/kc/ - Krautchan

 >>/43504/
> You mean the Speer miracle?
And the whole propaganda effort surrounding it.

 >>/43502/
So foreseeing America's rise.
In general the problem with foreseeing stuff is that so many parallel opinions exist, some of them are bound to be true. Those who proved to be right were smart or just lucky?
And individual people too say many things, even broken clock displays time correctly twice a day.
On the other hand, there are information out there laying about and they need to be sorted out and put together, and they may see the flow of the processes, and they might come to the right conclusion. And ofc circumstances change all the time, and can change the direction of history.
And then for the different sides, countries, ideologies they always have mandatory stuff to say (that is ofc, their sides are right and will win).
Nothing is without a precedent, today's events are built on yesterday's there had to be signs of US's rise, how apparent they were I cannot judge, I don't know what info was available, and our judgement is forever tainted by the knowledge of the events that followed, so even with the best intention we would weigh the importance of the info according to this.
For Britain's downfall chief clue could have been how easily their asses were handed over to them. Back in the day in Iberia against the French Wellington fought back hard (I think it was Wellington, I might be wrong). If not for the US (and I don't want to minimize the role of the Commonwealth nations neither) from the Western and Southern fronts, nothing could have come out. By '42, Britain was out of Europe with no way back.
In WWI the showing up of the US in Europe was just a frosting on a cake, but it showed that they aren't just confined on their continent, and they have a place in the big boys' table. Then they essentially reached below the armpits of Europe and raised them up from the ground. Then the great depression was spiraled out from the US, it hit hard everyone. The significance what's happening there can't be missed.
Eh, too large topic, and my thoughts are all over the place.

 >>/43527/
I think it was always obvious that at some point they would become a super power, they are just that big. In Hitlers second book he mentions it a lot. It's part of the reason he thinks Germany has to expand, in order to compete with the US which has a larger size and population. It's also why he talks about allying with Britain and also why some say he didn't destroy their army at Dunkirk. In his view were Britain to fall the US, USSR or Japan would fill their role.

But maybe people did not think it would happen so soon.

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"The first half of the 20th century is characterized by the struggle of the morally, spiritually, and materially bankrupt humanity to settle this failure and create a sorely needed new world order."
He compares the two ways to this new world order:
"The one is the Materialist-Judaist, the direction to the failure itself; its goal: securing to place permanently the Jewish power and rule, the Worldjudaism. The attempts are made from two directions: from bottom to top in the Marxist way, and from top to bottom with Plutocracy. About this initiative we can establish that it is already in bankruptcy [...] because its practical basis are: in morality the kiss, in spirit the falsehood, in material the gold."
"The other main direction is spiritual-folkish, the life itself; its goal: the fair distribution of our globe's wealth among the folks, the folkish global welfare. [...] Its moral base is the family, the spiritual is the truth, and the material is welfare. [...] This spiritual-folkish main direction took four forms on our globe. The first initiative was made by the Fascism in 1919, the second on behalf of the Turanism* about the same time, the third by the Völkische Bewegung from 1923, the fourth by the Hungarism from 1930." - I believe he means Japan under Turanism.
"Both the Worldjudaist and the world welfare initiatives are racially built. But while the first one set exclusively its own race into the center of the global existance [...] showing the highest racial intolerance in its practical system, the second stands on the basis of eugenics [...] therefore [...] it wants to cleanse every folk's racial composition from the Jewish race's racial poison." - He does not mention more ethnicities specifically, just the Jew. On previous pages of the book, he talks about asemitism, instead of antisemitism, and it means living without Jews in his dictionary. Also he does not mention superior ethnicities or races, only racial health, purity, integrity of ethnicities in general. When elsewhere he writes about German excellence, these don't have racial tones, it's more like acknowledgement of their preparedness, or level of organization, etc.

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"The innermost reason of the wars of 1914-18 and 1939, and the struggle fought with political, economical, and social weapons between them, is the final and secure formation and stabilization of our globe's order." - Essentially sounds like the one war idea.
"The folks of our globe simply want to enjoy the fruits of their labor, their sweat and blood, inside of their property and domain, they will simply won't suffer it anymore from the so-called chosen to usurp everything, while they are kept in moral, spiritual, and material slavery, exploitation, and poverty." - All the "folks" mean people as ethnicities, not people as pleb.
"Our globe is the heritage, the right of the folks. This was usurped by the unworthy, the folks were all excluded. The clash between the usurpers of the rights and those who demanded their rights was unavoidable. And it happened."
"The English global empire is the soul and spine of the Plutocrat-Marxist-Judaist old world order based on class rule. The heart area is the English island itself. England from the 17th century turns away from Europe, and builds the basis of her existence outside Europe. And for her consequential estrangement of Europe and the aversion she feels towards Europe, she thinks a united Europe means a mortal danger to her. So she fights with all her might to thwart a united Europe." - Even today, England needs to keep the semblance of independence.
"She made a pact for life and death with the Jews living in Europe, and through them she kept Europe on the end of those political, economical, and social strings, which she called freedom, equality, and brotherhood, and what in reality were just Judaism masked with English hypocrisy and pseudo-gallantry." - Reminds me the moral highground they always try to take first, if we can believe imageboards and polanball comics.
And now about England's strategy with the periphery/rim of Europe:
"In these England fielded her own army, so the forced out decisions always happened under the guard of her armed supervision. With her armies she always fought in Europe on the coasts, defended by her ships, ready to quickly leave Europe's firm grounds in case of failure. This periphery was the first continental pillar of offense and defense for England, the English Wall built through centuries against Europe."
And for last one, about Germany:
"For England's Shylock-greed this war is the last chance, and the last tool as well [Germany] had to resort to. And the example and the moral that she can only reach he goal within the globe community, and not outside of it, aligned together in cooperation and not imperialistically is in the English global empire and her fate." - This reflects his belief that Germany won't just conquer all for keepers.

