosmic Eros, the other, the "Queen of Various Song" (Πολύμνια) and mother of the Pandemic Eros (*Symposium* 180DE, 187E, *Laws* 840E).

[99] *Republic* 399E.

[100] JB II.69, 70, and 73.

[101] ŚB III.x4.1-6 and 16-22; cf. III.2.I.19-23.

[102] *Saṃkhyānam* is "reckoning" or "calculation" and corresponds in more senses than one to Plato's λογισμός.. We have seen that accuracy (ὀρθότης,, *integritas)* is the first requirement for good art, and that this amounts to saying that art is essentially iconography, to be distinguished by its *logic* from merely emotional and instinctive expression. It is precisely the precision of "classical" and "canonical" art that modern feeling most

resents; we demand organic forms adapted to an "in-feeling" *(Einfühlung)* rather than the measured forms that require "in-sight" *(Einsehen)*.

A good example of this can be cited in Lars-Ivar Ringbom's "Entstehung und Entwicklung der Spiralornamentik," in *Acta Archaeologica,* IV (1933), 151-200. Ringbom demonstrates first the extraordinary perfection of early spiral ornament and shows how even its most complicated forms must have been produced with the aid of simple *tools*. But he resents this "measured" perfection, as of something "known and deliberately made, the work of the intellect rather than a psychic expression" ("sie ist bewusst und willkürlich gemacht, mehr Verstandesarbeit als seelischer Ausdruck") and admires the later "forms of freer growth, approximating more to those of Nature." These organic ("organisch-gewachsen") forms are the "psychological expression of man's instinctive powers, that drive him more and more to representation and figuration." Ringbom could hardly have better described the kind of art that Plato would have called unworthy of free men; the free man is not "driven by forces of instinct." What Plato admired was precisely not the organic and figurative art that was coming into fashion in his time, but the formal and canonical art of Egypt that remained constant for what he thought had been ten thousand years, for there it had been possible "for those modes that are by nature correct to be canonized and held forever sacred" (*Laws* 656-657; cf. 798AB, 799A). There "art . . . was not for the delectation ... of the senses" (Earl Baldwin Smith, *Egyptian Architecture,* New York, 1938, p. 27).

[103] AĀ III.2.6, *sa candobhir ātmānaṃ samādadhāt*; AB VI.27, *candomayam . . . ātmānaṃ saṃskurute*.

[104] For what Plato means by wings, see *Phaedrus* 246-256 and *Ion* 534B. "It is as a bird that the Sacrificer reaches the world of heaven" (PB V.3.5). *Phaedrus* 247BC corresponds to PB XIV.I. 12-13, "Those who reach the top of the great tree, how do they fare thereafter? Those who have wings fly forth, those that are wingless fall down"; the former are the "wise," the latter the "foolish" (cf. *Phaedrus* 249c, "It is only the philosopher's discriminating mind that is winged"). For the Gandharva (Eros) as a winged "maker" and as such the archetype of human poets, see RV X. 177.2 and

JUB III.36. For "metrical wings," see PB X.4.5 and XIX.II.8; JUB III.13.10; AV VIII.9.12. The meters are "birds" (TS VI.I.6.1; PB XIX.II.8).

[105] ŚA VIII.10.

[106] BG II.50, *yogah karmasu kauśalam*. If yoga is also the "renunciation" (*saṃnyāsa)* of works (BG v.I and VI.2), this is only another way of saying the same thing, since this renunciation is essentially the abandonment of the notion "I am the doer" and a reference of the works to their real author whose skill is infallible: "The Father that dwelleth in me, he doeth the works" (John 14:10).

[107] ŚA VII.5 and 75 cf. *Phaedo* 61 ab.

[108] What is meant by *vidyā* as opposed to *avidyā* is explicit in *Phaedrus* 247C-E, "All true knowledge is concerned with what is colorless, formless and intangible (Skr. *avarṇa, arūpa, agrahya)*" "not such knowledge as has a beginning and varies as it is associated with one or another of the things that we now call realities, but that which is really real (Skr. *satyasya satyam)."* Cf. CU VII.16.1 and 17.1, with commentary; also *Philebus* 58A.

[109] ŚA XIV. 2.

[110] CU I.7.6-7. Cf. Coomaraswamy, "The Sun-kiss," 1940, p. 49, n. 11.

[111] For all the statements in this paragraph, see CU I.6-9; *Sāhitya Darpaṇa* I.4-6; and *Daśarūpa* I.12-14.

[112] [See John D. Wild, *Plato's Theory of Man* (Cambridge, Mass., 1946), p. 84.]

[113] *Timaeus* 22BC.

[114] In *The Nation* (December 10, 1938). Cf. Socrates' dictum at the head of this chapter.

6

The Nature of Buddhist Art

> He is not himself brought into being in images presented through our senses, but He presents all things to us in such images.
>
> Hermes, *Lib*. V.1b

In order to understand the nature of the Buddha image and its meaning for a Buddhist we must, to begin with, reconstruct its environment, trace its ancestry, and remodel our own personality. We must forget that we are looking at "art" in a museum, and see the image in its place in a Buddhist church or as part of a sculptured rock wall; and having seen it, receive it as an image of what we are ourselves potentially. Remember that we are pilgrims come from some great distance to see God; that what we see will depend upon ourselves. We are to see, not the likeness made by hands, but its transcendental archetype; we are to take part in a communion. We have heard the spoken Word, and remember that "He who sees the Word, sees Me"; we are to see this Word, not now in an audible but in a visible and tangible form. In the words of a Chinese inscription, "When we behold the precious characteristics, it is as though the whole and very person of the Buddha were present in majesty. . . . The Vulture Peak is before our eyes; Nāgarahāra is present. There is a rain of precious flowers that robs the very clouds of color; a celestial music is heard, enough to silence the sound of ten thousand flutes. When we consider the perfection of the Body of the Word, the eight perils are avoided; when we hear the teaching of the Mighty Intellect, the seventh heaven is reached" (E. Chavannes, *Mission archéologique dans la Chine septentrionale,* 3 vols., Paris, 1909-1913, I, 340). The image is of one Awakened: and for our awakening, who are still asleep. The objective methods of "science" will not suffice; there can be no understanding without assimilation; to understand is to have been born again.

The epithet “Awakened” (Buddha) evokes in our minds today the concept of an historical figure, the personal discoverer of an ethical, psychological, contemplative, and monastic Way of salvation from the infection of death: which Way extends hence toward a last and beatific End, which is variously referred to as a Reversion, Despiration, or Release, indescribable in terms of being or nonbeing considered as incompatible alternatives, but certainly not an empirical existence nor an annihilation. The Buddha “is”; but he “cannot be taken hold of.”

In the developed Buddhist art with which we are now mainly concerned, we take for granted the predominance of the central figure of a “Founder” in a form that can only be described, although with important reservations, as anthropomorphic. If we take account of the manner in which this usually monastic but sometimes royal figure is sharply distinguished from its human environment, for example, by the nimbus or by the lotus support, or similarly take account of the “mythical” character of the life itself as described in the early texts, we generally say that the man who is spoken of as “Thus-come” (Tathāgata) or as the “Wake” (Buddha) has been “deified,” and presume that miraculous elements have been combined with the historical nucleus and introduced into the representations for edifying purposes. We hardly realize that “Buddhism” has roots that can be traced backward for millennia; and that though the Buddha’s doctrines are in the proper sense of the word original, they are scarcely in any sense novel; nor that this applies with equal force to the problems of Buddhist art, which are not in reality those of Buddhist art in particular, but rather those of Indian art in a Buddhist application and, in the last analysis, the problems of art universally. It would be possible, for example, to discuss the whole problem of iconoclasm in purely Indian terms; and we shall in fact have something to say about it, in making the nature and genesis of the anthropomorphic image the main theme of this introduction.

If “Buddhism” (we use quotations because the connotation is so vast) is a heterodox doctrine in the sense that it apparently rejects the impersonal authority of the Vedas and substitutes or seems to substitute for this the authority of an historically spoken Word, it is nevertheless becoming more apparent every day that the content of Buddhism and Buddhist art are far more orthodox than was at first imagined, and orthodox not only in a Vedic sense, but even universally. For example, the famous formula, *anicca, anattā, dukkha* “Impermanence, Nonspirit, Suffering,” does not, as was

once believed, involve a denial of the Spirit (*ātman),* but asserts that the soul-and-body or individuality (*nāma-rūpa, atta-bhāva, saviññāna-kāya)* of man are passable, mutable, and above all to be sharply distinguished from the Spirit. *Anattā* does not assert that "there is no Spirit" or "Spiritual-essence," but that "this (empirical self, *Leibseele)* is not my Spirit," *na me so attā,* a formula constantly repeated in the Pali texts. It is in almost the same words that the Upaniṣads assert that "what is other than the Spirit is a misery" (*ato anyad ārtam)* and that "this (its station) is not the Spirit, no indeed: the Spirit is naught that can be taken hold of, naught perishable, etc." *(sa eṣa neti nety ātmā agrihyo . . . aśīryaḥ,* etc., BU III.4.1 and 9.26). This is the greatest of all distinctions, apart from which there can be no intelligence of man's last end; and we find it insisted upon, accordingly, in all orthodox traditions—for example, by St. Paul when he says, "The word of God is quick and powerful, and sharper than any two-edged sword, piercing even to the dividing asunder of soul and spirit" (Heb. 4:12).

We have traced elsewhere[1] the Vedic sources and universal values of Buddhist symbolism, and shall presently discuss the nature of symbolism itself. Here it will suffice to add that the Vedic and Buddhist, or equally Vedic and Vaiṣṇava or Vedic and Jaina scriptures, taken together in continuity, enunciate the dual doctrine, which is also a Christian doctrine, of an eternal and a temporal birth; if the former alone is expounded in the *Ṛg Veda,* the Buddha's historical nativity is in reality the story of the aeonic manifestation of Agni—*Noster Deus ignis consumens est*—compressed "as if" into the span of a single existence. The "going forth" from the household to the homeless life is the ritual transference of Agni from the household to the sacrificial altar; if the Vedic prophets are forever tracking the Hidden Light by the traces of its footsteps, it is literally and iconographically true that the Buddhist also makes the *vestigium pedis* his guide; and if Agni in the Vedic texts, as also in the Old Testament, is a "Pillar of Fire," the Buddha is repeatedly represented as such at Amarāvatī. We need hardly say that, from our point of view, to speak of the "lives" of the Buddha or Christ as "mythical" is but to enhance their timeless significance.[2]

We very naturally overlook the fact that the central problem of Buddhist art, of which a solution is essential to any real understanding, is not a problem of styles, but of how it came about that the Buddha has been represented at all in an anthropomorphic form: which is almost the same thing as to ask why indeed the Great King of Glory should have veiled his

person in mendicant robes—*Cur Deus homo?* The Buddhist answer is, of course, that the assumption of a human nature is motivated by a divine compassion, and is in itself a manifestation of the Buddha's perfect virtuosity (*kosalla, kauśalya*) in the use of convenient means *(upāya):* it is expressly stated of the Buddha that it belongs to his skill to reveal himself in accordance with the nature of those who perceive him. It had indeed already been realized in the Vedas and Brāhmaṇas that "His names are in agreement with his aspect" and that "as He is approached, such He becomes" *(yathopāsate tad eva bhavati,* ŚB x.5.2.20); as St. Augustine, cited with approval by St. Thomas, expresses it, *jactus est Deus homo ut homo fieret Deus*.

The notion of a Creator working *per artem,* common to the Christian and all other orthodox ontologies, already implies an artist in possession of his art, the foremeasure *(pramāṇa)* and providence *(prajñā)* according to which all things are to be measured out; there is, in fact, the closest possible analogy between the "factitious body" *(nirmāṇa-kāya*[3]*)* or "measure" *(nimitta)* of the living Buddha, and the image of the Great Person which the artist literally "measures out" *(nirmāti)* to be a substitute for the actual presence. The Buddha is, in fact, born of a Mother *(mātṛ)* whose name is Māyā (Nature, Art, or "Magic" in Boehme's sense of "Creatrix"), with a derivation in each case from *mā,* to "measure"; cf. *prati-mā* "image," *pramāṇa,* "criterion," and *tāla-māna,* "iconometry."[4] There is, in other words, a virtual identification of a natural with an intellectual, metrical, and evocative generation.[5] The birth is literally an evocation; the Child is begotten, in accordance with a constantly repeated Brāhmaṇa formula, "by Intellect upon the Voice," which intercourse is symbolized in the rite; the artist works, as St. Thomas expresses it, "by a word *conceived* in intellect." We must not overlook, then, that there is also a third and verbal image, that of the doctrine, coequal in significance with the images in flesh or stone: "He who sees the Word sees Me" (S iii.120). These visible and audible images are alike in their information, and differ only in their accidents. Each depicts the same essence in a likeness; neither is an imitation of another—the image in stone, for example, not an imitation of the image in flesh, but each directly an "imitation" *(anukṛti,* mimesis) of the unspoken Word, an image of the "Body of the Word" or "Brahma-body" or "Principle," which cannot be represented as it *is* because of its perfect simplicity.

It was not, however, until the beginning of the Christian era, five centuries after the Great Total-Despiration *(mahā parinibbāna)*, that the Buddha was actually represented in a human form. In more general terms, it was not until then (with certain exceptions, some of which date back as far as the third millennium B.C., and despite the fact that the *Ṛg Veda* freely makes use of a verbal imagery in anthropomorphic terms) that any widespread development of an anthropomorphic iconography can be recognized at all. The older Indian art is essentially "aniconic," that is, it makes use only of geometrical, vegetable, or theriomorphic symbols as supports of contemplation, just as in early Christian art. An artistic inability to represent the human figure cannot be invoked by way of explanation in either case; not only had human figures already been represented very skillfully in the third millennium B.C., but, as we know, the type of the human figure had been employed with great effect from the third century B.C. onwards (and no doubt much earlier in impermanent material), *except* to represent the Buddha in his last incarnation, where even at birth and before the Great Awakening he is represented only by footprints, or generally by such symbols as the Tree or Wheel.

In order to approach the problem at all we must relegate to an altogether subordinate place our predilection for the human figure, inherited from late classical cultures, and must, to the extent that we are able, identify ourselves with the unanimous mentality of the Indian artist and patron both as it had been before, and as it had come to be when a necessity was actually felt for the representation of what we think of as the "deified" Buddha (although the fact that he cannot be regarded as a man among others, but rather as "the form of humanity that has nothing to do with time," is plainly enough set forth in the Pali texts). Above all, must we refrain from assuming that what was an inevitable step, and one already foreshadowed by the "historicity" of the life, must be interpreted in terms of spiritual progress. We must realize that this step, of which an unforeseen result was the provision for us of such aesthetic pleasures as everyone must derive from Buddhist art, may have been itself much rather a concession to intellectually lower levels of reference than any evidence of an increased profundity of vision. We must remember that an abstract art is adapted to contemplative uses and implies a gnosis; an anthropomorphic art evokes a religious emotion, and corresponds rather to prayer than to contemplation. If the development of an art can be justified as answering to new needs, it

must not be overlooked that to speak of a want is to speak of a deficiency in him who wants: the more one is, the less one wants. We ought not, then, to think so much of a deficiency of plastic art in aniconic rituals as of the adequacy of the purely abstract formulae and the proficiency of those who could make use of purely symbolic representations.

The aniconic character of Vedic ritual and early Buddhist art was, then, a matter of choice. Not only is the position iconoclastic in fact, but we can hardly fail to recognize a far-reaching iconoclastic tendency in such words as those of the *Jaiminīya Upaniṣad Brāhmaṇa,* IV.18.6: “The Brahman is not what one thinks with the mind (*yam manasā na manute*)*,* but, as they say, is that whereby there is a mentation, or concept *(yenāhur manomatam*): know that That alone is Brahman, not what men worship here *(nedaṃ yad idam upāsate*)." At the same time, the Upaniṣads distinguish clearly between the Brahman in a likeness and the Brahman not in any likeness, mortal and immortal *(mūrtaṃ cāmūrtaṃ ca martyaṃ cāmṛtaṃ ca,* BU II.3.1, where it may be noted that one of the regular designations of an image is precisely *mūrti);* and between the concept by which one distinctly remembers and the lightning-flash at which one can only exclaim (Kena Up. IV.4-5). The distinction is that of Eckhart and Ruysbroeck between the knowledge of God *creaturlicher wise, creatuerlikerwijs* and *âne mittel, âne wise, sonder middel, sonder wise,* and involves the universal doctrine of the single essence and two natures. It is clear that these texts and their implied doctrine are tantamount to a justification both of an iconography and of iconoclasm. It is the immediate value of an image to serve as the support of a contemplation leading to an understanding of the exterior operation and proximate Brahman, the Buddhist Sambhogakāya: it is only of the interior operation and ultimate Brahman, Buddhist Dharmakāya, Tattva, Tathatā, or Nirvāṇa, that it can be said that *“This* Brahman is silence.”[6]

No one whose life is still an active one, no one still spiritually under the Sun and still perfectible, no one who still proposes to understand in terms of subject and object, no one who still is anyone, can pretend to have outgrown all need of means. It is not a question of the virtually “infinite possibilities of the simple soul” (A. C. Bouquet, *The Real Presence,* Cambridge, 1928, p. 85), which it would be absurd to deny, but one of *how* these potentialities can be reduced to act. One is astounded at the multitude of those who advocate the “direct” approach to God, as if the end of the road could be reached without a wayfaring, and who forget that an

immediate vision can be only theirs in whom "the mind has been de-mented," to employ a significant expression common to Eckhart, the Upaniṣads, and Buddhism.

The *present* problem is not, then, one of the propriety or impropriety of the use of supports of contemplation, but of what sort the most appropriate and efficacious supports of contemplation must be, and of the art of making use of them. For *us,* the work of art both exists and operates on an altogether human, visible, and tangible level of reference; we do not, as Dante requires that we should, "marvel at the doctrine that hides itself behind *(s'asconde sotto)* the veil of the strange verses" *(Inferno* IX.61); the verses are enough for us. It is otherwise in a traditional art, where the object is merely a point of departure and a signpost inviting the spectator to the performance of an act directed toward that form for the sake of which the picture exists at all. The spectator is not so much to be "pleased" as to be "transported": to see as the artist is required to have seen before he took up brush or chisel; to see the Buddha in the image rather than an image of the Buddha. It is a matter of *penetration,* in the most technical senses of the term (cf. Muṇḍ. Up. II.2.3) : the variegated presentation in colors is merely a conceptual exteriorization of what in itself is a perfectly simple brilliance —"Just as it is an effect of the presence or absence of dust in a garment that the color is either clear or motley, so it is the effect of the presence or absence of a penetration into Release *(āvedha-vaśān muktau)* that the Gnosis is either clear or motley. That one alludes to the profundity of the Buddhas on the Unsullied Plane in terms of iconographic characteristics, stances, and acts *(lakṣaṇa-sthānakarmasu)* is a mere painting in colors on space."[7] Or again, and with reference equally to verbal and visual imagery, the Buddha is made to say that the metaphorical expression "is adduced by way of illustration . . . because of the great infirmity of babes ... I teach as does the master painter or his pupil who disposes his colors for the sake of a picture, which picture is not to be found in the colors, nor in the ground, nor in the environment. It is only to make it attractive to[8] creatures that the picture is contrived in color: what is literally taught is impertinent; the Principle eludes the letter.[9] In taking up a stand amongst things,[10] what I really teach is the Principle as understood by the Contemplatives:[11] a spiritual reversion evading every form of thought. What I teach is not a doctrine for babes, but for the Sons of the Conqueror. And just as whatever I may see in a diversified manner has no real being, so is the pictorial

doctrine communicated in a manner irrelevant. Whatever is not adapted to such and such persons as are to be taught cannot be called a 'teaching.'. .. The Buddhas indoctrinate beings according to their mental capacity."[12] That is as much as to say with St. Paul, "I have fed you with milk and not with meat: for hitherto ye were not able to bear it, neither yet now are ye able" (1 Cor. 3:2): "Strong meat belongeth to them that are of full age" (Heb. 5:14).

It is only one who *has* attained to an immediate Gnosis that can afford to dispense with theology, ritual, and imagery: the Comprehensor has found what the Wayfarer is still in search of. This has too often been misinterpreted to mean that something is deliberately withheld from those who are to depend on means, or even that means are dispensed to them as if with intent to keep them in ignorance; there are those who ask for a sort of universal compulsory education in the mysteries, supposing that a mystery is nothing but a communicable, although hitherto uncommunicated, secret and nothing different in kind from the themes of profane instruction. So far from this, it is of the essence of a mystery, and above all of the *mysterium magnum,* that it cannot be communicated, but only realized:[13] all that can be communicated are its external supports or symbolic expressions; the Great Work must be done by everyone for himself. The words attributed to the Buddha above are in no way contradictory of the principle of the open hand (*varada mudrā)* or expository hand *(vyākhyāna mudrā)*. The Buddha is never ineloquent: the solar gates are not there to exclude, but to admit; no one can be excluded by anyone but himself. The Way has been charted in detail by every Forerunner, who *is* the Way; what lies at the end of the road is not revealed, even by those who have reached it, because it cannot be told and does not appear: the Principle is not in any likeness.

Of what sort are, then, the most appropriate and efficacious supports of contemplation? It would scarcely be possible to cite an authoritative Indian text condemning explicitly the use of anthropomorphic as distinguished from aniconic images. There is, however, one Buddhist source, that of the *Kālinga-bodhi Jātaka,* in which what must have been the early position is still clearly reflected. The Buddha is asked by what kind of hallow, shrine, or symbol (*cetiya*)[14] he can properly be represented in his absence. The answer is that he can properly be represented by a Bodhi tree[15] (a *paribhoga-cetiya,* Mhv I.69), whether during his lifetime or after the

Despiration, or by bodily relics after his Decease; the "indicative" *(uddesika)*[16] iconography of an anthropomorphic image is condemned as "groundless and conceptual, or conventional" *(avatthukam manamattakam)*. It will be seen that the wording corresponds to that of the Brāhmaṇa as cited above: *manamattakam* = *manomatam*.

Before we proceed to ask how it could have been that an anthropomorphic image was accepted after all, we must eliminate certain considerations extraneous to the problem. It must be realized, in the first place, that although an iconoclastic problem is present, it was as a matter of convenience, and without reference to any supposed possibility of a real localization[17] or fetishism that the advent of the image can be said to have been "postponed," and also as a matter of convenience that the image was realized when a need had been felt for it; and in the second place, that the resort to an anthropomorphic imagery by no means implies any such humanistic or naturalistic interests as those which led to the subordination of form to figure in European art after the Middle Ages, or in Greek art after the sixth century B.C. The question of localization has been fundamentally misunderstood. If it is practically true that "the omnipresent Spirit *is* where it acts or where we are *attending* to it" (Bouquet, *The Real Presence,* p. 84), it is equally true that this "where" is *wherever* there is posited a center or duly set up an image or other symbol: the symbol can even be carried about from place to place. Not that the Spirit is therefore in one place more than another or can be carried about, but that we and our supports of contemplation (*dhiyālamba)* are necessarily in some one place or another. If the use of the symbol is to function mediately as a bridge between the world of local position and a "world" that cannot be traversed or described in terms of size, it is sufficiently evident that the hither end of such a bridge must be somewhere, and in fact wherever our edification begins: procedure is from the known to the unknown; it is the other end of the bridge that has no position.

By fetishism we understand an attribution to the physically tangible symbol of values that really belong to its referent or, in other words, a confusion of actual with essential form. It is a fetishism of this sort that the Buddhist texts deprecate when they employ the metaphor of the finger pointing to the moon, and ridicule the man who either will not or cannot see anything but the finger. The modern aesthetic approach makes fetishes of traditional works of art precisely in this sense. Our own attitude is indeed so

naturally and obstinately fetishistic that we are shocked to find and unwilling to believe that it is taken for granted in Buddhism that "those who consider the earthen images, do not honor the clay as such, but without regard to them in this respect, honor the Immortals designated" *(amarasaṃjñā, Divyāvadāna,* ch. 26). Plato in the same way distinguishes "soulless images" from the "ensouled gods" that they represent; "and yet we believe that when we worship the images, the gods are kindly and well-disposed towards us" (*Laws* 931A). So in Christian practice "honor is paid, not to the colors or the art, but to the prototype" (St. Basil, *De spir. sanct*. c. 18, cited in the *Hermeneia* of Athos), and "we make images of the Holy Beings to commemorate and honor *them"* (Epiphanius, Fr. 2), cf. Plotinus, *Enneads* IV.3.11. "How bold it is to embody the bodiless! Nevertheless, the icon conducts us to the intellectual recollection of the Celestials" *(Greek Anthology* I.33).

As regards the second point, it will suffice to say that "anthropomorphic" in the sense in which this word is appropriate to Indian images does not import "naturalistic"; the Buddha image is not in any sense a portrait, but a symbol; nor indeed are there any Indian images of any deity that do not proclaim by their very constitution that "this is not the likeness of a man"; the image is devoid of any semblance of organic structure; it is not a reflection of anything that has been physically seen, but an intelligible form or formula. Even the canons of proportion differ for gods and men.[18]

Even at the present day there survives in India a widespread use of geometrical devices (*yantra*) or other aniconic symbols as the chosen supports of contemplation. If, in the last analysis, the intellectual has always preferred the use of abstract and algebraical or vegetable or therio-morphic or even natural symbols, one cannot but be reminded of the position of Dionysius, to whom it likewise appeared more fitting that divine truths should be expounded by means of images of a less rather than a more noble type in themselves (the noblest type in itself being that of humanity): "For then," as St. Thomas follows, "it is clear that these things are not literal descriptions of divine truths, which might have been open to doubt had they been expressed under the figure of nobler bodies, especially for those who could think of nothing nobler than bodies" (*Sum. Theol.* I.I.9). What the Buddha anticipated was not that the figure in stone could ever have been worshiped literally as such, but that he might come to be thought of as a man, who denied of himself that he was "either a man, or a god, or a

daimon," as one amongst others, and had not in fact "become anyone." He prognosticated precisely such a humanistic interpretation of the "life" as that which leads the modern scholar to attempt to disengage a "historical nucleus" by the elimination of all "mythical elements," and to repudiate any attribution of omniscience to him to whom the designation "Eye in the World" was appropriate. It is just those "who can think of nothing nobler than bodies"[19] who in modern times have discovered in the incarnate Deity, Christian or Buddhist, nothing but the man; and to these we can only say that this "his manhood is a hindrance so long as they cling to it with mortal pleasure" (Eckhart).

The iconolatrous position developed in India from the beginning of the Christian era onward is apparently in contradiction of that which has been inferred in the *Kālinga-bodhi Jātaka*. It is, however, the iconoclastic position, that of Strzygowski's "Mazdaean" and "Northern" art, that still determined the abstract and symbolic nature of the anthropomorphic image and can be said to account for the fact that a naturalistic development had never taken place in India until the idea of representation was borrowed from Europe in the seventeenth century. The fact that the Ś*ukranītisāra* condemns portraiture at the same time that it extols the making of divine images very well illustrates how the Indian consciousness has been aware of what has been called "the ignominy implicit in representational art"—an ignominy closely related to that of an obsession with the historical point of view, to which in India the mythical has always been preferred. The parallels between the Indian and Christian artistic development are so close that both can be described in the same words. If, as Benjamin Rowland justly remarks, "With the sculptures of Hadda and the contemporary decoration of the monasteries at Jaulian (Taxila), the Gandhāra school properly so-called is at an end. Counter currents of influence from the workshops of Central and Eastern India have almost transformed the Indo-Greek Buddha image into the ideal norm for the representation of Sakyamuni that prevailed at Mathura and Sarnath and Ajanta,"[20] it can only have been because a sense of the unsuitability of any would-be humanistic style had been felt; an idea of the "Buddha type" had already been formed, "but the Hellenistic ideal of representation, the engrained, debased, and commonplace naturalism of a millennium, was incapable of achieving it. Hence the excessive rarity [in India proper] of the Greek type of Christ [Buddha], and the prompt substitution of the Semitic [Indian]."[21] A further

parallel can be pointed out in the effects of the European iconoclasm on the nature of Byzantine art: "The chief outcome of the controversy was the formulation of a rigid iconography, which sufficed to prevent, once and for all, any backsliding towards meaningless naturalism. The picture, the human representation, was designed henceforth as an illustration of Reality, and as a vehicle of the deepest human emotions. ... In this elevation of art to its highest function, though at the price of the artist's freedom, the iconodule defence, raised by the controversy to a high philosophical level, also played a part. . . . This was the chief iconodule contention: that pictures, like statues to Plotinus [IV.3.11], were an effective means of communication with the extra-terrestrial universe.[22] . . . The concern of the artist was to evoke, through his pictures, not this world, but the other . . . that he [the beholder] might attain, through the reminder of these events, actual communion during life on earth with that firmament of divine arbitration of which the Latin Church taught only the post-human expectation."[23] These distinctions of the Byzantine from the Roman point of view are analogous to the differences between the Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna point of view, and between the more or less didactic art of Sāñcī and the epiphanies of Bamiyān, Ajaṇṭā, and Lung Men.

We do not know whether or not the deprecation of an "indicative" (*uddesika*) likeness which we have cited from the Jātaka is intended to refer to the old lists of *lakkhaṇas,* or thirty-two major and eighty minor iconographic peculiarities of the "Great Person." It must certainly have been in accordance with these prescriptions that a mental image of the Buddha had been entertained before any other image had been made; and equally certain that the validity of the images themselves has always been held to rest upon an accurate rendering of these peculiarities, or such of them as could be realized in any wrought material. For the Buddhist, iconography is art; that art by which he works. The iconography is at once the truth and the beauty of the work: truth, because this is the imitable form of the ideas to be expressed, and beauty because of the coincidence of beauty with accuracy, the Scholastic *integratio sive perfectio,* and in the sense in which a mathematical equation can be "elegant." As a Chinese inscription puts it, "I have sculptured a marvellous beauty ... all of the iconographic peculiarities have been sublimely displayed" (Chavannes, *Mission archéologique,* I.i.448). In the traditional view of art there is no

beauty that can be divided from intelligibility; no splendor but the *splendor veritatis*.

The authenticity and legitimate heredity of Buddha images are established by reference to what are supposed to have been originals created in the Buddha's own lifetime, and either actually or virtually by the Buddha himself, in accordance with what has been said above with respect to an iconometric manifestation. The capacities of the artist exercised at empirical levels of reference have not sufficed for the dual operation of imagination and execution. The Buddha "cannot be apprehended"; what has been required is not an observation, but a vision. One is reminded of the fact that certain Christian images have been regarded in much the same way as "not made by hands" (ἀχειροποίητοι). (It is of no importance from the present point of view that the legends of the first images cannot be interpreted as records of historical fact: what is important for us is that the authentication of the images themselves is not historical but ideal. Either the artist is transported to a heaven to take note there of the Buddha's appearance, and afterwards uses this model, or the Buddha himself projects the "shadow" or outlines of his likeness *(nimitta),* which the painters cannot grasp, but must fill in with colors, and animate[24] by the addition of a written "word," so that all is done "as prescribed" *(yathā saṃdiṣṭam, Divyāvadāna,* ch. 27); or finally, the image is made by an artist who, after the work has been done, reveals himself to have been in fact the future Buddha Maitreya.[25]

Interpreted thus, the iconography can no longer be thought of as a groundless product of conventional realization or idealization, but becomes an ascertainment; the form is not of human invention, but revealed and "seen" in the same sense that the Vedic incantations are thought of as having been revealed and "heard." There can be no distinction in principle of vision from audition. And as nothing can be said to have been intelligibly uttered unless in certain terms, so nothing can be said to have been revealed unless in some form.[26] All that can be thought of as prior to formulation is without form and not in any likeness; the meaning and its vehicle can only be thought of as having been concreated. And this implies that whatever validity attaches to the meaning attaches also to the symbols in which it is expressed; if the latter are in any way less inevitable than the former, the intended meaning will not have been conveyed, but betrayed.

