/kc/ - Krautchan

This doesn't seem to make much sense. The Ukrainians are simply wasting men and resources.

I heard rumours that the war was going to end in a ceasefire this year. So I wonder if maybe the Ukrainians are launching this attack in the hope that it will give them at something to use at the negotiating table. Because long term this attack is stupid, like actually stupid. If this isn't in support of a ceasefire then all it will do is tie up Ukrainian forces, waste Ukrainian men and resources which they are lacking as it is and give Russia justification to use conscripts and to escalate the war in general. There are also worrying movements coming from Belarus who is of course a Russian ally and so theoretically could be brought into this war.

This operation seems like a desperate gamble to me.

 >>/52309/
> I heard rumours that the war was going to end in a ceasefire this year. So I wonder if maybe the Ukrainians are launching this attack in the hope that it will give them at something to use at the negotiating table.
I see/hear/read rumors and speculations about that. That "peace plan" of Zelensky's they hyped this year also part of this rumor mill. But Russia has no reason to sit down yet. If they feel they can take more land they'll just go on.
For now the Kursk incursion did not slow down the rest of the fronts, Russians have a capacity separated just for the "SMO", and they use other resources to defend Russia "proper".
On the other hand Ukraine's army is getting weaker by the day. When the cohesion drops low enough, Russia will be able to do anything. And they are betting on this in Moscow I think.
I do think they won't do quick captures like at the very beginning of the war. They will be suspicious of everything. Hidden minefields, booby traps, guerillas in hiding. They don't want neither of these behind their units. Perhaps a point comes when they drop most precautions, perhaps not.
For the Western powers it would be advantageous to have a peace that is temporary, to have a situation they could reignite (especially indirectly through provocations), but the Kremlin don't want to replay this war ever again. They want all the places in their strategic interest to hold, and want Ukraine neutered. They want a buffer zone between them and NATO. They want a buffer zone they have influence on, like Belarus.
They have unfinished business in the Caucasus, and potential confrontation zone in the Baltics, a new one with Finland, and on the longer run in Asia. While China is friendly now, the two countries are rival too, and their cooperation will only last until the US is a danger for both.

2024-08-13-donetsk-li... jpg
(332.38 KB, 1862x907)

zap-npp-black-smoke jpg
(55.78 KB, 1920x1080)

In Kursk Russians are still playing whack-a-mole with the distracting diversionary forces and AFU solidifies and expands the occupied areas.
I think Russia in Donetsk wants something like this, as a mid-range goal. Straightening the front, so they can concentrate more on one point - which is the Tsentr at the center aiming towards Pokrovsk.

Meanwhile one of the cooling towers at Zap NPP vomits black smoke into the sky and noone knows why and what could emit that. Perhaps they piled up a bunch of tires there and lit 'em.
https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/update-242-iaea-director-general-statement-on-situation-in-ukraine

I think the Kursk offensive is a live military exercise. How would a NATO invasion against Russia would look like?

Putin is addressing his staff about the Kursk invasion.
https://yewtu.be/watch?v=u1qHC_471C8
https://youtube.com/watch?v=u1qHC_471C8
He says that the #1 priority of the Def Ministry is to force out the Ukrainians. But he does not mention the army, only the FSB (Federal Security Service) and the National Guard (Rosgvardiya) - used against the sabotage and recon groups, and some vague combat objectives of the National Guard. Later in the speech he does say that the RuAF doing well in its effort to "liberate" Donetsk and Luhansk, so that is about only the offensive operations of the SMO.
Wyatt of DPA says form open sources it can be gathered that Russians use airplanes, helicopters, and drones heavily, but on the ground it seems it's mostly special forces that engages the AFU on the ground in Kursk. It does seem that regular units of the Russian army aren't there to halt the advances.
So I assume the fight - for now - is the job of the oblast itself, the local units of the National Guard. The federal government complements them with air force, FSB, and other special forces. I wonder why.

nord-stream2-graphic jpg
(105.67 KB, 1200x803)

Route of Nord Stream... jpg
(41.47 KB, 750x499)

They identified the culprit! It was Ukrainian citizen, Volodymyr Z!
https://www.tagesschau.de/investigativ/ndr-wdr/nordstream-172.html
https://www.politico.eu/article/german-authorities-obtain-first-arrest-warrant-ukraine-nord-stream-bombing/
https://www.expressen.se/nyheter/varlden/ukrainske-dykaren-volodymyr-zhuravlov-44-efterlyst-for-sprangningen-av-nord-stream/

German authorities fingered three people as possible culprit for the sabotage of the Nord Stream pipelines, one of them the aforementioned not actually Zelensky, all three expert divers.
Apparently there is a yacht, called Andromeda, where traces of such explosive found, which could have been used. All three person is tied to the boat.
The German article provides a lot of details. A fun one:: the German prosecutor's last name is Rommel. Perhaps the whole thing is just some ML generated fantasy story.

Daily Russian attacks png
(129.77 KB, 2030x1010)

Kursk-rail-and-russia... jpeg
(114.44 KB, 1080x859)

An Ukrainian cheerleader's analyis of the Kursk offensive, a week ago:
https://realcontextnews.com/kursk-belgorod-operation-ukraines-transformational-ace-up-its-sleeve/

His main points:
> Putin is going to have to remove large numbers of better troops and better equipment from the front lines in Ukraine, and this means there will almost certainly be collapses of the Russian lines in Ukraine.
> the choice for Putin is clear: cannibalize key parts of the Russian lines in Ukraine, almost certainly leading to major Ukrainian breakthroughs there, or allow Ukraine to occupy, control, and demilitarize large swathes of Russia on Ukraine’s border.  Because as it stands now, Ukraine has smashed through the rear support lines of the Russian right flank of the entire war effort and will be able to threaten and roll up a large chunk of the Russian line in the north of Ukraine unless a dramatic redeployment of Russian troops from those Ukrainian lines occurs.  Again, simple math.  And Russia will have to keep a closer eye on other border areas, too, further diverting resources from the front lines in Ukraine
Lots of wishful thinking, the Russians continue to advance in Pokrovsk on a daily basis and potential elite Ukrainian reinforcements have been sent away to Kursk. HistoryLegends mentioned the Russians transferring reserves from the Belgorod-Kharkov axis to Kursk, that's a medium-term brake for their ambitions in Vovchansk. But Vovchansk matters a lot less than anywhere in the Donbas. The chart he cites as a "dramatic decline" of Russian attacks isn't dramatic.

