/kc/ - Krautchan

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 >>/54293/
cont.
And here come the states/regimes that the US considers as enemy. The US does two things, routinely hostile activities and hostile interventions. As Bernd can see these are the inverse of routine maintenance and maintenance interventions.
Enemy can be defined as a non-client regime that deliberately chooses to oppose the US in key issues, in their foreign and domestic policies both. They are considered to be a threat for the US and her clients, physically and ideologically. Sometimes they are recently lost clients, I can describe this as if they were essentially gone through a reverse-switching  >>/54236/. The US can be real obsessive about these, think of Cuba.
Not all the wars the US wages are against enemies - not enemies in this sense at least. And not all enemies gets into a war against the US. So war isn't a real measurement of an enemy.
If we try to grab the essence what an enemy means, the book quotes a State Department "thinker" who described the Soviet Union after WWII:
our free society finds itself morally challenged by the Soviet system. No other value system is so wholly irreconcilable with ours, so implacable in its purpose to destroy ours ... and no other has the support of a great and growing center of military power.
Very picturesque.

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 >>/54313/
cont.
Routinely hostile activities aren't directed to overthrow a regime, but as the book says, they express displeasure and that the regime is somehow unfit for regular relations, too abnormal to deal with. The US does the reverse of maintenance. They hamper the target economically, militarily, politically/diplomatically. As the authors detail it:
The U.S. may withhold diplomatic recognition, block UN membership, decree or intensify a trade embargo, vote against multilateral loans, forbid normal travel by citizens of either country, offer asylum to immigrants from the enemy, attempt to restrict weapons and technology transfers, verbally support exiled opposition leaders, electronically broadcast propaganda, and, of course, denounce the enemy as illegitimate and a violator of basic norms (e.g., human rights).
Have to note, we are talking about enemy regimes. The US has nothing against the population and they try to project the idea, that the population should get rid of the regime and everything will be better. From what I've seen with the routinely hostile activities they could cause suffering in the country, like famine in North Korea North Korea is under constant embargo. They hurt the country and they say it's their fault for not ejecting that regime. The abusive partner: Why do you make me do this to you????
The US tends to utilize her client empire and international institutions (such as UN - and it's predecessor the League of Nations -, IMF, NATO, etc.) for these activities.
This is the standard way how US deals with enemies. If a country gets on the shitlist, it gets the routinely hostile treatment. If a regime decides to change their stance on an issue they differ with the US, the US takes it as a positive sign that these routinely hostile activities work (they experience it as a positive feedback), and they keep it on, or even add more. If a regime gives up all their stances then the US will label them as neutral and will try to acquire them as a client, see again  >>/54236/.
While I was reading about the hostile interventions I found a great example for routinely hostile activities: Japan from the Manchurian Incident (1931) and the invasion of Manchuria to Pearl Harbor attack (late 1941) where they effectively cornered Japan with these activities, and by choking her economically they pushed them to initiate the war with the US.

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 >>/54314/
cont.
On the other hand if actions against the regime's military seems promising the US will start a hostile intervention, overt or covert, usually depends on how internationally acceptable the enemy regime is. If they are recognized and other states have relations with them, seen as legitimate, the US will try to avoid the blowback and act from the position of plausible deniability. But if the enemy does something outrageous or the US can pin on them something (eg. human rights violation), the state becomes a pariah, then no obstacle for the US to act openly.
Note: circumstances change and depending the US can launch hostile interventions, then stop them and only run routinely hostile activities, then if circumstances allow then start another hostile intervention, etc. Routine activities and interventions can run parallel.
The chief goal of the interventions can be the overthrow of the enemy regime, but often it's forcing them to withdraw from a satellite (a client) of theirs, or a region they occupy, or stop a war against a US client, or such.

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 >>/54315/
cont.
Covert interventions. Two main questions divide these interventions: can the military detached from the regime, turn against them; and if there is an internal front or only exiles are available?
1. Coups d'état
This is different somewhat to the client coups, since in case of an enemy it's rare the US has direct ties, relation to the enemy's military. In fact they usually see that the military backs the regime, so they aren't suitable to foment a coup. So there are two situations when this can happen: if the regime just came to power, not solidified yet, or if the regime consists of a shaky coalition where the members are at odds with each other, which allows the US has some way to drive a wedge between them. Indonesia is the second type, starting in 1958 and culminated in the anti-communist massacres.
2. Punctuated military operations
These are a form of utilizing proxy forces. They organize raids with the promise of building a resistance, a guerilla activity, a rebellion, etc. If an exile or emigrant group already planning this then the US is likely to take over the organization, their training. They provide them plans, equipment, weapons, and transport. Very typical example is Albania after WWII (Operation BGFIEND). From the examples: typically these raids are huge failures, the volunteers are sent to their death, and achieve no results. However this does not stops the US to continue as long as there are people who are willing to go. The Brits are also practiced in this type of operations, in fact they got the US into the business (with Albania and some other). Frankly this really reminds me of the Krynky operation in Ukraine...
3. Aid to internal armed opposition forces
Proxy forces again, except they are in the country controlled by an enemy regime, or in a country where enemy military is present (they are occupying it or the client of theirs). Some sort of internal group has to be present, which could be propped up. In these cases the help the US can offer is either monetary or material (equipment, weapons), since training and/or organizing these movements aren't really possible. So the US acts from one step further and easier to stop and/or disassociate from these groups, if situation changes or becomes necessary. In this case the proxy will most likely claim they were sold out to the enemy. Good examples are the Kurds, who are present in Turkey, Syria, Iraq, Iran, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. It seems they were supported on and off by the US. The book's example when they were used against Iraq in the early '70s - US got Israel and Iran to send weapons to them, and they compensated these countries for the help. And in the end US shut down relations with the Kurds. Now in Syria similar happens, they were used as proxies against ISIS, and to corner Assad (not to oppose him directly), and now they are getting abandoned in the face of Turks.

pdfrel: synopsis of bgfiend by the CIA

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 >>/54316/
cont.
Overt interventions - when the open use of US combat troops are justified, and can be widely accepted by US citizens, diplomats, the mass public.
1. Large-scale combat
If the enemy is at war, or occupies a state "illegally", and the US judges that the enemy forces are sufficiently anchored, they are too strong, this is the only option. Ground combat troops has to be deployed. Germany WWI, Germany WWII, Japan WWII are the classic. The bonus is the Soviet Union in North Korea 1950-51. The US viewed that the SU acts through a puppet, as NK was not viewed as a legit government (according to UN only SK was legitimate), the US aimed to expel the Soviet from Pyongyang.
2. Sustained and asymmetrical attacks
Bring 'em freedoms in the form of bombs. Essentially the modernized versions of sending ships to bombard enemies into submission - or as the book puts it use of airpower as an instrument of coercive diplomacy. Typically used to pressure enemy to give up some land or give up on a military campaign. "Typically" since only two examples exist: North Vietnam (1965-72) with Rolling Thunder and Operation Linebecker to get them to stop backing insurgents in South Vietnam; and Serbia (1999) to pressure them releasing Kosovo. This kind of intervention is a strategic bombing campaign to break their morale, where strategic target list is given to the military which they should hit. The effectiveness of this form of intervention is debatable. They will still use it since it is an available option.
3. Combat operations alongside local insurgent forces
If there is a local opposition to the enemy, and the enemy regime acquires the pariah status, the US props up the insurgents and also sends some type of own ground combat force in support. This is one of the oldest type of tools against enemies. Nicaragua 1909-10, a rebellion broke out against president Jose Santos Zelaya, the US supported them, and sent some forces too after Zelaya executed two US citizens who fought with the rebels.
4. Invasion by U.S. troops
This is quite new policy tool. Deployed when an enemy regime has to be overthrown, it does not occupy anything and no local proxy force is available. Grenada in 1983 and Iraq in 2003.

