/kc/ - Krautchan

 >>/52671/
> Scholz failed his no confidence vote. Germany's government is past tense.
This one was surprising to me though. I was not expecting that to happen.

 >>/52672/
His govt. cracked in half can't govern effectively from minority. If they voted him confidence that would meant he can have majority support in the Reichstag Bundestag, at least occasionally. And his work could have continued. That was denied from him the other day.

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Listening Orbán's intro for the end year press conference. So this is just him talking, not replying to questions.
He opens with three points:
1. the Hungarian EU presidency is ending soon, evaluation;
2. the situation of Hungarian and EU politics after the US presidential elections;
3. decisions the Hungarian govt. took and will influence the plans for 2025.
But all before he expresses our condolences towards the families of the victims of the Magdeburg terror attack and to the German people, "we are with them". He says such events happens now on all the Christmases, as if run on by a timetable. These events only happen since Europe is hit by a migrant crisis. Some still deny it or don't see it, but that there is a connection, a causation between migration and the attacks.

1. Hungarian presidency
EU had a summit this week, where they said we have a "successful presidency" behind us. Lots of work was put into this. We already had a presidency, had to put more work now into it. Hungary is/was very isolated in this half a year. But at the end even our opponents congratulated for the work done.
1a. War
We had no room for maneuver.
In the EU there is a deep difference between opinions what should be the strategy of the EU in the Russo-Ukrainian War. One side - which has the overwhelming majority, and their will is enforced right now - says that the war is Europe's war too, as they call it "our war as well". Luckily they don't include us into the "our" - Orbán adds. They say it's a European war and we have to participate, only the way of participation is under debated - what to send, what not, when to send, how much to send. The other opinion is ours: this is not our war. This is a war of brothers between Slavic nations, and we should isolate, and not jump into it, and escalate it with out participation. This difference between opinion is in the European public thinking since the breakout of the war.
Since as president we could only express common EU opinions, our hands were tied. Despite this we could do peace mission which we separated from the presidency. I think they did not separate it.
1b. the question of Schengen Area
Schengen Area divides the EU into full and not actually full members. Bulgaria and Romania was outside of it and they could feel they weren't full members. For 10-13 years the expansion of the Schengen Area was blocked, can be known by which countries when and for what reasons, but this "blockade" was resolved with lots of negotiations. The two aforementioned countries will join now. Life becomes very different now for them, and for Hungary as well, since we are on the border of Schengen.
Now Hungary can move border guards and police away from the Romanian border.
1c. The worsening EU competitiveness
The Dragi report describes the situation quite radically. The Hungarian presidency led the creation of a document called Pact of Competitiveness, which is a plan to stop the decline, and reverse the process. Generally these types of "pacts" only touch typically leftist issues, such as social or climate problems, far from capitalism. It is really hard to create a consensus in a lefty Europe in questions of market, capital, investment, efficiency - so we are proud we managed.
1d. the outlook of the EU agriculture after 2027
Another 7 year cycle starts then. Huge funding goes into it, and negotiations and debates already started behind the scenes. Al 27 ministries of agriculture made an agreement on how the future should look like. This doesn't mean that debates end, they start now in earnest, but now everyone can see what are we debating about, and what goals we want to reach.
So as for the EU presidency, all in all it is worth to pick fights, and struggle, because results are showing.

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2. US presidential election
Is there a new life after the US election? In Brussels they think: there is none. He says he experienced that in Brussels they behave nothing changed, they do what they did up until now, and continue. European elite did not noticed anything - he says legally this is right, since Trump is not sworn in yet. He noted the promised tariffs.
Europe should realize we will live in a new world, the Western approach to migration, family, traditional values, gender problems will change drastically. Economic ties will change, the view of the war will change, and the sanctions against Russia as well. He says we will move from war times into the period of peace. We are glad about it. We, Hungary can only lose on war. This is why we gave all the humanitarian help to Ukraine, but did not sent weapon. We secured the entry of 1.5 million Ukrainian citizen, most of them crossed the country, freshest data says 80 thousand live still here. We helped Ukraine with energy, electricity, training of doctors, saving of lives, and we continuously giving peace suggestions, right now there is a Hungarian suggestion on the table for cease fire and exchange of prisoners.
The war has economical impact, war means war economy as well. He says we can close this now and a new era can come. War can end, peace can begin. With the peace the embargo that plagues the European economy can end. The sanctions have to be lifted as much as possible. If this is managed successfully, the period of inflation will end as well, economic boom can start and prosperity can return to Europe.
We represent this standpoint in the EU debates. We always hit wall for now, because only a few small countries see this similarly, all the big players not recognized this yet. The majority block in the EU Parliament made a pact to keep everything how it is now as long as possible, and they decided to pressure all the countries to accept that in the next 5 years they all pay the GDP's 0.25% into the coffers for Ukraine's war support. According to us this point now is superseded, this is the past, we should talk about the next step. We should decide instead how to put this money not into the prolongation of the war, but into its closing, we should invest in the peace.
The US presidential election is in accord with the change in the EU Parliament and formation of the Patriots group (Patriots for Europe, PfE). All the offices were denied from the members, and now the liberal Brussels elite has an opposition in the Patriots (and with them, us).
Meanwhile we are punished with a €1 million per day because we defend the borders and don't let migrants into the EU.

3. Outlook and plans
We had another "national consultation".
If Bernd doesn't know what is this, it's liek an opinion research, they plan a number of questions with prepared answers, and they mail it to citizens, who can fill out the form and mail it back. The questions and answers are written in a way, that no man in his right mind would disagree with the answers that supports the Fidesz' opinion. An exaggerated example: "Do you want more money? 1. Yes. 2. No, in fact we want to pay more!" This opinion polling is used as a legitimization tool by Orbán and our govt. and it replaces plebiscites.
He says the participation shows that people want to be involved. He says this "national consultation" is always criticized, but for "us" it is important.
He lists some domestic economic measurements the govt took/takes. I won't type 'em in. No consequence for Bernd.

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So while EU is preparing to enact tariffs on cars manufactured in China one of the Chinese companies, the BYD Auto, opens a factory on the Hungary. They'll employ ~10K people with €1800-2000 average salary which is a pretty good number hereabout. They're gonna produce electric and hybrid cars. BYD has an electric bus assembly plant in the country already.
I heard gossips about opening new factory(ies) for a while now, but this is the first actual news with concrete facts.
This has the obvious advantage of the cars being manufactured within the EU so no tariffs on them. Probably can't manufacture as much as China does at home, but it's just a first plant, perhaps they'll open more in other EU countries. Northern Hungary, Czechia, Poland, Croatia, Romania, perhaps even the Baltics would welcome them I'm sure if they see benefits from this example here.
https://index.hu/gazdasag/2024/12/29/kina-byd-szeged-kecskemet-fizetes-nyelvtanulas/

On a related note, how much more Chinese surveillance will find their way into our country?

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Hah, Wikipee.
This is their production outside China. I'm pretty sure their factory here won't produce 150K yearly.

