/kc/ - Krautchan

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 >>/54232/
What are the ways the US acquires new clients? The book gives the following "contexts" country acquisitions fall within:
- post-occupation;
- switching;
- danger;
- prewar planning;
- postwar planning;
- special access.

Post-occupation
Oldest and simplest. US fights a war, occupies some land, releases them as a new client state. Cuba is the OG example (see the Platt Amendment), which was a client between 1902 and 1959. Most recent was Afghanistan, 2001-2021, except when the US troops left, the country ceased to be a client.

Switching
When an enemy state goes through such a fundamental change, without being occupied by US troops still the US might have something to do with that change, that the new regime accepts the US as its patron.
Iran, 1953-79, with the help of CIA a coup removed the PM.

Danger
US officials perceive a country to be in some kind of a danger and the US has to swoop in and help out. The British client, Greece was in the danger of a communist takeover in a civil war (1946-49), the Brits had to abandon them, so the US stepped in with economic and military aid, effectively starting in 1947. With the same swoop they acquired Turkey as well, for the same reason: they feared Turkey will get in the hands of communists - so Turkey was US client 2 years before NATO was created. Also see the Greek and Turkish Assistance Act.

Prewar planning
Pre- and postwar planning is one group in the book I took 'em apart for readability. Both decides the fate of whole regions.
The US officials see that a military conflict is coming up, so they get clients as part of the preparations, to gain strategic advantages and deny these from the enemies ahead. Pre-WWII Latin America except Argentina, 1939-40. And Canada too.

Postwar planning
War is over have to decide how the peace will look like. Plethora of Western Euro countries after WWII (1948), depleted, fatigued, destroyed. Argentine too (1946) - although it was the same agreement as the other Sudacas got.

Special access
This access is "access to Washington policy makers". These countries falling in this category has some special ties to Washington, either due to lobbying or various historical circumstances. Half a dozen countries are in this list. Ofc, Bernd might have guessed it, Israel is one of them (1948). Saudi Arabia might not be surprising (1953), but Poland might be (1998).

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 >>/54236/
The Platt Amendment is quite interesting. Full text here:
https://www.archives.gov/milestone-documents/platt-amendment
It was named after the Chairman of the Cuban Relations Committee, senator Oliver H. Platt (from Connecticut), and was accepted first in 1901. It regulated the US-Cuban relations. The Cuban assembly also included it in their Constitution. Since their island was under US occupation did they really have a choice?
Anyway. The most interesting parts.
"III. That the government of Cuba consents that the United States may exercise the right to intervene for the preservation of Cuban independence, the maintenance of a government adequate for the protection of life, property, and individual liberty, and for discharging the obligations with respect to Cuba imposed by the treaty of Paris on the United States, now to be assumed and undertaken by the government of Cuba."
This paragraph above essentially mirrors what the book says. The authors aren't taking these ideas out of their own arses.
"VII. That to enable the United States to maintain the independence of Cuba, and to protect the people thereof, as well as for its own defense, the government of Cuba will sell or lease to the United States lands necessary for coaling or naval stations at certain specified points to be agreed upon with the President of the United States."
Guantanamo base sounds familiar? Having various basing rights is one major point in the US-client relations. They established this practice in the first years of client empire building.

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So they started to post the thingies for the "opinion expressing vote" mentioned here  >>/54185/
It contains a paper that says:
> Do you want Ukraine in the EU?
And to circles for yes and no to mark... and a return envelope is included.
This wole thing is just "national consultation" rebranded.
Two more papers are included that informs people about how bad would be if Ukraine joined, fake, twisted arguments, like
> oh no all the job seekers of Ukraine will take away the job from Hungarians
And the like.
Thank you Fidesz, thank you Orbán.

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Let's go back, have to continue this:  >>/54236/
I wrote the context in which the US acquires new clients. There are contexts for maintenance too. Maybe we could call these "cases".
One important thing to remember is, that decision makers don't look at a client, classify into one from the possible cases, and apply policy instruments, but reports coming in about the clients and with the reports suggestions what should be done. There is a palette of policy instruments available, decision makers apply these - based on the suggestions or later evaluations, etc, and life goes on. The authors of the book examined the clients and the applied policy instruments and they created these cases as abstractions.

From routine maintenance point of view, we can see economically deprived and wealthy clients, the US offers them economic, military and political "help". The authors use a different word depending how well of a client is. In case of poor countries it's "assistance", but with rich countries it's "contributions". I don't think the difference is in the amount of help, but in case of poorer countries, the US has to act more dirty and in a more direct but more covert fashion. For example:
In Ecuador, for example, the CIA had on its payroll in the early 1960s the chief of the intelligence and personnel departments of the national police, the vice president of the Senate, one of the leading political journalists, leaders of several political parties, a cabinet minister, the manager of one of the largest banks, labor leaders, and an important figure in the federation of university students.
Or:
In some cases, heads of state or government themselves were recipients of regular payments from the CIA. [...] regular stipends went to the leaders of Jordan ($750,000 per year to the King), Cyprus, Kenya, Zaire, Guyana, South Vietnam, Taiwan, the Philippines, South Korea, Chile, Mexico, Venezuela, Thailand, and Panama.

picrel:
Anastasio Somoza, dictator of Nicaragua. His rise was a direct consequence of US military training programs. In some of the Caribbean countries, where the US sent her marines to intervene, they had to organize a new armed force after the military was defeated or disbanded. Nicaragua was the same. They created the National Guard, with Somoza in the helm, and he simply took the power over (with rigged election after he forced the prez to resign).