 >>/54308/
Hmm. I want to rephrase this. Or make it more precise.
So what choice is presented to an average 3rd world shithole like somewhere in Africa? Three power comes and each says:
West:
we give you money/help, but you have to be our bitch plus give up age old traditions such as beating up gays, oppress women, and have to chop of the peepee of little boys and dress them in girly clothing
Russia:
we give you money/help, but you have to be our bitch
China:
we give you money/help, but you have to be our bitch
So when faced the choice what would countries such as Mali pick? Hard decision.

Problem is Westerners Western liberals don't see it like this. They see themselves as good who wants to save these countries from evil Russia and China. What they can't process that they save these countries how one horny man wants to save a hot chick from another horny man...
> I want to save her from his exploitative boyfriend... for myself

> oh no chiner will own the airport and 50 meters of beach

Ben Shapiro made an interview with Orbán. It's on Orbán's youtube channel, but not on Shapiro's. Was it made for Hungarian audiences? Will he just release it later? Mystery.

 >>/54317/
Am gonna try to finish this tomorrow. There is one major way of US "liquidating" enemies. Quite surprising.

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 >>/54317/
The authors talk briefly about assassinations. Sometimes these happen, the US make attempts, some are successful some aren't, they train groups that potentially can execute these. In itself it is not a policy tool, but can be included into others. There were plans to make it institutional (create official CIA branch a "Health Alteration Committee"...) but these were discarded supposedly and they are careful that neither US Presidents and top decision makers never presented with written or explicit oral proposals.

Couple of things to close hostile interventions.
Numbers.
Covert: 7 successes - 17 failures 
- coups: 5 success vs. 3 failures
- exile raids: 1 success vs. 8 failures
- internal armed movements: 1 success vs 6 failures
Overt: 9 successes, 4 failures
- bombing: 1 success vs 1 failure the success is debatable tho
- proxy assistance: 3 success vs 2 failures
- invasions: 5 success vs 1 failure I think they lumped large-scale combats and invasions together
Summed up: from 37 hostile interventions 16 succeeded and 21 failed.
It seems overt interventions when the US herself goes into action are more successful. However there is a clear contrast between the coups and other interventions. The authors differentiate between non-military and military operations. Coups being the non-military, succeeded 5 times vs 3 failures, and all the rest are military with 11 successes and 18 failures, which means the non-military routes more often reach their goals. The book makes a point here that in client interventions again non-military responses work better. And again, the US herself has a better chance to get to the desired outcome, when they turn to use proxies.
My impression is that the US uses proxy forces either when the situation is dire, or when a proxy force is available and with low cost they can cause some inconveniences to US enemies. The US seems to not care what happens with these proxy forces. They treat them like this:
> they know the risks and they volunteered to do it, who are we to stop them, and with our help they have a better chance than without anyway so we do good to them

see picrel for more text

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 >>/54431/
Two more ways of "liquidating" enemies left
Enemies sometimes collapse by themselves (see Soviet Union), or caused by other states. Khmer Rouge in Cambodia was deposed by Vietnam (1978-79), the Kahlq regime in Afghanistan was removed by the Soviet Union. Sometimes other changes occur within a country, or with the country. In Egypt Sadat changed the game, and South Yemen disappeared when it merged with the North (1990).

picrel: Hafizullah Amin, the leader of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, probably put on ice by the KGB when the Soviet intervened.

 >>/54432/
And lastly negotiations can end enemy status.
The US negotiates with enemies all the time. In most cases it's fairly inconsequential, about details in whatever questions, and status doesn't change, they do their routinely hostile activities in the background. The US might stop intervention, or start new one if these negotiations fail. But there are notable cases when negotiations led to the end of enemy status. This usually happens when another enemy with a more immediate or larger threat arises - so when an outside pressure forces the US to stop being a hardass in certain questions, and give up from their stance, in short: to be reasonable...
In 1933 Japan became such a threat, that Washington sat down with Moscow and made a deal. Similarly the rise of the Axis in Europe, and the start of the war there motivated the US to change her stance on Mexico.
One major example is rapprochement with China, a the start of the 70s. Important example since there wasn't a new threat, since the Soviet Union - whom the US tried to isolate with this move - existed for quite a while now. What changed was how the US viewed China. They thought up a different approach to the Chinese question, they saw an opportunity and a situation which a friendlier China could fit into. So they went and made a deal. Ofc they did not do this from their good heart, but because they gained a better strategic position during the Cold War. I don't think Taiwan was happy about it (it led them out of the UN and state status) but the US had to break their eggs so they did.

picrel: Zhou Enlai, Chinese Premier under Mao, and Kissinger when the American security advisor sneaked into China from Pakistan in 1971 July.

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 >>/54433/

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 >>/54433/
There were other successful negotiations - eg. Libya and Sudan - but there were bunch of failed ones, that went on and off, they opened talks but things got derailed over and over: Cuba, Syria, Iran, North Korea. When failure occur it seems the blame is always on both sides, but it seems to me from the American side, they usually don't see the strategic advantage to see through the change. For example in case of China the whole process was supported by three consequent presidents, it was just too important. So if there is no immediate threat, then it will depend a lot on how the various power blocks within the US see the enemy and the benefits.

picrel: Muammar Gaddafi, how I see it they negotiated his weapons away, the US and Western Europe made him give up aspirations for nukes, and his chemical weapons, and then they killed him off with the Arab Spring. I bet Iran learnt a lot from this lesson.

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All in all 15 enemy regimes left that status as result of either negotiations, or by actions that the US has little to do with - so hostile interventions aren't more effective than these. Literally just waiting the enemy to collapse might be more effective than... let's say bombing them.
As the book puts it:
Since most U.S. enemies eventually leave that status (in 2008, only five states were still enemies), this calls into question the utility of hostile intervention.
And again they drive their point home, US foreign policy is means driven. They have tools to deal with situations and they apply them, no matter of the cost:
When to these considerations are added the enormous potential human costs of those interventions for both target states (combat deaths, civilian casualties, deliberate massacres) and the U.S., not to mention the budgetary implications, such operations appear even more means-driven than their client counterparts.

The book talks about the future of client-state imperialism, the possibilities if it could stop. Their conclusion is unlikely. Since the publication of the book things doesn't seem to change, if we look closer, we can see the behavioural patterns.
I highly recommend this book to anyone who wants to see the US foreign policy in a different light, and to get some insight how it works. And how it doesn't.