We need hardly add that all that is said in the preceding paragraph has to do with the art in the artist, which is already an expression in terms, or idea in an imitable form, and holds good irrespective of whether or not any mimetic word has actually been spoken aloud or any image actually made in stone or pigment; if it is not historically true that any tangible image of the Buddha had been made before the beginning of the Christian era, it is equally certain that an essential image not made by hands had been conceived, and even verbally stated, in terms of the thirty-two major and eighty minor peculiarities of the "Great Person"; when the first image was to be made, there already existed the "ascertained means of operation." If, at last, the artist made a corresponding figure in stone or pigment, he was only doing what the Indian imager has always done, and in accordance with such familiar instructions as that of the *Abhilaśitārthacintāmaṇi,* where the painter is told to "Put down on the wall what has been seen in contemplation (*tad dhyātam bhittau niveśayet*)." Even for Alfred Foucher, who held that the earliest Buddha images are those of the school of Gandhāra and the product of a collaboration between the Hellenistic artist and the Indian Buddhist patron, the prescription or concept of the work to be done was Indian; the Hellenistic artist performing only the servile operation, the Indian patron remaining responsible for the free act of imagination.[27] The sculptors of Mathurā, on the other hand, had at their command not only the visual image of the "Great Person" as defined in the Pāli texts, but also the tradition of the standing types of the colossal Yakṣas of the latter centuries B.C., and for the seated figure also a tradition of which the beginning must have antedated the Śiva types of the Indus Valley culture of the third millennium B.C. The Buddha image came into being because a need had been felt for it, and not because a need had been felt for "art."

THE practice of an art is not traditionally, as it is for us, a secular activity, or even a matter of affective "inspiration," but a metaphysical rite; it is not only the first images that are formally of superhuman origin. No distinction can be drawn between art and contemplation. The artist is first of all required to remove himself from human to celestial levels of apperception; at this level and in a state of unification, no longer having in view anything external to himself, he sees and realizes, that is to say becomes, what he is afterwards to represent in wrought material. This identification of the artist

with the imitable form of the idea to be expressed is repeatedly insisted upon in the Indian books, and answers to the Scholastic assumption as stated in the words of Dante, "no painter can paint a figure if he have not first of all made himself such as the figure ought to be."

The later artist is not, then, imitating the visual aspect or style of the first images, which he may never have seen, but their form; the authenticity of the later images does not depend upon an accidental knowledge (such as that by which our "modern Gothic" is built) but upon a return to the source in quite another sense. It is just this that is so clearly expressed in the legend of Udāyana's Buddha image, which is said to have flown through the air to Khotān (Beal, *Hsüan-tsang,* II, 322) and thus established the legitimacy of the lineage of Central Asian and Chinese iconography.[28] "Flight through the air" is always a technicality implying an independence of local position and ability to attain to whatever desired plane of apperception: a form or idea is "winged" in precisely the sense that, like the Spirit, it is wherever it operates or is entertained and cannot be a private property. What the legend tells is not that an image of stone or wood flew through the air; it tells us, nevertheless, that the Khotanese artist saw what Udāyana's artist had seen, the essential form of the first image: that same form which Udāyana's artist had seen before he returned to earth and took up the chisel or brush.

A distinction must then be very clearly drawn between an archaistic procedure, which involves no more than the servile operation of copying, and the repeated entertainment of one and the same form or idea in a manner determined by the mode or constitution of the knower, which is the free operation of the artist whose style is his own. The distinction is that of an academic from a traditional school of art, the former systematic, the latter consistent. That "Art has fixed ends and ascertained means of operation" asserts an immutability of the idea in its imitable form—that the sun, for example, is *always* an adequate symbol of the Light of lights—but is not in any way a contradiction of another Scholastic dictum, that "To be properly expressed, a thing must proceed from within, moved by its form." It is because there is an endless *renewal* of the imaginative act that the artist's interior operation is properly spoken of as "free"; and the evidence of this freedom exists in the fact of a stylistic sequence always observable in a traditional art, followed from generation to generation; it is the academician that repeats the forms of "classic" orders like a parrot. The traditional artist is always expressing, not indeed his superficial

"personality," but himself, having made himself that which he is to express, and literally *devoting* himself to the good of the work to be done. What he has to say remains the same. But he speaks in the stylistic language of his own time, and were it otherwise would remain ineloquent, for, to repeat the words of the *Laṇkāvatāra Sūtra* already cited, "Whatever is not adapted to the such and such persons as are to be taught, cannot be called a 'teaching.' "

It is not only the artist, but also the patron who *devotes* himself, not merely by the gift of his "substance" to defray the cost of operation, but also in a ritual, symbolical, and spiritual sense, just as the Christian who is not merely a spectator of the Mass but participates in what is enacted, sacrifices himself. It is the merit of Paul Mus to have recognized for the first time that the essential values of the Vedic sacrifice are inherited and survive in the later iconolatry; the royal patron, for example, donates precisely his own weight of gold to be made into an image, which image is also made at the same time in accordance with an ascertained canon or proportion and employs as modulus a measure taken from his own person; and when the image has been made, offers to it himself and his family, afterwards to be redeemed at a great price. It is in just the same way that the statue of the patron is literally built into the Vedic altar, and that the sacrificer himself is offered up upon the altar—"That sacrificial fire knows that 'He has come to give himself to me' " *(paridāṃ me,* ŚB II.4.I.11). As Mus expresses it, "It is, in fact, well known that the construction of the fire-altar is a veiled personal sacrifice. The sacrificer *dies,* and it is only upon this condition that he reaches heaven: at the same time, this is only a temporary death, and the altar, identified with the sacrificer, is his substitute. We freely recognize an analogous significance in the identification of the king with the Buddha, and in particular in the manufacture of statues in which the fusion of the personalities is materially effected. It is less a question of apotheosis than of *devotio*. The king gives himself to the Buddha, projects his person into him, at the same time that his mortal body becomes the earthly 'trace' of its divine model. .. . The artistic activity of India, as we have indicated, has always exhibited the trace of the fact that the first Brahmanical work of art was an altar in which the patron, or in other words the sacrificer, was united with his deity" (Mus, "Le Buddha pare," 1929, pp. *92, *94). If the deity assumes a human form, it is in order that the man, for his part, may put on the likeness of divinity, which he does metaphysically and as if to anticipate

his future glorification. The inadequacy of the worship of any principle as other than oneself or proper spiritual essence is strongly emphasized in the Upaniṣads; and it may be called an established principle of Indian thought that "Only by becoming God can one worship Him" *(devo bhūtvā devaṃ yajet)*:. it is only to one who can say, "I am the Light, Thyself," that the answer is given, "Enter thou, for what thou art I am, and what I am thou art" (JUB III.14).[29] The work of art is a devotional rite.

If the original artist and patron are thus devoted to and literally absorbed in the idea of the work to be done, which the artist executes and for which the patron pays, we have also to consider the nature of the act to be performed by those others for whose sake the work has also been done, among whom may be reckoned ourselves: the donor's inscriptions almost always indicating that the work has been undertaken not only for the donor's benefit or that of his ancestors, but also for that of "all beings." This will be more than a matter of mere aesthetic appreciation: our judgment, if it is to be the "perfection of art," that is, a consummation in use, must involve a reproduction. Or to put it in other words, if it is by their ideas that we judge of what things ought to be like, this holds good as much *post factum* as *a priori*. In order to understand the work we must stand where the patron and artist stood and we must have done as they did; we cannot depend upon the mere reactions of "our own unintelligent nerve ends." The judgment of an image is a contemplation, and as such can only be consummated in an assimilation. A transformation of our nature is required. It is in the same sense that Mencius says that to grasp the true meanings of words requires not so much a dictionary or a knowledge of epistemology as a rectification of personality. The *Amitāyur-Dhyāna Sūtra* is explicit: if you ask *how* is one to behold the Buddha, the answer is that you have done so only when the thirty-two major and eighty minor characteristics (i.e., of the iconography) have been assumed in your own heart: it is your own heart that becomes the Buddha and is the Buddha (SBE, XLIX, 178). It is in the same sense that the words of an inscription at Lung Men are to be understood: "It is as if the summit of the mountain has been reached and the river traced to its source: the fruition is accomplished, and one rests upon the Principle" (Chavannes, *Mission archéologique,* p. 514). The aesthetic surfaces are by no means terminal values, but an invitation to a picture of which the visible traces are only a projection, and to a mystery that evades the letter of the spoken word.

The reader may be inclined to protest that we have been speaking of religion rather than of art: we say, on the contrary, of a religious art. One can speak of a "reduction of art to theology" (St. Bonaventura) just because in the traditional synthesis plastic art is as much as any literary form a part of the art of knowing God. The aesthetic experience empathetically realized and cognitive experience intuitively realized can be logically distinguished, but are simultaneous in the whole or holy man who does not merely feel but also understands. It is not at all that the value of beauty is minimized, but that the occasional beauty of the artifact is referred to a formal cause in which it exists more eminently; there is a transubstantiation of the image, in which there is nothing taken away from the participant, but something added.

ALL that has been said above applies as much to the literary narrative of the Buddha's "life" as to the iconographic representation of his "appearance"; just as the latter is not a portrait but a symbol, so the former is not a record of facts but a myth. The supernatural iconography is an integral part of the image, as are the miracles of the life; both are essential elements rather than accidental or adventitious accretions introduced for the sake of "effect."

We have no intention to explain away the miracles by a psychological analysis, any more than we propose to consider the art in its merely affective aspects. As regards the historicity of miracles, there is, of course, a fundamental divergence between the rationalist and traditional positions. The actual demonstration of a magical effect would upset the rationalist's entire philosophy: his "faith" would be destroyed if the sun should stand still at noon or a man walk on the water. For the traditionalist, on the other hand, magic is a science, but an inferior science about which he feels no curiosity; the possibility of magical procedure is taken for granted, but regarded only as illustrating, and by no means as proving, the principles on which the exercise of powers depends.

It matters very little from the present point of view which of these positions we assume. Rationalist and fundamentalist fall together into the pit of an exclusively literal interpretation. Actually to discuss the historicity or possibility of a given miracle is far beside the main point, that of significance. We can, however, illustrate by a glaring example how the rationalistic, far more than the credulous point of view, can inhibit an understanding of the true intention of the work. The *Sukhāvatī-Vyūha*

speaks of Buddhas as "covering with their tongue the world in which they teach"; just as in RV VIII.72.18 Agni's tongue—the priestly *voice*—"touches heaven." What Burnouf has to say in this connection is almost unbelievable: "This is an example of the incredible stupidities that can result from an addiction to the supernatural. ... To speak of a sticking out of the tongue, and as the climax of the ridiculous also to speak of the vast number of assistant teachers who do the like in the Buddha's presence, is a flight of the imagination scarcely to be paralleled in European superstition. It would seem as though Northern Buddhists had been punished for their taste for the marvellous by the absurdity of their own inventions."[30] *Voilà le crétinisme scientifique dans toute sa beatitude!*[31] Contrast, however, what St. Thomas Aquinas has to say in a similar connection: "The tongue of an angel is called metaphorically the angel's power, whereby he manifests his mental concept. . . . The intellectual operation of an angel abstracts from *here and now*. . . . Hence in the angelic speech, local distance is no impediment" (*Sum. Theol.* I.107.1 and 4).

We alluded above to a "flight through the air" of Udāyana's Buddha image from India to Khotān, which image became in fact, as Chavannes observes, the prototype of many others fashioned in Central Asia. We repeat, in the first place, that the very existence of an "Udāyana's image" made in the Buddha's lifetime is of the highest improbability. In the second place, what is really meant by "aerial flight" and "disappearance"? The ordinary Sanskrit expression for "to vanish" is *antar-dhānaṃ gam,* literally to "go-interior-position." In the *Kālinga-bodhi Jātaka,* flight through the air depends upon an "investiture of the body in the garment of contemplation" *(jhāna veṭhanena)*. As Mus has very aptly remarked in another connection, "Tout le miracle résulte done d'une disposition intime" ("Le Buddha paré," p. 435). It is not, then, a matter of physical translocation that is involved, but literally one of concentration; the attainment of a center that is omnipresent, and not a local motion. It is altogether a matter of "being in the Spirit," as this expression is used by St. Paul: that Spirit *(ātman)* of whom it is said that "seated, he fares afar, recumbent he goes everywhere" (KU II.21).[32] Of what importance in such a context can be a discussion of the possibility or impossibility of an actual levitation or translocation? What is implied by the designation "mover-at-will" (*kāmācārin)* is the condition of one who, being in the Spirit, no longer needs to move at all in order to be anywhere. Nor can any distinction be made between the possible intellect

and the ideas it entertains *in adaequatione rei et intellectus*: to speak of an intellectual omnipresence is to speak of an omnipresence of the forms or ideas which have no objective existence apart from the universal intellect that entertains them. The legend does not refer to the physical transference of a material image, but to the universality of an immutable form that can be seen as well by the Khotanese as by the Indian contemplative; where the historian of art would see what is called the "influence" of Indian on Central Asian art, the legend asserts an independent imagination of the same form. It will be seen that we have not had in view to explain away the miracle, but to point out that the marvel is one of interior disposition, and that the power of aerial flight is nothing like an airplane's, but has to do with the extension of consciousness to other than physical levels of reference and, in fact, to the "summit of contingent being."[33]

Consider another case, that of "walking on the water,"[34] a power attributed to some, alike in the Hindu, Buddhist, Christian, and Taoist, and very likely many other traditions. We do infer that such a thing can be done, but are not at all curious as to whether it was or was not done upon a given occasion; that we leave to those who suppose that the Vedic Bhujyu was actually picked up from the physical ocean by a passing "tramp." The matter of interest is one of significance. What does it mean that this power has been universally attributed to the deity or others in his likeness? To speak of a motion at will on the face of the waters is to speak of a being all in act, that is, to speak of the operation of a principle wherein all potentiality of manifestation has been reduced to act. In all traditions "the waters" stand for universal possibility.

The direct connection between the symbolic myth and mythical symbol can nowhere be illustrated better than in this context. For if the Buddha is invariably represented iconographically as supported by a lotus, his feet never touching any physical or local earth, it is because it is the idiosyncrasy of the lotus flower or leaf to be at rest upon the waters; the flower or leaf is universally, and not in any local sense, a ground on which the Buddha's feet are firmly planted. In other words, all cosmic, and not merely some or all terrestrial, possibilities are at his command. The ultimate support of the lotus can also be represented as a stem identical with the axis of the universe, rooted in a universal depth and inflorescent at all levels of reference, and if in Brahmanical art this stem springs from the navel of Nārāyaṇa, the central ground of the Godhead recumbent on the face of the

waters, and bears in its flower the figure of Brahmā (with whom the Buddha is virtually identified), the universality of this symbolism is sufficiently evident in the Stem of Jesse and in the symbolic representation of the Christian Theotokos by the rose. The expression *rose des vents,* a compass card, and Dante's "quant' è la larghezza di questa rosa nell' estreme foglie" (*Paradiso* XXX.116-117) illustrate the correspondence of rose and lotus in their spatial aspects: cf. MU VI.2, where the petals of the lotus are the points of the compass: directions, that is, of indefinite extension. We need hardly say that the universality and consistent precision of an adequate symbolism do not preclude an adaptability to local conditions and do not depend on the identification of botanical species.[35]

Now this significance of the lotus to which we have referred is inseparably bound up with the problem of Buddhist representation in plastic art. If we take the mythical symbol literally, as the modern Indian artist has sometimes done, we get a picture of what is no longer formally but figuratively a man supported by what is no longer a ground in principle but by what A. Foucher calls "the frail cup of a flower" (in "On the Iconography of the Buddha's Nativity," *Memoirs of the Archaeological Survey of India,* 1934, p. 13); the picture is reduced to absurdity, and we expect the "man" to fall into the "water" at any moment. The correspondence of the aesthetic surfaces to the picture not in the colors has been destroyed; the picture is no longer beautiful, however skilfully executed, precisely because it has been robbed of meaning. It is a case in point of the principle that beauty cannot be divided from truth, but is an aspect of truth.

It has been a fundamental error of modern interpretation to have thought of Buddhist symbolism both as *sui generis* and as conventional, in the sense that Esperanto can be called a conventional language. That is what symbols seem to *us* to be, who are accustomed to the "symbolism," or rather "expressionism," of poets and artists who speak individually in terms of their own choice, which terms are often obscure but are nevertheless sometimes taken over into current usage. It is from these points of view that Foucher can think that he is "able to observe retrospectively the old image-maker's increasingly bold attempts," and opines that elephants "naturally came to take their stand on lotuses ... a kind of specific detail subsequently added ... the superstition of precedent alone prevented them from going further" *(ibid.).* Had he remembered that the Vedic Agni is born in and

supported by a lotus, he would surely have asked, "How could man have imagined that a fire could have been kindled on the frail cup of a flower in the midst of the waters?" He does protest, in fact, that "Had not the lotus filled from the beginning all the available space, no one would ever have dreamt of using the frail cup of a flower as a support for an adult human being" *(ibid.)*.[36]

This is to remove the symbols altogether from their traditional context and values and to see in an art of ideas merely an idealizing art. The modern view of symbols is, in fact, bound up with the modern theory of a "natural religion," invoked by some in explanation of the "evolution" of all religions and by others in explanation of all but the Christian religion. But from the point of view of the tradition itself, Brahmanism is a revealed religion, that is to say, a doctrine of supernatural origin; a revelation, then, in terms of an adequate symbolism, whether verbal or visual, in the same sense that Plato speaks of the first Denominator as a "more than human Power" and of the names given in the beginning as necessarily "true names." Whatever we think of this, [37]6 the fact remains that symbolism is of an immemorial antiquity, an antiquity as great as that of "folklore" itself; many of the Vedic symbols, that of the tracking of the Hidden Light by its footprints, for example, imply a hunting culture antecedent to the beginning of agriculture. The commonest word for "Way," Skr. *mārga,* Pāli Buddhist *magga,* derives from a root *mṛg* "to hunt," and implies a "following in the tracks of." In any case, the Indus Valley peoples, three thousand years B.C., already made use of "symbols, such as the *svastika,* that India has never relinquished. Dare we think that the spirituality of Indian art is as ancient as the Indus civilization? If so, we may never hope to penetrate the secret of its origin" (W. Norman Brown, in *Asia,* May 1937, p. 385).

Symbolism is a language and a precise form of thought; a hieratic and a metaphysical language and not a language determined by somatic or psychological categories. Its foundation is in the analogical correspondence of all orders of reality and states of being or levels of reference; it is because "This world is in the image of that, and vice versa" (AB VIII.2, and KU IV.10) that it can be said *Coeli enarrant gloriam Dei*.

The nature of an adequate symbolism could hardly be better stated than in the words "the parabolical (Skr. *parōkṣa*) sense is contained in the literal (Skr. *pratyakṣa).*" On the other hand, "The sensible forms, in which there was at first a polar balance of physical and metaphysical, have been more

and more voided of content on their way down to us: so we say, This is an 'ornament' " (W. Andrae, *Die ionische Säule,* Berlin, 1933, p. 65). It becomes, then, a question of the restoration of significance to forms that we have come to think of as merely ornamental. We cannot take up here the problems of symbolic methodology, except to say that what we have most to avoid is a subjective interpretation, and most to desire is a subjective realization. For the meanings of symbols we must rely on the explicit statements of authoritative texts, on comparative usage, and on that of those who still employ the traditional symbols as the customary form of their thought and daily conversation.[38]

Our present concern is not, however, so much with the methodology of symbolic exegesis as with the general nature of a typically symbolic art. We have spoken above of a transubstantiation, and the word has also been properly used by Stella Kramrisch in speaking of art of the Gupta period and that of Ajaṇṭā in particular, with reference to the coincidence in it of sensuous and spiritual values. Our primary error when we consider the Eucharist is to suppose that the notion of a transubstantiation represents any but a normally human point of view. To say that this is not merely bread but also and more eminently the body of God is the same as to say that a word is not merely a sound but also and more eminently a meaning: it is with perfect consistence that a sentimental and materialistic generation not only ridicules the Eucharistic transubstantiation, but also insists that the whole of any work of art subsists in its aesthetic surfaces, poetry consisting, for example, in a conjunction of pleasurable or interesting sounds rather than in a logically ordered sequence of sounds with meanings.[39] It is from the same point of view that man is interpreted only as a psychophysical being, and not as a divine image, and for the same reason that we laugh at the "divinity of kings." That we no longer admit an argument by analogy does not represent an intellectual progress; we have merely lost the art of analogical procedure or, in other words, ritual procedure. Symbolism[40] is a calculus in the same sense that an adequate analogy is proof.

In the Eucharistic sacrament, whether Christian, Mexican, or Hindu, bread and wine are "charged with meaning" (Bouquet, *The Real Presence,* p. 77): God is a meaning. The Vedic incantation *(brahman)* is physically a sound but superaudibly *the* Brahman. To the "primitive" man, first and foremost a metaphysician and only later on a philosopher and psychologist, to this man who, like the angels, had fewer ideas and used less means than

we, it had been inconceivable that anything, whether natural or artificial, could have a use or value only and not also a meaning; this man literally could not have understood our distinction of sacred from profane or of spiritual from material values; he did not live by bread alone. It had not occurred to him that there could be such a thing as an industry without art, or the practice of any art that was not at the same time a rite, a going on with what had been done by God in the beginning. *Per contra,* the modern man is a disintegrated personality, no longer the child of heaven and earth, but altogether of the earth. It is this that makes it so difficult for us to enter into the spirit of Christian, Hindu or Buddhist art in which the values taken for granted are spiritual and only the means are physical and psychological. The whole purpose of the ritual is to effect a translation, not only of the object, but of the man himself to another and no longer peripheral but central level of reference. Let us consider a very simple case, in which, however, our fictitious distinctions of barbarism from civilization must be discarded. That neolithic man already called his celts and arrowheads "thunderbolts" is preserved in the memory of the folk throughout the world. When Šaṇkarācarya exclaimed, "I have learnt concentration from the maker of arrows," he may well have meant more than to say, "I have learnt from the sight of this man, so completely forgetful of himself in his concern for the good of the work to be done, what it means to 'make the mind one-pointed.' " He may also have had in mind what the initiated artisan and initiated archer[41] had been made aware of in the Lesser Mysteries, that an arrow made by hands is transubstantially the point of that bolt with which the Solar Hero and Sun of Men first smote the Dragon and pillared apart heaven and earth, creating an environment and dispelling the darkness literally with a *shaft* of light. Not that anybody need have thought that the man-made object had actually "fallen from heaven," but that the "arrow feathered with the solar eagle's feathers and sharpened by incantations" had been made to be not merely a thing of wood and iron, but at the same time, metaphysically, of another sort.[42] It is in the same way that the warrior, also an initiate, conceived himself to be not merely a man, but also in the image of the wielder of the bolt, the Thundersmiter himself. In the same way, the Crusader's sword was not merely a piece of iron or steel, but also a shard detached from the Cross of Light; and for him, *in hoc signo vinces* had neither exclusively a practical nor only a "magical" value; actually to strike the heathen foeman and to bring light into darkness were of the essence of a

single act. It belonged to the secret of Chivalry, Asiatic and European, to realize oneself as—that is, metaphysically, to *be*—a kinsman of the Sun, a rider on a winged stallion or in a chariot of fire, and girded with very lightning. This was an imitation of God in the likeness of a "mighty man of war."

We could have illustrated the same principles in connection with any of the other arts than that of war; those, for example, of carpentry or weaving, agriculture, hunting, or medicine, or even in connection with such games as checkers—where the pawn that reaches the "farther shore" becomes a crowned king and is significantly called to this day in the Indian vernacular a "mover-at-will" *(kāmācārin,* already in the Upaniṣads the technical designation of the liberated man in whom the spiritual rebirth has been accomplished). The same holds good for all the activities of life, interpreted as a ritual performed in imitation of what was done in the beginning. This point of view in connection with sexual acts, sacrificially interpreted in the Brāhmaṇas and Upaniṣads is, for example, essential to any understanding of the Tantric and Lamaistic Buddhist iconographies, or equally of the Krishna myths and their representation in art; the point of view survives in our own expression, "the sacrament of marriage." The bivalence of an image that has been ritually quickened by the invocation of Deity and by the "Gift of Eyes" is of the same kind. In the same way relics are deposited in a stūpa and called its "life" *(jīvita)*; the stūpa being, like the Christian altar and church, at once an embodiment and the tomb of the dying God. A formal presence of the altogether despirated Buddha, *Deus absconditus,* is thus provided for on earth: the veritable tomb in which the Buddha, himself a Nāga,[43] really lives, is *ab intra,* and guarded by Nāgas; the cult establishes a link between the outward facts and inward reality for the sake of those who are not yet "dead and buried in the Godhead." We indeed speak, although only rhetorically, of the "life" of a work of art; but this is only a folk memory and literally a "superstition" of what was once a deliberate animation metaphysically realized.

From the traditional point of view, the world itself, together with all things done or made in a manner conformable to the cosmic pattern, is a theophany: a valid source of information because itself in-formed. Only those things are ugly and ineloquent which are informal or deformed *(apratirūpa)*. Transubstantiation is the rule: symbols, images, myths, relics, and masks are all alike perceptible to sense, but also intelligible when

"taken out of their sense." In the dogmatic language of revelation and of ritual procedure this general language is reduced to a formulated science for the purposes of communication and transmission. It is more necessary that the doctrine should be transmitted forever, for the sake of those that have ears to hear—"such souls as are of strength to see"—than possible that everyone who plays a part in the transmission should also be a Comprehensor; and hence there is an adaptation in terms of folklore and fairy tale for popular transmission as well as a formulation in hieratic languages for sacerdotal transmission, and finally also an initiatory transmission in the Mysteries. It is equally true with respect to all of these transmissions that "Whereas in every other science things are signified by words, this science has the property, that the things signified by words have themselves also a signification... . The parabolical sense is contained in the literal" *(Sum. Theol.* I.1.1-10); that "Scripture, in one and the same sentence, while it describes a fact, reveals a mystery" (St. Gregory, *Moralia* xx.I, in Migne, *Series latina)*.

It is only in this way that the formality of the whole of traditional art and ritual, Christian, Buddhist, or other, can and must be understood; all of this art has been an applied art, never an art for art's sake; the values of use and meaning are prior to those of ornament. Aesthetic virtues, adequate relations of masses, and so forth, survive in the "art forms" even when their meaning has been forgotten; the "literary" values of Scripture and the "musical" values of the liturgy hold, for example, even for the "nothing-morist" (Skr. *nāstika)*.[44] No doubt, our "feelings" about works of art can be psychologically or even chemically explained, and those who wish may rest content with knowing what they like and how they like it. But the serious student of the history of art, whose business it is to explain the genesis of forms and to judge of achievements without respect to preferences of his own, must also know what the artist was trying to do or, in other words, what the patron required.

We may have to admit that it is beyond the competence of the rationalist, as such, to understand Buddhist art. On the other hand, we are far from maintaining that in order to understand one must be a Buddhist in any specific sense; there are plenty of professing Buddhists and professing Christians who have not the least idea what Buddhist or Christian art is all about. What we mean is that in order to understand one must be not merely a sensitive man, but also a spiritual man; and not merely a spiritual, but also

a sensitive man. One must have learned that an access to reality cannot be had by making a choice between matter and spirit considered as things unlike in all respects, but rather by seeing in things material and sensible a formal likeness to spiritual prototypes of which the senses can give no direct report. [45] It is not a question of religion versus science, but of a reality on different levels of reference, or better, perhaps, of different orders of reality, not mutually exclusive.

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[1] Coomaraswamy, *Elements of Buddhist Iconography,* 1935, and "Some Sources of Buddhist Iconography," 1945.

[2] To speak of an event as *essentially* mythical is by no means to deny the possibility, but rather to assert the necessity of an *accidental*—i.e., historical—eventuation; it is in this way that the eternal and temporal nativities are related. To say "that it might be fulfilled which was said by the prophets" is not to render a narrative suspect but only to refer the fact to its principle. Our intention is to point out that the more eminent truth of the myth does not stand or fall by the truth or error of the historical narrative in which the principle is exemplified.

[3] The expression *nirmāna-kāya* is evidently derived from JB III.261-263. Here the Devas have undertaken a sacrificial session, but before doing so propose to discard "whatever is crude in our Spirit (*tad yad eṣām krūram ātmana āsīt,* i.e., whatever are its possibilities of physical manifestation), and to measure it out *(tan nirmimāmahai*—i.e., fashion it)." Accordingly, "they measured it out *(nirmāya)* and put what had thus been wiped off *(sammārjam)* in two bowls (*śarāvayoh,* i.e., heaven and earth). . . . Thence was born the mild Deva ... it was verily Agni that was born. . . . He said, 'Why have ye brought me to birth?' They answered, 'To keep watch' *(aupa-dṛṣṭrāya*; cf. ŚB III.4.2.5, *aupadṛṣṭā,* and Sāyaṇa on RV X.27.13, *āloka karaṇāya*)." Here, then, Agni's embodiment in the worlds is already a *nirmāṇakāya*. That Agni is to keep watch corresponds, on the one hand, to

the Vedic conception of the Sun as the "Eye of the Devas" and, on the other, to that of the Buddha as the "Eye in the World" *(cakkhhum loke)* in the Pali texts, and to Christ as θεοῦ . . . ὄμμα *(Greek Anthology* I.19). Cf. Coomaraswamy, "Nirmāṇa-kāya," 1938.

[4] The origin of the name of the Buddha's mother, Māyā (μαῖα, μῆτις, Sophia), can be followed backward from *Lalita Vistara* XXVII.12 through AV VIII.9.5 to RV III.29.11, "This, O Agni, is thy cosmic womb, whence thou hast shone forth. . . . Metered in the mother *(yad amimīta mātari)*—Mātariśvān"; cf. X.5.3, "Having measured out the Babe *(mitvā śiśum),"* and TS IV.2.10.3, "born as a steed in the midst of the waters."

[5] Observe, in this connection, that in John 1:3-4, the Latin *quod factum est* represents the Greek γέγονεν (Skr. *jātam),* cf. Philo, *Aet.* 15, ἔργον δὲ καὶ ἔγγονον. . "The teaching of our school is that anything known or born is an image. They say that in begetting his only-begotten Son, the Father is producing his own image" (Meister Eckhart, Evans ed., I, 258).

It is from the same point of view, that of the doctrine of ideas, that for St. Thomas, "Art imitates nature [i.e., Natura naturans, Creatrix universalis, Deus] in her manner of operation" *(Sum. Theol.* I.117.1c), and that Augustine "appuie plus nettement [que Plotin] sur la même origine de la nature [Natura naturata] et des oeuvres d'art, *l'origine en Dieu"* (K. Svoboda, *L'Esthétique de saint Augustin et ses sources,* Brno, 1933, p. 115).

[6] A traditional saying quoted by Śaṇkara on *Brahma Sūtra* III.2.17. Cf. the Hermetic "Then only will you see it, when you cannot speak of it; for the knowledge of it is deep silence, and suppression of all the senses" (Hermes, *Lib.* X.6). Just as for the Upaniṣads the ultimate Brahman is a principle "about which further questions cannot be asked" (BU III.6), so the Buddha consistently refuses to discuss the quiddity of Nibbāna. In the words of Erigena, "God does not know what He Himself is, because He is not any what," and of Maimonides, "by affirming anything of God, you are removed from Him." The Upaniṣads and Buddhism offer no exception to the universal rule of the employment side by side of the *via affirmativa* and *via remotionis*. There is nothing peculiarly Indian, and still less peculiarly Buddhist, in the view that we cannot know what we may become, which

“Eye hath not seen, nor ear heard” (1 Cor. 2:9). In the meantime, the function of the image bodily, verbal, or plastic, or in any other way symbolic, is mediatory. See also Coomaraswamy, “The Vedic Doctrine of ‘Silence’ ” [in *Coomaraswamy* 2].