He makes interesting points that the offensive aims to cut off rail lines and occupy high ground. He also correctly points out Ukraine's impeccable secrecy and surprise.

2024-08-18-Sudzha png
(842.86 KB, 1156x897)

rail-lines-cut jpg
(334.83 KB, 1667x850)

 >>/52324/
That "Daily Russian attacks" graph is lying with the "Russian Spring-Summer Offensive 2024" title for the Russians are on the offense since the Ukrainian "Spring"/Summer Offensive 2023 stopped in Autumn. There is no separable line between the winter campaign and this year's activity.
But about the graph: if we compare it with what's happening on the ground we see that the RuAF takes more land with less attacks, which means less effort on the front, means Ukraine is failing.
Another week passed since that graph was published I wonder how the numbers look like today.
Where is that graph is from? ISW?

> Russians continue to advance in Pokrovsk on a daily basis 
And not just there. Lugansk front, New York, Vodian (the highway leading to Vuhledar was cut yesterday).
> points out Ukraine's impeccable secrecy
It is so impeccable that the only information that is available was made available by the Russians. Imagine the implications.

I'm skimming the article. Here's some quotes.
> And one of the main Russia rail lines supporting the war for a large part of the front line—the Lgov-Belgorod Line—has now been severed during this operations
Wow they're practically isolated the SMO forces! They can collapse any day now!
Frankly it could be uncomfortable for the forces at Kharkov, but might not even that.
> to the point that they have taken over and will be able to use Russia’s own rail lines to rapidly move in its own heavy equipment into the area.
They can't because RuAF can (and do) bomb their equipment to hui. Air force is very active there. They took out some important heavy weaponry already (among them at least one HIMARS).
> the choice for Putin is clear: cannibalize key parts of the Russian lines in Ukraine
Which - now with some hindsight - clearly did not happen.
> Ukraine [...] will be able to threaten and roll up a large chunk of the Russian line in the north of Ukraine unless a dramatic redeployment of Russian troops from those Ukrainian lines occurs.  Again, simple math.  And Russia will have to keep a closer eye on other border areas, too, further diverting resources from the front lines in Ukraine.
So the number of solders and equipment on the fronts is a problem for Russia, but not Ukraine? Very lopsided view.
> prime position
> massive damage
The whole article is full of these expressions. The author really tries to encourage. I don't blame him, the view is bleak.

Yesterday Zelensky said the goal is to establish a buffer zone in Kursk to prevent Russia opening another front in Ukraine.
Perhaps this idea I put forward here:  >>/52318/ is right and they essentially testing how Russia reacts when attacked. And it is also an exercise, a learning opportunity for Russia to polish their defense plans and actions.
https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2024/08/19/zelenskyy-envisions-buffer-zone-as-ukraine-pushes-into-kursk-region/

2024-08-21-newyork-GR... png
(847.89 KB, 1861x908)

2024-08-21-russian-ca... png
(812.98 KB, 1183x910)

How is that a gray zone?
As I understand the gray zone is a place where no Ukrainian or Russian troops are present. Which is a stupid concept for what makes them "present"? Do they have to constantly stand, sit, or lay on it otherwise it doesn't count? Why not just paint that hole pink and purple areas grey??? It's impossible them to be everywhere, cover every square cm all the time. Those aren't occupied, no?!
It's like at the start of this crap, when they draw those worms along the roads.
Imagine WWI generals hunching over the maps how meaningless for them would have been this concept. When French generals evaluated German advances and knew for a fact that there's a patch of field that is not actually occupied they just wrote that down as lost territory. And that's it, it was in German hands from there, and had to be retaken.
This grayzone wankery is literally just to alter the vision, the perspective for clueless outside spectators.

2024-08-27-pokrovsk-a... png
(1.98 MB, 1860x910)

2024-08-27-pokrovsk-a... png
(1.98 MB, 1860x909)

2024-08-27-pokrovsk-a... png
(1.97 MB, 1860x909)

2024-08-27-pokrovsk-a... png
(1.97 MB, 1863x910)

The Shit Hit the Pants
- Wyatt of Defense Politics Asia

He means Ukrainian side holds back information on frontline changes until they can't hold it anymore and have to be released.
I don't know, it is surely the case with New York, but on the rest of the frontline they update daily. I agree they want to release the news when they have another serious result in Kursk, to lessen the blow. And on their official map (Deepstate) the situation is the same at NY for a week now (while there are no reports of fighting within NY).

Anyway. The Ukrainian Kursk offensive started on August 6. Deepstate released no mapping till the 11th, and the last change they noted was on the 21st. So they don't really cover it.
So here's the map of the Pokrovsk front, or rather the Pokrovsk-Avdiivka-Toretsk triangle from August 6 to August 26 (last update). Changes were noted on daily basis. RuAF is pushing constantly. Won't be winter until they reach Pokrovsk with this rate. They don't need to capture it to reduce it's importance as a supply hub. One important line to Kramatorsk and Sloviansk will be disabled. Which means more pressure on the rest of the supply lines, more traffic, more targets to strike, and reduced effectiveness of troops in that important region of the Donbas.
I'm curious when will the front start to move north at Keramik. I think Russians have troops only to hold the line there and they try to push towards Pokrovsk as long as they can, have the momentum, trying to keep Ukrainians from solidifying the line and keep them on the move.