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 >>/54268/
cont.
The larger topic in maintenance is the maintenance by intervention.
Sometimes situations arise which may cause the loss of a client, so the US have to intervene. This can range from economic crises to insurgencies. In these situations Washington has to be directly involved and take over certain functionalities of the regime from the client, and has to intervene in the affairs of the client. The book defines intervention:
It involves any policy in which an activity by a regime, essential to its survival, is taken over by an outside actor.
In this case the outside actor is the US.
In the client-patron relationship the client accepts surveillance and problem solving by the patron. This ensures a presence in the internal affairs of the client states. Intervention, ie. taking over specific activities, is a step beyond of this. It's not just about providing aid (economic, political, military), which the client uses, but do stuff instead of the regime.

There are obviously non-military and military intervention situation. First the first:
1. Emergency economic assistance.
Taking over the financing of the client. The US govt. can give money directly, but most often relying on loans, from banks or other clients, or most notably for the IMF (which was set up precisely for these things it also does economic surveillance of clients). The 1995 Mexican bailout is a good example (Mexican Debt Disclosure Act of 1995).
2. Emergency covert political assistance
Typically intervening elections due to the fear that the "wrong" party will come to power. Since this is a covert activity, usually the CIA does this and finances the propaganda of the chosen parties and paying various organizations and individuals. Example Chile, they sponsored Allende's opponents, even a party which was seen drawing votes from him too.
3. Jettisoning the president
The leader of the regime loses political support in the country, and the military has to be maintained to keep the regime in power as long as the unwanted politician can be "jettisoned" to appease the masses. Example is the Philippines' Ferdinand Marcos.
4. Losing the client
Compared to the previous case, in this situation the military could not be maintained, held together, to keep the regime alive. Only one example: Iran in 1978-79 when the Islamic Revolution happened. They not just failed to create a military government, but the Iranian army literally melted, 500-1000 soldiers deserted each day.

picrel:
Ayatollah Khomeini returns to Iran from exile in 1979 February.

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 >>/54270/
cont.
Here are the military intervention situations, these are the cases when the US takes over some of the military side of things to solve a crisis threatening to overturn the regime. When emergency arises there are other means to intervene besides sending the troops, this is the first case.
1. Emergency military aid and advisers
When the client has sufficient manpower sending equipment and advisers might just be the thing to do. Now these things they do as part of routine maintenance, the difference is in this case the US trains (via "advisers") whole units for imminent combat, in the size from battalions up to corps. 'member the NATO trained Ukrainian brigades, this is it. Advisors also can advise the high command on strategy and whatnot. 'member Ukraine? As for the equipment the ones given in routine context can take years to arrive, since usually they are produced after orders placed, in this case however the US ships from existing stocks - payments postponed or waived entirely. This also really sounds liek Ukraine, no? Anyway as the book says classic example is South Vietnam in the early 1960s, initiated by Kennedy. Another example is Nationalist China during WWII.

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 >>/54271/
cont.
In the next cases combat troops are involved. These aren't always own troops, can be a proxy's as well.
2. Competent clients: open-ended combat
When the client deemed competent enough, but the troop pool is getting emptied (by enemy attacks) the US is willing to get into a conflict where no clear end or even a victory in sight. They commit troops, even in growing fashion. One example the authors found: South Vietnam in 1965-68. The VC was annihilating battalions of the ARVN, so the US decided to take over the role of military in two provinces and fight the VC.
3. Competent clients: life preserver
The decision makers are optimistic the local military can be built up and become competent, so the US troop commitment has a near end. Sometimes they miscalculate ofc. South Korea 1950-51, when South Korea was barely more than a puppet for the US it's really interesting what they write about this. Nicaragua 1927-33, although events starts earlier. And Afghanistan, Operation Enduring Freedom...
4. Incompetent clients: easy wins
The client is not and won't ever be competent, but the enemy is not formidable. When combat troops deployed, a relatively rapid and low-cost victory is expected. The US bothers with training and creating a local force, but it's more symbolic, they aren't really expected to do any lifting. Lebanon 1958. Zaire 1978, not to mix this up with the 1977 Moroccan (US client) intervention. In 1978 the US herself flew in French Legionnaires and and Belgian paratroopers. Then came the Moroccans again and some other African contingents.
5. Incompetent clients: basket cases
So the client is not and won't ever be competent, essentially no local forces, but the enemy is formidable. The victory is neither sure or rapid. Would the US public support sending their sons into a war like this? Nope, and the US does not send them. The US organizes proxy forces instead, covertly. Via the CIA. In Laos, 1962-73, a parallel war raged on, separate from the Vietnam conflict, between the US and North Vietnam. The communist was countered by a Hmong army, brought in from Thailand, and bombing, launched from Thai airfields.

