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Erdogan has met Putin and ironed out the partition of northeastern Syria. He gets to keep everything he conquered and the rest stays with Assad. YPG retreats from a 30km strip along the border, leaving the bulk of Kurdish-populated areas. Russo-Turkish patrols guard the safe zone. The deal shows two things:
By inviting Assad the SDF have completely relinquished their sovereignty. This was why they were so relutanct to receive aid during Olive Branch. As long as Erdogan maintains good relations with Assad and Putin, YPG will no longer bother him. If, however, relations sour then he can even expect a repeat of the 90s, when Hafez sheltered Ocalan and allowed PKK to use Syria as its base of operations.
The deal was discussed with Putin, not Assad. It's also clear who calls the shots.

For locals conquered by Peace Spring, the problem is not Turkey itself but its Syrian rebel puppets, who are thugs and mistreat the population, as has already been the case in Afrin. For the war as a whole, peace is now closer. Once Idlib is sorted out, a simple deal with Turkey can grant Assad the whole country except for al-Tanf.
The attack of Turkey to the kurds was pretty sudden. The last I remember before it was that Assad was making gains from dealing with ISIS and FSA, kurds weren't even an issue but just this month they started cracking down on them.





 >>/30868/
> The attack of Turkey to the kurds was pretty sudden
Turkey invading is no surprise, Erdogan has made clear his intention for a long time. What was sudden was American withdrawal, and even then that wasn't totally unpredictable as Trump promised to get out of Syria.
> The last I remember before it was that Assad was making gains from dealing with ISIS
That was all the way back in late 2017, when he and the SDF advanced up to the Euphrates reducing ISIS to a small strip at the left bank and some pockets in the desert. The residual Caliphate was defeated this year and only the desert presence remains.
> FSA
The Free Syrian Army itself has effectively ceased to exist years ago, though Turkish-controlled rebels are sometimes called "TFSA". The rebels overall suffered major defeats with all their pockets including Damascus being cleared by 2018, leaving only "Greater Idlib" which has lost a lot of territory with a campaign taking place there just a few months ago.





 >>/30906/
Pretty sure Syria is gonna get partitioned. The Turkish military won't go anywhere, the Russians pretty much have Assad by the balls, he's their puppet now and the US is still staying there. Basically, pre-2011 Syria is not coming back.

 >>/30919/
Turkey will drop those rebels like a hot potato. Sure, they won't attack them directly but they won't lift a finger to stop the Syrian and Russian forces from bombing them to shit.

 >>/30945/
It's not the first time syrians wanted to rebel, during the papa assad's time, islamists wanted our support for a coup, but we refused. Only reason we jumped this mess because erdoğan is an islamist and he was doing will of USA. 

Only now he kinda turned to Russia, he is still a bad politican. He is the reason why my country couldnt handle it unlike previous leaders.




Al-Baghdadi reportedly dead In a US raid.

I guess now that the ISIS stage of the Syrian Civil War is officially drawing to a close and we’re getting to the Mexican Standoff stage, they are mopping up the remains of all the patsies.

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Some clashes in northern Syria, SAA fights only against Turkish backed rebels. They also went back to shell and bomb rebels around Idlib.

 >>/30994/
Yeah, suicide it seems. Well, probably sounded more comfy than getting interrogated by US national security. And probably it is.
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/10/isil-chief-abu-bakr-al-baghdadi-killed-syria-confirms-trump-191027132540524.html

 >>/31308/
> probably sounded more comfy than getting interrogated by US national security


With all due respect to the awesomeness of the Ride of the Valkyries helicopter assault scene in the film Apocalypse Now, the Americans didn't come crashing in playing AMERICA FUCK YEAH! or anything else. They may have been screaming at everyone to surrender, that is, screaming in Arabic. Special forces don't overtly identify themselves until it's all over, and usually not even then. Leaving your prisoners guessing is all part of the fun. It's the Russians who have a big rep in this part of the world for doing these sort of up close and personal operations. The Americans are known more for having an observer embedded with the locals to call in precision air strikes and artillery, plus a small special forces team to keep an eye on their observer for his own safety.

Al-Baghdadi probably thought he was facing Russians, or, just possibly, Turks.

In any event, once he realized his attackers were going to stand back so as to throw in yippy cuddly doggos and lickity sweet Adamsite, he knew it was over and he wouldn't get any chance to negotiate, or take some of them with him, or anything. Game over. "Fuck me gently with the greatness that is Allah!" Boom.

Al-Baghdadi wasn't going anywhere with anyone on anything but his own terms.






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 >>/31358/
Scandal/10
Index has a whole subtitle just to make it easier to reach articles about the event. Were many protest and the police wasn't in it's best form apparently, barred wrong streets and places (trapped ~1500 unrelated pedestrians at a place, sent everyone back into the metro at another time) and such.
Articles in English:
https://index.hu/english/2019/11/07/turkey_hungary_relationship_economy_turkic_council_azerbaijan_energy_policy_syria/
https://index.hu/english/2019/11/07/erdogan_visit_budapest_protests_traffic_chaos_opposition/
https://index.hu/english/2019/11/07/turkey_hungary_erdogan_orban_meeting_syria_safe_zone_trade_cooperation/
Long reads, but quite a few pretty pictures to look at.

Also Turkey want to send back captured ISIS fighters to their homelands. Except UK and Netherlands withdrew their citizenship so those who arrived from there now they have nowhere to go.

 >>/31359/
I hate erdoğan with everything I have. But opposition response seems stupid in this case. They complain about refugees yet be crybabies when we attempt to resettle them. Westerns are generally very oblivious around to their surroundings.

 >>/31361/
Here oppositon opposing everything what governing party does. Even if it's the rational thing to do. Previously Jobbik stood together in some questions with the Fidesz since it fit in their narratives too. But now they're just the same as liberals/greens and socialists.



 >>/31359/
Oof, the way they write you can just tell that relations are a bit strained behind closed doors. Not that Orban really has much choice, the rest of Europe treats him with suspicion at best, so Erdogan is pretty much the best ally he has in the region so far. Plus, it seems like Hungary REALLY doesn't want to be doing trade in the energy sector with Russia.

> kurds are still oppressed in turkey

Honest question, why does the rest of Europe continued to behave like Turkish/Kurdish relations are still back at 80's levels?













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 >>/31524/
> ISIS is weird, it's supposed to be contained in the middle east

It is as if they are Muslims.

But Shlomo told me in the news that isn't so and it perfectly save and the right thing to do to let in this children. Anything else would be literally Hitler!

Do you want to make little Anne Frank cry?

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 >>/31361/
> erdoğan opposition Westerns

Erdog is if not member then supporter of "Muslim Brotherhod", like Quatar and the USA.
USA gave them asylum in Germany and helped them establishing themselves.

US State Department supported the "color revolution" against Mubarak like they did against the Shah.


Consider President Eisenhower. In 1953, the year before the Brotherhood was outlawed by Nasser, a covert US propaganda program headed by the US Information Agency brought over three dozen Islamic scholars and civic leaders

One of the leaders, according to Eisenhower’s appointment book, was “The Honorable Saeed Ramahdan, Delegate of the Muslim Brothers.”* The person in question (in more standard romanization, Said Ramadan), was the son-in-law of the Brotherhood’s founder and at the time widely described as the group’s “foreign minister.” (He was also the father of the controversial Swiss scholar of Islam, Tariq Ramadan.)

By the end of the decade, the CIA was overtly backing Ramadan. While it’s too simple to call him a US agent, in the 1950s and 1960s the United States supported him as he took over a mosque in Munich, kicking out local Muslims to build what would become one of the Brotherhood’s most important centers—a refuge for the beleaguered group during its decades in the wilderness. 

In later years, he supported the Iranian revolution and likely aided the flight of a pro-Teheran activist who murdered one of the Shah’s diplomats in Washington.

By Bush’s second term, the US was losing two wars in the Muslim world and facing hostile Muslim minorities in Germany, France, and other European countries, where the Brotherhood had established an influential presence. The US quietly changed its position.

The Bush administration devised a strategy to establish close relations with Muslim groups in Europe that were ideologically close to the Brotherhood.


 >>/31934/
Why are you telling me this? Also know that it wasn't the first time to we're asked to support rebels. Like more than 50 years ago anti baathists wanted our support for coup. More than a decade ago we're asked to stir some shit up in İran by using Azerbayjani nationalists, same case for Iraqi Türkmens. Literally everyone with a half brain in my country knew muslim brotherhood and "moderate islam"ists were american puppet. 

Until the west supported "moderate islam"ist leader instead of strict secular ones we had good foreign policy. It's another let's fund a freak so we have a legit reason to attack them tactic. Stay classy guys.





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They finished that cusp. They didn't create a pocket, just pushed back the frontline. I guess rebels withdrawn gradually, they knew they can't hold or launching a counter attack, and they would just lost manpower and war material if they allowed the SAA circle them.



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To be honest I'm not sure what are those rebels doing or hoping for. It's obvious the Syrian govt, will reclaim those lands and no outside help will arrive. They can get support from Turkey, material, but no troops. Via proxies from westerners too, but I don't think they bother much.
So the only place is left is the conference table. But time works for the Syrian govt. The more the rebels wait with surrender the less cards they'll have, the less they can negotiate with.

Apparently Turkey is sending SNA fighters to Libya, really bizarre. You would think they would at least set up a new Proxy force instead of importing one from another theatre and a theatre that is losing ground at that. I suspect that Turkey probably doesn't expect to hold Idlib, they just want the border areas already under their control.

 >>/33610/
Well Turkey is concerned about the Kurds and a Kurdis I don't think she has much against the Syrian govt. Turkbernd surely has more precise insight in this.
It does seem like the Syrian conflict is done, but Libya is still an open question. So it is more important to influence the outcome there out on the fields.


 >>/33611/
 >>/33610/
Erdoğan needs foreign threats to keep his seat. We don't need to send soldiers to Libya every sane man knows that. It's typical "together united against the world" romanticism policy keeps him one piece and ruling.

 >>/33611/
most of the Turks doesnt concern about kurds, they concern about terrorists.




 >>/33624/
 >>/33624/
For enlarging territorial waters which will used for searching oil in medditerranean.

Of course he tries to justify this by saying Atatürk fought in there too (he was a volunteer against Italians and quite a succesfull one) but he forgets one thing. It's not our clay anymore.  He also used justification that, UN recognizing that libyan guy, so it's legit. But the thing is UN recognizes Assad as sovereign ruler, so there is this one sided point of view of him.








 >>/33744/
> All that was done without declaration of war.
Isn't that a given? Afaik 'state of war' in USA means just a formal recognition that they are going to increase civilian kills to the point that saying "oops" every time would be embarrassing, so don't expect them to.








 >>/33758/

There was some attack on Iraqi/US base in region. Then counterattack of US on some bearded guys camp (Shia backed). Then protests around US embassy in Iraq after that attack.

And then this. Trump was very soft on Iran recently, so this looks like just typical show of power, like "hey guys, we are still the biggest guy in the room, don't forget about it"


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How many d chess are these playing?
https://www.rt.com/op-ed/477388-erdogan-intervention-libya-gas/
So this article says that:
- GNA is considered the legit govt. by the UN, therefor the free world, NATO, EU you name it
- GNA is supported by Turkey (since NATO takes their side it's given)
- LNA are rebels
- LNA is supported by Egypt, UAE and Russia
- the EU is establishing gas supply pipeline from Israel, via Grease and Cyprus
- Turkey supplies EU with gas from Russia via the TurkStream pipeline
- Turkey wants to establish common maritime border with Libya, he needs the GNA for this
- she does that to block the pipeline preserving the relevance of the TurkStream
This all means, that Turkey - and NATO led by the US - is supporting the enemy of a group that is supported by Russia to help Russia selling gas to EU, so they can block Israel the most important ally of the US in the region to do the same.
Which also means if the Russian backed rebels can oust the GNA then Israel, the most important ally of the US in the region, can sell gas to EU, but Russia will lose on the business.

Additional information:
- the article was written by an american
- the article was published in fuckin RT





 >>/33785/
This reminds me the sabre rattling with North Korea. Except now elections are coming and he needs to do the most to his face be there in every home in every mind.
I don't think so this will evolve into an open conflict with Iran. At how many places US soldiers are deployed? Can they afford more fronts?
I think they withdrew forces from Syria they just need a good reason to shove them somewhere. The neighbourhood (like Iraq or Kuwait) will do fine.
Maybe he can rile up emotions, then play the peacemaker. The US dun goofed with Syria, she was taken away by Russia and Turkey (and Iran, but they are less in the media). With NK the situation is almost jovial. What big baddies are there really? China? It's an important source of consumercrap and the "trade war is going on anyway". That leaves basically Iran.

I wonder what he EU will say. Most of us are in the NATO, and the countries that matters (Germany, France and UK) were trying to make dealings with Iran, just think of this nuclear program question.






 >>/33793/
Backing the GNA will push Libya into the Turkish Sphere if they win, backing the LNA won't to the same degree as they would be competing with Russia and Russia has more pull than Turkey does. They probably have other deals with the LNA as well.


 >>/33792/
> just need a good reason to shove them somewhere. The neighbourhood...will do fine.
iraq is likely out of the question
https://web.archive.org/web/20200105212110/https://www.foxnews.com/world/iraq-parliament-expulsion-us-troops-drone-attack

 >>/33812/
Even with that it's not like NATO troops will leave overnight. The withdrawal can go on indefinitely.
Also this could fit into the peacemaker narrative. The US obligation of leaving might give Trump an excuse to give an empty gesture to Iran they can find acceptable without them losing face, troops return home, Trump can close the war in Iraw finally which goes on 16 17 years now. Gets reelected.


 >>/33792/
They need Saudi Arabia (a major US front) to win the war. If they go wrong in Saudi Arabia, or if they try to stay away from the conflict, then they're fucked.
They need to withdraw from Afghanistan since the quagmire over there has basically resulted in them losing. Also, the Taliban are still heavily at odds with Iran (despite officially not being at conflict, they used to be, and they personally hate the Iranians being an anti-Sunni theocracy)




 >>/33820/
Israel's support is natural given the pipeline situation but it's very subtle. France's aims are harder to make out but its weapons have been found in the LNA's possession, though it's not open about it.
As neither of them like to talk about it Turks are among the biggest accusers:

https://www.trtworld.com/mea/despite-denials-france-s-support-for-libyan-warlord-haftar-is-laid-bare-26138/amp
https://www.trtworld.com/africa/how-khalifa-haftar-s-secret-ties-with-israel-fuel-chaos-in-libya-31941/amp

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 >>/33814/
> That's what people said before WWI.

And also that's what people said multiple times, and war didn't happen.

Compared to WWI, USA and Iran have no real points for serious conflict anyway (even when USA allies ask for this), and Iran is too strong for swift and easy takeover like Iraq was. Going into big bloody war is hard even for superpower like USA, if there is no real reason like defending own national territory. So, maybe it will end in some random strikes, maybe it will end in nothing at all. Iranians and related people, be they government sponsored or just fanatical guys, will surely do some things (like recent attack on Kenya), but probability of big long war is small. Also both sides (Iran and USA) aren't fanatical or mad, even if media paints them as such. We'll recently seen a good example of conflict between two normal countries (India vs Pakistan), when escalation suddenly stopped.

Of course I can be wrong, but predicting the future is hard task anyway.

Also, I don't recommend reading Trump's twitter at all. Or at least taking his writing seriously. It is written for specific audience, not for anyone like us.

 >>/33832/
> Compared to WWI, USA and Iran have no real points for serious conflict anyway 
Right now Iran has a bunch of proxies in Iraq and in Lebanon, and the USA is blaming them for smashing up their embassy. 
> too strong for swift and easy takeover
How about the Taliban? Though they aren't as strong, they were dealing with a much harsher environment and they were conquered fairly quickly and switched to insurgency.


 >>/33825/
Hm. The first article isn't the freshest and not very good proofs of French support. This line is interesting tho:
> Haftar [...] Backed by the UAE, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia, and with political support from Russia and the US
> US
Huh.
Second link is kinda fresh. Also confirms that an LNA led Lybia would help Israel with the pipeline.
And both article brings the Saudis into the picture as well.

 >>/33832/
Those are good points.
> Trump's twitter
> It is written for specific audience, not for anyone like us.
Well true, and ofc we shouldn't take them seriously. But they can tell much, like that tweet earlier before Turkey started the "invasion" into Kurdish areas, and they had to pull US troops back, but allow Assad to send forces to "defend" the Kurds... Pretty gud reflection on the situation there, when everyone enveryone's enemy and ally at the same time directly or via proxies and he has to cover his and US diplomacy's ass while telling the world what's going on.

 >>/33833/
> How about the Taliban? Though they aren't as strong, they were dealing with a much harsher environment and they were conquered fairly quickly and switched to insurgency.

Taliban had no real state nor united army, it was bunch of local armies hardened in constant war, joined in some kind of confederation. And that is why in first "real" fight with proper army they failed and moved straight to insurgency phase (some of them were just bought).

Iran has army, militia, large and relatively civilized population, proper economic and state. They even have military industry, maybe not best, but it isn't last industry in the world. They couldn't be easily crushed by limited bombing and fast troop strike. Of course USA will win long conventional war, but there will be casualties from US side, much more that in first phases of Iraq or Afghanistan war. Then war will go into insurgency stage, so it will be like Afghan, but on larger scale.

Good example is Serbia. In reality Serbs weren't finished by air phase of war (even most of their tanks survived), and they surrendered only because of political reasons (they also didn't want casualties). If Serbs were more stubborn and ideologically prepared, NATO would need to start land phase, and no one in NATO really wanted it (because casualties would be much bigger). It is easy to bomb someone in remote land with 100 soldiers dead, but would modern European country accept 10000 soldier deaths, especially when they are dying for unknown purpose? That is why most of modern conflicts are done with local proxy infantry, even Turks in Syria don't use own troops freely. And Iran is much stronger than Serbia in 1999.

Who will do land invasion into Iran? Saudis are only country that may want it, but they couldn't even beat some bearded guys in Yemen. Jews from Israel are too smart for this anyway, so they wouldn't. Maybe in future, when Iran collapses under some crisis and internal turmoil it would be easier, but now they are too big to be conquered by small expedition force.

> Right now Iran has a bunch of proxies in Iraq and in Lebanon, and the USA is blaming them for smashing up their embassy. 

I guess everything will be limited to bombing proxy forces (by US) and terror acts (by proxies). Iraq will suffer anyway, they are in the middle.

By the way, there are conspiracy theories already, like Iranian government desided to remove Suleimani because he is dangerous for current leadership, and used Americans help in exchange of something, like new nuclear deal that will happen after current escalation.

 >>/33843/
I don't think USA could win a war. They still haven't really won nor in Afghanistan neither in Iraq don't matter what they say. Iran would be another mire to be bogged down.
> conspiracy theories already, like Iranian government desided to remove Suleimani
I think the CIA has the next guy in line in their pocket. And now that guy is already in place.
There is also an opinion (I think from Israeli viewpoint) that Suleimani was an idiot that the US did a favor to Iran to remove him.
> desided
How Russian of you to misspell it.

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 >>/33844/
> I don't think USA could win a war

It also hard to really understand what will be considered a "win" in Afghanistan. Crush local forces and technically occupy country? They did it quickly. Install new government? This also happened. Stop the fighting between Taliban-like structures and that new government? This requires a good genocide, it couldn't be made in modern times. USA may install Taliban as new government, and they'll do that genocide though, but looks like that option is still unavailable for some reason.

So, there is no real goal now. Although I don't know what was their goal from the start, and I guess they don't know either.

> How Russian of you to misspell it.

English is hard. Why they need two different letters for one sound?

 >>/33846/
> It also hard to really understand what will be considered a "win"
> So, there is no real goal now.
Yeah, that's that. Even back in Vietnam there wasn't a real goal (that could have been presented to the people and accepted by them) fighting no real enemy (since American troops couldn't enter the north and conquer it) on nonexistent fronts (which actually were everywhere).
And this situation now smells the same, if they try to hold the foothold in Iraq, they'll fight Iranian backed proxy forces, but they can't enter Iran and defeat them properly, so it can go on and on, even through generations.

