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 >>/51607/
EU doesn't really need battle ready army. She needs to keep her nukes (well, France's nukes), but beyond that just some army. With a deal which builds interdependence with Russia (or better yet, having Russia in EU, and Russia comes with more nukes, and more military), there is noone who would attack the EU.
Beyond these borders the countries are either too weak and disorganized, or involved in heavy trade with the EU.
This is the thing:
Realism says war is inevitable, so have to raise security.
Liberalism says trade (economical ties), international organizations, and democracies prevent war. So raising security (creating a battle ready army), isn't that important.
If they could follow liberalism consistently (building trade, and involve her with the EU international organization) they could tame Russia, and turn her into a democracy.

Norway and Switzerland have way more ties to the EU (for example they are within Schengen), which means more pressure to conform.
 >>/51604/
There are always differences in opinion but the US is still one nation not many seperate ones and the rural internal areas are also much less populated and industrialised than the coastal states(as opposed to Germany who is the largest state in the EU).
 >>/51609/
If national parliaments and states got abolished, EU would be one nation, not separate ones. Regions would also get more role which often overstretch original state boundaries.
And then how much "power projection" EU would need? The aforementioned soft power (in the form of being a rich market, and also a supplier of goods too, not to mention cultural influence) worth more than foreign military bases.
 >>/51610/
The EU won't ever be one nation as such even if that happened, it's too diverse and has too much of a history and too many unique factors within each region so I don't think they would ever think of themselves as one nation.

While the EU as a whole does not need to project much power, there are 2.7 Million French people who live in overseas territories of France and not in Metropolitan France and in addition France has many interests in Africa. So France individually needs to project power and so the French portion of a federalized EU would always push for a more external foreign policy.
 >>/51611/
I disagree.
The homogenization of the population will happen in our lifetime. There are many internal migrants, mainly those who moved from Eastern EU countries to get a job in the West, and the migration from external sources will only strengthen. Chiefly this will happen in the West more but still.
As for France if EU becomes a state there won't be any France anymore. There won't be any French citizens, only EU citizens. EU would have to care about those.
In your scenario those factors won't support the EU becoming a state and dissolution of France in the first place. And these people and companies and institutions and whatever IRL do exist.
They can be also part of the group who has no interest in unified EU, because they look beyond, are globalist, and want no border anywhere.
So in a sense I do agree with the first part that the EU won't ever be one nation.
In fact I should note that I believe that such unification, that eradicates national borders and abolishes national legislation and governments in the following decades won't happen. The phenomenon, that time to times voices in Brussels demands to change decision making of the EU Council form unanimous to simple majority, I dunno where it will lead.
 >>/51612/
I don't think it will. While there is a lot of movement between EU states I don't think it's enough, it's also not really new, they often keep their ethnic identities and there are parallels with internal divisions in states like Spain. Sure that's one nation and there is a lot of internal migration there but the Catalonians as a whole still don't see themselves as Spanish and they still want to be independent. I think that if there were a federal EU you would end up with a whole bunch of Catalonians only much larger.

French Guyana and New Caledonia are not a EU colonies, no other EU nation has a connection to them but France. I think that given Germany's apologist nature, they would see French colonial holdings much differently and not only would they not want to invest in the means to retain them but they would probably push for them to be released as independent states.
And the French are some of the least likely to homogenise with the rest of the EU as well.

Yes, that's true.
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Back to actual warfare from poolitics:
Are we going to see self-flying AI/ML operated drones in this war?
Drone warfare evolves in the Russo-Ukrainian war constantly, as each side adapts to the new equipment and tactics, they also come up with new equipment and tactics. 
Meanwhile Machine Learning evolves constantly. And unlike in civilian application, like in self-driving cars, here the point will be to cause collisions...
Beside the limitations of technology, the major factor is cost effectiveness. Running hundreds of drones need lots of computational power. But how much?