[7] See Sylvain Levi’s edition of the *Mahāyāna Sūtrālamkāra* of Asaṇga, 2 vols. (Paris, 1907, 1911), I, 39-40; II, 77-78. Levi has not quite understood *lakṣaṇa-sthāna*; the reference is to the descriptive iconography of narrative and visual art. In *A Survey of Painting in the Deccan* (London, 1937), pp. 27 and 203, n. 31, Stella Kramrisch has mistaken the bearing of the passage: “to paint with colors on space” is a proverbial expression implying “to attempt the impossible” or “effort made in vain,” as, for example, in M I.127, where it is pointed out that a man cannot paint in colors on space, because “space is without form or indication.” What Asaṇga is saying is that to think of any representation of the transcendent Principle as it is in itself is no more than an idle dream; the representation has a merely temporary value, comparable to that of the ethical raft in the well-known parable (M I.135).

It is, nevertheless, as the Sādhanas express it, against a background of “space in the heart” that the picture “not in the colors” must be imagined, just as also Śaṇkarācārya’s “world-picture” (the intelligible cosmos seen in the *speculum aeternum)* is “painted by the Spirit on the canvas of the Spirit.” And because the picture has been thus imagined as an appearance manifested over against an *infinite* ground, the picture (of Amida, for example) painted in actual colors and on canvas stands out against an analogous background of *indefinite* extent.

[8] *Karṣaṇārthāya*: the notion coincides with the Platonic and Scholastic concept of the *summoning* quality of beauty. Cf. *Mathnawī* I.2770, “The picture’s smiling appearance is for your sake; in order that by means of that picture the reality may be established.”

[9] “Eludes” is precisely Dante’s “s’asconde sotto.” “Speech does not attain to truth; but mind (νοῦς = *manas)* has mighty power, and when it has been led some distance on its way by speech, it attains to truth” (Hermes I.185).

[10] I.e., in being born, and consequently in using material figures, speaking parabolically, etc.

[11] *Tattvaṃ yogīnām:* cf. RV X.85.4, "Of whom the Brahmans understand as Soma, none ever tastes, none tastes who dwells on earth," and AB VII.31, "It is metaphysically *(parōkṣeṇa)* that he obtains the drinking of Soma, it is not literally *(pratyakṣam)* partaken of by him."

[12] *Laṇkāvātāra Sūtra* II.112-114.

[13] "This sort of thing cannot be taught, my son; but God, when he so wills, recalls it to our memory" (Hermes, *Lib.* XIII.2).

[14] *Cetiya, caitya,* are generally derived from *ci,* "to pile up," originally used in particular connection with the building of a fire-altar or funeral pile, and this is not without its significance in connection with the fact to be discussed below that the Buddha image really inherits the values of the Vedic altar. But as the Jātaka itself makes clear, a *caitya* is by no means necessarily a stūpa nor anything constructed, but a symbolic substitute of any sort to be *regarded as* the Buddha in his absence. There must be assumed at least a hermeneutic connection of *ci,* "to edify," with the closely related roots *ci* and *cit,* to regard, consider, know, and think of or contemplate; it is, for example, in this sense that *cetyaḥ* is used in RV VI.I.5, "Thou, O Agni, our means-of-crossing-over, *art-to-be-known-as* man's eternal refuge and father and mother," all of which epithets have, moreover, been applied also to the Buddha. In ŚB VI.2.3.9 it is explicit that *citi* ("platform," √*ci)* is so called because of having been "seen in meditation" *(cetayamāna,* √*cit)*. The fires "within you," of which the external altar fires are only the supports, are "intellectually piled," or "wisdom-piled" *(manasācitaḥ, vidyācitaḥ,* √*ci,* ŚB X.5.3.3 and 12). Cf. *"Cetiya"* in Coomaraswamy, "Some Pāli Words" [in *Coomaraswamy* 2] with further references; and Coomaraswamy, *"Prāṇa-citi,"* 1943.

The assimilation of *ci* to *cit,* in connection with an operation of which the main purpose is to "build up" the sacrificer himself, whole and complete, has a striking parallel in the semantic development of "edify," the "edifice" having been originally a hearth (*aedes*) and the cognate Greek and Sanskrit

roots αἴθω and *idh,* to kindle. The hearth, which is an altar as much as a fireplace, establishes the home (as in ŚB VII.I.1 and 4). So just as *aedes* becomes "house," so "to edify" is in a more general sense "to build," the meaning "to build up spiritually" preserving the originally sacred values of the hearth. Also parallel to "edify" and *idh* is the Pāli *samuttejati,* literally "sets on fire" by means of an "edifying" discourse (D II.109, etc.), no doubt with ultimate reference to the "internal Agnihotra" in which the heart becomes the hearth (ŚB X.5.3.12, ŚA X; S I.169).

[15] This is not, of course, an exclusively Buddhist position. The Vedas already speak of a Great Yakṣa (Brahman) moving on the waters in a fiery flowing at the center of the universe in the likeness of a Tree (AV X.7.32), and this Burning Bush, the Single Fig, is called in the Upaniṣads the "one Awakener" (*eka sambodhayitṛ)* and everlasting support of the contemplation of Brahman *(dhiyālamba,* MU VII.II). In ŚA XI.2 the spirant Brahman is "as it were a great green tree, standing with its roots moistened." [Cf. Mhv I.69.]

[16] Cf. Coomaraswamy, *Elements of Buddhist Iconography,* pp. 4-6. I now render *uddesika* by "indicative" in view of the discussion by Louis de la Vallée Poussin in HJAS II (1937), 281-282. From the passage which he cites in the *Yogaśāstra* of Asaṇga it is clear that the *uddiśya* means "indicative of the Buddha"; the examples given of such indicative symbols are "stūpa, building, and ancient or modern shrine." If it was only later that *uddesika cetiya* came also to mean "Buddha image" *(tathāgata paṭimā),* this would mean that the Jātaka takes no account at all of Buddha images; alternatively, Buddha images must be held to have been deprecated with other indicative symbols as "arbitrary." The pejorative sense of *anudissati,* "points at," may be noted in D II.354. The net result, that Buddha images were either ignored, or condemned, suffices for our purposes, the demonstration of the trace of an originally aniconic attitude.

The Buddhist iconoclastic position is curiously like that of Sextus Empiricus *(Adversus dogmaticos* II.146 ff.), who distinguishes "commemorative" ((ὑπο- μνηστικόν) from "indicative" (ἐνδεικτικόν)*)* signs and rejects the latter on the ground that the former are, or have been seen, in intimate association with the things of which they remind us, while for the

latter there is no way of demonstrating that they mean what they are said to mean. One may honor the memory of the human teacher that was, but it was and still is only in the Dhamma, his doctrine, that he can really be seen; cf. the story of Vakkali's excessive attachment to the Buddha's visible form, cited in Coomaraswamy, *"Samvega:* Aesthetic Shock" [in *Coomaraswamy* 1]. At the same time, it must not be overlooked that while Sextus Empiricus is a sceptic even in the modern sense, the Buddhist is *not* a "nothing-morist."

[17] The question is one at the same time of localization and temporality. In modern Indian personal devotions it is typical to make use of an image of clay temporarily consecrated and discarded after use, when the Presence has been dismissed; in the same way the Christian church becomes the house of God specifically only after consecration and, if formally deconsecrated, can be used for any secular purpose without offense. The rite, like the temporal Nativity, is necessarily eventful; the temporal event can take place *anywhere,* just because its reference is to an intemporal omnipresence. In any case, it is not a question of contradiction as between a "God extended in space" (Bouquet, *The Real Presence,* p. 52) and a special presence at a given point in space; extension in space is already a localization in the same sense that procession is an apparent motion. Of a God "in whom we live and move and have our being" we cannot say that He is in space as we are, but much rather that He *is* the "space" in which we are. But all Scripture employs a language in terms of time and space, adapted to our capacity; it is not only the visual image that must be shattered if this is to be avoided. The iconoclast does not always realize all the implications of his ideal: it cannot be said of anyone who still knows who he is that all his idols have been broken.

[18] The image in pigment or stone, "indicative" of the Buddha, is as much an image of (and as little in the nature of) the god "whose image it is" as is the image in flesh or in words: each is "a sensible god in the likeness of the intelligible god" (εἰκὼν τοῦ νοητοῦ [θεοῦ] θεὸς αἰσθητός, Plato, *Timaeus* 92). We need not shrink from the implied identification of the *aparinibbuto* Tathāgata with ὁ κόσμος οὗτος, in the sense that the universe is his *body*.

[19] A remarkable anticipation of the Renaissance point of view. “Coming events cast their *shadows* before.” “Through familiarity with bodies one may very easily, though very hurtfully, come to believe that all things are corporeal” (St. Augustine, *Contra academicos* XVII.38); one may, as Plutarch said, being so preoccupied with obvious “fact” as to overlook the “reality,” confuse Apollo with Helios (*Moralia* 393D, 400D, 4330), “the sun whom all men see” with “the Sun whom few know with the mind” (AV X.8.14).

[20] “A Revised Chronology of Gandhāra Sculpture,” *Art Bulletin,* XVIII (1936), 400.

[21] Adapted from Robert Byron and David Talbot Rice, *The Birth of Western Painting* (London, 1930), p. 56, by addition of words in brackets.

[22] “In these outlines, my son, I have drawn a likeness (εἰκών) of God for you, as far as that is possible; and, if you gaze upon this likeness with the eyes of your heart (καρδίας ὀφθαλμοῖς, (, Islamic '*ayn-i-qalbī),* then, my son, believe me, you will find the upward path; or rather, the sight itself will guide you on your way” (Hermes, *Lib*. IV.II;b cf. Hermes, *Asclepius* III.37f.).

[23] Byron and Rice, *Birth of Western Painting,* pp. 67, 78. It was, in both cases, a matter of the recognition and endorsement of an older and originally neither Christian nor Buddhist, but universally solar, iconography and symbolism, rather than one of the invention of an iconography *ad hoc*.

[24] We deliberately say “animate” because the inscription of an essential text (usually the formula *ye dharmā,* etc.) or the enclosure of a written text within the body of a metal or wooden image implies an eloquence, and it is far more literally than might be supposed that the words of a Chinese inscription, “the artist painted a *speaking* likeness” (Chavannes, *Mission archéologique,* I, 497), are to be understood. We have to alter only very slightly the Buddha’s words, “He who sees the Word, sees Me,” to make them read, “He who sees my Image, hears my Word.”

[25] Samuel Beal, *Hsüan-tsang, Si-yu-ki; Buddhist Records of the Western World* (London, 1884) II, 121.

[26] We must avoid an artificial distinction of “terms” from “forms.” The symbol may be verbal, visual, dramatic, or even alimentary; the use of material is inevitable. It is not the kind of material that matters. It is with perfect logic that the Buddhist treats the verbal and the visual imagery alike; “How could the Luminous Personality be demonstrated otherwise than by a representation of colors and iconographic peculiarities? How could the mystery be communicated without a resort to speech and dogma?” The sculptured figures of Buddhas and Bodhisattvas “furnish knowledgeable men with a means of raising themselves to the perfection of truth” (Chinese inscriptions, Chavannes, *Mission archéologique,* I, 501, 393).

[27] We are more inclined to agree with Rowland that “the Gandhāra school came into existence only shortly before the accession of Kanishka in the second century of the Christian era” (“A Revised Chronology of Gandhāra Sculpture,” p. 399), thus either making the earliest Gandhāran images and those of Mathurā almost contemporary, or giving some priority to the latter.

[28] For an image called “Udāyana’s” at Lung Men, see Chavannes, *Mission archéologique,* I, 392, and Paul Mus, “Le Buddha pare,” BÉFEO, XXVIII (1928), 249.

[29] “If then you do not make yourself equal to God, you cannot apprehend God; for like is known by like” (Hermes, *Lib*. XI.2.20b). “But he that is joined unto the Lord is one spirit” (1 Cor. 6:17). Cf. Coomaraswamy, “The ‘E’ at Delphi” [in *Coomaraswamy* 2].

[30] *Le Lotus de la bonne loi* (Paris, 1925), p. 417.

[31] L. Zeigler, *Überlieferung* (1936), p. 183. One cannot wonder that some Indians have referred to European scholarship as a crime. At the same time, the modern Indian scholar is capable of similar banalities. We have in mind Professor K. Chaṭṭopādhyāya, who considers RV X.71.4, where it is a question both of the audition and the vision of the Voice *(vāc),* proof of a knowledge of writing in the Vedic period—an example of intellectual myopia at least as dense as Burnouf’s.

[32] Hermes, *Lib.* XI.2.19: "All bodies are subject to movement; but that which is incorporeal is motionless, and the things situated in it have no movement. . . . Bid your soul travel to any land you choose, and sooner than you can bid it go, it will be there ... it has not moved as one moves from place to place, but it *is* there. Bid it fly up to heaven, and it will have no need of wings." RV VI.9.5: "Mind (*manas, νοῦς*) is the swiftest of birds"; PB XIV.I.13: "The Comprehensor is winged *(yo vai vidvāṇsas te pakṣiṇah)*."

[33] "For man is a being of divine nature . . . and what is more than all besides, he mounts to heaven without quitting the earth; to so vast a distance can he put forth his power" (Hermes, *Lib.* X.24b).

[34] For the history of the symbol see W. Norman Brown, *Indian and Christian Miracles of Walking on the Water* (Chicago, 1928), and Arthur Waley, *The Way and Its Power* (London, 1934), p. 118. The form of the Hermetic statements, "But from the Light there came forth a holy Word (*λόγος= śabda brahman, uktha)* which took its stand upon the watery substance . . . [earth and water] were kept in motion, by reason of the spiritual (*πνευματικός= ātmanvat)* Word which moved upon the face of the water" (Hermes, *Lib.* I.8b, 5b), although perhaps dependent on Genesis, is especially significant in its use of the expression "took its stand"; cf. *adhitiṣṭhati,* as predicated of the *ātman* in the Upaniṣads, *passim*.

[35] For a fuller discussion of the lotus, see Coomaraswamy, *Elements of Buddhist Iconography,* 1935. Cf. the Egyptian representations of Horus on the lotus, of which Plutarch says that "they do not believe that the sun rises as a new-born babe from the lotus, but they portray the rising of the sun in this manner to show darkly (*αἰνιττόμενοι*) that his birth is a kindling *ἄναψι*) from the waters" *(Moralia* 355c), even as Agni is born.

[36] That "the lotus filled from the beginning all the available space" is for Foucher merely a fact of iconography and in this sense a "superstitious precedent." The words are true, however, in this far deeper and more original sense—that *in the beginning there was no other space,* and as it was in the beginning it is now and ever shall be because the lotus is the symbol and image of all spatial extension, as stated explicitly in MU VI.2, "What is the lotus and of what sort? What this lotus is is Space, forsooth;

the four quarters and four inter-quarters are its constituent petals." The "precedent" is primarily metaphysical and cosmic, and *therefore also* iconographic.

[37] The notions of a "revelation" and Philosophia Perennis (Augustine's "Wisdom uncreate, the same now as it ever was, and the same to be for evermore," *Confessions* IX.10) are, of course, anathema to the modern scholar. He prefers to say that the Vedic hymns "contain the rudiments of a far higher species of thought than these early poets could have dreamt of . . . thought which has become final for all time in India, and even outside of India" (Maurice Bloomfield, *The Religion of the Veda, New* York, 1908, p. 63). It is true that the writer has here in mind an evolution of thought, but just how *does* the Vedic poet formulate "a far higher species of thought than he could have dreamt of"? It is as much as to say that man accomplished what man cannot do. But it is rather unlikely that Bloomfield really meant to support a doctrine of verbal inspiration.

[38] See Coomaraswamy, "The Rape of a Nāgī: An Indian Gupta Seal" [in *Coomaraswamy* i].

[39] Sentimentality and materialism, if not in every respect synonymous, coincide in the subject. Man in search of spirit has become Jung's "modern man in search of a soul" who discovers . . . spiritualism and psychology.

[40] Webster, "any process of reasoning by means of symbols."

[41] See Coomaraswamy, "The Symbolism of Archery," 1943. It is said that the last company of French archers was dissolved by Clemenceau, who objected to their possession of a "secret."

[42] For the cult and transubstantiation of weapons, cf. RV VI.47 and 75, and ŚB I.2.4.

43 The Buddha is sometimes referred to as a Nāga. In M I.32, the *arhats* Mogallāna and Sāriputra are called "a pair of Great Serpents" *(mahānāgā);* at I.144-145, the Nāga found at the bottom of an ant hill (considered as if a *stūpa)* is called a "signification of the monk in whom the foul issues have

been eradicated"; in Sn 522, "Nāga" is defined as one "who does not cling to anything and is released" *(sabatta na sajjati vimutto)*. Parallels abound on Greek soil, where the dead and deified hero is constantly represented as a snake within a conical tomb, and the chthonic aspect of Zeus Meilichios is similarly ophidian.

[44] *Nāstika,* one "who thinks 'there is naught beyond this world' *ayam loko nāsti para iti māni"* (KU II.6), not realizing that "there is not only this much, but another than this *aitāvad enā anyad asti"* (RV X.31.8). If Buddhists themselves have sometimes been regarded as *nāstikas,* this has been because *anattā* has been misunderstood to mean "there is no Spirit"; the true Buddhist position is that it is only of "what is not the Spirit (*anattā; na me so attā*)," only of "life under these conditions," that it can be said that "there is [for the *arahant*] now no more *(nāparam),"* (S III.118). Cf. "Natthika," in "Some Pāli Words" [in *Coomaraswamy 2*].

[45] The nature and use of "images" as supports of contemplation is nowhere more briefly or better stated than in *Republic* 510DE ("he who uses the visible forms and talks about them is not really thinking of them, but of those things of which they are the image"), a passage that may have been the source of St. Basil's well-known formula that "the respect that is paid to the image passes over to its archetype" *(De spiritu sancto* [Migne, *Series graeca,* Vol. 32], c.18; cf. Epiphanius, Fr. 2).

7

An Indian Temple: The Kandarya Mahadeo

The nature of the present symposium suggests the use of a single illustration, but the reader is asked to understand that my subject in the present short article is really that of *the* Hindu temple, irrespective of period and relative complexity or simplicity. The choice of this subject is one that is made especially appropriate by the recent [1946] publication of Dr. Stella Kramrisch's magnificent work, *The Hindu Temple*.

It may be remarked, in the first place, that the most essential part of the concept of a temple is that of an altar on which, or a hearth in which, offerings can be made to an invisible presence that may or may not be represented iconographically. The types of the oldest shrines are those of the "stone tables"[1] of megalithic cults and those of the stone altars of tree or pillar cults;[2] or the shrine may be a hearth, the burnt offering being conveyed to the gods with the smoke of the fire, Agni thus functioning as missal priest. In all these cases the shrine, even when walled or fenced about, remains hypaethral,[3] open to the sky. On the other hand, the oldest Indian type of sacred architecture both enclosed and roofed is that of the *sadas* ("seat," the sacrificial operation being itself a *sattra,* "session") of the Vedic Sacrifice or Mass. Made only for temporary use, this enclosure is a place "apart" (*tiras, antarhita)* to which the gods resort and in which the Sacrificer, having put on the "garment of initiation and ardor," sleeps, becoming "as it were one of themselves" for the time being; he becomes, indeed, an embryo, and is reborn from the sacred enclosure as from a womb.[4] This "hut or hall is a microcosm," of which the corners, for example, are called the "four quarters."[5] At the same time, it must be recognized that no fundamental distinction can be made between the god-

house as such and the dwellings of men, whether huts or palaces, as is evident in the case of those cultures, notably the Indian, in which the paterfamilias himself officiates as household priest, daily performing the Agnihotra in the domestic circle.



Figure 12. *Kandarya Mahadeo Temple, Khajuraho*

In addition to this, it must be realized that in India, as elsewhere, not only are temples made with hands, the universe in a likeness, but man himself is likewise a microcosm and a “holy temple”[6] or City of God *(brahmapura)*.[7] The body, the temple, and the universe being thus analogous, it follows that whatever worship is outwardly and visibly performed can also be celebrated inwardly and invisibly, the “gross” ritual being, in fact, no more than a tool or support of contemplation, the external means having (just as had been the case in Greece) for its “end and aim the knowledge of Him who is the First, the Lord, and the Intelligible”[8]—as distinguished from the visible. It is recognized also, of course, that the “whole earth is divine,” i.e., potentially an altar, but that a place is necessarily selected and prepared for an actual Sacrifice, the validity of such a site depending not upon the site itself but on that of the sacerdotal art; and such a site is always theoretically both on a high place and at the center or navel of the earth, with an eastward orientation, since it is “from the east westwards that the gods come unto men.”[9]

It is constantly emphasized, accordingly, that the Sacrifice is essentially a mental operation, to be performed both outwardly and inwardly, or in any case inwardly. It is prepared by the Sacrificer’s “whole mind and whole self.” The Sacrificer is, as it were, emptied out of himself, and is himself the real victim.[10] The true end of the cult is one of reintegration and resurrection, attainable not by a merely mechanical performance of the service, but by a full realization of its significance, or even by this comprehension alone.[11] The Agnihotra, or burnt offering, for example, may be—and is for the comprehensor—an interior self-sacrifice, in which the heart is the altar, the outer man the offering, and the flame the dompted self.[12]

The human frame, the constructed temple, and the universe being analogical equivalents, the parts of the temple correspond to those of the human body no less than to those of the universe itself.[13] All these dimensioned *(nirmita, vimita)* forms are explicitly “houses,” indwelt and filled by an invisible Presence and representing its possibilities of manifestation in time and space; their *raison d'être* is that it may be known. For this unifying and constructive Principle, the Spirit or Self of all beings, is only apparently confined by its habitations which, like other images, serve as supports of contemplation, none being ends in themselves but more

or less indispensable means to liberation from every sort of enclosure. The position, in other words, is primarily iconolatrous, but teleologically iconoclastic.

Each of the "houses" we are considering is dimensioned and limited in six directions, nadir, quarters, and zenith—the feet, floor, or earth; bulk, interior space, or atmospheric space; and cranium, roof, or sky— defining the extent of this man, this church, and this world respectively. Here we can consider only one or two particular aspects of these and other analogies. The temple has, for example, windows and doors from which the indweller can look out and go forth, or conversely return to himself; and these correspond in the body to the "doors of the senses" through which one can look out in times of activity, or from which one can return to the "heart" of one's being when the senses are withdrawn from their objects, i.e., in concentration. There is, however, in theory, another door or window, accessible only by a "ladder" or the "rope" by which our being is suspended from above, and through which one can emerge from the dimensioned structure so as to be no longer on a level with its ground, or within it, but altogether above it. In man, this exit is represented by the cranial foramen, which is still unclosed at birth, and is opened up again at death when the skull is ritually broken, though as regards its significance it may be kept open throughout one's life by appropriate spiritual exercises, for this God-aperture *(brahma-randhra)* corresponds to the "point" or "eye of the heart," the microcosmic City of God *(brahmapura)* within us, from which the Spirit departs at death.[14] Architecturally, the *brahma-randhra* or foramen of the human cranium or man-made temple corresponds to the luffer, smoke hole, or skylight *(Lichtloch)* of the traditional house; and in some ancient and even relatively modern Western temples, this oculus of the dome still remains an open circular window, and the structure therefore remains hypaethral.[15] In the early Indian timbered domes, the opening above is apparently closed by the circular roof-plate (*kaṇṇikā)* on which the rafters rest like the spokes of a wheel or the ribs of an umbrella, but this plate is perforated, and in any case functions as a doorway or place of exit through which the Perfected (Arahants) movers-at-will and "skyfarers" are repeatedly described as making their departure; it is an "upper door" (agga-dvāra) [16] In later Indian lithic structures, in the same way the summit of the spire is apparently closed by a circular stone slab *(āmalaka),* but this, too, is perforated for the reception of the tenon of the finial that prolongs the

central axis of the whole structure; and the term *brahmarandhra* remains in use. Finally, in the world of which the sky is the roof, the Sun himself is the Janua Coeli, the "gateway of liberation" *(mokṣadvāra),* the only way by which to break out of the dimensioned universe, and so "escape altogether." [17]

We have considered so far the altar (always in some sense a sacrificial hearth, analogous to the heart) and the oculus of the dome (always in some sense a symbol of the Sun) as the proximate and ultimate goals of the worshiper who comes to visit the deity, whose man-made "house" is the temple, there to devote himself. The altar, like the sacred hearth, is always theoretically at the center or navel of the earth, and the solar eye of the dome is always in the center of the ceiling or *coelum* immediately above it; and these two are connected in principle, as in some early structures they were in fact, by an axial pillar at once uniting and separating floor and roof, and supporting the latter; as it was in the beginning, when heaven and earth, that had been one, were "pillared apart" by the Creator.[18] It is by this pillar —regarded as a bridge[19] or ladder, or, because of its immateriality, as a bird on wings,[20] and regarded in any case from its base, for "there is no side path here in the world"[21]—that the "hard ascent after Agni" *(dūrohaṇa, agner anvārohaḥ*)[22] must be made from below to the Sundoor above; an ascent that is also imitated in countless climbing rites, and notably in that of the ascent of the sacrificial post (*yūpa*) by the Sacrificer who, when he reaches its summit and raises his head above its capital, says on behalf of himself and his wife: "We have reached the heaven, reached the gods; we have become immortals, become the children of Prajāpati."[23] For them the distance that separates heaven from earth is temporarily annihilated; the bridge lies behind them.

The nature and full significance of the cosmic pillar *(skambha),* the Axis Mundi referred to above, can best be grasped from its description in *Atharva Veda* x.7 and 8,[24] or understood in terms of the Islamic doctrine of the Qutb, with which the Perfect Man is identified, and on which all things turn. In the Vedic *Sadas* it is represented by the king-post (*sthūṇarāja,* or *śālā-vaṃśa)* that the Sacrificer himself erects, and that stands for the Median Breath,[25] in the same way as within man, as the axial principle of one's own life and being.[26] In the Vedic (Fire-) altar, a constructed image of the universe, this is also the axial principle that passes through the three

"self-perforated bricks" *(svayamātṛṇṇā),* of which the uppermost corresponds to the Sundoor of the later texts; it is an axis that—like Jacob's ladder—is the "way up and down these worlds." In visiting the deity whose image or symbol has been set up in the womb of the temple, the worshiper is returning to the heart and center of his own being to perform a devotion that prefigures his ultimate resurrection and regeneration from the funeral pyre in which the last Sacrifice is made.

We are thus brought back again to the concept of the three analogous—bodily, architectural, and cosmic—"houses" that the Spirit of Life inhabits and fills; and we recognize at the same time that the values of the oldest architectural symbolism are preserved in the latest buildings and serve to explain their use.[27] I shall only emphasize, in conclusion, what has already been implied, that the Indian architectural symbolism briefly outlined above is by no means peculiarly or exclusively Indian, but rather worldwide. For example, that the sacred structure is a microcosm, the world in a likeness, is explicit among the American Indians; as remarked by Sartori, "Among the Huichol Indians ... the temple is considered as an image of the world, the roof as heaven, and the ceremonies which are enacted during the construction almost all relate to this meaning,"[28] and as related by Speck in his description of the Delaware Big-House, "the Big-House stands for the universe; its floor, the earth; its four walls, the four quarters; its vault, the sky-dome atop, where resides the Creator in his indefinable supremacy ... the centre-post is the staff of the Great Spirit with its foot upon the earth, with its pinnacle reaching to the hand of the Supreme Being sitting on his throne."[29] In the same way, from the Indian point of view, it is said with respect to the way up and down that "within these two movements the Hindu temple has its being; its central pillar is erected from the heart of the Vāstupuruṣa in the Brahmasthāna, from the center and heart of existence on earth, and supports the Prasāda Puruṣa in the Golden Jar in the splendor of the Empyrean."[30]

Finally, inasmuch as the temple is the universe in a likeness, its dark interior is occupied only by a single image or symbol of the informing Spirit, while externally its walls are covered with representations of the Divine Powers in all their manifested multiplicity. In visiting the shrine, one proceeds inwards from multiplicity to unity, just as in contemplation; and on returning again to the outer world, one sees that one has been surrounded by all the innumerable forms that the Sole Seer and Agent within assumes

in his playful activity. And this distinction between the outer world and the inner shrine of an Indian temple, into which one enters "so as to be born again from its dark womb,"[31] is the same distinction Plotinus makes when he observes that the seer of the Supreme, being one with his vision, "is like one who, having penetrated the inner sanctuary, leaves the temple images behind him—though these become once more first objects of regard when he leaves the holies; for There his converse was not with image, not with trace, but with the very Truth."[32]

The deity who assumes innumerable forms, and has no form, is one and the same Puruṣa, and to worship in either way leads to the same liberation: "however men approach Me, even so do I welcome them."[33] In the last analysis, the ritual, like that of the old Vedic Sacrifice, is an interior procedure, of which the outward forms are only a support, indispensable for those who—being still on their way—have not yet reached its end, but that can be dispensed with by those who have already found the end, and who, though they may be still in the world, are not of it. In the meantime, there can be no greater danger or hindrance than that of the premature iconoclasm of those who still confuse their own existence with their own being, and have not yet "known the Self"; these are the vast majority, and for them the temple and all its figurations are signposts on their way.

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[1] Cf. J. Layard, *Stone Men of Malekula* (London, 1942), pp. 625, 701, on dolmens as altars, used also as seats.

[2] Cf. Coomaraswamy, *Yakṣas* [I], 1928, p. 17.

[3] Cf. Coomaraswamy, "Early Indian Architecture: II. Bodhigharas," 1930. The Greek word (as applied to Cynics and Indian Gymnosophists) = *abhokāsika* (as applied to Buddhist monks); cf. *vivattacado* ("whose roof has been opened up," said of a Buddha).

[4] ŚB III.1.1.8, III.I.3.28; TS VI.1.1.1, VI.2.5.5.

[5] TS vi.i.i.i, with Keith's comment in HOS, XIX, 483, n. 4.

[6] I Cor. 3:16, 17.

[7] AV x.2.30; CU viii.1.1-5.

[8] Plutarch, *Moralia* 352A.

[9] ŚB i.i.2.23, iii.1.I.1,4.

[10] ŚB ii.4.i.11, m.3.4.21, iii.8.i.2, ix.5.i.53.

[11] ŚB x.4.2.31, x.4.3.24.

[12] ŚA x; ŚB x.5.3.12; S i.169.

[13] Cf. Stella Kramrisch, *The Hindu Temple* (Calcutta, 1946), II, 357-61, "The Temple as Purusa."

[14] BU iv.4.2; CU viii.i.1-4; Hamsa Up. i.3. For the breaking of the skull, see *Gāruḍa Purāṇa* x. 56-59, *bhitvā brahmarandhrakam,* corresponding to *bhitvā Ḳaṇṇikā-maṇḍalam* architecturally (DhA iii.66) and to *bhitvā sūryamaṇḍalaṃ* ("breaking through the solar disk") microcosmically (MU vi.30). In the Purāṇa, this "breaking through" represents explicitly the rebirth of the deceased from the sacrificial fire in which the body is burnt; cf. JUB III. ii.7.

For the "eye of the heart," cf. J. A. Comenius, *The Labyrinth of the World* (1631, based on J. V. Andreae, *Civis Christianus),* tr. Spinka (Chicago, 1942), chs. 37, 38, 40 ("in the vault of this my chamber, a large round window above," approachable only by ladders; through it on the one hand Christ looks down from above, and on the other "one could peer out into the beyond").

