/his/ - History

Напомню что тема русско-японской войны как магнит притягивает 100 процентных пидорашек. При этом из всей этой тусовки один только Бибер оказался с яйцами и добровольно ушел на фронт, остальные пидорашки продолжают тявкать из своих углов.

 >>/418/
В Российских школах сейчас эту тему как-то разбирают на уроках истории? Ответы на вопросы в оппосте школьникам говорят?

 >>/420/
С одной стороны если рационально  разбирать такие темы в школах, то на выходе будут сплошные русофобы.  С другой, если расматравать эти события без наработаного навыка критического мышления, то получиться классическое пидорашье ряканье "слабо ебали, недостаточно глубоко засунули сапог в задницу".

 >>/421/
Ну, в США же в школе разбирают тему войны во Вьетнаме, а ее сложно назвать удачной для США.

 >>/423/
Как вы заебали своими сравнениями.
 Вот тебе на блогарском эсперанто два мира два шапиро: 

> Земский собор 1613 г. был созван в период кризиса, и его главной целью было избрание нового монарха и новой правящей династии. Собрание открылось 16 января 1613 г., и его результатом стало избрание первого царя Романовых.
Количество собравшихся избирателей, по оценкам историков, колеблется от 700 до 1500.
Состав сегодняшнего собрания известен только из избирательного удостоверения Михаила Федоровича, в котором свои подписи оставили избранники из разных городов. Но в списке всего 227 подписей, в то время как количество людей, присутствовавших на столь значимом мероприятии, явно превысило это число.

vs


> Генеральная ассамблея Вирджинии описывается как "старейший постоянно действующий законотворческий орган в Новом Свете". Её существование датируется его учреждением в Джеймстауне 30 июля 1619 года по указанию Лондонской Вирджинской компании новому губернатору сэру Джорджу Ярдли. Первоначально это был однопалатный орган, состоящий из назначаемого компанией губернатора и Государственного совета, а также 22 граждан, избранных поселениями и Джеймстауном. Ассамблея стала двухпалатной в 1642 году после образования Палаты представителей.

 >>/424/
> избрание первого царя
> избирателей
> избирательного удостоверения

Так же как избрали Путина? :3

 >>/425/
Именно. Но ты не на том акцентировался. Когда одни избирали представителей в прото парламент, другие "выбирали" ТСАРЯ. Имеет ли значение на этом фоне вопрос  

> Почему Армия России отступила после сражения при Сандепу?

 >>/425/

Я тебе даже больше скажу - вопрос об институциях основополагающий. Можешь погуглить, если интресно, как именно Леопольд фон Бисмарк проложил рельсы в пропасть для германии XX-о века еще в дни конституционного кризиса 1860-х.

 >>/426/
> Имеет ли значение на этом фоне вопрос
> Почему Армия России отступила после сражения при Сандепу?

А какое отношение к ней имеет Земский собор 1613?

> Что было ее причиной?
Maybe this is an oversimplification but:
Two expansive empires wanted more but they were blocking each other from getting more, leading to the confrontation?

 >>/425/
Long and revered tradition.

 >>/426/
Elective monarchies were a thing. It's a question of centralization.

 >>/429/

>  Новая конституция была обнародована императором Мэйдзи 11 февраля 1889 г. , но вступила в силу 29 ноября 1890 г. Первый Национальный сейм Японии , новое представительное собрание , созванное в день вступления в силу Конституции Мэйдзи. Организационная структура сейма отражала как прусское, так и британское влияние, в первую очередь во включении Палаты представителей в качестве нижней палаты  и Палата пэров в качестве верхней палаты.

Вот и я то же думаю, какое значение имеет отступление русской армии после сраженяи при Сандепу?

 >>/434/
The point is that when inclusive political institutions were created in one country, the other was still solving problems with centralization (sic!) through extractive political institutions. And it makes no sense to compare these two societies without taking into account the civilizational gap.