I can't find the other comic.

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After all these warmups, I will condense Szálasi's already terse writing around these four main topic:
1. summary of the events of the Western Theater;
2. contemplation of the Anglo-French plans;
3. evaluation of the armistice with France;
4. gloating about the second front, a timeline of the Anglo-Soviet labor to birth it.

He divides the Western campaigns into three, we know the events, what I want to highlight that he writes it in a fashion that smells military (but maybe I'm wrong), a list of phases, and at the end he notes the length of the operation and how much the actual fighting took.
1. against Denmark and Norway: "operational period: from April 1940 to end of 1943; fighting took six weeks";
2. against Netherlands, Belgium, and the Anglo-Franco army: "operational period: from March 1940 to June 1940; fighting took three weeks";
3. against France: "operational period: from May 1940 to the end of 1943; fighting took eight weeks".
Probably Bernd noticed that he considered the operations still ongoing, long after the armistice, he considers the following three years as the work to build the Atlantic Wall - as the Germans formed National Socialist bastions from these countries -, which is a military activity.

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As for the Anglo-Franco Strategic Plan he found a hiatus of it, from the events he concluded (today I'm gonna write many ordered lists I see):
1. the Anglos wanted to save their soldiers on the price of their allies', what they not just denied but they insinuated that their allies doing this on English expense;
2. the Allied command underestimated their opponent; they thought the Germans were badly equipped and their leadership was incompetent;
3. the French thought that since the Maginot line was so expensive, then it must be impregnable.
He harshly criticized the Allies, but he separates the Belgian army from them, and acknowledges and praises their steadfastness.
The Allies had seven months without interruptions and hindrance to execute an offensive plan to cross the Rhein and beat them the Germans between that and the Elbe. He guesses they might have planned this they just failed due to their lack of aptitude.

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The armistice with France he treats as a moral question: the French were perfidious who did not want to keep their word, because they saw weakness in the magnanimousness, and he sees the fall of the moral of the French people, they should have accepted honorably the defeat in what was a fair fight. But now that the French tested the German patience, the latter gained the moral authority to act with iron fist if necessary.
The most interesting part of the Armistice for him seems to be the part that is missing: the fate of North Africa, in a military sense (for the curiosity's sake, here's the full text of it https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Franco-German_Armistice ). These parts were simply treated zusammen with all the other colonies in the agreement, however with Italy in the war they gained importance in the warfare. With the "widening" the war (as the Soviet, Japan, and USA entered) this importance just grew. It would have made sense if the Axis had secured French Morocco, Algeir, Tunis, Corsica.
Szálasi try to find the reasoning behind this omission. He concludes that the Axis wanted to give up Africa and only continued fighting there to gain time, maybe even to the end of the war depending how events unfold. Meanwhile they would force the English convoys to sail around Africa. However leaving Northern Africa would be temporary anyway since the fate of the war is decided on Europe's East and West. So in this sense - he says - this wasn't an omission, but forethought.

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The fate of the second front depended on the diplomatic relations between England and the Soviet Union. Churchill expected the Reich and the SU tiring out in their struggle, so he could enter the scene and just poke a dagger into their heart after they did most of the job on each other.
1. Szálasi suspects that at the beginning of the Barbarossa England offered a second front, but Stalin might have thought they can win alone and gain whole Europe, so he refused.
2. Then by 1941 winter the Soviet started to fear the end, so begged for the second front. But this time England wasn't that hasty, and while promised it, they preferred to wait for them tiring out.
3. Third phase of this question started with the Caucasian front opening up. The SU threatened England - it isn't clear with what -, and this gave birth to the first attempt at Dieppe. Then in return after the findings of Katyn came to daylight England blackmailed the SU acknowledging the the bombing campaign as the second front.
4. But since the bombings did not eased the situation of the Soviet, she continued demanding that front again and again. This fourth stage went on until the invasion of Sicily.
5. Then came the Anglo plan to knock Italy out of the war, separate it from Germany. This phase went on till the Tehran Conference.
6. The Italian failure of the Anglos made the Soviet reject this as a second front. Things stood here at the time when Szálasi wrote this book.
He notes that Anglos and their continental fanboys called this Italian offensive an invasion, the new world order calls it retaliation. He gloats a little by pointing it out that it was actually the Soviet '42-43 winter and '43 summer campaigns that made possible both the North-African, and the South Italian landings, therefore the whole thing was a vain attempt.
Why the attempts failed? He sees the reason in the division of the German forces in a way, that whatever the Anglo-Saxons do, their campaigns can't have influence on the Eastern theater, its forces and Strategic Plans.

This concludes the Western Front. Gonna continue with the South.

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Southern Theater
When we read into this chapter we're gettin a description of this Theater first - which I missed in the case of the Western -, and it's possible military usage.
The definition is many layered: geographical, cultural, and historical (the latter two often inseparable).
It is the clashing zone of the cultures of Europe, Asia, and Africa. Here encountered Greek-Europe and Persian-Asia, Roman-Europe and Semite-Punnic-Africa, Gothic-Europe and Semite-Moorish-Africa, Frankish-Europe and Semite-Moorish-Africa, Christian-Europe and Islamic-Turanic-Asia. In the struggles between the last two this region was annexed into the lebensraum of Europe, and after the exploration of America has ended, it got back it's old importance.