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Now we are arrived to the point when the combat has to end and liquidating a troop deployment comes in.
Combat deployment means an escalation of the situation, since previously the country they sent the troops was either a client maintained routinely or a client maintained by non-combat intervention.
Note: as a third case it can-be a non-client where the troops are, not discussed at the maintenance topic but the process of liquidation of the deployment is fairly the same.
US decision makers very easily ramp up the efforts and commit more money, troops, support when they see they don't make progress (eg Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Lebanon, Nicaragua, Afghanistan, Iraq), they have to arrive to the point where they decide they should stop. This point comes when the situation changes and they realize the it isn't at all how it looked like in the beginning. For example it started as a "life preserver" commitment, but it looks like an "open-ended combat" and they'd need a lot more troops but it might not be available for years. Or they are having an open-ended conflict which turns out to be a basket case, and have to set up a proxy force but it's impossible. They can escalate vertically from non-combat intervention to combat one, but they don't (can't) escalate horizontally from one combat intervention case to another.

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 >>/54273/
cont.
So the alternative is walking out. This can happen slowly or rapidly depending on how much political support (time) they have at home.
1. Political support: drawdown and negotiate
The book puts forward three usual reasons why political support for the commitment still could exist: the "rally round the flag" effect, the arguments about sunk costs, and preserving national honour - as the book puts it, the public is "susceptible" to these types of arguments. The political support allows time to maintain the combat while preparing for the US troops to withdraw and for negotiations with the enemy. It is very interesting what they write about the negotiation, I'll quote it in full in the next post. The example here is the Korean War. In 1950 November the Chinese entered, and Washington briefly entertained various ideas, including invading China and using nuclear weapons. Then it was decided they'll negotiate peace with the Chinese and decide the fate of Korea together. It took 6 months until the negotiations could start after sufficient bloodletting. And another 1,5 years until they reached peace. Well cease fire.
2. Lack of political support: rapid liquidation
This usually happens in case of small troop deployments or proxy forces. In 1982 a multinational force intervened in the Lebanese civil war, and the US found itself in escalating fire exchanges with Syria. After two American planes were shot down, both Democrats and Republicans started to demand withdrawal and in the end Reagan was pressured into doing so.
3. Military defeat
Sometimes...
As in previous cases the client faces a military problem, that elicits intervention, but in this case new or further intervention seems pointless, and they know it would make no difference. The US might intervene if they see that defeat can be postponed to later time, and perhaps situation changes during that time so it can be turned to a win, or at least leave the defeat to the next president to deal with who cares. But in the cases which fall into this category they don't even see these possibilities, now they just hope they can do a "soft landing", where they might preserve a foothold, or save, rescue some of the key members of the client regime. They hope they can salvage what's possible.
These military defeats can occur when the US not intervening, just doing routine maintenance. They see the military problem rising which will topple the client regime, but they don't lift a (military) finger. Cuba, 1958, they saw Batista is in trouble, they offered him an exile in Florida, they tried for a "third force" to step in, but was no way of leaving Castro out.
Nationalist China in the 40's was a client of US, and they intervened by sending weapons and advisors (non-combat military intervention). The 1947 communist campaign occured and they considered sending combat troops, but Washington rejected the idea, and by 1949 what they could salvage was Taiwan where the KMT had to withdraw to.

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 >>/54274/
cont.
As promised here's the quote from the book about negotiation:
the only alternative to current policy is to reduce the number of U.S. troops. Ideally, this would not be done until the client’s capabilities had been built up; to gain time for that to happen, negotiations would have to be undertaken with the enemy. In principle, the client should also be a party to these talks but as it is likely to see them as an American betrayal, the U.S. will probably to take over entirely the task of negotiations. (A consequence is that, when an agreement is reached, the U.S. has to apply great pressure to the client for it to be accepted, going so far as to contemplate a coup d’état against the country’s president.)
I see some relevance to the Ukrainian "peace negotiations", how Trump started to handle it, and how they pressured Ukraine to agree.
As for Ukraine the US does intervention there in the form of:
1. economic aid;
2. military aid via weapon transfers and advisers these advisers and "advisers" - like HIMARS crews -, advice and "advice" - like guiding rockets to targets
How much role they had in setting up the AFU as a "proxy force", I dunno, but it is a legit view to consider the conflict as a proxy war.
How I see it the war is in the phase of "Political support: drawdown and negotiate" because Washington fears a "Military defeat" situation.
This quote really hits home:
> the U.S. will probably to take over entirely the task of negotiations
...when we consider one of Trump's latest: that this won't end until him and Putin don't sit down and discuss it together.