Oh and when we arrive to these drones, when will Skynet take over the world?
Searched a bit around.
https://defencesecurityasia.com/en/lancet-russia-targetting/
What a shitty article. But. Apparently the latest models of the Lancet has some "AI capabilities". Basically as it can detect, recognize, and engage targets on it's own. Reminds me of "fire-and-forget" rockets, this is a launch-and-forget drone basically. Can watch the recorded video after the drone's display blinks offline.
Lancets seems to gain more and more range. Which means they can force AFU to abandon the shorter ranged heavy equipment. Well if Russia can produce and launch the Lancets in growing number.
I wonder if they could paradrop some team inside Ukraine and supply them with Lancets, perhaps with the goal of taking out HIMARS-es. I dunno.
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"Major" change just north of Avdiivka, Russians pushed south on both end of that lake, Ukrainians gave up the land inbetween, withdrew.
I think next Russians try to reach that road on the other side of town, one of the "lifelines" for the defenders of the town proper. I think Ukrainians will gradually give up land, especially when Russians finally reach that road. In the end I expect the front to be stabilized somewhere at the blue line.
I don't expect the coke plant fall, I think very tough resistance is organized there.
I wouldn't even guess how long this will take.

Some speculations after this... Russians still have to occupy the rest of Donetsk oblast. Important towns are Kramatorsk and Sloviansk, chief nests for the separatists movements when hell broke out back in 2014-15. And there is the rest of Zaporozhia and Kherson.
Still I think next big battle (like Bakhmut and Avdiivka) will be either at Siversk or Chasiv Yar. Perhaps Siversk. Russians might try advance along that road from Bakhmut towards Sloviansk more, then close on Siversk.
 >>/51608/
You don't launch a nuke in proxy conflicts, Russia didn't do that for example. Nukes are used only if it's war of survival since others also have it, we're not talking about that.

 >>/51612/
Homogenization doesn't happen in a way you think Europeans are very exclusivist, especially Western Europeans which goes under the rader because of championing memorized politically correct sayings and behaviour, that hardly anybody genuiely believes behind closed doors, almost like communist country where nobody believes in the official bullshit, this is closest you get in a free country. The only reason Eastern Europeans accepted to a degree is because perception of danger by other migrants and desperation. Sheer influence of US also changes the dynamics between immigrants and natives. Even the educated guys I know from here, Bulgaria and ex-YU countries can't assimilate as Germans want you to deny your own background(literally Turkey under military dictatorship in 80's) and only to bring it up whenever you rub them in the wrong way, I mean we did that shit out of security paranoia and dictatorship, Germans do it, just because of delusional worldview and hypocrisy and I don't imagine it's different elsewhere, in places it matters I mean. 

Imagine not being able to assimilate even the ones they want to, which brings the question of weak identity of "EU values" which is not a set value but something used like a weapon and wore like an armor, similar to USA bringing "democracy" to others. There is a real democracy and real EU values, it doesn't change the fact how it's used though.

The power of identities are critically important  which is why Israel despite overpowering Palestinians, can't seem to end the war without forcibly sending Palestinians to another country which constitutes as genocide, not to mention it would create another refugee wave, but they skip that fact. 

Another example would be despite Russian corruption and overall lack of morals among elites and nihilism in young population, many far-right people saw Putin's Russia as embodiement of masculinity, traditional values but turns out it's not and never has been. The desperation was so bad they had to cling to a corrupt regime that wants to subvert their country. The truth was always there, I think we both saw it, but we must ask why the others couldn't? It's not because we're super smart it's because the EU doesn't inspire and give identity as much as you guys assume. Trolling Russians for being collectivistic  mongols and Americans for being fat, not having walkable cities etc. only creates a very niche value that only some internet nerds give a damn about.  The potential is there but no reason to use it, if one is content with bliss of the ignorance.
 >>/51617/
We're talking about nukes because nukes guarantee that no war will broke out between nuclear powers. There won't be war between NATO and Russia due to MAD if Ukraine still had her nukes she inherited from the Soviet Union - instead of the paper guarantee from NATO - we wouldn't have this excellent war. So basically this way we can rule out participants in military conflicts, and look around for possible enemies. And whatever EU would need to face in the hypothetical scenario above, for that she wouldn't need that big of an army.
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 >>/51616/
There is still the possibility that the Ukrainians may send their intact armoured formations(such the as of yet unused Abrhams formations) to counter attack in the area.