Updated the Strategic Space of Europe.

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Geographically the region where the three continents meet and connect to each other, from the line of Nantes - Lyon - Alps - Sava - Lower Danube, to the rock and sand desert of the Sahara. It can be divided into three parts:
1. The three peninsulas of Southern Europe (Iberia, Italia, Balkans)
Each means a separate front in itself, sharply separated from the body of Europe with mountains and rivers. There is no hinterland behind them for an attacker - just the seas and the resource thin Africa -, forces, war materials have to be transported from afar, nowhere to retreat, and if the separate fronts are established, they can't help out each other easily. While a defender will have Europe's resource rich areas behind them, short distances, and the central position means they can regroup and rebalance forces easily. Decisive action can be taken in the area of the Garonne or Ebro, the Po, and the Danube.
2. the Mediterranean sea itself with its islands and archipelagos
The shortest sea lane between the Atlantic and the Indian ocean for European powers. Three key areas are Gibraltar, Suez, and the narrow waters at Sicily and Tunis.
3. the shores of Northern Africa
A land bridge between the Atlantic and the Indian ocean. Its more developed pair runs in parallel south of the Sahara (I assume through the French colonies of Sahel to Djibouti), but that is outside of the European Strategic Space.

 >>/43527/
Stresemann and Hitler were thinking on economic terms, from that angle America's rise was easier to see.

His very optimistic interpretation of 1943 got me thinking. We have hindsight and interpret each of those battlefield defeats in light of Germany's final defeat, but from different angles it's not as bad. Szálasi is writing with limited information and only looking at the whole war up until that point. If an even smaller time frame is observed and with less context, the limitations of each Soviet victory become more visible. And if Soviet high command ambitions are considered, then it can be seen that with each offensive they only achieved part of what they sought. Thing is, they kept getting those partial victories all the way to Berlin, and the arms race was always against the Germans.

 >>/43656/
> We have hindsight and interpret each of those battlefield defeats in light of Germany's final defeat, but from different angles it's not as bad.
He compares the Soviet campaigns to the 1941 & '42 summer events essentially. How little time was needed for the Wehrmacht to gain huge amount of grounds and how it costs comparatively little in men and war material to them, and how much price the Red Army payed (time, men, and material) for smaller gain.
I also believe the short campaigns against Poland, West, and Balkans made a huge impression on him (and on many other of his contemporaries). Especially, considering he had first hand experience in the static meatgrinder of WWI.
Regarding to us, we see the Soviet retreat a temporary setback because we know it is. And when we see the German retreat as the beginning of the end, we do because we know it is. But if we cut everything at the end of 1943 we can only see the front moving fast to the East, than crawls back to the west (and not even to the starting position). The one who believes Germany is in control of the situation, and can throw more resources it, could easily make the conclusion: the Germans still can win this. Especially if the person thinks the successful advance of 1941, the crushing victories were the results of the brilliant German war command.
I could draw a parallel with the Korean War, btw, like how the front moved down and up, and down, and up again, and then solidified.
> the arms race was always against the Germans.
The dice had been cast. But it was loaded.

Gonna continue the South soon. He sees a couple of things so clearly, then he just disregards his insight, and focuses elsewhere.

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 >>/43598/
Szálasi considers this Southern Theater as one of the key areas of the British global empire. The arteries that connects the British Isles with the East go through here. With these pinched, redirecting the flow around Africa means months delay in shipments. Based on this and the events that happened he tries to draw up the plans for each blocks in the following strategic phases, differentiating between four:
1. from Italy entering the war to Japan's entrance
2. from Japan's entrance to the invasion of Sicily
3. from the invasion of Sicily to the Badoglio armistice
4. from the Badoglio armistice to Szálasi's present day

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England's motivation was always to secure that region. The work was done during centuries. Softening the folks living along that route. Softening for English influence and intervention. This is what the "Soft Underbelly" really means (Szálasi does not say this outright this is my conclusion - he says it is soft because soft folks live there). In military sense, conquering Europe from the South is a nightmare, getting a grip on the nations by England however, is relatively easy.
So whatever happens, it's a natural thing that England wants to be in control here. When Italy entered the war they tried to take Tripoli by storm. The Germans had to intervene, take over the control and push the Brits back. They even managed to pinch that artery, and prevent sailing through the Mediterranean.
Then with Japan's sudden expansion, a new front opened up for the Brits in the East. Burma was taken from them, and the Japs stood at the gates of India, threatening the Eastern base of the British Empire. The importance of the European Southern Theater rose. Now it meant a channel not just for the resources moving to the Isles, but troops and war material back to East. But there was another reason: among these circumstances (it's 1942 summer when the Germans were at the Soviet Crisis line, expanded toward the Caucasus, the Japanese also at their height of expansion) a possible joint Tripartite Pact action could be expected if something drastic not happens. So the Southern Theater could turn into a springboard for the Axis into the Middle East, toward Persian Gulf. However Szálasi saw quite a few conditions to this happening (and in late 1943 these were even farther than in '42 summer), I'll list them later, I want to continue with England.

 >>/43747/
Was just thinking that Mediterranean shortcut is even shorter because that map is a projection from a globe, Africa is bigger, Europe is smaller, all that jazz.