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 >>/54274/
cont.
There is a third type of intervention group besides the non-combat and combat, the interventions against unacceptable leaders. This is the case when the US has a client regime but the leadership (usually one particular person, like a president) is not acceptable for Washington for various reasons, which we can sum up as the leader endangers the client status in some way. No ideological reasons.
Previously the book established that with an intervention the US takes over certain tasks of the regime. It occurs to me that in this case they take over the role of the constituency and choose a new leader... Tho the US not always has a say who the new leader is.
Have to stress: this is about the leader, not the regime, the regime - serving as a client for the US - is just fine.
The key question is: does the military supports the leader? Four possible cases arise.
1. Military supportive, fighting feasible: overthrow by U.S. combat forces
The US military, especially the marines were among the earliest available policy tools. They can be used when the client military supports the leader, but they are weak. Literally all the examples are from the Caribbean and Central America. Honduras 1911, Haiti 1994
2. Military supportive, fighting not feasible: long-term pressures
When the US can't just curbstomp the client's military. Might not be the question of might, but logistics, large landmass, difficult topography. Time would be a factor in this group of interventions, the US just wants to flip to another, more acceptable leader, without losing the client, and don't want to be bogged down by long campaigns, or drained by cost. So no combat troops, no coup, they stuck with the leader. Then the US essentially Cold War them, deploys economic and diplomatic tools to make their lives hard, indefinitely if it's necessary. The only two examples are Allende's Chile and Chavez' Venezuela.

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 >>/54290/
3. Military neutral: proxy forces and psychological warfare
When the military is not that interested, the US tries to turn them against the leader, corner him. They can (and do) use any policy instruments, everything short of US ground combat troops. Deny economic help, starting propaganda campaign (in the client country, at home in the US, or anywhere else), isolate the states from other countries, organize a proxy force, use bombing raids to help said proxy force. And then they do a demo of strength, send some ships with troops on deck and imply that they'll invade the country. At this point the leader resigns. Guatemala 1954, unfortunate Jacob Arbenz got on the shitlist of the United Fruit Company by enacting agrarian reforms.
4. Military opposed: coups d'état
Ah, qudetah. The optimum for the US. When the military wants the leader gone, the same person whomster the US wants to go. Nothing to do, just contact the military to do something, or encourage them, sometimes it's the military's idea to begin with. The US can give aid of course, send more arms or other materiel. But the main thing in this case to acknowledge the next leader who comes to power via the coup. Give him legitimacy. Usually the new leader(s) goes on giving a bit of arse licking to the US, to let the US know they are still the faithful servants of theirs.
Brazil, 1964, against Goulart. US sent help by ship, but the coup won just in a couple of days way before it could have arrived. Also Allende's mysterious suicide.

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 >>/54291/
cont.
For routine client maintenance I can separate three tools the US has:
1. economic assistance, advisors, often loans, from banks or multilateral ones, World Bank and IMF;
2. military assistance, basically equipping and training client militaries, sending advisors;
3. political assistance, advisors, propaganda can think of as low key as publishing nice news about the client regime in Reuters, CNN, etc regularly, telling how great relations are, and how well the client regime is doing, which the client's media can take and essentially translate; these days, especially with social media, everything is more connected then ever
For client maintenance interventions the book lists five tools (and now I'm quoting the followin):
1. emergency economic aid, mostly in the form of emergency loans and advice;
2. emergency covert political aid, mostly in the form of propaganda, material assistance to political parties, and encouragement of coups and insurrections;
3. emergency military aid;
4. U.S. ground troops;
5. proxy military forces (perhaps aided by U.S. air power).
The first three are essentially the same as above, except in a short term, quick, emergency form.

One point of the book is that the US has limited set of means to use in foreign politics. She really does.

For interventions the book gives the following summary and statistics:
Out of 89 current or former clients in 35 the US had to intervene, all in all 68 times. Certain countries seen more than one interventions. These numbers are conservative, and don't cover all the instances of emergency aids, excludes cases when the US only encouraged others to intervene, or when the actions were too covert to know about. So this is a minimum number.
From the 16 types of interventions:
- 3 emergency assistance;
- 4 combat forces;
- 5 overthrowing or jettisoning leaders;
- 2 client lost or intervention wasn't feasible;
- 2 liquidating troop deployment.
From the 68 interventions:
- 33 nonmilitary;
- 8 emergency military aid and advisers;
- 28 US or proxy combat forces.
From this 28, in 24 cases the US used her own ground combat troops overtly.

The other point the authors make is that they explain the US actions by the available tools. In many cases the US intervenes militarily, she does it because that is the available tool. The army was always something they can use to solve a certain problem, so the US policy makers take it "off the shelf" and use it.
Especially in the early days when they have little else but the marines to send into small southern neighbours. They opted with military solutions because they only had that.
In the past 100 years, since they started out, they developed new tools, such as economic assistance with IMF, or with the CIA covert operations and such. But all in all the number of tools is small.