[15] For instance, the Roman Pantheon; cf. Piranesi's engraving of the Tempio della Tossa. "Even today lest he [Terminus] see aught above him but the stars, have temple roofs their tiny aperture" ("exiguum . . .

foramen," Ovid, *Fasti* II.667-668). For Islamic architecture, cf. E. Diez in *Ars Islamica,* V (1938), 39, 45: "Space was the primary problem and was placed in relation to, and dependence on, infinite space by means of the widely open *opaion* in the zenith of the cupola. This relation to open space was always emphasized by the skylight lantern in Western architecture. . . . Islamic art appears as the individuation of its metaphysical basis *(unendlichen Grund)."*

[16] See Coomaraswamy, "The Symbolism of the Dome," "Pāli *kaṇṇikā"* and *"Svayamātṛṇṇā:* Janua Coeli" [all in *Coomaraswamy* 1]; for the *agga-dvāra,* cf. Coomaraswamy, "Some Sources of Buddhist Iconography," 1945, p. 473, n. 12. For the exit via the roof, cf. *Odyssey* I.320 where Athene, leaving Odysseus' house, "flew like a bird through the oculus"; Cross and Slover, *Ancient Irish Tales* (1936), p. 92, "And he [the god Mider] carried her [Etain] off through the smokehole of the house . . . and they saw two swans circling"; and H. Rink, *Tales and Traditions of the Eskimo* (London and Edinburgh, 1875), pp. 60, 61, when "the *angakok* [shaman] had to make a flight, he started through an opening which appeared of itself in the roof."

It is through the cosmic opening that the Man, the Son of God, looks down, and descends (Hermes, *Lib.* I.14). And just as the *kaṇṇikā* is a symbol of *samādhi,* "synthesis," so is this Greek capstone a "harmony," as Pausanias says, "of the whole edifice" (Pausanias, VIII.8.9 and IX.38.7).

In connection with the term *agga-dvāra* it may be observed that *agga (= agra,* cf. Plato, *Phaedrus* 247B and Philo, *De opificio mundi* 71), "summit," is predicated of the Buddha (A II.17, D III.147), who "opens the doors of immortality" (Vin I.7, D II.33, M I.167) and is in this sense a "Door-God," like Agni (AB III.42) and like Christ (John 10:9; *Sum. Theol.* III.49.5), this Janua Coeli being the door at which the Buddhas are said to stand and knock (S II.58).

Further pertinent material will be found in P. Sartori, "Das Dach im Volksglauben," *Zeit. des Vereins f. Volkskunde,* XXV (1915), 228-241; K. Rhamm as reviewed by V. Ritter von Geramb, *ibid.,* XXVI (1916); R. Guénon, "Le Symbolisme du dome," *Études traditionelles,* XLIII (1938); F.

J. Tritsch, “False Doors in Tombs,” JHS, LXIII (1943), 113-115; and more generally in W. R. Lethaby, *Architecture, Mysticism, and Myth* (New York, 1892).

[17] JUB I.3.5, i-e., “through the midst of the Sun,” JUB I.6.1, the Janua Coeli, JUB IV.14.5, IV.15.4 and 5, or the “Sundoor” of MU VI.30 and Muṇḍ. Up. I.2.11.

[18] RV *passim*. In general, the axial column of the universe is a pillar *(mita, sthūṇā, vaṃśa, skambha,* etc.) of Fire (RV I.59.1, IV.5.1, X.5.6) or Life (RV X.5.6) or solar Light (JUB I.10.10), Breath or Spirit *(ranāh, passim),* i.e., the Self *(ātman,* BU IV.4.22). The primordial separation of heaven and earth is common to the creation myths of the whole world.

[19] D. L. Coomaraswamy, “The Perilous Bridge of Welfare,” HJAS, VIII (1944).

[20] PB V.3.5.

[21] MU VI.30.

[22] TS V.6.8; AB IV.20-22.

[23] TS I.7.9, V.6.8, VI.6.4.2; ŚB V.2.I.15. Cf. Coomaraswamy, *“Svayamātṛṇṇā*: Janua Coeli” [in this volume—ED.].

[24] AV X.7.35 and 8.2, “The *skambha* sustains both heaven and earth . . . and hath inhabited all existences. . . . Whereby these twain are pillared apart, therein is all this that is enspirited (*ātmanvat*)*,* all that breathes and blinks.”

[25] AĀ III.I.4, III.2.1; SA viii; cf. Coomaraswamy, “The Sun-kiss,” 1940, p. 58, n. 30.

[26] BU II.2.1, where in the subtle and gross bodies of individuals, “the Median Breath is the pillar” *(madhyamah prāṇaḥ . . . sthūṇā)*.

[27] "En effet, il est bien connu que la construction de l'autel du feu est un sacrifice personnel déguisé. . . . L'activité artistique de l'Inde s'est toujours ressentie, nous l'avons reconnu, de ce que la premiere oeuvre d'art brāhmanique ait été un autel où le donataire, autrement dit le sacrifiant, s'unissait à son dieu," Paul Mus, *Barabuḍur* (Paris, 1935), I, *92, *94.

[28] Sartori, "Das Dach im Volksglauben," p. 233.

[29] F. G. Speck, on the Delaware Indian big-house, cited from *Publications of the Pennsylvania Historical Commission,* II (1931), by W. Schmidt, *High Gods in North America* (Oxford, 1933), p. 75. Fr. Schmidt remarks, p. 78, that "the Delawares are perfectly right in affirming this, the fundamental importance of the centre-post," and points out that the same holds good for many other Indian tribes, amongst whom "the centre-post of the ceremonial hut has a quite similar symbolical function and thus belongs to the oldest religious elements of North America."

On the importance of the center-post, cf. also J. Strzygowski, *Early Church Art in Northern Europe* (New York, 1928), p. 141, in connection with the mast-churches of Norway: "The steeple marking the apex of the perpendicular axis appears to be a relic of the time when the only type was the one-mast church." For China, cf. G. Ecke, "Once More Shen-T'ung Ssu and Ling-Yen Ssu," *Monumenta Serica,* VII (1942), 295 ff. Cf. the invocatory verse of the *Dasakumāracarita:* "May the staff of His foot, the Three-strider's (Viṣṇu), bear thee across—viz. the staff of the umbrella of the Brahmānda, the stalk of the Hundred-Sacrificer's (Brahma's) cosmic lotus, the mast of the ship of the earth, the flag pole of the banner of the nectar-shedding river, the pole of the axis of the planetary sphere, the pillar of victory over the three worlds, and death-dealing club of the foes of the gods—may this be thy means of crossing over."

[30] Kramrisch, *The Hindu Temple,* II, 361.

[31] *Ibid.,* p. 358.

[32] Plotinus, *Enneads* VI.9.11.

[33] BG IV.11.

8

Literary Symbolism

> Lo! Allah disdaineth not to coin the similitude even of a gnat.
>
> Koran II.26.

Words are never meaningless by nature, though they can be used irrationally for merely aesthetic and nonartistic purposes: all words are by first intention signs or symbols of specific referents. However, in any analysis of meaning, we must distinguish the literal and categorical or historical significance of words from the allegorical meaning that inheres in their primary referents: for while words are signs of things, they can also be heard or read as symbols of what these things themselves imply. For what are called "practical" (shopkeeping) purposes the primary reference suffices; but when we are dealing with theory, the second reference becomes the important one. Thus, we all know what is meant when we are ordered, "raise your hand"; but when Dante writes "and therefore doth the scripture condescend to your capacity, assigning hand and foot to God, with other meaning . . ." (*Paradiso* IV.43, cf. Philo, *De somniis* I.235), we perceive that in certain contexts "hand" means "power." In this way language becomes not merely indicative, but also expressive, and we realize that, as St. Bonaventura says, "it never expresses except by means of a likeness *(nisi mediante specie, De reductione artium ad theologiam* 18). So Aristotle, "even when one thinks speculatively, one must have some mental picture with which to think" *(De anima* III.8). Such pictures are not themselves the objects of contemplation, but "supports of contemplation."

"Likeness," however, need not imply any visual resemblance; for in representing abstract ideas, the symbol is "imitating," in the sense that all art is "mimetic," something invisible. Just as when we say "the young man is a lion," so in all figures of thought, the validity of the image is one of true

analogy, rather than verisimilitude; it is, as Plato says, not a mere resemblance (ὁμοιότης) but a real rightness or adequacy (αὐτὸ τὸ ἴσον) that effectively reminds us of the intended referent *(Phaedo* 74 ff.): the Pythagorean position being that truth, rightness (κατόρθωσις,*recta ratio)* in a work of art is a matter of proportion (ἀναλογία, Sextus Empiricus, *Adversus dogmaticos* I.106); in other words, true "imitation" is not an arithmetical reproduction, "on the contrary, an image, if it is to be in fact an 'image' of its model, must not be altogether 'like' it" *(Cratylus* 432B).

Adequate symbolism may be defined as the representation of a reality on a certain level of reference by a corresponding reality on another: as, for example, in Dante, "No object of sense in the whole world is more worthy to be made a type of God than the sun" *(Convito* III.12). No one will suppose that Dante was the first to regard the sun as an adequate symbol of God. But there is no more common error than to attribute to an individual "poetic imagination" the use of what are really the traditional symbols and technical terms of a spiritual language that transcends all confusion of tongues and is not peculiar to any one time or place. For example, "a rose by any name (e.g., English or Chinese) will smell as sweet," or considered as a symbol may have a constant sense; but that it should be so depends upon the assumption that there are really analogous realities on different levels of reference, i.e., that the world is an explicit theophany, "as above, so below."[1] The traditional symbols, in other words, are not "conventional" but "given" with the ideas to which they correspond; one makes, accordingly, a distinction between *le symbolisme qui sait* and *le symbolisme qui cherche,* the former being the universal language of tradition, and the latter that of the individual and self-expressive poets who are sometimes called "Symbolists."[2] Hence also the primary necessity of accuracy (ὀρθότης, *integritas)* in our iconography, whether in verbal or visual imagery.

It follows that if we are to understand what the expressive writing intends to communicate, we cannot take it only literally or historically, but must be ready to interpret it "hermeneutically." How often it happens that in some sequence of traditional books one reaches the point at which one questions whether such and such an author, whose account of a given episode is confused, has understood his material or is merely playing with it, somewhat as modern literary men play with their material when they write what are called "fairy tales," and to whom may be applied the words of Guido d'Arezzo, "Nam qui canit quod non sapit, diffinitur bestia." For as

Plato long ago asked, “About what does the Sophist make one so eloquent?” *(Protagoras* 312E).

The problem presents itself to the historian of literature in connection with the stylistic sequences of myth, epic, romance, and modern novel and poetry whenever, as so often happens, he meets with recurring episodes or phrases, and similarly in connection with folklore. An all-too-common error is to suppose that the “true” or “original” form of a given story can be reconstructed by an elimination of its miraculous and supposedly “fanciful” or “poetic” elements. It is, however, precisely in these “marvels,” for example in the miracles of Scripture, that the deepest truths of the legend inhere; philosophy, as Plato—whom Aristotle followed in this respect—affirms, beginning in wonder. The reader who has learned to think in terms of the traditional symbolisms will find himself furnished with unsuspected means of understanding, criticism, and delight, and with a standard by which he can distinguish the individual fancy of a littérateur from the knowing use of traditional formulae by a learned singer. He may come to realize that there is no connection of novelty with profundity; that when an author has made an idea his own he can employ it quite originally and inevitably, and with the same right as the man to whom it first presented itself, perhaps before the dawn of history.

Thus when Blake writes, “I give you the end of a golden string, Only wind it into a ball; It will lead you in at heaven’s gate Built in Jerusalem’s wall,” he is using not a private terminology but one that can be traced back in Europe through Dante *(questi la terra in sè stringe, Paradiso* I.116), the Gospels (“No man can come to me, except the Father . . . draw him,” John 6:44, cf. 12:32), Philo, and Plato (with his “one golden cord” that we human puppets should hold on to and be guided by, *Laws* 644) to Homer, where it is Zeus that can draw all things to himself by means of a golden cord *(Iliad* VIII.18 ff., cf. Plato, *Theatetus* 153). And it is not merely in Europe that the symbol of the “thread” has been current for more than two millennia; it is to be found in Islamic, Hindu, and Chinese contexts. Thus we read in Shams-i-Tabrīz, “He gave me the end of a thread. . . . ‘Pull,’ he said ‘that I may pull: and break it not in the pulling,’ ” and in Hāfiz, “Keep thy end of the thread, that he may keep his end”; in the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa,* that the Sun is the fastening to which all things are attached by the thread of the spirit, while in the *Maitri Upaniṣad* the exaltation of the contemplative is compared to the ascent of a spider on its thread; Chuang-tzu tells us that our life is

suspended from God as if by a thread, cut off when we die. All this is bound up with the symbolism of weaving and embroidery, the "rope trick," rope walking, fishing with a line and lassoing; and that of the rosary and the necklace, for, as the *Bhagavad Gītā* reminds us, "all things are strung on Him like rows of gems upon a thread."[3]

We can say with Blake, too, that "if the spectator could enter into these images, approaching them on the fiery chariot of contemplative thought . . . then he would be happy." No one will suppose that Blake invented the "fiery chariot" or found it anywhere else than in the Old Testament; but some may not have remembered that the symbolism of the chariot is also used by Plato, and in the Indian and Chinese books. The horses are the sensitive powers of the soul, the body of the chariot our bodily vehicle, the rider the spirit. The symbol can therefore be regarded from two points of view; if the untamed horses are allowed to go where they will, no one can say where this will be; but if they are curbed by the driver, his intended destination will be reached. Thus, just as there are two "minds," divine and human, so there is a fiery chariot of the gods, and a human vehicle, one bound for heaven, the other for the attainment of human ends, "whatever these may be" (TS V.4.10.1). In other words, from one point of view, embodiment is a humiliation, and from another a royal procession. Let us consider only the first case here. Traditional punishments (e.g., crucifixion, impalement, flaying) are based on cosmic analogies. One of these punishments is that of the tumbril: whoever is, as a criminal, carted about the streets of a city loses his honor and all legal rights; the "cart" is a moving prison, the "carted man" *(rathita,* MU IV.4) a prisoner. That is why, in Chrétien's *Lancelot,* the Chevalier de la Charette shrinks from and delays to step into the cart, although it is to take him on the way to the fulfilment of his quest. In other words, the Solar Hero shrinks from his task, which is that of the liberation of the Psyche (Guénévere), who is imprisoned by a magician in a castle that lies beyond a river that can only be crossed by the "sword bridge." This bridge itself is another traditional symbol, by no means an invention of the storyteller, but the "Brig of Dread" and "razor-edged way" of Western folklore and Eastern scripture.[4] The "hesitation" corresponds to that of Agni to become the charioteer of the gods (RV x.51), the Buddha's well-known hesitation to set in motion the Wheel of the Law, and Christ's "may this cup be taken from me"; it is every man's hesitation, who will not take up his cross. And *that* is why Guénévere, even when

Lancelot has crossed the sword bridge barefoot and has set her free, bitterly reproaches him for his short and seemingly trivial delay to mount the cart.

Such is the "understanding" of a traditional episode, which a knowing author has retold, not primarily to amuse but originally to instruct; the telling of stories only to amuse belongs to later ages in which the life of pleasure is preferred to that of activity or contemplation. In the same way, every genuine folk and fairy tale can be "understood," for the references are always metaphysical; the type of "The Two Magicians," for example, is a creation myth (cf. BU I.4.4, "she became a cow, he became a bull," etc.); John Barleycorn is the "dying god"; Snow-white's apple is "the fruit of the tree"; it is only with seven-league boots that one can traverse the seven worlds (like Agni and the Buddha); it is Psyche that the Hero rescues from the Dragon, and so forth. Later on, all these motifs fall into the hands of the writers of "romances," littérateurs, and in the end historians, and are no longer understood. That these formulae have been employed in the same way all over the world in the telling of what are really only variants and fragments of the one Urmythos of humanity implies the presence in certain kinds of literature of imaginative (iconographic) values far exceeding those of the belle-lettrist's fantasies, or the kinds of literature that are based on "observation"; if only because the myth is always true (or else is no true myth), while the "facts" are only true eventfully.[5]

We have pointed out that words have meaning simultaneously on more than one level of reference. All interpretation of scripture (in Europe notably from Philo to St. Thomas Aquinas) has rested upon this assumption: our mistake in the study of literature is to have overlooked that far more of this literature and these *contes* are really scriptural, and can only be criticized as such, than we supposed; an oversight that implies what is really an incorrect stylistic diagnosis. The twofold significance of words, literal and spiritual, can be cited in the word "Jerusalem" as used by Blake, above: "Jerusalem" being (1) an actual city in Palestine and (2) in its spiritual sense, Jerusalem the "golden," a heavenly city of the "imagination." And in this connection, too, as in the case of the "golden" thread, it must be remembered that the traditional language is precise: "gold" is not merely the element *Au* but the recognized symbol of light, life, immortality, and truth.

Many of the terms of traditional thinking survive as clichés in our everyday speech and contemporary literature, where, like other

“superstitions,” they have no longer any real meaning for us. Thus we speak of a “brilliant saying” or “shining wit,” without awareness that such phrases rest upon an original conception of the coincidence of light and sound, and of an “intellectual light” that shines in all adequate imagery; we can hardly grasp what St. Bonaventura meant by “the light of a mechanical art.” We ignore what is still the “dictionary meaning” of the word “inspired,” and say “inspired by” when we mean “stimulated by” some concrete object. We use the one word “beam” in its two senses of “ray” and “timber” without realizing that these are related senses, coincident in the expression *rubus igneus,* and that we are here “on the track of” (this itself is another expression which, like “hitting the mark,” is of prehistoric antiquity) an original conception of the immanence of Fire in the “wood” of which the world is made. We say that “a little bird told me” not reflecting that the “language of birds” is a reference to “angelic communications.” We say “self-possessed” and speak of “self-government,” without realizing that (as was long ago pointed out by Plato) all such expressions imply that “there are two in us” and that in such cases the question still arises, which self shall be possessed or governed by which, the better by the worse, or vice versa. In order to comprehend the older literatures we must not overlook the precision with which all such expressions are employed; or, if we write ourselves, may learn to do so more clearly (again we find ourselves confronted by the coincidence of “light” with “meaning”—to “argue” being etymologically to “clarify”) and intelligibly.

It is sometimes objected that the attribution of abstract meanings is only a later and subjective reading of meanings into symbols that were originally employed either only for purposes of factual communication or only for decorative and aesthetic reasons. Those who take up such a position may first of all be asked to prove that the “primitives,” from whom we inherit so many of the forms of cur highest thought (the symbolism of the Eucharist, for example, being cannibalistic), were really interested only in factual meanings or ever influenced only by aesthetic considerations. The anthropologists tell us otherwise, that in their lives “needs of the soul and body were satisfied together.” They may be asked to consider such surviving cultures as that of the Amerindians, whose myths and art are certainly far more abstract than any form of story telling or painting of modern Europeans. They may be asked, Why was “primitive” or “geometric” art formally abstract, if not because it was required to express

an abstract sense? They may be asked, Why, if not because it is speaking of something other than mere facts, is the scriptural style always (as Clement of Alexandria remarks) “parabolic”?

We agree, indeed, that nothing can be more dangerous than a subjective interpretation of the traditional symbols, whether verbal or visual. But it is no more suggested that the interpretation of symbols should be left to guesswork than that we should try to read Minoan script by guesswork. The study of the traditional language of symbols is not an easy discipline, primarily because we are no longer familiar with, or even interested in, the metaphysical content they are used to express; again, because the symbolic phrases, like individual words, can have more than one meaning, according to the context in which they are employed, though this does not imply that they can be given any meaning at random or arbitrarily. Negative symbols in particular bear contrasted values, one “bad,” the other “good”; “nonbeing,” for example, may represent the state of privation of that which has not yet attained to being, or, on the other hand, the freedom from limiting affirmations of that which transcends being. Whoever wishes to understand the real meaning of these figures of thought that are not merely figures of speech must have studied the very extensive literatures of many countries in which the meanings of symbols are explained, and must himself have learned to think in these terms. Only when it is found that a given symbol—for instance, the number “seven” (seas, heavens, worlds, motions, gifts, rays, breaths, etc.), or the notions “dust,” “husk,” “knot,” “eye,” “mirror,” “bridge,” ship,” “rope,” “needle,” “ladder,” etc.—has a generically consistent series of values in a series of intelligible contexts widely distributed in time and space, can one safely “read” its meaning elsewhere, and recognize the stratification of literary sequences by means of the figures used in them. It is in this universal, and universally intelligible, language that the highest truths have been expressed.[6] But apart from this interest, alien to a majority of modern writers and critics, without this kind of knowledge, the historian and critic of literature and literary styles can only by guesswork distinguish between what, in a given author’s work, is individual, and what is inherited and universal.

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[1] [Cf. *Mathnawī* I.3454 ff.]

[2] A distinction "of the subjective symbol of psychological association from the objective symbol of precise meaning . . . implies some understanding of the doctrine of analogy" (Walter Shewring in the *Weekly Review,* August 17, 1944). What is implied by "the doctrine of analogy" (or, in the Platonic sense, "adequacy," ἰσότης) is that "une réalité d'un certain ordre peut être représentée par une réalité d'un autre ordre, et celle-ci est alors un *symbole* de celle-la," Rene Guénon, "Mythes, mystères et symboles," *Le Voile d'Isis,* XL (1935), 386. In this sense a symbol is a "mystery," i.e., something to be understood (Clement of Alexandria, *Miscellanies* II.6.15). "Ohne Symbole und Symbolik gibt es keine Religion" (H. Prinz, *Altorientalische Symbolik,* Berlin, 1915, p. 1).

[3] For a summary account of the "thread-spirit" *(sūtrātman)* doctrine and some of its implications, see Coomaraswamy, "The Iconography of Dürer's 'Knoten' and Leonardo's 'Concatenation,' " 1944.

[4] See D. L. Coomaraswamy, "The Perilous Bridge of Welfare," HJAS, VIII (1944).

[5] On the understanding of myths, cf. Coomaraswamy, "Sir Gawain and the Green Knight: Indra and Namuci," 1944. See also Edgar Dacqué, *Das verlorene Paradies* (Munich, 1938), arguing that myths represent the deepest knowledge that man has; and Murray Fowler, s.v. "Myth," in the *Dictionary of World Literature* (New York, 1943).

"Plato . . . follows the light of reason in myth and figure when the dialectic stumbles" (W. M. Urban, *The Intelligible World,* New York, 1929, p. 171). "Myth ... is an essential element of Plato's philosophical style; and his philosophy cannot be understood apart from it" (John A. Stewart, *The Myths of Plato,* New York, 1905, p. 3). "Behind the myth are concealed the greatest realities, the original phenomena of the spiritual life. ... It is high time that we stopped identifying myth with invention" (N. Berdyaev, *Freedom and the Spirit,* London, 1935, P. 70). "Men live by myths . . . they are no mere poetic invention" (F. Marti in *Review of Religion,* VII, 1942). It is unfortunate that nowadays we employ the word "myth" almost

exclusively in the pejorative sense, which should properly be reserved for such pseudo-myths as those of “race.”

[6] “The metaphysical language of the Great Tradition is the only language that is really intelligible” (Urban, *The Intelligible World,* p. 471). [Jacob Boehme, *Signatura rerum,* Preface: “a parabolical or magical phrase or dialect is the best and plainest habit or dress that mysteries can have to travel in up and down this wicked world.”]

9

The Symbolism of the Dome

Part I

The origin of any structural form can be considered either from an archaeological and technical or from a logical and aesthetic, or rather cognitive, point of view; in other words, either as fulfilling a function or as expressing a meaning. We hasten to add that these are logical, not real distinctions: function and significance coincide in the form of the work; however, we may ignore the one or the other in making use of the work as a thing essential to the active life of the body or dispositive to the contemplative life of the spirit.

Inasmuch as we are here mainly concerned with significance, we need not emphasize the importance in architectural history of the problem presented by the superposition of a domed (or barrel-vaulted) roof upon a rectangular base, nor go into the question of how, where homogeneous materials such as mud or wattle were in use, this was originally very simply solved (and even more easily in the case of a tent of skins or woven material) by a gradual obliteration of the angles as the walls were built up; and how subsequently where stone or brick was employed, the same problem was solved structurally in two ways, either by spanning (trabeation, squinches) or by building forward from the angles (corbelling, pendentives). We propose to ask rather *why* than *how* "the square chamber is *obliged* to forsake its plan and strain forward to meet the round dome in which it must terminate,"[1] and whether it is altogether accidentally, so to speak, that our domes "appear to have been *destined* to symbolize the passage from unity to quadrature through the mediation of the triangle of the squinches";[2] and why in the north porch of the Erechtheion

"immediately above the trident-mark [of Poseidon] an opening in the roof had been *purposely* left."[3] We might have expressed the problem otherwise by asking, "Why should the walls of a tepee or sides of a pyramid contract towards a common point in which their independent existence ceases?" or again, in the case of a dome supported by pillars, by asking, "Why should these pillars either actually (as in the case of certain bamboo constructions) or virtually (as is evident if we consider the arch as a dome in cross-section) converge towards the common apex of their separated being, which apex is in fact their '*key*'?"

In this matter of procedure from unity to quadrature there is something analogous to the work of the three Ṛbhus in making four cups out of Tvaṣṭṛ's one. These Ṛbhus compose a triad of "artists,"[4] who are described as "Men of the interspace, or air" *(antarikṣasya narāḥ),* and are said to have quartered the Titan's cup *(camasam, pātratn),* "as it were measuring out a field" *(kṣetram iva vi mamuḥ,* RV I.130.3-5). The reference is undoubtedly to the primordial act of creation by which a "place" is prepared for those who are eager to emerge from the antenatal tomb, to escape the bonds of Varuṇa. Attention may be called to the expression *vi mamuḥ,* from *vi mā,* to "measure out" or "lay out," and hence to "plan" or even "construct." The root with its prefix occurs notably in the word *vimāna,* which often coincides with *ratha* (chariot) as the designation of what is at once the "palace" and the "vehicle" of the gods (i.e., the revolving universe),[5] and which occurs in the *Ṛg Veda* chiefly in connection with the creative determination of "space" (*antarikṣa, rajas*), for example in V.41.3, where Somāpūṣaṇā, described as the Poles of the Universe, are besought to "urge your chariot hitherward, the seven-wheeled chariot that measures out the region" *(rajaso vimānaṃ . . . ratham),* that is to say, are asked to bring into being an inhabitable space. In countless texts we find *vi mā* employed in this way with respect to the delimitation of space, the laying out of "abodes of cosmic order" *(ṛtasya dhāma),* and the determination of the "measure of the sacrifice" *(yajñasya mātram),* which is again an aspect of the act of creation. In V.81.3 it is the Sun himself that "measures out the chthonic regions" *(pārthivāni vi mame ... rajāṃsi deva savitā),* i.e., the "grounds" of the seven worlds; or, otherwise expressed, it is Varuṇa who, "employing the Sun as his rule, measures out the earth" *(māneneva .. .vi ... mame pṛthivīm*

sūryeṇa, V.85.5);[6] and we may say in the words of Genesis 2:1, "thus the heavens and the earth were finished, and all the host of them."

Our citations above have been chosen in part to bring out the connection of the Sun with the act of creative delimitation by which the Three (or Seven, or Thrice Seven) Worlds are made actual. For we must assume from RV I.110.3 and 5 that the "Asura's cup" made fourfold by the Ṛbhus is really the "platter" or disc (*pātra = maṇḍala)* of the Sun (or rather, *ante principium,* that of the united Sun and Moon, Heaven and Earth, coincident in the beginning as they are at the end of time): we remark not merely the appositional sequence "Savitṛ (the Sun) . . . him-that-may-not-be-hidden ... this only feeding vessel of the Titan (Father)" *(savitā . . . agohyaṃ . . . camasam asurasya bhakṣaṇam ekyṃ santam,* I.110.3, with *pātram* for *camasam,* in verse 5)[7] and similarly in AV X.8.9, "bowl wherein is set the glory omniform" *(camasa . . . yasmin yaśo nihitaṃ viśvarūpam),* but also the later designation of the Sundoor as an "entrance covered over by the golden platter of truth" *(hiraṇyamayena pātreṇa satyasyāpihitaṃ mukhaṃ,*[8] Īśā Up. 15, cf. JUB I.3.6).

It is, then, by means of the Sun, often described as the Titan's "eye," that He surveys, experiences, and "feeds upon" the worlds of contingent being under the Sun, which are in the power of Death, and properly His food; by means of the Sun that these worlds are in the first place "measured out," or "created." It is just this that is implied in the work of the Ṛbhus, who make of the single solar "platter" four of like sort, by which we can only understand four solar stations, representing the limits of the solar motion in the four directions (motion daily from east to west and back again, and annually from south to north and back again). It will then be a matter of obtaining "food from all four quarters" (PB XV.3.25): this may seem from a human point of view a great thing, but it can be easily seen that it is far more in accordance with the dignity of the divine unity to obtain all possible kinds of "nourishment" from a single source, a veritable cup of plenty, than to obtain these varied foods from widely extended sources: what Tvaṣṭṛ resents is in effect the partition of his central unity involved by an extension in the four directions. If all this is attributed in the Ṛ*g Veda* either to the Deity in person, or alternatively to a subsequently deified triad of "artists," this can only be understood to mean that the latter are collectively the three dimensions of space, and in this sense "powers" whose operation is indispensable to the extension of any horizontal "field"

in terms of the four quarters: it is, in fact, only by means of the three dimensions that an original "one" can be made "four," "like a field" *(kṣetram iva),* and is in this sense that we proceed from unity to quadrature by means of a triangle.[9] The converse procedure is given in the well-known miracle of the Buddha's begging bowl *(patta = pātra, Jātaka* I.80); that the Buddha receives four bowls from the kings of the Four Quarters, and making of these four one bowl eats from it, implies an involution of space, and what is evidently and literally an atonement of what had been done by the Ṛbhus. For the Buddha, now a unified being, the Grail is once more as it had been in the beginning and for Tvaṣṭṛ, single.

Thus considered, the "myth" of the Ṛbhus may be called a paraphrase of a more usual formula according to which the Sun is described as sevenrayed;[10] of which seven, six represent the arms of the three-dimensional Cross of spiritual Light *(trivṛd vajra)* by which the universe is at once created and supported.[11] Of the six rays, those which correspond to the zenith and nadir coincide with our Axis of the Universe *(skambha, divo dharuṇa,* etc.), Islamic *qutb,* and Gnostic *σταυρός,* while those which correspond to north and south, east and west, determine the extension of any horizontal plane or "world" (*loka*, precisely as the *locus* of a specific ensemble of possibilities), for example, that of each of the seven worlds considered as a given plane of being. The seventh ray alone passes *through* the Sun to the suprasolar Brahma worlds, "where no sun shines" (all that is under the Sun being in the power of Death, and all beyond "immortal"); and is represented accordingly in any diagram by the point at which the arms of the three-dimensional cross intersect, or as Mahidhara expresses it, "the seventh ray is the solar orb itself." It is by this "best ray," the "one foot" of the Sun, that the "heart" of each and every separated essence is directly connected with the Sun; and it will prove to be significant in our interpretation of the summit of the dome that when the separated essence can be thought of as returned to the center of its own being, on whatever plane of being this seventh ray will evidently coincide with the Axis of the Universe. In the case of the Buddha's "First Meditation,"[12] it is evidently just because he is for the time being completely reverted and thus analogically situated at the "navel of the earth," the nether pole of the Axis, that the Sun above him casts an unmoving shadow while the shadows of trees other than the one under which he is seated change their place. We need hardly say that the position of the Axis of the Universe is a universal

and not a local position: the "navel of the earth" is "within you," else it were impossible to "build up Agni intellectually," as the Ś*atapatha Brāhmaṇa* expresses what is formulated in Christianity as the "bringing to birth of Christ in the soul." In the same way the center of every habitation is analogically *the* center, an hypostasized center, of the world, and immediately underlies the similarly hypostasized center of the sky at what is the other pole of the Axis at once of the edifice and of the universe it represents.