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At this point the British global empire was in mortal danger. And this is the point where she traded her global primacy away to the US. She begin to prepare the campaigns for taking back her position in the Southern Theater, she initiated the "pre-plow" of her diplomacy, to soften the soil for the military when the time comes. In this period England's foreign office vigorously worked on all the countries both in the area, and where she could expect a bit of help from.
The first fruit of this diplomatic work was the capture of French North Africa, then the whole shore. Sicily came, but when the turn was on Italy itself, the Anglo-Saxon military failed to exploit the chance their diplomacy secured for them. The Italian army was taken out from the war, but the Germans managed to close down the gap, kept Northern Italy under control, halted the Anglo offensive in Italy, and neutralized the possibility of another invasion on the Balkans.
Szálasi found the Anglo-Saxon mistake in not trying for Genoa, but Salerno. At Genoa the Apennines are relatively narrow and small, it would have been a great beachhead into the Po valley, and offered the possibility to break Italy away from the Alps. He also notes that historically the fate of Italy was decided in the North, the conquerors coming from the North could secure the peninsula, but those who tried from the South, they all failed to make lasting results.
Since from that point ('43. September 8) the "millimeter offensive" stuck, it couldn't play the role of the promised Second Front. However the Allies now preparing for 1944, with both their diplomacy and the military.

 >>/43754/
The British weren't going to invade the Balkans. The Germans were tied up just having to send troops there in case they did invade the Balkans and the British were happy to leave them there. The British only set foot in the Greece(well other than those send in secret already) when the Germans were already leaving and even then it was to secure the region and try to prevent a civil war between the Communists and others, once the British army did get involved in that Alanbrooke became quite frustrated as it was now tying up British forces for little purpose.

Going for Genoa would have required taking Corsica and Sardinia first and then it places them too close to France. Part of the reason for the invasion was to bring German forces away from France in the first place. I think it would have been easier of Germany to throw off an invasion there as well. Having Taken Sardinia and then Corsca the Germans would have an idea where they were headed next and would not just have the forces in Italy to deal with it but there would be the forces that had been defending southern France too. Plus it is easier to send troops to that area than to Southern Italy, it's closer and would be less vulnerable to allied air attack.

 >>/43755/
> The British weren't going to invade the Balkans.
You can bet your ass they had plans even for that. And ofc they also used this possibility when they bartered with the Soviet, because the Soviet wanted control in the Balkans. And a successful Allied campaign in Italy could only be followed up either towards France, or the Balkans.
> Genoa
The Brits prepared to knock off Italy from the war, their diplomacy managed to soften them up so much, that for the first slap they flushed Mussolini down the toilet, and made an armistice with the Allies, and their units had to be disarmed by the Germans.
> Corsica and Sardinia
Let's say you are right.
> Having Taken Sardinia and then Corsca the Germans would have an idea where they were headed next
Just the opposite. That would have meant (assuming you are right in the previous point) the Allies could place units everywhere in Italy, so Germans would have to cover the whole shoreline. But without them the Germans could be sure it will come in the south. And there they stopped the Allied and forced them to crawl and bleed for every millimeter.
But the Allies would have managed without those islands. They could put units into French Africa far from everything, they could have reached the area of Genoa. Resistance also would have been minimal, since the Germans expected them in the South and grouped the bulk there.
The Allies could have occupy the islands en route to Genoa, I'm not sure about what kind of defenses the Axis had there, but I'd bet just some symbolic Italian garrisons. You can get info on this, if you want.
In fact the Allies could have camouflage an attempt at Genoa as an invasion of Sardinia and Corsica.

Also you still don't seem to really have a grasp on what I'm writing, do you.

 >>/43756/
Well no they had no plan to invade the Balkans, Alanbrooke, the man responsible for Britian's strategic plans said as much.

They would have to place units in the Italian peninsular yes, but only up north near Corsica. To threaten the South they would have to take Corsica as well. The Germans were placing forces all over the peninsular as it was, hence how they took Rome and disarmed the Italians so quickly when they changed sides.

Occupying the islands on route to Genoa still involves occupying them, it takes time, the Germans did have forces there as well.

> In fact the Allies could have camouflage an attempt at Genoa as an invasion of Sardinia and Corsica.

It's not really camouflaging if you have to take the islands you were pretending to try to take anyway.

> Also you still don't seem to really have a grasp on what I'm writing, do you.

I know, you are just writing down what his thoughts on the matter are. I was just saying that they were not necessarily so.

 >>/43757/
I meant they would have to take Scilly as well.

 >>/43757/
> Alanbrooke, the man responsible for Britian's strategic plans said as much.
I know, the Brits are incapable of lying or filtering what they give to the general public to know. They are a scholar and gentleman. If he said it, it must be so.

 >>/43759/
It kind of makes sense though. Why bother with the Balkans? It ties up German forces and that is it, invading it just ties up your own forces and means the German forces are actually doing something useful there now.