> Why they need two different letters for one sound?
Yeah, they do that all the time. Such silliness.

 >>/33843/
> Taliban had no real state nor united army, it was bunch of local armies hardened in constant war, joined in some kind of confederation
The Taliban was a unified army under a leader (Mullah Omar) that had the full support of much of the Pashtun population that it led, and controlled and had a central government in Kabul in which most people there had to swear an oath to a leader, which is very important in Afghanistan. The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan was de-facto a state, it was only unrecognised, and even then, it still had support from Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE.


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 >>/33849/
> The Taliban was a unified army under a leader (Mullah Omar) that had the full support of much of the Pashtun population that it led, and controlled and had a central government in Kabul in which most people there had to swear an oath to a leader, which is very important in Afghanistan.

But then many of local commanders (technically still warlords) joined Northern Alliance in Mazari-Sharif for example, and I guess many more just defected or changed sides in conflict.

This is Asian thing though, when people are loyal to another people, not to some abstract thing like country or nation (also that is why killing Suleimani matters - he was powerful men with skill, contacts and chain of command). Iraq quickly collapsed in second war by this scenario too, general just switched sides or quit, and many of Iraqi army units didn't even fight.

It is hard to say, could this be happen in Iran or not. Considering their history and state of the country, they must be less prone to these things, but who knows.

https://twitter.com/jakobandresen/status/1214699353622880256
> No Danish soldiers injured: Danish Armed Forces
Okay, it's confirmed Iran is now launching ballistic missiles into NATO bases in Iraq. The US is definitely going to respond to this.






 >>/33878/
Possibly, but then the missiles would have been picked up and they would know they are coming, I am not sure of the details of the base but it could be that the US portion had bunkers that the US troops could use to wait out such an attack and maybe the Iraqis didn't(or were not told and had less time to prepare).

 >>/33873/
>  >No Danish soldiers injured: Danish Armed Forces
Reminded me: "during the filming of this movie no animals were harmed", kek

 >>/33875/
 >>/33877/
Yeah a comment below says so, Fateh-313.

 >>/33878/
 >>/33880/
I'm reading in the news, that two sites were attacked, one is Erbil in the north where international contingent is stationed, Hungarians too (about 200). Two rockets "reached" the target: one was a near miss, but it was dead anyway so no explosion, the other misses by 33 kms.
There were warnings so both here and at al-Assad soldiers could retreat to their panic-rooms.
US claims no casualties.
Iran says this was a self-defense action, international/UN law allows it, it's no act of war.

I think they spent the last days searching for some loophole so they can do something but not really do something so they don't lose face, and what they can sell to their own citizens.

 >>/33885/
> I think they spent the last days searching for some loophole so they can do something but not really do something so they don't lose face, and what they can sell to their own citizens.

Yes, you would think the US rhetoric to such an attack would be quite aggressive but Trump was actually quite calm about it and it looks like the situation has died right down with not a single US or Iranian soldier being lost.  >>/33843/ may be closer to the truth than one would have first thought(not that I actually am wholly convinced).

 >>/33886/
> .  >>/33843/ may be closer to the truth than one would have first thought
Way too many times I can agree with his point. He is a scholar and a gentleman. But don't tell him this tho.
To be honest I frequently feel I'm the stupidest around here, I'm just the most "social" I think.

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CNN now talks about deescalation and backing down n shiet.
On Reuters I read Trump talked about Iran standing down since no Americans were harmed in the missile strikes. Aljazeera says the same, also regional and world leaders called for deescalation. Oh all of them mentions new sanctions.
https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/443967/Iran-fires-missiles-at-U-S-air-base-to-avenge-Soleimani-assassination
> Iran’s television said over 80 U.S. forces have been reportedly killed in the missile strikes, citing a source close to the IRGC. 

In Iraq early elections are coming, they'll have - if everything goes in order - a new govt in the next two weeks. And then they hope to expel foreign troops and restore independence.

I don't like this map. I assumes that the missiles will be launched from the center of Iran.

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What happened with the Ukro airplane over Iran? I put this link here for later read.
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/01/ukraine-rule-attack-plane-crash-iran-200108175322733.html
Anyway this explosive situation seems to be dying down. Another article says the assassination of Suleimani helps the Iraninan govt. stop losing popularity and restore inner stability.

Meanwhile in Syria changed little. Some ISIS activity near Deir ez-Zor.



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 >>/33914/

Yes, that is one theory, although it is strange. It is possible when you have lonely aircraft suddenly appearing in some air defense region, but there is a route where many planes fly every day. Air defense crew always see this on radar, yet at that night they mistake civilian plane for enemy target? Although this is a possible situation. It isn't comparable with MH17 for many reasons.

If that happened, Iran is in bad condition. They already lost many people just at funeral of Suleimani, now they shoot civilian plane. Maybe USA just need to wait.

Another theory, widely circulated in media, is engine failure. Boeing of same type had fan blade failure resulting in one dead passenger (blade penetrated hull) some time ago. This is pretty bad thing, because engine must be protected from this, as regulations stay (engine hull must contain any broken fan blade). Technically it isn't Boeing fail (engine is made by French), but it is Boeing task to control this. 

https://www.flightglobal.com/in-depth/boeing-commits-to-ntsbs-recommended-cfm56-fan-cowl-redesign/135468.article

And story about 737 MAX is still going, so Boeing surely doesn't want another reputation hit, and will try to blame everything to move investigation into other side.

 >>/33896/
> What happened with the Ukro airplane over Iran?
Trump said, sic, "it was flying over pretty rough neighborhood", so I'll believe him.

In NWO we don't do silly things like declare wars (=asking for it), we just know that some states are run by democrats (Detroit, Iran, all these kinds of antifa-terrorist-etc enclaves), and those kinds of rough neighborhoods may result in planes getting shot down.


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 >>/33921/
> it is strange
> there is a route where many planes fly every day. Air defense crew always see this on radar,
Also it was on outbound course from Iron to Ukraine, and not inbound:
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-crash/iran-to-probe-black-boxes-after-missile-blamed-for-plane-crash-idUSKBN1Z9250
Funny line:
> Ukraine is looking at various possible causes of the crash, including an attack by a Russian-made missile
Putin personally shot down the airplane.
More fun:
> Tehran said earlier that it may ask Russia, Canada, France or Ukraine for help in a probe that could take one or two years to complete. 
Iran might wanna manipulate data if really they downed it.
France might wanna manipulate data if the engine was faulty.
Ukraine might wanna manipulate data to blame Russia for the missiles.
Russia might wanna manipulate data to cover up their fault due missiles.
Canada... well Trudeau blames Iran, saying they downed the craft, but do they have any motivation for data tampering?







 >>/34217/
Erdogan is a lot more sensitive about the north, he would veto any offensive there. West of the M5 there are sometimes skirmishes in Latakia and the Ghab plain but those places are locked in attrition warfare, understandably for Latakia as it's rough terrain but not for the plain.

 >>/34218/
Now that I saw a physical map (openstreetmap) it seems the most open way to Idlib is straight from the east. Lucky for the SAA. I wonder what kind of resistance is there about, fortifications, units.
Made me think if google taking sat images there and if the war left recognizable imprint on the landscape.

And suddenly red dots everywhere with neat little bombs on them.
Judging by those two green Kalashnikovs (they say rebels stopped advancing, infiltrating SAA troops) about those two depressions in the front the govt. forces started a new offensive.





 >>/34281/
Last news from 7 hours ago. Situation seems to be the same.
I wonder how precise this map is. I tried reading news (syrianews, aljazeera, reuters) but they report only very vaguely. No settlement names at all, or just the most important (Ma’rat al-Numan).

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SAA is going all out on the highway.
 >>/34283/
> I wonder how precise this map is
It just compiles information from a number of sources and displays it cartographically. Back in the day a source would report a territorial change and another source from the opposing side would say "no, the attack was pushed back" or "we lost the village but counterattacked and regained it". But it's been long since I last heard contradicting information like that.

 >>/34303/
I see.
The offensives are one sided too now, maybe there are no important changes happens on that level to worth noting it. Or maybe those who could make corrections in the media, journalists, are way less in numbers in the rebel camp now that the situation is getting really dangerous.
They report on the condemnation by the US govt. of this attack. This isn't in the headlines of the front pages of news sites, so I guess it isn't a big thing. How often the US govt does such thing? Is it a routine? "While we cannot do about it anything we have to condemn the Assad regime." Or maybe this happened now because of the tension with Iran?








So many happenings have happened while the site was down... Sad.

I really wonder what Erdogan will do, it's getting to the point where a confrontation is inevitable. Either the Turks are going to leave or they are going to have to do something.

 >>/34414/
Well, they will try and cut off that corner.
YPG participating would gain them some goodwill at minimum. I dunno what was the Kurds situation in Syria before the war, but they can be important elements of rebuilding the country after the war.

 >>/34418/
Yes. We were at sportschan during downtime: https://sportschan.wrigel.xyz/kc
We had some discussions there.
I think Erdo will posture like a cock (the bird, not the penis) until the new lines, "security zones" are getting made. They continue to send war materials to the rebels, and try avoiding more Turkish soldiers killed. So they'll do something without actually doing anything.


 >>/34430/
Not much in the northern pincer. Maybe it's just a distraction attack, rebels are better entrenched in the older frontline or YPG, a poorly armed force, is indeed participating. At the national level SDF have lengthy serious discussions with the government about reconciliation but they've never gone anywhere due to mutual stubbornness and American obstruction. The many groups in the SDF have different opinions, those closer to Turkey are friendlier to Assad while Arabs, particularly old FSA groups, refuse a deal. What happens is concrete cooperation at the local level and Afrin is a particularly close example, the local YPG were the only non-hostile border in the Nubl&Zahraa pocket and local NDF later repaid the favor helping out during Olive Branch. Or the YPG along the border in general, which invited the army to protect them from the most recent Turkish invasion.



 >>/34452/
Yellow skull is a report of SDF casualties, maybe they really were participating but kept a low profile. The road from Aleppo to Menagh airbase is open. Flights to Damascus and Cairo will soon resume from Aleppo. From what it seems this operation should go on for a while.



 >>/34466/
Maybe, it will be interesting to see what happens when they reach the border area. They are going to be have fire control over the roads leading into Syria but also Turkey may decide that they will just shell the Syrians from within Turkey itself if they get that close, making it hard to respond(but then I guess they have been shelling them any way and it hasn't done much to stop them).











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Busy day in Neyrab. Loyalists attacked. To great fanfare and announcements of a grand offensive towards the encircled observation posts, rebels counterattacked with massive Turkish support. Russia called Erdogan's bluff and just leveled them off with airstrikes, allowing loyalists to countercounterattack. They're back in control of the city. 
Meanwhile evidence of Turkish weapons in HTS hands continues to surface.



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 >>/34541/
The three plus Erdogan will meet on the 5th of March to discuss the crisis. Meanwhile Assad prepares to attack the M4 and show his superiority on the ground. If Russia makes any move towards a truce Syria can place pressure by striking further on the ground. This took place earlier in the offensive, when Assad was told to slow down but continued to escalate, and in the end Russia stayed on his side and continued to provide air support.



 >>/34585/
Since they created that security zone there's always some activity about.
Now that the campaign started in it's earnest at Idlib, this activity became more serious. There should be SAA forces around that blue and not SDF I believe so it's maybe for engaging those units. There's some shelling in Afrin region too, what left on "Kurdish" hand.

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First villages begin to fall. Instead of an encirclement movement SAA is attacking the south.

 >>/34585/
The frequency of artillery strikes rose a bit but the skirmishes are the same. Elsewhere ISIS has gotten stronger in SDF territory since the Turkish invasion as forces had to be diverted to the border.




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Looks like rebels are still in Nayrab. No wonder they're obsessed with that front, it's very close to Idlib city and allows an attack on Saraqib which, if successful, would deny both the M4 and M5 to the regime. But it's doubtful if they can hold it for long. Meanwhile they're facing great losses in the south with Kafranbel falling. It used to be famous for its demonstrations with political cartoons and English-language banners.






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 >>/34679/
Judging by the quick movement of the SAA in the south, the rebels pulled out everyone they could from that area, leaving token forces there, just enough to make a little resistance. Not ten days earlier they shortened their lines in the north. This meant they could regroup units about Idlib, and with the Turkish reinforcement and supplies they were able to execute this push, maybe with a local numerical superiority, since the opposing forces were concentrated elsewhere.
Most likely their swan song.

Meanwhile corona is arriving to the scene. A destroyed country with weakened population, where the situation is already a humanitarian catastrophe, prime target.

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I'm informing meself a little of Syrian history to get some context on Syria's place in the world and it's internal politics. I didn't know she had "personal union" with Egypt for three years when the two countries formed a common republic and Nasser was the president.
I'm using the Contemporary Archive of the Islamic World, Volume 1, Syria 1975/76-2018 (Edited by Anthony Axon and Susan Hewitt, Brill, 2019), just running through the timeline for now. I wonder why the book starts at 1975/76. Hafez al-Assad came to power five years earlier, and the ruling Ba'ath Party seized control in '63. Was their occupation of Lebanon so important? Maybe the reason for the starting date is in the Preface or something.

So basically Syria became independent in 1945-46, since then it had several conflicts with Israel, as a member of the Arab League, along Egypt, on the apropos of the Golan Heights, and in Lebanon. Also a usual opponent of Iraq and a natural ally of Iran. The timeline doesn't mentions Turkey only for her role she played by allowing the formation of an Syrian opposition faction in Istanbul. Since 2002 Syria is massaged by the US, accusing her with supporting terrorists and acquiring weapons of mass destruction.
I really have to squint into the book to tell something about the internal affairs. It looks like they have a de facto one party system with the Socialist Ba'ath Party controlling the politics, they helped Bashar, the son of Hafez into power too. Apparently a quite large number of residents doesn't/didn't have citizenship, Kurds, who form about 15% of the population got citizenship only recently. Some religious softening is also going on, niqab was banned, in favor of hijab.
During the Arab Spring the same went down as in Lybia: while civilian unrest was going on (I assume also fueled by foreign powers), and troops switched sides to help rebels, foreign powers demanded Assad to be more lenient toward them and stop suppressing them, stop fighting. Assad did better than Gaddafi.

Also Hafez al-Assad had big heda.

 >>/34681/
Being as important as Idlib is they were always going to be strongest near to it and any pulling of forces from the front in that area was likely to have that result. One would think they would be aware of that but they must have deemed the trade off to be worth it.

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 >>/34691/
Yeah, you're right. They should have expected it, they either rejected the idea of a counterattack or they judged the result as good trade off and/or temporary.

Meanwhile many eye catching happening all around. US convoy intercepted at the Turkish border in the north east, Israeli helicopter attack in the south west, extensive Turkish shelling, not only at the Idlib front and SE of Afrin, but as far as Hama and close to Latakia (at an airport). Reaching social media from Turkey was restricted for a while as well.
Yesterday there was a discussion about Syria in UN security council.
Events following each other thicker and thicker. I still believe the conflict won't be renewed, local base is too small and limited into specific areas. While Turkey and Russia is now really involved, and they are one step away from an actual war (as long as Turkish and Russian soldiers doesn't shoot at each other with handguns they won't deem it as an open conflict), they won't risk their political and economical ties, I'm almost sure. Maybe the US could push toward it somehow if she would want it and maybe the election can force them to, but that would mean an even bigger war, it would step over local scale.

 >>/34685/
I've read some on that in the Internet, never had the idea of reading on a book. Also researched the first years of the war, which are hard to get information on, and analytical essays on how the regime maintains its power. They mostly have an anti-regime bias.
For example: https://tcf.org/content/report/assads-broken-base-case-idlib/?agreed=1
Assad relies on a network of local protégés on every city, and in areas lost to the rebels this network has been uprooted, making it harder to reestablish authority as they are reconquered.
https://warontherocks.com/2017/11/the-last-king-of-syria-the-feudalization-of-assads-rule/
Assad still has more brute force than his militias but has to balance his need for their military power with their side-effects such as popularity loss; occasionally this means disbanding and suppresing militias.
https://international-review.org/the-syrian-regime-turns-on-its-patrons-rami-makhloufs-fall-from-grace/
The wealth of a loyalist oligarch had to be cannibalized to pay debts to Russia.
https://international-review.org/assad-or-we-burn-the-country/
Lengthy multi-part writing on reconstruction, oligarchs, militias, welfare, polarization and so on.

> I wonder why the book starts at 1975/76. Hafez al-Assad came to power five years earlier, and the ruling Ba'ath Party seized control in '63. Was their occupation of Lebanon so important? Maybe the reason for the starting date is in the Preface or something.
Lebanon is a very complicated subject, even more than Syria. Alliances changed all the time, at one point Hafez and Israel were in the same camp. I haven't delved into it, it's a headache to try to understand.
> Since 2002 Syria is massaged by the US, accusing her with supporting terrorists
For a time during the Iraq War Bashar was complacent to Iraqi insurgents across the border.
> while civilian unrest was going on
You might look into the roots of unrest in the hinterland. Rural areas in particular were in a poor condition in 2011. There was decades-old environmental degradation in the steppe, which was opened to massive herds instead of just what the Bedouins had. Bashar conducted needed reforms, cutting subsidies and moving to cash crops, but in the short term this made farmers suffer. And since 2006 there was drought. Climate has effects on the war itself, sandstorms are good for ISIS and the like as they eliminate other side's air cover and this was particularly damaging for besieged airbases. The war itself helps cause sandstorms as it leads to less land being cultivated and cared for.

 >>/34693/
I guess Erdogan is engaging in brinkmanship and will keep adding fuel to the fire until he can negotiate a ceasefire with Russia and the West. His decision to open the Greek border to let refugees enter Europe is another way to put pressure.

 >>/34704/
Quite a lot of book about Syria on libgen as fresh as the one I mentioned, and now I see one published this year. They explore many aspects of the situation. The Arab Spring, the society falling apart, minorities, refugees, the proxy nature of the war, factions, international relations, the use of media, etc, etc.
Thanks for the links, maybe I can find the time to skim them through.
Yeah, as I browsed the books, I checked couple of publishers and it is very likely most has anti-regime bias. Especially from the early stages of the war when Assad position was fickle.

From the little I read so far it seems economically Syria had the chance, but somehow they always fall back. Besides they struggle with constant corruption. But will see in a little bit more detail.

 >>/34685/
So. The book says in the '70s an annual journal was launched under the name of Middle East Review:
This volume re-publishes the Middle East Review’s annual appraisals of Syria, its politics and economy. In terms of news coverage and analysis for much of the period covered here, Syria was an exceptional case. Coverage of the country in international media was at best negligible, often non-existent. The al-Assad regimes did not welcome journalistic probing. Not many journalists were given visas to visit Damascus, even less to make their way to those cities well-known to be hostile to the al-Assad administrations.





 >>/34733/
The question is how much the govt managed to pacify the south. It also made me think how much of that southern movements were organized from the outside. Did they get foreign help, or have they managed to pull this out themselves? How much weapon caches left undiscovered. How reliable and committed are those insurgents there. Was a low key guerrilla warfare went on which didn't reach the media?
But every bit helps. I'm really not looking forward to the continuation of the war, but these surprises makes the thing educational.

 >>/34733/
They have already shot down 2 more(and possibly a third but the owner of that one is not known yet). We will have to wait and see what Russia does.

 >>/34735/
Well Jordan was never a friend of Syria so they may have provided aid or allowed aid to pass through Jordan. It's quite a coincidence that the uprising took place on the same day that Turkey's operation Spring Shield has started though.