There is talk of a 2025 Ukrainian offensive which would imply that the Ukrainians would not send them in, so this will be something to watch over the year.
 >>/51620/
Ukrainian telly showed one Abrams at Avdiivka (seen on WillyOAM). Perhaps they have that battalion in the area, I assume partially for testing purposes see how it fares. Frozen ground is good for it. But we might just see them in action (with couple of losses, but that's war), in counterattacks.
 >>/51617/
> Homogenization doesn't happen in a way you think
Actually, homogenization doesn't happen in a way you think. Homogenization is like the United States.
Mainstream media erodes national identity further, and the norm will be over 9000 languages coexisting in the same street. Sure there will be ethnographic reservations, so tourists can get the local color.
Even today doesn't matter where you go, you'll find mcdolans, lidl and kebab everywhere, while people wearing the same chink made clothing (Western brand names sewed on in Turkey, Polan, and Italy).
Sure people are bigots everywhere this doesn't mean they won't go with the flow, and won't surrender to conveniences. And there won't be any race riots on behalf of the "aboriginal" Europeans.
I bet some bastardized language will emerge so basic thought exchange can take place - but actually even that won't be needed, you just pull out the phone and it'll translate anything, you don't even have to ask how much for a döner, just beep you phone and payed.
Not to mention the newer generations growing up. How many from generation X Germans knows what's to be a German? How many zoomers know? How can they teach their kids about that? In our lifetime is about 40-50 years. Zoomers will be grandparents by then. Today here in Europe noone has real ethnic character anymore.
They will be social media citizens.
But this really isn't Syria war topic.
 >>/51623/
That's what I'm saying though. It's simply globalization lead by US, not some EU unique stuff which creates a weak identity under US hegemony. USA despite race obsessed weirdos including wokes, made progress on the issue, western Europe on the other hand not really. And I've seen too many examples of people focusing on far future only to get ripped of their close future.
Should be noted at this point, creating a sort of timestamp, a log of how things stand.
Relatively large advances on behalf of the RAF (AFRF, not the Royal Air Force), on multiple places along the eastern front line (from the corner in the south to the Russian border in the north) during this winter, and especially in the last days. Notable places (from south to north):
- Novomikhailivka
- Marinka
- Avdiivka
- Bakhmut
(- Siversk had some movement back and forth, Vesele is now on Russian hands)
- Kreminna (Terny direction)
- Kupiansk (near Tabaivka and Lyman Pershi)
There were no important settlements taken yet, but the momentum seems strong as for now.
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The circus is going around this for at least a month now, today became official, in the commander-in-chief position Zaluzhny was swapped by Syrsky, who was the commander of the Ukrainian Ground Forces - which is one of the branches of the AFU. Basically he made one step upwards (unless we consider the General Staff a step between the two).
What will be Zhaluzhny's next job? It seems Zelensky "proposed" another job, but looks like in the "state team" so perhaps in civilian(-ish) role?
I don't think we'll experience noticable change - for we won't know how events were unfolded if Zhaluzhny remained in his position.
The war goes on.
 >>/51640/
Perhaps Zaluzhny will run for the Presidency. I dunno if it's really political infighting, or they try to make a case for a candidate who is seemingly in opposition with Zelensky, and who can be run as someone who isn't part of his system. Since some of the possible opposition parties are banned, and they have to appear democratic for the EU support, but they (and their US "puppet masters") don't want to change the direction.
Previously Z n Z looked looked like a united front, until commander-in-chief started to recognize great losses and setbacks. Still I would think in goals they still agree on.
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Goddamit Vladdy, I thought we're partitioning Ukraine any day now!

So I watched/listened the Putin interview by Tucker Carlson. It was long and boring, and basically he reiterated the same things he usually talks about.
Here's Michael Rossi's channel (of Rutgers), he translates speeches and interviews and appearences and whatnot from Putin (and Lavrov):
https://yewtu.be/channel/UCo-P9gyWGjOkdquRBt0zowQ
I think in the Results of the Year videos Putin covers some of the points. At least the little I watched from those I noticed some overlaps.
Anyway it was very comprehensive, they were talking (well mostly Putin) about all kinds of stuff.

The only question I still haven't heard an answer to is:
> Why did he invade Ukraine?
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So why Russia invaded Ukraine?