 >>/436/
And I will emphasize that the problems with centralization in 1613 were caused precisely by the hyper-extractive political institutions of Ivan the Terrible, which, surprise, were restored again in 1613

https://youtube.com/watch?v=QKFREM_9EQU

 >>/438/
Палю годноту, за нехваткой времени не могу сам заниматься, - тема исследования "Институциональное превосходство Японии над Российской империей до реставрации Мейдзи как причина поражения россии в РЯВ". Можно знатно поглумиться, тема не паханая и богатая, материала нынче навалом пока не ввели чебурнет, а там глядишь под шумок можно и завести страный трактор к нео институаналистам.

> Почему Армия России отступила...
As reply to all such question:
Perhaps Russians could only get supplies and reinforcement from the west so giving up land for shortening the supply line was a good trade. In return they could hope that lengthening the Japanese route will impose problems for the enemy.
Also should note that this war wasn't like WWI with the lines of parallel trenches where retreat was just a couple dozen meters to the line back. A beaten, disorganized army had to regroup somewhere, and couldn't just take a step back and wait.
What you guys think?

 >>/440/
Let me explain my polemic . Open poster voiced the questions that arise for everyone, studying the Russian-Japanese war for the first time. I answered sarcastically and provocatively, hinting that the answers to these questions lie in a completely different plane. In particular, studying the course of the war sooner or later leads to the question why did the Russian army (75% of whose soldiers could not read before being drafted into the army) end up on the Liaodong peninsula in northeast China?

As for your question, the course of the war was dictated by the decisions taken by the monstrously inefficient management system of the Russian Empire. On the one hand, within the framework of the Franco-Russian alliance, the Russian Empire had been preparing for war with Germany for several decades (by the way, Russia's largest trading partner at that time, evaluate the quality of the strategy!) and concentrated the largest and best part of the army in eastern Europe (83% of the personnel in 1900). On the other hand, these same people began a rapid expansion in China, since 1898 predicting an inevitable war with Japan. After the outbreak of war unexpectedly (!) it turned out that it was urgently necessary to transport troops and supplies to northeast China through the whole of Russia on a single single-track railway! But one way or another, all these are small uninteresting details described by the term institutional backwardness.

 >>/438/
Чот не взлетает

> В 1892 г., соблюдая требования крайней экономии, мы приступили к постройке железной дороги, долженствовавшей пересечь азиатский материк. В целях сокращения расходов железная дорога строилась не по типу магистрали, а по техническим условиям, допустимым для короткой ветки местного значения: одноколейная линия, легкие рельсы, узкое полотно, крутые подъемы и закругления, деревянные мосты, слабенькое водоснабжение, большие перегоны между станциями. Строители не ожидали особого развития движения по этому пути, пролегавшему по редко заселенной Сибири. Сибирская железная дорога являлась пугалом для держав, заинтересованных в тихоокеанских вопросах, но совершенно не отвечала размаху нашей империалистической политики: по заданию она в сутки должна была пропускать три пары поездов облегченного состава, ползущих со скоростью 12 верст и максимально — 20 верст в час.

> Дорога еще находилась в постройке, а станции не были забиты грузами. В 1898 г. грузы на станциях ожидали своей очереди погрузки 3,5 месяца.  Переправа через Байкал происходила на ледоколах; в январе, вследствие толщины льда, ледоколы прекращали на 3 месяца навигацию, и в Сибирской железной дороге оказывался разрыв, подобно тому как в 1859 г. такие разрывы имелись в железных дорогах Ломбардии. К постройке Кругобайкальской железной дороги было приступлено в 1899 г., но готовность ее ожидалась только в 1904 г. Самым слабым участком Сибирской железной дороги являлась Забайкальская, которая пропускала только три-четыре пары облегченных поездов в сутки, а зимой и того меньше. На Китайскую восточную железную дорогу было истрачено много денег, но эта дорога, начавшая строиться в 1897 г., к 1904 г. обладала мощностью не свыше семи-восьми тяжелых пар поездов в сутки. Эта мощность особенно недостаточной являлась для участка Харбин — Порт-Артур; по этому участку должны были следовать в действующую армию все пополнения и все снабжение.