Every house is therefore the universe in a likeness, and provided with an analogous content: as Mus expresses it, "the house and the world are two equivalent sums.... The family living in it is the image of the countless crowd of creatures dwelling in the shelter of the cosmic house, of which the ceiling or roof is heaven, light, and sun." The work of the architect is really an "imitation of nature in her manner of operation": the several houses reflect in their accidents the peculiarity of as many builders, but are essentially "so many hypostases of one and the same world and all together possess but one and the same reality, that of this universal world."[13]

What we have said with respect to the house applies with equal force to many other constructions, of which we may cite the chariot as a notable example. No less precisely than the house, the chariot reproduces the constitution of the universe in luminous detail. The human vehicle is an exemplary likeness of the cosmic vehicle or body in which the course is run from darkness to light, from endless end to endless end of the universe, conceived at once in terms of space (and in this sense as stable) and in terms of time (as the Year, and in this sense revolving).[14] The paired wheels of this cosmic vehicle or universal incarnation of the Spirit, its driver, are respectively heaven and earth, at once divided and united by the axle tree, on which the revolution of the wheels takes place (RV X.89.4). This axle tree is the same thing as our Axis of the Universe, and trunk of the Tree, and the informing principle of the whole construction. The division of the wheels, which is the act of creation, brings into being a space within which the individually proceeding principles are borne on their way; while their reunion, realized by the charioteer when he returns from the circumference to the center of his own being, is the rolling up of time and space, leaving in principle only a single wheel (Dante's *prima rota),* of which the hub is that solar gate "through the midst of which one escapes altogether" *(atimucyate,* JUB I.3.5) from the revolving cosmos into an uncontained empyrean.

Nothing will be changed in principle if we take account in the same way of the exemplary likeness of ships to the cosmic Ship of Life in which the Great Voyage is undertaken; the deck corresponding to the surface of the earth, the mast coinciding with the vertical axis of the house and axle tree of the chariot, while the "crow's nest" corresponds to the seat of the all-seeing Sun above.

All that we have implied, here and elsewhere, with respect to the imitation of heavenly prototypes in human works of art, and the conception of the arts themselves as a body of transmitted knowledge of ultimately superhuman origin, can be applied equally to the case of the artificer himself, just as also in Christian philosophy there is taken for granted an exemplary likeness of the human architect to the Architect of the World, and as indeed the consistency of the doctrine requires. If we consider such an architectural treatise as the *Mānasāra,* we find in the first place clear evidence of a direct dependence upon Vedic sources, for example, in the statement that the master architect *(sthapati)* and also his three companions or assistants, the surveyor *(sūtra-grāhī),* the builder and painter *(vardhakī),* and carpenter *(takṣaka),* are required, by way of professional qualification, to be acquainted both with the Vedas and with their accessory sciences *(sthapatiḥ . . . vedavic-chāstra-pāragah, Mānasāra,* II.13ff.), and in such verses as "It is through the Sun that the Earth becomes the support of all beings" *(ibid.* III.7), evidently an echo of RV V.85.5 cited above.[15] Furthermore, "It has been said by the Lord Himself that He is the All-fashioner (Viśvakarmā)" *(ibid.* II.2); and it is from His four "faces" that are descended the quartet of architects mentioned above, who are moreover called "all-fashioners" after Him *(ibid.* II.5). It may be added that evidently the "four architects" correspond to the four ritual priests of the sacrifice, the *sthapati* in particular to that one who is styled preeminently *the* Brāhmaṇa, as distinguished from the others by his greater knowledge, without which their operation would be defective. In Coomaraswamy, *Mediaeval Sinhalese Art* [1908—ED.], we have called attention to the sacerdotal and regal functions performed even by the modern *sthapati* in Ceylon. A similar analogy could be drawn between the "four architects" on the one hand, and the Sun or solar Indra with his particular associates, the Ṛbhus. And finally, the designation of the master architect as *sthapati* immediately suggests *VI. .. atiṣṭhipaḥ* in RV I.56.5-6, where it is a matter of the architectural construction of the universe, with its axial "Pillar of Heaven" *(divo*

dharuṇam, cf. IX.73.7, where Soma as the Tree of Life is *aharuṇaḥ mahaḥ divaḥ,* "the great σταυρός of the sky"), and rigid crossbeam *(tiro dharuṇam acyutam): sthapati* and *atiṣṭhipaḥ* being equally causative forms of *sthā* in the sense "to set up." RV I.56 at the same time makes a direct connection between the construction of the universe and the smiting of the Serpent, Ahi-Vṛtra, the significance of which will appear later. We may say that just as much as the sacrifice itself (a synthesis of all the arts), every artistic operation as such operation is envisaged by tradition is an imitation of what was done by the gods in the beginning.

The questions of the Ṛbhus and of the Cross of Light have been introduced into our discussion of the principles of sacred architecture (from the traditional point of view, there is nothing that can be defined as essentially or wholly secular) primarily in order to provide a background illustrative of the manner in which the problems of spatial extension and construction have been traditionally approached. Our method of approach is based upon the fact that the technical problem as such only presents itself when there has already been imagined a form to be realized in the material. Whether we have in view a spatial universe or a human construction, the idea of a space to be enclosed between a vault above and a plane below must be assumed in the mind of the architect logically prior to any actual becoming of the work to be done; which priority will be merely logical in the case of the Divine Architect, but must be also temporal in the case of the human builder who proceeds from potentiality to act. And prior to this formal cause, with the same reservations, there must be assumed a final cause or purpose of the construction to be undertaken, the artist always working both *per artem et ex voluntate*. The same will hold good whether we take account of the house of the body, a constructed dwelling, or the universe as a whole. Just as formally considered there is a correspondence between the human body,[16] human building, and whole world, so there is also a teleological correspondence: all these constructions have as their practical function to shelter individual principles on their way from one state of being to another—to provide, in other words, a field of experience in which they can "become what they are." The concepts of creation (means) and of redemption (end) are complementary and inseparable: the Sun is not merely the architect of space, but also the liberator of all things thereinto (which would otherwise remain in an obscurity of mere potentiality), and finally of all things therefrom.

It can be said with respect to any of these houses to which we have referred that one enters into the provided environment at its lowest level (at birth) and departs from it at its highest level (at death); or in other words that ingress is horizontal, egress vertical (these are the two directions of motion on the wheel of life, respectively peripheral and centripetal). If this is not empirically evident in all respects,[17] this is nevertheless an accurate presentation of the traditional concept of the passage of any individual consciousness through any "space"; and this is a matter of importance, because it is precisely in the notion of a vertical egress that we shall find an explanation of the symbolism of our domes.

We are not then disposed to inquire whether or not, or whether to some extent, the form of a stūpa may or may not have been derived from that of a tumulus or domed hut (we agree in fact with Mus in rejecting such a theory of origins), but rather to seek for what may be called the common formal principle that finds expression equally in all of these and in other related constructions. We propose to consider the architectural form primarily as an imagined *(dhyātam)*[18] form, referring its "origin" rather to "Man" universally, in whom the artist and the patron are one essence, than to this or that man individually. It need hardly be said that the traditional theory of art, and the Indian tradition in particular, invariably assume an "intellectual operation" *(actus primus)* preceding the artist's manual operation. We have discussed this elsewhere in connection with the later sources,[19] but may remark that the principle is clearly expressed in Indian texts from the beginning by the constant employment of the roots *dhī* or *dhyai*[20] and *cit* or *cint* in connection with all kinds of constructive operation, such as the fashioning of an incantation or that of a chariot or altar. For example, in RV III.2.1 the priests are said to bring Agni nigh "by contemplation" *(dhiyā),* "even as it is by contemplation that the tool gives form to the chariot"; in AV X.I.8, where we find the image "even as by a Ṛbhu the parts of a chariot are put together, by means of a contemplation" *(dhiyā)*; and in ŚB VI.2.3.1 (and *passim)* where in connection with the building of the Fire Altar, whenever the builders are at a loss, not knowing how to build up the next course of the structure, we find a sequence of words in which they are enjoined to "contemplate" *(cetayadhvam)* and are then described as "seeing" *(apaśyan)* the required form. It is thus not by means of the empirical faculties, nor, so to say, experimentally, but intellectually that the

formal cause is apprehended in an imitable form. We are considering the dome, accordingly, primarily as a work of the imagination, and only secondarily as a technical achievement.

Man has always, in a manner that we have tried to indicate above, correlated his own constructions with cosmic or supramundane prototypes. As Plotinus expresses it, "The crafts such as building and carpentry which give us matter in wrought forms may be said, in that they draw on pattern, to take their principles from *that* realm and from the thinking *there"* (Plotinus, V.9.11). For example, the Indian seven-storied palace *(prāsāda)* with its various floors or "earths" *(bhūmi)* has always been thought of as analogous to the universe of seven worlds; and one mounts to the top story as if to the summit of contingent being *(bhavāgra),* just as the Sun ascends the sky and from his station in the zenith surveys the universe. It has been pointed out by Mus, in his magnificent monograph on Barabuḍur, from which we have quoted above, that the stūpa, particularly when monolithic, is essentially a domed *form* rather than a domed construction, and therefore, necessarily to be understood rather from a symbolic than from a practically functional point of view; it represents a universe *in parvo,* the abode of a person who has passed away, analogous to the universe itself considered as the body or abode of an active "Person." In the same way the Christian church, functionally adapted to the uses of liturgy, which are themselves entirely a matter of symbolic significance, derives its form from an authority higher than that of the individual builder who is its responsible architect: just as also in the case of the painted icons. "The art alone belongs to the painter; the ordering and the composition belong to the Fathers" (Second Council of Nicaea). In the same way the Indian architect "should reject what has not been prescribed *(anuktam),* and in every respect perform what has been prescribed" *(Mānasāra)*; just as it is stated in connection with images that "the beautiful is not what pleases the fancy, but what is in agreement with the canon" *(Śukranītisāra,* IV.4.75 and 106), the function of which canon is to provide the support for the contemplative act in which an imitable form is visualized *(Śukranītisāra,* IV.4.70-71) .[21]

Before proceeding to a more detailed consideration of the ideology expressed in Indian domed constructions, and in what may be termed the archetypal form of any edifice, we must point out that what has been said by Mus for the stūpa and for the palace, "this Buddhist monument is comprehensible primarily with respect to its axis," and "we say of the

prāsāda, as of the *stūpa,* that it is to be understood with respect to its axis, and that all the rest is only accessory decoration,"[22] is of universal application.[23] This is sufficiently evident in the case of a domed hut of which the roof is actually supported by a king post, thought of not merely as connecting the apex of the roof with a tie beam, but as extending from the apex to the ground. We wish to point out, however, that while huts of this type have certainly existed and that similarly, at least in some cases (e.g., at Ghaṇṭasālā), the axis of the stūpa was actually and structurally represented within it, the importance of the axis in principle is no more necessarily represented by an actual pillar within the building than it would be possible to demonstrate the empirical existence of an Axis of the Universe, which axis is, indeed, always spoken of as a purely spiritual or pneumatic essence. On the other hand, we do find that the prolongations of the axis above the roof and below the ground are materially represented in actual construction; above, that is, by a finial, which may be relatively inconspicuous, but in many stūpas extends upwards in the form of a veritably "sky-scraping" mast *(yaṣṭi)* or "sacrificial post" *(yūpa)* far beyond the dome; and below the floor of the contained space by the peg of khadira wood driven into the ground, by which the head of the all-supporting Serpent is fixed.[24] In any traditional society, every operation is in the strictest sense of the word a rite, and typically a metaphysical rather than a religious (devotional) rite; and it is of the very nature of the rite that it is a mimesis of what was done "in the beginning." The erection of a house is in just this sense an imitation of the creation of the world; and it is in this connection that the transfixation of the head of the Serpent, alluded to above, and regarded as an indispensable operation, acquires an intelligible meaning. In modern practice, "the astrologer shows what spot in the foundation is exactly above the head of the snake that supports the world. The mason fashions a little wooden peg from the wood of the khadira tree, and with a coconut drives the peg into the ground at this particular spot, in such a way as to peg the head of the snake securely down ... if this snake should ever shake the world to pieces." A foundation stone *(padma-śilā),* with an eight-petaled lotus carved upon it, is set in mortar above the peg. A Brahman priest assists at all these rites, reciting appropriate incantations (mantras).[25] As Mus very justly adds to this citation, "If one performs in this way what is apparently a sacrilege, it is with a view to avoiding such quakings of the earth as might be caused if

the Serpent should move its head." [26] A very striking example of the rite is to be found in the "Ballad of the Iron Pillar" at Delhi: "All above a polished shaft, all a piercing spike below. Where they marked the Nāga's head [Śeṣa's in a subsequent verse], deep the point was driven down. .. . Soon a castle clothed with might round the iron pillar clomb; soon a city ... "; but when at the instigation of an enemy of the royal "house," the bloody point is afterwards withdrawn,[27] "sudden earthquakes shook the plain."[28]

The earth was originally insecure, "quaking like a lotus leaf; for the gale was tossing it hither and thither. . . . The gods said, 'Come, let us make steady this support' " (ŚB II.1.1.8-9).[29] The architect who drives down his peg into the head of the Serpent is doing what was done by the gods in the beginning, what was done, for example, by Soma when he "fixed the miser" *(paṇim astabhāyat,* RV VI.44.22), and "made fast the quaking Earth" *(pṛthivīṃ vyathamānām adṛṃhat,* RV II.12.2), and by Indra when he "smote the Serpent in his lair" *(ahiṃ ... śayathe jaghāna,* RV VI.17.9); and what has been done, and is done, by every solar hero and Messiah when he transfixes the Dragon and treads him underfoot.

In conclusion of the present introduction, a word may be said on the principle involved in the symbolic interpretation of artifacts. The modern critic is apt to maintain that symbolic meanings are "read into" the "facts" which "must" originally have had no meaning, but only a physical efficiency. Nor could any objection be made to this if it were a matter of such absurdities of "interpretation" as are involved in an explanation of Gothic arches as imitated from the interlacing branches of forest trees, or implied in the designation of certain well-known classical ornaments as "acanthus" and "egg and dart" motifs. Far from such sentimental fancies, a correct symbolic exegesis must be founded on a real knowledge of the principles involved, and supported by cited texts, which are just as much facts as the monuments themselves. The modern critic is apt, however, to go further, and to argue that even the oldest citable texts are already "meanings read into" still older forms, which perhaps had originally no intellectual significance whatever, but only a physical function.

The truth is, however, that it is precisely in adopting *this* point of view that we are reading our own mentality into that of the primitive artificer. *Our* division of artifacts into "industrial" and "decorative," "applied" and "fine" art, would have been unintelligible to the primitive and normal man,

who could no more have separated use from meaning than meaning from use; as Mus remarks, "the true fact, the only fact of which the builders were aware, was a combination of both";[30] in primitive and traditional art the whole man finds expression, and therefore there is always in the artifact "a polar balance of physical and metaphysical," and it is only on their way down to us that the traditional forms "have been more and more emptied of content."[31] The primitive artifact can no more be fully explained by our economic determinism than it can be by our aestheticism; the man who did by thinking, and thought by doing, was not as we are solely concerned about physical safety and comfort, but far more self-sufficient; he was as profoundly interested in himself as we are nowadays in our bodies.

Part II

Let us for a moment abandon the consideration of architecture for that of another craft, the smith's, and that of his ancestor, the maker of stone weapons.

Tangible symbols, no less than words, have their etymons: in this sense, a "derivation" of the sword, and similarly of the celt, from a "root" or archetype in lightning is universal and worldwide.

In *Śatapatha Brāhtnaṇa* I.2.4, there is described the origin of the sacrificial sword, sacrificial post, chariot (of which the axle-tree is evidently the principle), and arrow from Indra's *vajra* (thunderbolt, lightning, adamantine lance, and σταυρός)."When Indra hurled the thunderbolt at Vṛtra, that one thus hurled became fourfold. Thereof the wooden sword *(sphya)* represents a third or thereabouts, the sacrificial post about a third or thereabouts, and the chariot *(sc*. axle tree) one third or thereabouts. That (fourth and shortest) piece moreover, with which he struck him, was broken away, and flying off *(patitvā)*[32] became an arrow; whence the designation 'arrow' *(śara)* inasmuch as it was 'broken away' *(āśīryata)*. In this way the thunderbolt became fourfold. Priests make use of two of these in sacrifice, while men of royal blood make use of two in battle. . . . Now when he [the priest] brandishes the wooden sword, it is the thunderbolt *(vajra)* that he raises against the wicked, spiteful enemy, even as Indra in that day raised the thunderbolt against the Dragon (Vṛtra). ... He takes it with the incantation 'At the instigation of divine Savitṛ (the Sun), I take thee with

the arms of the Aśvins, with the hands of Pūṣan (the Sun).' . . . With His hands therefore he takes it, not with his own; for it is the thunderbolt, and no man can hold that. . . . He murmurs, and thereby makes it sharp, 'Thou art Indra's right arm,' for Indra's right arm is no doubt the strongest, and therefore he says 'Thou art Indra's right arm.' 'The thousand-spiked, the hundred-edged,' he adds, for a thousand spikes and a hundred edges had that thunderbolt that Indra hurled at Vṛtra; he thereby makes the wooden sword to be that thunderbolt. 'The keen-edged Gale (Vāyu) art thou,'[33] he adds; for he who blows here is indeed the keenest edge; for he cuts across these worlds; he thereby makes it sharp. When he further says: 'The killer of the foe,' let him, whether he wishes to exercise or not, say: 'The killer of so-and-so.'[34] When it has been sharpened, he must not touch either himself or the earth with it: 'Lest I should hurt, etc.' " Later he brandishes the sword thrice, driving away the Asuras from the three worlds, and a fourth to repel the Asuras from "what fourth world there may or may not be beyond these three"; the first three strokes being made with chanted formulae, the fourth stroke silently. The third verse of the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* text, cited above, in effect affirms *in hoc signo vinces*. The wooden sword is described as straight (Kāty. Śr. I.3.33 and 39), and the usual word for sword, *khaḍga,* is used in connection with it, and as it must accordingly have had a guard, it is clear that this must have been cruciform. The European parallel is sufficiently obvious; sword and cross are virtually identified in Christian knightly usage; the sword, at least, can be used as a substitute for a wooden cross, and in the same way as a hallowed or apotropaic weapon, in the banning of evil spirits.

In Japan the sword is similarly "derived" from an archetypal lightning. The Japanese sword, Shinto, royal, or samurai, is in fact the descendant or hypostasis *(tsugi,* as this word occurs in the imperial title Hitsugi, "Scion of the Sun," Skr. ā*ditya-bandhu)* of the sword of lightning found by Susa-no-Wo-no-Mikoto, whom we may call the "Shinto Indra," in the tail of the Dragon of the Clouds whom he slays and dissevers, receiving in return the last of the daughters of the Earth, whose seven predecessors have been consumed by the Dragon.[35] The solar hero, in other words, possesses himself of the Dragon (Father's) *sting,* which "sword" he indeed returns to the gods, but which in a likeness made by hands and empowered by appropriate rites becomes a veritable palladium, a talisman "fallen from the sky" (διοπετεῖς (= *divo-patita),* whether as a cult object in a Shinto shrine or

"symbolizing the soul of the samurai, and as such the object of his worship." Dr. Holtom's "worship" is, however, scarcely the right word here. The sword of a samurai is thought of both as himself or own soul *(tamashii)* or alter ego, and also as the embodiment of a guardian principle *(matnori),* and thus as a protector, spiritually as well as physically. The first conception, that of the sword as an extension of one's own essence, bears a close likeness to the doctrine of *Bṛhad-devatā* I.74, where the weapon of a Deva "is precisely his fiery energy" *(tejas tv evāyudhaṃ . . . yasya yat),* and IV.143, where conversely the Deva "is its inspiration" *(tasyātmā bahudhā saḥ,* better perhaps "is hypostasized in it"). The Templar's sword is in the same way a "power" and extension of his own being, and not a "mere tool"; but only an outsider *(pro-fanus)* would speak of the crusader as "worshipping" his sword. Dr. Holtom is, of course, a "good" anthropologist, and satisfied with naturalistic and sociological explanations of the weapon as a *palladium,* of celestial derivation; we, who see in traditional art an incarnation of ideas rather than the idealization of facts, should prefer to speak of an *adequate symbolism* and an adaptation of superior principles to human necessities.

The same idea can be recognized in the fact that in the mysteries of the Idaean Daktyls, Pythagoras was purified by a "thunder stone" which, as Miss Harrison says, was "in all probability nothing but a . . . black stone celt, the simplest form of stone-age axe"; and in the fact that the designation of stone axes and arrowheads as "thunderbolts" and the attribution to them of a magical efficacy has been "almost world-wide." We agree with Miss Harrison that this idea was not of popular origin; but not therefore that it must have been of late origin, for we see no force or sense in her view that "the wide-spread delusion that these celts were thunderbolts cannot have taken hold of men's minds till a time when their real use as ordinary axes was forgotten . . . cannot therefore have been very primitive" *(Themis,* pp. 89, 90). "Delusion . . . cannot"— a *non sequitur* from any point of view, for if the Hindu and the Japanese can call a wooden or a metal sword a thunderbolt at a time when these weapons were in "real use," it is hard to see why primitive man, who was also in some sense a shamanist, should not have done the same. In the first place there can be little doubt that primitive man enspirited his weapons by appropriate incantations (as did the Hindu and the Japanese, and as the Christian church even to this day consecrates a variety of objects made by hands, notably in the case of

"transubstantiation"), and thereby endowed them with a more than human efficiency; and in the second place, if we assume from the worldwide and "superstitious" ("stand-overish") prevalence of the notion, and also on more general grounds, that he already called his weapons thunderbolts, though perfectly aware of their actual artificiality, can we possibly suppose that he meant this to be taken in any more literal (or any less real) sense than the Brahman who likewise calls his sword a *vajra*—thunderbolt, lightning, or adamant?[36] Primitive man, as every schoolboy knows, recognized a will in all things—"Iron of itself draws a man on"—and has therefore been called an "animist." The term is only inappropriate because it was not an independent *anima* ("soul") that he saw in everything, but *mana,* a spiritual rather than a psychic power, undifferentiated in itself, but in which all things participated according to their own nature. In other words, he explained the being-in-act or efficacy of any contingent thing by thinking of it as informed by an omnipresent, inexhaustible, informal, and unparticularized Being and source of all power: which is precisely the Christian and Hindu doctrine.[37] We say, then, that primitive man already spoke of his weapons as "thunderbolts," and more, that he knew what he meant when he called them such; that the same is true of the more sophisticated Hindu and Japanese, with only this difference, that he can prove by chapter and verse that he calls his weapons thunderborn without being unaware of their artificiality and practical use; that the Christian in the same way "worships idols made by hands" (as the iconoclast or anthropologist might say), while able to show that it is not as a fetish that he "worships" the icon; and finally, that if there are to be found ignorant peasants who speak of celts as thunderbolts without knowing them for weapons, in this case only we have to do with a veritable superstition or "stand-over"—a superstition which it should have been the business of the anthropologist rather to elucidate than merely to record.

All of these considerations apply, *mutatis mutandis,* to the problem of architectural symbolism. How then can we propose to explain the genesis of the forms embodied in works of art only by an enumeration of the material facts and functions of the artifact? To take a case in point, it is certainly not by purely "practical" considerations that one can explain the position of the *harmikā* or "little dwelling," or *deva kotuwā* or "citadel of the gods" immediately above and outside the apex of the stūpa; whereas the *raison*

d'être of this emplacement becomes immediately evident if we understand that "immediately above the apex of the dome" is as much as to say "beyond the Sun"; all that is mortal being contained within, and all that is immortal exceeding the structure.

But let us also consider the matter from a physically practical point of view. We have agreed that the symbols, on their way down to us, tend more and more to become merely decorative "art forms," a sort of upholstery, to which we cling either from habit or for "aesthetic" reasons; and that the corresponding rites, with which, for example, the work of construction is "blessed" at various stages, become mere superstitions. In this case we ask what practical value was originally served by these now apparently useless institutions and survivals. In a purely material sense, what have we gained or lost by an implicit decision to "live by bread alone"? Was the actual stability of buildings in any way secured by the recognition of such meanings and the performance of such rites as we have described above? We mention bread, because all that we have to say will apply as much to agricultural as to architectural rites. Not to take up too much space, we shall only ask whether or not it is by chance that the neglect of agriculture as a sacred art, and denial of a spiritual significance to bread, have coincided with a decline in the quality of the product, so conspicuous that only a people altogether forgetful of the realities of life, and drugged by the phraseology of advertisers, could have failed to remark it.

For the answer to this question we refer the reader to Albert Gleizes, *Vie et mort de l'Occident chrétien* (Sablons, 1930), of which the latter part is devoted to "le mystère du pain et du vin." Here we shall only attempt to show that in spite of all our scientific knowledge (which is in reality not so much at the consumer's disposal as it is at the disposal of the consumer's exploiter, the commercial builder and real estate agent), there can be traced a significant parallel between the neglect of architecture as a sacred and symbolic art and an actual instability of buildings; that it is not without its consequences for the householder that the builder and mason can no longer conceive what it may have meant to be "initiated into the mystery of their craft," nor in what sense an architect could ever have played the part of priest and king. Let us grant that rites as such, envisaged, that is, simply as a mechanical going-through with habitual and required motions, cannot be supposed to affect in any way the stability of a structure, and that the stability of an actual building depends essentially on the proper adjustment

of materials and stresses, and not on what has been said or done in connection with the building. It remains that in considering only materials and stresses, of which an admirable knowledge may exist in theory, we are leaving out the builder. Does nothing depend upon him—upon his honesty, for example? Is it of no consequence whatever if he mixes too much sand with his mortar? as he will surely do, whatever the textbook says, if he is building only for profit, and not for use? Arguing not merely on principle, but also from personal contact with hereditary craftsmen in whom a tradition of workmanship has been transmitted through countless generations, we affirm that, as long as faith remains, the attribution of superhuman origins and symbolic significance to architecture, and the participation of the architect in metaphysical rites in which a direct connection is made of macrocosmic with microcosmic proportions, confer upon the architect a human dignity and a responsibility far other than that of the "contractor," who at best may calculate that "honesty is the best policy."[38] We say further that it is not merely a question of ethics, but that the recognition of the possibility of an "artistic sin," as a thing distinct in kind from "moral sin,"[39] even in Europe (where occasional workmen are still to be found whose first concern is with the good of the work to be done) long delayed the appearance of what is now called "jerry-building." We are not here, however, primarily concerned with these practical and technical considerations but more with meanings, and with the artifact considered as a symbol and as a possible support of a contemplation dispositive to gnosis. We say that just as it is beyond the capacity of man to make anything whatever so purely spiritual and intellectual as to afford no sensuous satisfaction, so it is beneath the dignity of man to make anything whatever with a view to an exclusively material good, and devoid of any higher reference. We who have consented to this subhuman standard of living cannot postulate in primitive man such limitations as our own. Even at the present day peoples survive, uncontaminated by civilization, to whom it has never occurred that it might be either possible or desirable to live by bread alone, or in any manufacture to separate function from significance. It is not by any means only for political reasons that Western civilization is feared and hated by the Orient, but also because "it is impossible for one to obtain liberation who lives in a town covered with dust" *(Baudhāyana Dh. Sū*. II.3.6.33). We are not, then, "reading meanings into" primitive works of art when we discuss their formal principles and final causes, treating them

as symbols and supports of contemplation rather than as objects of a purely material utility, but simply *reading their meaning*.[40] For to say "traditional art" is to say "the art of peoples who took for granted the superiority of the contemplative to the active life, and regarded the life of pleasure as we regard the life of animals, determined only by affective reactions." "A *person* knows what is and is not mundane, and is so endowed that by the mortal he pursues the immortal. But as for the *herd,* theirs is an acute discrimination merely according to hunger and thirst" (AB II.3.2); cf. Boethius, *Contra Evtychen* 11, "There is no person of a horse or ox or any other of the animals which, dumb and unreasoning, live a life of sense alone, but we say there is a person of a man, or God."

Part III

We shall take it for granted that the reader is familiar with our "Pali *kaṇṇikfā*: Circular Roof-Plate" [see appendix to this essay—ED.]. To what has been said there, we wish to add in the first place that it can hardly be doubted that the *kaṇṇikā* or roof-plate of a domed structure, the meeting place of its converging rafters, had almost certainly, as the term itself suggests, the form of a lotus, and that this lotus was in effect the Sun, "the one lotus of the zenith" (BU VI.3.6), to be correlated with the "lotus of the earth" and womb of Agni below; and, secondly, that the expression *vijjhitvā* (Skr. root *vyadh), J* I.201, implies a central perforation of the *kaṇṇikā-maṇḍalam,* which was itself an image of the disk of the Sun *(sūrya-maṇḍalam)* and at the same time constituted what may have been called the "eye" of the dome, although for this we have no Indian literary evidence beyond the use of "eye" for "window" in the word *(gavākṣa,* literally "bull's eye"), and the expression "eye of a lotus" *(puṣkarākṣa)* occurring in *Pāṇini* V.4.76. We need hardly say that "Sun" and "Eye" are constantly assimilated notions in Vedic mythology, and that it is from the same point of view that the Buddha is frequently called the "Eye in the World" *(cakkhumāloke)*.[41]

A majority of existing domes are in fact provided with an apical aperture, called the "eye of the dome" (J. Gwilt, *Encyclopedia of Architecture,* London, 1867, defines "eye" as "a general term signifying the center of any

part. The eye of a dome is the horizontal aperture in its summit. The eye of a volute[42] is the circle in its centre").

"On the Acropolis of Athens... in the north porch of the Erechtheion are the marks of a trident. In examining the roof of this north porch it has been found that immediately above the trident-mark an opening in the roof had been purposely left: the architectural traces are clear."[43] The Roman Pantheon was lighted by an enormous eye, open to the sky, making the structure in fact hypaethral. More often the eye of a dome is comparatively small, and opens into a "lantern" above the dome, which lantern admits light but excludes rain. In the case of the stūpa there is likewise an opening at the summit of the dome, the purpose of which is to serve as a place of insertion or socket for the mast that overstands the dome, and which is therefore also an "eye."

In any case, and whether an opening or a socket, the aperture can be regarded as at the same time functional (source of illumination, mortice, etc.) and as symbolic (means of passage from the interior to the exterior of the dome). It may be further observed that the eye in a roof is also a louver or luffer permitting the escape of smoke from the central fire beneath it.[44] That the eye or luffer thus functions as a chimney (as well as a source of light) by no means reduces, but rather reinforces the macrocosmic symbolism, for it is both as an ascending flame and as a pillar of smoke that Agni props up the sky, as in RV IV.6.2-3, where "Agni, even as it were a builder, hath lifted up on high his splendor, even as it were a builder his smoke, yea, holdeth up the sky *(stabhāyat upadyām)* . . . a standard, as it were the pillar of sacrifice *(svaru = yūpa),* firmly planted and duly chrismed," cf. RV III.5.10, IV.5.1, VI.17.7.

It is certainly not without significance that *vijjhitvā,* "perforating" or "penetrating," is also employed in connection with the piercing of a mark or bull's eye by an arrow, e.g., in J V.129 ff., where there is an account of the feats of archery performed by the Bodhisattva Jotipāla ("Keeper of Light"), a superlative marksman *(akkhaṇa-vedhin)*[45] whose shaft is "tipped with adamant" *(vajiraggaṃ nārācam),*[46] and who is, furthermore, possessed of the power of aerial flight, to be subsequently discussed. One of the feats of the "Keeper of Light," whom we can only regard as a "solar hero" and like the Buddha a "kinsman of the Sun" *(ādicca-bandhu),* is called "the threading of the circle" *(cakka-viddham)*. In the execution of this feat, his

arrow, to which a scarlet thread *(rattasuttakam)* has been attached, penetrates in succession four marks placed at the four corners of the arena, returning through the first of these marks to his hand, thus describing a circle which proceeds from and ends in himself as its center. Thus the Bodhisattva, standing within a four-cornered field *(caturassa-paricchedabbhantare),* connects its corners (the four quarters, cf. ŚB VI.I.2.29) to himself by means of a thread *(suttakam = sūtram):* and this is unmistakably a "folklore" version of the *sūtrātman* doctrine, according to which the Sun connects these worlds and all things to himself by means of a thread of spiritual light. [47]

We cannot, indeed, agree with M. Foucher that the well-known bow and arrow symbol met with on early Indian coins primarily represents a stūpa. On the other hand, as pointed out by Mus, "Does not the stūpa, considered as constructed wholly round about the axis of the universe, look strangely like a bow to which an arrow has been set?"[48] and, we may add, like other domed structures, if thought of in cross section. Remembering the actual perforation *(vijjhitvā)* of our roof plate, and what has been said above about the "eye of a dome," we cannot but be struck by the fact that in this symbol of a bow and arrow suggesting the cross section of a stūpa (or any like domed structure), the arrow actually penetrates the apex of the "dome"; in other words, breaks through the summit of contingent being *(bhavāgra),* through the station of the Sun in the zenith, into a beyond.