Will the US Prez election change anything?
Even if Trump gets elected (seems likely) he won't be sworn into office till January. And then Putin still has to agree to sit to the table. As long as the Kremlin feels they have the upper hand, I don't think they will. And as I wrote before, they want this war be done and never repeated. They want strategic victory, with strategic objectives, and a neutralized Ukraine, or what's left of it. And for that they have to push more. It's not about ground but the ability of Ukraine to wage war. Forces will crack, western support will vanish, then the frontlines will crumble they'll still keep slow relatively as written before.
So no. I don't expect any change from the US election and until then still much more water to flow down the Dniepr.

 >>/52365/
In the East the Russians are entering areas now where the buildings are still intact and there are still leafy trees in the towns. This shows that very little fighting has taken place in those areas as compared with what we usually see where it looks worse than Stalingrad. I heard that the Ukrainians are pulling out, but I don't know how far they are pulling out too.

Regarding the US election, it's hard to say. Germany announced they were reducing spending on Ukraine for next year, they are the second largest donor and we have not really heard much about any new plans or wonder weapons to defeat Russia. The F16s have arrived but people have begun to realise that they really were never going to achieve all that much.
I think that there is a possibility that US support will wain anyway but I also think that if Trump gets in it will certainly wain. But regardless of the party in  charge, if US support for Ukraine starts declining or it stops all together than I think the rest of NATO will follow suit(if it does not stop by itself anyway) and I think Ukraine will have to negotiate.

Ukraine really doesn't seem to be the biggest concern in most countries now. Britain has a huge debt, Britain's healthcare is in a bad state as are other public services, they have internal unrest and they have cost of living issues. They can't afford to help all that much. France has similar problems(and it doesn't even have a functioning government) and Germany is not doing too great either.

The only upside for Ukraine is that as time goes on defence manufacturing ramps up more and more which might help if nations choose to send it to Ukraine and if they can send more to Ukraine that way than Ukraine has been getting through NATO stock piles but I still doubt that. I certainly don't think Ukraine is going to get many more Patriot batteries or tanks.

 >>/52368/
> the buildings are still intact and there are still leafy trees
Ah yeah, I noticed that. They don't really drop FABs for sure and seems not much artillery and drone strikes are basically precision ones. Which means little to no resistance.
This is the "big arrow" offensive, they just have to take it slow, so no potential guerillas/special forces slip in, and no booby traps, mines remain in the way.

Hmm. Germany goes where the wind blows. Will they ever say no to US demands?
Monies should already prepared for a while, and they don't let the whole picture slip. Starting this year was the drama about the €50 billion - "oh my god will Orbán block it circus" - and it seemed it popped out from nowhere, while it was in the pipes since the start of the war basically. They rely on people not be able to track what's going on for a longer run. So god knows what's the situation now.
On EU level they were talking about using the frozen Russian assets. They are debating this for a while now.
> doesn't even have a functioning government
They don't really need it.
> defence manufacturing ramps up more and more 
Indeed, the wheels started to spin. I guess they produce 155mm now.

New info to me, also CNN acknowledging problems...
https://edition.cnn.com/2024/09/08/europe/ukraine-military-morale-desertion-intl-cmd/index.html

Article writes about huge losses, tho a bit vague on this (whole units eroding).
Also mentioning the hardships on the frontline, with some data. In general units try to rotate troops sitting on the front every 3-4 days. However this could be as much as 20 days. And this is 24/7, it's not like "hey my 8 hours shift is done, I hang my hat". They can sit there, getting bombarded, or attacked by ground troops, replying with fire as they can. The article also says, they often cannot reply with artillery, can't help out the troops from behind.
The real banger is the subordination problems. The "newly" mobilized troops who aren't there on their own volition, they got enough of the fight very quick. Many leave, desert, or try to use connections to get somewhere else, just far from the front.
In the first 4 months of 2024 "prosecutors launched criminal proceedings against almost 19,000 soldiers who either abandoned their posts or deserted"! And things only got worse in the next 4 months passed since. This could mean as much as 40000 soldiers denying to face the enemy!
The author also mentions other problems such as lack of communications, lack of vital information sharing, skepticism towards the Kursk offensive.
For a CNN article this is quite shocking. What the regular readers could think?

 >>/52393/
The punishment for that kind of thing in most armies used to be death. We have really gotten soft now...

 >>/52394/
Indeed. When presented with the choice of facing sure death vs. possible death, most people will pick which gives them a (fighting) chance.
But it's not like they will execute 19 (40) 000 people.

14242844210... jpg
(27.46 KB, 280x412)

https://www.politico.eu/article/russia-ukraine-nuclear-plants-energy-war-joe-biden-united-states-nato/
> The risk of Ukraine losing the war this winter
This, coming from Politico, is like a bomb. What their readers think? They were telling all this time that Ukraine is winning. That Russia is shit! SHIT! This is literally a 540 degree turn.

grinny-scholz jpg
(52.46 KB, 950x950)

Well, Mr. Jamie Dettmer of Politico, it's time for you to suck some Scholz dick. Imagine the options of Western centers of power if they setting up Scholz as the peacemaker. Really scraping the bottom of that barrel.
https://www.politico.eu/article/ukraine-kyiv-un-security-council-washington-nato/

Anyway.
This article above is one more voice they started to let peep the tune that things aren't going as media (like Politico) told to us. But it also seems to be one that starts to contemplate what they'll present to the readers as victory.
> When the dust settles, will the West’s media coverage get a passing grade, or will we find, at times, we allowed our sympathy for the Ukrainian cause to overlook matters we shouldn’t? 
Mr. Jamie Dettmer, you have no sympathy for Ukraine. You write whatever you are paid to write and that is to make the readers feel sympathy for Ukraine just enough to not question whatever bs the legislations and governments pass through related to this war.