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Tables are turning again, Erdogan has made sure the final chapters of the war are not a placid mopping up but an electrifying experience full of plot twists. Rebels were already breaching the gates of Kafranbel when an army counterattack contained their breach from the west. And despite news of massive losses from bombed convoys, Tiger forces massed in the M5 again and retook Saraqib. It took some time, rebels released videos from inside the city whilst pro-regime sources were already declaring it taken and the city was probably divided for a while but already taken by now. A Turkish drone was seen in the background as Syrian TV broadcasted from Saraqib. Some sources give the whole M5 as cleared while the live map still shows it cut to the north. Suheil himself was photographed in the city and Russian MP arrived, making it now off-limits to Erdogan.

So trying to make sense of this:
Erdogan has no long-term thinking for Syria, he's just bumbling from one crisis to another and improvising as he goes. When the army's offensive curbstomped the rebels, he panicked and tried to salvage the situation with his observation posts and materiel deliveries to the rebels. It was laughably ineffective and caused an escalation, but now he does seem to be following a logic. When the posts inevitably caused casualties, he chose to keep escalating. Soon he was taking dozens of casualties and bombing Syria en masse with drones and artillery. This had the practical effect of threatening the Syrian army's helicopter and bomber support and dramatically raising its attrition, with large losses of men and vehicles including tanks. In this new environment rebels managed to counterattack and as the army shuffled men across fronts several convoys were hit. Erdogan's endgame right now is to raise the temperature so much Idlib becomes an international crisis, bringing great powers to negotiate a truce. This will give at least a few more months of life for rebels in Idlib. He'll meet Putin in Moscow soon. Another arm of his strategy is his opening of the border with Europe for Syrian refugees, which puts pressure on Merkel and Macron to take a stand and hopefully back a ceasefire. 
With the prospect of a ceasefire, both sides try to assert themselves on the ground as fast as possible. Assad went for Saraqib as the most valuable target and its takeover demonstrates that, in face of Turkish bombing he has the manpower and the willingness to sacrifice it, and most importantly, that despite this higher attrition the rebels are still an inferior fighting force and will fold wherever Tiger Forces and other elite troops are concentrated and Russian airstrikes fall. Putin is still giving his support, but notably hasn't raised it to compensate Erdogan's, refusing an expansion of his mission in Syria. It seems he only intervened to get a cheap victory, and is reluctant to take a bigger commitment. Erdogan may have found his weak spot. Furthermore, Turkey matters to Russia a lot more than Assad's takeover of Idlib. Russia doesn't even need Idlib, it already has Assad solidly in power and bases in the coast. A weaker Assad is in fact a more loyal ally.

 >>/34735/
> The question is how much the govt managed to pacify the south.
The population was against him in the first place and largely remains so. Reconciliation with rebels requires trust, which is in short supply in the dire wartime conditions; a few of the reconciled still found themselves arrested and tortured. In a former warzone a lot of civilians already had firearms and in some cases reconciled rebels kept theirs. The regime's client networks will take a long time to restore. However, rebellious thoughts were kept at bay by a general feeling that the regime had won and was strong. Recent battlefield defeats did away with this feeling so the angriest rebels thought they had a shot.





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The government has control over the M5 again and is consolidating it's position along it. Another plane shot down in the south of Idlib as well as some minor Syrian gains in that area.

 >>/34781/
Yes, seems to be so. Another convoy was sent into Syria so they are still increasing their presence but it looks like Operation Spring Shield may fall through.

 >>/34776/
> Erdogan has no long-term thinking for Syria, he's just bumbling from one crisis to another and improvising as he goes.

Yes, it looks like it's going to backfire on him too. If the situation remains as it is and the Syrians regain the momentum then it is worse for him than had he never launched Spring Shield. At least before that he could bargain with Russia over the threat of a military intervention, now he has shown his hand and shown it to be a poor one.



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Reports of Turkish bombing in Saraqib and Russian MP leaving, but hours later pro-regime sources showed the Russians were still there. Rebels attacked but were pushed back, this time Tiger Forces are defending. Denied reports of Suheil being injured. Loyalists try to push towards Afes just north of Saraqib, while rebels attacked far up north near YPG territory. A Syrian Su-22 evaded a Turkish missile.

 >>/34790/
> now he has shown his hand and shown it to be a poor one.
It's not powerless, the higher attrition rate he achieved is considerable and maybe Assad is better off with a ceasefire in control of the M5. Further, he can escalate further, maybe by trying to systematically shoot down any Syrian aircraft in the area, and has the nuclear option of a direct ground assault by Turkish troops. But overall he has maneuvered himself into a corner and now both his internal and external situations are awful. If he didn't rig the system enough he might be unseated from power. 

 >>/34814/
Won't help much.




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Here's the result.
Well it's nice and all, joint patrolling in a corridor along the M4... But what's gonna happen with the rest of Idlib area? The de-escalation area is probably defined in those 2017-2018 memorandums, but still.
> combat terrorism
> avoid targeting civilians
Nice rubber agreement. Al-Qaeda types mix in the civilian crowd. One side can always claim "those were terrorists", the other can reply with "those were civilians".
> There can be no military solution to the Syrian conflict
So Assad isn't allowed to finish the job. Even Russia says so. They are basically solidifying a divided Syria with hostile forces leading each. They are guaranteeing that a new conflict can be ignited any time. That corner of the Middle East remains destabilized.
> Syrian-led
What does this mean anyway? Assad is Syrian? Who is the Syrian?

What a turd.
I think peace can only be reached if one side is defeated properly. Now that Assad has the upper hand it's him who should unify and rebuild the country, he should be bind by UN to give concessions whatever were the demands, and allow the refugees back to resettle.
I also believe the countries of the European Union fucked up big time. They should have committed themselves removing Assad at all cost as fast as possible. Now Erdogan has the refugee tap and he can open it any time he wants it. Basically the EU countries gave away control over their own fate. I believe an EU Army is needed and it have to be made ready to be deployed at all the places where the situation can influence directly Europe (liek Africa and the Middle East). The best would be leaving NATO and committing solely to own force. This would mean ofc raising military spending and this would cut into the standard of living, western peeps would have a hard time to accept that. Especially now the liberals and "greens". Also without Britain...

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 >>/34841/
> joint patrolling in a corridor along the M4...
Unless the Syrian army moves in this won't go anywhere, with jihadists still in the area it'll be impossible in practice to open the highway for civilian traffic. The previous Sochi demilitarization stipulated that it would be open and nothing of the sort happened.
> But what's gonna happen with the rest of Idlib area?
Frontlines freeze where they are. Turkey's whole intervention was about getting loyalists to retreat back to Sochi lines and now Erdogan admits defeat in this goal.
> Nice rubber agreement. Al-Qaeda types mix in the civilian crowd. One side can always claim "those were terrorists", the other can reply with "those were civilians".
Last agreement also included Turkey dissolving HTS, instead at this point they gave vehicles and bombing support. So it's meaningless.
> They are basically solidifying a divided Syria with hostile forces leading each. They are guaranteeing that a new conflict can be ignited any time.
Also what Astana and Sochi did, and in both cases fighting broke out again in a matter of months. This is also the case now. Assad has no long-term intention to maintain the truce and the rebels keep provoking, a quick breakdown is inevitable. A potential flashpoint is Afes, from where the rebels can shell the M5 and try to close it. 
So not only Erdogan had to accept all of Assad's gains, but all he got back with is some breathing room, a few moments of respite. He can't move things in the direction he wants so he just stalls and delays. What is his long-term plan? Just preserving the status quo, maintaining Idlib as it is, an Afghanistan with tens of thousands of heavily armed jihadists roaming around. He fears the alternative -letting it be restored to the Syrian government- means he'll get more refugees and lose prestige and a bargaining chip, so he's willing to accept this. It's also what Western hawks want. Yet it's a foolish strategy. Rebel Idlib is a perpetual hotbed of instability and a potential terror threat. Sure, at the moment it can be argued that it distracts Sunni fundamentalists by channeling their enthusiasm, but those people are unpredictable. Who knows if Syrian jihadists won't launch terrorist attacks on Turkey itself in the future? And letting them hold that land is a point of prestige for fundamentalists across the world as well as a breeding ground for locals potentially joining the cause of jihad. Syria's armed opposition is a spent force, a dead end, it cannot effect any change, all Erdogan can try to do is extend its lifespan.

https://ejmagnier.com/2020/03/04/putin-erdogan-meeting-a-storm-is-expected-over-the-mother-of-all-battles-in-idlib-ayn-al-arab-is-at-stake/amp/?__twitter_impression=true
This interesting article situates Iran/Hezbollah within the current crisis and sets it to the background of last year's Peace Spring crisis. Turkey had offered the M4 and M5 in exchange for Kobane but Russia felt it had a strong hand, valued its ties with the SDF and concluded it did not need a deal, preparing instead for a military takeover of the highways. Now that Turkey found itself without either Kobane or the highways it reacted with force so it wouldn't be at a complete loss. During this escalation, besides the battles in Saraqib in the south there was a rebel attempt to advance towards Aleppo through al-Eis, and in the process Turkish bombing killed some Hezbollah fighters, as the area was in Iran's sphere of influence. Iran and Hezbollah threatened to retaliate, making Turkey back down from bombing them. Hezbollah then took an important part in the final battle to retake Saraqib. This last counterattack, however, happened only after an initial period in which the Russian air force stayed put for 48 hours and loyalists were heavily damaged by Turkish bombing with little AA capabilities in place. This was the period when the rebels seemed to regain the upper hand. Then Russian jets returned to the field, Syrian AA assets arrived, Turkish drones began to fall and the tide reversed once again.
But I'm not sure about the Russian Air Force stepping down part, this is the first time I read about it.

https://www.rt.com/news/482341-syria-turkey-russia-idlib/
RT has some casualty figures.
> Assad’s army has suffered significant losses during the conflict – hundreds of troops have been killed or wounded. Assad’s allies have also been affected, including Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, who lost 43 soldiers in an attack on an observation post. There have been losses in Hezbollah’s units as well, even though they haven’t engaged in any frontline combat.  
> For example, in a matter of days, 191 soldiers from the Syrian armed forces were killed, and another 292 wounded. The army also lost tanks, IFVs and artillery guns and mortars, though experts say most of the damaged hardware can be repaired and used again.
So hundreds, not thousands of casualties as Turkey claimed. Still a lot. But no numbers on tank losses, which might well reach a few dozen, and other armor.

And Erdogan's approval rating is weak. The Turkish public is unenthusiastic about this operation. Right now he can say he "won" because he stopped further advances and refugee generation but this truce will break down in mont

 >>/34843/
> Last agreement also included Turkey dissolving HTS

As I recall, Turkey actually did try to convince HTS to GTFO but they refused. That being said, I don't know what the hell is going on in the region anymore, it's such a clusterfuck of competing news.

 >>/34843/
> He fears the alternative -letting it be restored to the Syrian government- means he'll get more refugees

How? If Assad wins, the refugees no longer have an excuse to stay in Turkey. They can all be thrown out into Syria within weeks to Assad's mercy. Sure, you might argue that it is not humane and that they will suffer under Assad but at this point, I'm pretty sure that the Turks don't give a shit, they want all the Syrians and other migrants gone. Remove the immigrants, reinforce the border and watch Assad like a hawk. If the PKK starts initiating assaults again with Assad's help, run a massive propaganda campaign against him, get NATO onboard and rape his ass with a full-on offensive. Russia won't dare do shit with the NATO forces ravaging the area except stand and watch helplessly as their hard-earned investments go down the toilet. Withdrawing from Syria is basically the only smart option left now.

 >>/34843/
>  >But what's gonna happen with the rest of Idlib area?
> Frontlines freeze where they are. 
With the halting of all military actions yes, it should mean that. I was trying to highlight that this little "additional protocol" says nothing about the rest of the land. And I added I dunno what is exactly in the previous agreements.
I see you have some knowledge on that however, your post explains a lot.
I saw snippets in the mininews on the livemap about Erdo sending reinforcement to the observation points. I think he will use this intermission to also resupply the rebels, and prop them up for another round, so the agony of Syria can continue.

 >>/34851/
> How?
Many might leave if Assad stays. But I would think they already gone, so that's that.

Further proofs that EU is a joke.
https://www.politico.eu/article/no-fly-zone-flop-undermines-eus-grand-ambitions/
> "If we say today 'we want a no-fly zone,'" Borrell said, “the problem is not what we want, the problem is what we can do.”

 >>/34826/
Yes, I mean it did have an effect but it also showed that in order for Turkey to have the impact they want they will have to escalate and that may not even be possible for numerous internal and external reasons. Knowing this Syria can be emboldened, they can keep pushing the rebels and could potentially start pushing into the northern held area as well(but I'm not sure they will until Idlib is cleared).

 >>/34851/
Many of them aren't even Syrians to begin with, many off the people in Idlib aren't even Syrian. The issue is that these foreign fighters often tend to bring their family with them.

 >>/34858/
> I think he will use this intermission to also resupply the rebels, and prop them up for another round, so the agony of Syria can continue.

I don't think Erdogan is that stupid, he knows if there's another firefight and more Turkish soldiers die, there will be riots in Turkey and his ass is grass. As proven over and over, you can't keep giving resources and air/artillery support to a bunch of incompetent jihadi goatfuckers and expect them to magically turn into the Wehrmacht.

 >>/34886/
> there will be riots in Turkey 
Can this be stated categorically? Maybe his approval is falling but this wouldn't necessarily lead to riots.
He does not need a proper army, he just buys more time. The use of the vast majority of war material can be taught in a fairly short time and trained to adequate level.
> As proven over and over
This is interesting. Can you give examples?

Erdogan just gave the order to stop migrant boats from going across the Aegean because the Greeks keep trying to sink them. This is really turning into a huge disaster for him, first he gets humiliated by Putin, now he’s essentially conceded defeat on Greece blocking migrants by any means they want with the full blessing of the EU. Mark my words, he’ll be gone from office by next year.



Regime has apparently resumed their offensives into Idlib and there's a heated back-and-forth going on between the rebels and the regime. As predicted, everyone just wiped their ass with the ceasefire agreement.

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Some minor gains made by the Syrians. They have been probing the area south of the M4, no air support involved, just artillery. They also sent some units back to Deir Ez-Zur from Idlib. The probing has been ongoing sense the start of the ceasefire but never gained ground before now.

 >>/34918/
It's hard to say, as they may just be fighting HTS who never were officially a part of it anyway. It's also been relatively minor so far.


Where do taste buds come from? Not from an intelligent designer visualizing their consequences, but from a frozen history of ancestry: Adam liked sugar and ate an apple and reproduced, Barbara liked sugar and ate an apple and reproduced, Charlie liked sugar and ate an apple and reproduced, and 2763 generations later, the allele became fixed in the population. For convenience of thought, we sometimes compress this giant history and say: "Evolution did it." But it's not a quick, local event like a human designer visualizing a screwdriver. This is the objective cause of a taste bud.

What is the objective shape of a taste bud? Technically, it's a molecular sensor connected to reinforcement circuitry. This adds another level of indirection, because the taste bud isn't directly acquiring food. It's influencing the organism's mind, making the organism want to eat foods that are similar to the food just eaten.

What is the objective consequence of a taste bud? In a modern First World human, it plays out in multiple chains of causality: from the desire to eat more chocolate, to the plan to eat more chocolate, to eating chocolate, to getting fat, to getting fewer dates, to reproducing less successfully. This consequence is directly opposite the key regularity in the long chain of ancestral successes which caused the taste bud's shape. But, since overeating has only recently become a problem, no significant evolution (compressed regularity of ancestry) has further influenced the taste bud's shape.

What is the meaning of eating chocolate? That's between you and your moral philosophy. Personally, I think chocolate tastes good, but I wish it were less harmful; acceptable solutions would include redesigning the chocolate or redesigning my biochemistry.

Smushing several of the concepts together, you could sort-of-say, "Modern humans do today what would have propagated our genes in a hunter-gatherer society, whether or not it helps our genes in a modern society." But this still isn't quite right, because we're not actually asking ourselves which behaviors would maximize our ancestors' inclusive fitness. And many of our activities today have no ancestral analogue. In the hunter-gatherer society there wasn't any such thing as chocolate.

So it's better to view our taste buds as an adaptation fitted to ancestral conditions that included near-starvation and apples and roast rabbit, which modern humans execute in a new context that includes cheap chocolate and constant bombardment by advertisements.

Therefore it is said: Individual organisms are best thought of as adaptation-executers, not fitness-maximizers.


 >>/34851/
> They can all be thrown out into Syria within weeks to Assad's mercy.
Legally Erdogan can't do that. If he ignores international law, he still has a massive public order and logistical challenge of forcibly moving millions of refugees. The last time a Turkish government tried a resettlement on this scale did not go well. Even if he has the means to ship them, Assad may block the border on his side. Refugees are mostly those who didn't support the regime in the first place and the new demographic balance is advantageous.

 >>/34858/
> I think he will use this intermission to also resupply the rebels, and prop them up for another round, so the agony of Syria can continue.
He's already doing that. They're full of TOWs, armored vehicles and probably even MANPADs and know how to use them. Not sure how much additional training can be given, he already had several years to organize his Syrian National Army.

 >>/34928/
Some sources deny the push took place at all.


There are rumors Erdogan's next target is SDF territory. Daraa is still restless.
https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2020/03/corona-virus-autonomous-administration-kurdish-qamishli.html
Coronavirus may have already reached the northeast.

https://www.mei.edu/publications/people-cant-even-afford-buy-bulgur-discontent-rise-syrias-economic-crisis-worsens
Good article on the present state of the Syrian economy by an anti-regime source. Even though the war is being won living conditions continue to wither away and basics such as food and heating are hard to get. With Lebanon's crisis it gets worse. However the military is unaffected, those tied to the regime stay loyal and dissatisfaction is expressed towards the economic situation rather than to the political system.




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 >>/35173/
They're trying everything they can, these patrols won't go anywhere. Perhaps this will give Erdogan an excuse to not intervene if Assad attacks everything south of the M4, it's already scarcely populated anyways.
Bilal Abdul Kareem interviewed some of the demonstrators. Look at the man on his left.













 >>/35284/
> turks are now getting attacked by the very people whose asses they keep saving

I feel legitimately sorry for the Turkish soldiers in Syria, it must suck being stuck in a desert hellhole and having to take shots from everyone in the region. I'm surprised some Turkish commander didn't just decide to go rogue and firebomb everything in sight.


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http://www.syriahr.com/en/?p=159458
> Al-Hasakah Province – Syrian Observatory for Human Rights: reliable sources have informed SOHR that armed fight erupted between two groups of the Turkish-backed faction “Sultan Murad” in Ras Al-Ain city (Sere Kaniye), north of Al-Hasakah, after a dispute between the two groups over stealing a “washing machine”. The clashes left four militiamen injured. According to SOHR sources, two of the injured fighters were taken to Turkey after sustaining serious injuries.
Business as usual in TFSA territory.


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A number of gunmen hailing from al-Tanf surrendered to the regime with their vehicles and weapons. There are several reports on what happened:

https://twitter.com/MaghaweirThowra/status/1250205887458938882
-MaT (Maghaweir al-Thowra)/Revolutionary Commando Army, the tiny rebel group which shares the zone with American troops, claims the convoy cannot be considered one of their own as it was led by a local drug dealer who gave up after MaT prevented him from doing his trade, leaving with his family including some MaT members. Previously they have claimed they interdict the drug trade in the highway and Hezbollah is involved, but do not link the dealer with Hezbollah.
https://twitter.com/Mzahem_Alsaloum/status/1250340393389973506
-A former MaT spokesman as "Ghanam al-Khudair" aka "Abu Hamzah Asha'ir" and claims he is a MaT member and drug dealer with Hezbollah, regime and MaT ties who was protected and given a high rank by the MaT leadership but had to leave with his retinue after local hostility made his position unsafe.
https://sana.sy/en/?p=190136
-Official Syrian media says Abu Hamza was a disillusioned MaT member who defected after seeing that within al-Tanf "militants" were being trained to sabotage infrastructure in the desert and equipment was indirectly reaching ISIS. No mention of drugs at all.


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 >>/36067/
Reading my mind with bumping this thread.