Listening to this:
Rhetoric vs Reality: The Geopolitical World in the Age of Trump
by Michael Rossi
https://youtube.com/watch?v=g34fXJJAdiM
https://yewtu.be/watch?v=g34fXJJAdiM
Posted three weeks ago, so quite some water flowed down the Danube since, but still (there is still no meeting between Trump and Putin, so his intro is still valid).

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> [...] if you can really tell me who is the new leader of Europe today, I mean I'm willing to, you know, hear you out, but if your answer is Emanuel Macron, I got some bad news for you. If he is the best you can think of, Europe is in sort of dire straits these days

:^)

The screenshot he uses is obviously from twitter, but I found part of the quote in an article, about the Israel-Hamas war.
https://www.politico.eu/article/israel-hamas-war-europe-eu-power-irrelevance/

Listening the Trump speech in the Congress. Mostly it's airy bullshit, but this:
> You should be hired and promoted based on skill and competence

How people anywhere in the world can't agree with this statement? This is such a nobrainer. Ofc reality doesn't work like this (see nepotism and cronyism) but the notion should be universally accepted.

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> Governor

Ebin banter.
Can view his truths here, no need to sign up or anything:
https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump

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Quick post. I hope this will upload.
Interesting thoughts from this Infantryman: Total Democracy.
Assume along the lines of totalitarian dictatorship. I actually searched a bit and found two essays on democracies "defending" democracy by banning/silencing political opponents.
I might reflect on this sometimes.

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It is customary to create an even lamer Hungarian version of lame western products and services and whatnot.
The Fidesz-aligned Századvég Foundation founded by a minister of the first Orbán government 1998-2002  opened a fact-checker website, first in the country. Now they claim control over the facts and the correct interpretation of them.
They say they don't just fact check, but also offer a "barometer" which shows if a statemen, an article is "factual", "partially factual", or false. And the example was that the opposition said that the birth rates are low despite what the government say how their family supporting measures are successful. According to the fact-checkers this statement is partially true because the correct thing to state would have been: birth rates are low since the 70s...
So yeah. They are taking over the propaganda-control idea of the left-libs of the USA. I bet previously they published articles and did statements about their blatant fact falsifying technique.

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 >>/54153/
Three main thoughts he has:
1. total democracy
2. woke imperialism
3. might not makes right, but morals don't win wars

1. Basically limiting democracy in the name of democracy. Especially in the name of liberal democracy. Banning parties, restricting speech, labeling political opponents, arresting them.
Not without precedent. From the top of my head in ancient Athens it happened they declared politicians as enemy of their polity and democracy (labeled them as tyrannos) initiated ostrakismos against them. I bet there are other examples, from various republics, like Rome, tho they weren't actually democracies (they were oligarchies).

2. Western institutions exerting cultural and ideological domination over other sovereign nations, trying to influence their social policies towards what Westerners think is right.
How I see it, this is the global scope of #1, total democracy applied in foreign politics. It is essentially the same, labeling opponents as something undesirable, and punishing them, trying to silence and ostracize them.
I think the root can be found in the Liberal school of thought of international relations - but explained by Constructivism. I'd suggest Matt (and ofc, Bernd) to get Introduction To International Relations by Oxford University Press (2022 is the latest I think), or for a quick reference Michael Rossi's videos, here's playlist, look for Liberalism and Constructivism:
https://youtube.com/playlist?list=PLCFS2rj-qIVZLbIVLrUx8cXEDAn4RgGVB
He gives really good explanations.

3. Good quote: "we are morally right - therefore we shall win"
They (western - typically left-liberal - politicians, thinkers, and their main audience) live in a Lord of the Rings fantasy, and ignore that in a conflict all sides consider themselves morally right (probably even Sauron did), they disregard objective truths like firepower superiority, and shoot themselves in the foot if they lose, since that should prove them that they were wrong (since they lost).

 >>/54169/
Some stuff to add.
Quick sum of Constructivism:
How states (and other participants) behave in international relations stem from their view of themselves and the others. How they see themselves, how they see others.
So we can observe me adding this liberals see themselves as the morally right, the champions of freedom, democracy, and socio-economic welfare. They see others as dictators, oppressors, racists, imperialists, slavers, ethnic cleansers, etc. Danger in short. And no matter how awful those regimes are which liberals support all around the world they'll find a way to spin the narration to their favor.

As for liberalism in international relations. For liberals states - and indeed nations - are things of the past. For them states are surpassed and they should not exist. They say the actors of international relations are institutions, companies, and even individuals. In their mind they already live in this world, so it is natural for them, that while they live and are citizens in country X, they feel they have the right to tell the citizens of Y country what to think and how to behave. They see themselves as citizens of the world, a cosmopolitan.
I want to refer to my Theory of Power, you can find it somewhere on these pages if you look hard enough. People want more power and keep power reminder: power is the ability to make decisions. So liberals are all for freedom while they want others to share the power with them, but when they get into the position of power they turn authoritarian. They want to tell others what to think and do. Simple. There is a tyrant within every liberal.
Liberals are very militant and belligerent. Unlike Realists the classic school of international relations, who are pragmatists essentially, Liberals have an ideological and emotional bias, they feel right and they feel very strong about it. Liberals in international relations will seek out differences with others and they will clash with them about it. Realists who see interests and are willing to compromise are way, way less belligerent.
Liberals also believe in democratic peace theory. They believe democracies don't war each other. If they see the living example which refutes, dispels this flawed opinion, they will argue that one side (whom they label as aggressor) is not a real democracy. That is usually a liberal democracy.
Moreover they feel justified by democratic peace theory to launch and provoke wars against those whom they consider enemies. They want to turn them to democracies "democracies" to achieve this global peace.

 >>/54172/
I think to finish this, I want to add examples of individual actors in foreign politics.
Think of Elon Musk offering Starlink to Ukraine. He is a private person who mobilized the resources of his companies to intervene in a war of two states.
Or that tard who banned Russian IPs to download his software which was necessary to some crap, I don't recall the exact detalis anymore.
Institutions are more obvious: UN, NATO, EU, BRICS, etc.

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Greenland held election, the great question was if they should secede from Denmark or not. Poor sods, little they know they are rightfully Turkish.
I feel this question of independence isn't really a question, since all but the smallest party is unionist. Apparently the current winner, the Demokraatit is also pro-independence, except they wish to take gradual steps in that direction, whatever that is.

Thing to know: Greenland is an autonomous region of Denmark, they have their own legislative and executive branches. Not sure about judicial one. Anyway they are quite independent and basically share head of state with Denmark, the Danish king. Should we call this a personal union?

31 seats in their parliament, and here's the result:
Demokraatit - 10 seats - gradual independence, liberals
Naleraq - 8 seats - pro-independence, orange populist
Inuit Ataqatigiit - 7 seats - pro-independence, soc-dems
Siumut - 4 seats - pro-independence, soc-dems
Atassut - 2 seats - unionist, conservatives

They need 16 seats for majority, I guess if the Dems want a balance they could involve the two smallest parties. I don't think there is any real difference between any of these parties, just shades of the same. The labels I wrote above feel quite "generous".