Tho this article also starts out with telling us, they are right about everything they wrote check out this paragraph:
> The information trap we’re caught in isn’t one that overplays the true menace of [...] Putin — his thuggish, antediluvian nastiness; the bestial nature of his army’s atrocious behavior; his unlawful and detestable deportations (many of them children) from occupied parts of Ukraine to Russia — all echoing some of the worst episodes of a dark and hideous European past. Nor does it downplay the threat to democracies posed by his axis of autocrats and their antagonism toward classic liberal values.
Nooo, not the children! Think of them.
Literal Holocaust Holodomor. dark and hideous European past
Also Orbán.The "axis of autocrats".

Anyway #2, quotes.
> skepticism needed when considering whether this war is winnable — as in, can Russian forces be ejected from the 20 percent of Ukraine they’ve seized? Are we properly questioning some of the key assumptions underpinning the West’s strategy? Assumptions like Ukraine being the first stage of a broader Russian master plan to launch a land attack on NATO; that the fates of Ukraine and Europe are absolutely synonymous; or that Western sanctions will inevitably wreck Russia’s economy.
Here's the replies this article implies to each question:
> Is this war winnable?
No.
> As in, can Russian forces be ejected from the 20 percent of Ukraine they’ve seized?
No.
> Are we properly questioning some of the key assumptions underpinning the West’s strategy?
No.
> Is Ukraine the first stage of a broader Russian master plan to launch a land attack on NATO?
No.
> Is the fates of Ukraine and Europe are absolutely synonymous?
No.
Will Western sanctions inevitably wreck Russia’s economy?
No.

So much to tell and note about this article. Beyond all the above it also wants readers to support lifting restrictions over weapon systems:
> Questions like is this war winnable in the maximal sense? And if it is, can it be won with the current Western approach of foot-dragging when it comes to supplies or maintaining restrictions on Ukraine’s use of long-range missiles? And if the West isn’t prepared to do much more, what then? Prolonged war?
Translation:
> if you don't support lifting restrictions that will prolong the war
Isn't giving more straws to Ukraine to grab on prolongs the war but not helping Ukraine actually "win" this?
The author criticizes the "game changing weapons", but can't prevent himself suggesting another one. Good job.

2024-09-23-avdiivka png
(1.22 MB, 1229x909)

2024-09-23-avdiivka-0... png
(1.24 MB, 1228x908)

2024-09-23-avdiivka-0... png
(1.24 MB, 1231x909)

Thought I compare the newest salient at Avdiivka/Pokrovsk with the earlier Avdiivka one.
Situation today, February 2nd, February 17th.
That huge grayzone is actually just some wankery, so the actual frontline can be anywhere.
How long that bulge will hold?

zelensky-peace-plan png
(23.04 KB, 687x157)

zelensky-victory-plan png
(21.23 KB, 715x125)

> War Is Peace. Freedom Is Slavery. Ignorance Is Strength
Well, we know that "10-point peace plan" jamboree was done to gain attention in the media, drum up more help from "allies" so they can continue war. War Is Peace: Check.
Does victory means defeat?

use-of-nukes mp4
(8.58 MB, 854x480 h264)

Russia update the ToS of nuclear weapons. Translation done by Michael Rossi, not machine translator, so might be more accurate than others.
https://invidious.jing.rocks/watch?v=mKrCQyZDy4U
https://youtube.com/watch?v=mKrCQyZDy4U
Essentially:
- nuclear deterrence includes Belarus;
- extended definition of weapons and use of weapons that can trigger nuclear response, such as massive air attack - think of the modus of Iranian strike against Israel - with aircraft, drones, hypersonic missiles, etc, or the use other conventional weapons if they create critical threat to the sovereignty of Rus/Belrus;
- nuclear weapons can be used against non-nuclear state which is supported by nuclear states (considered joint attack);

I dunno. Sounds like this new regulation is tailored to a specific ongoing conflict..., although considering new weapons (chiefly drones and hypersonic rockets) and their new type of usage warrants an updated policy.

Vuhledar is gone. Symbolic. Russians surely payed the price. Tough haggle, Ukrainians.
DeepState map hasn't acknowledge'd yet, DPA, reported based on geolocations.

2024-10-02-vuhledar png
(1.28 MB, 1186x865)

DeepState confirmed.
Well they held it for a long time and held it well.
Situation changed. The balance of power tipped towards the Russians, they have the firepower, initiative, and their strategy and tactics evolved.
Back then when the assault of Vuhledar failed, there was only one real fighting force conducting offensive operation: the Wagner at Bakhmut. Now the Russian army is capable conducting even more serious operation what they did there, and not just at one place. They have an offensive at Pishchane (near the Oskil), Siversk, Chasiv Yar-Bakhmut, New York-Toretsk,  Pokrovsk, Kurakhov, and Vodiane-Vuhledar. They are doing something at Kursk now too, at least checking the AFU there. Very different in magnitude.

 >>/52444/
 >>/52445/
Things are not going well for the Ukrainians. But you are right, in the past Russian offensives were focused on singular points fo the front, now they are not. But back then the Russians were outnumbered whereas now they are the ones that have the numbers. Though numbers on both sides are really hard to even guess at by this stage in the war.

It will be interesting to see what happens in the next few days, to see how much farther the Russians can push in that direction.

 >>/52446/
> But back then the Russians were outnumbered whereas now they are the ones that have the numbers.
True. Situation changed a lot.
> Though numbers on both sides are really hard to even guess at by this stage in the war.
Maybe it would be more correct to say that Russian military is more powerful which consists of a number of factors, one of it is manpower. And perhaps not simply numerical, but number of men who are capable of doing assault operations.
It's told sometimes that not all soldiers are doing frontline duty, and even in the units holding the line not all sub-units are used, or can be used in such way. When I browsed the militaryland map and checked some of the brigades that were set up for the 2023 spring/summer offensive, only 1 or 2 mechanized brigades had an assault battalion. And I remember clearly when Ukrainian soldiers from a mechanized brigade complained that they are used for assault duty which they have nor training neither equipment. Now imagine the situation with "simple" rifle brigades, and even lower: territorial defense brigade.