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Orbán's gonna do his traditional yearly speech at Tusnádfürdő in Erdély on Saturday. Right now I think I will write something, I won't translate it, but I might give summaries of each point he talks about, as I did at least once in the past.
I'm actually curious now that Trump changed his peace tune to support Ukraine to continue the war, and the Iranian stuff, since Bibi and Orbán are great pals (and Israel has great influence on our foreign politics as well). Surely he'll talk about the Hungarian who died due to the press-gang treatment when they tried to mobilize, about migration, about Brussels, Chiner, agriculture, EU moneys to Ukraine (they are planning to give 25% of all EU subsidies to Ukraine), Ukraine's EU membership, and the Fidesz government's successes as usual.

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So, Orbán at Tusnádfürdő. I'll add my comments with italics. This will be very long, many posts, spent most of the day doing this. Not sure anyone will read. Time spent well.
Says this speech closes a governmental cycle, he's planning this speech next year will be the opening for the next governmental cycle. We're gonna have legislative election in 2026.
He wants to talk about the current events first, then dive deeper.

Says the first "current event" is the elections of next year.
No guarantees for victory, it will happen how the people decide. According to their own inside assessment that if they held election this Sunday then from the 106 constituencies the Fidesz would win in 80. In 2022 they won in 87 so the goal is that.
The greatest risk in all elections is for the Hungarians living outside of Hungary, have to pick from two fates. When the members of the opposition went to Nagyvárad, they just said: Romanian land. Everyone with an ear knows what this means, we (Orbán and the Fidesz) represent the other way around, the state has borders but the nation does not. They can count on the national government which will struggle for all Hungarians. He asks the audience to stand up for themselves too.
As I pointed out in previous post this event takes place in a town in Erdély.

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Second current event: on Wednesday evening he met the new Prime Minister of Romania.
He says he is the 24th colleague of his. This PM is the 24th PM while Orbán was a PM. He adds that the stability of the Romanian system does not come from the stability of the government and the PM, but the President. He says this PM is a heavyweight politician from Nagyvárad, who moves in the same code system and cultural patterns as us, who is a Romanian patriot who will fight for the Romanian national interests, and who wants common Romanian-Hungarian successes, and who has interest in these, and who will act for these. But Romania has to get a grip on the economy.

Third. He says we (Orbán and Fidesz) banned an anti-semitic and terrorist glorifying rock band.
He says here noone can be hurt for their origin or religion, not even verbally. Seems like he blames the opposition for the incident.
I have not heard of this before. Sounds like censorship to me. Where we draw the boundaries? I hear Hungarian and "Hungarian" politicians verbally abusing Muslims all the time. Now I'm speculating: something like there was a festival and they invited a band whom our govt deemed anti-Semitic and supportive to terrorists. Did they criticize Israel for Gaza? Did they call for an independent Palestinian state? I might look this up.

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Fourth. He introduces the "Digital Civil Associations".
These will play role in the next election, but they want them for the long run. The virtual space is a hostile environment for the "civil christian conservative nationalist right" community. We (Orbán and Fidesz) need a digital civil force. For all around the world we switched the cafés to webcams, meetings of friends to forums, we moved conversations to chat windows, and if something doesn't start on the internet it will fail. This change went through all the Western world, there is nothing inherently Hungarian in this. However there is something that inherently Hungarian: rudeness, insults, trolling, and digital violence.
I don't see how these are inherently Hungarian, I see these from just about anyone.
He says those who commits openly to their civic non-leftlib non-progressive convictions, they get attacked, ridiculed. Trolling communities rule the digital space.
A community can only work if it has one leg in the cyberspace, so we have to create the opposing pole of the destruction, we need to create the culture of work, building of a country, and patriotism in the digital space too. To counter the Tisza Party's aggression they created the Fight Club previously, but the fight is not for everyone, many has enough of conflicts. So this new place for those who doesn't want to participate in direct political clashes, but want to build the country.
These give support in the question of the national sovereignty too, so on international level. Have to make an immune system against the globalists, the leftlibs, those who are on the side of war, and are there in digital space already.
The "Civic Associations" was a movement created by Fidesz next to the party, to do grassroot propaganda and help out in various tasks during campaigns and elections to unburden the party and save some bucks. For me it seems they want to do the same but on facebook, forums, and comment sections. The Fight Club is essentially a trollcommando which gets various messages and has to seek out the nests of opposition and write those as comments there. Eg. open up Magyar Péter's (the leading face of the opposition) or Karácsony Gergely's (the mayor of Budapest) facebook profile and troll the commenters with political messages.

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Fifth. What did Hungary gain with the victory of Trump?
Avoided WWIII - for now. Ended the political discrimination against Hungary. Ended the economic sanctions against PaksNPP - we can finish the enlargement. American investments: 4 new R&D investments for now, and another 3 from September.

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Now the deep dive.
Is a world war coming?
No sure answer, Trump made the world more secure. What the fuck. 
He cites a study which asked people all over in the West if there will be another WW in the next 5-10 years, here's the percentages of the yes side:
France: 55
Spain: 50
Italy: 46
US: 45
UK: 41
Germany: 41
He says authors and analysts publish stuff about WWIII by the dozen these days.
He collected bad omens indicators of a world war and processes leading to one, based on the history of the interwar period:
- Rivalry strengthens between the great powers. This guy is a genius. He says 3 Suns are on the sky now: USA, Chiner, and Russia.
- Number of armed conflicts rises. In 1990 there were 111 armed conflicts all over the globe, in 2024 184. Since 2010 armed conflicts between states - not just simply between armed groups - doubled. He wisely keeps quiet about the actual numbers here. I wonder where an armed conflicts starts according to him and the lackeys who collected the stuff for him. When aunt Mary beats uncle Joe with the rolling pin?
- Before great wars arms race gets stronger. From 1990 to 2025 military spending grew to 1,5 times of the original. I wonder if this has something to do with Trump demanding that 2% spending from NATO cunts. Most investments into arms are financed by loans, and loans can only be covered if the investment pays off, ergo the weapons have to be used, wars have to happen. I don't get this, but okay.
- World economy gets ordered in power blocks. The big geopolitical blocks close down the markets from each other. In the past 10 years the number of policies that restricts global trade grew by 5 times.
- The rise of migration. Global migration doubled, it effects 300 million people.
So, he says, chances for another WW grows continuously.

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Relevance to Hungarians:
- Keep calm, strategic patience. Do not allow Ukraine in the EU coz that would bring the war in. Clapping in the crowd, up until now they sat like a dead fish.
- Have to act for the peace, but our limitations and lack of impact are clear.
He saw this when he visited Zelensky and told him that time is not on their side they should try settling, he got told by Big Z that he is wrong, time is on Ukraine's side, they have to continue the war and they'll win.
We have to concentrate on our region and create "Regional Peace Alliances". We did this with the Serbs, Northern Hungarians. We can hope for one with the Romanians, after the elections the Czechs will be probably in, and Poland is returned by half already, and we can't resign from one with the Austrians.
We have to prepare to stay out of a war if one breaks out. Staying out is not a declaration, but an ability.