 >>/43761/
> Why bother with the Balkans?
Many reasons.
For starters those who have power over others don't really like to give up that power, it really makes sense wanting to get back the influence. Then it is good for Britain's global empire's global economy. Those Balkanite cogs could be placed back in the machine and make it chug on. Germany tore them out from there. Then via the Balkans two strategic resources of the Germans can be attacked, the Romanian oil, and the Hungarian bauxite.
And then for geopolitical reasons. Denying the Soviet their influence growing there, and especially the warm see access, and a springboard for them to interfere with the Mediterranean reserved for the Anglos. Szálasi was right when he pointed out that area's importance in the Anglo world power, and whoever else has a way to stir trouble there, he will be a danger to the Anglo global power. In that system Spain is a bastion against France (since Napoleon this isn't really a problem), Italy against France and Germany, the Balkans against Germany and Russia. At that time Turkey can be considered pacified, and they made sure it became another bastion there (a solid NATO member, since 1952! - with Grease) and is up to this day, cockblocking Russia's aspirations to grow their influence in the Mediterranean and the Middle East.
An action on the Balkans didn't depend on the "want" but on the reason. They lacked the resources, the ability to wage war there, in the hierarchy of importance it fall back in the list, there were more urgent tasks to do and places to be. This is Realpolitik, they could measure what is fantasy and what is reality, and they knew what to let go.
In the context of Szálasi's work we can see already that he looked for possible decisive battles to take place, how to defeat quick an opponent, how and where to maximize the damage and minimize the losses. He reasoned the enemy looks at the situation similarly. But the enemy did not bother with such silly notions, it was fine to let the grinder go on, was fine with tiring out Germany, just weighing on her more and more, instead of ending the struggle decisively, quickly. I think I finish this chapter today, and in the next chapter we'll see another example of what I just described.

 >>/43769/
> For starters those who have power over others don't really like to give up that power, it really makes sense wanting to get back the influence. Then it is good for Britain's global empire's global economy. Those Balkanite cogs could be placed back in the machine and make it chug on. 

That's more postwar. I'll get to that.

> Then via the Balkans two strategic resources of the Germans can be attacked, the Romanian oil, and the Hungarian bauxite.

Yes, but not in any practical way. They can and did attack Romanian oil fields with air raids through Russia and could have done so through Turkey, that is about the extent of any kind of practical action against them. Actually taking them would take far too much effort and time and divert resources from more important areas. Maybe they could have landed in Greece and worked their way up the Balkans by 1945, maybe(it's not like Greece and the Balkans have favourable terrain either). But they were not going to be able to do that at the same time as invading France or even Italy, doing that would see the war drag far longer whilst angering the soviets at the same time. Striking at the Balkans will not knock out Italy either.

> And then for geopolitical reasons. Denying the Soviet their influence growing there, and especially the warm see access, and a springboard for them to interfere with the Mediterranean reserved for the Anglos. 

That's really the only reason. But you are threatening the success of the war you are actually fighting to do so. You are also ruining your relations with the soviets. If the west went for the Balkans that ruins the cooperation between them so the Soviets are going to stop pushing towards Berlin and move towards the Balkans to get there before you do or if they do get to Berlin they may decide to keep going, assuming they can as the Germans will not be fighting in France or Italy. But then because of that very thing if they do get to Berlin and keep going they may reach the shores of Britain.

> An action on the Balkans didn't depend on the "want" but on the reason. They lacked the resources, the ability to wage war there, in the hierarchy of importance it fall back in the list, there were more urgent tasks to do and places to be. This is Realpolitik, they could measure what is fantasy and what is reality, and they knew what to let go.

Exactly, they were not going to bother with the Balkans. The amount of resources it would take for such little reward meant it was not even a vague idea to them.

> But the enemy did not bother with such silly notions, it was fine to let the grinder go on, was fine with tiring out Germany, just weighing on her more and more, instead of ending the struggle decisively, quickly.

Invading the Balkans would have drawn the war out possibly into the 50's if it did not cause a complete stalemate or the Germans to win, both scenarios would easily be possible.

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 >>/43754/
In the Southern Theater the Axis had to have one goal: preventing the Brits using the sea lane at their leisure.
Szálasi saw a couple of questions regarding to the German plans. Why didn't Italy took control over the whole African shore by the start? Or at least the French Northern Africa? Why didn't the stronger Italian forces sent back the Allies into the water in Sicily (10 divisions against 6, the 10 Allied divisions only followed a week later)? Why didn't the Germans sent German reinforcement into Sicily?
At the French armistice he partially replied - in Africa the Axis had to play only for time, and they calculated with the possibility of giving it up - but now he completes the answer: Italy proved to be too weak for any of the tasks. Couldn't have pacify French Northern Africa, and even in Italy in the end the Germans had to take over the whole job. Specifically regarding to Sicily, Szálasi speculates that the Allies first wanted to see the reaction of the defenders, and with the 10 divisions held back they would have tried to establish another beachhead on the boot itself. The Germans calculated with this possibility and did not want to risk forces get trapped on Sicily.
Instead they put a "steel kernel" (how he calls it) into this soft nation, and now this kernel holds them in place.
Previously I mentioned the conditions that Szálasi saw in case of an joint Tripartite offensive against the Brits. These are the following:
- the Wehrmacht have to reach the Volga, preventing the Soviet interference (I assume not just at Stalingrad, but taking the whole aforementioned crisis-area);
- French Morocco needs to be in Axis hands, the Atlantic Wall needs to be expanded to Africa;
- the Muslim block from Morocco to Adra needs to be recruited on the side of the Axis, by assuring their freedom and independence;
- building up a secure way of resupply;
- include Turkey, Spain, and Portugal into the plan.
He did not say this, but we can see the impossibility of such action, based on these criterion (or any, really).

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 >>/43782/
Couple more thing I wanna note here.
He says that in this struggle Germany showed such performance that non of her enemies were able to come close of, and she won the right to lead European community. This war cut the strings of the Southern nations that tied them to England, and made them dependent on Europe itself, especially economically.
Now I'm taking these lines a bit out of context, but again this makes me think of the European Union, where the main driving engine is Germany, and the Southern nations are all dependent on her (and her banking system). Anglos were essentially BTFOed.