Lebanon-IDF-invasi... png
(355.98 KB, 640x708)

Lebanon-IDF-i... png
(208.19 KB, 376x513)

lebanon-geograp... jpg
(137.56 KB, 900x1133)

levant gif
(1.15 MB, 1800x2000)

Israel launched a "limited ground operation" into Lebanon on October 1st.
I wanted to read up on what's going on, I have no time and actual will to do so. I'm still planning to do it.
First 2 pictures are from the NY Times. Article is paywalled, I used 12 feet ladder (turning specific JS scripts should open it tho):
https://www.nytimes.com/article/israel-lebanon-invasion-map.html
Here's an article that touches related topics, like the prelude to the invasion, Gaza, and Iran.
https://edition.cnn.com/2024/10/01/middleeast/israel-ground-incursion-lebanon-explainer-intl-hnk/index.html

I'm not sure this invasion will solve anything. Frankly the Gaza operation won't solve anything.

 >>/52448/
They really haven't achieved much so far. It seems they are being cautious.

I think the Gaza operation does actually have the potential to be beneficial to Israel. If they manage to take and hold Gaza then that puts an end to the Palestinian question. There won't be any more serious Palestinian resistance.

But I agree that this Lebanon operation doesn't seem to have much potential benefit. Even if they take southern Lebanon, then what? Hezbollah will just move north and launch rockets from there instead.

 >>/52450/
> puts an end to the Palestinian question
They can't "annex" Gaza, they don't want a large Palestinian minority in Israel. At least with that they are outside of it. And there could be in international backlash, tho this don't matter much to them. Muh holocaust.
Plus the West Bank is still there. Problem is the Jews want all the banks, hehehe.
Unless they literally kill all the Palestinians, the only way forward is such a level of cooperation, with such level of Palestinian benefits that no "radical" organization can get a real support among the Palestinian population.
I don't think that's happening either. So at some point things will be at square one.

 >>/52453/
They would manage Gaza like they do the west bank. The Israelis have the west bank under control even though it's a larger area. Yes there is some resistance their but nothing on the scale of Hamas.

 >>/52454/
West Bank has PNA/Fatah.
Hamas is good for Israel at least for certain interest groups there and the US, because they can generate conflict out of them when necessary, and they can use it as an excuse not to create independent Palestine.
Now the name Hamas will be too inconvenient so they'll drop it and setup some different organization which Iran can support on.

s-70-su-57-k-1160x773 jpg
(94.26 KB, 1160x773)

Russian fighter shot down own S-70 drone over Ukraine. This type of drone is still in development and used as a pilotless weapon platform, an expansion of firepower per pilot basis. One pilot in a Su-57 can control a few of these.
Now the AFU (therefore the USA) has the wreckage, free to study this new system. What Bernd thinks, how much this matters? The West has experience with these types of airframes, and trick is in the control tech, the programs that enables these drones.
https://www.twz.com/air/why-did-russia-just-shoot-down-its-own-fighter-sized-s-70-hunter-drone-over-ukraine

 >>/52458/
It's interesting. I have long wondered why the SU-57 hasn't seen any use in this war, my theory for this was that it's stealth capabilities were not good enough and so it would be shot down if it was but the fact that this happened over Ukrainian held territory would imply that the SU-57 is actually undetectable by the Ukrainians. But why would they fly the Su-57 alongside a test vehicle over Ukrainian territory? It's such an odd thing to do.

I don't think the west will learn anything from the drone, we already have such drone programmes. But maybe this will help the west develop means to detect the S-70.

 >>/52459/
> the fact that this happened over Ukrainian held territory would imply that the SU-57 is actually undetectable by the Ukrainians.
Either tech is lacking, or the air defense has more holes than Swiss cheese.
> why would they fly the Su-57 alongside a test vehicle over Ukrainian territory?
In theory a "drone strike force" consists of one Su-57 and 2-3 S-70. The pilot in the Su-57 controls the drones. They add more firepower to one pilot, more rockets and bombs, but also they help the Su-57 remain stealthy: stealth aircrafts typically hold their armament inside the fuselage to lower radar cross section. But if they want to fire them they have to open up - which breaks their silhouette and they open up to radars too. If the weaponry is another airplane, they they don't have to reveal themselves, and/or can do it when it's absolutely necessary. The S-70 is more sacrificable than the Su-57 with pilot.
The real question is why the Su-57 shot the S-70 down??? Surely not by mistake, especially if they flew together as a wing.

> But maybe this will help the west develop means to detect the S-70.
You might be right.

 >>/52460/
> or the air defense has more holes than Swiss cheese.
The Ukrainians are fairly mobile with their AA plaforms so the Russian's would find it hard to guarantee that there were no patriot batteries in the area, I don't think the Russians would risk it.

> They add more firepower to one pilot, more rockets and bombs, but also they help the Su-57 remain stealthy
I get the reason for the drone but not why the Russians would have used it where they were. What were they doing that was so important that it was worth sending a valuable experimental assets like that for?

> The real question is why the Su-57 shot the S-70 down??? Surely not by mistake, especially if they flew together as a wing.
My theory would be that the drone either lost connection to the SU-57 or it lost the ability to fly properly. So it was uncontrollable and the SU-57 had to destroy it. That might also explain why it was there in the first place, maybe the drone been uncontrollable for a while and had away from safe Russian airspace into Ukrainian airspace.