But I tell you, Bernd, it's actually very simple. It's REALPOLITIK!
According to realism, the international scene is anarchic (ie. there is no regulation, or a higher power that forces an order on it), and states have to make decisions in the fog of war, in a state of incomplete knowledge. And the fact that they can't know exactly what other states are doing, and why they are doing it, this makes them paranoid.
States are obsessing over two things: security and power. They raise security so they can raise their power, and they raise power to raise their security.
Security is both military and influencing others. Power is the ability to make decisions as we know it from the Theory of Power..., and states try to make sure they make their own decisions, but also they try to make decisions for others. The latter is done via soft power (influences, cultural, economical), various diplomatic tools (partially soft power, but partially hard), and with military might. Again they do this to increase their own security and power.
Realists also believe war is inevitable, and if it comes to that, have to act fast and decisively.
So there are three states:
A b C
'A' and 'C' are major powers, 'b' is a minor. When 'A' and 'C' look at 'b' they'll see how weak she is, and how easily could be taken. Since this is the thing that came to their mind, they suppose the other think the same thing. Then 'A' and 'C' will think it would be quite uncomfortable if the other would extend the influence over 'b', so both start to do just that. First they'll use diplomatic tools, they'll try economic and cultural ways, but the race becomes harder as they try to buy the leadership of 'b', perhaps doing even a coup or two, and at one point one of the side we'll recognize she run out of steam and losing the diplomatic battle, and have no tools left but the last argument of kings. So that side will start a war, trying to occupy, annex 'b' - so she can both preserve her own security by denying the other to acquire 'b', and raise her own power by incorporating 'b'.
'A' is the USA with NATO.
'b' is Ukraine
'C' is Russia.

There are many other considerations. Like from the Ukraine the flight time of ICBMs to Moscow is way shorter than those launched from the US, UK, France, or the seas. Or that Ukraine can offer great amount of foodstuff, or big ports, or any other economic assets. Or that there is in fact a sizeable Russian minority there. Or that historically Ukraine is an "artificial construct". Or anything really.
But all just circumstances that make this particular situation unique. And all just rationalizations. In it's core it's this abstract process above.
 >>/51644/
I dunno, perhaps for those who aren't really look into stuff (like the Nord Stream 2 bombing) - because can't make the effort, don't have time, or don't know how or where to start - it feels new. And compared to any Biden appearances (with him losing the train of thought or mixing up words) it's really laid back. Putin articulates his points well, but it's not something he has to think a lot about, these his usual lines. For great many in the US (or in the West in general where they really suppress anything that comes from the other side - just need to look through DW's headlines, or block sites like RT I can't reach it from the Hungary - last I tried and so on) it could come like a breeze of fresh air.
But not sure if all of them realizes that this is the viewpoint of Moscow, and just use it to fuel their enmity towards the current establishment.

 >>/51645/
Happy New Year!
There's a thread somewhere I post new year's wishes - probably a xmas thread - with a chinese new year card.  >>/51455/  >>/51456/
 >>/51600/
I don't either, but I think a lot of those in the political realm start to meme and think too much in one or the other. Russia forgot fundamentals a slightly softer hand and maintaining influence with her neighbors might have lost a lot less blood and treasure. EU/West forgot that moralfaging and sanctions aren't going to stop a country with as much resources and a somewhat functional defense industrial base as Russia. Though honestly I should've just started with that.

 >>/51643/
Largely agree, though:
> Or that Ukraine can offer great amount of foodstuff, or big ports, or any other economic assets

> But all just circumstances that make this particular situation unique. And all just rationalizations. In it's core it's this abstract process above.

I'd argue that abstraction is too much and in fact things like economic assets and a large Russian population (and a significant population of a very closely related ethic group) do matter more than rationalizations for pure power politics and are very much at the heart of paranoia and security in the calculus of Russia.   

 >>/51642/
The interview was... what I expected. I did think Tucker, in his reaction to it, was spot in pointing out that Putin talks like someone who savors everyword but it is a rambling mess.