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Polonia had presidential election on Sunday.
I think turnout was relatively high, 71,63% in the second round, and the results are close, the PiS backed Karol Nawrocki Gzegorz I beat his opponent, Rafal Trzaskowski Gzegorz II, who was the governing coalition's candidate, for 50.89% vs 49.11%.
Btw I and II aren't Roman numbers but weird Polish letters.

This is an important result I think. The previous President was also the PiS' man. In 2023 the opposition could form a government, tho the PiS got the most votes. This generated butthurt all around. Plus the new Tusk government started a... let's call it a purge... which was called unconstitutional, undemocratic and so on. I really can't judge this, I only know what I heard from Fidesz media...
Details I forgot, the PiS is considered conservative, the coalition liberal. Whatever this means in our time and age, in the EU parliament they sit with the EPP which is conservative but count as leftist now.

Ewa Zajączkowska-Hernik Gzegorz III looks cute. She has nothing to do with the presidential election.

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Another sidetrack before I get back to the US client empire thingy.
I already posted about these guys once. I watch these videos on Michael Rossi's youtube channel, but I assume they can be found on the two other dude's as well. The other two being Pyotr Kurzin and James Ker-Lindsay. As they apostrophe themselves as the "two liberals and a marxist".
Listen to the segment related I want to type about, Bernd.
They talk about the US AID, and how these were spent on silly crap like tranny rights on the Afghanistan, and how third worlders don't appreciate that various Western investments are tied to the liberalization of their countries. Not just US AID aims to advance certain social changes, but IMF loans come with conditions such as they have to give rights to women or they should stop beat up gays on sight. They also point out the contrast that these countries rather accept Chinese loans, which although are used by China to push them into debt slavery, but at least they don't want to meddle with their customs, traditions, religion, and society.
Kurzin starts to get it, but Ker-Lindsay is totally oblivious to the reason why.
The ex-colonizers can't fathom that their ancestors went to the 3rd world with the mindset that they are civilized and they have every right to create colonies, exploit those lands, and enslave the population, because they are enlightened who bring the blessings of culture to those savages - and now their descendants again come with the mindset that they know better than these savages who beat up gays and oppress women and they talk down on them high and mighty from their moral high-ground. They again think of the third worlders as retarded children, acting condescending towards them.
> it's for your own good...
In contrast the Chinese are all business, simple.

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 >>/54293/
cont.
And here come the states/regimes that the US considers as enemy. The US does two things, routinely hostile activities and hostile interventions. As Bernd can see these are the inverse of routine maintenance and maintenance interventions.
Enemy can be defined as a non-client regime that deliberately chooses to oppose the US in key issues, in their foreign and domestic policies both. They are considered to be a threat for the US and her clients, physically and ideologically. Sometimes they are recently lost clients, I can describe this as if they were essentially gone through a reverse-switching  >>/54236/. The US can be real obsessive about these, think of Cuba.
Not all the wars the US wages are against enemies - not enemies in this sense at least. And not all enemies gets into a war against the US. So war isn't a real measurement of an enemy.
If we try to grab the essence what an enemy means, the book quotes a State Department "thinker" who described the Soviet Union after WWII:
our free society finds itself morally challenged by the Soviet system. No other value system is so wholly irreconcilable with ours, so implacable in its purpose to destroy ours ... and no other has the support of a great and growing center of military power.
Very picturesque.

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 >>/54313/
cont.
Routinely hostile activities aren't directed to overthrow a regime, but as the book says, they express displeasure and that the regime is somehow unfit for regular relations, too abnormal to deal with. The US does the reverse of maintenance. They hamper the target economically, militarily, politically/diplomatically. As the authors detail it:
The U.S. may withhold diplomatic recognition, block UN membership, decree or intensify a trade embargo, vote against multilateral loans, forbid normal travel by citizens of either country, offer asylum to immigrants from the enemy, attempt to restrict weapons and technology transfers, verbally support exiled opposition leaders, electronically broadcast propaganda, and, of course, denounce the enemy as illegitimate and a violator of basic norms (e.g., human rights).
Have to note, we are talking about enemy regimes. The US has nothing against the population and they try to project the idea, that the population should get rid of the regime and everything will be better. From what I've seen with the routinely hostile activities they could cause suffering in the country, like famine in North Korea North Korea is under constant embargo. They hurt the country and they say it's their fault for not ejecting that regime. The abusive partner: Why do you make me do this to you????
The US tends to utilize her client empire and international institutions (such as UN - and it's predecessor the League of Nations -, IMF, NATO, etc.) for these activities.
This is the standard way how US deals with enemies. If a country gets on the shitlist, it gets the routinely hostile treatment. If a regime decides to change their stance on an issue they differ with the US, the US takes it as a positive sign that these routinely hostile activities work (they experience it as a positive feedback), and they keep it on, or even add more. If a regime gives up all their stances then the US will label them as neutral and will try to acquire them as a client, see again  >>/54236/.
While I was reading about the hostile interventions I found a great example for routinely hostile activities: Japan from the Manchurian Incident (1931) and the invasion of Manchuria to Pearl Harbor attack (late 1941) where they effectively cornered Japan with these activities, and by choking her economically they pushed them to initiate the war with the US.