 >>/52461/
> What were they doing that was so important that it was worth sending a valuable experimental assets like that for?
Maybe they aren't really experimental by now but combat ready and do missions for a while now.
> lost connection to the SU-57 or it lost the ability to fly properly. So it was uncontrollable and the SU-57 had to destroy it. 
Now this really activates the almonds. Anti-drone EW capabilities can do more than disrupt frequencies, communications with various means: it is possible to take control over drones. Granted it is probably easier to do it with a DJI Mavic, than the S-70, but who knows. NATO is watching, they gather intelligence, draw conclusion, develop their own stuff, and they test weapon systems in Ukraine, partially by Ukrainians, partially by foreign "volunteers", they could test stuff covertly and directly themselves, as long as public does not know about. Russia has to turn a blind eye for different things anyway (like directing strikes on the Black Sea fleet from aboard of NATO AWACS and whatnot).
tl;dr NATO might have an EW system that can take the control over S-70s. They caught one and the Russian pilot had to destroy it.

 >>/52462/
I had not really thought about EW but yes, that could be it. EW is one of those things that's obviously quite common and very important but at the same time highly classified and hard to actually see or know what is even going on or what it even is so I don't think about it as much as I probably should.

Harris-Ukraine mp4
(3.77 MB, 1280x720 h264)

Now we know that success for Ukraine would be if Ukraine could have a place at the negotiating table.
And now we know that Ukraine's NATO membership is a pipe dream and they hover it as a carrot.

 >>/52475/

Even if they won't get in NATO de jure, they will still enter into mutual defense agreements with the most important NATO countries (if not all of them plus some non-NATO ones). This process has already started.

 >>/52476/
> mutual defense agreements
This could be a broad term, and could include stuff liek:
> thereby we vow that if Ukraine is attacked by Russia again, we'll sanction Russia (again) and send our concern to Ukraine (again)
But in a strict sense which would cause these most important NATO countries to go to war against Russia: no. They won't risk it.
The chief problem is however - as far as we can tell - that noone knows how Ukraine will look like after the war, or even in half a year distance that could be after the war btw, I linked an article here  >>/52417/ that notes Ukraine could lose during this winter.

Here's two unpopular opinions.

1. Strong Ukraine is bad for the EU
The EU was created by France and Germany (with the participation of the Netherlands and Italy) and serves first and foremost their interests, their economical progress. When the Eastern EU countries entered into this institution they had to fulfill some requirements. Beyond the commonly cited ones (like law and order and democratic expectations) they also had to downgrade their economies, cut back on production, because Western companies and farmers and such don't want competition. They want new markets and workforce working for them.
They also want to preserve their weight in the decision making. They bitch about new power blocks even so weak as the V4. Eastern EU countries can gang together and cause all kinds of troubles, like earlier this year when the farmers of these countries came together to stop Ukrainian grain (which Western governments wanted so much). They cry about Poland/Northern Hungary/Hungary vetoing random crap.
Would they really want a respectable sized country with relatively large population and potentially strong economy enter to their club and fuck the power of balance up even more? Not to mention the hundreds of thousands of Nazis who would be pissed by Brussels' immigration policies too.

2. Strong Russia is good for the US
In a multipolar world the leading powers are all enemies of each other, and they only create temporary alignments (not alliances, but align together to oppose others), depending on the balance of power.
As of now three leading powers exist: USA, China, Russia. Power ranking follows this order too. Right now China and Russia are working together to balance out the US. But China and Russia are also rivals of each other. In the future it can happen that the US will need someone to balance out China. And this will be Russia.
Frankly from now on all the great powers need the others.
Ofc there is another possibility to kick one leading power down and downgrade it to a local power achieving a bipolar world, but for now this doesn't seem working, and Russia is getting stronger China alone still can't balance out US, so they won't let this happen either.

 >>/52478/
1- That's true, also the EU is ageing and they are going to face economic challenges in the future. I don't think they have the resources to fix Ukraine, lift it to EU standards and then give them the same support that they give every other EU nation. And yes, as you say they are not going to want another Hungary or Poland in the EU.
Having said that, the EU is still going to want to make use of their labour and they are still going to want to keep them aligned with the west, so I think they will make some kind of other arrangement. Like giving them some kind of partial EU member status.

2- Sort of, that's partly how they dealt with the USSR, they swayed the weaker power(China) to support them against the the stronger power(the USSR). But the problem is that the Russians are a direct threat to Europe in a way that China was not, so by working with Russia they put themselves at odds with Europe and they also are trying to leave Europe to focus on China but if Russia gets too strong they will have to come back to Europe anyway. Although China is in a complicated situation, Russia's war in Ukraine really does not help her and nor does the escalating situation in the middle east, on top of that, US and EU trade wars against China are going to force China to rethink how it engages with the world and who it engages with. They might come out of that either doubling down on Russia as a source of energy imports and an ally against the west or turning against Russia as a rival to Chinese ambitions in Africa,Iran and North Korea and as a threat to global trade and energy security, if Russia supports Iran in attacking Saudi oil facilities and cutting off Saudi oil, China will not be happy. But that also relates to the Saudis who are also at a crossroads and are also going to have to rethink their place in the world as the US increasingly loses interest in them and the region.

 >>/52479/
> EU is still going to want to make use of their labour
And a weak Ukraine is enough for that.

> Russians are a direct threat to Europe
Which is perfect if the US wants the European countries beneath of the protective umbrella of NATO. Can't scare Europe with a weak Russia, they would even think cooperating with her could be a good idea. Can't allow that.
> China is in a complicated situation, Russia's war in Ukraine really does not help her
It does. She sells great many non-lethal non-weapons (which still can be used in the war) to both sides. And while Russia created local facilities to produce the much needed stuff she can't buy from Europe anymore, they also turned to China to buy 'em. Machines, tech, cars. Russia became quickly a great market for Chinese cars.
> Saudi and Iran
While this is a tangent, but why not. Iran is now a member of BRICS and perhaps Iran will be too. Trade could help to build a mutual understanding. Well it did little for India and China... but perhaps.