Russians tested the new T-14 Armata main battle tank in Syria, among "wartime" conditions.
Gonna find English source, but for now:
https://index.hu/kulfold/2020/04/19/fegyver_orosz_hadsereg_armata_tank_harckocsi_sziria/
This says they tested 600 weapons during their whole participation. Muntarov said Armata is just brilliant, everyone wants to buy it all right I'm exaggerating here a little, he said it was good and there's some foreign interest in it - according to the article, but Russia won't order much, they want to modernize the existent armoured vehicle park.


Germany designated the entirety of Hezbollah including its political wings as a terrorist organization, which should damage funding from the diaspora.
http://www.aymennjawad.org/2020/04/the-fifth-anniversary-of-the-ishtabraq-massacre
And a few days ago was the fifth anniversary of a massacre of hundreds of Alawites in the aftermath of rebel victories in Idlib and Jisr al-Shughur.

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A few months ago the GNA took back a few positions, now I look and they have encircled a part of the LNA and are moving to take the airport. Turkish involvement keeps getting heavier with more Syrian rebels arriving as well as Turkish supplied Drones, M60s and APCs and Turkey is increasing it's official military presence as well.  I guess the ceasefire in Syria is freeing up Turkish resources so they are able to give them such support but they were increasing there presence in Syria as well. They are quite busy indeed.


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So they took the airport, LNA didn't resist too strongly. The war seems to be fairly small scale, I guess because of how small Libya is population wise(it has a population of 6.6million). I think because of this an outside power can influence the tide of the war with minimal intervention if not opposed by the machinations of another outside power.

 >>/37139/
I heard there were Russian mercenaries there and a Russian war plane spotted in the area.

 >>/37255/
Yes, large scale conflict is prevented by the lack of large scale. Also Libya's armed forces were organized during the decades of Gaddafi to be weak and incompetent. Since then the country wasn't in the position to build up any army.


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Here's some stats of the Libyan military. Also a screenshot from the book.
https://www.globalfirepower.com/country-military-strength-detail.asp?country_id=libya
For 2020, Libya is ranked 80 of 138
Total and active military personnel: ~30 000
Airplanes:
- fighter 17
- dedicated attack 2
- attack helicopters 7
250 tanks
450 armored vehicles
50 self-propelled artillery
100 towed artilery
55 rocket projectors
1 frigate, 4 other boats
I have to assume this is the govt. forces (GNA), and does not include rebels (LNA).








With its good momentum the GNA is about to try to reconquer Sirte. To compensate Erdogan's intervention Egypt has officially raised the stakes and approved the deployment of its armed forces to back Haftar:
http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/374923.aspx

I wonder what this means in practice. Will they send foot soldiers to Haftar's rear guard, or even his frontline?

 >>/38718/
How much backing the GNA gets from Turkey. They send fighters from Syria, some war material arrives with them for sure, but do they provide more? Like Russia did in Syria? Or simply more technical support and advisers?

Here's a list what Russia deployed in Syria:
https://rusi.org/publication/rusi-defence-systems/detailing-russian-forces-syria
> The Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) is the world’s oldest and the UK’s leading defence and security think tank
Hm.

Btw Syria, air-defence fire in the southern part of the country, with IAF activity on the other side of the border. Adding 2+2 is just a step away.


https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/libya-conflict-turkey--options-
> When it comes to the governance of Sirte and Jufra, Turkey will arguably be open to different options, rather than the GNA’s full control. Local administration of these areas or the presence of an international force could be alternatives to full control by the GNA or LNA, but the LNA’s control appears to be the main red line for Turkey. 
> While Egyptian intervention or a miscalculated move can’t be ruled out, as Egypt may feel compelled to respond to a military offensive on Sirte-Jufra after its public pledges and threats, the belief is that it would likely be limited, symbolic and more in the form of air strikes than ground operations.

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I was looking up what's up in Libya Turkey and Russia is having some chat about the situation - will they divide the country into two I wonder, giving a little, gaining a little, they made compromises in Syria too but my attention was hijacked by Mali. They just had a coup! And we are talking about coups nowadays.

At the beginning of 2012 the Tuareg uprising broke out in Mali - pushing for independence -, and their president couldn't handle the situation so in a coup d'etat he was removed by a group from the military, calling itself the National Committee for the Restoration of Democracy and State. To resolve the escalating conflict - several armed groups joined in, even al-Qaeda affiliates - the French military had to intervene.
Next year during the presidential elections Ibrahim Boubacar Keita won by large over his opponent Soumaila Cisse, he can be styled as a "unifying figure of the fractured country" who promised zero tolerance for corruption. After his five year term he was re-elected in 2018, again defeated Cisse. However some irregularities were noticed by the opposition during the election.
Keita also became less popular. By 2020 the country got into political, economic, and security crisis. Reform came slow, and were ineffective, public services crumbled, economy halted - the corona panic-pandemic made it even worse -, corruption is running rampant in the government, in inter-ethnic violence thousands died, hundreds of thousands became refugees. However he could keep those armed groups in check which caused headaches to the international partners.
This spring saw a parliamentary elections. Two events left deep impressions in the people: Cisse was kidnapped by terrorists just three days before the first round, and after the second round the Constitutional Court declared 31 seats invalid and handed over 10 to the governing party, making it the biggest faction. Protests broke out in early June and they are going up to date with little pauses. The protesters are held together by an umbrella organization called the June 5 Movement (M5-RFP), they demanded the resignation of the president.

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On Tuesday, 18th, a group of military officers, calling themselves the National Committee for the Salvation of the People arrested Keita and other government officials, then made him resign, what he announced on the 19th, little after midnight. Now this junta is leading the country, according to them they are preparing for a new election, handing back the power to civil governance, in a reasonable time.
Internationally the coup was condemned by everyone ofc, from the Economic Community of West African States (since Mali is a member), through France, South Africa, the African Union, Algeria, Angola, Nigeria, Germany, Turkey, US, China, to the UN. They have to ofc be very concerned, there are some rules to play by, and ofc noone wants to get couped, no need to encourage those. As I read their comments, most of them don't really give a shit about Keita, they just urging to hold an election and get done with the military government asap.

It's easy to spot the parallels with the 2012 coup probably will play out similarly and Mali will return to the internationally sanctified constitutional ways. Heh, one article I read a fun comment, not sure now who said it, but went something like this: "referring to constitutionality is a bad argument, anti-constitutional events happen all over Africa all the time, they are going right now and noone cares" (this isn't an exact quote ofc).
I see an interesting contrast. President Keita is 75 years old, while the group of officers are kinda low ranking (colonel and below) and young ones. The leader of the junta, Colonel Assimi Goita is said to be 37.

 >>/39448/
 >>/39449/
> but my attention was hijacked by Mali. They just had a coup! And we are talking about coups nowadays.

Wonder why nobody has reported that happening

>  To resolve the escalating conflict - several armed groups joined in, even al-Qaeda affiliates - the French military had to intervene.
>  Cisse was kidnapped by terrorists just three days before the first round, and after the second round the Constitutional Court declared 31 seats invalid and handed over 10 to the governing party, making it the biggest faction
> President Keita is 75 years old, while the group of officers are kinda low ranking (colonel and below) and young ones. The leader of the junta, Colonel Assimi Goita is said to be 37.

That sounds legit crazy fam. Why is this not in the news?

 >>/39453/
Well, Mali is a piss poor country at behind God's back. It was in the news tho, just didn't reach headlines for that reason. Also maybe some powers that be don't want to make it too loud.
I got my info from Al Jazeera mostly but I saw other articles from big news agencies when I did some duckduckgoing.

Also it turns out Mali has an tiny army. The size of the country is quite large (but most of it is desert), the population is about the reach 20 million, which isn't that high, but their army personnel is somewhere between 7 and 10 thousand. The 7000 data is kinda old and from Wikipedia, the other figure I got from the website called "Global Firepower" which offers somewhat up to date rankings of the armies of the world.
Despite this number about 13% of their GDP goes into the military.
This force isn't homogeneous, about half of it regular army, the other half is national guards, and militias. Apparently they had to take in the Tuareg paramilitaries as well to appease them.
Gonna try to dig up more.




 >>/39467/
I was just thinking we should make a website dedicated to Mali. If I ddg I only find wiki articles and news. The site would gather stuff about Mali.
I dunno about that, but deserts can be "bound" by planting certain types of vegetation.




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French soldiers are still stationed in Mali. In fact the war of 2012 hasn't ended, only toned down basically to guerilla warfare and sporadic attacks, but no light at the end of the tunnel for now. The countries involved - called the G5 - in the region are: Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Chad. The plus one is France, who has  over 5000 soldiers in these countries. The enemy consists of Islamist armed groups, including the largest an al-Qaeda offshoot group - the "al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb" - and ISIS itself.
Anti-French sentiments are getting stronger in Mali, these days - after the coup - some protesters demand the French troops to leave. And France's, Macron's plan coincides, they want the local troops to take over the bulk of the heavy lifting so French troops can return home (which is already scheduled). It's like the Vietnamisation was in the Vietnam War. Will France manage better?
Btw other countries were involved in the conflict, like Germany, Sweden, Estonia, and China. And ofc more African ones.
The main divide between ethnicities in this equation is the Tuaregs and Arabs vs negers. By 2013 Tuaregs are out of the conflict. Btw about 90% of the population is Muslim.


 >>/39491/
Neocolonialism. Not only do all ethnic groups there speak French as a lingua franca there, they use francs and gained independence.
There has to be some way to enforce the technocracy in Africa; China and France are just the typical agents in this accord.




 >>/39449/
> It's easy to spot the parallels with the 2012 coup probably will play out similarly and Mali will return to the internationally sanctified constitutional ways
Not at all uncommon for militaries to just "shuffle the deck", throwing their weight behind one or another civilian faction, then returning to their quarters.

 >>/39491/
It's their heap of rubbish. They keep close ties with Franceafrique (it's good for business, the deal with those countries keeps them being relevant, for example they get cheap radioactive material for their NPPs, French companies get special treatment in the area, etc.)

 >>/39492/
> Neocolonialism
B-but Macron said no neocolonialism is in play.

 >>/39497/
Yeah they should learn. They can't. Whitey are still exploiting them and their tribal conflicts, now China is there to do the same, and ofc these jihadi fucknuts also want a slice from the pie. And frankly their tribal conflicts and tribal, despotic mentality does not help.

 >>/39498/
No end in the foreseeable future. And if it ends, there will be others in Africa. I wonder how many are ongoing.

 >>/39505/
Yeah. Basically you write about one.



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There is a connection with the conflict in Libya.
Tuaregs in the past had several confrontation with the Mali government - 1963-1964, 1990-1996, 2006, 2012 -, chiefly because their integration into the state's politics and economy is seriously lacking. They wanted a place at the table and they took up fighting for it. I'm lacking in info what results they reached but I assume if they gained anything in time they always lost it again.
Prior to 2012 northern Mali was on the road of decay, arms, drugs, and human trafficking become prominent. In 2011 the "Arab Spring" sprouted the flowers of war in Libya and Tuaregs went there to join the fray from everywhere they lived, from Mali too. Then they returned in 2012 drunk on blood and some military experience under their belt to start their rebellion - which then resulted in deposing the President in a coup by the military.



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This might be of some interest.
I'm reading Perspectives on Military Intelligence from the First World War to Mali - Between Learning and Law (by various authors and editors) in relation to the recent topic.
There are several ongoing peacekeeping mission in Mali, on behalf of the EU, and the UN, since the conflict of 2012. Chapter 9 examines the case of MINUSMA - the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali - at least the intelligence gathering part. It has a couple of memorable tidbits, I'm not finished yet however.
At one point the peacekeeping force consisted about 20 000 military personnel (way larger then Mali's own force), besides they employed policemen, international civilians, UN volunteers, and local hires. Most of the personnel is African in origin.
From intelligence point of view, they were (and are) capable of gathering huge amount of it, since day zero. They have a few ways of collecting intel, from simply talking to locals, through helicopter recon (Dutch army even sent Apaches) and UAVs, to "Open Source Intelligence". However quite a few obstacles is/was rendering it less useful. In the beginning the dedicated units lacked direction, due to the commander of the force only gave vague instructions, the second dude who took over however solved this. But there are many ongoing problems, for example the lack of equipment, especially computers, they could process the data and store it. Language barrier is also a major problem: due to the international nature of the UN forces they speak many languages, but worse people in Mali themselves have many other languages, frequently they don't speak French, which is a lingua franca in the region. Many of UN soldiers illiterate(!), not to mention the locals. One juicy tidbit is that the average people of Mali doesn't understand the nature of the conflict going on around him, they only perceive the quarrels in their local communities between groups and individuals.
Some pages still left from the chapter will see if there's any noteworthy in there.

 >>/39715/
> the average people of Mali doesn't understand the nature of the conflict going on around him, they only perceive the quarrels in their local communities between groups and individuals
In many ways local quarrels aren't details in the big picture but the big picture is a structure tying together local quarrels. The quarrels always existed and once one side happens to be part of a side in the big picture, the other local side will pick the wider opposition side.

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Some maps for Mali.
Btw, the local ISIS in the region is called Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS).
The local branch of al-Qaeda is called Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wa-l-Muslimin (JNIM). One of their prominent leader is called Amadou Kouffa.

 >>/39750/
Hmm. True.
I'm reading a paper now about how fragmented this conflict and its participants are. I found a website of a so called "think tank" which has great many publications related to Mali. These guys (I know nothing about them, just find out they exist):
https://www.clingendael.org/


 >>/39887/
That paper I mentioned isn't really about the fragmentation of the conflict and the participants as I imagined, but more about politics. The author takes the kidnapping of the opposition leader, Soumaila Cisse, as an example for a demonstration. I wanna skim it through once more tomorrow because it contains quite a few absurdities and hilarious details worth mentioning here.
For example the goals of participants. The government (well, now ex-government) seems willing to negotiate a deal with JNIM, however the opposition opposes the negotiation. The rebel groups accuse the government to be a puppet of France, meanwhile France want to run this conflict until all the rebels eradicated, no deals accepted. ISGS also wants to fight to the end. But that's given, liek the sky is blue and the grass is green.

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On the Hungary, the political elite is fairly the same from 1990, they have the same background, social circles they came from, no matter what parties were they in (the only divide was their place during the communism, did they have ties to the Party, or were they in the forming opposition movement). Rejuvenation goes slowly, on one side came the Jobbik, on the other the newer liberal parties (LMP, Momentum), but among their ranks there are people who already had ties to the elite.
In Mali it's worse, because smaller the societal base where politicians could come from, education, profession, connections, people all lack in these. So since 1990 their political elite basically unchanged or those who got into it were already in it with one foot. And people are fed up with them, the traditional parties both on the government and the opposition side, with their leading figures have low popularity - while other public figures, such as clerics enjoy wide support from the populace. And since the social circles of politics are small, they are fairly the same, and personal changes means little for the big picture This also means the most recent coup won't have much effect.
The traditional political elite does what it can to appease Western expectations (France first and foremost) which is mostly ensuring a rule what can be called democratic, and suppressing "terrorist" elements. Since the latter is a tough job and they don't have the resource, they try to satisfy the firs by holding elections regularly, no matter the circumstances. So in these times with the low level war as background noise, this spring they went ahead to keep another - spiced with usual voting "irregularities".

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In central Mali, not far from Timbuktu to the south west, in Niafunké administrative district on 17th March, a candidate of the governing party, the main rival of Soumalainen Cisse in that district was kidnapped by an armed group and held captive for 48 hours.
Central Mali is a place where neither side has decisive control over the region, and the kidnapping of his rival warned Cisse to be careful. He negotiated safe travel with local armed bands, hired local bodyguards instead of relying the government's security forces, and checked in with the local authorities. Such authority was the mayor of Koumaira, who assured him about the safty of his settlement.
On 25th of March however when visiting Koumaira, his delegation was intercepted and kidnapped by another armed group. Only one of his bodyguard lost his life and shortly everyone from his entourage was released. Cisse himself was delivered to Amadou Kouffa, the leader of the JNIM most likely. The last news says he was chained to a tree.
Koumaira’s Mayor, Amadou Kalossi, felt remorse and stepped forward to negotiate of his release, just to find himself kidnapped as well. He was released in early May.
The government wasn't lazy, formed a committee on 31 March, but it took a month to staff fully the board, and they did little in practice.
Roughly 20 other "unofficial" effort was made in parallel to free the leading politician of the oppostion. All failed. They say his family was willing to pay a large sum to an individual who claimed he can deliver, but the guy disappeared with the money.

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Why was he kidnapped? Noone entirely sure, it was evaluated differently. Kouffa can lose as much as he can gain from the act. As the leader of the opposition Cissé was against the negotiation the government had with him, this could be a reason. But Kouffa proving himself untrustworthy with this act could hamper in the very same conciliation - playing on the hand of France, who wants to continue the war.
One detail also spices up the act. Both him and Cisse are from the Peul people, an ethnicity native to Sahel, whom are suffering from considerable stigmatization due to the fact that disproportionately many recruits of the JNIM and the ISGS are from this folk. While Kouffa tries riding two horses simultaneously by showing himself as a Peul community leader and a regional jihadist commander, he could suffer a blowback from behalf of other Peul leaders.

 >>/39887/
> Btw, the local ISIS in the region is called Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS).
> The local branch of al-Qaeda is called Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wa-l-Muslimin (JNIM). One of their prominent leader is called Amadou Kouffa.

Any other debil groups going to be joining this mess in the future?

 >>/39913/
All the participating sides are fragmenting constantly and the fragments switching sides.
For example from the northern rebels a Timbuktu based, chiefly Tuareg militia seceded, and created the Coalition for the People of Azawad (CPA), which switched sides and now supports the government forces. (I think they were the ones I was writing about when I started to post Mali related stuff).
Or Kouffa always have to deal with little bands leaving his JNIM and joining ISGS.
But there are a bunch of more or less independent fighting force, tribal, clan, or locality based. Their leaders often participate in the state in official positions.

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The information processing of the UN peackeepers had its own peculiarities, which hampered the overall effectiveness of their job - besides the caveats I already mentioned related to gathering data.
The first time in the history of UN peackeeping they established a specialized intelligence unit, the All Sources Information Fusion Unit (ASIFU), with localized subunits, and they fitted it into the structure of MINUSMA to cooperate with other branches' intelligence sections. But this led to confusions. For example MINUSMA HQ had 15 officer trusted with intel work, but they lacked in training in that area, however ASIFU had over 70 well trained intel officers. So on one hand due to competence ASIFU tried to lead the intel efforts, but due to it's place in the hierarchy MINUSMA HQ demanded that role to itself.
The different units used different and incompatible databases to store their info, the Dutch used their TITAAN system (used in NATO), but others used SAGE, which is standard for the UN.
Or the Swedish Task Force - subordinated to ASIFU HQ - only shared processed data with the superior unit, and not raw information.
The African units reported their collected raw info to the commander of the unit. Then he passed the still raw info to his superior, then that guy give it one level above, and so on until it landed on the desk of the MINUSMA commander, who confused intelligence officers during briefings who didn't get that info.

ASIFU's main target for its intelligence reports was the Force Commander, but they also made ones for strategic level, for UN organizations and offices above MINUSMA, and also to lower levels, for subunits, and civilian components of the peacekeepers in Mali too. However the needs and what ASIFU provided sometimes differed. Military commanders needed current and security related information, ASIFU prepared long term comprehensive reports.

From now on I want to look up info about the 2012 putsch, or even deviate from Mali, and about coups in general. I'm curious after the Brazilian example.


 >>/40108/
Definitively worth a look. No examples from my subject of study but it appears in the tables at the end. They do cite 1955 and 1961 as examples of successful coups. The first was a preventative legalist countercoup which successfully allowed the elected President to assume office, and the second a failed coup though politically the result was a draw. As it distinguishes military and political perpetrators, more cases than registered were by both political and military factions. The 1964 case is formally known as a "Civilian-military coup" and happened so swiftly through strong support among governors and Congress.