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5 pillars of Staying Out:
1. Lessen vulnerability, create good relations with all the centers of powers.
He lists 6 such center and says only one is problematic: USA, Russia, China, India, and the Turk/Altaic world. All is fine except Brussels. Under good relations he doesn't mean declarations of theoretical friendships while drinking, not even sympathy for political attitude. He says he means that we have to make the interest of all the economical success of Hungary, to make our success their success, so neither of them has interest in the destruction of Hungary.
This is a basic thought in the liberal school of foreign politics. If countries satisfy their needs with trade there is no need for war. If they create economic interdependence, a war would be detrimental to the participants. I have to point it out: this is a very globalist thought!
2. Have strength to defend ourselves.
Our defense spending at 1750 billion Hooves. We created a chain of arms industry centers: Győr, Zalaegerszeg, Kaposvár, Várpalota, Kiskunfélegyháza, Gyula. 4 west, 2 south, nothing in north east. I'm not sure about the actual products. There is one new factory for the Rheinmetall Lynxs. We bought bunch of some helicopters, we developed the army, we entered international miltech development. The Hungarian army has to reach a technological superiority versus who the fuck???, we have to build a kind of "precision army".
Yeah. Defend from whom? And the war next door shows that tech is highly overrated, cheap uncomplicated mass produced weapons trumps it. If we faced Ukraine or Russia, they'd just stroll through the country after BTFOing our 25K soldiers - probably not even 10K at actual frontline units. What the fuck do we prepare for? Because we rely on NATO and the "Peace Alliances" above not to get into war. What this spending for? Ofc NATO participation for we have to do stuff within NATO. Especially spend more on US weapons now. But how this helps us staying out of a war if WWIII breaks out? We can't deter shit. This is so stoopid.
3. Recession proofing, self-sufficiency in four fields: arms industry, energy, food production, digital capabilities. The last one is highly related to LLMs/AI, for it will change everything from work, through governance to wars. We have to do this AI work ourselves, for the EU counts nothing on this field. The whole thing how to reach this seems very unclear. Do we create LLM ourselves? Do we at least train open source LLMs, like the Mirage, ourselves? Or we just include ChatGPT in everything? Clearly he knows the audience has 0 idea about these beyond some sensationalist articles, and I see he also has only some vague ideas.
4. Superiority in human resource. The oldtimers called it cultural superiority. We spend the most percentage of GPD in Europe on education. Says him at least. There are 3 Hungarian universities in the top 2% of universities of the world, and 9 in the top 5%.
5. Long-term plan for political stability, a plan that overarches political cycles, and even generations.
He says this one thing should be common understanding in all the parties: we can't close in ourselves in no closets blocks. We are part of the Western alliance but we have to be there in the eastern economy too. This isn't openness, but balance. We have to reach balance if we want to live as a nation in the next decades.

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Back to Europe.
Will there be a European war?
This is already reality. The Russo-Ukrainian war is a European war. Europe plays with fire since 2014.
Western politicians describe this conflict as the clash between democracy and authoritarianism. He says he doesn't know if they believe it or they just saying so but this has nothing to do with reality. He says even if this was real it won't be relevant at all. It's about the balance of power. As Ukraine moves towards a side it will create an imbalance. He says it's perfectly fine if Ukraine wants to join NATO or EU, and it's fine if these accept Ukraine, but the moment Ukraine moves to that side, this will change the balance and create an existential threat to the other side which will react so. Even good will can start wars, if applied at a bad place, with bad timing and bad methods.
He refers to the security dilemma of Realpolitik ofc. But he doesn't go there explaining.
He says the European war wasn't a result of a decision, but it was a consequence. The same with world war. He says they have an inside joke: those who invent the global order they invent the global collapse too, as those who invented the train, they invented train crashes.
He says if the global order collapses there will be regional survival zones. And the big question is how the European will look like and how will fit into that. Especially that Europe got into this war.
He says he has the experience from the meetings of the heads of states and governments of EU member countries. He says the EU decided to go to war, that will continue to support Ukraine even if the US leaves. The peace project of EU became a war project. Hungary decided not to go to war. The EU decided Hungary has to as well. The EU decided that Hungary has to have a pro-Ukraine and pro-war government, they are entering into our internal politics. Orbán and the Fidesz decided it won't be so.

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EU presented the budget of the next 7 year budgetary cycle.
This is a war budget, everything is centered around the logic of war. 20% of all the spending will go to Ukraine. The rest won't be spent on agricultural, economic development, but military preparations. This is about an EU in war against Russia. It fights a war against Russia on the soil of Ukraine, in the hope that a defeat of Russia will collapse the system, open up liberalism, and the Yeltsinian times will return which they think will be good for business.
Hungary needs a budget that needs a development budget, and we won't accept this budget as the foundation for negotiations. Other EU leaders won't even talk to the govt. they expect a new one in 2026 anyway. 
BUT.
He says we already got half of the EU gibsmedats from this cycle. The EU holds back the other half. A new EU budget needs unanimous vote, and as long as we don't get the dough there won't be new EU budget. We will bring home this money and we won't make concessions from our sovereignty.
So basically the EU buys our vote for this "war budget" with the money that's ours - they just hold it back - and our Party and Government tells us that this is somehow a great victory for us. Orbán does this with everything. He tells us he'll veto everything, then for something symbolic in return he doesn't and we have to celebrate. With the latest 18th sanction package against Russia was this: we got a paper guarantee that ensures us we shouldn't need to worry about energy prices. What the fuck.
After this he talks about how the opposition parties were promised they'll get the money if they manage to win in 2026 and do bunch of stuff for the EU (like accepting migration pact or supporting Ukraine and such).

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About Europe's reasons of her actions.
EU decided that they accept the role of the supporter of progressivism or wokism, now that Trump made the US quit with. So now Europe got herself into a position what the US President doesn't just see annoying, but as a political opponent. The current leaders of the EU placed the EU on a forced trajectory, and they'll make the worst deals in the worst time with the US, and this will lead to a trade war which we can't win. These leaders also thought if we confront China along with US, that will help with the US. They were wrong, and they spoiled relations with China too. The latest Trump offer was to sell weapons to Europe what they can give to Ukraine. Brussels tries to fill the vacuum as a supporter of the war, which also makes impossible to make amends with Russia.
So Brussels now is in a trade - and quasi-cold - war with Washington and Beijing, while participates in a hot war against Moscow, and wants to deepen this participation more.
He asks: why? What is the reason behind all these, especially now that most Europeans, citizens, don't support this.
He has a couple of ideas:
1. Federalist master plan. At every crisis they look at a chance for centralization. Raise the jurisdiction of the centralized EU governmental bodies, and cut back the powers of the state governments.
2. EU budget can only be kept up with wartime budget and war economy because it lost the competitiveness. No idea what he really means.
3. Getting Ukraine into the EU they could create a personally managed region within the EU which could prove quite profitable for some participants in the economy. There was a discussion something along the line of this between the European Commission and Zelensky. He means that Ukraine is basically in the pocket of some corpos, it is so indebted and bought up, the local government wouldn't have any real say in anything, they could govern it directly from Brussels.
In the past 10 years we let UK out but want Ukraine in. The UK is anti-federalist, but Ukraine is.