 >>/52480/
> Which is perfect if the US wants the European countries beneath of the protective umbrella of NATO. Can't scare Europe with a weak Russia, they would even think cooperating with her could be a good idea. Can't allow that.
Europe would be less willing to work with the US if the US is also working with their enemy. Europe is also at a crossroads right now(I keep saying that but it's just the way the world is right now). The US is looking increasingly isolationist and hostile towards the outside world, even towards Europe, and there may be a US trade war with Europe. On top of that the Europeans themselves are looking like they might have a trade war with China and the Europeans have already ruined relations with Russia over the Ukraine war. So they have to rethink where they get energy and raw materials from and who they sell their finished products too.

> It does. She sells great many non-lethal non-weapons (which still can be used in the war) to both sides. And while Russia created local facilities to produce the much needed stuff she can't buy from Europe anymore, they also turned to China to buy 'em. Machines, tech, cars. Russia became quickly a great market for Chinese cars.
Chinese exports to Ukraine have tanked due to this war, they were 9.29 Billion in 2021 but only 3.3 Billion in 2022 and 2.78 Billion in 2023.

https://tradingeconomics.com/china/exports/ukraine

But Chinese exports to Russia have grown from 67.2 Billion in 2021 to 111 Billion in 2023.

https://tradingeconomics.com/china/exports/russia

But Russia isn't a big enough market to be able to replace Europe or the US in the event of a trade war or sanctions, so China really doesn't want to be forced to pick a side in this war.

> While this is a tangent, but why not. Iran is now a member of BRICS and perhaps Iran will be too. Trade could help to build a mutual understanding. Well it did little for India and China... but perhaps.
Maybe, Iran produces a lot of agricultural products and Saudi Arabia is a desert so they probably could do with that, it would benefit the Saudis to be on good relations with Russia to access her grain exports as well. But they have to get over their differences first.

 >>/52481/
>  But they have to get over their differences first.
I mean the Saudis have to get over their differences with Iran not Russia.

unnamed jpg
(10.12 KB, 200x240)

 >>/52478/

> As of now three leading powers exist: USA, China, Russia

Aren't you forgetting someone? Europe united into a (con)federation would have more military power than Russia and China and would rival economies of USA and China. I mean, they are not a "leading power" right now, but out of the three you mentioned only USA can be truly described like that.

So, a united and independent Europe has the potential to be more of a rival, a threat to USA dominance than Russia or China. Only if the latter two would combine their potentials in a firm political and military alliance akin to NATO, only then would they be able to rival USA or Europe (think like - "if USA attacks China Russia will launch all their nuked towards USA, or if Europe would attack Russia, China would send all their ground and air forces to the European front to fight alongside Russia"), which is of course highly improbable.

Therefore it is in American interests to keep Europe from further integrating into a single country (ergo "Brexit"), and to keep China and Russia from entering a true alliance. USA will try to keep Europe dependent both on American resources (instead of, say, Norwegian gas and oil) and on American military might via NATO. To this end they'll maintain Russia as a threat to Europe and the raison d'etre for NATO - a source of threatening newspaper headlines, but not much of a real threat. They will also try to deepen the rift between the "old EU" and "new EU" (ergo Visegrad 4), perhaps helping Poland to become a rival of Germany and the power center of [s]Eastern[/s] sorry, Central Europe. Meanwhile in Asia (and Africa) all their might will be poised against China. May be we will finally see something of an asian NATO - NEATO, if you will.

 >>/52481/
Europe has very little say and is manipulated into what US wants.
> The US is looking increasingly isolationist and hostile towards the outside world, even towards Europe
Yeah, US seems to drain Europe's wealth, to keep the motor running at home, lessen the impact of recession, and restart the economy.
> Europeans themselves are looking like they might have a trade war with China and the Europeans have already ruined relations with Russia over the Ukraine war. So they have to rethink where they get energy and raw materials from and who they sell their finished products too.
Seems so.
> Chinese exports to Ukraine have tanked due to this war, they were 9.29 Billion in 2021 but only 3.3 Billion
But they sell stuff to US and EU whom then sends that to Ukraine.
> Russia isn't a big enough market to be able to replace Europe or the US
Europe will continue buy Chinese stuff, they can't compete with production (Europe pays like three times more for energy than the rest of the world) no matter how much tariffs they put on certain goods (and they won't put on everything).
> they have to get over their differences first.
We can only wait and see.

> Aren't you forgetting someone? Europe
Hello, Slovborg!
Europe is an international organization. It is not a sate. Furthermore it lacks resources, it is not independent, first and foremost in energy, but in everything else. Europe is the consumer of the world's products. China also has energy problems, but can't sell shit to China, they sell to everyone they buy very little, only luxury goods basically
> not a "leading power" right now, but out of the three you mentioned only USA can be truly described like that.
Multipolar world doesn't mean "multiple powers of equal strength". The toplist doesn't go extinct.
After the fall of the SU, and the demise of the bipolar world, the US become hegemon. Now it is not anymore. This doesn't mean China and/or Russia caught up, it just means that now they are strong enough to form their own poles within the global order. Not just US can meddle around the globe, but them too.
But yeah, "global power" is perhaps the more accurate term.
> united and independent Europe 
There is no united and independent Europe.
> has the potential to be more of a rival, a threat to USA
And this is why the US prevents Europe to become a global power. And it will make sure European countries needs her. As of now almost all of Europe is a client state of the US, btw, yes Hungary too and is used to prevent the unification of Europe.
> Therefore it is in American interests to keep Europe from further integrating into a single country
Indeed. Europe is a non-factor. I'm not forgetting someone, because Europe is nowhere.
> rest of the paragraph
I mostly agree.

indonesian-peacekeepe... jpg
(118.44 KB, 1000x650)

indonesian-peacekeepe... jpg
(172.31 KB, 1024x680)