The spice of the election was Trump and his rhetoric of taking Greenland. I'm not sure if any of these would want a union with US after they left Denmark.
But I do see them making a deal, US getting basing rights if they don't have already. If they do have one perhaps some expansion of that.

What a travesty.
Our government is initiating a "opinion expressing vote" about Ukraine's EU membership. They don't do a proper plebiscite, a referendum, but an advisory caricature of the institution which has no legal background in our Constitution, it specifically talks about only binding ones.
The Fidesz govt. made extensive use of this so called national consultations I already wrote about, where they send a list of loaded questions to the citizens who should fill the form and send it back to them. Now they take this one step further. I highly suspect they will twist the actual question Do you want Ukraine in the EU?/Do you agree to take Ukraine into EU?/Do you agree to give Ukraine EU membership? - or something similar that make you look like crazy if you want Ukraine in the EU.
We are further and further to actually have a say in our politics, and people are getting used to it.

 >>/54174/
> secede from Denmark
This sounds like a collective joke. Nobody seriously believes Greenland can survive on its own as a sovereign state. Maybe if they ejected all of Denmark's privileges while still receiving Danish subsidies.

 >>/54186/
I assume that's where the blonde prince on white horse from Washington would swoop in with the basing rights offers and whatnot.

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So Marine Le Pen was banned from running for presidency in 2027.
Banning prez candidates is the new black. Perhaps Ukraine is Second France, but France is Second Romania is Ukraine Third Romania now?
tl;dr
She got EU funds to pay EU staff for her EU parliamentary membership. She payed staff for her French party who did little to no work related to EU. Essentially this is embezzlement.
She got 4 years of prison, 2 she'll spend in house arrest with ankle monitor on, 2 was suspended. And as a bonus she was banned from politics.
Oh this sentence is just as long so she can't run for the presidency. Oh well, coincidences.
https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20250331-france-s-le-pen-faces-verdict-that-could-end-presidential-hopes

So.
1. What I don't understand. We have this thing that legislative members and such has immunity. And not just Hungary, Netanyahu can't be prosecuted for decades now for the same reason. What's up with this?
2. I assume this was the "court of first instance" or whatever it is called in English. They appeal against the decision.
3. This is feeding munitions to Russia. When criticized for Georgia, or the Donbas, Russia could point to Kosovo and said: USA does the same. Now when criticized for not being democratic, Moscow can just point to France or Romania and say: EU ain't really democratic either.

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Now. About the aforementioned corrupt politician.
Netanyahu arrived to Hungary for a lengthy visit, he stays till Sunday.
Weird tho. They said he's gonna arrive on Wednesday evening. And then the story is now that he arrived this morning. On the other hand the photo was done in dark. Did he arrive during the night? Before dawn?
The spicy thing is that the International Criminal Court has an arrest warrant against him, and despite Hungary participates in that our govt. denied to do such thing.
https://magyarnemzet.hu/kulfold/2025/04/netanjahu-budapesti-latogatasa

Anyway what is he doing here? He won't just talk to Orbán this much we know. I assume he'll meet various representatives of the local Jews and I expect some meetings with EU officials, I assume they'll come here too. Bibi hasn't been in the EU for quite a while, over ten year or so. Relations strained, all these nonsense about the Palestinians, you know.
Our news says nothing, they make big fuss about traffic restrictions, some roads will be barred.
https://dailynewshungary.com/israeli-pm-netanyahus-four-day-visit-to-budapest-huge-traffic-restrictions-icc-arrest-warrant/

Trying to find the Orbán-Netanyahu press conference. There are quite a few long ones. Dl'd an over 3 hours long video and even that's cut.
And I'm not sure the language. Do they speak Hungarian and Hebrew? I found a 4 minute slice, Bibi talks in English.
I don't have the time now, but I'll try today.
I know from the news that we announced Hungary's exit from ICC. Does this mean Putin will visit too? Trump meets Putin on the Hungary would be a banger.

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It's kinda hard to assess what Netanyahu's visit was about.
He visited the shoes at the Danube ofc, Holocaust is always part of the ritual, and I assume he met the representatives of various Jewish/Israelite communities of the Hungary, I did found any mentions in the news about this, but it feels like a given.
Articles write about a phone call, between him, Orbán, and Trump, and they note he flew straight to Washington from here, to talk about the new tariffs of Trump.
But here he gave a speech at a university, talked to Orbán, and met with our foreign minister with his delegation.
What were the topics? Beyond our exit from the International Criminal Court.
Economy and security for sure. As Bibi said: Israel needed a strong economy and strong military to stay alive.
I heard/read mentions about car industry, Israeli companies on the Hungary and the thousands of jobs they offer, and tourism.
As for security, Szijjártó, our foreign minister, said that security is a technological challenge these days. No details. So here's couple of assumptions:
I assume our govt. buys more snoop tech from Israel and will use it against Hungarian population in the name of "rising anti-semitism in Europe cause by illegal migration". After all they were the ones who acquired and used a spyware Pegasus by NSO Group to wiretap journalists, businessmen and related persons.
Just recently, a month ago perhaps, bomb threats were sent to over 250 schools in email. Long drivel about Allah and such. I'm sure they want to read emails and check logins and whatever.
And ofc we have to remember the explosives beepers were assembled on the Hungary...
Lotsa stuff to cooperate about in the future. I'm sure these things will get more ridiculous by the day.

One thing have to be noted.
This political alignment of conservative populist leaders. A French news source pointed out that both Orbán and Bibi are looking for allies, since both are fairly isolated. And for sure the "right wingers, unite" tune is popular these days. Trump rounding up the Trio. We host a CPAC conference in each year now. And within the EU too, see the formation of the Patriots group the European Parliament. And all these "hardliner" "far-right" parties are very much anti-muslim, anti-immigrant, but pro-Israel types. But I don't see how the other arm of the horseshoe, the leftists and liberals are against Israel, beyond lukewarm sympathy towards the Palestinians. Not Sholz, nor Macron would arrest Bibi if he visited their country.

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Reading U.S. Foreign Policy in Perspective: Clients, enemies and empire (by David Sylvan and Stephen Majeski) these days, I already recommended it on various boards, and usually post picrel too. I really should write  up a series posts about it, but so many ways to approach this, seems like a complex task, and I'm not the most active these days.
We'll see. It could be a good to really engrave it into the brain.