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What is Hungarian grand-strategy?
In 1920 we got defeated. Our enemies decided about us: Hungary will be small and poor. They made this our fate. The point of our (Orbán and Fidesz) grand strategy to change that: Hungary will be great and rich. Before all our neighbours grab the pen to draft a formal protest against this, he suggests to the translators to use the word "great" what the President of the US uses in the Make America Great Again, and not the big.
I think he dun goofed with the explanation since Whole Hungary is called Greater-Hungary customary, he should have emphasized the spirit of the quote not the word.
These are the key questions of our grand-strategy:
1. Where do we get the people?
2. Where do we get resources and energy?
3. Where do we get capital?
4. Where do we get knowledge?
5. How will we be capable for self-defense?
6. How to stop them leaving us out from the international decisions?
He says to explain it it's a separate lecture, but he reflects some on the first question:
We won't import people, we support families. European statistics only shows direct monetary support and doesn't calculate with tax cuts and such. And we are leading in these type of supports, such as women who give birth for two children get immunity for income tax for the rest of their lives. They also starting a new a system that helps young people acquire property with low interest loans.

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Why the future belongs to Central Europe?
Basically migration flooded Western Europe with non-Europeans, for now various Muslims, but Africans will arrive soon in a great flood which the West won't be able to handle.
Statistics:
Germany: 42% of students have migration background.
France: 40% of 4 year olds and below has migration background.
41.2% of the Viennese students are Muslim. Christian is only 34.5%. This is our neighbour.
Western countries now are irreversibly mixed countries. The cities will have Muslim majorities in the forseeable future.
Western Europe will stay migrational destination. They have ready made admitting communities, the newly migrating don't come into the nothing, but they go for specific people who receive them.
About in 10 years we'll have to defend our western borders not just the south.
Why westerners could not defend themselves?
Their last clash with the Muslim world in Western Europe was the battle at Poitiers over 1300 years ago. This is the last experience of the Franco-German Europe that reinforced that national survival and the Christian faith goes hand in hand. By today this is not in their national instinct. Our Constitution says: we acknowledge the role of Christianity in keeping our nation and national character. He says when he tells this in the west, they don't understand. Their history did not teach them this historical lesson. So now their old, well known countries don't exist anymore.

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Will Christianity keep us?
He talks about the relations between Christianity and politics. He talks about three stations:
1. When people still had a "living" belief. People weren't simply religious, or church-goers, but their beliefs permeated through their lives. It was kind of an innate state. He calls this Faithful Christianity. Secularism however destroyed this and we slipped down on the slope to the next one:
2. The living belief shrinks but the culture which grew out of it still remains as a coordinate system, that helps to differentiate between good and bad, what we should think of man and woman, children, family, responsibility, punishment and forgiveness etc. For all these questions we give answers according to the Christian culture. He calls this Cultural Christianity. Central Europe is still here.
3. Zero Christianity. Even as guide Christianity is ceased to exist. Here people give up the culture, and there is a point: when they accept same sex marriage. Westerners are here, and mass migration caught them in this state.
I understand what he talks about and tried to not sure it will make any sense for the reader.
Is there a lower state? Can we hold on to ours and stay? Can we climb back to the living faith? He says he does not know the answer, this will depend on our children. Have we taught them that our duty as Hungarians? Keep what we have, get what we don't have but we need, reject what we don't even need. We'll see what kind of parents we were.

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After this long talk there are some questions and whatnot, there's a bishop next to him, who also talks. One thing that might interest us is a short sketch how the EU can survive.
He says it would be important to restore the balance in the jurisdictions if member states and the EU.
He also draws up a picture of a "Concentric EU":
1. circle of Security (security of energy too; even Turkey and Ukraine fits)
2. circle of Free Movement (unified market, Schengen)
3. circle of Common Wallet (Eurozone)
4. circle of Constitutionalized Institutions (for those who wants United States of Europe)
All the nations have their own needs and all the nations can decide which circle they want to belong, and not to force them to wear the same sized shoe.
This is the only chance to save the EU.
Pic not entirely related but depicts soemtin similar.


All right. This concludes his speech. I got tired and commented less and less I think. Really should have came up with some funny stuff, but this is all I could muster.
Perhaps one day someone will Google something and find it and get something out of it.

Huh... Intresting...
He does realize that Hungary actually is in Nato and the EU right?

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 >>/54489/
Well he noted it at one point. I think I noted it he noted it.
I think he is trying to create the illusion that whatever happens it's part of some plan they have in motion.
We are in the situation where EU multis rule the market, but we have to rely on the Russians for energy (gas, nuclear), while the gas is true to Turkey as well, but the Chinese build their battery and car plants in the country, and now we have to take American investments to satisfy Trump's trade balance demands or whatever probably part of being a good client for Washington.
So Orbán just claims that this is their the master plan, we are doing "connectivity". But we are on a path with hard constraints.
And there is a thing that too many masters as a great author once wrote. Kek.

Frankly he talked a lot, but he touched on many topics and spent 2-3 minutes on most, and even where he talked more, those raise more questions, than gives answers. I got the feeling the whole thing was very shallow. I hoped for something more substantial.

Now media is reiterating his talking points over and over. I had little time to listen this morning, but caught some of it, about the gibsmedats:  >>/54483/
So, for each budgetary cycle the EU parliament votes on the budget, this budget also decides how much funds each country gets. These funds what the EU holds back from Hungary citing various reasons, like corruption, freedom of speech apparently the opposition has no voice in the country - this is false, there are some funky stuff, but most of the largest media outlets are all pro-opposition and human rights violations such as not allowing gay marriages or not letting in the migrants just like that and not accepting the "migration pact". This money also plays role in various negotiations related the the Ukrainian war.
So Orbán and govt media says Hungary will get this money. I'm fairly sure the EU has to give it to us by the end of the cycle... this needs some research, how long they can hold back transferring it??? these funds are specifically for spending. But - they say - how we get it back will depend on the next government elected in 2026.
According to them Magyar Péter and the Tisza Party made a deal with Brussels, that they get the money when they get elected if they start supporting the war in Ukraine, let in the migrants, deconstruct the family supporting policies of the current govt, etc, etc.
And they say that the Orbán government can get it back the money while not compromising the country's sovereignty, while staying out of the war.
Weirdly enough Orbán said we won't accept next EU budget until they give us the money. He also said that budget is a war budget and its baed, and we have to veto it, because we have to stay out of the war. But if we don't veto it, this means we enter the war, and they are willing to trade our entry for that money.