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 >>/54314/
cont.
On the other hand if actions against the regime's military seems promising the US will start a hostile intervention, overt or covert, usually depends on how internationally acceptable the enemy regime is. If they are recognized and other states have relations with them, seen as legitimate, the US will try to avoid the blowback and act from the position of plausible deniability. But if the enemy does something outrageous or the US can pin on them something (eg. human rights violation), the state becomes a pariah, then no obstacle for the US to act openly.
Note: circumstances change and depending the US can launch hostile interventions, then stop them and only run routinely hostile activities, then if circumstances allow then start another hostile intervention, etc. Routine activities and interventions can run parallel.
The chief goal of the interventions can be the overthrow of the enemy regime, but often it's forcing them to withdraw from a satellite (a client) of theirs, or a region they occupy, or stop a war against a US client, or such.

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 >>/54315/
cont.
Covert interventions. Two main questions divide these interventions: can the military detached from the regime, turn against them; and if there is an internal front or only exiles are available?
1. Coups d'état
This is different somewhat to the client coups, since in case of an enemy it's rare the US has direct ties, relation to the enemy's military. In fact they usually see that the military backs the regime, so they aren't suitable to foment a coup. So there are two situations when this can happen: if the regime just came to power, not solidified yet, or if the regime consists of a shaky coalition where the members are at odds with each other, which allows the US has some way to drive a wedge between them. Indonesia is the second type, starting in 1958 and culminated in the anti-communist massacres.
2. Punctuated military operations
These are a form of utilizing proxy forces. They organize raids with the promise of building a resistance, a guerilla activity, a rebellion, etc. If an exile or emigrant group already planning this then the US is likely to take over the organization, their training. They provide them plans, equipment, weapons, and transport. Very typical example is Albania after WWII (Operation BGFIEND). From the examples: typically these raids are huge failures, the volunteers are sent to their death, and achieve no results. However this does not stops the US to continue as long as there are people who are willing to go. The Brits are also practiced in this type of operations, in fact they got the US into the business (with Albania and some other). Frankly this really reminds me of the Krynky operation in Ukraine...
3. Aid to internal armed opposition forces
Proxy forces again, except they are in the country controlled by an enemy regime, or in a country where enemy military is present (they are occupying it or the client of theirs). Some sort of internal group has to be present, which could be propped up. In these cases the help the US can offer is either monetary or material (equipment, weapons), since training and/or organizing these movements aren't really possible. So the US acts from one step further and easier to stop and/or disassociate from these groups, if situation changes or becomes necessary. In this case the proxy will most likely claim they were sold out to the enemy. Good examples are the Kurds, who are present in Turkey, Syria, Iraq, Iran, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. It seems they were supported on and off by the US. The book's example when they were used against Iraq in the early '70s - US got Israel and Iran to send weapons to them, and they compensated these countries for the help. And in the end US shut down relations with the Kurds. Now in Syria similar happens, they were used as proxies against ISIS, and to corner Assad (not to oppose him directly), and now they are getting abandoned in the face of Turks.

pdfrel: synopsis of bgfiend by the CIA

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 >>/54316/
cont.
Overt interventions - when the open use of US combat troops are justified, and can be widely accepted by US citizens, diplomats, the mass public.
1. Large-scale combat
If the enemy is at war, or occupies a state "illegally", and the US judges that the enemy forces are sufficiently anchored, they are too strong, this is the only option. Ground combat troops has to be deployed. Germany WWI, Germany WWII, Japan WWII are the classic. The bonus is the Soviet Union in North Korea 1950-51. The US viewed that the SU acts through a puppet, as NK was not viewed as a legit government (according to UN only SK was legitimate), the US aimed to expel the Soviet from Pyongyang.
2. Sustained and asymmetrical attacks
Bring 'em freedoms in the form of bombs. Essentially the modernized versions of sending ships to bombard enemies into submission - or as the book puts it use of airpower as an instrument of coercive diplomacy. Typically used to pressure enemy to give up some land or give up on a military campaign. "Typically" since only two examples exist: North Vietnam (1965-72) with Rolling Thunder and Operation Linebecker to get them to stop backing insurgents in South Vietnam; and Serbia (1999) to pressure them releasing Kosovo. This kind of intervention is a strategic bombing campaign to break their morale, where strategic target list is given to the military which they should hit. The effectiveness of this form of intervention is debatable. They will still use it since it is an available option.
3. Combat operations alongside local insurgent forces
If there is a local opposition to the enemy, and the enemy regime acquires the pariah status, the US props up the insurgents and also sends some type of own ground combat force in support. This is one of the oldest type of tools against enemies. Nicaragua 1909-10, a rebellion broke out against president Jose Santos Zelaya, the US supported them, and sent some forces too after Zelaya executed two US citizens who fought with the rebels.
4. Invasion by U.S. troops
This is quite new policy tool. Deployed when an enemy regime has to be overthrown, it does not occupy anything and no local proxy force is available. Grenada in 1983 and Iraq in 2003.