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 >>/54223/
The book has a companion website which features "intervention" cases, basically examples of US foreign policy actions. The book itself features others. These examples demonstrate how US acts and what policies it has.
https://www.us-foreign-policy-perspective.org/

So.
Since the Spanish-American War of 1898 the United States started to build her client empire. The book was published in 2008, but the list of clients they give is dated to 2005. Since then 20 years passed and I'm sure some changes happened, like the failure and withdrawal in Afghanistan, or that Hungary got on the list too.
Picrels show four points in time how this client empire grew.
Here's the list:
Africa: Ethiopia, Ghana, Liberia. It's not a lot, but most countries there are clients of US clients', such as France. This is a multi-level clientèle.
The Americas and related islands: all but Cuba. I wonder how they'd rank Venezuela these days.
Europe: Austria, B&H, BeNeLux, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Macedonia, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, UK. Long list of non clients, I assume that list got shorter.
Middle East and North Africa: Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates. Noteworthy: Lebanon was on the list for a while back.
Caucasus, Central and South Asia: Afghanistan, Pakistan. The first one is not anymore obviously.
Asia Pacific: Australia, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, New Zealand, Palau, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand.

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 >>/54224/
So what's this client empire?
Traditionally an empire conquers and annexes new clay to grow. But not always. Even Rome had some Greek polities as clients in Hellas. Before incorporating them into the empire, but still. The British colonial empire was similar to this important to note: clients aren't colonies, they organized new states subordinated to Great Britain, instead of annexing them. Another example is the contemporary Franceafrique.
A client is not simply a tributary, who pays tax to their bully. A client's regime regime =/= leadership, regime is the system, the people running it can and do change consciously agrees to be subjected to the surveillance of the patron, who gives them advice, helps keeping the regime in power through maintenance and if necessary intervention. Important to note: clients don't have to follow the advice, tho the patron might pressure them into doing how they were told. In the British colonial empire there wasn't any choice, there were officials - I think the Brits called them "inspectors" - whom when they said something it was expected the colony to obey.
What the patron gets in return? In Realpolitik terms the patron state gets to raise power and security, the two things it concerns with. Essentially clients help the US to project her power all over the globe. If we view it in more liberal sense, then we can say the US state does what a state should: create opportunities for its citizens and the companies of the citizens all over the world, it ensures that they can conduct their business safe and free. The patron expects the client to keep the patron's interests in mind.
The patron relies on the clients, draw on their resources, be it economical, political, or militarily. Of course it is often not granted (just as listening to the advice), but they always can get an open door and mind to negotiate. The US relies on the clients to get aid to other clients, or use them as a proxy force in conflicts, or to bully enemies with embargo, or strengthening Washington's voice in questions of international politics.
I think we can describe the position of a client as closer than an ally, but farther than a colony. And this is to that particular one way surveillance the patron does, the client has nothing similar to that.

picrel
French foreign legion embarks to intervene in Zaire in 1978. The US had barely anything to do with the conflict, according to the book:
> Morocco stepped into the breach, sending a 1,500-man paratroop brigade, assisted by Egyptian pilots and mechanics, paid for by Saudi Arabia, and flown in by France, which added additional weapons and paramilitary advisers.

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 >>/54225/
In general three federal executive departments are busy with building this client empire:
1. State
2. Treasury
3. Defense
For certain tasks other departments might get involved, but these three runs the institutions runs the bureaucratic structure that does the surveillance, writes the reports on other states, suggests policy instruments to deploy, and does the maintenance.
In the international relations the US busy herself with three things:
1. opposing enemies;
2. taking on new clients;
3. maintain clients;
One would think that interacting with "neutral" states is way more prominent. But apparently not. Basically the fact that like half of all the countries are US clients, and a large chunk is the clients of clients, and then there are the enemies and the clients of the enemies... By now barely any "neutral" countries left, even less to worry about them.
Tho it wasn't like that in 1898 when they started out. But the book doesn't tell us how the US dealt with countries in their sovereign times, like France. Although the mindset, the "clientelist ideology" - how the book calls it - comes natural for all the diplomats, elites, and even to the general populace, it evolved gradually. I suppose it had an opportunist nature until all the policy tools which are available today formed.

picrel
One of the oldest client. Along with Cuba, but Cuba ain't a client no more.

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 >>/54232/
What are the ways the US acquires new clients? The book gives the following "contexts" country acquisitions fall within:
- post-occupation;
- switching;
- danger;
- prewar planning;
- postwar planning;
- special access.

Post-occupation
Oldest and simplest. US fights a war, occupies some land, releases them as a new client state. Cuba is the OG example (see the Platt Amendment), which was a client between 1902 and 1959. Most recent was Afghanistan, 2001-2021, except when the US troops left, the country ceased to be a client.

Switching
When an enemy state goes through such a fundamental change, without being occupied by US troops still the US might have something to do with that change, that the new regime accepts the US as its patron.
Iran, 1953-79, with the help of CIA a coup removed the PM.

Danger
US officials perceive a country to be in some kind of a danger and the US has to swoop in and help out. The British client, Greece was in the danger of a communist takeover in a civil war (1946-49), the Brits had to abandon them, so the US stepped in with economic and military aid, effectively starting in 1947. With the same swoop they acquired Turkey as well, for the same reason: they feared Turkey will get in the hands of communists - so Turkey was US client 2 years before NATO was created. Also see the Greek and Turkish Assistance Act.

Prewar planning
Pre- and postwar planning is one group in the book I took 'em apart for readability. Both decides the fate of whole regions.
The US officials see that a military conflict is coming up, so they get clients as part of the preparations, to gain strategic advantages and deny these from the enemies ahead. Pre-WWII Latin America except Argentina, 1939-40. And Canada too.

Postwar planning
War is over have to decide how the peace will look like. Plethora of Western Euro countries after WWII (1948), depleted, fatigued, destroyed. Argentine too (1946) - although it was the same agreement as the other Sudacas got.

Special access
This access is "access to Washington policy makers". These countries falling in this category has some special ties to Washington, either due to lobbying or various historical circumstances. Half a dozen countries are in this list. Ofc, Bernd might have guessed it, Israel is one of them (1948). Saudi Arabia might not be surprising (1953), but Poland might be (1998).

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 >>/54236/
The Platt Amendment is quite interesting. Full text here:
https://www.archives.gov/milestone-documents/platt-amendment
It was named after the Chairman of the Cuban Relations Committee, senator Oliver H. Platt (from Connecticut), and was accepted first in 1901. It regulated the US-Cuban relations. The Cuban assembly also included it in their Constitution. Since their island was under US occupation did they really have a choice?
Anyway. The most interesting parts.
"III. That the government of Cuba consents that the United States may exercise the right to intervene for the preservation of Cuban independence, the maintenance of a government adequate for the protection of life, property, and individual liberty, and for discharging the obligations with respect to Cuba imposed by the treaty of Paris on the United States, now to be assumed and undertaken by the government of Cuba."
This paragraph above essentially mirrors what the book says. The authors aren't taking these ideas out of their own arses.
"VII. That to enable the United States to maintain the independence of Cuba, and to protect the people thereof, as well as for its own defense, the government of Cuba will sell or lease to the United States lands necessary for coaling or naval stations at certain specified points to be agreed upon with the President of the United States."
Guantanamo base sounds familiar? Having various basing rights is one major point in the US-client relations. They established this practice in the first years of client empire building.