Italy. Even the contemporaries, allies, and comrades in arms noted their shameful performance. What if they didn't suck?
https://tube.cadence.moe/watch?v=GHC7HuiLlaQ

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Invasion and Retaliation (Vergeltung)

This chapter is about the Anglo-Saxon Invasion, and the German reaction in the form of Retaliation. Szálasi was fairly sure the Invasion will happen, and was absolutely sure the Retaliation will. He sees only one case the Invasion not happening, if the Retaliation precedes and prevents it. He questions however how seriously the Invasion has to be taken, he draws up a structure of a huge operation, in a coordinated attack from all sides against Germany, and alternatives. As for the form of Retaliation, he imagines an entirely new type of warfare.
So in short, this is about speculation about the future on behalf of Szálasi.

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Invasion
The definition would be something like this: a decisive operation on behalf of the Anglo-Saxons on the demand of the Soviet, to help to beat the Germans in open battle in order to end the war; the decisiveness demands the deployment of all the tools of moral, spiritual, and physical violence, in the decisive time at the decisive place, purposefully and expediently.
The operation has to happen on five fronts.
On the West the Anglo-Saxons have to land between the Rhein and the Elbe and lead an attack into the heartland of Germany, the river quadrant of Rhein, Main, Saale, and Elbe. If we called the Moscow-Stalingrad-Kazan triangle the Soviet "crisis area", by Szálasi's standard I think we can call this the German crisis area.
To this to work the Soviet also has to strike simultaneously from the East. They have to push the Germans back to the line of Danube-Carpathians-Vistula and beat them in the hook of the Vistula.
As a secondary front which supports the previous two operations, events have to be set in motion too, by both parties. Anglos have to move on Bergen, Trondheim, and Narvik, get Sweden's cooperation, and secure Skandinavia, while the Soviet deal with Finland.
Another supportive front has to be opened in the south, from France toward the Upper Danube valley to help the crossing the Alps of the forces in Italy. These unified armies will form the southern wall of the pocket of the crisis area.
Lastly toward the Balkans and into the Danube basin, to deny the oil and bauxite. In cooperation of the Anglo-Saxons, the Soviet, and with the involvement of Turkey.
One more detail is turning every folk of Europe against Germany, with the tools of anarchy, destruction, and sabotage.
He specifies as the final meeting line of the Allied powers at Trondheim-Stockholm-Oder-Western Carpathians-Pozsony-Fiume (Rijeka)-Rustchuk (Ruse)-Varna.
Szálasi had no doubt that in material, and especially in freight space the conditions are met. But in aptitude and personnel, they are lacking.

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There is an alternative to this, if the Anglo-Saxons land between the Schelde and the Seine. This is way less than optimal place, because France is a good place to defend from an offensive coming from the West. Lines after lines follow one after another suitable to take a stand.
The situation is similar if - as a second alternative - they would initiate the offensive from the Mediterranean (from Southern France or Spain, doesn't matter), the landscape also suitable for setting up subsequent defensive positions.
If a main attack would be led through the Balkans, that would need the military participation of Turkey, and a Soviet attack into the Danube basin, these could be stopped in the Rhodope, and the Carpathians. Same would happen with a main attack from Italy, just at the Alps.

On the other hand did the Anglos had the opportunity to initiate a decisive strike against the Germans?
Indeed they had on behalf of the Brits:
- in 1939 September during the Polish campaign;
- in 1940 spring during the Norwegian campaign;
- in 1941 summer and autumn during the Barbarossa.
On behalf of the Brits and Americans:
- from 1942 April to 1943 March during the German summer offensive and the following Soviet winter offensive.
Szálasi believed Germany is prepared to repel the invasion, and supposes the Western Allies just want to see their enemy and ally of necessity tiring and bleeding out each other, to be the laughing third.
And one more possibility he raises: in '44 the Anglo-Saxons will only approach the walls of Fortress Europe, clean the forefront, and the main attack will follow in '45.

 >>/43814/
In 1939 yes but not in 1940 as the Germany army was already fairly well deployed on the border. Not in 41 or 42 either, maybe not in 43 as well.

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 >>/43813/
On that map those black lines are some of the possible places where a defense can be mounted relatively easily. He mentions some more. All follows a river or a mountain range.

In comparison here's what I can put together based on his vague description in relation to the German crisis zone.
He refers to it as a pocket which is an encircled area, in order to trap, contain, and crush a military force inside. The encirclement is done by the landing units, while at the Main a backstop for their advance is created by armies joining at the Upper Danube region. The crossing of the Alps is helped by the attack from France, I'm guessing by forcing the defending German units in the Alps out of their position by threatening those by cutting their supply lines, and way of retreat, so basically with the danger of encirclement.
Since he mentions operations in Scandinavia and the Balkans, I assume depending on their advance they could also join in the battle, coming from Denmark and Austria, but those at some point have to cross major rivers, Elbe and the Danube. From the Balkans they could go through Czechia, despite the mountainous areas can be well defended (also rivers in a way again).
Viewing the landscape purely from the landing forces, it's relatively easy. Instead of crossing major rivers, they only need to follow along them. As they would move into the German Uplands, the advance bound to become harder, but still easier than crossing the Rhein from the West.

 >>/43815/
I think diplomatic restrictions also tied their hands in the beginning. Launching an effective offensive against Germany would have needed the cooperation of the lowlands countries, to move quickly over the Rhein and attack from there and not just the way more difficult terrain of the Franco-German border.
I'm not sure what kind of agreements they had with those countries, but just from the position of preservation of the states, countries as is - just for l'art pour l'art or for the so called "continental balance" - they also had to keep up the appearance of respecting sovereignty.