It is at this point that our symbolic archery becomes most significant. For, as will now be seen, that goal which lies beyond the Sun, and which is usually described as reached by a passing through the midst of the Sun, is also very strikingly described in Muṇḍ. Up. II.2.2-4 (which we cite in a slightly condensed form) as to be attained by means of a spiritual marksmanship: "Resplendent Sun *(arcinam),* imperishable Brahman, Breath of Life *(prṇāḥ),* Truth *(satyam),* Immortal—That is the mark *(lakṣyam)* to be penetrated *(veddhavyam)*.[49] Taking for bow the mighty weapon of the Upaniṣad, set thereunto an arrow pointed by reverent service, and bending it by the thought of the nature of That, penetrate *(viddhi)*[50] that mark, my friend. Oṃ is the bow, the Spirit *(ātman)* the arrow, Brahman the mark to be penetrated by one abstracted from sensuous infatuation: as is the arrow, so should he become of that same nature *(śaravat tanmayo bhavet)"* i.e., of the nature of That, the mark to be attained. It is only as no man to whom soul and body are "himself," no man who still conceives "himself" to be So-and-

so, but as one who recognizes in "himself *(ātman)*" only the immanent Spirit *(śarīrātman, dehin),* and moving in the Spirit *(ātmany etya),* or as our text expresses it, making of himself a purely spiritual arrow, that any man can hit That mark so as to be confused with It, as like in like: just as, in more familiar imagery, when rivers reach the sea, their individuality is undone, and one can only speak of "sea" (Praśna Up. VI.5).

The flight of our spiritual arrow is a flight and an emergence from a total darkness underground and the chiaroscuro of space under the Sun into realms of spiritual Light where no Sun shines, nor Moon, but only the Light of the Spirit, which is Its own illumination. [51] Now, as we know from texts too many to be cited here at length, it is through the Sun, and only through the Sun, as Truth *(satyam),* and by the way of the Well at the World's End, that there runs the road leading from this defined Order *(rta,* κόσμος) to an undefined *Empyrean*. It is "through the hub of the wheel, the midst of the Sun, the cleft in heaven, that is all covered over by rays, that one is altogether liberated" (JUB I.3.5—6). "The Sun is the world-gate *(loka-dvāra)* which admits the Comprehensor into Paradise, but is a barrier *(nirodha)* to the ignorant" (CU VIII.6.15, cf. JUB I.5 and III.14). The question is asked accordingly, "Who is qualified *(arhati)* to pass through the midst of the Sun?" (JUB I.6.1, cf. KU II.21 *kas taṃ . . . devaṃ jñātum arhati)*.[52] The *arhati* immediately reminds us of those *arhats* who ascend in the air, pass through the roof-plate (kaṇṇikā-maṇḍa*lam)* and are "movers-at-will."

Before proceeding to consider these, however, we shall cite the account of the Comprehensor's passage of the Sun from MU VI.30, the wording of which is closely paralleled in texts already cited and in the Buddhist texts to follow. Here, then, it is said that the "Marut" (i.e., the King Bṛhadratha, the "Lord of the Mighty Chariot" and disciple of Śākāyanya, MU II.1), "having done what had to be done *(kṛtakṛtyaḥ,* i.e., as one 'all in act'), departed by the northern solar course, than which there is, indeed, no other path. That is the path to Brahman (whence, as may be interjected from CU IV.15.5-6, 'there is no return'); breaking through the Solar Gate, he made his way aloft" *(sauraṃ dvāram bhītvordhvena vinirgatā)*. At this point the text makes a direct transition from the preceding narrative of what is apparently an outwardly manifested miracle to a formulation of this ascension in terms of the "vectors of the heart" *(hṛdayasya nāḍyaḥ,* CU VIII.6.1, q.v.), which "vectors" are the channels of the solar rays and breaths of life "within you."

All but one of these vectors "are for procedure hither or thither"; only that one which passes vertically upward and emerges from the crown of the head "extends to immortality," i.e., the Brahma worlds beyond the Sun. At death, "the apex of the heart is illuminated *(hṛdayasyāgram pradyotate)*; by way of that illumined point the spirit departs *(ātmā niṣkrāmati),* either by way of the eye, or head,[53] or other part of the body; and as it goes, the breath of life follows" (BU IV.4.2). For "the rays of Him (the Sun) are endless, Who as its lamp indwells the heart. ... Of which one standeth upward, breaking through the solar orb *(bhitvā sūrya-maṇḍalam)* and overpassing *(atikramya)* into the Brahma-world; thereby men attain their final goal" (MU VI.30). It is thus that one "wins beyond the Sun" *(param ādityāj jayati),* CU II.10.5.

We proceed to an analysis of the significance of the dome and roof-plate, using as key the various accounts of the miraculous powers of the Buddhist *arhats,* "spiritual adepts," by which powers *(iddhi)* they are able to rise in the air, and, if within a roofed structure, to emerge from it by "breaking through" the roof-plate and subsequently moving at will in the beyond.

We shall first consider the case in which this power is exercised out of doors, and where there is therefore no reference to an artificial roof-plate; and it will be necessary to consider the nature of the miracle itself, which as we have already seen can also be thought of as an interior operation, before we make use of it in explaining the symbolism of the dome itself. In Mil 85, the power *(iddhi)* of travelling through the sky is explained as consisting in an intellectual virtue analogous to that sort of mental resolution by means of which, in ordinary jumping, "one's body seems to be light" when the moment for taking off arrives. In J V.125-127, we have the case of the Elder Moggallāna, an *arhat,* who by means of his miraculous power *(iddhi-balena)* is able to visit heaven or hell at will. This Elder, being in danger of death at the hands of certain evilly disposed persons, "flew up and made off" *(uppatitvā pakkāmi)*. Upon a subsequent occasion, because of a former sin of which the trace remained in him, he "could not fly up in the air" *(ākāse uppatitum nāsakkhi)*. Left for dead by his enemies, he nevertheless recovered consciousness, and "investing his body in the cloak of contemplation" *(jhāna-vethanena sarīraṃ veṭhetvā),* he "flew off into the Buddha's presence" and obtained permission to end his life. At the close of the subsequent "Story of the Past" related by the Buddha, we are told that

the assembled Prophets *(isiyo)* also "flew up into the air and went to their own places."

We hardly need to go beyond these texts for an adequate indication of the true nature of the "power" *(iddhi)* of flying through the air. In the first place it may be observed that *uppatitvā,* "flying," implies wings, as of a bird;[54] and that wings, in all traditions, are the characteristic of angels, as being intellectual substances independent of local motion; an intellectual substance, as such, being immediately present at the point to which its attention is directed. It is in this sense that the "intellect is the swiftest of birds" *(manah javiṣṭam patayatsv antaḥ,* RV VI.9.5); that the sacrificer, endowed by the singing priest with wings of sound by means of the Syllable (OṂ) is supported by these wings, and "sits without fear in the world of heavenly light, and likewise goeth about" *(ācarati,* JUB III.14.9-10), i.e., as a "mover-at-will" *(kāmācārin),* cf. PB XXV.3.4, "for wherever a winged thing would go, thereunto it comes"; and that "of such as ascend to the top of the Tree, those that are winged fly away, the wingless fall down: it is the comprehensors that are winged, the ignorant wingless" (PB XIV.I.12-13).[55]

In the second place, it will be observed that the power of motion at will presupposes a state of perfection, that of one who can be thought of as *arhat,* or in other terms *kṛtakṛtyaḥ, sukṛtaḥ, kṛtātmā*: it is inhibited by even a trace of defect. And finally, the very striking expressions "flew up into the air" and "investing his body in the cloak of contemplation" imply at the same time an "ascension" and a "disappearance." The meanings of *veṭhetvā = veṣṭitvā* include those of "wrapping up," "enveloping," and "veiling," and hence of "concealing" that which is enveloped, which in the present case is the body *(śarīram)* or appearance *(rūpam)* of the person concerned.[56] The primary senses of *pakkāmī = prākramit* are "went forth," "made his exit," or as in our rendering, "made off," or "disappeared," as in Cowell and Francis (J V.65).

What is really involved and implied by an "investiture of the body in the cloak of contemplation" is a disappearance into one's spiritual essence, or "being in the spirit" *(ātmany antarhita, guhā nihita, ātmany etya);*[57] just as in Manu I.51, where the manifested Deity, having completed his creative operation, is described as having "vanished into his own spiritual essence *(ātmany antar dadhe,* being accordingly *ātmany hita, antarhita, guhā nihita, adṛśya),*[58] superenclosing time within time" *(bhūyah kālaṃ kālena*

pīḍayan),[59] that is to say, in the language of Genesis 2:2, "rested on the seventh day from all his work which he had made."

To have entered thus into one's own spiritual essence, *ātmany antarhito bhūtvā,* is to have realized that state of unification *(samādhi)* which is, in fact, the consummation of *dhyāna* in Indian, as *excessus* or *raptus* is that of *contemplatio* in Christian yoga. Nor could we understand the supernatural power of ascension and motion at will otherwise than as a going out of oneself, which is more truly an entering into one's very Self. One cannot think of the power as an independent skill or trick, but only as a function of the ability to enter into *samādhi* at will and as a manifestation of that perfect recollectedness which is, in fact, attributed to the *arhat*. To have thus returned to the center of one's own being is to have reached that center at which the spiritual Axis of the Universe intersects the plane on which the empirical consciousness had previously been extended; to have become if not in the fullest sense a *sādhu,* at any rate *sādhya,* one whose consciousness of being, on whatever plane of being, has been concentrated at the "navel" of that "earth," and in that pillar *(skambha, stauros)* of which the poles are chthonic Fire and celestial Sun.

We have seen that the *Breath of Life (prāṇaḥ),* often identified with the Spirit, and with Brahman, but more strictly speaking the vital manifestation of the Spirit, the Gale of the Spirit insofar as this can be distinguished from the Spirit at' rest, departs from the heart by its apex; and we know also that all the breaths of life *(prāṇāḥ)* are, as it were, the subjects of the Breath (Praśṇa Up. III.4) and diverge into their vectors at birth, and are unified in the Breath, or Gale, when it departs, and hence it is that one says of the dying man that "He is becoming one" (Upaniṣads, *passim*). This supremacy of the Breath of Life lends itself to a striking architectural illustration, which we find first in the *Aitareya Āraṇyaka,* III.2.1 (ŚA VIII), as follows: "The Breath of Life is a pillar *(prāṇo vaṃśa)*. And just as [in a house] all the other beams are met together *(samāhitaḥ)* in the king-post *(śālā-vamśa,* 'hall-beam'),[60] so it is that in this Breath [the functions of] the eye, the ear, the intellect, the tongue, the senses, and the whole self are unified" *(samāhitaḥ)*. In order to grasp the connection of this simile with the later Buddhist variant, it is needful to observe that to be *samāhita* is literally the same as to be "in *samādhi*."[61] In the Buddhist variant we have, Mil 38 (II.I.3): "Just as every one of the rafters of a building with a domed roof *(kūṭāgāra)* go up its roof-plate *(kūṭaṇgamā honti),* incline towards its roof-

plate (*kūṭaninnā*),[62] and are assembled at its roof-plate *(kūṭasamosaraṇa),* and the roof-plate is called the apex *(agga = agra)* of all, even so, your Majesty, every one of these skilful habits *(kusalā dhammā)*[63] has the state of unification as its forefront *(samādhi-pamukhā honti),* inclines towards the state of unification *(samādhi-ninnā),* leans towards the state of unification *(samādhi-poṇā),* and bears upon the state of unification *(samādhi-pabbhārā).*"[64] It will be seen that *samādhi* here replaces the previous *prāṇe ... samāhita,* affecting the emphasis, rather than the essence of the meaning.

We are now in a position to consider the texts in which a breaking through the roof-plate of a house, and even a breaking down of the house itself, is spoken of. In J III.472, the *arhat* "flies up in the air, cleaving the roof-plate of the palace *(ākāse uppatitvā pāsādakaṇṇikam dvidhā kalvā).*" In DhA I.63, an *arhat* "flying up by his 'power,' breaks through the roof-plate of the peaked [or probably domed] house, and goes off in the air." DhA III.66, the *arhat Moggallāna* (cf. J IV.228-229) "breaking through the round of the roof-plate, springs into the air *(kaṇṇKa'maṇḍalam bhinditvā ākāsan pakkhandi)*," is incidentally good evidence also for the circular form of the plate. Finally, in J I.76, we have the Buddha's song of triumph on the occasion of the Full Awakening *(mahāsambodhi),* in which he glories in the fact that the house of life, the tabernacle of the flesh, has once and for all been broken down *(gahakūṭaṃ visaṇkhitam),*[65]

If we have not by any means exhausted the subject of the symbolic values of Indian architecture, we may perhaps claim to have shown that during a period of millennia this architecture must be thought as having been not merely one of "material facts" but also an iconography: that the form of the house conceived in the artist's mind as the pattern of the work to be done, and in response to the needs of the householder (whether human or divine), actually served the double requirements of a man who can be spoken of as a whole man, to whom it had not yet occurred that it might be possible to live "by bricks and mortar only," and not also in the light of eternity, "by every word that proceedeth out of the mouth of God"; by which we mean in India precisely "what was heard *(śruti = veda),*" together with the accessory sciences *(śāstra),* of which the basic principle is to imitate what was done by the gods in the beginning, or in other words to imitate Nature, Natura naturans, Creatrix, Deus, in her manner of

operation.[66] By touching on the subject of other things than buildings made by art, and that of other than Indian architecture, we have implied that the metaphysical tradition, or Philosophia Perennis, of which the specifically Indian form is Vedic, is the heritage and birthright of all mankind, and not merely of this or that chosen people; and hence that it can be said of all humane artistic operation that its ends have always been at the same time physical and spiritual good. This is merely to restate the Aristotelian and Scholastic doctrine that the general end of art is the good of man, that the good is that for which a need is felt and to which we are attracted by its beauty (by which we recognize it, as though it said, "Here am I"), and that the whole or holy man has always been conscious at the same time of physical and spiritual needs; and therefore not in any capacity merely a doer or merely contemplative, but a doer by contemplation and a contemplative in act.

Finally we contend that nothing has been gained, but very much lost, both spiritually and practically, by our modern ignorance of the meanings of superstitions, which are in fact "stand-overs" that are only meaningless to us because we have forgotten what they mean. If the thunderstorm is no longer for us the marriage of heaven and earth, but only a discharge of electricity, all that we have really done is to substitute a physical for a metaphysical level of reference; the man is far more a man who can realize the perfect validity of both explanations, each on its own level of reference. Of the man who could look up to the roof of his house, or temple, and say "there hangs the Supernal Sun," or down at his hearth and say "there is the navel of the earth," we maintain not only that his house and temple were the more serviceable to him and the more beautiful in fact, but in every sense much more such homes as the dignity of man demands than are our own "machines to live in."

APPENDIX: PALI *kaṇṇikā:* CIRCULAR ROOF-PLATE[67]

The renderings of this word, in its architectural sense, in published translations of Pāli texts are so obviously unsatisfactory that it will be needless to cite them here. I have therefore consulted afresh practically all the original texts in which the word can be found.

The literal meaning of the word is, of course, "ear-thing," probably with reference to the idea of something standing out or projecting. The only example of the meaning "earring" (cf. Hindi *karṇphūl)* is DA I.94, *pilandhana-kaṇṇikā*; cf. Skr. *karṇaka, karṇkā* "projection, handle, earring, pericarp of a lotus, central point," etc. Very often the word is used to denote a part, namely the inner part, the seed vessel, of a lotus. In J I.183, we have *patta, kiñjakkha, kaṇṇikā,* i.e., petals, stamens, pericarp of a lotus *(paduma)*; the two first fall away, leaving the last "standing." The same words occur in the same sense in Mil 361, except that *kesara* replaces *kiñjakkha*. As is well known, the *paduma* (Skr. *padma)* seed vessel has a flat circular top marked with smaller circles. In iconography it is precisely this top which forms the actual support of a deity seated or standing on a seat or pedestal *(pīṭha)*; accordingly, we find the upper part of a pedestal *(vedi, pīṭhaka)* designated in Sanskrit as *karṇikā (Mānasāra,* XXXII.III, 112, and 117 with v. 1. *kari-karṇa)*.

The *paduma-kaṇṇikā* disk forms the top of a cylindrical body which narrows downwards towards the stalk of the flower. Probably because of their resemblance in shape to this form, shocks of rice standing in a field are called *kaṇṇikā-baddhā* (DhA I.81); they are tied in at the waist, so to speak.

In J I.152, a fawn is said to be as beautiful as a *puppha-kaṇṇikā,* which may mean here no more than the "heart of a lotus flower."

We come now to the more difficult problem of *kaṇṇikā* and *kaṇṇikāmaṇḍala* as an architectural term. We find it as part of the roof of a *kūṭāgāra,* DA I.309, DhA I.77; of a *sālā,* J I.201 (= DhA I.269, *vissamanasāla*); of a *pāsāda,* J III.431 and 472; of a king's *vāsāgāra,* J III.317-319; of a *geha* generally, DhA IV.178; and D I.94, where divination by the *lakkhaṇa,* lucky marks, of a *kaṇṇkā* is alluded to, the Commentary (DA I.94) explaining that the *kaṇṇikā* may be either an ornament, or the *kaṇṇikā* of a house, *geha*. *Kaṇṇikā-maṇḍala* seems to mean the same as *kaṇṇikā,* as will appear from the texts (DhA III.66, IV.178; J III.317) and from the fact that the *kaṇṇikā* is in any case round, just as a plate and the circle of a plate are practically the same thing.

In three places we have an account of arhats rising in the air and making their exit from the house by breaking through the *kaṇṇikā*. Thus, *pāsāda-kaṇṇikaṃ dvidhā katvā,* J III.472; *kūṭāgāra-kaṇṇikaṃ bhinditvā,* DhA I.77; *kaṇṇikā-maṇḍalaṃ bhinditvā,* DhA III.66. In DhA IV.178, several novices make a miraculous exit: one breaks through the *kaṇṇikāmaṇḍala,* another

through the front part of the roof *(chadana),* another through the back of the roof.

In J I.200-201 and DhA I.269, we have the story of a woman (Sudhammā) who contrives, against the will of the original donors, to share in the meritorious work of building a public hall *(sāḷā, vissamana-sālā)*. She conspires with the carpenter *(vaḍḍhaki)* to become the most important person in connection with the hall, and it appears that the person who provides the *kaṇṇikā* is so regarded. A *kaṇṇikā* cannot be made of green wood, so the carpenter dries, shapes *(tacchetvā),* and perforates *(vijjhitvā)* a piece of *kaṇṇikā*-timber *(kaṇṇikā-rukkham),* and the woman takes it, wraps it in a cloth, and puts it away. Presently the hall is nearly finished and it is time to put up the *kaṇṇikā;* as hers is the only one ready for use that can be found, it has to be used. In the DhA version we are further told that an inscription was carved on the *kaṇṇikā: Sudhammā nāma ayaṃ sālā,* "this hall hight Sudhammā," after the principal donor.

In J III.431, the king is told that a weevil has eaten up all the soft wood *(pheggu)* of the *kaṇṇikā* of the *pāsāda,* but as the hard wood *(sāra)* is still intact, there is no danger.

The most instructive text is that of the *Kukku-Jātaka* (J III.317-319). Here the king's *vāsāgāra* is unfinished; the rafters *(gopānasiyo)* are supporting the *kaṇṇikā,* but have only just been put up. The king enters the house *(geha)* and, looking up, sees the *kaṇṇikā-maṇdala;* he is afraid it will fall on him, and goes out again. He wonders how the *kaṇṇikā* and rafters are held up. Two verses follow; in the first, the size of the *kaṇṇikā* is given: it is one and a half *kukku* in diameter, eight *vidathi* in circumference,[68] and made of *si*ṃsapa[69] and *sāra* wood; why does it stand fast? In the second verse the Bodhisattva replies that it stands fast because the thirty rafters *(gopānasiyo)* of *sāra* wood "curved[70] and regularly arranged, compass it round, grip it tightly." The Bodhisattva goes on to expound a parable; the *kaṇṇikā* and rafters are like the king and his ministers and friends. If there is no *kaṇṇikā,* the rafters will not stand, if there are no rafters, there is nothing to support the *kaṇṇikā;* if the rafters break, the k*aṇṇikā* falls; Just so in the case of a king and his ministers.

In DA I.309, gloss on *kūṭāgāra-sāla,* we have *kaṇṇikaṃ yojetvā thambānaṃ upari kūṭāgāra-sālā-samkhpena deva-vimāna-sadisaṃ pāsādaṃ akpṃsu*. I now venture to render this passage not quite as in C.A.F. Rhys Davids' translation quoted in JAOS, XLVIII, 269, but "putting in the

kaṇṇikā, they completed the mansion in the shape of a gabled hall (resting) on pillars, like to a palace of the gods." This is quite in accord with the architectural forms represented in the old reliefs, where the commonest type of more pretentious building is that of a pinnacled hall resting on pillars: *saṃkhepena* is "in the shape of," just as in DA I.260, *bhūmi-ghara-saṃkhepena pokkharaṇiṃ*. In DA I.43, gloss on *maṇḍalamāla* (a building in which the brethren assemble), we have "Wherever two *kaṇṇikās* are employed, and the thatching *(channa)* is done in goose or quail (-feather style), it is a *maṇḍala-māḷa,* 'a circle hall,' and so also where one *kaṇṇikā* is employed and a row of pillars is set around about (the building) it is called *upaṭ-ṭhāna-sālā* (attendance hall) or *maṇḍalamāḷa."* Here then, *maṇḍala-māḷa* must mean "assembly hall."[71] It is clear that when the size of a building required it, two circular roof-plates might be employed instead of one; presumably the building would then be apsidal at both ends. The reference to thatch patterns is interesting. It is to be noted that *maṇḍala* refers not to the circular shape of the building, but to the "circle" of those assembled in it.

It will now be obvious that the *Kaṇṇikā* is made of wood, is connected with the rafters, and is to be seen from within the house by looking up (hence it cannot possibly be a "pinnacle," as hitherto commonly translated) ; it is the most honorable part of the house, and may bear a donor's inscription; it is probably always ornamented, very likely representing an inverted lotus. It is distinct from the rest of the roof. It is not obviously firmly fastened to the rafters, but they and it are interdependent, and support each other.

Only one possible architectural unit answers to these conditions, that is, a roof-plate or patera. The perforating of J I.201 probably alludes to the cutting of slots in the margin of the *Kaṇṇikā* to receive the ends of the rafters; once set in place, the rafters pressing inwards grip the *kaṇṇikā* tightly and, on the other hand, the *kaṇṇikā* itself keeps the rafters in place. Where a building is not simply circular, square, or octagonal, but barrel-vaulted with two apsidal ends,[72] there must be two (half-) *kaṇṇikās;* on the other hand, in the case of a barrel-vaulted building with gable ends, the rafters would rest directly against a ridge-pole *(kūṭa),* as at Ajaṇṭā, Cave XIX, or would simply meet above (as at Aurangābād, Cave IV), and no *kaṇṇikā* would be needed. In any case the meaning "circular roof-plate" or patera must be regarded as definitely established for *Kaṇṇikā* as an architectural term in

Pāli literature; taken collectively, the various allusions are singularly explicit.

The present discovery of the roof-plate as a typical architectural device in the construction of early domed or half-domed (apsidal) roofs is of considerable interest for the history of the dome in India. Like other wooden methods of construction, it would naturally have been copied in stone; only in making a solid dome, we should expect to find the stone "rafters" thinned and broadened out; and this is just what we see in the case of the little domed temple of the Amarāvatī relief illustrated in my *History of Indian and Indonesian Art,* fig. 145, where it is evident that there must be a roof-plate (beneath the finial) against which the stone rafters rest.[73] It will be observed that the principle is that of the true arch, and that the roof-plate is effectively a keystone. Domed construction of this type has survived in India down to modern times.

Actual representations of the interiors of secular buildings are, of course, very rare or unknown in the early reliefs. But it is well known that the early rock-cut caitya halls exactly reproduce wooden forms; and actually I have been able to find two or three examples in which a *kaṇṇikā* can be clearly seen. One of these, Aja*ṇṭ*ā, Cave XIX, reproduced in Martin Hürliman, *India* (New York, 1928), pl. no, shows a small circular roof-plate which receives the upper ends of the rafters of the half-dome of the apse, while a long straight plate in similar fashion receives the ends of the rafters of the barrel-vaulted part of the roof. Another is Cave IV at Aurangābād, where in a photograph, so far unpublished, a semicircular roof-plate, or half-kaṇṇ*ikā*, receives the apsidal rafters, while those of the barrel-vaulting meet above without a plate of any kind; similarly at Kārlī. A majority of photographs of early caves do not show any of the roof details clearly, but it is almost a certainty that an examination *in situ* would reveal a circular or semicircular roof-plate wherever we have a dome or apsidal half-dome.

As an architectural unit our *kaṇṇikā* obviously corresponds to the central pendant so characteristic of later *Cāḷukyan* and *Solaṇkī* architecture, but I am not able to say whether the term *karṇikā* is actually used in this connection.

It is also obvious that the word may have other and related meanings; in the *Kāmikāgama* LIV.37, 40, cited by Prasanna Kumar Acharya, *Dictionary of Hindu Architecture* (New York, 1927), s.v. *karṇikā,* it is explained as

meaning a swinging lotus pendant attached to the edge of the cornice *(kapota)*.

It is necessary also to discuss briefly the meaning of *kūṭa,* which occurs so commonly in the combination *kūṭāgāra*. As the top, peak, or roof-ridge of a building, the meeting place of the rafters, *kūṭa* is partially synonymous with *kaṇṇikā;* and this is exemplified in *Jātaka* no. 347, entitled the *Ayakūṭa Jātaka* because in it there is mentioned a piece of iron "as big as a *kaṇṇikā*." Usually it is more specifically the horizontal ridge-pole or roof-plate against which rest the rafters of a building with a peaked or barrel-vaulted roof. This is just what is to be understood in Mil 38 (II.1.3) where we have, "As the rafters *(gopānasiyo)* of a *kūtāgāra* go up to the *kūṭa,* and are gathered together at the *kūṭa,* and the *kūṭa* is acknowledged to be the peak *(agga)* of all, so. . . ."[74] *Kūṭa* does not, as I formerly supposed (JAOS XLVIII, 262), mean finial, but roof-ridge, etc. For finial we have *(puṇṇa-)ghaṭa, kalasa,* etc.; in DhA I.414, a *pāsāda* has a golden *kūṭa* designed to carry sixty *udaka-ghaṭa*. Hence *kūṭāgāra* is not primarily a pinnacled hall, though this is also implied, but a building with a ridged or rounded, but not domed, roof, and the established translation "gabled hall" is probably the best that can be found; in any case a mansion, rather than a mere house, is to be understood. The PTS Dictionary equation *gaha-kūṭa = thūṇirā = kaṇṇikā* is not actually incorrect, but it should be remembered that the two first are horizontal beams, the last a circular roof-plate. When, as in DA I.309, cited above, a *kūṭāgāra* has a *kaṇṇikā,* it must be assumed that a building with apsidal end or ends is meant, each such end requiring its (half-) *kaṇṇikā*. but it is just possible that here *kaṇṇikā* stands for *kūṭa* since, after all, the two are alike in function although different in form.

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[1] E. Schroeder, in *A Survey of Persian Art,* ed. Arthur Upham Pope and Phyllis Ackerman (Oxford, 1938-1939 [2nd ed., 1964-1965]), Vol. VI, s.v. "The Seljuq Period," pp. 1005-1006 (italics mine). In a consideration of the successive courses of the elevation, Schroeder also remarks that "the four zones suggest in their succession a series of metaphysical concepts whose progression has been the concern of contemplatives from Pythagoras to St.

Thomas: first individuality or multiplicity, secondly conflict and pain, next unanimity, consent and peace, and finally unification, loss of individuality, beatitude."

[2] J. H. Probst-Biraben, "Symbolisme des arts plastiques de I'Occident et du Proche-Orient," *Le Voile d'Isis,* XL (1935), 16.

[3] Jane Ellen Harrison, *Themis* (Cambridge, 1927), p. 92.

[4] Rbhu, from *rabh* (cf. *labh),* as in *ārabh,* to "undertake," "fashion," and *rambha,* a "prop," "post," "support." In RV x. 125.8 *ārambhamāṇā bhuvanāni vi'svā,* "fashioning all the worlds, the universe," embodies the meaning also of "setting up all the houses."

[5] Hence it is that actual temples, as at Koṇāraka, may be provided with wheels and represented as drawn by horses; and it is from the same point of view that their movable images are carried in procession on chariots, drawn by men or horses, of which the most familiar example is that of the annual procession of the "Lord of the World" (Jagannātha) at Puri. That the universe is thought of as a house, not only in a spatial but also in a temporal sense, is seen in ŚB I.66.I.19, "He alone wins the Year who knows its doors, for what were he to do with a house who cannot find his way inside?"

[6] Similarly MU VI.6, "The eye of Prajāpati's crudest form, his cosmic body, is the Sun: for the Person's great dimensioned world *(mātrāh)* depends upon the eye, since it is with the eye that he moves about amongst dimensioned things," *mātrāḥ* meaning literally "measured things," and hence the material world of measurable things, or whatever occupies space.

It may be remarked that although we began with the case of the dome on a square base, the spatial principles involved are the same in the case of a circular base, since any "field" is determined in two dimensions. Heaven and Earth are generally thought of as wheels or circles (*cakya*); but in ŚB XIV.3.I.17, the Sun is "four-cornered, for the quarters are his corners," and ŚB VI. I.2.29, the Earth is similarly "four-cornered, and that is why the bricks (of the altar) are likewise fourcornered."

The Axis of the Universe, according to the texts or as represented, is usually cylindrical or four- or eight-angled; early Indian pillars are usually either cylindrical or eight-angled. We might also have discussed the symbolism of these pillars, and similarly that of the palace supported by a single pillar *(ekathambhaka-pāsāda)*, but will merely cite as parallel, "Every column in those Achaemenid palaces was an emblem of the sun-god to which the king of kings might look up" (Anna Roes, *Greek Geometric Art,* London, 1933).

[7] *Camasaṃ (= pātraṃ) bhakṣaṇam,* the solar "Grail" as an all-wish-fulfilling feeding vessel; regarded either as himself the "enjoyer" or as the Titan's (Varuṇa's) "means of enjoyment," just as we speak of the eye as "seeing" or as the "means of vision." The Titan Father's bowl, which is also his "eye" (RV I.50.5-7, X.82.1, X.88.13; AV X.7.33, etc.) provides whatever "food" may be desired, precisely inasmuch as it is the solar orb, paten, or platter which envisages and thus partakes of all things at once; in which sense it is that "the Sun with his five rays feeds upon the objects of sense perception" *(viṣayān atti,* MU VI.31, cf. *pippalam . . . atti,* RV I.164.20), i.e., "When as the Lord of Immortality he rises up by food" (*amṛtatvasyêśāno yad annena atirohati,* RV X.90.2 = "comes eating and drinking"); which rays are "the far-seeing rays of Varuṇa," RV X.41.9, "five" if we consider the four quarters and central orb, "seven" if we also consider the zenith and nadir, or more indefinitely "a hundred and one," of which the hundred and first is again the central orb. The bowl is not, as some have suggested, the Moon—"The Person in the orb is the eater, the Moon his food. . . . The Moon is the food of the gods" (ŚB X.5.2.18 and I.6.4.5); "The Sun is the eater, the Moon his dues. When this pair unites, it is termed the eater, not the food" (ŚB X.6.2.3 and 4). It is, of course, as "world" or "universe," all that is "under the sun," that the Moon is his "meat." The very "life" of Varuṇa, the Fisher King, the deity *ab intra,* otherwise inert and impotent, depends upon this Grail as the eternal means of his rejuvenation and procession. And this solar Grail is the prototype of every sacrificial paten. For the Grail motif in the Indian tradition, and the Buddha's bowl as a Grail, see Coomaraswamy, *Yakṣas,* Pt. 11, 1932, pp. 37-42.