 >>/40117/
What made me post it was what I found it in the Preface of the 2016 Edition.
all through the years to the last coup recorded in 2015, the essence of the coup d’état has remained exactly the same: it is a special form of politics that requires guns as an aid to persuasion, although coups rarely succeed if guns are much used and fail totally if the situation degenerates into civil war—the polar opposite of the swift and bloodless coup d’état.
Made me think that a failure of a coup doesn't just mean it didn't succeed and the people whom they wanted to remove from power will remain, there are other consequences for the act; and yes a civil war is a failure of grand proportion (even if the side wins which started the coup).
And your topic is a very successful putsch, and now I'm thinking those Brazilian officers really did know what they were doing (in a theoretical sense; they might had very incomplete information what is going on out in the field about them and as a consequence they might were very unsure what their next step should be), and avoiding bloodshed was a top priority.

 >>/40121/
It seems to be a study of coup d'etats, by a military historian. I haven't read much of anything but I'm expecting he author dissecting the topic, and making generalized observations based on individual cases.
Here's the short contents:
1. What Is the Coup d’État?
2. When Is a Coup d’État Possible?
3. The Strategy of the Coup d’État
4. The Planning of the Coup d’État
5. The Execution of the Coup d’État



Well I skimmed through the Wikipee article of the 2012 Malian coup, it didn't go as smooth as this year's, they couldn't really seize the president, they needed about two weeks to make him resign. I wanna know more about this, but only this much I could afford today.

What's up with these Malian names?
> Amadou Toumani Touré
Touman was a Hun khan, the first one who unified the steppe people in Asia.
> Soumaïla Cissé
Well, Soumi = Finland, and soumalainen = Finnish.

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This shit is hilarious:
https://www.britannica.com/place/Mali/2012-coup-and-warfare-in-the-north
> but the alliance quickly broke down over Ansar Dine’s insistence on imposing a strict version of Sharīʿah law in the region, which had traditionally embraced a more liberal and tolerant version of Islam.
> more liberal and tolerant version of Islam.

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It's not easy to dig up info on the 2012 coup d'etat of Mali. But some nice pearls can be found out there.
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/23/world/africa/mali-coup-france-calls-for-elections.html
From this article we can learn that the 2012 coup was done by low ranking officers and even enlisted soldiers. The leader was a captain (Amadou Sanogo), and their spokesman was a lieutenant. Now we can read about colonels related to this year's coup.
The army of Mali back then, was 7000 strong, this was reinforced through the years since then. Still considering it's pretty weak and have to cover a large country.
But more importantly the article says that the Tuareg rebellion - which led to the destabilization of the country and triggered the coup - was made possible by the arms the Tuareg fighters obtained in Libya's revolution which deposed and killed Gaddafi, and brought back home.
They link this article, which contains more info about this:
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/06/world/africa/tuaregs-use-qaddafis-arms-for-rebellion-in-mali.html
The Tuaregs gained considerable firepower. Beside their trusty Kalashnikovs now they could deploy machine guns, mortars, anti-tank and anti-aircraft weaponry. They also had first hand battle experience, and started the rebellion with about a thousand soldiers. It seems religious fanaticism also made them more dangerous. Mali's army proved to be impotent against them.
Gaddafi's role however is more deeper than this. Apparently his country played as a base camp, training center for Africa's rebellious groups for decades now. He also supported separatist and rebel movements all over the continent. Tuaregs themselves got their drills while visiting their Libyan cousins basically. In Mali Gaddafi also was a foreign benefactor who helped to develop the country, but the Arab Spring and his death resulted in a conflict still haven't resolved.
The article closes with a quote from a Malian lawmaker:
“The Westerners didn’t want Qaddafi, and they got rid of him, and they created problems for all of us,” he said. “When you chased Qaddafi out in that barbaric fashion, you created 10 more Qaddafis. The whole Saharo-Sahelian region has become unlivable.”

I also found an interesting website:
https://www.strategypage.com
They published a few articles about Mali, I'm gonna check those sometimes. The site main profile is military news, so I'm hopeful.


 >>/40195/
Nope. They just meant secular polity. The intention of the encyclopedia is the usual Western European liberal narration they try to justify importing over 9000 muslims with:
> these guys baaaaad muslims, they make war and shiet
> these guys good muslims, we have to take them in

Also it's just a divide Muslim countries can be cracked along, used in global politics, and goes back to the Cold War era when the SU and the US competed for influence. One side won those who would rule based on Sharia, the other side supported the seculars. In the next country it happened the other way around.



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 >>/40341/
Heh, we do really has a war on our hands.
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/9/29/nagorno-karabakh-battles-continue-for-third-consecutive-day-live
Sending Syrian rebels would be an understandable move on the part of Turkey. Nothing good can come out from those guys sitting on their hands, thinking about ways to pass the time, fiddling with guns and explosives.



 >>/40364/
It must be frustrating being a Syrian rebel, first you fight a war in Syria and then there is a ceasefire so you can't do anything, then you get shipped to Libya and the fighting hits a lull again so you can't do anything and then you get shipped to Azerbaijan, where can they go next? Yemen?


It's not easy to find any deeper data on the coupl of 2012 in Mali, that's not already said. But the Luttwak book started to give the first nuggets. Gonna sum it up little later. Now I've some irl stuff to do, then the stream will start.

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So I'm at the chapter about the preconditions of the coup, and the first one is the Economic Backwardness. Actually this is more than just economy, but everything that a working economy could provide, or prevent:
the general condition of the population is characterized by disease, illiteracy, high birth and death rates, and periodic hunger
Also the divide between the political elite and the rest of the society - even those who belong to local bureaucracy - that prevents the latter actively participating in politics, and not be just simple subjects.
To sum it up:
The social and economic conditions of the target country must be such as to confine political participation to a small fraction of the population.
Mali is one of the poorest country on the Earth, about 165th in GDP (PPP) per capita, and 184th in HDI. Both the paper I mentioned above at the kidnapping of Cisse, and the MINUSMA assessment confirms that the general populace is detached from the political activity, and those who participates are basically from the same circles, makes little difference for the people who is at the helm of the country. The little people and their attention is trapped in their tight world around them, the local community, clan, tribe. For them it's entirely irrelevant if a coup replaces people above their heads.
The fact that the leaders of the country can be picked from a small group leads to the second point: Political Independence. In this section Luttwak points out that coups cannot be successful in countries which are occupied by a foreign power, or dependent on one, without the blessing or at least neutrality of that foreign power. The first example he gave is Hungary: in 1956 the Revolution successfully took over the country's direction, but eventually failed, because the real source of power was Moscow. Luttwak soon arrives to France and her ex-colonies:
Former French colonies in West Africa are the most persistent examples of such dependence because the presence of the former mother country is very real—and very effective. Instead of large and expensive armies, there are military and economic “advisers,” there is economic aid, and, above all, there is the tight web of long-established dependence in nonpolitical spheres.
And:
Although the French have generally opted for neutrality in the face of African coups, intervening only now and then, they have retained in Africa or in rapidly deployable form a force of several thousand air-transportable troops with efficient, albeit light, weapons.
Basically a coup cannot happen in Mali without France deliberately looking the other way. This is made easy by the fact that doesn't matter who's gonna be the next boss in Mali, those guys only can be promoted from Mali's political elite (since noone else with the necessary education, wealth, connections), and this whole political elite holds the approval of the French government. For France it doesn't matter who holds the reign in Mali, all candidates considered presentable. Oh yeah, they express their concerns about "constitutionalism", they did both 2012 and 2020, but that's a routine act for the international community.

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Among those quotes some other remarks are mixed.
a few companies of French troops inserted in January 2013 defeated the Islamist insurgents who were conquering the vastness of Mali.
That may not sound like a large force, but it is huge when compared to the efficient bits of local armies (whose troops are worthless for the most part), so that French interventions have usually been decisive.
In comparison after 7 years of struggle Mali still isn't pacified. While the Tuareg rebellion was quenched, the rest of Al-Qaeda and the local ISIS branch are still at large and causing problems.
A coup could have been countered by the French if they wanted, especially in 2012 when the President got away and was in hiding for weeks, but France did not want to intervene. I would expect further coups in Mali, until the other preconditions for the coups eradicated.

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Had to look up what's this Armenian-Azeri war is about. Judging by the threads on Kohl, it's about Russia vs Ukraine. Wikipedia says it's about a region's ownership/independence, and they call it the war by the region's name as "2020 Nagorno-Karabakh conflict". But learning from the moral of the previous stories, and from the information morsels here and there it may be very well another arm wrestling of the major powers of the area.
I heard something that the Hungarian government supports Azerbaijan following the directive "no border changes ever" which I find curious since:
1. they support Catalonia's independence
2. France can support Armenia
3. there were a bunch of border changes already
4. Nagorno-Karabakh is for about 25 years under Armenian control
Such cases.

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Found fun shit in the Luttwak book, about USian security and intelligence agencies, about the whole bloated structure it is today. Quotes are incoming. 
the intelligence community has grown enormously into a many headed bureaucratic monster, largely because each intelligence failure caused by gross errors induces Congress to give even more money to those who fail, instead of the opposite.
the abolition of the wartime stand-alone Office of Strategic Services (OSS) was followed by the formation of the very small and improvised Central Intelligence Group with some OSS people as a temporary expedient. At that point, the State Department could have easily absorbed that orphan entity, but the career Foreign Service Officers of those days disliked its ex-OSS “émigré” (read Jewish) intellectuals and assorted tough guys and, therefore, allowed the rise of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) as an entirely independent agency—which over the years has gained ever greater funding (regardless of its abysmal performance) and has become a powerful competitor in the policymaking process.
Worse still, the CIA itself failed to live up to its name from the start because the army, navy, and the air force retained their own separate intelligence organizations. [...] the Defense Intelligence Agency, did not include the codebreakers — a handful of talents pre-1941, in the thousands by 1945, and later embodied into the immense National Security Agency (NSA), whose ambition to intercept any and every electromagnetic transmission, including the idle chatter of infants with cell phones [keks], was merely dented by the revelations of Edward Snowden, the most patriotic of traitors. But the hydra has many more heads, 19 of them at the last count, though there may be more
The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), whose thousands of employees include very few people who know any foreign languages other than Spanish perhaps, even fewer people who know any useful language
The very much larger NSA, with the world’s largest gathering of computers and an ever-growing number of linguists who can translate an ever-shrinking proportion of all communications intercepted. (Hilarious.)


 >>/40486/
>  >Hungarian government
>  >no border changes ever
> Ironic.
Well, nothing much that could be taken seriously. Since 1990 governments had to gave upon the border revision a couple of times, Fidesz had to as well, not just the previous governments. I don't think it's in the foreign policy to support officially Székelyföld's autonomy, which is far from border corrections. Politicians here and there from the Fidesz expressed their support (especially since Hungarians with double citizenship can vote, so they need to be friendly with them) but nothing like independence, or gib back clay. In the Jobbik, sure, but again not as official policy. And even Jobbik cannot be taken seriously, they'll never get into the government, and from farther right, it gets more weightless.
Many Hungarians would support revision, it's not a political reality however. Now.



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Baijanis take their time with this campaign. Gained some grounds, but considering that southern tip is more even terrain, they won't have easier going later.
Lots of chatter about drone strikes made by the Azeris, seen some vids too.

Meanwhile Libya is getting into an impasse. Situation balanced out. It feels like a pattern, powers coming in (Russia and Turkey), and they divide the place and solidifying the situation at their leisure, not restoring the original form of the countries, but making them divided for unknown length.

 >>/40599/
Azerbaijan made major breakthroughs in the past 2 days, their strategy of slowly hammering Armenian forces to breaking point and then making rapid advancements seems to be paying off. Additionally, Armenian forces apparently tried to lure Azerbaijani forces into a trap near Shushi region and ended up getting surrounded and destroyed, leading to Azerbaijan making even more advancements. Apparently there's reports of heated clashes near Lacin now, which means Armenia's southern flank has completely collapsed and they don't have enough soldiers to reinforce anymore.

Libya, I don't even know what the fuck is going on anymore. Sarraj resigned, which caused chaos across the board and now Haftar is holding a bunch of Italian fishermen hostage and demanding an exchange for some human traffickers that Italy arrested. Additionally, UN is trying to broker another ceasefire and as expected, GNA is quickly on-board demonstrating how committed to peace they are and shit, while LNA, realizing that they are probably going to get screwed by any agreement, seem to be stubbornly resisting. Unlike Syria, I think Libya isn't going to end at an indefinite impasse, one side is going to dominate eventually.


 >>/40645/
Currently contained to Nagorno-Karabakh itself, with occasional shelling by Armenian forces of Azerbaijani cities closer to their border. Not sure what they are trying to achieve with that, it just makes them look bad in the international sphere despite some foreign media outlets making not so subtle attempts to run interference for them.


 >>/40641/
 >>/40645/

Pretty interesting that Armenia isn't officially part of conflict, it doesn't even recognize Karabakh independence (!), although de-facto it is Armenian territory. This is one reason why Armenia couldn't use own forces fully, but Azerbaijan could (because it is officially their own land and they do what they want).

Armenia also has no allies, nor proper army to act against both Azerbaijan and Turkey (that silently backs Azerbaijan), so it couldn't, for example, use aviation openly (although Azeris also hesistant to use it to slow the escalation).

Another problem of Armenia is complete unpreparedness. They won in 90s with less numbers and worse equipment than Azerbaijan had, only on quality of forces, but then didn't do anything. Although few years ago another clash displayed that Azeris pushed large amount of money in the army and now are much better prepared to conflict. That clash didn't change anything, Armenians still has no anti-drone weapons or proper tactics in new situation, and lose in combat badly.

Some videos from Azerbaijan MoD:

https://youtube.com/watch?v=jUB3TLnpiWY
https://youtube.com/watch?v=_-HYLEpBbrg
https://youtube.com/watch?v=uvV4feHuLdo



 >>/40667/
Well, it's in the thousands. Armenia literally announced total mobilization of their entire country, asking civilians to grab whatever they can and charge east to fight Azerbaijan. This definitely ain't no small skirmish anymore.

 >>/40668/
Armenia is definitely part of the conflict, the armed forces of Armenian NK are basically an extension of their own. Hell, officials who served in the "Republic of Artsakh" government went on to serve in the Armenian one and RoA has direct representation in Armenian government. They just don't officially recognize it because it would mean a whole heap of political headaches for them that would weaken their political position more than it already has been (though that might be changing now with Pashinyan pulling out all the stops). Azerbaijan is actually the one handicapped here because Armenia can directly attack them, claim it's actually Nagorno-Karabakh's forces and Azerbaijan can't attack Armenia in response, only keep pushing into NK.

 >>/40673/
Russia sells weapons to Azerbaijan, it gives them to Armenia for free (there was a hilarious moment about this recently where Pashinyan complained to Putin that the missiles Russia gave them are busted - Putin replied that they have ones that work but they cost money). This is why Armenia is in such deep shit now, this is the first conflict with Azerbaijan where they haven't had massive Russian backing because their government has been shitting on Russia and Putin for too long. France seems to have stepped in to send them some supplies though and Russia still sends them some stuff through Iran, even though it's less now. And apparently they have some Kurdish militants fighting for them now although that is uncertain much like the Syrian mercenaries for Azerbaijan story.

 >>/40683/
> apparently they have some Kurdish militants fighting for them now although that is uncertain much like the Syrian mercenaries for Azerbaijan story.
Pretty sure the Kurds are a Turkish/Azeri fabrication. On the other hand there's plenty of evidence for the TFSA fighters.

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 >>/40670/
> Russia has a military base in armenia yo

Russia has friendly relations with both sides. Armenian relations had some cooling recently, but they are still friends.

Actually, Russia is in lose-lose situation. If it backs Armenia, Azerbaijan would be lost, and Russia has no good way to influence Azerbaijan in another way (economics aren't that highly tied, Azerbaijan also has own oil and ways to export it). If Russia backs Azerbaijan, it loses Armenia that can then go westward and became Georgia-like "NATO friend". But Armenia is less valuable ally, because it is basically an empty country without people and any reasonable economics (all Armenians are abroad, really). In both cases Russia loses one ally at south border.

In these types of situations regional superpower must say "just stop", without backing anyone, and both countries must stop. Otherwise superpower isn't really a superpower. But looks like "just stop" doesn't work, at least now. Maybe Moscow waits until new Armenian government became friendlier (i.e. until Armenia loses and cry for help).


 >>/40684/
Apparently the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service straight-up confirmed that there are both Kurdish and Syrian fighters in the area, so it seems both sides are using external help. The Kurdish militants I can swallow a bit easier because Armenia has had friendly relations with groups like PKK for years, while I have no idea why Azerbaijan would permit Sunni jihadists to come to the frontline. They'd sooner shoot their Shi'a comrades than Armenians and according to Armenian claims, there are already cases of them refusing to fight. But, it is what it is.

 >>/40689/
I don't think it's exactly lose-lose. If Armenia loses NK, Pashinyan gets the boot and likely another pro-Russian puppet gets installed in government, which means Russia regains their influence over Armenia. Their relationship with Azerbaijan remains the same. The only wildcard is Turkey. Their relationship with Azerbaijan could possibly get much stronger, so Russia will need to watch that. That's why I think Putin is pushing for peacekeepers now. He knows the stalemate that's been going on in Karabakh for 20 years is likely gone now, so he needs to find another way to play a balancing act in the region.

 >>/40699/
> I have no idea why Azerbaijan would permit Sunni jihadists to come to the frontline
A lot of the TFSA are Syrian Turkmen, they're fighting for ethnic reasons. But more importantly the ones who've volunteered to go abroad are mercenaries, they're doing it for the money.

If the area they are fighting for is so desolate and poor why are they fighting over it? 

Doesnt make sense to me. Does it have oil or is it important for the assbadjan pipeline?

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Luttwak ofc writes about the foreign reactions triggered by the coup:
one particular problem, however, requires further exploration: recognition by foreign powers.
And parts of these insights feels as if they were moulded after Mali.
for the poorest countries whose pays réel lies outside their own borders, it will be a crucial problem - Mali as one of the most pisspoor part of Franceafrique, heavily dependent on France.
When much of the available disposable funds come from foreign aid both official and via non-governmental organizations [...] the maintenance of good relations with the particular donor country [...] may well be a determining factor in our political survival after the coup. - for Mali - as one of the most poorest country on Earth, where economic development is almost nonexistent, and large part of the country is a warzone for 8 years now - foreign aid is crucial, as soon as the news of the coup got out, the African Union for example announced embargo. But more than that, foreign troops are present in the form of not one, but three international military/peacekeeping missions, they are ever present, and they influence the life of the country on daily basis.
Premature recognition by a foreign power, i.e., recognition granted while the old regime still retains some degree of control, is becoming regarded as a form of aggression in international law. - The coup of 2020 was done very quick and without incidents, unlike the 2012 one. Still no foreign powers went ahead and recognized the junta, not even Russia or Turkey.
Beyond that, however, recognition is usually granted even to very illegitimate governments after a polite interval if there are convincing assurances about their continuity in terms of foreign relations. These assurances are conveyed simply and publicly by formal announcements stating that membership in alliances and groupings will be maintained, that foreign agreements and obligations will be respected, and that legitimate foreign interests in the country concerned will - The whole coup was about just putting aside the leadership and giving a way to a new civilian government who would change the inner policies (initiating economic growth, shutting down corruption etc), but honor foreign treaties. Foreign powers, and organizations like UN or African Union demanded adhering to constitutionality, and the Junta in their declarations and press releases weren't slow to promise the announcement of new elections asap.
The whole coup in Mali very much went down in a way to please everyone who has any power over Mali.





 >>/40668/
So basically the odds Armenia is facing aren't in their favors, not one bit.
> unpreparedness
> no anti-drone weapons
They probably try to make steps to remedy that. Will they be quick enough is the question. Or is the situation salvageable at all.

 >>/40683/
> They just don't officially recognize it because it would mean a whole heap of political headaches for them that would weaken their political position more than it already has been
The change in military position would be more urgent since that would give the permission to Azerbaijan to attack Armenia proper, and open a whole new front.