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Retaliation
Definition: the strategic plan the German leaders promised to their people to break the resistance of the opposing military and finish the war on the European Theater.
And I rather quote a couple of relevant lines:
"The retaliation will happen by the unexpected deployment of weapons built yet unknown ways, and which have yet unknown effects, and these surely will suddenly paralyze the enemy's wartime will and resistance. [...] The retaliation maybe won't be executed on the enemy military, but on the civilian population. [...] What would those say, who [...] if the war reached its peak on a history changing day by the metropoli of the Far-West falling into ruins: the Jewmarket of Earth: New York, the center of spiritual leadership: Washington, and the bottom of its materialistic life: Chicago; and then those Anglos who just live a few kilometers away got warned to shed their Plutocrat - Marxist - Judaist system, or suffer the same fate?!"
Szálasi expects the Germans to exploit the yet unknown effects, even with launching their own invasion, first of all against the British isles. They will reconnect the British to Europe, into a Germanic commonwealth.
I'm fairly sure there was already talk in Axis newspapers about the Vergeltung at the end of 1943, probably in vague terms, the Vergeltungswaffen came half a year later in 1944. Their effect wasn't that apocalyptic like in Szálasi's description, but another weapon coming in 1945 which had - it just wasn't deployed by the Germans.
I've no actual knowledge of this but I suspect the German leadership released information to their fellow National Socialist brethren, and probably to the allied governments as well via confidential channels, in order to reassure their faith in their final victory. Especially in those times of the war when the Axis advancement not just stopped, but they were forced to retreat.

 >>/43822/
Yes, the allies were not even allowed in Belgium until it was actually invaded. The Belgians did not want to do anything that would overtly pick a side. So the allies had to rush in and put up a defensive line when it was invaded which meant giving up eastern Belgium, before that they were deployed along the Franco-Belgium border.

 >>/43840/
Some people knew about it before then, the British captured von Thoma in 1942 in Africa and whilst a POW he was talking to another POW about these weapons and about how he visited the development site. The British had bugged his cell and so looked for and found the site and bombed it which delayed it.

 >>/43843/
It was an ongoing project, an loose lips are always talk.
In fact I can recall how Hitler wrote in Mein Kampf, that one bit fault of the German people is that they can't shut up. He blames them for being to open.

Also why I'm sure Szálasi was talking about the a-bomb and not the V-1 bomb or even the V-2 rocket, because he writes about unknown builds and operation. These are conventional explosives he was familiar with, and even rockets weren't new things.

 >>/43844/
*and loose lips
*one big gaulrs

 >>/43318/
Eh, from that list several points isn't in the book. Only the German and Japanese cooperation left.

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The cooperation of the German and Japanese leadership

The last chapter published in this book among Szálasi's writings about the WWII. He examines the question if there is a real alliance between the Tripartite powers, if they have opposing interests or their interests are aligned, what steps they took, and what moral, spiritual, and material tools they have to realize their goals.
He really displays his idealist nature in this one.
But first thing first.
In this chapter Szálasi mentions an event from early 1944 (Japanese diplomats in Turkey stated the events in Europe doesn't influence the war in the East, Japan would continue the war even if remained alone - he did not note exact date of this) so I have to revise the date when this work was put to paper. Since up to this part the writing is so devoid from anything happened in 1944, this makes me think it was written over time starting 1943 autumn (maybe October, probably from November) to sometimes in early 1944. Sadly the book doesn't give any clues about this. I suspect this study about the war was never even completed, and what was available the editors of the book compiled together (hence the missing items from this list here:  >>/43318/ ).

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According to Szálasi, the Germany-Italy-Japan alliance is a real alliance, it's for victory, for defeat, based on common values, common goals, while the American-British-Soviet one, which is a kinda fair-weather friendship, based on temporary interests.
I want to comment on this, before moving on. We know how things turned out after the war, and the factors behind the events can be traced back to ideological differences, even the authoritarian nature of the Soviet (and the exclusive nature of the absolute power, besides Stalin's probable megalomania, psychopathy, or whatever else he had). But what about the other guys? They weren't internationalist, their own interest should have came first, all were authoritarian; would have this led to final confrontation or a Cold War-like stand off between them? Or similis simili gaudet and living happily ever after?

Szálasi says their common goal - their "life goal" - was to form and build a National Socialist world order, which secures the just reallocation of the moral, spiritual, and material wealth of the globe, providing welfare and safety.
They have to do this out of imperative necessity, break the old order around the whole globe, against an enemy who is well aware of this and will commit everything its strength allows.

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Do they have the moral, spiritual, and material tools to fight this fight?
As for the material, he believes it matters little how many percentages of the raw resources they have control over, it depends more on how they use what they have. He refers to the rationalization, and the changing over to total war. He sees the defensive operations (and shortening the distance to the front and of the front) of 1943 on behalf of the Germans, and the stop of the Japanese advancement is a way of saving the resources for more suitable moments to deploy.
The spiritual basis of the alliance is expressed in the political contract of 1940, and the economical contract of 1943. These years it seemed they had conflicting interests. The declared goal for the Germans was to break the previous order and install a National Socialist one in place. The Japanese was to break the Anglo-Saxon power and build the East Asian Großraum. Speculation arose from the ambivalence, that the Germans don't want the Anglo empire to crumble, just change it to National Socialist (essentially building a Germanic global empire). From 1943 January, the Germans made steps to dispel the gossip, and expressed they were fighting for the same goal. They separated the European Großraum (containing Africa), acknowledged the Japanese plans (and that India and Australia belongs into the East Asian Gro$raum), and agreed on the dismantling of the Anglo-Saxon global empire. The final step in the spirit of this cooperation was that both parties recognized Chandra Bose's government, and goal to free India under the British rule. The Tripartite Pact showed their unity in goal and will.