 >>/54491/
This is the same thing with the sanctions, funds for Ukraine, and weapon shipments.
We are after the 18th sanction package. Which one of these was vetoed by Orbán? Which funds were denied, and weapon shipment torpedoed?
There is this alternative fantasy universe created by the media and the politicians, foreign and local both, opposition and governmental both, where Orbán stops EU support. The reality is that all passes. And not against Orbán's will, but with his cooperation.
There are some bartering going on for our consent, yes. I remember three occasions:
1. When they sent out Orbán for a coffee and they voted the motion in without him. The genius idea attributed to Scholtz.
2. One of the sanctions introduced price cap on Russian fossil fuels. We "successfully managed" to get exemption from this so we could buy those on any price. We were allowed to pay more.
3. When they wanted to send money to Ukraine and we got some of the EU funds allotted to us for our signo.
Must be other occasions, but these I can recall.
Does this means things stop? Well maybe like at a stop sign at a crossroad. But traffic goes on, sanctions goes on.
Vetoing means denying. Full stop. There would be a list of sanctions that failed to pass. Not failed in their effect, but which never were implemented because Orbán said: no!
And back to the fantasy world. One side is angry because Orbán prevents the support of Ukraine, the other side is delighted by it. Meanwhile no such thing happens.

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Our dear Ursula made the best trade deal ever.
https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20250727-trump-eu-chief-seek-deal-in-transatlantic-tariffs-standoff
https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/5422634-trump-eu-trade-deal-tariffs/
15% tariffs on European goods (including cars)
EU purchases $750 billion worth of energy from the US (forbids buying gas from Russia, in the name of "energy independence")
EU invests $600 billion more than planned in the US (not sure about the full amount, the news carefully keeps quiet about it)
EU buys arms from the US, coincidentally the military budget was recently raised to 2% and from there to 5% there will be money to spend.
I heard there will be zero tariffs on US goods arriving to Europe. The articles I checked have not wrote anything or I'm just blind. Asked grok and chatgpt and I found most likely there won't be any tariffs on US goods. There was a zero-zero proposal tho, that's out of the window.
> It's a good deal for everybody," Trump told reporters
Well as long as EU doesn't count as everybody. It doesn't matter who sits in the White House, if the US gets horny, EU has to bend over.

Check out the politico article. How they hiding the sad fact of getting robbed is an art in itself.
https://www.politico.eu/article/us-and-eu-strike-trade-deal/

 >>/54493/
Not great.
Interestingly the Japanese deal was a 15% tariff both ways but the EU one is not. Hmmm....
EU already buys energy from US.
I also don't know how those investment deals work. Who is investing? The government or Private organisations?
In Saudi Arabia's case it was simpler as they have a state investment fund. But even then I heard they didn't have enough to invest what they promised.

 >>/54495/
> Who is investing? The government or Private organisations?
Orbán asked similar things.
> Who buys the gas?
> Who invests the money?
> Who buys the weapon?
The EU can't do any of that. About the tariffs, they can talk about it due to the single, unified market, but beyond that it's either the member states, or the companies. And here it gets more difficult for - as you pointed out - how Leyen can negotiate on behalf of private organizations? In case of member state perhaps they can force them to do things, or at least make things "for the willing".

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So.
Which Path to Persia?
I wanna go through the book's list of paths in short, and take a look at it through the lens of the other book I just wrote about above, the US Foreign Policy in Perspective.

The book was published by Brookings Institute, supposedly the US's most cited think tank, so this might be the closest to get to a publication that was made along the debates politicians and bureaucrats, and a publication that is read by politicians and bureaucrats - especially by those in the State, Treasury and Defense departments of the US government, the three departments that conducts US's foreign relations. And the President.

The book reviews of the policy options to the problem Iran embodies. But what is the problem with Iran?
A. Iran tries to acquire nuclear weapons, but at least a nuclear program.
B. Iran supports various violent extremist/terrorist groups (eg. Hamas, Hezbollah, Talibans update: Houthis)
C. Seeks to disrupt Arab-Israeli relations and Palestinian peace process
D. Destabilizes the Middle East
Well one could point out Israel is doing great job in disrupting her relations with the Arabs and preventing peace with Palestinians, and that the greatest threat to the stability of the Middle East is the US herself, but this is about US's point of view.

Quick rundown of the options ("contents" essentially):
I. Diplomatic options
1. persuasion
2. engagement
II. Military Options
1. invasion
2. airstrikes
3. airstrikes by Israel
III. Regime Change
1. revolution
2. insurgency
3. coup
IV. Containment
1. containment
2. containment
3. containment

These options were all discussed by US administration, at the time of the writing of the book Obama's govt. put forward its strategy consisting of many of the options above, but mainly focusing on persuasion. The book criticizes the Bush administration's approach which also followed persuasion. The book actually makes difference between the two they are quite biased towards Obama, calling Bush's implementation heavy-handed, I don't think that actually mattered any.

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I think I have to start with the last option. The Containment is what the US Foreign Policy in Perspective calls routinely hostile activities. This is a quite important one too, if not the most important, which is essentially responsible for the situation we are currently in. The authors of Which Path to Persia has a confusing take on this with contradictory statements.
Let's quote some. On one hand they say it's the last choice for the US:
> Containment is always America’s last policy choice.
> When a state proves too hostile for Engagement or a diplomatic compromise, when it is too strong to be invaded or otherwise attacked, and when it is too repressive to be overthrown, only then does the United States opt to contain it as best it can.
> Containment may become the U.S. policy of last resort toward Iran
> [...] must be addressed before the United States adopts the Containment policy.
On the other hand it says it's the normal practice:
> Containment has been the default U.S. policy toward Iran since the Islamic Revolution
> the constant in U.S. policy toward Iran over the past 30 years has been Containment
> Except for those moments when Washington was attempting to engage the Iranian regime, the United States typically was trying to isolate it
> Containment may also be the easiest policy option toward Iran to conceptualize, both because it is effectively what the United States has pursued for most of the past 30 years and because it would be roughly congruent with how the United States contained the Soviet Union during the Cold War, and has contained a host of other antipathetic regimes such as Cuba and North Korea
It is a mistake to consider Containment a policy the US has to adopt, since even the authors point it out that it was used constantly. It is the backdrop for the US to implement the rest of the policies in front of. It permeates all the actions done by the US from the first day the Islamic Revolution came to power.
And indeed it was used against all the enemies of the US! As the other book says this is the default way the US behaves when an enemy emerges: she starts doing her routinely hostile activities.

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What is Containment?
U.S. efforts to discourage arms sales, trade, and investment with Iran by other countries. [...] trying to isolate it — diplomatically, economically, militarily, and in every other way conceivable.
So basically sanctions, sanctions and more sanctions. Get the clients to do sanctions. Barter with non-clients to implement sanctions. But we really can recognize the routinely hostile activities  >>/54314/
> The U.S. may withhold diplomatic recognition, block UN membership, decree or intensify a trade embargo, vote against multilateral loans, forbid normal travel by citizens of either country, offer asylum to immigrants from the enemy, attempt to restrict weapons and technology transfers, verbally support exiled opposition leaders, electronically broadcast propaganda, and, of course, denounce the enemy as illegitimate and a violator of basic norms (e.g., human rights).
And yes, this is the standard way of the US when dealing with enemies.
This isn't really to make the enemy do something, it's just for containing and hampering them in every way possible.