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Azerbaijan has made full use of the flat terrain in the south. The juiciest target would now be the Lachin corridor, the road from Armenia proper to Stepaakert, though going up the mountains Armenian vehicles will be better concealed from drones, the line of supply itself is short and ATGMs have more opportunities to ambush Azeri vehicles.

https://akmckeever.com/2020/10/26/sna-mercenaries-in-azerbaijan-the-visual-evidence/
> In conclusion there is significant visual evidence verifying the presence of SNA mercenaries in the ongoing Nagorno-Karabakh war. A number of videos filmed by men speaking Syrian Arabic, sometimes identifying the factions they’re affiliated with, have been geolocated to southern front of the conflict. Further video and imagery shows men identified as Syrians all in the same Azerbaijani Border Service fatigues. In addition to this, numerous researchers and media outlets have collected testimony from fighters in Azerbaijan themselves, as well as from their family members, representing further evidence of this deployment directly from those involved. 
Some details:
> one of the Syrians makes the ‘Grey Wolves’ salute, a hand gesture used by Turkish ultranationalist
> The first image was published on September 30th by Jesr Press, a media outlet from eastern Syria, reportedly showing the dying breathes of a man named Abdul Razzaq (‘Abu Hurairah’) from the largely Turkmen-populated village of Tasnin (Homs Governorate)

 >>/40742/
 >>/40750/
I'd love a sectarian attrition warfare game, an Assad Simulator, focusing on the economic, demographic and internal political dynamics. Local populations are numbered, mobile and divided by ethnoreligious group and political allegiance. Each side must maintain a power base in face of societal and economic collapse long enough to bleed out the other ones.

 >>/40758/
> Azerbaijan has made full use of the flat terrain in the south
Wonder how the mountains will suit them. Large military movements are forced onto roads, and there they are prone to harm.
> I'd love a sectarian attrition warfare game...
Kc-tier.

 >>/40750/
> Isn't that Victoria 2? And Tropico? Managing a banana republic without getting couped does sound like Tropico.
> Although it would be an awesome game if you had to play the one who tries to coup the regime.

I was thinking more like a new EA games Battlefield game or CoD. Or just an original I.P doing it. Dunno


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The war is ending in Karabakh. Proofs:
https://www.rt.com/russia/506324-nagorno-karabakh-battlefield-victory/
> The Nagorno-Karabakh peace deal amounts to a triumph of Russian diplomacy, miraculously turning a lose-lose mess into win-win.
t. Paul Robinson
Basically Azeris get the provinces they captured now, and later Armenia will give back the rest. There's something about a tiny piece of land that will remain in Armenia's control. What will be with the Armenian majority of the area? I dunno. The deal doesn't sort out the future of the Nagarno-Karabakh, it seems Armenia still pushes for the international recognition of its independence, which sounds impossible, but maybe autonomy is a possible scenario.
Russian peacekeepers are setting up "observation points" which pretty much is reminding me of the Turkish ones in Syria.

 >>/40953/
> turning a lose-lose mess into win-win.
Certainly a win for Russia as Armenia will become more dependent. On the other hand Azerbaijan can't be allowed to grow too strong or it'll drift further away, it has already found a powerful alternative to Russia in the form of Turkey.

> What will be with the Armenian majority of the area?
They'll leave, like the Azeris had to three decades ago.
https://www.rferl.org/a/mass-exodus-as-armenians-flee-nagorno-karabakh/30945120.html

> Russian peacekeepers are setting up "observation points" which pretty much is reminding me of the Turkish ones in Syria.
Notably while the world's attention was on Artsakh Erdogan evacuated several of those.
Which makes me wonder about his foreign policy. His internal management has been a disaster but externally he can claim several victories: giving a life extension to the Syrian rebels, saving the western Libyan government and now giving a triumph to his ally Azerbaijan and the promise of a road cutting through Armenia, achieving a pan-Turkic ambition and potentially opening the way to Central Asia. He can project power with an army of Syrian mercenaries and swarms of drones. Yet this came at a cost of accumulating enemies, the entire eastern Mediterranean is against him and there's a lot of resentment against Turkish influence abroad.

 >>/40985/
> giving a triumph to his ally Azerbaijan

> swarm of drones

Was Turkey that influential in this short war? Advertisement for military drone merchants again, but did Azerbaijan get them from Turkey? Cube, Russia, others?


 >>/40985/
I think Erdo also managed to put some pressure onto the EU with the threat of opening the refugee tap. The Libya thing aimed to halt the Israeli gas pipe reaching Grease and opening a direct border with Libya on the sea. I think he failed with that.
I think we could evaluate that he managed to inflate the image of Turkey as power to count with for the short term, by exploiting the Syrian conflict at every move. The real result is better relations with Russia despite they are on the other side of the table in every conflict.

 >>/40986/
I also heard the drones were from Turkey.

 >>/40985/
 >>/40985/
> pan-Turk
nobody from higher ups even have idea of it, don't eat whatever media says, erdoğan just needs to secure the next election, he is just too concerned with it, western media nowadays seems to create fake aggressor from erdoğan even though his real image already providing enough milk for anti-Türk point of view. Not to mention certain populists act exactly like erdo, cause fear, antagonize and get votes.

As for syrian mercs, many of them are ethnic Turkmens from syria, they are not syrian arabs or whatever media portrays them. I have seen too many "syrian mercenary" video where the people speak Turkish without funny foreign accents.


 >>/41004/
Here is the thing, he can just say "fuck you, Turkey needs me" and stay on top. 

BUT erdoğan has reached in agreement with non-party organizations, mainly eurasianist side of the military who replaced gülenist traitors after the purge. So in our conflicts, it's very likely military and erdo conflicting secretly, just like hitler and top brass conflicting despite no media to show it. (duh) 

Anyway if he just takes the "fuck you" way it is likely military would intervene, if you think military is absoulutely loyal then you need to explain why he is currently trying to create an alternative army.

And AKP votes are getting lower they are getting more dependent on MHP and MHP are loyal as long as they are content with what erdo gives them and they wont like it, when erdo causing so much turbulence just because his personal ambitions.

Not to mention erdo does not have an heir, none of his relatives are popular. In Turkey all popular leaders relatives at best got a seat in parliment for 4 years and that's that, people themselves don't care them.

Erdoğan is very cornered and panicked. This is what the media doesnt tell you, well you can't really antagonize a country by showing a panicked leader can you?
You need to show him as powerful tyrant not as panicked defensive man.

 >>/41007/
> This is what the media doesnt tell you
Well I dunno what Turkish media tells, from our media I can only learn that Orbán = Putin + Erdogan. That's the most they tell anything about Turkey.
> trying to create an alternative army
Tell me more about this. The Luttwak book goes into anti-coup policies, setting up redundant intelligence agencies, designated loyal army units, parallel military organizations (liek a badly equipped army, but well equipped militia), etc. The book mentions Turkey and Erdogan specifically a couple of times, but beside that it's a recommended reading.


 >>/41009/
> Well I dunno what Turkish media tells, from our media I can only learn that Orbán = Putin + Erdogan. That's the most they tell anything about Turkey.
just lol

> Tell me more about this. The Luttwak book goes into anti-coup policies, setting up redundant intelligence agencies, designated loyal army units, parallel military organizations (liek a badly equipped army, but well equipped militia), etc. The book mentions Turkey and Erdogan specifically a couple of times, but beside that it's a recommended reading.
I can't speak too much about this for various reasons. Just dig about SADAT and filter the "literally hitler omg" parts and focus on panicked leader parts I was talking about.

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Vatnik analysis:
https://www.unz.com/akarlin/military-lessons-of-karabakh-war-2020/
He sums it up as Azerbaijan going from a chaotic state in the 90s to having a strong government which effectively converted a bigger economy and population into military power, while Armenia failed geopolitically by distancing itself from Russia.

There's shooting going on in West Sahara and Ethiopia:
https://southfront.org/war-started-in-western-sahara/
https://southfront.org/ethiopian-pm-claims-his-forces-liberated-western-part-of-tigray/

 >>/41010/
I also heard Israel is on friendly terms with Armenia. Not that they couldn't support Azerbaijan. Plus I haven't checked this. Tho would make sense being another non-Muslim country in the region.

 >>/41012/
Gonna try ddg it.

 >>/41013/
> average IQ around 90
KC-tire.
To be honest not easy to stand against a country with population three times larger. Plus foreign backing. Not to mention the legitimacy of the question, whole word acknowledging the region as part of Azerbaijan, makes the situation pissing against the wind for Armenia.
> Armenia failed geopolitically by distancing itself from Russia.
It's hard to distance yourself from Russia if Russia is one of your neighbours. Even here, a bit further isn't that convenient sometimes. And if you get Turkey and Iran as other neighbours, and you aren't Muslim, not many choices exists.
This one is interesting tidbit:
> modern high-intensity wars between peers – as opposed to more anodyne peacekeeping or anti-insurgency campaigns – still eat up manpower and materiel at essentially World War II level rates. Remarkably little has changed in that respect!

Gonna check the other conflicts sometimes.

 >>/41014/
> Plus foreign backing
Armenia has visited  from russia to france to israel to  to Qatar to Iran to USA to..  everyone and everything.

You forgot the part where armenians almost completely reliant of russian military yet they thought they are the top shit and go pro west. It's glaringly retarded to say fuck off to the country that you are completely dependent on, it has nothing to do with their neighbours they had it coming. If they werent so vehement anti Türks they could have more flexiabl foreign policy.

We are the first country recognize them in both 1918 and 1991 they still relentlessly sabotaged every attempt with goodwill, created a terrorist organization called ASALA that assassinated Turkish diplomats and other civilians and got shot down only after they targeted a plane with ethnic french people in it instead of ethnic Türk ones. 

They did all kinds of nasty shit while hiding their "big brothers" back and eventually paid the price, by losing the lands they invaded.

 >>/41007/
> Not to mention erdo does not have an heir

Not great for him. And maybe for turks. Yesteryear popular strongmen used to have political succession and power stability high on their priority lists. He is not the only counterexample of our time. Seems odd. Even wrong.
 >>/41013/
Learned another epithet for faget western liberal universalist cultural marxists: sorosite! Worth the 15 minutes.



So Donald Trump is apparently halving troop numbers in Iraq and Afghanistan. I had heard he sacked his minister of defence shortly after the election, this must be the reason he did that I don't think a US defence minister would agree to this.

So how will this affect Syria I wonder? The logistics for the US forces in Syria of course run through Iraq and whatever is deployed in Iraq is in a position to be deployed in Syria quickly and easily, and whatever air assets are in Iraq can be used in Syria. Maybe they are withdrawing from Syria as well but I doubt that, this will leave them more vulnerable and with fewer resources in this theatre though. But who knows, it could be just political, if it's that important then Biden will have to send the troops back and that will make him look bad which may be the whole point.


 >>/41050/
Haven't they pulled the troops from Syria already? They were working with the SDF, but when Turkey went on to establish the security zone they gave up the "defense" of Northern Syria and let the Syrian Army to take over. I dunno maybe they still operating in Deir ez-Zor area.

 >>/41057/
> Haven't they pulled the troops from Syria already?
Not entirely, some troops are still occupying oil fields east of the Euphrates. And there's the occupation of al-Tanf, which is supplied from Jordan and hence doesn't need Iraq.


 >>/40986/
Not really that influential. They sold drones to Azerbaijan and their army personnel provided some training in combat tactics to Azerbaijan before the war but outside of that, not much. The biggest action they undertook was parking F-16s in Azerbaijan to deter Russia, Iran or France from doing anything stupid to help Armenia. Mercenaries are still kind of a grey area, it's possible some volunteers showed up but I don't see much actual evidence. One video of them driving was clearly not from Azerbaijan, another of a Syrian "mercenary" confessing turned out to be a Syrian-Armenian in Azerbaijani border guard uniform.

 >>/41050/
One rumor I heard is that the US is preparing to do some "rebel backing" in East Turkestan with the Uighurs. Seeing as China is Numero Uno on the USA's shitlist now, it makes sense that they'd try to destabilize. Could end up with WW3 in the worst case scenario and Vietnam 2.0 in the best case scenario if they really are stupid enough to go through with it. And with Biden increasingly likely a shoe-in (even with Trump's lawsuits, he's done for. He's not been officially booted out but let's face it, if he doesn't get something major by January 20, he's finished), looks like we're back in the "wars for freedom and democracy" era.


 >>/41156/
> Well, supposed to.

Yeah, that's the thing, nothing's been going according to plan since 2020 started. I mean the year literally kicked-off with Soleimani getting whacked on, what, the 1st day after New Year's? And it hasn't slowed down since.

And Trump's gonna keep this shitshow running all the way until the end. I'll be honest, I'd rather take Trump over Biden but at this point, I'm kinda looking forward to the inevitable MAGA crowd meltdown when Biden officially gets sworn in.


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Anyway. Another possibility - I don't know how real can be, but still a possibility - on behalf of the US is to start something in Venezuela in the next presidential cycle. I'm not sure where I read this, but they might shut down internal oil production, the whole or just partially (I know due to the sinking of oil prices their shale oil extraction does not worth it), so they might wanna secure some cheap options.


 >>/41152/
> Mercenaries are still kind of a grey area, it's possible some volunteers showed up but I don't see much actual evidence. One video of them driving was clearly not from Azerbaijan, another of a Syrian "mercenary" confessing turned out to be a Syrian-Armenian in Azerbaijani border guard uniform
 >>/40758/ sounds conclusive to me. Also important is that such rumors began a few days before the war itself.

 >>/41166/
All they have to do is endorse a proper coup d'état. Then regression to the mean can begin.

 >>/41193/
I've seen the videos, problem is that several of them are easily-identifiable fakes. Like I said, a video of Syrians in trucks driving was clearly not from Azerbaijan because they were driving on the wrong side of the road. Another was an "interview" with a Syrian fighter for Azerbaijan who turned out to be a Syrian-Armenian in Azeri border guard uniform. A third was a barren town implied to be in Nagorno-Karabakh, except NK is a wooded, mountainous region, it doesn't look anything like, for example, central Syria. Another problem is that those videos purporting to be evidence of Syrian mercenaries were published several days in locations before the actual Azerbaijani army actually took them over, which makes it rather unlikely that they were the ones that filmed them. Not implying anything about the Armenian military but as I pointed out above, they already got busted once trying to fake footage. Turkey also hasn't really ever been shy about deploying mercenaries in full view which makes it weird that they'd deny it this time, while Armenians have every reason to convince international observers that there are Syrian jihadis fighting for Azerbaijan. What I do buy is that Turkmen/Armenian volunteers may have traveled the border to join the fight. That is very likely considering the proximity of NK to certain regions.

 >>/41166/
I don't think the US oil industry is that important in the long term. Alternative energy sources are already seriously taking off and I think even the US is starting to realize that they don't really need to bet on oil that much anymore. Observe, for example, Saudi Arabia's politics in the past year or two. So if Venezuela gets another US-backed regime change, it will be to keep Russian/Chinese influence out.

 >>/41193/
 >>/41221/
Problem is too much misinformation in the ether. Even if something is true it can be discredited it with the flood of easily accessible bs.

 >>/41193/
Maybe they're one coup away but I'm sure they can take the hard road for the "good" cause if they really want.

 >>/41222/
Oil plays a huge part in manufacturing just about anything due to plastics too. Not just a source of energy. Even in manufacturing the stuff needed to exploit the alternative energy sources. Btw, the only real alternative is still fission.

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Checking out this Mali conflict again. Not much is going on, but here's a tidbit might worthy of attention.
The French 17th parachute engineer regiment built a star fort style base, back in 2018, somewhere near Ménaka and Labbézanga. And perhaps at other places.
Here's two articles:
https://defensionem.com/vauban-star-forts-french-army-goes-retro-in-mali/
https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/weapons/a35084150/vauban-fortification-star-forts-french-army-north-africa/
And one more with pretty pictures:
https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/35863/the-french-army-is-building-renaissance-style-fortresses-in-africa

Maybe they can be seen on Google Earth. I couldn't find it at Labbézanga, maybe it's there somewhere I just lack the time.
Back in WWII when Hungarian forces built fortifications in the Carpathians, first they inspected other forts like the Maginot line and drew conclusions from their experiences. They saw - what lacked in the Maginot - that a good fortification can be defended from threats all around, even if the lines of the fortifications are broken through, defenders can place fire where the attackers penetrated the defenses, and hold the enemy in place instead of letting them flood through; and in worst case scenario when surrounded and isolated from the rest of the chain of forts, they still can continue the fight effectively toward every direction.
I think these forts in the Malian desert and savannah are similar in this question, they are capable of mounting defence all around, even with small teams, modern weapons enable sufficient firepower. And unless Malian desert warriors on their dirt bikes suddenly can install mortar teams and howitzer batteries with precision targeting, these forts can practically defend themselves with small crews, allowing the bulk of the troops going on patrols, and busy themselves elsewhere while knowing they have safe havens to return to.


 >>/41923/
It's hard to see from this image but that outer trench looks more like a ditch than a trench, the sides look too shallow. Maybe it's made to stop things like that. In fact it almost looks like it may not even be a ditch but that the whole area of the fort is raised.

 >>/41923/
I think they have some anti-vehicle weaponry in there too. But if they can mistake the suicide bomber with a civilian that could suck balls.
Too bad it cannot be seen where the defence is deployed, where they would do it, they have bastions which should offer cover on the side. Eh, gonna write about this later.

 >>/41924/
It's a ditch. A "moat". On the left there's a bridge over it.

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Here's the other photo that featured in the tweet linked in one of the articles here:  >>/41922/
The Frenchies made patrician choice when built bastions with indentations, since fighting positions are covered by the faces of the bastions. However from these pics I can't really tell if they formed those positions for the purpose or the whole fort just uniform stacked hesco barriers. And I also no idea what are those long thingies - reminding me of shipping containers - there, placed randomly everywhere, inside he bastions too in a very disorderly fashion.
Searched a little about modern field fortifications, because I remembered battle of Wanat, where an unfinished small unit combat outpost was attacked by Talibans. I found two interesting thing, a documentary was filmed with the title Restrepo (not about Wanat, but a deployment of a unit in Afghanistan), and this:
https://www.design.iastate.edu/projects/design-for-modern-warfare/?c=interior-design
Okay, it's about "interior design" but that fortification is nowhere from Vauban's sophistication (I would expect the dude to be familiar with Vauban's work if the designs military shit, I would expect him to know a lot about all kinds of defensive buildings from the antiquity to the present).



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 >>/41958/
> Okay, it's about "interior design" but that fortification is nowhere from Vauban's sophistication (I would expect the dude to be familiar with Vauban's work if the designs military shit, I would expect him to know a lot about all kinds of defensive buildings from the antiquity to the present).

It is just a similar looking fort, but not fort made by Vauban principles. His works were about protection from ricochet fire, different types of artillery etc, There were plenty of different concepts, reverse-sloped rows, counterscarps, different wall height.

But those Mali "forts" are just look like that from above. Looks like their commander is an educated history lover, and tried to make it beautiful, in old style.

But whatever, no one in sane mind would really attack French forces, so they need to protect themselves only from rare crazy jihadis, not from proper enemy army.

 >>/41985/
> but not fort made by Vauban principles.
> But those Mali "forts" are just look like that from above. Looks like their commander is an educated history lover, and tried to make it beautiful, in old style
Well, maybe. My supposition is that they wanted something they could hold with just a few people.
> protect themselves only from rare crazy jihadis, not from proper enemy army.
This is why that fort should be effective.

Why has Erdogan kept Assad as his enemy? They used to be friends and the breakup after the Arab Spring is easy to understand as Erdo judging Assad would fall like Gaddafi or Mubarak and betting on the opposition. But a lot has changed. Why does he insist on the lost cause of the rebels?

 >>/42437/
Maybe partially it's a prestige thing. Now he can be topdog at the conference table who can negotiate with Putin as an equal. On Assad side he would be secondary after Putin.