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So they started to post the thingies for the "opinion expressing vote" mentioned here  >>/54185/
It contains a paper that says:
> Do you want Ukraine in the EU?
And to circles for yes and no to mark... and a return envelope is included.
This wole thing is just "national consultation" rebranded.
Two more papers are included that informs people about how bad would be if Ukraine joined, fake, twisted arguments, like
> oh no all the job seekers of Ukraine will take away the job from Hungarians
And the like.
Thank you Fidesz, thank you Orbán.

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Let's go back, have to continue this:  >>/54236/
I wrote the context in which the US acquires new clients. There are contexts for maintenance too. Maybe we could call these "cases".
One important thing to remember is, that decision makers don't look at a client, classify into one from the possible cases, and apply policy instruments, but reports coming in about the clients and with the reports suggestions what should be done. There is a palette of policy instruments available, decision makers apply these - based on the suggestions or later evaluations, etc, and life goes on. The authors of the book examined the clients and the applied policy instruments and they created these cases as abstractions.

From routine maintenance point of view, we can see economically deprived and wealthy clients, the US offers them economic, military and political "help". The authors use a different word depending how well of a client is. In case of poor countries it's "assistance", but with rich countries it's "contributions". I don't think the difference is in the amount of help, but in case of poorer countries, the US has to act more dirty and in a more direct but more covert fashion. For example:
In Ecuador, for example, the CIA had on its payroll in the early 1960s the chief of the intelligence and personnel departments of the national police, the vice president of the Senate, one of the leading political journalists, leaders of several political parties, a cabinet minister, the manager of one of the largest banks, labor leaders, and an important figure in the federation of university students.
Or:
In some cases, heads of state or government themselves were recipients of regular payments from the CIA. [...] regular stipends went to the leaders of Jordan ($750,000 per year to the King), Cyprus, Kenya, Zaire, Guyana, South Vietnam, Taiwan, the Philippines, South Korea, Chile, Mexico, Venezuela, Thailand, and Panama.

picrel:
Anastasio Somoza, dictator of Nicaragua. His rise was a direct consequence of US military training programs. In some of the Caribbean countries, where the US sent her marines to intervene, they had to organize a new armed force after the military was defeated or disbanded. Nicaragua was the same. They created the National Guard, with Somoza in the helm, and he simply took the power over (with rigged election after he forced the prez to resign).

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 >>/54268/
cont.
The larger topic in maintenance is the maintenance by intervention.
Sometimes situations arise which may cause the loss of a client, so the US have to intervene. This can range from economic crises to insurgencies. In these situations Washington has to be directly involved and take over certain functionalities of the regime from the client, and has to intervene in the affairs of the client. The book defines intervention:
It involves any policy in which an activity by a regime, essential to its survival, is taken over by an outside actor.
In this case the outside actor is the US.
In the client-patron relationship the client accepts surveillance and problem solving by the patron. This ensures a presence in the internal affairs of the client states. Intervention, ie. taking over specific activities, is a step beyond of this. It's not just about providing aid (economic, political, military), which the client uses, but do stuff instead of the regime.

There are obviously non-military and military intervention situation. First the first:
1. Emergency economic assistance.
Taking over the financing of the client. The US govt. can give money directly, but most often relying on loans, from banks or other clients, or most notably for the IMF (which was set up precisely for these things it also does economic surveillance of clients). The 1995 Mexican bailout is a good example (Mexican Debt Disclosure Act of 1995).
2. Emergency covert political assistance
Typically intervening elections due to the fear that the "wrong" party will come to power. Since this is a covert activity, usually the CIA does this and finances the propaganda of the chosen parties and paying various organizations and individuals. Example Chile, they sponsored Allende's opponents, even a party which was seen drawing votes from him too.
3. Jettisoning the president
The leader of the regime loses political support in the country, and the military has to be maintained to keep the regime in power as long as the unwanted politician can be "jettisoned" to appease the masses. Example is the Philippines' Ferdinand Marcos.
4. Losing the client
Compared to the previous case, in this situation the military could not be maintained, held together, to keep the regime alive. Only one example: Iran in 1978-79 when the Islamic Revolution happened. They not just failed to create a military government, but the Iranian army literally melted, 500-1000 soldiers deserted each day.

picrel:
Ayatollah Khomeini returns to Iran from exile in 1979 February.

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 >>/54270/
cont.
Here are the military intervention situations, these are the cases when the US takes over some of the military side of things to solve a crisis threatening to overturn the regime. When emergency arises there are other means to intervene besides sending the troops, this is the first case.
1. Emergency military aid and advisers
When the client has sufficient manpower sending equipment and advisers might just be the thing to do. Now these things they do as part of routine maintenance, the difference is in this case the US trains (via "advisers") whole units for imminent combat, in the size from battalions up to corps. 'member the NATO trained Ukrainian brigades, this is it. Advisors also can advise the high command on strategy and whatnot. 'member Ukraine? As for the equipment the ones given in routine context can take years to arrive, since usually they are produced after orders placed, in this case however the US ships from existing stocks - payments postponed or waived entirely. This also really sounds liek Ukraine, no? Anyway as the book says classic example is South Vietnam in the early 1960s, initiated by Kennedy. Another example is Nationalist China during WWII.

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 >>/54271/
cont.
In the next cases combat troops are involved. These aren't always own troops, can be a proxy's as well.
2. Competent clients: open-ended combat
When the client deemed competent enough, but the troop pool is getting emptied (by enemy attacks) the US is willing to get into a conflict where no clear end or even a victory in sight. They commit troops, even in growing fashion. One example the authors found: South Vietnam in 1965-68. The VC was annihilating battalions of the ARVN, so the US decided to take over the role of military in two provinces and fight the VC.
3. Competent clients: life preserver
The decision makers are optimistic the local military can be built up and become competent, so the US troop commitment has a near end. Sometimes they miscalculate ofc. South Korea 1950-51, when South Korea was barely more than a puppet for the US it's really interesting what they write about this. Nicaragua 1927-33, although events starts earlier. And Afghanistan, Operation Enduring Freedom...
4. Incompetent clients: easy wins
The client is not and won't ever be competent, but the enemy is not formidable. When combat troops deployed, a relatively rapid and low-cost victory is expected. The US bothers with training and creating a local force, but it's more symbolic, they aren't really expected to do any lifting. Lebanon 1958. Zaire 1978, not to mix this up with the 1977 Moroccan (US client) intervention. In 1978 the US herself flew in French Legionnaires and and Belgian paratroopers. Then came the Moroccans again and some other African contingents.
5. Incompetent clients: basket cases
So the client is not and won't ever be competent, essentially no local forces, but the enemy is formidable. The victory is neither sure or rapid. Would the US public support sending their sons into a war like this? Nope, and the US does not send them. The US organizes proxy forces instead, covertly. Via the CIA. In Laos, 1962-73, a parallel war raged on, separate from the Vietnam conflict, between the US and North Vietnam. The communist was countered by a Hmong army, brought in from Thailand, and bombing, launched from Thai airfields.