 >>/51645/
Happy Lunar New Year!

and now, back into being a silent tor lurker once more. Just had a couple of things I wanted to say.
Btw, DW writes:
> former British military intelligence officer Frank Ledwidge warned that Syrskyi was "less popular with the troops" due to his being "less casualty-averse" than Zaluzhnyi.
And then they quote Syrsky:
> "We see that people are cannon fodder to them," he told Ukrainian broadcaster 1+1. "We have a whole different approach. To us, the people are the highest value.
And then Ledwidge again:
> I have no doubt at all that [Syrskyi] is recommending right now, as we speak, that the Ukrainians hold on as long as they can in Avdiivka, regardless of the cost, just as he did during the Bakhmut campaign
Ell-oh-ell
Do Ukrainian leaders want to kill as many Ukrainians as possible? God knows how much time they left to do it...

https://www.dw.com/en/ukraine-war-who-is-new-top-commander-oleksandr-syrskyi/a-68216345
 >>/51647/
True, Russia really needs to focus more on it's soft power(though it's too late now), so does China. China in particular has the potential to become the largest soft power in the world if it was not for their government and their rhetoric. Imagine if they had a similar government to Japan? They would be like Japan only with a population 10 times as large and a country much larger and that is resource rich. They would dominate in the entertainment sphere and having a western style government would get rid of much of the excuses that the west could use to justify seeing her as an adversary. 

 >>/51648/
I guess his response to the Avdiivka situation will show what kind of leader he is. It looks like the situation there is even worse than Bahkmut, though I don't know if there are as many people fighting there as in Bahkmut.
There was talk that Ukraine was going to pull out but if they stay it will display what kind of commander Syrskyi is.
 >>/51649/
I already see the communications about Avdiivka:
1. If he holds Avdiivka as long as possible:
- pro-Rus: he unnecessarily threw Ukrainians into the meat grinder
- pro-Uki: he heroically held the town grinding down Russian forces, and engaging them so they can't be used elsewhere on the front
2. If he withdraws in timely fashion:
- pro-Rus: he failed to hold the stronghold
- pro-Uki: it was strategically unimportant, also conserved many lives
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To expand on this post above  >>/51650/
This is so fucking stupid:
Bakhmut happened when Zaluzhny was commander-in-chief. Critics blaming Syrsky for not withdrawing from Bakhmut but throwing more bodies into the meatgrinder.
Now that Avdiivka is still holding critics blame it on swapping Zaluzhny with Sir Ski in the position of commander-in-chief.
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Douple encirclement. The guys in the south in that small pocket, and Avdiivka itself. If AFU isn't doing it already they really should get the guys out from both.
I think both regular and guerrilla warfare experts agree that the hardest test for an army is breaking out from an encirclement.
Heavy losses unavoidable.

I heard - perhaps on Military Summary yt channel - Russia started to use personal electronic warfare equipment to scramble drone communication. Just one dude can darken a 100-150 m radius. Supposedly this is one of the keys to the success at Avdiivka. Proofs: no drone footage from the area.
But I dunno one thing: how their own drones operate?
 >>/51660/
I think it's too late for a withdrawal now, not without accepting huge losses or not unless they can manage to launch a counter attack and open the route out back up.

Thinking about it, maybe this was never intentional but the Russian breakthrough in the north was underestimated and has now pushed too far for a Ukrainian withdrawal. I don't actually think anybody(in Ukraine) wants this as while yes it may tie up Russian forces for a while it will also end up like Mariupol rather than Bahkmut in that Russia is going to end up with large numbers of Ukrainian POWs.

In addition to that, it may not even tie Russian forces up as much as it did in Mariupol of Bahkmut anyway. Mariupol was quite urban and had Azovstal with it's labyrinths filled with supplies, Bahkmut was also more built up and had the Soledar mines. It seems that Avdiivka has some industrial facilities in the north but they are in the north and already separated form the rest of Avdiivka. It's not clear how much supply they have there either(I guess we will see).