What's up with the US role in Syria? After Biden took over the wheel I read some brief headline or something that US armored vehicles are crossing Syrian border from Iraq. And I saw predictions from before that with Biden the wars and aggression will renew from the part of the US.

 >>/42437/
I think he wants to expand his sphere of influence, Syria would never submit to him under Assad and Turkey can only ever be a junior partner to Russia thus putting Syria in Russia's sphere not Turkey's(and given the state of Russo-Turkish relations that may not be in their interest). He will not get the whole of Syria by backing rebels but he does get a buffer zone at least. Although at what cost?

Also, Turkey has been furthering efforts towards control of the Mediterranean as well, though I don't think Syria is much of a threat to this(although maybe as a Russian proxy they could be) so I can't say how much that contributes.

 >>/42462/
> And I saw predictions from before that with Biden the wars and aggression will renew from the part of the US.

He is bringing the US back into a more global mindset. He already rescinded Trumps plan to send home troops from Germany. So maybe it could lead to a war, however interestingly enough he did also state that he is going to stop supporting the Saudis in Yemen and try to force an end to that war.




 >>/42437/
Erdoğan made a bet alongside with NATO and he lost it. I know that we can reconcile with Assad but it's not that easy because:

USA returned with super hawk cabinet. They will increase the pressure on Assad.

We created a dam decades ago which fucked Assads country, they have butthurt about it.

Ba'atists never liked us, because they were in Russian sphere of influence and we were in NATOs.

But since Syria lost Golan Heights for good, Damascus is ore vulnerable than ever, so they need us. And we need them to wipe out American proxy YPG. 

Also Assad is quite happy as Sunni Arabs has been banished from his lands, but the thing is despite Kurds used to have very low percentage, it increased due to refugee wave. So if Assad wants to return to statusquo, he needs the refugees that we are keeping. But Erdoğan is an islamist and quite moron, he doesnt know he can fight all fronts and win all of them. We need to reconcile and resettle the refugees and wipe out YPG. If EU and USA complains they can take the refugees instead of complaining like a clueless naughty child.

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Checked the Syria liveuamap because why not.
Couple of interesting things going on actually.
SAA is busy south of Idlib.
US troops finished an airstrip. This is highly related to our topic  >>/42484/ they want to move moar troops, armament, and supply there quick. Or maybe they want to organize tour flights with Cessnas and such.
Some activity against YPG on behalf of Turkey, I think it's just the usual level however.
Haha, Benin.

Antony Blinken, Biden's secretary of state, is a known Syria hawk and a harsher American stance against Assad is a certainty. But the bigger question is how he'll approach Turkey. There's suggestions he'll be harsher on Erdogan, but then there's little he can do other than hold America's ground. If America does approach Turkey, then another question opens up: is Erdogan willing to worsen his relation with Assad if America insists on it?

 >>/42513/
It will be weird because US supports the YPG side of the conflict. But that area is now under the protection if the SAA since they had to move in when Turkey established the buffer zone there, and the US troops moved out. Or is it really under their protection, or they just sandwitched between the Turks and the Kurds? Or did they move out too already?
What a mess.

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I rather continue the topic of the Central African Empire here. But this starts at these  >>/42720/  >>/42736/ posts.

Just yanked a couple of books from libgen about the Central African Republic, and frankly those Wiki articles mentioned above don't give justice to poor Emperor Bokassa I.
Ofc as a monarch he seems bonkers but his time as dauphin, when he controlled the country as lowly President from 1966 to 1976 he actually made an effort to keep a certain direction and the country a bit above the level of shit.
In 1966 he gained power via a bloodless coup (later he made his personal counselor the ex-president, Dacko, he ousted, as previously discussed in relation to the Mali coup, these countries has very few people who are actually usable to anything, it's a good thing not to waste a relative talent), then he tried to lead the country on a path with the promise of some independence from France, the previous colonial leash-holder. He entered his country into the Economic Community of Central African States, took a Marxist orientation and had cooperative agreements with the USSR and Romania, also sought relations with other African nationalist, anti-colonialist, and Marxist states, like Equatorial Guinea and Libya. Besides he maintained some level of relations with western powers, France and the US, the latter sent foreign aid up until his coronation, and France even after that, tho they stopped direct help to him (butnot the country).
From the '70s Muslim businessmen saw an opportunity in the CAR, this and maybe the visit of Gaddafi made him turning towards Islam. Ah, and ofc the fact that during the Cold War many Muslim countries got in friendly terms with the Soviet Union. He gave monopoly of diamond mining to some Central African Arab mining consortium (if I understood right) too.
There were a couple of reasons that hindered the taking of the first shaky independent baby steps. For one he alienated the French, and many businessmen of theirs, along with various experts left the country. I think at one time he threw them out. Then global commodity prices dropped, I think due to the 1973–1975 recession, it would worth a look see of the impact of this to the African economies. Anyway CAR relies on diamond export by large, today and back then, then cotton as cash crop. They have some coffee, kola, and cocoa too. There is at least one more reason the lack of success, and that's typical to third world countries, the mismanagement of the budget, pocketing the wealth.

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Additional information:
- after he couped David Dacko, they made a new constitution which had the Vichy-regime model as a base;
- Bokassa's father was a symbol of the resistance against colonial powers, he was some village elder and when they demanded to send people to forced labor, he denied it, then he was beaten to death by the French colonial thugs;
- his mother died weeks after (I kinda remember suicide) so he was raised by French missionaries from his young childhood;
- it seems he had a love-hate relationship with France, he was very much inspired by them, especially by Napoleon;
- after he became Emperor he made the appearance of not controlling the country directly, which reminds me of Gaddafi's method;
- he converted to Islam in 1976 October, but when they set up the Empire in December, he abandoned it, like on a whim;
- he expelled his oldest son, Prince Georges, from his country.
Well, that's about the insight I could gain in short notice. Not sure if I wanna continue the mining for info.

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Had to look up (in Wikipee) what happened with the Central African Republic since then.
As things got more "democratic" there, the situation got more turbulent. Civil wars took over the place of the relatively peaceful years between coups, the latest is still ongoing. Foreign peacekeeping missions also involved.
Btw the CAR isn't that big of a country, the population is less than 5 million. And they are divided between 80 ethnicities. From the Wikipee article alone it is hard to say how much role this plays in the wars.
Noteworthy: at the end of the Bush War, the rebels achieved the integration of their forces into the army. This is the same what the Tuaregs in Mali demanded (and also achieved).



 >>/42756/
Yeah, Europe seems to be a very sorted out and orderly place compared. And while there are ethnically motivated mass murders in Africa, and lots of tribalist conflict, this situation in CAR seems to be above that (but maybe it's just the lack of info I have). The Mali conflict as well, while the little people can't see farther than the locality and the tribe, the divide that separates the opposing camps are also above that.

 >>/42757/
Having weapons was the privilege of the free men all through the ages. They are all really free there. We can't even have a sharp stick.
Supposedly in Uruk the Sumerians appeared in their assembly armed.

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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2021_Armenian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat_attempt
https://southfront.org/pashinyans-fails-lead-him-into-political-coffin/
Political crisis in Armenia, PM Pashinyan and his chief of staff have called for each other's removal and the President is on the military's side. "Coup" is a misnomer, the original dismissal of the chief of staff was probably for much bigger reasons than just contradicting the PM. The following call for Pashinyan's removal was a pronunciamento. Neither side has tried to forcefully evict the other from power yet so it's a standoff.

Pashinyan's continued rule after losing the war is a disgrace. He should've assumed responsibility and resigned immediately afterwards.

 >>/42740/
> later he made his personal counselor the ex-president, Dacko, he ousted, as previously discussed in relation to the Mali coup, these countries has very few people who are actually usable to anything, it's a good thing not to waste a relative talent
Also makes any of their subjects wonder how much political leaders actually hate each other. It's almost like kids taking turns on using a console.

 >>/42773/
Yeah, coup is not the word for it.
Armenia was the rabbit of that tale letting the turtle Azerbaijan to catch up and take the prize. They definitely fucked it up, but this was a result of a longer project of not doing it right. The termination of Pashinyan should have been a nobrainer.

> Also makes any of their subjects wonder how much political leaders actually hate each other. It's almost like kids taking turns on using a console.
I think when Dacko was abroad, they just took away his presidency, kek.
Generally the average people hate each other more for following certain ideologies or parties than the politicians themselves. And politicians count on this hatred and play this card against each other, sometimes up to the armed conflict.

 >>/42773/
> Pashinyan's continued rule after losing the war is a disgrace. He should've assumed responsibility and resigned immediately afterwards.

But could he do anything? Armenia won in previous war and did nothing to prepare to new one, even considering multiple incidents (like in 2017). But Pashinyan wasn't in control in past anyway.

Most of Armenians live abroad (there are much more Armenians outside Armenia than inside), they had large and rich diasporas , and they did nothing except whining in twitter and demanding from someone to intervene. Armenia declared mobilization, but no one really tried to help. There are 500 thousands of Armenian citizens in Russia (and this is only about real citizens, not ethnic Armenians, those count is 2 million or such). But we didn't seen any volunteers, while Karabakh/Armenian army had manpower shortage. Now compare this to Donbass conflict, where both sides had plenty of volunteer military units, especially from Ukrainian side (and these units had pretty serious achievements in start of war).

And now Armenians constantly blame Pashinyan. What he could do, go and beat Azerbaijan army by himself? It was especially fun when armistice was achieved but Armenians in Yerevan protested against it. Why these people didn't go to the frontline if they want to defend Artsakh? Did they thought that someone must fight for them?


 >>/42798/
The state of Armenian military capabilities was the accumulated product of every past government since the previous war, not just Pashinyan's. Armenia could've had a stronger defense with better governments in the past 30 years but would in any case face a more formidable foe now. 90s Azerbaijan didn't have a strong regime, now it does and hence managed to convert more of its larger economy into military power. The one thing Pashinyan did different was distancing himself from Russia, which otherwise might have intervened on his favor earlier. 

I don't think he's the only one to blame but say this more as a matter of honor. As the highest authority he's expected to assume responsibility for what happens.

 >>/42800/
> I don't think he's the only one to blame but say this more as a matter of honor. As the highest authority he's expected to assume responsibility for what happens.

This rarely works on post-Soviet space. Even after big and obvious fails people often remain on their places.

 >>/42798/
 >>/42800/
We all seem to agree that the position of Armenia worsened through a longer period, and did not happen only during the term of Pashinyan.
However since 2017 it's him in office, and the last clash between the two countries happened in 2016 with an outcome that favored Azerbaijan even if it cost dearly to them. It was a warning sign, and Pashinyan (with his minister of defence and all related officials) should have pushed for reforms, should have prepared better. For example the mentioned lack of volunteers, the relations with population living abroad are have to be maintained so they could be mobilized in some way.

 >>/42814/
And that's not a good thing. That makes everyone think they can do whatever. I know it's not like they can be removed just like that, and the reality is that by themselves they won't leave, but we can note if they should or if they are the one to be blamed.

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Looking into why Chad is so Chad. Found couple of books, but these two sounds the most spot on. I read The Roots of Violence. The titles of the first three volumes are also intriguing:
1. Fouding and Warfare: Selected Works of Keith F. Otterbein (I dunno who is he, I dunno if it's a shame or not)
2. Studying War: Anthropological Perspectives
3. Troubled Times: Violence and Warfare in the Past
I might try and get them (on libgen).
Problem is it was published in 1998 and in the past decades lots of water flowed down the Danube. For example the book mentions oil was "recently" (in the '90s) found in Chad, but doesn't know about what happened since then, that the oil took over the cotton's place as chief export product/resource.
Chief characteristic of Chad is the constant state of war since the '60s, essentially participating constantly in armed conflicts, internal or external, everything.
As I mentioned at the Central African republic, it is a very "diverse" country with over 80 ethnicities. Chad goes further with over a 100, some most likely undocumented. The most prominent groups, the southern Sara and the northern Arab clans and tribes arrived here late, in the past 500 years. In contrast the region's history reaches back to 3000 BC to the Sao civilization, who built fortified walled settlements. The prehistory and history (actually everything researchable) is poorly researched due to the constant conflicts, and the general lack of interest. Most what was written was done by Frenchies, with their biases.
One more interesting thing to note. Nowadays the population of Chad is 16 million. In the 90's this was 5,5 million. The fuel of perpetual conflict isn't a war for resources, they can feed 16 mils now, they could 5 mils back then, still they did nothing but war.


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Ethiopia is getting extra heated. Google Earth is releasing new satellite imagery and it's now clear many villages were burned down in the. Also various recordings of slaughter of civilians are surfacing, as well as escapees reporting mass rape. Majority of action is taking place in "Western Tigray", which was historically northern Begemder, though it has an ethnic Tigrayan majority (which is why it was attached to the rest of Tigray under ethnofederalism established – by Tigrayans in foremost positions – after overthrowing the Derg regime in early 90s.)

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ethiopia-conflict-rape-idUSKBN29R2HV
https://www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/2021-02-11/troops-accused-of-mass-rape-in-ethiopias-tigray-conflict


 >>/42930/
Why are Ethiopia and Eritrea on the same side?

 >>/42931/
I wonder what future historians will consider the "main phase" of the war. Certainly it's already over, the current state is of mostly geographically continuous blocs locked in a stalemate occasionally broken but always restored by foreign powers. I guess from 2012-3 (slide from insurgency to open territorial war) to 2018 (last rebel pockets out of Idlib cleared).

https://youtube.com/watch?v=ToxfSPfbx2E

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 >>/42935/
> Why are Ethiopia and Eritrea on the same side?
Given that it's not officially admitted, must have been part of that peace deal earlier. You know, the one that earned Abiy Ahmed Ali the Nobel Peace prize. Perhaps he offered them to take their claims eventually if they participate?

Btw, Somalis are also reporting that a lot of their boys who were supposed to be on training have gone missing – and some are reporting in from Tigray.

 >>/42930/
Problem is with the Ethiopa topic it would need a bit of research from my part to know what's up. Last thing I read about that country was an article about the falassas, when they were taken to Israel, a 91 year old falassa Jew said: "thanks to Yahweh I could learn this day, that there are Jews with white skin in the world."


 >>/43186/
I wonder if their activity liven up in Mali.
Dl'd a book, Short History of Africa, because the big picture needs a look to take. Still chewing the book about Chad, but her history is very much tied to not just "greater" Sudan, but to the Middle East, and the Sahel region. And certain events and processes cannot be understood without knowing a little of the stuff going on those directions. Today's Chad is an artificial construct, the borders are cutting into the ties, but they can't sever them.
I highly suspect if we take a look onto any other part of Africa we'll face the same problem. To understand Mozambique, we'll probably have to look around more. It's not a coincidence ISIS is there, just like in Mali, and not just from the simple fact that considerable part of the population is Muslim.

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Looked into this conflict in Mozambique.
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/4/2/inconsolable-tears-as-huge-crisis-unfolding-in-mozambique
> Palma is [...] just a few kilometres from [...] Africa’s largest liquified natural gas construction site, where French energy giant Total has embarked on a $20bn project.
Then the next line:
> There are still many questions surrounding the real reason driving the violence, although competing theories are being floated.
What is the reason, I wonder.
> Meanwhile, foreign bodies and countries have offered to help the Mozambican government in its fight against the armed group.
> The United States has sent special operations forces to train Mozambican troops, while the former colonial power Portugal will deploy 60 military experts, also for training purposes.
Reminded me a flashgame about "war for resources" or something. The player had to pick a country to extract oil from, then place wells, then security to guard, then more mercenaries, then more oil wells, and whatever, meanwhile the resources vanished and were spent on war in these countries, when nothing left just empty war torn wastelands, and bunch of soldiers.

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But not the news from Mozambique was on the home page of AlJazeera, bur from our old acquaintance, Mali.
The low key war is relentlessly going on, taking casualties on all the sides involved, the articles listing body counts.
Accidents happen however. The report about the mistake was made by MINUSMA we also met already.
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/4/2/families-of-victims-seek-justice-over-french-air-strike-in-mali


 >>/43213/
Some of the stuff in Mali is Al-Qaeda. The articles mostly mentions them, or vaguely "terrorists". But in Mozambique, ISIS is the active one. But yes, they are still going, and will be around forever, it's basically those who wants to create/restore the Caliphate or some such. And since Islam is Universalist, it could be appear anywhere, it doesn't matter where they start, and the end is always the spread of the Caliphate and Islam to the whole World.

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> Black Sheep Plot
In 1973 the Chadian Army Chief of Staff was accused of the preparation of a coup against President Tombalbaye. One of the charges was that the conspirators ritualistically buried a black sheep in order to influence the outcome of an event, and this event would have been the overthrow of every Chadian's beloved President.
Why animal sacrifices aren't listed in Luttwak's book as parts of coups?

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> it's unfair to call us terrorists
t. Al Qaeda in Syria chief
https://english.alaraby.co.uk/english/news/2021/4/4/hts-terror-designation-unfair-jolani-claims-in-first-interview

Funnily enough, wearing a suit alone was newsworthy, marking his effort to improve his image and have his force seen as having exclusively Syrian goals and no risk to the West. He's interviewed by international media despite being on the wanted list. 
https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2021/02/syria-hts-leader-picture-suit-western-media-opposition.html

And even gets called the "least bad option" by James Jeffrey.
https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/did-former-us-officials-support-extremists-in-syria-as-an-asset-664248

 >>/43213/
It's a local group pledging loyalty to ISIS, it's not like they moved fighters all the way to Mozambique.

 >>/43236/
Reminds me of the days before the 1964 coup in Brazil, when setting the date general Guedes was worried about the lunar phase, he thought they'd have bad luck if it happened on a waning moon.

 >>/43257/
> Jolani and HTS
I guess for the coming peace, they want to look more "civil" for taking over civilian governing tasks in Idlib. That area will probably preserve it's "not really Syria anymore" designation and they are the local holders of power.
But I really don't know what's gonna happen, or where the peace talks stand.

Still reading that book about Chad on the side.
For me it seems the conflicts in Africa just partially tribal, or motivated by religion. It's liek the Urpian colonists created these artificial entities, the countries, states in Africa, as the avatars of power, and the strongmen of the African countries battling against each other to gain that power (and then to be cast down by another rival).
In Chad only in the beginning the civil war had some tribal coloring, showing the division between north and south, but after Tombolbaye, it's northern strongmen who competes against each other with their personal - partially ex-guerilla, partially mercenary, partially state - armies, with the help of external powers, like was Libya and the always present France.

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Meanwhile in the third world.
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/5/17/israel-launches-heavier-raids-in-second-week-of-gaza-bombing
https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2021/5/16/israels-doctrine-humane-bombing-and-benevolent-occupation
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/5/17/israel-yet-to-show-proof-of-hamas-in-gaza-media-tower-us
> including Al Jazeera and The Associated Press

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 >>/43532/
I finally finished that book.
I'm certain the question of Chad cannot be understand without stepping out of her borders and look at the picture integrated in the region she belongs. And not the artificial "Central Africa" region which takes her out of the context from her organic place, where the geographical circumstances and historical developments tied her into.
I also think conflict is a natural state of human beans, I wouldn't go that far to call periods of standstills (like we have now in Europe) abnormal, but certain circumstances need to be in effect to force such times onto us.
So while I think these artificial African countries should be dissolved, ending civil wars, it would not end the conflicts. The struggle would go on as part of the state formation, but it would result in more organic countries, and nation states. Things which belong would grow together, and divide which aren't.
But today they expect from these fake nations they created at the end of the colonial period to be "nationalistic" and band together and deny their ethnic and religious ties bridging over these artificial countries, and somehow be invested in maintaining these multicultural entities as if it would be a desirable thing.
Why are they fighting in Africa? It's an eternal human thing to do. But the direct reason why they are fighting now? This is pretty much how the ex-colonialists set up.

 >>/43777/
Dissolving theses states might create new nations but as you say, it would be through conflict. It would be very, very bloody. It would be like the Sengoku Jidai crossed with the Rwandan genocide.