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Now we are arrived to the point when the combat has to end and liquidating a troop deployment comes in.
Combat deployment means an escalation of the situation, since previously the country they sent the troops was either a client maintained routinely or a client maintained by non-combat intervention.
Note: as a third case it can-be a non-client where the troops are, not discussed at the maintenance topic but the process of liquidation of the deployment is fairly the same.
US decision makers very easily ramp up the efforts and commit more money, troops, support when they see they don't make progress (eg Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Lebanon, Nicaragua, Afghanistan, Iraq), they have to arrive to the point where they decide they should stop. This point comes when the situation changes and they realize the it isn't at all how it looked like in the beginning. For example it started as a "life preserver" commitment, but it looks like an "open-ended combat" and they'd need a lot more troops but it might not be available for years. Or they are having an open-ended conflict which turns out to be a basket case, and have to set up a proxy force but it's impossible. They can escalate vertically from non-combat intervention to combat one, but they don't (can't) escalate horizontally from one combat intervention case to another.

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 >>/54273/
cont.
So the alternative is walking out. This can happen slowly or rapidly depending on how much political support (time) they have at home.
1. Political support: drawdown and negotiate
The book puts forward three usual reasons why political support for the commitment still could exist: the "rally round the flag" effect, the arguments about sunk costs, and preserving national honour - as the book puts it, the public is "susceptible" to these types of arguments. The political support allows time to maintain the combat while preparing for the US troops to withdraw and for negotiations with the enemy. It is very interesting what they write about the negotiation, I'll quote it in full in the next post. The example here is the Korean War. In 1950 November the Chinese entered, and Washington briefly entertained various ideas, including invading China and using nuclear weapons. Then it was decided they'll negotiate peace with the Chinese and decide the fate of Korea together. It took 6 months until the negotiations could start after sufficient bloodletting. And another 1,5 years until they reached peace. Well cease fire.
2. Lack of political support: rapid liquidation
This usually happens in case of small troop deployments or proxy forces. In 1982 a multinational force intervened in the Lebanese civil war, and the US found itself in escalating fire exchanges with Syria. After two American planes were shot down, both Democrats and Republicans started to demand withdrawal and in the end Reagan was pressured into doing so.
3. Military defeat
Sometimes...
As in previous cases the client faces a military problem, that elicits intervention, but in this case new or further intervention seems pointless, and they know it would make no difference. The US might intervene if they see that defeat can be postponed to later time, and perhaps situation changes during that time so it can be turned to a win, or at least leave the defeat to the next president to deal with who cares. But in the cases which fall into this category they don't even see these possibilities, now they just hope they can do a "soft landing", where they might preserve a foothold, or save, rescue some of the key members of the client regime. They hope they can salvage what's possible.
These military defeats can occur when the US not intervening, just doing routine maintenance. They see the military problem rising which will topple the client regime, but they don't lift a (military) finger. Cuba, 1958, they saw Batista is in trouble, they offered him an exile in Florida, they tried for a "third force" to step in, but was no way of leaving Castro out.
Nationalist China in the 40's was a client of US, and they intervened by sending weapons and advisors (non-combat military intervention). The 1947 communist campaign occured and they considered sending combat troops, but Washington rejected the idea, and by 1949 what they could salvage was Taiwan where the KMT had to withdraw to.

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 >>/54274/
cont.
As promised here's the quote from the book about negotiation:
the only alternative to current policy is to reduce the number of U.S. troops. Ideally, this would not be done until the client’s capabilities had been built up; to gain time for that to happen, negotiations would have to be undertaken with the enemy. In principle, the client should also be a party to these talks but as it is likely to see them as an American betrayal, the U.S. will probably to take over entirely the task of negotiations. (A consequence is that, when an agreement is reached, the U.S. has to apply great pressure to the client for it to be accepted, going so far as to contemplate a coup d’état against the country’s president.)
I see some relevance to the Ukrainian "peace negotiations", how Trump started to handle it, and how they pressured Ukraine to agree.
As for Ukraine the US does intervention there in the form of:
1. economic aid;
2. military aid via weapon transfers and advisers these advisers and "advisers" - like HIMARS crews -, advice and "advice" - like guiding rockets to targets
How much role they had in setting up the AFU as a "proxy force", I dunno, but it is a legit view to consider the conflict as a proxy war.
How I see it the war is in the phase of "Political support: drawdown and negotiate" because Washington fears a "Military defeat" situation.
This quote really hits home:
> the U.S. will probably to take over entirely the task of negotiations
...when we consider one of Trump's latest: that this won't end until him and Putin don't sit down and discuss it together.

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 >>/54274/
cont.
There is a third type of intervention group besides the non-combat and combat, the interventions against unacceptable leaders. This is the case when the US has a client regime but the leadership (usually one particular person, like a president) is not acceptable for Washington for various reasons, which we can sum up as the leader endangers the client status in some way. No ideological reasons.
Previously the book established that with an intervention the US takes over certain tasks of the regime. It occurs to me that in this case they take over the role of the constituency and choose a new leader... Tho the US not always has a say who the new leader is.
Have to stress: this is about the leader, not the regime, the regime - serving as a client for the US - is just fine.
The key question is: does the military supports the leader? Four possible cases arise.
1. Military supportive, fighting feasible: overthrow by U.S. combat forces
The US military, especially the marines were among the earliest available policy tools. They can be used when the client military supports the leader, but they are weak. Literally all the examples are from the Caribbean and Central America. Honduras 1911, Haiti 1994
2. Military supportive, fighting not feasible: long-term pressures
When the US can't just curbstomp the client's military. Might not be the question of might, but logistics, large landmass, difficult topography. Time would be a factor in this group of interventions, the US just wants to flip to another, more acceptable leader, without losing the client, and don't want to be bogged down by long campaigns, or drained by cost. So no combat troops, no coup, they stuck with the leader. Then the US essentially Cold War them, deploys economic and diplomatic tools to make their lives hard, indefinitely if it's necessary. The only two examples are Allende's Chile and Chavez' Venezuela.

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 >>/54290/
3. Military neutral: proxy forces and psychological warfare
When the military is not that interested, the US tries to turn them against the leader, corner him. They can (and do) use any policy instruments, everything short of US ground combat troops. Deny economic help, starting propaganda campaign (in the client country, at home in the US, or anywhere else), isolate the states from other countries, organize a proxy force, use bombing raids to help said proxy force. And then they do a demo of strength, send some ships with troops on deck and imply that they'll invade the country. At this point the leader resigns. Guatemala 1954, unfortunate Jacob Arbenz got on the shitlist of the United Fruit Company by enacting agrarian reforms.
4. Military opposed: coups d'état
Ah, qudetah. The optimum for the US. When the military wants the leader gone, the same person whomster the US wants to go. Nothing to do, just contact the military to do something, or encourage them, sometimes it's the military's idea to begin with. The US can give aid of course, send more arms or other materiel. But the main thing in this case to acknowledge the next leader who comes to power via the coup. Give him legitimacy. Usually the new leader(s) goes on giving a bit of arse licking to the US, to let the US know they are still the faithful servants of theirs.
Brazil, 1964, against Goulart. US sent help by ship, but the coup won just in a couple of days way before it could have arrived. Also Allende's mysterious suicide.