As for EW. Maybe, but then also the fighting in Mariupol was mostly done by Chechens and in Bahkmut is was mainly Wagner. Both of which post far more material than the regular Russian army does which might be why not much drone footage(and other footage) is coming out.
And Ukraine probably would not post drone footage if it was showing things going badly for them, plus in Ukraine also there are certain units that are more liberal with footage than others.
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Navalny died in prison. Extremely suspicious in every sense. Another case
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/feb/16/russian-activist-and-putin-critic-alexei-navalny-dies-in-prison
I don't see how Moscow can profit from his death. It's just more ammo for Western accusations. I mean Bucha, Nord Stream 2, Kakhovka dam, Prigozhin, 2024 US election are all blamed on Putin & Co. ... Now this.
Meanwhile Avdiivka is falling.
HistoryLegends had interesting addition. That "second road" into Avdiivka on the DeepState map isn't a road at all, just the same dirt path inbetween fields as everywhere else. I think we (like everyone who follows) knew that is a dirt path, but it's weirdly accentuated, and seemingly everyone treated it as a serious (or at least half-serious) lifeline.
So basically now Avdiivka isn't connected to anything really.
On the other hand this particular youtuber might have made a deal about it to make things more dramatic. There are differences between dirt road and dirt road.
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So they withdrawing from Avdiivka after all. Well at least they'll try, sound like this is not the 23rd, neither the 24th hour, but the 25th...

Zelensky in München said this is a good and necessary decision to preserve the soldiers' life. He also said Ukraine is kept in an "artificial weapon shortage". He added, that the capture of Avdiivka doesn't mean that Russia captured something.
https://politic.karpat.in.ua/?p=103972&lang=hu

Here's an article reports the words of an Ukrainian soldier who was part of the unit that defended Zenit, that southern fortification/AA base which was given up yesterday. They are the part of the 110th Mechanized Brigade. The first attempt to break out from the encirclement and return to Avdiivka proper was on the 14th. Next day they were promised evacuation but help never came, then they decided to leave again, were ordered to leave wounded. The main body of the brigade was pulling out from Avdiivka by then.
https://ua-reporter.com/news/doroga-useyana-nashimi-truppami-ukrainskiy-voennyy-ob-othode-ot-avdeevki
 >>/51669/
Surprisingly quick.
> I was wrong here.  >>/51662/
You mean the too late for withdrawal? Perhaps you weren't and the AFU leadership just cut losses and left everyone in there who left. They call those who made it out "withdrawn" and that's it.
> it may not even tie Russian forces up as much as it did in Mariupol of Bahkmut anyway.
You were definitely right here.
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thumbnail of roads to the coke plant.png
roads to the coke... png
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 >>/51667/
> It seems that facility isn't that strongly fortified to hold, or perhaps there is no good route to supply anyone there.
It used to have the O0542 road and another one from Orlivka. They must've abandoned the coke plant because Russian pressure was unbearable, the local garrison had been hollowed out to reinforce other areas and/or general confusion had taken over their forces in the area.
 >>/51675/
I suspect that the northerly road is a dirt path (like the "second road" to Avdiivka) along a gully. Soggy to borderline boggy.

In the past couple of days I had the feeling the Ukrainian army is done. It's retreat from now own. More cracks will follow and they'll have to fall back, and then from elsewhere to avoid encirclement. And then there will be very little prepared lines at all. And then Ukraine will be "demilitarized".
The AFU run out of trained men (especially experienced), weapons, and ammunition. It is still a relatively capable army but not for the task this size anymore.
Then perhaps NATO involvement will happen, and some of the NATO countries will enter Ukraine to establish a security zone in the most Western areas. Perhaps they'll cite humanitarian reasons, for there will be another flood of refugees that the control of Kiev breaking down, and people can leave.
I can't say I can support this with hard facts. The freshly occupied patches of lands aren't significant enough. It just seems more rapid this year.
 >>/51676/
> In the past couple of days I had the feeling the Ukrainian army is done. It's retreat from now own. More cracks will follow and they'll have to fall back, and then from elsewhere to avoid encirclement. And then there will be very little prepared lines at all. And then Ukraine will be "demilitarized".
I think it's still far too early for that. Russia has been clearly winning for the past few months, and yet it can only manage slow, incremental territorial gains at a high cost. If it tried to mass troops for a "big arrow offensive", there would be no element of surprise and any deficiencies in officers, combined arms coordination and so on would become apparent. So slow advances like those taking place right now will continue, but maybe they'll happen in wider sectors of the front.

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