There are just far too many ethnic groups that live right next to each other but hate each other and these ethnic groups are all really too small to from a state on their own, if each ethnic group had a state there would be thousands of these nation in Africa, all being tiny micro-nations.

People give the Colonial borders a lot of stick but I don't think there was really much of a better way and neither did the African nations themselves when they were offered the chance to redraw borders.

 >>/43779/
There is federalization, uniting certain micro-nations along certain criterion.
And I'm not convinced that all of them need states anyway. In the southern region of Chad, those guys lived in stateless societies (they didn't even had chiefdoms and tribes) until France made the are into their colony in 1900. There is no evidence of major violence between those guys in those times, but they were victims of the rising slaver states of the Sahel region. Then France ruled with violence, and surprisingly they found the best material for the military and administration (and ofc workforce) in those southern people, and not the northern who had a history of statehood. And now they form the real basis of the state (literacy was 60-80 in the South, while in the North could be as low as 3-5%), and started as the driving force of the independent Chad, while the Northerners were all salty. Interesting fate.

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I'm in a bit out of phase. The Gaza conflict ended on the 21st. Officially, still some minor shocks are resonating.
I found it as:
> 2021 Israel–Palestine crisis
Curious since the existence of Palestine is... "disputed". Anyway Hungary recognizes it as a sovereign state, fine by me.
Not much interesting is going on, so here's a Syria map instead. Sporadic Daesh attacks still occur, and will occur, no way every cells can be rooted out, if it ceases, it will be their decision to stop doing actions.

In the question of Africa, the possibility of reinventing the political map there, I'm thinking about what keeps peace in other areas of the globe. Like how the nations of Europe are interdependent economically, or the nuclear powers refrain to start wars against each other openly (even the border clashes between Pakistan-India, India-China doesn't lead to open conflict), or South America because I dunno why.
But during a reshaping of Africa the turbulent times were cease after a while and situation would stabilize there as well.
Btw the Chadian conflicts themselves weren't that bloody (I kinda recall about 50000 victims through the decades). Considering participating forces weren't larger than a couple thousand soldiers, even the Chadian army was ~11-12 000 at it's height (I don't know the current situation), and most conflicts were played out around larger settlements, especially in N'Djamena, and in the sparsely populated central and northern regions, I think many in the country lived in relative peace. The effected populace were more likely to be driven away and forced into refugee camps, than butchered - since these weren't really ethnical or religious conflicts, even tho sometimes could have a shade of those.

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 >>/43779/
> There are just far too many ethnic groups that live right next to each other but hate each other and these ethnic groups are all really too small to from a state on their own, if each ethnic group had a state there would be thousands of these nation in Africa, all being tiny micro-nations.

It isn't impossible to be a functioning microstate in 21st century. Technology and globalization already allows it.

Also these ethnic groups not that unique, so many states may contain more than one ethnic group, or will be relatively friendly and open to each other. Like Baltic states (two different ethnics - Balts and Finns), or Georgia ( https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Georgians#Geographic_subdivisions_and_subethnic_groups )

 >>/43777/
> But today they expect from these fake nations they created at the end of the colonial period to be "nationalistic" and band together and deny their ethnic and religious ties bridging over these artificial countries

It worked for Europe in past. France, Germany and Italy were composed from pretty different groups, but now they are viewed as single nations even from inside (mostly). And USA - descendants of Germans, Brits and Italians already aren't different there. Of course radical differences are problematic, but are they so radical?

Maybe it wouldn't work in 21st century, because there are globalization, mass migrations and other funny things though. World is too connected and too fast for nation-building process. Especially considering that many Africans not progressed much from stone age mentality, and mentality progress are always slow and require generations.

 >>/43780/
But then you end up in the same situation anyway, only less centralised which could cause issues(one state becoming too influential or a state sitting on a cobalt mine getting too rich so other states invade it).

True, they don't need states if they want to live a traditional lifestyle. But if they want to live a modern one they will. They also may not have a choice, they may need to create a state in order to survive.

 >>/43791/
Yes but Africa lacks both. Even then it's really only possible in special circumstances. Like being in good locations like Singapore and Hong Kong or being surrounded by large nations that like you and will protect you whilst relying on rich people to fund the nation and not an industry, such as places like Monaco. These African micro states will have none of this, bar maybe one or two that could act like a Hong Kong of Africa.

Yes, they are not that unique and they are close to each other in many ways, yet that does not stop them hating each other. They would need some kind of overarching identity to bring them together which is part of the reason you would make them part of the same state(though this has not worked). But then Africa is a big place so some ethnic groups may be more open to such cooperation. Brining them together would probably involve one central group absorbing the neighbouring groups and forcing their culture on them whilst preventing the culture and language of the subject states. Kind of like what France and Japan did, how they forced their local dialect on the entire nation and banned the other local dialects. Thus eventually creating one identity.

 >>/43791/
> functioning microstate
And they weren't like those microstates when some blokes decide his property is a sovereign nation, but actual folks with several hundreds, thousands, 10s thousands of people. We got used to the thought that countries numbers millions, but it's not a necessity, even a the past couple thousand blokes could form states just fine.
It isn't impossible either that at one point, let's say in Europe, states will be decentralized so much that people can make major decisions about their lives on settlement level, from the settlement budget, funding local services, and only function on higher levels when it is absolutely necessary. Even now, in the EU the regions stepped forward as a way of coordinating smaller areas within countries, but above county level - sometimes even over state borders.
> but are they so radical?
In the case of Chad I would say it is more radical than it was in the case of Europe. In Europe the traditional way of living was mostly the same, even before the unifying force of Christianity and feudalism. I would say the difference in some cases even more larger than what was in the case of Rome and her barbarian neighbours.
In Chad beside linguistic, ethnical, cultural, and religious factors, they have/had such major dichotomies liek sedentary vs. nomadism, statelessness vs. statehood, and other differentiating factors like specialized economies to local conditions (e.g. fishing folks at bodies of water, or terracing cultivators in a mountainous zone). In Europe the list up to the sedentary-nomadism dichotomy holds true, but they all had states when these cultures clashed, and the specialized lifestyles (like transhumance) were within those cultures and weren't separate folks.
But if the differences are really that radical? Especially after 60 years of colonialism, and 60 more in these turbulent times, I dunno.
> Maybe it wouldn't work in 21st century, because [...]
Not the mention the ever present First World meddling, and China stepping up beside them. My thought was just a "could it be other way" or "would be better if" musing.

 >>/43792/
> They also may not have a choice, they may need to create a state in order to survive.
In those areas (the Sahel region of Eastern Niger, Chad, and Western Sudan), before the European colonizers arrived exactly that was the reason of state formation, in a circular logic, or "egg or chicken" fashion. The state's goal was to wage war, but created because of the pressure of war, and it is hard to pin the exact point when either of them came to existence and say which was first.
Conflicts exist without state, but war is something that needs state level organization (even in their most disorganized forms). States can rise for other reasons than war (the organization is needed to large project, like maintaining irrigation system or something) but in Chad and about that was the sole reason of its existence.
We know that southern states there - like Bagirmi and such - was created so they could withstand of northern pressure (like Wadai of Kanem), to became hunters instead of prey. But the northern ones? Some say they started to war because of Islam.

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Hungary's mission in Afghanistan ended. The last 9 soldiers we had there returned. Some photos.
https://index.hu/belfold/2021/06/09/afganisztan-honvedelem-katonak/
Our soldiers did their duty in many roles during this 18 years, as light infantry, helicopter instructors, in security, rebuilding, healthcare, mentoring, airfield operation, etc.
The article also says Biden considers the mission in Afghanistan finished on behalf of the US too, and by 9/11 their soldiers will also return home.


 >>/43899/
What a coincidence. Just wanted to ask someone what's up. What is the latest, what did you hear?
Last time I checked not much went on, Assad won the presidential election. I assume war changing event did not happen since then.


 >>/43901/
Well, this thread is about exchanging thoughts about third world conflicts essentially. If we see something interesting on the internet, we share it, and comment it.
Feel free to look around on our board, check the Catalog, you might find a topic you are interested in. Don't worry about necrobumping, we don't mind old threads getting continued.
We have a some thematic threads, like music, news, politics, vidya, movies, books, those type of stuff can go there, we try to keep the board decluttered, since it's a slow board. Very slow nowadays.
If you are new to Endchan, you might wanna check the boards page, and look around what's what.


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Changes do happen in Afghanistan.
I know little about the conflict, but this could be important, so here we go.
NATO troops withdraw, the Taliban advances. Now the Afghan government should fend for itself, but maybe it's too huge of a task for them, even tho the US should have prepare their army for that. The country has 34 provinces and about 400 districts, talibs took over 10% of these.

https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/6/19/afghan-president-replaces-security-ministers-amid-taliban-advance
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/6/20/afghan-president-ghani-to-meet-biden-as-violence-surges
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/6/21/former-president-says-us-failed-in-afghanistan

The maps I found and had "timestamp" are generally fall between old and not new (1960-2013), but they could offer a general idea.
Afghanistan's population is about 32 million people, and it's among the poorest countries on Earth.

Atlas Pro (channel suggested here:  >>/44232/ ) also went on the "better borders for Africa" road. 
https://tube.cadence.moe/watch?v=LvKONiRHgkU
What I disagree with is what he finds as the root cause of conflict: struggle for resources. Maybe this is true in some areas, but in Chad it is certainly not how it is. As previously stated they fought when 5 million lived on that area, they fight when they can feed 16 million on the same land.

 >>/44243/
I agree. I don't think there is really anything to done about that and I think he and other people just put things there to kind of justify why they fight each other so much. I think resources play a part but not so much in the form of a fight over resources for survival but more in rival tribes stealing from each other in tribal warfare, kind of like capitalism maybe. Why raise a cow when you can steal it from a tribe you hate?

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Maded this map. Well, added the country names and the population numbers. I could have picked another map maybe, but I liked the fact it shows the major rivers.
First I started with Wikipedia, but they changed the article in the meantime, so I decided I rather use this:
https://www.worldometers.info/population/countries-in-africa-by-population/
Additional information:
- where it was over 900 thousand I rounded up to million;
- the red line is the approximate border between the two Sudans, the south one is the freshest country.

What really surprised me was some of the contrast. Like between Algeria and Libya. In their case I'd assume the coastal region is inhabited, while the inner deserty parts are sparsely. Are their coasts so different? What made Algeria so populous? Libyan people don't have sex?


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 >>/44267/
> Like between Algeria and Libya. In their case I'd assume the coastal region is inhabited, while the inner deserty parts are sparsely. Are their coasts so different? What made Algeria so populous? Libyan people don't have sex?

Maybe it is historical differences - Algerian coast had better development from ancient times, maybe trade and close proximity to Italy/Spain matters.

Considering demographics - they've both had typical high birth rates and fast growth, but Libya had less people when that demographic epoch (modernity with tech and proper healthcare), and so it needs more time for growth to became noticeable. That type of growth is exponential, so initial amount matters. Compare Nigeria and Gabon - they both got near 5x population (from 45 to 200 and from 0.5 to 2.2), but what a difference in absolute numbers.






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Afghanistan again.
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/7/4/taliban-seizes-key-districts-in-afghanistan-as-govt-forces-flee
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/7/6/taliban-to-present-written-peace-plan-at-talks-next-month
More Taliban advancement. According to first link, there are 421 districts in Afghanistan. The second link says the tally of the Taliban control differs depending who you get your info from. Westerners say they took hold of 100 districts, Talibans claim double of that, which would mean half of the country. Sure, there are less and more important areas, so their value also matters not just the pure number.
Was talk about Turkey offering help to Afghan government, and we are seem to be involved in the cooperation, chiefly due to our previous experience in running an airfield there.
Just now the Bagram airbase was evacuated by US troops.

 >>/44270/
Well the growth rate is higher in Libya than in Algeria, but the latter had larger population base. So it's historical reasons - beside the amount of habitable areas. I kinda recall from history lessons in relation to ancient Egypt, that west from there was very sparsely populated. But considering the suitability of Egypt due to the Nile, it doesn't mean much.
In Rome all three places (Egypt, "Africa", and Mauritania) was used as a source of grain.

The Taliban are capturing even more territory, militia are changing sides, Afghan forces are fleeing into Tajikistan and Tajikistan is calling on the CSTO to secure the Border with Afghanistan with Russia already talking about that too. What a mess...

 >>/44325/
I think both the pages I linked and other related articles talked about those. About 1000 troops had to cross the Tajik border. Tough.
The Taliban says they wanna talk, but I bet they won't stop the offensive while peace talks are going on.


Joe Biden says that the Taliban won't take over because the Afghan army is as well equipped as any other army in the world. It looks like the Taliban is going to be as well equipped as any other army in the world soon. Heh.

 >>/44339/
> Taliban *is* an Afghan government.
Taliban is *an* Afghan government.
I also just made one in my basement, gonna tell Orbán to support them.
I understand what you're writing however. Machiavelli also wrote about this situation in the Il Principe, in the chapters about how the prince gains power, when a foreign power grants him his throne which will depend on this foreign backing.

The Afghan non-taliban govt needs to secure its positions at least that much they could achieve an impasse against the Taliban. And they should involve foreigners to gain more grounds above that. Do they even have bargaining chips? Their existence came from the US need to wage war on terror back in the early 2000s. Times are changing.

 >>/44341/

It looks like Taliban is not just a political movement, but more like self-organization of Afghan society, at least for now. Otherwise they wouldn't get popular support that they've got, and it wouldn't be so easy to conquer everything in one second after international forces left.

Other "governments" are too foreign for locals, and only way to become real government is to become another Taliban, just with different name.

Taliban already sent delegates to Moscow: https://apnews.com/article/taliban-moscow-europe-russia-51327432f1455020352826281c6c4e73


 >>/44343/

It is unrelated to CIS. CIS is basically non-existent anyway, just a word without meaning. Economically there is so-called Eurasian Customs Union that includes some CIS parts. CSTO is some strange entity too, it isn't purely military block, and there are questions about it's effectiveness. Recent Karabakh conflict had one side (Armenia) from CSTO, and no one did anything.

Considering military side, Russia also has presence on Tajik/Afghan border from Soviet times, and border incidents with Afghanistan was numerous in 90s. With US involvement it became much more quiet, but now, I guess, these talks are all about that border again.


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 >>/42492/
Do you know about that turkman Sedat Perker? Apparently he used to be some kind of mafia boss who developed connections to government. He was jailed for a time and then released under Erdogan. He became very pro-Erdo since then. But more recently the government started to hound and arrest some supposed "mafiosi" from his camp and that caused a complete break. He fled to the Arab Emirates (people say) and became something of a minor sensation due to the publication of a series of videos in which he lays out wide ranging schemes, ploys, and outright criminal activity of various turkish politicians and organizations, even implicating himself . But according to media no hard evidence was provided, only his alleged "witness" account.
How much verisimilitude is in his stories? He is wanted by Turkey now Is he only bluffing in hopes of being offered some kind of deal by authorities?
If translation is correct, he admits sending truckloads of weapons to Syria, disguised as "humanitarian aid"

There's now talk of Turkey deploying Syrian mercenaries to guard the Kabul airport. I wonder how much support the government will be left with. If it's not enough, those Syrians will have to pack up and leave soon.

https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2021/07/turkey-likely-use-syrian-mercenaries-kabul

 >>/44393/
I found this part as particularly interesting:
> several hundred US soldiers are expected to remain at the Kabul airport, potentially until September, to assist their Turkish counterparts until the new mission is in place.
> new mission in place
It sounds it sure there will be a new mission. Syrians are a likely part of it, but the issue with them obscures the bigger picture. What will that mission be?




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Just opened up Al Jazeera to check if they have something on Syria these days, and this is what greeted me.
On one of the links I found this skeptical line:
> Often celebrated as the Arab Spring’s so-called success model, Tunisia
And another article shows Tunisia never recovered since 2011. If the success model is a failure, we can imagine what's going on elsewhere. Well, here we've taken a look to other places, so we know.


 >>/44571/
> IDF will hopefully get into combat with Russians
I don't think such clashes are probable.
> Putin declared he's defending Assad & co.
1. wasn't this he did up until now?
2. could you link a source, a news site, with his statement? I've little time to search myself.


 >>/44573/
Thanks.
> Russian Center for Reconciliation of the Opposing Parties in Syria
That's a mouthful.
> Russia has “run out of patience” with Israel in Syria and is planning a shift in its policies toward Israeli sorties over the country, according to the London-based Arabic newspaper Asharq Al-Awsat which cited an unnamed “well-informed” Russian source.
> Asharq Al-Awsat cited an unnamed Russian source as saying that following talks with Washington, Moscow had got the impression that “Washington does not welcome the continuous Israeli raids,” and thus believes it has the freedom to act more aggressively
I'm not saying that unknown source if bs, but they may pick their words differently and shift the emphasis on different things to play for the ear of the Arabic newspaper.
But the facts seems to be that in that attack almost all rockets were intercepted, so they really do something.
> the Russians were now supplying Syrian forces with more advanced anti-missile systems and know-how
They themselves won't face another major player in the area, just as how they don't face Turkish forces.
Nevertheless the relations with Israel, and the possibly growing influence of Iran nearby is another layer of the issue and the excitement. And another loop on the "how the Syrian situation can be resolved" Gordian knot.

 >>/44564/
Shortly before the arab spring, like couple months maybe, I was in Tunisia with my folks. We had polish speaking guide but he was a local. He studied in Poland and lived here for a while so he knew the language quite well. 
My father was giving him a lot of question regarding the ancient history of this region but after a while he straight up asked why do they call their country democratic when they had the same president for over 20 years. The man responded that there's democracy in Tunisia, but they can't have too much democracy otherwise the country will just plunge into chaos which will kill tourism industry, and tourism is the main income source for basically everyone there.

Came back home and some time later news about happenings across north africa started to appear.
I think about it a lot.

 >>/44577/
The truth had been told.
The Arab Spring served nothing just the destabilization of the whole region. And who knows when things will be set into place.
Problem is order would only be restored when a strongman acquires the power, and everything would go back as it was. However this could only happen if a major player backs that person, and he will be dependent on the support. Like Assad.

 >>/44577/
I was also in Tunisia not that long before, in 2009. Dad asked about it as well and got similar answer – that people might be frustrated by it, but the good side is that the country is stable and that they don't have groups kidnapping tourists or stuff.

 >>/44577/
 >>/44581/
Not every country can afford to have demoracy. Security first demoracy later, otherwise you get arab spring.

To get demoracy you need to have independent educated middle class otherwise you will get at best tyranny of majority. The countries are forced to have democracy not because people reached a conclusion it's because USA tyrantly forces it and benefits from corrupt, sell out  governments not to mention US defition is demoracy is more or less related with their ability of enforcing their financial and media power.

Reached bump limit within this thread. New Syria/third world conflict thread is needed.

 >>/44586/
> the country is stable and that they don't have groups kidnapping tourists or stuff.
Now they have the reverse.

 >>/44588/
> US defition is demoracy
Something similar came to mind as I read your post. The definition of democracy, how it is interpreted, and everyone (well, the West) is trying to make their definition exclusive.
For example the system Gaddhafi created, the Jamahiriya, was highly decentralized with opportunities for the populace to get involved in politics directly. It is criticized however because he implemented redundancies which allowed him influence making him a de facto leader without being one in name. I have no information how well or bad the system actually worked, but Lybia - thanks to the oil - was wealthy country, with some level of comfort.

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Too many refugees for feeble amount of Merkel bribes. Even the Afgans are coming, we can't handle it anymore, your shitty is about to trigger a civil war and they are as guilty as Erdoğan. We host more than %50 of worldd refugees it will eventually bite Europe bad. When shit hits the fan blame your politicians for buying out erdoğan instead of encouraging their permanent return in syria, which doesnt happen as EU is supportive of YPG/PKK's ethnic cleansing in favor of kurds, so we can resettle arabs without hitting kurds but if we do that it's anudda genocide, that's what your unbiased media says.



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