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 >>/54291/
cont.
For routine client maintenance I can separate three tools the US has:
1. economic assistance, advisors, often loans, from banks or multilateral ones, World Bank and IMF;
2. military assistance, basically equipping and training client militaries, sending advisors;
3. political assistance, advisors, propaganda can think of as low key as publishing nice news about the client regime in Reuters, CNN, etc regularly, telling how great relations are, and how well the client regime is doing, which the client's media can take and essentially translate; these days, especially with social media, everything is more connected then ever
For client maintenance interventions the book lists five tools (and now I'm quoting the followin):
1. emergency economic aid, mostly in the form of emergency loans and advice;
2. emergency covert political aid, mostly in the form of propaganda, material assistance to political parties, and encouragement of coups and insurrections;
3. emergency military aid;
4. U.S. ground troops;
5. proxy military forces (perhaps aided by U.S. air power).
The first three are essentially the same as above, except in a short term, quick, emergency form.

One point of the book is that the US has limited set of means to use in foreign politics. She really does.

For interventions the book gives the following summary and statistics:
Out of 89 current or former clients in 35 the US had to intervene, all in all 68 times. Certain countries seen more than one interventions. These numbers are conservative, and don't cover all the instances of emergency aids, excludes cases when the US only encouraged others to intervene, or when the actions were too covert to know about. So this is a minimum number.
From the 16 types of interventions:
- 3 emergency assistance;
- 4 combat forces;
- 5 overthrowing or jettisoning leaders;
- 2 client lost or intervention wasn't feasible;
- 2 liquidating troop deployment.
From the 68 interventions:
- 33 nonmilitary;
- 8 emergency military aid and advisers;
- 28 US or proxy combat forces.
From this 28, in 24 cases the US used her own ground combat troops overtly.

The other point the authors make is that they explain the US actions by the available tools. In many cases the US intervenes militarily, she does it because that is the available tool. The army was always something they can use to solve a certain problem, so the US policy makers take it "off the shelf" and use it.
Especially in the early days when they have little else but the marines to send into small southern neighbours. They opted with military solutions because they only had that.
In the past 100 years, since they started out, they developed new tools, such as economic assistance with IMF, or with the CIA covert operations and such. But all in all the number of tools is small.

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Polonia had presidential election on Sunday.
I think turnout was relatively high, 71,63% in the second round, and the results are close, the PiS backed Karol Nawrocki Gzegorz I beat his opponent, Rafal Trzaskowski Gzegorz II, who was the governing coalition's candidate, for 50.89% vs 49.11%.
Btw I and II aren't Roman numbers but weird Polish letters.

This is an important result I think. The previous President was also the PiS' man. In 2023 the opposition could form a government, tho the PiS got the most votes. This generated butthurt all around. Plus the new Tusk government started a... let's call it a purge... which was called unconstitutional, undemocratic and so on. I really can't judge this, I only know what I heard from Fidesz media...
Details I forgot, the PiS is considered conservative, the coalition liberal. Whatever this means in our time and age, in the EU parliament they sit with the EPP which is conservative but count as leftist now.

Ewa Zajączkowska-Hernik Gzegorz III looks cute. She has nothing to do with the presidential election.

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Another sidetrack before I get back to the US client empire thingy.
I already posted about these guys once. I watch these videos on Michael Rossi's youtube channel, but I assume they can be found on the two other dude's as well. The other two being Pyotr Kurzin and James Ker-Lindsay. As they apostrophe themselves as the "two liberals and a marxist".
Listen to the segment related I want to type about, Bernd.
They talk about the US AID, and how these were spent on silly crap like tranny rights on the Afghanistan, and how third worlders don't appreciate that various Western investments are tied to the liberalization of their countries. Not just US AID aims to advance certain social changes, but IMF loans come with conditions such as they have to give rights to women or they should stop beat up gays on sight. They also point out the contrast that these countries rather accept Chinese loans, which although are used by China to push them into debt slavery, but at least they don't want to meddle with their customs, traditions, religion, and society.
Kurzin starts to get it, but Ker-Lindsay is totally oblivious to the reason why.
The ex-colonizers can't fathom that their ancestors went to the 3rd world with the mindset that they are civilized and they have every right to create colonies, exploit those lands, and enslave the population, because they are enlightened who bring the blessings of culture to those savages - and now their descendants again come with the mindset that they know better than these savages who beat up gays and oppress women and they talk down on them high and mighty from their moral high-ground. They again think of the third worlders as retarded children, acting condescending towards them.
> it's for your own good...
In contrast the Chinese are all business, simple.

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 >>/54293/
cont.
And here come the states/regimes that the US considers as enemy. The US does two things, routinely hostile activities and hostile interventions. As Bernd can see these are the inverse of routine maintenance and maintenance interventions.
Enemy can be defined as a non-client regime that deliberately chooses to oppose the US in key issues, in their foreign and domestic policies both. They are considered to be a threat for the US and her clients, physically and ideologically. Sometimes they are recently lost clients, I can describe this as if they were essentially gone through a reverse-switching  >>/54236/. The US can be real obsessive about these, think of Cuba.
Not all the wars the US wages are against enemies - not enemies in this sense at least. And not all enemies gets into a war against the US. So war isn't a real measurement of an enemy.
If we try to grab the essence what an enemy means, the book quotes a State Department "thinker" who described the Soviet Union after WWII:
our free society finds itself morally challenged by the Soviet system. No other value system is so wholly irreconcilable with ours, so implacable in its purpose to destroy ours ... and no other has the support of a great and growing center of military power.
Very picturesque.

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 >>/54313/
cont.
Routinely hostile activities aren't directed to overthrow a regime, but as the book says, they express displeasure and that the regime is somehow unfit for regular relations, too abnormal to deal with. The US does the reverse of maintenance. They hamper the target economically, militarily, politically/diplomatically. As the authors detail it:
The U.S. may withhold diplomatic recognition, block UN membership, decree or intensify a trade embargo, vote against multilateral loans, forbid normal travel by citizens of either country, offer asylum to immigrants from the enemy, attempt to restrict weapons and technology transfers, verbally support exiled opposition leaders, electronically broadcast propaganda, and, of course, denounce the enemy as illegitimate and a violator of basic norms (e.g., human rights).
Have to note, we are talking about enemy regimes. The US has nothing against the population and they try to project the idea, that the population should get rid of the regime and everything will be better. From what I've seen with the routinely hostile activities they could cause suffering in the country, like famine in North Korea North Korea is under constant embargo. They hurt the country and they say it's their fault for not ejecting that regime. The abusive partner: Why do you make me do this to you????
The US tends to utilize her client empire and international institutions (such as UN - and it's predecessor the League of Nations -, IMF, NATO, etc.) for these activities.
This is the standard way how US deals with enemies. If a country gets on the shitlist, it gets the routinely hostile treatment. If a regime decides to change their stance on an issue they differ with the US, the US takes it as a positive sign that these routinely hostile activities work (they experience it as a positive feedback), and they keep it on, or even add more. If a regime gives up all their stances then the US will label them as neutral and will try to acquire them as a client, see again  >>/54236/.
While I was reading about the hostile interventions I found a great example for routinely hostile activities: Japan from the Manchurian Incident (1931) and the invasion of Manchuria to Pearl Harbor attack (late 1941) where they effectively cornered Japan with these activities, and by choking her economically they pushed them to initiate the war with the US.