Spotlight is directed by the media to this now, Hungarian too. IDF tries to push UN peacekeepers out of the way in southern Lebanon, from the "Blue Line".
Israeli tank wounded two Indonesian peacekeepers by firing at their observation point. This story is told in mainstream media:
> On Thursday, two Indonesian peacekeepers were injured falling from an observation tower after Israeli tanks fired towards it.
> t. https://www.bbc.com/news/live/c80r2y47rz4t
So we could also say Ukrainian soldiers died after a building collapsed onto them after a Russian Su-24 dropped a FAB towards it.
https://inv.nadeko.net/watch?v=LB0HUGSKou0
https://youtube.com/watch?v=LB0HUGSKou0
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/10/13/unifil-says-israeli-military-forced-entry-at-base-in-southern-lebanon

haaretz-nazi-timehal... png
(96.69 KB, 703x742)

Zelensky's "Victory Plan"
https://www.politico.eu/article/volodymyr-zelenskyy-presents-his-victory-plan-to-ukraine-parliament-war-vladimir-putin/
1. Invitation to NATO - not membership just invitation.
2. Moar weapons without restrictions of use.
3. Non-nuclear strategic deterrence (the fuck is this)
> exact weapons were not revealed by Zelenskyy 
4. Ukraine offers her strategic resources (such as lithium, gas, titanium, energy, I assume grain as well)
5. Ukraine's place in Europe after the war.

I have comments for #1 and #3.
#1 Way, way before I noted this could have been avoided if they took Ukraine into NATO. Ukraine had two "westward turn", in 2004 and 2014. Nothing happened. The 2014 one brought the civil war, which was still an internal conflict for Ukraine, and that issue with Crimea - which could have been ended by saying goodby to the peninsula. NATO membership needs no external conflict. And apparently NATO can act very quick if it wants. Wants such countries as Sweden and Finland. But not Ukraine.
#3 As an ex Soviet country, Ukraine inherited large number of nuclear weapons. That was nuclear deterrence. That could have helped them. But Westerners made them to give up in return for security guarantees. Paper defence. Moral of the story: never give up your weapons.

Fun:
Daniel Ortega, el Prezidente of Nicaragua said Zelensky and Netanyahu are the sons of the devil and are literally Hitler.
https://www.laprensani.com/2024/10/14/politica/3390632-ortega-califica-a-netanyahu-de-hijo-del-demonio
From Politico we learn that Netanyahu is actually Jewish. Who would have thought. About Zelensky we know this already.
Weird tho. Being Jewish doesn't prevent Jews calling each other Hitler and Nazi.
https://www.politico.eu/article/benjamin-netanyahu-volodymyr-zelenskyy-sons-adolf-hitler-devil-nicaragua-president-says-daniel-ortega-vladimir-putin-ukraine-russia-israel/
> Calling Your Political Rival a Nazi Is a Time-hallowed Tradition in Israel
> This specific term is a something left and right in Israel have always used against each other.
https://www.haaretz.com/2014-01-19/ty-article/.premium/calling-rivals-nazis-an-israeli-tradition/0000017f-e7b4-d62c-a1ff-ffff8ecf0000
Paywalled ofc, but still.

Orbán-in-Brussels-EP... png
(760.27 KB, 1280x748)

Hungary took over the presidency of the EU in July, will held it till January. Finally the bureaucrats in Brussels allowed Orbán to present his programme of the presidency on October 9, at the European Parliament Plenary.
I got the whole thing, speeches and "debate" from youtube, 3 and a half fucking hours. It complicates things that everyone talks in their own national language, so it has a shitty voice translation over it. I did not dare to listen yet.
Frau von der Leyen directed some lukewarm quips against Orbán and some others two, Orbán did a 15 mins reply there, I listen that one. They all touched several topics, one of them is Ukraine, and this is why I post about it here.
Orbán said in his reply (it's more or less a translation, not word to word tho, but close enough for our purpose, my notes in italics):
Now even in the Anglo-Saxon media (mainstream media) they report that Ukraine now loses the war, and this is accepted by all now. "We" - I got he meant as Ukraine, US, but first and foremost the EU with Hungary - "are losing the war". He said European MEPs still hasn't acknowledged it, but it would be the time to do. If we want to win, first we have to acknowledge the fact that we are losing. Because "we are losing on the Ukrainian front". And those in the EU Parliament pretends that this is not true. The truth is that - partially can be thanked for von der Leyen - the EU went into this war recklessly, with misguided and miscalculated strategy. If we want to win, this losing strategy has to be changed. The strategy was badly planned and badly executed. If we follow this, we'll lose. If we want the Ukrainians not to lose, we have to change the strategy. Every war needs diplomatical steps, communication, direct and indirect contacts, or we'll just go deeper into the war. Hundreds of thousands are dying in this war, thousands of each day. So this war won't have a solution with this strategy. So better to stand for peace. Argue for a ceasefire, and create a different strategy or we will all lose.
That's about it. Not many specifics. I think he just made notes and put together this reply while the others were talking.
The very end is interesting. In this form it means to freeze the conflict as it stands now, halt the fights, and... prepare a new fight???
Because it doesn't sound cutting the losses and make peace, just postpone the fight for a better time.
I think Russia would really want this to avoid. It is not good for Russia to have an unsolved situation, and they surely don't want NATO to equip and prepare Ukraine better. They surely don't want to wait until the Western arms production is in full swing.

https://www.politico.eu/article/ursula-von-der-leyen-attacks-viktor-orban-support-russia-speech-eu-european-parliament-hungary-ukraine-war/

 >>/52503/
I think it will end in a ceasefire. The concern the west has with this war is that if Russia were to invade another country and then annex territory from that country it would throw out the rule book and international law would be meaningless, it would mean any nation would be free to take land from any other nation. While yes, other countries have taken land from one another post WW2 it has never been recognised or legitimate. If Ukraine acknowledged the surrender of land in a treaty that would legitimise it. 
So I think the west would prefer an end to the war that saw Ukraine de-facto hand over land but to not officially acknowledge it as lost. Though there will probably be stipulations on that ceasefire, like a promise that Ukraine does not join NATO and a limit to the amount of arms that the west can send them. But the conditions of that ceasefire will of course depend on how the war ends and how badly the Ukrainians lose.