 >>/54308/
Hmm. I want to rephrase this. Or make it more precise.
So what choice is presented to an average 3rd world shithole like somewhere in Africa? Three power comes and each says:
West:
we give you money/help, but you have to be our bitch plus give up age old traditions such as beating up gays, oppress women, and have to chop of the peepee of little boys and dress them in girly clothing
Russia:
we give you money/help, but you have to be our bitch
China:
we give you money/help, but you have to be our bitch
So when faced the choice what would countries such as Mali pick? Hard decision.

Problem is Westerners Western liberals don't see it like this. They see themselves as good who wants to save these countries from evil Russia and China. What they can't process that they save these countries how one horny man wants to save a hot chick from another horny man...
> I want to save her from his exploitative boyfriend... for myself

> oh no chiner will own the airport and 50 meters of beach

Ben Shapiro made an interview with Orbán. It's on Orbán's youtube channel, but not on Shapiro's. Was it made for Hungarian audiences? Will he just release it later? Mystery.

 >>/54317/
Am gonna try to finish this tomorrow. There is one major way of US "liquidating" enemies. Quite surprising.

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 >>/54317/
The authors talk briefly about assassinations. Sometimes these happen, the US make attempts, some are successful some aren't, they train groups that potentially can execute these. In itself it is not a policy tool, but can be included into others. There were plans to make it institutional (create official CIA branch a "Health Alteration Committee"...) but these were discarded supposedly and they are careful that neither US Presidents and top decision makers never presented with written or explicit oral proposals.

Couple of things to close hostile interventions.
Numbers.
Covert: 7 successes - 17 failures 
- coups: 5 success vs. 3 failures
- exile raids: 1 success vs. 8 failures
- internal armed movements: 1 success vs 6 failures
Overt: 9 successes, 4 failures
- bombing: 1 success vs 1 failure the success is debatable tho
- proxy assistance: 3 success vs 2 failures
- invasions: 5 success vs 1 failure I think they lumped large-scale combats and invasions together
Summed up: from 37 hostile interventions 16 succeeded and 21 failed.
It seems overt interventions when the US herself goes into action are more successful. However there is a clear contrast between the coups and other interventions. The authors differentiate between non-military and military operations. Coups being the non-military, succeeded 5 times vs 3 failures, and all the rest are military with 11 successes and 18 failures, which means the non-military routes more often reach their goals. The book makes a point here that in client interventions again non-military responses work better. And again, the US herself has a better chance to get to the desired outcome, when they turn to use proxies.
My impression is that the US uses proxy forces either when the situation is dire, or when a proxy force is available and with low cost they can cause some inconveniences to US enemies. The US seems to not care what happens with these proxy forces. They treat them like this:
> they know the risks and they volunteered to do it, who are we to stop them, and with our help they have a better chance than without anyway so we do good to them

see picrel for more text

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 >>/54431/
Two more ways of "liquidating" enemies left
Enemies sometimes collapse by themselves (see Soviet Union), or caused by other states. Khmer Rouge in Cambodia was deposed by Vietnam (1978-79), the Kahlq regime in Afghanistan was removed by the Soviet Union. Sometimes other changes occur within a country, or with the country. In Egypt Sadat changed the game, and South Yemen disappeared when it merged with the North (1990).

picrel: Hafizullah Amin, the leader of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, probably put on ice by the KGB when the Soviet intervened.

 >>/54432/
And lastly negotiations can end enemy status.
The US negotiates with enemies all the time. In most cases it's fairly inconsequential, about details in whatever questions, and status doesn't change, they do their routinely hostile activities in the background. The US might stop intervention, or start new one if these negotiations fail. But there are notable cases when negotiations led to the end of enemy status. This usually happens when another enemy with a more immediate or larger threat arises - so when an outside pressure forces the US to stop being a hardass in certain questions, and give up from their stance, in short: to be reasonable...
In 1933 Japan became such a threat, that Washington sat down with Moscow and made a deal. Similarly the rise of the Axis in Europe, and the start of the war there motivated the US to change her stance on Mexico.
One major example is rapprochement with China, a the start of the 70s. Important example since there wasn't a new threat, since the Soviet Union - whom the US tried to isolate with this move - existed for quite a while now. What changed was how the US viewed China. They thought up a different approach to the Chinese question, they saw an opportunity and a situation which a friendlier China could fit into. So they went and made a deal. Ofc they did not do this from their good heart, but because they gained a better strategic position during the Cold War. I don't think Taiwan was happy about it (it led them out of the UN and state status) but the US had to break their eggs so they did.

picrel: Zhou Enlai, Chinese Premier under Mao, and Kissinger when the American security advisor sneaked into China from Pakistan in 1971 July.