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I'm gonna translate again:
"The moral foundation and factor is the ideology, their example and behaviour based on heroic life philosophy, and the basis they want to build the new global order onto, the basis what will restore the real, clear, and noble interpretation of the notions: liberty, independence, and self-determination. The safeguard is that blood the two leading nations offers in this holy sacrifice, and their wisdom which helped them notice that the rebellion and freedom fight of the people will not cease until they get their freedom, independence, and self-determination, they can build their moral, spiritual, and material welfare and security onto. Their moral sense and practice makes the Germans and the Japanese effectively invincible. Always the morality is the one that decides, on the right of the last word. It strengthens if followed, but tips over if going against. The Völkische Bewegung, the Fascism, and Turanism; the faith, loyalty, and wisdom; the conjoined family, works, and site in their readiness and ability to sacrifice, in their steadfastness, and constant service of the nations; the warriors' heroic life and example; the sure knowledge of possessing the absolute and unquestionable truth, and the historical service of the commands and demands of this truth, done with clear serenity; the matter of factness as they make their sacrifices, and how they don't fear death; the absolute faith and allegiance to the absolute Person, who is the sole enunciator and consolidator of everything Proper, True, and Good: these are such strengths that crumbles those prison walls built through centuries by foolishness, nefariousness, and misbehavior, against the folks' proper, true, and good life."

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In relation to the Vergeltung, Szálasi suppose, the German and Japanese leadership already planned out the steps they have to take together. The Japanese have to directions to take, either towards India - Persian Gulf - Aden, or the archipelagos envelopes Australia from the East to New Zealand. The Germans have various targets, the British Isles themselves, the Volga, Gibraltar, Suez, and the Persian Gulf.
The German-Japanese Alliance can recruit from a pool of 600 million, while 1300 million people is interested directly in the result of their struggle. He estimates the number of units available (in operational size, ie. divisions) about a thousand. The enemy must have similar number, however due to their situation, they can decide to concentrate their forces against one. He says at that point they do against Germany, the height will be the Invasion they will execute. After the defeat of the Germans, they want to employ the same plan against Japan. The Soviet ofc will join in, since the Japanese stand in the way of them getting out to the Pacific.
The balance of quality and quantity is in harmony for the Tripartite Pact, while there is a huge gap between the two for the Allied powers. This is the reason why they can't achieve decisive victories. "The German and Japanese leadership organized and trained the warrior, impeccable in his morality, spirit, and physique; while the enemy is still at the soldier which was created and tolerated by the Liberalism and Marxism."

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Well, I estimate this is what Szálasi wrote about WWII in his incomplete study. Now at least this little can be found on the internet in English. I'm sure I made some mistakes, and it is a fact that I left out some details, but I tried to present the thing honestly and roundly.
Most likely it was written for later publication, after the war was won, so what he wrote had to reflect his belief in the final victory, and - from what I know of him - he really believed it will happen so. Beside limited information available to him - some of those were simply false to boot - this bias led him into speculations that turned out to be baseless. Couple of fatal flaws I want to point out, which really stood out for me: the conviction that total war was a next level of effort and not just a propaganda phrase, the underestimation of the importance of the events in the Mediterranean even after he clearly describes the theater's importance, the overestimation of the quality of Tripartite leadership, the soldiers, and the war material available, or the insistence that the change in the outcome of the war only possible in a form of a flashy giant decisive battle won by the Allies.
What I do not understand, how could he not raise criticism after the events of 1942 summer, when the German attack on the Easter Front did not target the area he deemed the last critical one that needed to be captured to effectively end the war against the Soviet, but they launched a pointless offensive which resulted in getting farther and farther away from the decision.
On the other hand in a hierarchical structure, like the military, commands arrive from upstairs without the reasoning behind them, without giving more information than absolutely necessary. Down below the guys have to just accept them and trust the guys up there that they know what they're doing. Szálasi with his military education, and career in the army, was accustomed with this system, and this had to make him consider that the Tripartite leadership make their decisions based on information that isn't available to him. And he trusted them as if in the military. There is no way in that system that the subordinates second guess their superiors (in practice there is, but this leads to falling morale and disorder in an army), the foundation of their actions is the blind faith in the superiors. Szálasi's baseline in his thought process was for this and the previously mentioned reasons that everything goes according to the plan - which he has no access to, and no information what it is built on. These are also the things he wanted to explore within his study.
Anyway this concludes my work, if Bernd wants to find the starting post, here  >>/43270/ it is.

Also. He is a good example of ideological bias. It is more than that "trust the plan" Q thing, they're getting their chops busted for. It's a whole world view and real motivation put into actions. A life built on it. Nowadays it's easy to claim "I'm a this or that" (think "I'm libertarian", "I'm anarcho-capitalist" etc.) when their life and how they live it doesn't really reflects anything. They just find things true and they voice their thoughts.

 >>/43990/
At least it helped him sleep at night.

 >>/43990/
 >>/43990/
> . Nowadays it's easy to claim
It was always easy to claim such things, I mean for example champange socialism is not a new term. Comformism always existed but it has never been such an overwhelming norm before. You go to twitter you wave your ideological flag, release your anger, relax and live like everyone else. This new way of life prevents any meaningful change as it comforts pretty much everyone. The illusion of change is worse than normal stagnation.

 >>/44037/
"Moved" this discussion to the politics thread.

 >>/47638/
Weird link