So keep in mind that the other options try to achieve something, to make Iran give up aspirations to get nukes, or stop supporting non-state actors, or whatever the US doesn't like, and in general to make Iran to do what the US wants.
They examine each policy thoroughly. They introduce it, describe the goal, the possible timeframe it can be initiated and the time it takes to achieve the goal (or fail), they write an overview, requirements, pros and cons. I won't do all that, just give a summary.

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I. Diplomatic options
These have too many moving parts not entirely dependent on only the USA, but on other countries.
1. persuasion
Carrot and stick. The book says so. But they add shouldn't use the term because Iranians might find it offensive. Kek.
Anyway.
Carrot: good deals, offering lifting sanctions, allowing them to get cool stuff and wealth.
Stick: sanctions.
As the book notes, Iran is sanctioned to the point where not much more sanctions can be placed on her, and in fact more sanctions would be detrimental to everyone else. So good luck with this. Still consequent Presidents use this doomed to fail policy over and over.
I have to point out that all these sanctions was put in place by the US's containment policy which runs in the background.
2. engagement
No sticks just carrots. Total rapprochement. Like how the US made neutral state out of China. See "ending enemy status: negotiations"  >>/54433/
Frankly this is the actual liberal approach: lift everything, and integrate Iran into the global trade to eliminate the need for Iran to be hostile.
Problem is noone in the US sees any great opportunity in Iran, no new role they could integrate her in. Not much to gain. And even if one President thought it's a good idea, next could just revert it before the policy bears fruit.

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II. Military options
These are all hard to sell without Iranian provocation. And Iran's history shows they don't do much of such at all. If they act they do covertly to have some plausible deniability - just like how the US likes to act if has no justification.
1. invasion
Going gung ho all in AMERRRICA, FUCK YEAH! style. Invade it like Iraq or Afghanistan. They say the only obstacle is the terrain. Iranian military is weak indeed, for all the anti-coup redundancy measures, see Luttwak. The book says just to dismantle the nuke program and such, not to reform the country how they tried in Iraq and Afghanistan. The US is great overthrowing regimes, but setting up working ones instead is a harder question.
High cost, high manpower needs which the US might not has. Very few would support this. Back then it was true and it is true right now. Even the airstrike got flak this year. Since the publication of the book they failed in Afghanistan. No appetite now.
Neighbors might not help either so limited way of entries.
2. airstrike
They mention two types. A "coercive" bombing campaign - like Rolling Thunder or Linebacker - to bend Iran to will, which is less feasible, and one that aims to disarm Iran, trying to destroy the nuclear program with bombings. The latter being in the realm of possibility.
They write about the difficulties and tasks to solve - but all within the capabilities of the US. Can be initiated any time and could take from a few days to several weeks, but they need intelligence on the targets which could take some time to gather. They need to dismantle or suppress air defense first, next they have to target the components of the program: the facilities, the researchers, ballistic missile program. Targets are numerous.
Scaled down and up version exists, depending on what they wish to achieve, the limited version would only target key facilities.
Back then in 2009 they estimated Iran will acquire Da Bomb sometimes in 2010-2015. They also estimated that if they did an air campaign against Iran it would delay them by 2-10 years - lower numbers being more realistic, and even 5-7 years would make everyone ecstatic. They had no illusions they can stop it once and for all.
The model was the Israeli strike against Syrian (Deir ez-Zor) and Iraqi (Tuwaitha/Osiraq) nuclear facilities, with the caveat that it wouldn't anything be like those.
They note such an attack might solidify Iran's resolve to acquire nukes, could spark the rally around the flag effect, Iran might strike back with covert tools, and make them more radical in general.
This policy can be repeated as many times as necessary.

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3. Lave it to Bibi
As noted still within the military options the airstrike has a variation when not the US does it, but a proxy: Israel.
It is a recurring theme at almost every policy that if it doesn't work, or not work fast enough, Israel's palm can start to itch, and make a strike against Iran. As one point the authors put it, there are three clocks ticking:
- Israel's the fastest, they want to shut down Iran's nuclear program ASAP;
- Iran's the slowest, they want to gain time to build that weapon, they will stall and delay;
- US's clock in the middle, they have to find a way to slow down Israel and prevent them mucking up the whole thing, and hasten Iran to do what's told.
So it could happen that this "policy" won't be deployed by the United States, but Israel decides unilaterally to go ahead, and then the US have to react. As they put it:
under the right (or wrong) set of circumstances, Israel would launch an attack—principally airstrikes, but possibly backed by special forces operations — to destroy Iran’s nuclear program.
So the US has decisions to make: green light, yellow light, red light, or no light the attack. These are the combinations of encouragement/discouragement and opening Iraqi and Jordanian airspace. Mostly doesn't matter, unless the US sends her own aircrafts to clash with the IAF the whole world would think the US encouraged and helped Israel to do the strikes, consequences remained the same anyway. So the only option is green lighting it, at least that would give the sense of control...
Btw the hope is that both blame and retaliation would be put on Israel, as the authors noted, slim chance.

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Since Israel did strike Iran, now in the history books, have to spend more time on this.
Circumstances changed a lot since 2009.
Back then it was a danger that Iran might strike back via her proxies. Today, Hamas is in hiding, Hezbollah got pushed back and decapitated temporarily, and the Houtis attack Israel occasionally anyway.
On the other hand Iran developed serious missile capabilities. This was tested in the past year, on a tit-for-tat basis, a salvo of missiles and drones in return of an assassinated general. Israel defensive capabilities were also tested. And US's and UK's too - if they can (and will) jump in the way.
Back then Syria also posed a threat. Now after Assad was ousted and gone, the country lacking strong central leadership, divided, still bogged in a civil war, not so much. In fact it became an opportunity.
Back then the range of IAF planes and the route they could take looked like a problem. Jordan and Iraq was "friendly" thanks to US if the US wished too. But during the days after the fall of Assad the Israelis destroyed much of Syria's air defense capabilities, so they had a whole country to circle over and refuel their planes to solve the range problem. Jordan could be left out.
Back then Israel didn't have the capacity to harm the nuclear program much. They could destroy facilities on the surface, kill some eggheads and whatnot. But the core of the program was hidden below back then. Today it is more true.
Now here comes the real difference.
The US got involved to do that, Trump initiated II/2's scale down version, to put the dot onto the "i".
In fact it looks like Israel did an elaborate operation with forces on the ground, drone strikes (Spiderweb style I would not be surprised if that were also Israelis) in combination with the air strikes. They had to utilize the agent networks they built in Iran through the decades, to gather intel and paralyze air defense and disrupt the chains of decision making. Tho some of that might be the result of Iran's anti-coup measures.
It seems to me Israel did the heavy lifting from option II/2 and took the Iranian retaliation on the chin.