[8] *Mukha,* "entrance," "gateway," as in JUB III.33.8, "The comprehensor thereof, frequenting in the spirit both these classes of divinities (Gale, Fire, Moon, Sun as transcendent and as immanent), the Gate receives him"

(vidvān . . . etā ubhayīr devatā ātmany etya, mukha ādatte); JUB IV.II.5, "I (Agni) am the Gate of the Gods" *(ahaṃ devānām mukham asmi);* AB III.42, "Agni ascended, reaching the sky, he opened the door of the world of heaven" *(svargasya lokasya dvāram)*. For *mukha* as the gateway of a city or fort see *Arthaśāstra,* 11, ch. 21, and the plan in *Eastern Art,* II (1930), Pl. CXXII: the "mouth" of the gateway is approached by a bridge or "concourse" *(saṃkrama)* which spans the moat, so that whoever enters may be said to have reached the "farther shore." There is accordingly a solar symbolism of gateways and of bridges and bridge builders (cf. "pontiff").

[9] This holds good also in the analogous case of the four-fold partition of the *vajra* (made by Tvaṣṭṛ, given to Indra, and with which he smites the Dragon, RV I.85.9, etc.), inasmuch as the four parts are to be wielded, or otherwise moved, ŚB I.2.4.

The coronate and royal Buddha types of the Mahāyāna iconography characteristically hold the begging bowl, and represent (1) the Buddha as Cakravartin, or King of the World, and (2) the Sambhogakāya or Body of Beatitude (Paul Mus, "Le Buddha pare," BÉFEO XXVIII, 1928, 274, 277). Now we suggest that *sam* in *sambhoga* has the value "completely" or "absolutely," rather than that of "in company with"; *sambhoga* is not (in these contexts) an eating "together with others," but an "all-eating," in a sense analogous to that of "all-knowing," cf. *sam-bodhi, sam-vid, sam-s-kṛ,* etc. The bowl is more than the simple *patta* in which a wandering monk collects his food from here or there; it is a *puṇṇa patta,* a "full bowl," furnished with all kinds of food; and the story seems to assert unmistakably that His body who eats from it is no mere *kāya,* but the Sambhogakāya or Body of Omnifruition. Approaching the problem from another angle, Mus has reached the same conclusion, that the term *sambhoga* implies a perfect, universal, and effortless fruition; pointing out at the same time that *anāhoga,* meaning "not relying upon any external source of nourishment," naturally coincides with *sambhoga* in one and the same subject, and implies a self-subsistence of which the Sun is an evident image *(Barabuḍur,* Paris, 1935, p. 659). My own interpretation of the atonement of the four bowls merely confirms these deductions.

[10] From other points of view, of course, the Sun can be regarded as having one, four, five, eight, nine, or a "thousand" rays; eight, for example, with respect to the four quarters and four half-quarters on a given plane of being.

[11] A fuller discussion of the Vedic "Cross of Light," of which the arms are the pathways of the Spirit, must be undertaken elsewhere. In the meantime, for the expression *trivṛd vajra,* see JB I.247, "The procession of the threefold spear perpetually coincides with that of these worlds" (*trivṛd vajro'harahar imān lokān anuvartata);* for the "best ray" (*paraṃ bhās, jyeṣṭha raśmi,* cf. *jyotiṣāṃ jyotis,* "Light of lights"), see ŚB I.9.3.10 with Mahidhara's commentary, together with JUB I.30.4, *yat param atibhati . . . tam abhyatimucyate*; and for the *sūtrātman* doctrine, RV I.115.1, AV X.8.37-38, ŚB VI.7.I.17 and VIII.7.3.10, where the Sun is said to "string these worlds to Himself by the thread of the Gale of the Spirit" and to be the "point of attachment" *(āsañjanam)* to which these worlds are bound by means of the six directions; cf. in AV X.7.42 the concept of the universal warp of being as fastened by six pegs or rays of light *(tantram . . . ṣanmayūkham)*; and BG VII.7 and X.20. It may be added that similar ideas are clearly expressed in the apocryphal Acts of John, 98-99, and Acts of Peter 38.

To avoid all possibility of confusion, it must be emphasized that the position of the Sun in the universe is in the Vedic tradition always at the center, and not at the top of the universe, although always above and at the "Top of the Tree," when considered from any point within the universe. How this is will be readily understood if we consider the universe as symbolized by the wheel, of which the center is the Sun and the felly any ground of being. From any one position on the felly it will be seen that the Axis of the Universe, which pillars apart heaven and earth, is a radius of the circle and a ray of the Sun, occupying what is from our point of view the zenith, but from the solar point of view the nadir; while from an exactly opposite position on the felly, the same will hold good. The Axis of the Universe is represented, then, by what in the diagram is actually a diameter, made up of what is from any one point of view a nadir and a zenith; in other words, the axis passes geometrically through the Sun. It is in quite another than this geometric sense that the "seventh ray" passes through the Sun, viz. into an undimensioned beyond, which is not contained within the dimensioned circle of the universe. The prolongation of this seventh ray

beyond the Sun is accordingly incapable of any geometric representation; from our point of view it ends in the Sun, and is the disc of the Sun, through which we cannot gaze, otherwise than in the spirit, and not by any means either physically or psychically. To this "ineffable" quality of the prolongation of the "Way" beyond the Sun correspond the Upaniṣad and Buddhist designations of the continuing *brahma-patha* as "nonhuman" (*amānava*) and as "uncommunicable" or "untaught" *(aśaikṣa),* and the whole doctrine of "Silence" (see Coomaraswamy, "The Vedic Doctrine of Silence" [in *Coomaraswamy* 2]). The essential distinction of this seventh ray from the other spatial rays (which also corresponds to the distinction of transcendent from immanent and of infinite from finite) is clearly marked in symbolic representations, of which we give two illustrations, respectively Hindu and Christian [Figure 13].



Figure 13. The Seven-Rayed Sun
In B. the long shaft of the seventh ray extends downward from the Sun to the Bambino in the cradle.

[12] J I.58; cf. CU III.8.10, where for the Sādhya deities the Sun rises always in the zenith and sets in the nadir—and can therefore, so far as they are concerned, cast only a fixed shadow.

[13] P. Mus, "Barabuḍur: esquisse d'une histoire du Bouddhisme fondée sur la critique archéologique des textes," BÉFEO, 1932 f. [published in 1935 in 2 vols. (Paris: Geunther)]. Passages quoted above are from Part V, pp. 125, 207, 208.

Cf. H. Kern, *Histoire du Bouddhisme dans l'Inde* (Paris, 1903), II, 154, "The true Dhātugarbha of the Ādi-Buddha, in other words the Creator, Brahmā, is the Brahmāṇḍa, the world-egg, container of all the elements *(dhātu)* and which is divided into two halves by the horizon. This is the real

Dhātugarbha (receptacle of the elements): the constructions are only an imitation of it."

[14] See the excellent discussion of the cosmic chariot and its microcosmic replicas, and the demonstration of the analogy of cosmic and human *processions* in Mus, "Barabuḍur," p. *229.

[15] Cf. VIII.25.18, "He (Sun) hath measured out with his ray the boundaries of heaven and earth."

[16] With its interior cell, the "lotus of the heart, indwelt by the Golden Person of the Sun" (MU VI.2), "ever seated in the heart of creatures" (KU VI.17), the "all-containing city of Brahman" (CU VIII.1.6), "constance of Indra and Indrāṇī" (Heaven and Earth) (BU IV.2.3, MU VII.11). We shall see later that it is from the apex of this house of the body or heart that the indwelling Spirit emerges when its connection *(samyoga)* with the individual body and soul is severed.

For a corresponding analogy of the inward and outward "cells," see *The Golden Epistle of Abbot William of St. Thierry to the Carthusians of Mont Dieu,* tr. Walter Shewring (London, 1930), p. 51: "Thou hast one cell without, another within. The outward cell is the house wherein thy soul and thy body dwell together; the inward is thy conscience *(conscientia,* "consciousness," "inward controller," *antaryāmin),* which ought to be dwelt in by God (who is more inward than all thy inward parts) and by thy spirit" (sc. *antarātman).*

[17] Our allusion is, in fact, to the metaphysical identification of woman with the household fire *(gārhapatya)* and of the act of insemination with that of a ritual offering in this fire; for which see JB I.17 (JAOS, XIX, 1898, 115—116), and BU VI.4.1-3. Considered from this point of view all birth is from fire. Man's first birth is his liberation from an antenatal hell; he enters at birth into a purgatorial space; and being laid in the sacrificial fire at death, is regenerated through the Sun; his earthly motions are horizontal, his spiritual ascent vertical, by way of the σταυρός, under whatever aspect this pillar may be represented.

[18] Just as in connection with painting we find the instruction *tad dhyātaṃ bhittau niveśayet,* "put down on the wall what has been imagined" *(Abhilaṣitārtha-cintāmani* I.3.158).

[19] "The Intellectual Operation in Indian Art" [in *Coomaraswamy* 1]; The Technique and Theory of Indian Painting," 1934; *The Transformation of Nature in Art,* 1934.

[20] *Dhī* as noun is not so much merely "thought," but specifically *contemplatio, theoria, ars, prognosis*; and *dhīra* not merely "wise" but specifically "contemplative," and tantamount to *yogi,* especially in the sense in which the latter term is sometimes applied to artists.

[21] Needless to say that the doctrines of the "freedom of the artist" and of artistic "self-expression" could only have arisen, in logical apposition to that of the "free examination" of the Scriptures, in such an antitraditional environment as that which had been provided by the Protestant Reformation *(sic),* with its altogether un-Christian evaluation of "personality."

[22] Mus, "Barabuḍur," pp. 121, 360.

[23] We say "universal" advisedly, and not merely with reference to each and every human construction. The universe itself can be understood only with reference to its axis. The creation is continually described as a "pillaring apart" *(viskambhana) of* heaven and earth; and that "Pillar" *(skambha* = σταυρός) by which this is done is itself the exemplar of the universe. "It is pillared apart by this Pillar that heaven and earth stand fast; the Pillar is all this enspirited (*ātmanvat*) world, whatever breathes or winks" (AV X.8.2); "therein the future and the past and all the worlds are stayed" (AV X.7.22); "therein inheres all this" (AV X.8.6); "trunk of the Tree wherein abide whatever gods there be" (AV X.7.38).

Two illustrations may be cited. The Deopārā inscription of Vijayasena says that this king erected *(vyadhita,* lit, "struck," in the sense in which one "sticks up" a post) a temple of Pradyumna, which was the "Mount (Meru) whereupon the Sun at midday rests the Tree whose branches are the quarters of space *(dik-śākhā-mūla kāṇḍam),* and only sustaining pillar of the

house of the Three Worlds" *(ālambastambham ekam tribhuvana-bhavanasya) (Ep. Ind.,* I.310, 314, cited by Mus, "Barabuḍur," Part IV,p . 144; cf. BÉFEO, 1932, p. 412).

In the *Volsunga Saga,* "King Volsung let build a noble hall in such a wise that a big oak tree stood therein, and that the limbs of the tree blossomed far out over the roof of the hall, while below stood the trunk within it, and the said trunk did men call Branstock" (i.e., burning bush); it is moreover from this trunk that Sigmund draws the sword Gram, with which Sigurd subsequently slays Fafnir; cf. the Indian myth of the origin of the sacrificial sword, discussed in Part II of this article.

It will be observed that in Volsung's hall the roof is penetrated by the stem of the World-Tree. The hall is virtually a hypaethral temple, like the Indian *bodhighara,* fully described in Coomaraswamy, "Early Indian Architecture: I. Cities and City Gates; II. Bodhi-gharas," 1930, pp. 225-235.

[24] These penetrations of the roof and floor correspond to what in the case of the cosmic chariot are the insertions of the axle-tree in the hubs of the wheels. The Serpent underground, an Endless Residuum *(ananta, śeṣa),* is the nonproceeding Godhead, Death, overcome by the proceeding Energy with whom the Axis of the Universe, its exemplary support, is identified, and Who "occupies" the whole universe in the same way that the *σταυρός,* as the first principle of space, is said to "occupy" the six extents, for example in AV X.7.35: "The Pillar *(skambha)* hath given their place to both heaven and earth and to the space between them, hath given a place to the six extents (i.e., the three dimensions of space considered as proceeding from a common center in opposite directions), and taken up its residence *(vi viveśa)* in this whole universe," for all of which we have in practice the direct analogy of the builder's gnomon, set up in the beginning, and employed as the first principle of the whole layout *(Mānāsara,* ch. vi).

[25] Margaret Stevenson, *The Rites of the Twice Born* (London, 1920), p. 354. Cf. extracts from the *Māyāmataya,* verses 56-60, in Coomaraswamy, *Mediaeval Sinhalese Art,* 1908, p. 207. Mrs. Stevenson remarks that a fire altar is subsequently made "in the very center of the principal room of the house" (p. 358). Such a "principal room" may be said to represent what was

once the whole house, in its prototypal form of a circular hut, with its central hearth. At least in the case of this prototype, it will be safe to assume that this central hearth has been constructed immediately above the transfixed head of the chthonic Serpent; and it will be remarked that the smoke of the fire will rise vertically upwards to the eye or luffer in the roof, from which it escapes. These relations correspond exactly with the doctrine that the household fire is *ab extra* and manifestly what the chthonic Serpent is *ab intra* and invisibly (AB III.36), and with such texts as RV III.55.7, where Agni is said to remain within his ground, even while he goes forth *(anv agram carati kṣeti budhnah)*— proceeds, that is, when he has been "awakened" by Indra's lance *(sasantaṃ vajrena abodhyo'him,* RV I.103.7) which "awakening" is a "kindling," as in RV V.14.1, "Awaken Agni, ye that kindle him," *agnim . . . abodhya samidhanaḥ*. Cf. also the identification of Agni with the "Head of Being," RV X.88.6 and AB III.43; and the discussion in Coomaraswamy, "Angel and Titan," 1935, p. 413. Furthermore, were it not that the smoke passes through the roof and into the beyond, the analogy would be defective, since in this case (i.e., if the smoke of the burnt offering were confined), Agni could not be thought of as the missal priest by whom the oblation is conveyed to the immortal deities whose abiding place is beyond the solar portal.

[26] Mus, "Barabuḍur," p. 207. It will not be overlooked that even in modern Western practice there still survives the laying of a foundation stone, accompanied by what are strictly speaking metaphysical rites; nor that such survivals are strictly speaking superstitions, or "stand-overs" of observances of which the meaning is no longer understood.

[27] In connection with this "bloody point" and the cosmic instability that follows upon its withdrawal, there could be developed an exposition of the phallic and fertilizing properties of the Axis of the Universe, of which the Bleeding Lance of the Grail tradition, the Indian Śiva-liṇgam, and the planting stick or ploughshare are other aspects. But this would be to wander too far away from the present architectural theme.

[28] Waterfield and Grierson, *The Lay of Alha* (Oxford, 1923), pp. 276ff. The Brahman's question in the ballad, "How should mortal dare deal the Nāga king a mortal blow?" exactly corresponds to that of Mus, "Barabuḍur,"

“How is it that each house could be made out to stand just above the head of the mythical Serpent, the supporter of the world?” The answer is, of course, that the very center of the world, the “navel of the earth” *(nābhiḥ pṛthivyāḥ),* beneath which lies the all-supporting serpent Śeṣa, Ananta (Ahir Budhnya, Ahi-Vṛtra), is not a topographically situated place but a place in principle, of which every established and duly consecrated “center” can be regarded as an hypostasis. In this sense, and just as the *forma humanitatis* is present in every man, the form of the unique Serpent is an actual presence wherever a “center” has been ritually determined. In the same way the transfixing peg is the nether point of Indra’s *vajra,* wherewith the Serpent was transfixed in the beginning. It is an illustration of the customary precision of Blake’s iconography that in his Prophecy of the Crucifixion, the nail that pierces the Saviour’s feet pierces also the head of the Serpent.

For the general principle involved in the consecration of a holystead, see ŚB III.I.I.4, “Verily this whole earth is the goddess (Earth); on whatsoever part thereof one may propose to offer sacrifice, when that part has been taken hold of by means of a sacred formula *(yajuṣā parigṛhya),* there let him perform the sacrificial rite,” the rite, of course, involving the erection of an altar “at the center of the earth.” For the establishment of fires as a legal taking possession of a tract of land, see PB XXV.10.4 and 13.2; here the site of the new altar is determined by casting a yoke pin *(śamyà)* eastward and forward; where this peg falls and, as is evidently to be understood, sticks into the ground so as to stand upright, marks the position of the new center. There is reference, apparently, to how this was in the beginning, in RV X.31.10b, where “When the First Son (Agni) was born of Sire-and-Mother [Heaven and Earth, and/or two fire-sticks, of which the upper is like the yoke pin made of ś*ami* wood], the Cow (Earth) engulfed *(jagāra)* the yoke pin *(śamyām)* for which they had been seeking,” “seeking,” probably, because it had been “flung.” The expression *samāpāsam,* “peg-thrown site,” survives in S I.76.

[29] “He spread her out (cf. Skr. *pṛthivī),* and when He saw that she had come to rest on the waters, He fastened upon her the mountain” (ibn Hishām, quoted by Lyall, JRAS, 1930, p. 783).

[30] Mus, “Barabuḍur,” p. 361.

[31] W. Andrae, *Die ionische Säule* (Berlin, 1933), Schlusswort. "He for whom this concept of the origin of ornament seems strange, should study for once the representations of the whole third and fourth millennia B.C. in Egypt and Mesopotamia, contrasting them with such 'ornaments' as are properly so called in our modern sense. It will be found that scarcely even a single example can be found there. Whatever may seem to be such, is a drastically indispensable technical form, or it is an expressive form, the picture of a spiritual truth": for "or" in the last sentence we could wish to substitute "and at the same time" [cf. Coomaraswamy, review of Andrae in *Coomaraswamy* 1].

Similarly Herbert Spinden, in the *Brooklyn Museum Quarterly* (1935), pp. 168 and 171: "Then came the Renaissance. . . . Man ceased to be a part of the universe, and came down to earth. So it would seem that there are only two categories of art, one a primitive or spiritual category, one a category of disillusioned realism based on material experiments. . . . [The primitive artist] wrought and fought for ideals which hardly come within the scope of immediate comprehension. Our first reaction is one of wonder, but our second should be an effort to understand. Nor should we accept a pleasurable effect upon our unintelligent nerve ends as an index of understanding."

[32] *Patitvā* is also "fallen." The *double entendre* is, let us not say calculated, but inevitable. Inasmuch as the arrow is winged *(patatrin, patrin)* it is virtually a "bird" *(patatrin),* that is to say, in terms of Vedic symbolism, an intellectual substance (cf. RV VI.9.5) by the same token of divine origin and heavenly descent. The embodiment of the "form" of an arrow in an actual artifact is precisely such a "descent" *(avatarana),* and a decadence from a higher to a lower level of reference or plane of being; conversely, the actual weapon can always be referred to its principle, and is thus at the same time a tool and a symbol. *Patitvā,* finally, also implies subtraction, as of a part from a whole; and it is in this sense that our text provides us with a hermeneia of the word *śara,* "arrow."

[33] That is, of course, and also in Christian phraseology, the "Gale of the Spirit": "The Gale that is thy-Self thunders through the firmament, as it

were an untamed beast taking its pleasure in the cultivated fields," RV VII.87.2.

[34] RV VI.75.15-16, "Be such great honor paid unto the arrow, celestial, of Parjanya's seed; fly forth, thou arrow, sharpened by incantation, from the bow-string, go reach our enemies, let there not any one of them be left." Similarly for the chariot, compared to and addressed directly as "Indra's thunderbolt, edged of the Gales, germ of Mitra and navel of Varuṇa" *(indrasya vajro marutām anīkam mitrasya garbho varuṇasya nābhiḥ,* RV VI.47.28). The whole complex of ideas expressed in our Brāhmaṇa text is thus already present in *Ṛg Veda,* where the warrior very clearly sees himself in the likeness of Indra at war with the powers of darkness, and his weapons in the likeness of Indra's. The warrior *is* virtually Indra, his weapons virtually Indra's.

For the similar "deification," or as we should express it, "transubstantiation" of other implements, see also A. B. Keith, *Religion and Philosophy of the Veda and Upanishads* (London, 1925), p. 188. The modern craftsman's annual "worship" of his tools is of the same sort.

[35] D. C. Holtom, *Japanese Enthronement Ceremonies* (Tokyo, 1928, ch. 3, "The Sword"). It may be remarked that these ceremonies are essentially rites, and only accidentally, however appropriately, attended with an imposing pomp. The most solemn of all these "ceremonies" is that of the Great New Food Festival, of which Holtom says, "Herein are carried out the most extraordinary procedures to be found anywhere on earth today in connection with the enthronement of any monarch. In the dead of night, alone, except for the service of two female attendants, the Emperor, as the High Priest of the nation, performs solemn rites that carry us back to the very beginnings of Japanese history, rites which are so old that the very reasons for their performance have been forgotten. Concealed in this remarkable midnight service we can find the original Japanese enthronement ceremony" (p. 59).

[36] A mass of data on "thunder stones" has been brought together by Émile Nourry [Pierre Saintyves] (*Pierres magiques: bétyles, haches-amulettes et pierres de foudre; traditions savantes et traditions populaires,* Paris, 1936),

who, however, has not really understood his material; for, as René Guénon remarks (in a review in *Études traditionelles,* XLII, 81), "In the matter of prehistoric weapons, it is not enough to say with the author that they have been called 'thunder-bolts' only because their real origin and use has been forgotten, for if that were all, we should expect to find as well all sorts of other explanations whereas in fact, in evry country without exception they are always 'thunder-bolts' and never anything else; the symbolic reason is obvious, while the 'rational explanation' is disturbingly puerile"!

[37] It is not at all without ground that J. Strzygowski remarks that the Eskimos "have a much more abstract conception of the human soul than the Christians. . . . The thought of many so-called primitive peoples is far more spiritualized than that of many so-called civilized peoples," adding that "in any case it is clear that in matters of religion we shall have to drop the distinction between primitive and civilized peoples" *(Spuren indogermanischen Glaubens in der bildenden Kunst,* Heidelberg, 1936, p. 344).

[38] "The cost approach is the primary trouble with all housing in this country, private as well as public. . . . This has resulted not only in the tenements of the slums but also in the fantastic apartments of the well-to-do, sixteen stories or more in height, with a density per acre and a lack of natural light and ventilation which are shocking. It is literally true that the most important part of an architect's work in our cities has been to produce maximum floor space with minimum expense. . . . Design for comfort, health, and safety is always secondary" (L. W. Post, in *The Nation,* March 27, 1937). No "metaphysical" architecture has ever been as inefficient as this; we may say that a neglect of first principles inevitably leads to discomfort, and point out that the secularization of the arts has resulted in the sort of art we have—a sort of art that is either the plaything of an idle class or if not that, then a means of making money at the cost of human well-being, and for which in either case we have only to thank our own antitraditional individualism.

[39] Sin, defined as "a departure from the order to the end" may be either artistic or moral: "Firstly, by a departure from the particular end intended by the artist: and this sin will be proper to the art; for instance, if an artist

produce a bad thing, while intending to produce something good; or produce something good, while intending to produce something bad. Secondly, by a departure from the general end of human life: and then he will be said to sin, if he intend to produce a bad work, and does so actually in order that another may be taken in thereby. But this sin is not proper to the artist as such, but as a man. Consequently, for the former sin the artist is blamed as an artist; while for the latter he is blamed as a man" *(Sum. Theol.* 1-II.21.2 *ad* 2). Indian text books, at least, require of the hereditary artist to be both a good artist and a good man.

[40] That is, seeing things, whether natural or artificial, not merely as individual and in this sense unintelligible essence, but also as symbolic referents, that which is symbolized being the archetype and *raison d'être* of the thing itself, and in this sense its only final explanation.

[41] RV *passim*; AV III.22.5; BU I.3.8.14; III.I.4; KU V.11; S I.138; *Atthasālinī* 38; Sn I.599; etc. *Oculus mundi* is the sun in Ovid, *Metamorphoses* 4.228, whence "eye of the world" = "sun" in English. Other meanings of English "eye" include "center of revolution," "socket" (for insertion of another object), "place of exit or ingress," "fountain" (well-eye), "brightest spot or center." Arabic *'ayn* and Persian *chashm, chashma* are "eye, sun, and well-spring," *'ayn* also "exemplar." None of these meanings is without significance in the present connection.

[42] The two eyes of the double volute correspond in fact to the sun and moon, which are the eyes of the sky, RV I.70.10. It is not inconceivable that in apsidal buildings having an apse and therefore also a roof-plate at each end, the two *kaṇṇikās* were thought of as respectively the sun and moon of the house.

[43] J. Harrison, *Themis,* pp. 91-92. Miss Harrison adds, "But what does Poseidon want with a hole in the roof?" and answers correctly enough that "before Poseidon took to the sea he was Erectheus the Smiter, the Earth-shaker." Poseidon is no more than Ouranos or Varuṇa, in an essentially limited sense a sea god. These are, like the God of Genesis, the gods of the primordial waters (both the upper and the nether), representative of "all possibility"; if he bears a trident, iconographically indistinguishable from

Śiva's *triśūla* and Indra's *vajra,* and in fact a solar shaft, it is because he is not merely a "sea god" in the later and literary sense, but the protean deity of all that is, whether above or below. Vitruvius (I.2.5) says that Fulgur, Coelum, Sol, and Luna were worshipped in hypaethral temples. Even the domes of such modern structures as St. Paul's may be called, with respect to their "eyes," vestigially hypaethral shrines of the sky god. In cathedrals, of which the vault is generally closed, the opening is replaced by a representation of an evidently solar type; as Robert Byron and David Talbot Rice express it, "The central dome was *reft* by the stupendous frown of Christ pantocrator, the sovereign judge" *(Birth of Western Painting,* London, 1930, p. 81, italics mine).

[44] "It was the abode of a blacksmith. . . . We were ushered into the hall of dais, into the sanctum of the edifice. The 'riggin' was above our heads. . . . Chimney, of course, there was none, an opening in the center of the roof immediately above the fire, allowed of the egress of the smoke and admitted light enough to see one's way in the apartment. . . . Around the fire were arranged soft seats of turf for the family" (E. Charlton, "Journal of an Expedition to Shetland in 1834," in *Saga-book of the Viking Society,* 1936, p. 62). This description of the main room of a house, still surviving in the nineteenth century, is applicable in every detail to what we understand to have been the typical form of a dwelling already in the Stone Age, and generally as the prototype of the house, itself mimetic of a macrocosmic archetype.

[45] The etymology of the word *akkhaṇa* has been disputed: as PTS remarks, "We should expect either an etym. bearing on the meaning 'hitting the center of the target' [i.e., its 'eye'; cf. Eng. bull's eye] ... or an etym. like 'hitting without mishap.' " It is evident, in fact, that the connection of *akkhaṇa* is with Skr. *akṣ,* to "reach" or "penetrate," the source of *akṣa* and *akṣam,* "eye" and *ākhaṇa,* "butt" or "target" and in fact "bull's eye." We digress to cite the latter word from JUB I.60.8, "The breath of life is this stone as a target" *(sa eso'śmākhaṇam yat prāṇaḥ,* where it may be noted that *prāṇa* and *a'sman* can both be taken as references to the Sun; cf. RV vii. 104.19, *divo aśmānam),* which target the Asuras cannot affect.

Akṣa is also "axis" and "axle-tree" (distinguished only by accent from *akṣa, "eye"),* and Benfey was evidently near the mark when he suggested that *akṣa* as axle tree was so-called as forming the "eye" in the hub of the wheel which it penetrates. Eng. *eye* (Ger. *Auge)* and Eng. *axis* and *auger* present some curious analogies with Skr. *akṣa* and *akṣi*. Auger is stated to represent O.E. *nafu-gār,* "that which perforates the nave of a wheel"; had it been related to Ger. *Auge,* it would be "that which makes an 'eye' in anything." It may be added that Skr. *akṣāgra* is the "axle point," and the hub its "door," *akṣa-dvāra*.

Akkhaṇa-vedhin is then "one who pierces the 'eye,' " or "one whose arrow penetrates the bull's eye": in the present context it would scarcely be too much to say "pierces the center of the disk of the Sun" or "hits the solar and macrocosmic bull's eye," cf. Muṇḍ. Up. cited below [cf. note 54—ED.]. Probably the best short English equivalent for *akkhaṇa-vedhin* would be "infallible marksman."

We find the epithet again in Jātaka No. 18r (J II.88 ff.), where it is applied to the Bodhisattva Asadisa ("Nonpareil"), who performs two feats. In the first, a king under whom the Bodhisattva has taken service, is seated at the foot of a mango tree *(ambarukkhamūle)* on a great couch close beside a "ceremonial stone slab" *(mangalasilā-patta,* probably an altar of Kāmadeva, cf. *Daśakumāracarita,* ch. 5, as cited in Coomaraswamy, *Yakṣas,* Pt. II, 1932, p. 12); the king desires his archers to bring down a bunch of mangoes from the top of the tree *(rukkhagge = vṛkṣāgre*). Nonpareil undertakes to do so, but must first stand just where the king is sitting, which he is allowed to do (we see here a close analogy to the Māradharṣaṇa scene, and to that of the First Meditation, with the implication that the king has been seated precisely at the navel of the earth, or a least a "center" analogically identified with that center); standing then at the foot of the tree, he shoots an arrow vertically upwards, which pierces the mango stalk but does not sever it; and following this a second arrow, which touches and overturns the first, and continues into the heaven of the Thirty-three, where it is retained; finally the original arrow in its fall severs the mango stalk, and Nonpareil catches the bunch of mangoes in one hand and the arrow in the other. In the second feat, the Bodhisattva's brother, Brahmadatta ("Theodore"), king of Benares, is beleaguered by seven other

kings. Nonpareil terrifies these and raises the siege by letting fly an arrow which strikes the “knop of the golden dish from which the seven kings are eating” *(sattannaṃ rājūnaṃ bhuñjantānaṃ kañcanapāti-makule,* where *pāti = pātra),* i.e., the center of this dish, which can hardly be regarded otherwise than as a likeness of the Sun which we have identified with the “Titan’s feeding bowl,” *camasan asurasya bhakṣanaṃ . . . pātram* in RV I.110.3 and 5, cited above.

[46] *Vajiraggam,* applied to the weapon of a solar hero, is significant. For the arrow, in origin, is said to have been the broken tip of the primordial *vajra* with which Indra smote the Dragon; which part “having flown *(patitvā),* is called an arrow *(śara)* because it was broken off” *(aśīryata,* ŚB I.2.4.1). For further data on *vajira, vajra* see Coomaraswamy, *Elements of Buddhist Iconography,* 1935, pp. 43-46. We might say that *vajiraggam = vajrāgram* implies “which was the point of the *vajra”* as much as “tipped with adamant.”

[47] As pointed out in a subsequent note on the “turn-cap” motif, the question of “truth” in folklore, fairy tale, and myth, is not a simple matter of correlation with observed fact, but one of intelligibility. The “threading of a circle” as described above can only be called a “miracle” (and for present purposes we assume that “miraculous” and “impossible” are much the same): nevertheless we have seen that the narrative has a true meaning. It is no more necessary that a truth should be expressed in terms of fact, than that an equation should resemble its locus. The symbolism must be consistent; it does not have to be historically factual.