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 >>/441/
> institutional backwardness.
I won't argue that this did not have part in the Russian defeat. But it has many other particles and concentrating solely on this is a result of a bias which confirms of own bias.
Similar bias was the classical Japanese narration when they attributed their victory for Russians underestimating them. Sure it was part of it to some extent too.
I read at Yalu the Japs had larger howitzers. Big guns are a good thing and surely had impact on the outcome of the battle. Now someone would say Japs were smart to get those guns for their army, others might focus on how stupid Russians were they did not. It's a matter how we choose to perceive the question.
Due to the narration regarding the war, the defeat overshadows the diplomatic successes Russia could accomplish. They quite slyly managed to oust Japan from Manchuria and Korea, they secured an agreement to build a railway shortcut through Manchuria to Vladivostok, lease Port Arthur basically indefinitely, and set up a pro-Russian government in Korea. They reached all this with diplomacy. Noone gives Moscow the due it would deserve.
To unravel this result, the Japanese needed a war. That is not so sly. But noone cares because it was a shining victory on a major European power who could only use the fragment of it's own forces and resources.
But if Manchuria and Korea weren't in the hand of Russia, confrontation couldn't have been avoided either. And Russia could have lose more, from the longer held territories.
Also another bias I see (on the internet and at least in one book I dl'd hastily) is calling the Russian far east expansion an "encroachment" - but not what other powers, including Japan, did. Japan's expansion only became "problematic" when they started to eye British and American possessions.

 >>/446/
The far east acquisitions were relatively recent, things were just solidifying there. The railroad was a very new thing, and quite ambitious. Considering how other powers fucked up their similar African endeavors, the Tran-Siberian line was successful.
Did read that Japs couldn't use the railroad for the Russian wide gauge. Japs ordered engines and carriages that wide but the ships were sunk. (At least a couple of stuffs were done well by the Russians.)

To add something more to the thread, this site has contemporary maps:
http://alabamamaps.ua.edu/historicalmaps/asia/eastasia2_1901-1905.htm

 >>/449/
I read up more about the situation, and now it seems Moscow either thought Japan won't dare to declare war, or they were very confident they can beat them.
Japan sought peaceful resolution, tried to barter a deal, but Moscow snubbed them and pushed them enough so they did not see other choice but war. While in Korea a pro-Russian government reigned, the Russians themselves had no business south of the Yalu. But through a chap called Bezobrazov, who acted as a private entrepreneur - but backed by directly the Czar, had Russian soldiers as muscle -; pushed the Japs further with activities along the Yalu on both sides.
So as for if Japan could have tried some other way to dislodge Russia, I'm not sure. Russia exploited it's status along with the other European powers to gain what it could from China, but Japan had no status (until they beat the Tsardom).

As for the battle on the Yalu river and the retreat.
Zasulich was instructed to hold the river as long as he could then retreat. So retreat was the default.
The commander on the theater, Kuropatkin, wasn't the most offensive oriented general. I've read on couple of places he was sure in their own superiority over the Japs, but from these acts I got the feeling he realized they were the ones with handicap, and this made him play it overly cautious. They say he also used the old Russian strategy of neverending retreats with burning everything behind, but he did not abandon Liaoyang without losing a battle. And one part of the scorched earth would be only engaging the enemy when it's depleted (how they beat Charles XII and Napoleon). I read they had awful reconnaissance so good chance he had bad intel or nothing at all.
But back to Yalu. Japs were outnumbered Ruskies 2:1, had better artillery, and managed to cross the river elsewhere where Russians did not expect it. Again bad recon. Probably bad leadership. Holding the line of a river even with subpar soldiers in less number and with worse equipment should have gone a bit better. Maybe they couldn't have won, but delaying the Japs more that was a possibility.

