Position of the Russian Federation (1/3)
The key problem of the Pyniaregime is not so much the absence of a positive program for the future as the absence of any program at all. Any attempt to ascertain an “ideology” or a general description of strategy quickly comes up against the realization that these elements are absent from the machinery of supreme power. The incoherent, unfulfilled statements, one of the more delusional ones, are not a political program, but a sign of its absence. The Punjarema has no purpose. Lack of purpose means lack of strategy. The absence of a strategy means the impossibility of victory, since there is no clear plan for its achievement, because the conditions for victory are unknown in principle.
Even a superficial analysis of the system reveals its complete inability to create new institutions and structures within the state. External function can improve the performance of existing structures. The regime can break up existing structures into smaller ones. However, he cannot create something new. After several unsuccessful attempts, the Pynäzhim regime does not try to do this, as all new movements and institutions very quickly begin to bend due to ineffective management, and, again, lack of strategy and understanding of what goals are being pursued.
The problem of the Pyniaregime is not the resistance to everything new, but the inability to create something new, even if there is a desire to do so. Resistance to modernity is not active, but passive. Relegating authority to more qualified functionaries could solve the problem, but then new, more successful organizations would compete with the old functionaries, apologists, and beneficiaries of Pynarigima.
In the realities of the front, the bone of the military machine has repeatedly shown itself in a negative light. In Russia there are (were) several divisions of the Airborne Forces. In the United States, a country with a more powerful army and air component, only two airborne divisions remained, and one of them was reorganized into helicopter landing tactics. Why the VSRF several divisions of the Airborne Forces, which have already shown themselves extremely bad in conditions of combined arms combat since Chechnya? Why have they not been disbanded/retrained?
The Russian Navy had a Black Sea Fleet, absolutely useless and bloated. Surrounded on all sides by NATO naval bases, locked in the strait, under NATO control on both sides, and completely blocked in the event of anything resembling military action under the Montreux Doctrine. This fleet was absolutely carelessly placed in the Crimea, which was proudly called "unsinkable aircraft carrier" - even despite the fact that for this "aircraft carrier" the VSRF banally did not have aviation, and transport functions were carried out less than a dozen built under the USSR BDK.
Attempts to create new militarized structures are initiated from the bottom up, and are often met with active resistance from the top. Even if new structures receive official recognition, with it begins the active implantation of bureaucracy in all its mechanisms, which negate all the potential benefits of the new organization.
The entire vast army of a multimillion-dollar nuclear power, in fact, hangs in the balance from complete collapse and is held by the forces of a miserable handful of volunteer specialists who lay down their lives and health to keep troops in any state of combat readiness. This volunteer movement exists in spite of the Pynyaregime, not because of it. But, paradoxically, members of this movement continue to indulge and wave Pynyaregima in his Ukrainian adventure, even realizing that he is their key enemy in their cause. Thinking that victory in Ukraine will free them from Pynia, they foolishly put the cart before the horse. The choice between victory and defeat is false. The real choice is between defeat and surrender.
While in the power of the Russian Federation Pynarigim - victory in Ukraine is impossible. When the Pynary regime is not in power, victory in Ukraine will become unnecessary. It's a classic Catch 22.