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 >>/54314/
cont.
On the other hand if actions against the regime's military seems promising the US will start a hostile intervention, overt or covert, usually depends on how internationally acceptable the enemy regime is. If they are recognized and other states have relations with them, seen as legitimate, the US will try to avoid the blowback and act from the position of plausible deniability. But if the enemy does something outrageous or the US can pin on them something (eg. human rights violation), the state becomes a pariah, then no obstacle for the US to act openly.
Note: circumstances change and depending the US can launch hostile interventions, then stop them and only run routinely hostile activities, then if circumstances allow then start another hostile intervention, etc. Routine activities and interventions can run parallel.
The chief goal of the interventions can be the overthrow of the enemy regime, but often it's forcing them to withdraw from a satellite (a client) of theirs, or a region they occupy, or stop a war against a US client, or such.

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 >>/54315/
cont.
Covert interventions. Two main questions divide these interventions: can the military detached from the regime, turn against them; and if there is an internal front or only exiles are available?
1. Coups d'état
This is different somewhat to the client coups, since in case of an enemy it's rare the US has direct ties, relation to the enemy's military. In fact they usually see that the military backs the regime, so they aren't suitable to foment a coup. So there are two situations when this can happen: if the regime just came to power, not solidified yet, or if the regime consists of a shaky coalition where the members are at odds with each other, which allows the US has some way to drive a wedge between them. Indonesia is the second type, starting in 1958 and culminated in the anti-communist massacres.
2. Punctuated military operations
These are a form of utilizing proxy forces. They organize raids with the promise of building a resistance, a guerilla activity, a rebellion, etc. If an exile or emigrant group already planning this then the US is likely to take over the organization, their training. They provide them plans, equipment, weapons, and transport. Very typical example is Albania after WWII (Operation BGFIEND). From the examples: typically these raids are huge failures, the volunteers are sent to their death, and achieve no results. However this does not stops the US to continue as long as there are people who are willing to go. The Brits are also practiced in this type of operations, in fact they got the US into the business (with Albania and some other). Frankly this really reminds me of the Krynky operation in Ukraine...
3. Aid to internal armed opposition forces
Proxy forces again, except they are in the country controlled by an enemy regime, or in a country where enemy military is present (they are occupying it or the client of theirs). Some sort of internal group has to be present, which could be propped up. In these cases the help the US can offer is either monetary or material (equipment, weapons), since training and/or organizing these movements aren't really possible. So the US acts from one step further and easier to stop and/or disassociate from these groups, if situation changes or becomes necessary. In this case the proxy will most likely claim they were sold out to the enemy. Good examples are the Kurds, who are present in Turkey, Syria, Iraq, Iran, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. It seems they were supported on and off by the US. The book's example when they were used against Iraq in the early '70s - US got Israel and Iran to send weapons to them, and they compensated these countries for the help. And in the end US shut down relations with the Kurds. Now in Syria similar happens, they were used as proxies against ISIS, and to corner Assad (not to oppose him directly), and now they are getting abandoned in the face of Turks.

pdfrel: synopsis of bgfiend by the CIA

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 >>/54316/
cont.
Overt interventions - when the open use of US combat troops are justified, and can be widely accepted by US citizens, diplomats, the mass public.
1. Large-scale combat
If the enemy is at war, or occupies a state "illegally", and the US judges that the enemy forces are sufficiently anchored, they are too strong, this is the only option. Ground combat troops has to be deployed. Germany WWI, Germany WWII, Japan WWII are the classic. The bonus is the Soviet Union in North Korea 1950-51. The US viewed that the SU acts through a puppet, as NK was not viewed as a legit government (according to UN only SK was legitimate), the US aimed to expel the Soviet from Pyongyang.
2. Sustained and asymmetrical attacks
Bring 'em freedoms in the form of bombs. Essentially the modernized versions of sending ships to bombard enemies into submission - or as the book puts it use of airpower as an instrument of coercive diplomacy. Typically used to pressure enemy to give up some land or give up on a military campaign. "Typically" since only two examples exist: North Vietnam (1965-72) with Rolling Thunder and Operation Linebecker to get them to stop backing insurgents in South Vietnam; and Serbia (1999) to pressure them releasing Kosovo. This kind of intervention is a strategic bombing campaign to break their morale, where strategic target list is given to the military which they should hit. The effectiveness of this form of intervention is debatable. They will still use it since it is an available option.
3. Combat operations alongside local insurgent forces
If there is a local opposition to the enemy, and the enemy regime acquires the pariah status, the US props up the insurgents and also sends some type of own ground combat force in support. This is one of the oldest type of tools against enemies. Nicaragua 1909-10, a rebellion broke out against president Jose Santos Zelaya, the US supported them, and sent some forces too after Zelaya executed two US citizens who fought with the rebels.
4. Invasion by U.S. troops
This is quite new policy tool. Deployed when an enemy regime has to be overthrown, it does not occupy anything and no local proxy force is available. Grenada in 1983 and Iraq in 2003.

 >>/54308/
Hmm. I want to rephrase this. Or make it more precise.
So what choice is presented to an average 3rd world shithole like somewhere in Africa? Three power comes and each says:
West:
we give you money/help, but you have to be our bitch plus give up age old traditions such as beating up gays, oppress women, and have to chop of the peepee of little boys and dress them in girly clothing
Russia:
we give you money/help, but you have to be our bitch
China:
we give you money/help, but you have to be our bitch
So when faced the choice what would countries such as Mali pick? Hard decision.

Problem is Westerners Western liberals don't see it like this. They see themselves as good who wants to save these countries from evil Russia and China. What they can't process that they save these countries how one horny man wants to save a hot chick from another horny man...
> I want to save her from his exploitative boyfriend... for myself

> oh no chiner will own the airport and 50 meters of beach

Ben Shapiro made an interview with Orbán. It's on Orbán's youtube channel, but not on Shapiro's. Was it made for Hungarian audiences? Will he just release it later? Mystery.

 >>/54317/
Am gonna try to finish this tomorrow. There is one major way of US "liquidating" enemies. Quite surprising.