Here's a quote from The Russo-Japanese War and its Shaping of the Twentieth Century by Frank Jacob:
> For Japan, the war against the Czarist Empire was “a colossal enterprise [...] in many ways.”6 With costs of more than 1.7 billion yen, the Russo-Japanese War would put a financial burden on Japanese society for years to come, and since more than one million men were recruited for Japan’s army and navy, a large part of the population directly participated in the war.
More closely this line interests me:
> With costs of more than 1.7 billion yen, the Russo-Japanese War would put a financial burden on Japanese society for 
years to come
This means a loan/loans made it possible for them to wage this war if I put money away to gather a sum for a future expenditure that is a burden on the past, but if I borrow money then it's a burden on the future since I have to pay back after the expenditure. It had to cost a lot ofc, one component of the Japanese victory was equipment, such as the British ships and the German cannons. But the question gives itself:
Who financed Japan?

 >>/461/
Same author in same book gives some answers to that question:
Japan got her first loans for railway and samurai's salary from the second half of the 19th century. This built up her international financial standing, solvency. However before the war the odds weren't favor her.
> The war was expensive, and the 1 billion U.S. dollars needed to finance the victories of Mukden and Tsushima made Japan an accepted nation state on the world’s financial markets. However, it was hard to secure the first loan, since almost nobody believed in a Japanese victory.
Still she could found the support, where there were ulterior motives, or overlapping interest - to put a friendly spin on it:
> The first money – a 50 million dollar loan – was granted by the banking house Kuhn, Loeb and Co. in New York, where Jacob H. Schiff (1847–1920) had promoted the Japanese case, especially since he hoped to punish the Czarist Empire for its anti-Jewish policies.
When Japan proved to be capable, and gave a reason to believe she can repay her debts, the ball started rolling.
> Subsequent victories bolstered Japan’s position, and more loans were granted at the international finance center in London. In all, 350 million dollars for continued improvements were granted by July 1905.
However the United States and the international financial factors (khm) had an interest in Manchuria. For them it was the open policy what their interest lay in. They did not want either Russia or Japan claim Manchuria to herself, and it seems they used the financial aid as a leash on Japan.
> Despite Japan’s increasing credibility, the financial limits seemed to be reached after the Battle of Mukden, when the Japanese were no longer able to pursue the Russian troops to the north due to a shortage of munitions and the financial implications of continuing the war on a large scale. The remaining money would only last six months, thus peace negotiations were inevitable for the Japanese.
The author quotes a contemporary article from Deutsche Tageszeitung:
Poor Japan! It has not yet killed the bear, but it has already started to cut its fur. The friends of Japan would assist her immensely by pulling the rowdy, belligerent, but promising, nation out of the clouds of victorious excitement to the cold and unemotional earth. Japan has to recognize the real situation and balance of power.

Very interesting!
It would be even better if we could know who were in that "international finance center in London". That would give a more detailed picture how the financing of the war happened.
Also have to note for the quote above:
> the Japanese were no longer able to pursue the Russian troops to the north due to a shortage of munitions and the financial implications of continuing the war on a large scale.
The "shortage of munitions" was also the result of the "financial implications". The money was tight so they couldn't buy enough ammo. And money was tight because the international factors thought they shouldn't allow Japan to gloriously take over Manchuria just like that.

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 >>/414/
> причина

Запомни, гойский выродок, причиной ЛЮБОЙ войны/голода/несчастия/болезни произошедшей за последние 3к лет являются ЕВРЕИ. 

ЕВРЕЙСКИЙ народ, с того самого момента дарования священного пейсания Г-сподом Мойше, занимается лишь тем что наебывает, убивает, стравливает друг против друга вас, гойских скотов. 

Любая война за все это время, даже та бойня которая сейчас идет на територии бывшей Хазарии между slaveянскими ублюдками - все это произошло и происходит лишь по воле Б-гоизбранных людей. Все президенты, политики, короли - все они лишь исполняют волю ЗОГа.

Так что в следующий раз когда в твоей перегнившей от тупости черепушке появится вопрос про ЛЮБОЕ значимое историческое событие - ты будешь знать на него ответ.

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Japanese troops landing at Namp'o, Korea (now in North Korea), during the Russo-Japanese War, March 1904