Scripture is written in a hieratic language and a parabolic style, often requiring a learned commentary. The oral literature of the folk, which may be called the Bible of the unlearned, is by no means of popular origin, but designed to secure the transmission of the same doctrines by and amongst an unlearned folk. For such a purpose the ideas had necessarily to be imagined and expressed in readily imitable forms. The same, of course, applies to the visual art of the people, often misconceived as an essentially “decorative” art, but which is really an essentially metaphysical and only accidentally decorative art. The necessity and final cause of folk art is not that it should be fully understood by every transmitter, but that it should

remain intelligible, and it is precisely for this reason that its actual forms must have been such as would lend themselves to faithful and conservative transmission.

"Conservative transmission" can easily be misunderstood from our modern point of view, in which the emphasis on individuality has led to a confusion of *originality* with *novelty*. Herbert Spinden proposes a false alternative when he asks, "Does man, at large, think or merely remember?" *(Culture: The Diffusion Controversy,* London, 1928, p. 43.) "Transmission" may be either from one generation to another, *or* from one to another contemporary culture. We cannot draw a logical distinction between "transmission" and "memory": for even if we set ourselves to copy an object before us, it is only memory, visual or verbal, that enables us to bridge the temporal gap that separates the model from its repetition. If there can be no property in ideas, it is also true that nothing can be known or stated except in some way: and it is precisely in this "way" that the liberty of the individual subsists, apart from which there could be no such thing as a sequence of styles in a given cycle, nor any such thing as a distinction of styles in a national or geographical sense. It is of the essence of "tradition" that something is *kept alive*; and as long as this is the case, it is as erroneous to speak of a "mechanical" transmission from generation to generation as it is to suppose that the elements of culture can be mechanically borrowed from one people by another. It is only because our academic science acquaints us for the most part only with dead or dying traditions (often, indeed, traditions that have been deliberately killed by the representatives of a supposedly higher culture), and because of our own individualistic insistence upon *novelty* that we are so little conscious of the absolute *originality* of even the most conservative peasant art. No one who has ever lived and worked with the traditional artist, whether craftsman or storyteller, has failed to recognize that in repeating what has been repeated for countless generations, the man is always completely himself, and giving out what proceeds from within, moved by its form, which giving out from within is precisely what we mean by the word originality. As J. H. Benson, himself a "traditional artist," has recently admirably expressed it, "If a work of art *originates* in a clear mental image, we call it an *original* work of art. It has a true mental *origin*. Original work has nothing to do with the novelty or newness of the subject or its treatment. The subject and the technique

may be as old as the hills, but if they are created in an original mental image, the work will be original" (Museum of Fine Arts, Boston, Third Radio Series, sixth address, February 11, 1936).

There is something just a little too precious and condescending in the attitude of the modern intellectual who, for his part, is naive enough to believe that even the more technical language of scripture has none but literal and naturalistic meanings, and at the same time proposes to protect the child at its mother's knee and the peasant by the fireside from the possibility of a like belief in the literal significance of a transmitted legend, which indeed he may not have fully understood but which at least has been handed down to him reverently, and will be handed on by him in the same spirit. We need hardly say that the amoral character of the fairy tale, to which exception is similarly taken, is only a further evidence of its strictly metaphysical and purely intellectual content.

The *Jātakas,* of course, have been adapted to edifying uses, but it is impossible that the original shapers of the stories should not have understood their analogic significance, and improbable that none of those who heard or read them "had ears to hear."

A "symbolische Schiessen nach den vier Himmelsrichtungen" occurs in late Egyptian art; see H. Schäfer, *Aegyptische und heutige Kunst* (Berlin, 1928), p. 46, Abh. 54, after Prisse d'Avennes, *Mon. Eg.,* Pl. 33. No "thread" is represented, but it can scarcely be doubted that the arrows are shafts of light. There occur also in late Egyptian art admirable representations of the Sundoor both open and closed; see Schäfer, p. 101, Abh. 22-24.

[48] Mus, "Barabuḍur," p. 118.

[49] Cf. BG XI.54, "I can verily be penetrated" *(śakyo hy ahaṃ viddhaḥ)*. If That (Spirit, *ātman,* immanent as "body-dweller" and transcendent in itself discarnate) is also described as "ever impenetrable *(nityam avedhyah,* BG II.30)," this means, of course, by whatever is not of Its own nature; the Asuras, for example, being themselves shattered on that Stone that is the Breath of Life, JUB I.60.8, as quoted in a previous note.

[50] With the injunction *tal lakṣyaṃ viddhi,* “Hit that mark,” cf. the expressions *lakṣavedhin, lakṣya-vedha, lakṣya-bheda,* and the previously cited *akkhaṇa-vedhin,* all denoting one who hits the mark, the target, the “bull’s eye.” *Viddhi* is the imperative both of *vyadh* to “pierce” and of *vid* to “know”; the “penetration” is here in fact a Gnosis. In JUB IV.18.6, *tad eva brahma tvam viddhi, “viddhi”* is perhaps primarily “know” and secondarily “penetrate.” *Nirvedhya,* from *vyadh,* may be noted in the *Divyāvadāna* as “intuition” or “intellectual penetration.” We think that in the same way Vedic *vedhas* is “penetrating” in this sense, and to be derived from *vyadh* rather than from *vid*; and hence primarily equivalent to *vedhin,* “marksman” in the sense of Muṇḍ. Up., and secondarily “wise” or “gnostic.” Consider for example RV X.177.7 (cf. JUB III.35.1) *Pataṇgaṃ . . . hṛdā pasyanti manasā vipaścitah, marīcīnām padam icchanti vedhasaḥ.* An interpretation in terms of archery is, if not indeed inevitable, at least quite possible. For *vipaścitah* is not simply “wise,” but rather “vibrant” (cf. “Shaker” = Quaker), and *vip* may mean an arrow, as in RV X.99.6, “He smote the boar with bronze-tipped shaft” *(vipā varāham ayas-agrayā han—*incidentally *ayas-agra* does not invalidate the mythical origin of the arrow previously cited, inasmuch as the one foot of the Sun, which is also the Axis of the Universe and lance wherewith the Dragon was smitten, is itself “a golden shaft at dawn and one of bronze *[ayas]* at dusk,” RV V.62.8). *Icchantī* is from to “desire” or “seek” or “have as one’s aim” (Grassmann, “Die ursprüngliche Bedeutung ist sich nach etwas in Bewegung setzen”), a root distinguished in conjugation but originally identical (Grassmann, “ursprünglich gleich”) with *is* to “propel” (Grassmann, “in schnelle Bewegung setzen”), whence *iṣu,* “arrow.” We translate accordingly, that is, with specific reference to the imagery of Muṇḍ. Up. II.2, as follows: “Intellectually, within their heart, the vibrant (prophets) descry the winged (Sun = Spirit)—marksmen *(vedhasaḥ)* whose aim pursues the pathway of his rays.”

When in the Mahāvrata, “They cause a skin to be pierced *(vyādhayanti)* by a man of the princely caste,” by the best available archer (AĀ V.1.5, cf. A. B. Keith, *Śānkhāyana Āranyaka* [ŚA], pp. 80 ff.), which skin is the Sun himself in a likeness *(Kātaka Samhitā* XXXIV.5), this is evidently a symbolic penetration of the sense of the Muṇḍaka text, of which the very words *tad veddhavyam somya viddhi . . . lakṣyam tad evakṣaram somya viddhi* might

suitably have been addressed to the archer in the ritual, as he stood before his solar target. According to Keith (AĀ, p. 277, n. 13, and V.I.5), "The idea is clearly a rain-spell." Something of this kind may indeed have been involved, not in the penetration of the Sun, but in the ritual "intercourse of creatures" *(bhūtānāṃ ca maithunam),* the fall of rain being a consequence of the marriage of Heaven and Earth (PB VII.10.1-4, VIII.2.10, and more especially JB I.145, "Yonder world thence gave rain to this world as a marriage gift"). But the modern scholar is far too ready to resort to naturalistic and rationalistic explanations even when, as in the present case, the most obvious metaphysical interpretations are available. The whole context has to do with the attainment of Heaven; and even the "intercourse of creatures" is not primarily a "magical" (fertility) rite, but an imitation of the conjunction of the Sun and Moon "at the end of the sky, at the Top of the Tree, where Heaven and Earth embrace" *(dyāvāpṛthivi samśliṣyathah)*, and whence "one is altogether liberated through the midst of the Sun" (JUB I.3.2 and I.5.5, cf. Coomaraswamy, "Note on the Aśvamedha," 1936, p. 315).

When we assert the priority of the metaphysical significance of a rite, we are not denying that there may have been, then as now, *avidvānsah* for whom the given rite had a merely magical character: we are deducing from the form of the rite itself that it could only have been thus correctly ordered by those who fully understood its ultimate significance, and that this metaphysical significance must have been understood in the same way by the *evamvit*; just as a mathematical equation presupposes a mathematician, and also other mathematicians able to riddle it. That the modern scholar trained in a school of naturalistic interpretation is not a "mathematician" in this sense proves nothing; "For the Scriptures crave to be read in that spirit wherein they were made; and in the same spirit they are to be understood" (William of Thierry, *Golden Epistle,* X.31).

[51] None of this runs counter to the indefeasible principle that "the first beginning is the same as the last end." If the "long ascent" (AB IV.20-21) is apparently a departure from the chthonic Serpent, a release from the bonds of Varuṇa, it is also a return to Varuṇa, to the Brahman, who is no less above than He is below the Serpent in His ground: which "ground" is that of nature below, and of essence above, which nature and which essence are the same *in divinis,* and omnipresent; Ananta girdles these worlds. For the

ophidian nature of the Godhead see Coomaraswamy, "Angel and Titan," 1935, and "The Darker Side of Dawn," 1935, to which may be added the explicit formulation of Muṇḍ. Up. I.2.6, where the Brahman is described as a "blind [worm] and deaf [adder], without hands or feet" *(acakṣuḥśrotram tad apāny apādam),* as is Vṛtra in RV I.32.7, Kunāru-Vṛtra in III.30.8 *(budhne rajasaḥ)* and in IV.I.11, and Ahi in ŚB I.6.3.9; cf. AV X.8.21, *apād agre samabhavat,* etc., with this "footless he first came into being" compare Rūmī, *Dīvān,* Ode xxv, "the last step to fare without feet." Ahi is understood to mean "residue" (JB III.77), and this is, of course, the evident meaning of "Śeṣa," as being "that which is left," ś*isyate*. It is from this Endless Residuum *(ananta, śeṣa)* that one escapes *at* birth, and as and into the same Endless Residuum that one escapes *from* birth. There is no need to cite texts to show in what way the Brahman-Ātman is Endless *(ananta),* but we shall quote two in which the Brahman-Ātman is defined as the Residuum from which one departs at birth, and as the Residuum as and into which one reenters at last: BU v.I, where the ancient Brahman is called a "plenum that is left behind *(ava'sisyate)* as a plenum, no matter what has been deducted from it," and CU viii. I.4-5, where, when the soul-and-body vehicle perishes, "what is left over *(atiśisyata)* therefrom ... is the Spirit" *(ātman)*.

Let us remark at this point that the well-known symbol of the Serpent biting its own tail is evidently a representation of the Godhead, the Father, and of Eternity: as Alfred Jeremias has expressed it, "Das grossartige Symbol der Schlange, die sich in den eigenen Schwanz beisst, stellt den Aëon dar" *(Der Antichrist in Geschichte und Gegenwart,* Leipzig, 1930, p. 4).

We speak advisedly of a reentry "as and into" the Ophidian Godhead: the "return to God" can only be in likeness of nature. It can be only as a snake that one can be united to the "Snake without End," as a circle superimposed on a circle coincides with it. This does not, however, mean that the way from snakehood to snakehood which passes through the Sun is meaningless for the snake that proceeds *(atisarpati);* on the contrary, it is by means of the sacrifice, the incantation, and by reduction of potentiality to act, that the livid scaly snake skin must be cast, and a sunny skin revealed; it is as a streak of serpentine lightning that the Wayfarer returns to the source from which he came forth, for which source and now goal no other symbol than that of lightning is adequate, "The Person seen in the Lightning—I am He, I

indeed am He" (CU IV.13.1, cf. Kena Up. 29-30). It will not be overlooked that in Indian iconography, lightnings are commonly represented in the form of golden snakes.

The foregoing is based on the references cited and on materials collected for a discussion of the symbolism of lightning. In addition there can be cited some Buddhist texts in which the *arhat* is called a "serpent" in a laudatory sense. In M I.32, for example, the *arhats* Mogallāna and Sāriputra are Mahānāgā, "a pair of Great Snakes." This is explained, M I.144-145, where an anthill is excavated (anthills are, in fact, often the homes of snakes, and in the *Ṛg Veda* are evidently symbols of the primordial mount or cave from which the Hidden Light is released): when there is found a snake at the very base of the mound (which is called a "signification of the corruptible flesh"), it is explained that this Serpent or *Nāga* is a "signification of the Mendicant in whom the foul issues have been eradicated," i.e., of an *arhat*; cf. Sn 512, where *Nāga* is defined as "one who does not cling to anything and is released" *(sabattha na sajjati vimutto)*. From the first of these two passages it is evident, of course, that the "Nāga" in question is a snake and not an elephant. To these instances may be added the case of the death of Balarāma related in the *Mausala Parvan* of the *Mahābhārata,* where Balarāma, being seated alone and lost in contemplation, leaves his body in the shape *of* a mighty Snake, a white Nāga, having a thousand hoods and of mountainous size, and in this form makes his way into the Sea.

The formulations outlined above may be said to offer an intelligible explanation not merely of many aspects of Indian iconography, but also certain aspects of that of Greek mythology, where Zeus is not only represented as a solar Bull, etc., but also in his chthonic aspect of Zeus Meilichios as a bearded Serpent, and where also the Hero, entombed and deified, is constantly depicted in the same manner.

[52] It is, of course, the Pathfinder, Agni, *arhat* in RV I.127.6, II.3.1 and X.10.2, who first "ascended, reaching the sky; opened the door of the world of heavenly light *(svargasya lokasya dvāram apāvṛnot);* and is the ruler of the heavenly realm" (AB III.42); it is "by qualification" *(arhanā)* that the Suns partake of immortality (RV X.63.4). In the same way the Buddha (who is

none other than *the* Man Agni) opened the doors of immortality for such as have ears *(apārutā tesam amatassa dvārā ye sotavanto,* Mv I.7), and as Mus expresses it, “having passed on for ever, the way remains open behind Him” (“Barabuḍur,” p. *277).

The Christian parallel is evident, since Christ also prepared the way, ascended into heaven, and sits at the right hand of God. The opening of the gate is discussed by St. Thomas, *Sum. Theol*. III.49.5, “The shutting of the gate is the obstacle which hinders men from entering in ... on account of sin. . . . Christ by His Passion merited for us the opening of the kingdom of heaven, and removed the obstacle, but by His Ascension, as it were, He brought us to the possession of the heavenly kingdom. And consequently it is said that by ascending He *opened the way before them*.” And just as Agni, whether as Fire or Sun, is himself the door *(aham devānārn mukha,* JUB IV.II.5), so “I am the door: by Me if any man shall enter in, he shall be saved, and shall go in and out, and shall find pasture” (John 10:9), i.e., shall be a “mover-at-will” (*kāmācārin*). In this connection Meister Eckhart comments (Evans ed., I, 275) “Now Christ says, ‘No man cometh to the Father but through Me.’ Though the soul’s abiding place is not in Him, yet she must, as He says, go through Him. This breaking through is the second death of the soul, and far more momentous than the first.” With the expression “breaking through” may be compared both “breaking through the solar gate” *(sauraṃ dvāram bhitvā,* MU VI.30) and “breaking through the round of the roof-plate” *(kannikā-maṇḍalaṃ bhnditvā,* DhA III.66, to be cited again below).

To *hrdayasyāgra,* “apex of the heart,” corresponds the Islamic *‘ayn-i-qalb,* “eye of the heart”; which apex or eye is “the Sun-door within you.” Cf. Frithjof Schuon, “L’Oeil du coeur,” in *Le Voile d’Isis,* XXXVIII (1933), citing Mansūr al-Hallāj, “I have seen my Lord with the eye of my heart *(bi-ayn-i-qalbī*); I said, Who art thou? He answered, Thyself”; and JUB III.14.5, where the Comprehensor, having reached the Sun, is similarly welcomed, “Who thou art, that am I; who am I, that one art thou; proceed.”

[53] It is generally understood that the spirit of the Comprehensor, having left the heart, departs through the suture called *brahmarandhra* in the dome of the skull, that suture, viz., which is still open at birth, but closed throughout

life. *Brahmarandhra* is lacking in P. K. Acharya's *Dictionary of Hindu Architecture* (New York, 1927), but there is good evidence in the (quite modern) *Brhadiśvara Māhātmya,* ch. xv, that the opening in the top of a tower (the "eye" of the tower, as explained above) has been called by this name. The story (which closely parallels that of Sudhammā related in J I.200-201 and DhA I.269—see "Pali *kannikā"* [appendix to this article], p. 460) runs that a pious woman besought the builders of the great *gopura* of the Tanjore temple (ca. A.D. 1000) to make use of a stone provided by herself, "and accordingly it was used for closing the *brahmarandhra"* (J. M. Somasundaram, *The Great Temple at Tanjore,* Madras, 1935, pp. 40-41).

The *brahmarandhra* is precisely what is called in medical language the *foramen*. This *foramen* is the very word employed by Ovid (and no doubt as a technicality) to denote the hole intentionally left in the roof of the temple of Jupiter, immediately above "old Terminus, the boundary stone" to whom "it is not allowed to sacrifice save in the open air" (Harrison, *Themis,* p. 92, with a further reference to Vergil *ad Aen*. IV.48, as commented by Servius): "Even today, lest he (Terminus) see aught above him but the stars, have temple roofs their little aperture" *(exiguum ... foramen,* Ovid, *Fasti* II.667).

Terminus, whose place in the Capitoline temple of Jupiter was in the central shrine, and evidently in the center of this shrine, was represented by a column, which is not really the symbol of an independent deity, but the lower part of the column which stood for Jupiter Terminus, on a coin struck in honor of Terentius Varro (for which, and other data, see C. V. Daremberg, *Dictionnaire des antiquités grecques et romaines,* 5 vols., Paris, 1873-1919, s.v. *Terminus)*. Thus whereas *termini,* as boundary posts in the plural, are placed at the edges of a delimited area, the *Terminus of* all things occupies a central position, and is in fact a form of our cosmic axis, *skambha,* σταυρός.. It may be added in the present connection that Skr. *sīman* (from *sī,* to draw a straight line, cf. *sītā,* "furrow") is not only in the same way *a* boundary mark and in other contexts *the* utmost limit of all things, but also a synonym of *brahmarandhra*.

It will be observed that our *foramen,* identifiable with the solar doorway, is ideally situated at the summit of the cosmic σταυρός, and is quite literally an "eye." We can hardly doubt, accordingly, that no mere figure of speech, but

a traditional symbolism is involved in the saying, “It is easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle *(foramen acus* in the Vulgate) than for a rich man to enter into the kingdom of God” (Matt. 19:24), where, indeed, “eye of *the* needle” might have been a better rendering. *Brahmarandhra* and foramen, it may be added, imply by their physiological reference that the temple has been thought of not merely as in the likeness of the cosmic *house* of God, but at the same time as an image of the cosmic *body* of God (into which He enters and from which He departs by an opening above, the solar door, of which Eckhart speaks as “the gateway of His emanation, by which He invites us to return”).

It may be further remarked that a comparison of the human head with the spherical cosmos occurs in Plato *(Timaeus* 44D ff.; for further references see *Hermes,* II, 249). Incidentally, the saying that in man “there is nothing material above the head, and nothing immaterial below the feet” is far from unintelligible; the “Man” is cosmic; what is above his head is supracosmic and immaterial; what below his feet is a chthonic basis which is his “support” at the nether pole of being; the intervening space is occupied by the cosmic “body,” in which there is a mixture of immaterial and material.

[54] Or those of an arrow, cf. the discussion of Muṇḍ. Up. II.2, above. The Sun, identified with the Spirit (RV I.115.1, etc.), being typically winged *(suparṇa, patanga, garuḍa,* etc.), can be entered into as like unites with like only by a similarly winged principle: in the present context, by the arrow of the Spirit, soaring on wings of sound or light, coincident at this level of reference.

[55] Similarly Rūmi, *Dīvān* xxix and XLIV, “Fly, fly O bird, to thy native home, for thou hast escaped from the cage, and thy pinions are outspread. . . . Fly forth from this enclosure smce thou an a bird of the spiritual world.”

[56] Cf. the use of *vest* in Manu I.49, where creatures are described as “enveloped by darkness” *(tamasā . . . veṣṭitāh)*; and Śvet. Up. VI.20, “Not until men shall be able to roll up space like a skin” *(carmavat ākāšam vestayisyanti*)—impossible for man as such.

It may be added that *veṭhana = veṣṭana* is very often employed to denote not merely a wrapping of any sort but more specifically a head cover or turban. We might accordingly, and with reference to the familiar folklore motif of the cap of darkness (of which the possession signifies an *iddhi* of the sort that we are now considering), have rendered *jhāna-vethanena sarīraṃ vethetvā pakkāmī* by "concealing his person by means of the turn-cap of contemplation, disappeared."

This provides a further illustration of the fact, alluded to in a previous note, that what is called the "marvelous" in folk and epic literature, and thought of as something "added to" a historical nucleus by the irregular fantasy of the people or that of some individual littérateur, is in reality the technical formulation of a metaphysical idea, an adequate and precise symbolism by no means of popular origin, however well adapted to popular transmission. Whether or not we believe in the possible veridity of the miracles attributed to a given solar hero or Messiah, the fact remains that these marvels have always an exact and spiritually intelligible significance: they cannot be abstracted from the "legend" without completely denaturing it; this will apply, for example, to all the "mythical" elements in the nativity of the Buddha, which, moreover, are repetitions of those connected with the nativities of Agni and Indra in the *Ṛg Veda*.

In the present connection we may point out further that the phraseology of our text throws some light on the nature of the power of shape shifting and of imposing a disguise on others, which powers are so often attributed, for good or evil, to the heroes of folklore. If to disappear altogether is really to have perfected a contemplative act wherewith the person concerned in a spiritual sense escapes from himself, so that he no longer knows "who" he is, but only that he "is," and analogically vanishes from the sight of others who may be present in the flesh, one may perhaps say of the lesser marvel of magical transformation involved in the imposition of an altered appearance upon oneself or others that this is in a similar manner an investiture *(veṣṭana) of* the body in a form that has been similarly realized in contemplation *(dhyāna),* and thereafter projected and wrapped about one's own or another's person, so that only this disguise can be seen, and not the person within it.

Finally, it must not be supposed that the actual exhibition of marvels has any spiritual significance: on the contrary, the exhibition of "powers" is traditionally deprecated; it is only that state of being of which the powers may be a symptom that can be called "spiritual." It is, moreover, taken for granted that any such powers can be more or less successfully imitated by the "black magician," in whom they prove a certain skill, but not enlightenment. There is this great difference in the "traditional" and "scientific" points of view, that in the former one would not be astonished, nor one's philosophy upset, by the occurrence of an actual miracle; while in the latter, while the possibility is denied, yet if the event took place, the whole position would be undermined.

[57] As in Rev. 4:2, "I was in the spirit," and 1 Cor. 14:2, "in the spirit he speaketh mysteries." A great deal more than metaphor is intended in Col. 2:5, "For though I be absent in the flesh, yet am I with you in the spirit, joying, and beholding your order."

In Rev. 17:3, "He carried me away in the spirit" *(abstulit me in spiritu)*; *cf.* the Saṃgāmāvacara Jātaka (J II.92), where the Buddha "taking Nanda [not yet an *arhat* having the power of aerial flight] by the hand, went off in the air" to visit the heaven of Indra. *Abstulit* corresponds to being *raptus,* which is the consummation of *contemplatio*. In these two cases the state of *samādhi* is rather induced than innate.

[58] Cf. Mv I.21 *antaradhāyi,* "disappeared," and M I.329 *antaradhāyitum,* "to vanish," and *antarhito,* "vanished."

[59] That is, compressing past and present into the now of eternity; just as in Śvet. Up. VI.20, it is a question of the "rolling up of space." Being thus returned into Himself, He is "the hard to behold, abider in secret, set in the cave (of the heart), the Ancient whose station is the abyss" (KU II.12); He can be known only by the contemplative, as the immanent Spirit, "abiding in the vacancy of innermost being" or "within you," *antarbhūtasya khe,* MU VII.II.

Expressed in the narrative terms of the myth, creation (in which He might have been seen at work), being a past event, is concealed from us because

we cannot pursue it at a greater speed than that of light, or in other words are "not in the spirit," which if we were, the whole operation would be presently apparent.

[60] *Vaṃśa* is literally "bamboo," and architecturally either a post or a cross beam such as a wall plate. We assume that the *śālā-vaṃśa* is here a king post (either supported by tie beams, or even extending to the ground, and in either case coincident with the main axis of the house) rather than a ridge pole, because it is only in such a post that all the other beams, i.e. rafters, can be said to meet *together.* And similarly in the *Milindapañri ha* passage below [cf. note 63—ED.] we assume that *kūta* is synonymous with *kaṇṇikā* (as we know that it can be) and means roof-plate rather than ridge pole. If the meaning were "ridge pole" in either or both cases, the force of the metaphor would not, indeed, be destroyed, but somewhat lessened.

In this connection it may be noted that in J I.146, a "great blazing *kūṭa* of bronze, as big as a roof-plate" is used as a weapon by a *Yakṣa* (*so kaṇṇika-mattaṃ mahantam ādittam ayakūṭaṃ gahetvā).* This seems to throw some light on the obscure passages JB I.49.2, where the sacrificial victim "is to be struck on the *kūṭa" (kūṭe hanyāt),* by which we should understand "on the crown of the head"; and JB I.49.9, where a Season, described as "having a *kūṭa* in his hand" *(kūṭa-hastaḥ)*, descends on a "ray of light" *(raśminā pṛtyavetya)*: since the Season descends from the Sun and is the messenger of the solar Judge, we suppose again that this means that he has in hand as his weapon a *discus,* analogous to the solar disc, which is the roof-plate of the universe. Cf. H. Oertel in JAOS, XIX (1898), III-112.

In the same way the discus *(cakra)* is the characteristic weapon *(āyudha)* of the solar Viṣṇu. Another use of the Sun in a likeness as a weapon can be cited in the Mahāvrata, where an Aryan and a Śūdra struggle for a white round skin which represents the Sun, and the former uses the skin to strike down the latter. *Kūṭa-hasta* then is tantamount to "armed with the Sun."

Just as the sacrificial victim is to be struck "on the' *kūṭa,* so also we find that the deceased yogi's cranium may be broken, in order to permit the ascension of the breath of life; and in this connection Mircea Eliade *(Yoga,* Paris and Bucharest, 1936, p. 306) remarks that "Yoga has had an influence

also upon architecture. The origin of certain temple types, together with their architectonic conception, must be explained by the funeral rites of ascetics." Eliade gives references, and adds that "the fracture of the skull (in the region of the *brahmarandhra,* the foramen of Monro) is a custom found in the funeral rites of many races. It is widespread too, in the Pacific, India, and Tibet." That it was also an American Indian practice is known from the discovery in Michigan and elsewhere of perforated skulls; the circular perforation of the foramen met with here can only have had a ritual significance. It is distinct from ordinary trepanning in that the operation was performed post mortem. It would be perfecdy natural to describe the perforation as an "eye" in the dome of the skull.

[61] *Samādhi* (n.) and *samāhita* (pp.) are from *sam-ā-dhā,* to "put together," "make to meet," "con-centrate," "resolve," and hence reduce to a common principle: *samādhi* is "composition," "consent," and in yoga, the "consummation" of *dhyāna,* in which consummation or unification or at-one-ment, the distinction of knower and known is transcended and knowledge alone remains.

[62] As remarked in a previous note, we assume that *kūṭa* is here a synonym for *kaṇṇikā*. Had a ridge pole been meant, one could hardly have spoken of every one of the rafters as "converging" to it. *Kūṭāgāra* may indeed also mean a "gabled house." But in the present context we have evidence that the house envisaged had really a domed rather than a ridged or even a pointed roof. This is indicated by *ninnā,* which implies that the rafters *(gopānasiyo)* are curved, and the roof therefore rounded; cf. the expression *gopānasī-bhogga, gopānasīvanka,* "bent like a rafter," used of women and old people ("bent," i.e., curved, not bent double as implied by the A in PTS).

[63] Defined in Mil 33, etc., as *silam* (conduct), *saddhā* (faith), *viriyam* (energy), *samādhi* (unification, or "one-pointedness of the attention"), with the *indriyā-balāni* (sense powers) and *patina* (insight, or more strictly speaking, foreknowledge). It will be seen that while the application in the Brāhmaṇa is strictly metaphysical, that of the Buddhist text is rather more "edifying." The *Milindapañha* passage is repeated elsewhere; see Coomaraswamy, "Early Indian Architecture: III. Palaces," 1931, p. 193.

[64] Cf. M I.322-323, "Just as the roof-plate *(kūta)* of a domed mansion *(kūṭāgarassa)* is the peak *(aggam)* that ties together *(samghā-tanikam)* and holds together *(samgānikam),* just so the sheltering roof of the [skillful] habits *(channam-dhammānam)* [is the peak that ties together and holds together the six laudable states of consciousness]."

[65] The house of life, the spatial world of experience, is above all a half-way house: a place of procedure from potentiality to act, but of no further use to one whose purposes have all been accomplished and is now altogether in act. We have already seen the same idea (that of no further validity of space) expressed in another way by the miracle of the atonement of the four bowls. The cycle symbolized by the building and destruction of the house, or division and unification of the bowls, proceeds from unity to multiplicity, and returns from multiplicity to unity, in agreement with the Buddha's word, "I being one become many, and being many become one" (S II.212).

[66] For the Vedas as a "map of life," cf. ŚB XI.5.13.

[67] [At the beginning of Part III of "The Symbolism of the Dome," Coomaraswamy takes for granted the reader's knowledge of this article, originally published in the *Journal of the American Oriental Society,* L (1930).—ED.]

[68] Incidentally, we observe that a *kukku* must = 26/11 *vidatthi:* Vin III.149 informs us that a *vidatthi* = twelve *angulas,* or "inches."

The only other indication of the size is the vague reference in J III.146, to a mass of iron "as big as a *kaṇṇīka."*

[69] *Dalbergia sisu*.

[70] The *gopānasiyo* of a domed or barrel-vaulted roof are of course curved, as we see them reproduced in the interiors of *sela-cetiya-gharas,* but the curve (often used figuratively with reference to old people) is a single rounded curve, not like an inverted V as stated in the PTS Dictionary. The rafters are bent, but not bent double.

[71] The word occurs also at DA I.48; and Mil 23, where it is a monastery hall in which an innumerable company of brethren is seated. VbhA 366, explains it as a "rectangular *pāsāda* with one pinnacle (*kūṭa*), like a refectory *(bhojana-sālā)*." See also PTS Dictionary, s.v. *māḷa:* SnA 477 explains *māḷa* as *savitānaṇ maṇḍapaṇ,* "pavilion with an awning (or overhanging eaves)."

[72] E.g., in the case of the larger *maṇḍala-māḷa* described above.

[73] [A. K. Coomaraswamy, *History of Indian and Indonesian Art* (Leipzig, New York, and London, 1927; reprinted New York, 1965).—ED.]

[74] An analogous simile occurs already in ŚA VIII (= AĀ III.2.1): "Just as all the other beams *(vamśa)* rest on the main beam *(śālā-vaṃśa),* so the whole self rests on this breath." This enables us to translate ś*ālā-vaṃśa* more precisely as ridge-pole or roof-plate.

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