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Now did they do it after US encouragement? Did the US allowed them through Iraq? Or Turkey let 'em to fly in? In this case was US made Turkey to allow them? Or they just did and everyone stood by like some dicks?
'member how giddy Netanyahu was when he announced the American intervention? He has this sideways face structure but he almost smirks here. Check vidrel.
Now he had reasons to be happy, but which one was it? For the whole operation was a success, that the US could destroy the facilities? Or because he managed to pull the US into action, and finish what IDF could not do? Or because Trump managed to save their asses from prolonged Iranian rocket salvos?

We also have no idea about the effect. Trump ensured us about the total success. I have me doubts.
All right, let's move on.

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III. Regime change
These are what the US Foreign Policy in Perspective calls covert actions. When the US doesn't have a good justification for the world and her own citizens to act overtly. This part discusses how to seed local movements to topple the current Islamic revolutionist regime. One main problem: there is no real candidate, a charismatic leader to rally support around, and put forward as an opposing pole to Khameini and the supporting structure.
1. popular uprising
Since the Iranian Islamist regime is widely despised by the whole country, it seems possible to fan these negative emotions and spark a revolution. Iran has her revolutionary past too. The book notes that while many revolution happened in history, it is really not clear what leads to them, and even less clear how to reproduce the process "artificially". So it is more theoretical than anything.
This was in 2009 but how I see it, compared to US Foreign Policy in Perspective (published same year), in the meantime the US developed a new policy tool. Even back then they surely experimented with this. I try to list some:
Bulldozer Revolution (Serbia 2000), Rose Revolution (Georgia 2003), Orange Revolution (Ukraine 2004), Tulip Revolution (Kyrgyzstan 2005), Arab Spring (Middle EAst, 2011), Maidan (2013-14) - as far as I know all had some level of US/Western meddling. At the least via USAID and NGOs.
I think if not by 2009, but by today, they have a procedure to follow if they want to push a revolution in a country. Even here, opposition is/was hoping a colour revolution would happen which removed the Orbán government.
Anyway possible groups in the country: reformists, intellectuals, student, labor, civil society organizations. Maybe put forward Reza Pahlavi, the son of the last shah.

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2. insurgency
Supporting an insurgency of minority or opposition groups.
Iran is a multi-ethnic state, Persians little more than half of it. Kurds, Baluchs, Arabs, Azeris and others populate the country. Khameini has Azeri origins for example. It might be possible to turn against the regime one or many. Kurds are a convenient example - but these days I heard (on Caspian Report) that even Azeris could be played against the government.
Beyond them they could form external opposition groups from Iranian expats ("punctuated military operations"  >>/54316/), or prop up the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) or the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK). Or anyone else who is willing.
One real question: could they initiate a regime change? While a revolution certainly does that if successful, but an insurgency might be better for distraction, or as an option to put pressure on in a "persuasion" policy.
3. coup
A timeless classic. Probably this has the shortest chapter. Would be most convenient for the US if the Iranian military couped the regime. But the US has no good way in to engineer it. As here I wrote  >>/54316/ based on the US Foreign Policy in Perspective, this is pretty much impossible.
Imagine what would an Iranian officer (a colonel or a general perhaps) would think if a stranger approached him and hinted that he should do a coup. Will he think:
> yeah this is a legit CIA agent I should start organizing
or:
> fuck me, the regime is testing my loyalty, best report this highly irregular event, and pray to Allah I won't be taken in the middle of the night
?
Exactly.

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So what options the US really has?
They always do the Containment in the background, but beyond that...
In my opinion real solution would be the Engagement, this most likely would work, and this would pull the poison teeth out - even if they acquired nukes.
But the US would not do that, unless circumstances change a lot. What she is willing to do is just Persuasion, and as recent events proved: they found a way to do an airstrike (probably result of decades long preparatory work) which was a combination of Israeli one with a fly-in fly-out US participation. So it was barely a US airstrike.
Anything else don't seem to be a real possibility. Invasion? Revolution? Insurgency? Coup?
In the past 45 years this is what the US did: containment and in the layer above trying to persuade Tehran occasionally. And now the airstrike - which is a huge exception, like a rare astronomical event, and only good for delaying the inevitable.
Will things change? Did recent events opened up some of the paths - like an insurgency of a minority? Did it closed surely other options - such as the rally round the flag effect blocked a chance for a revolution?
And put it in global perspective: how feasible would be to do some other moves: consider the threat at Taiwan would the US spend resources on an invasion?
And in more local perspective, would a larger turmoil in Iran shift the stability in the Middle East in the right or the wrong direction? And the book also points out: Iran acquiring nuclear weapons could also cause proliferation, if they have that, some neighbours at the gulf would also want 'em Pakistan already has.

Lot of interesting things in this book. I want to note another one: it seems the US finds everyone with nukes reasonable and trustable. The Russians, the Chinese, the British, the French, the Indian, the Pakistani, the North Korean and the Israeli are all fine but surely the Iranians the irrational ones who'd launch 'em. The authors do ask, would Iran really do? Or would Iran give nukes to her terrorist proxies? They have not gave even chemical weapons. Is there a real threat there?
Ofc it's more about that pesky proliferation. They don't mind those who have nukes, since can't do much about that, it's not a good idea to fuck with them either. But they could try prevent others to get it. If everyone had nukes, there won't be any county whom the US could bully.

 >>/54532/
Serious omission. I noted how they here  >>/54316/ call "punctuated military operations" but forgot to note that other parts is the policy tool called "aid to internal armed opposition forces".
So what the Brookings' authors wrote was essentially checking all the options of the other book.

I wanna add some stuff, again from the morals we learnt from US Foreign Policy in Perspective.
I can see their point on the US foreign policy being means driven. They have tools and they are put forward to use them even if:
- the chance of success is slim to none;
- they are sure they won't use them;
- they don't suit the job.
First as we saw at the example of Brazil the US doesn't start invasions against large countries with difficult terrain.
Afghanistan is 650K sqKm with an estimated population of 36-50 million people. Iraq is 440K sqKm, with 46 million, but the terrain is much more forgiving in the sense that it's not hilly. Compared to these Iran is 1,65 million sqKm large, 'bout three times of the average of the previous two. Population 95 million, about twice. Terrain is also difficult. It doesn't look like a country the US would invade.
Punctuated military operations are doomed to failure and not suitable for a regime change at all. Supporting internal armed oppositions isn't suited to bring regime change about. Still both are/were proposed for that reason.
The book doesn't contemplate airstrike as a possible regime change tool (although can be used in combination of a regime change tool to support the effect), but when the happening happened this year in the media analysts and propagandists speculated that the air campaign is done to cause regime change. Even tho Bibi said clearly they started them to destroy the nuclear program. Still the speculation was put forward over and over, that it might be in the background - I guess on "surely the Jew is lying" basis.

Still meditating on Which Path to Persia.
The authors say that Iran is a totalitarian hellhole, but it's hard to predict what they will do, and how they react, and they can change their position a lot, because one can never know whom they'll elect as a president and there are many interest groups and cliques and whatever.
So democracy is bad now, and Iran is not centralized?
But turn this around and let's take a look as Iran at the US. They see a fickle country with you can make a deal today, but the next POTUS could throw the deal into the trash tomorrow. Would Iran listen to the promises they make? And why would she listen?