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 >>/54433/

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 >>/54433/
There were other successful negotiations - eg. Libya and Sudan - but there were bunch of failed ones, that went on and off, they opened talks but things got derailed over and over: Cuba, Syria, Iran, North Korea. When failure occur it seems the blame is always on both sides, but it seems to me from the American side, they usually don't see the strategic advantage to see through the change. For example in case of China the whole process was supported by three consequent presidents, it was just too important. So if there is no immediate threat, then it will depend a lot on how the various power blocks within the US see the enemy and the benefits.

picrel: Muammar Gaddafi, how I see it they negotiated his weapons away, the US and Western Europe made him give up aspirations for nukes, and his chemical weapons, and then they killed him off with the Arab Spring. I bet Iran learnt a lot from this lesson.

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All in all 15 enemy regimes left that status as result of either negotiations, or by actions that the US has little to do with - so hostile interventions aren't more effective than these. Literally just waiting the enemy to collapse might be more effective than... let's say bombing them.
As the book puts it:
Since most U.S. enemies eventually leave that status (in 2008, only five states were still enemies), this calls into question the utility of hostile intervention.
And again they drive their point home, US foreign policy is means driven. They have tools to deal with situations and they apply them, no matter of the cost:
When to these considerations are added the enormous potential human costs of those interventions for both target states (combat deaths, civilian casualties, deliberate massacres) and the U.S., not to mention the budgetary implications, such operations appear even more means-driven than their client counterparts.

The book talks about the future of client-state imperialism, the possibilities if it could stop. Their conclusion is unlikely. Since the publication of the book things doesn't seem to change, if we look closer, we can see the behavioural patterns.
I highly recommend this book to anyone who wants to see the US foreign policy in a different light, and to get some insight how it works. And how it doesn't.

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Orbán's gonna do his traditional yearly speech at Tusnádfürdő in Erdély on Saturday. Right now I think I will write something, I won't translate it, but I might give summaries of each point he talks about, as I did at least once in the past.
I'm actually curious now that Trump changed his peace tune to support Ukraine to continue the war, and the Iranian stuff, since Bibi and Orbán are great pals (and Israel has great influence on our foreign politics as well). Surely he'll talk about the Hungarian who died due to the press-gang treatment when they tried to mobilize, about migration, about Brussels, Chiner, agriculture, EU moneys to Ukraine (they are planning to give 25% of all EU subsidies to Ukraine), Ukraine's EU membership, and the Fidesz government's successes as usual.

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So, Orbán at Tusnádfürdő. I'll add my comments with italics. This will be very long, many posts, spent most of the day doing this. Not sure anyone will read. Time spent well.
Says this speech closes a governmental cycle, he's planning this speech next year will be the opening for the next governmental cycle. We're gonna have legislative election in 2026.
He wants to talk about the current events first, then dive deeper.

Says the first "current event" is the elections of next year.
No guarantees for victory, it will happen how the people decide. According to their own inside assessment that if they held election this Sunday then from the 106 constituencies the Fidesz would win in 80. In 2022 they won in 87 so the goal is that.
The greatest risk in all elections is for the Hungarians living outside of Hungary, have to pick from two fates. When the members of the opposition went to Nagyvárad, they just said: Romanian land. Everyone with an ear knows what this means, we (Orbán and the Fidesz) represent the other way around, the state has borders but the nation does not. They can count on the national government which will struggle for all Hungarians. He asks the audience to stand up for themselves too.
As I pointed out in previous post this event takes place in a town in Erdély.

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Second current event: on Wednesday evening he met the new Prime Minister of Romania.
He says he is the 24th colleague of his. This PM is the 24th PM while Orbán was a PM. He adds that the stability of the Romanian system does not come from the stability of the government and the PM, but the President. He says this PM is a heavyweight politician from Nagyvárad, who moves in the same code system and cultural patterns as us, who is a Romanian patriot who will fight for the Romanian national interests, and who wants common Romanian-Hungarian successes, and who has interest in these, and who will act for these. But Romania has to get a grip on the economy.

Third. He says we (Orbán and Fidesz) banned an anti-semitic and terrorist glorifying rock band.
He says here noone can be hurt for their origin or religion, not even verbally. Seems like he blames the opposition for the incident.
I have not heard of this before. Sounds like censorship to me. Where we draw the boundaries? I hear Hungarian and "Hungarian" politicians verbally abusing Muslims all the time. Now I'm speculating: something like there was a festival and they invited a band whom our govt deemed anti-Semitic and supportive to terrorists. Did they criticize Israel for Gaza? Did they call for an independent Palestinian state? I might look this up.

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Fourth. He introduces the "Digital Civil Associations".
These will play role in the next election, but they want them for the long run. The virtual space is a hostile environment for the "civil christian conservative nationalist right" community. We (Orbán and Fidesz) need a digital civil force. For all around the world we switched the cafés to webcams, meetings of friends to forums, we moved conversations to chat windows, and if something doesn't start on the internet it will fail. This change went through all the Western world, there is nothing inherently Hungarian in this. However there is something that inherently Hungarian: rudeness, insults, trolling, and digital violence.
I don't see how these are inherently Hungarian, I see these from just about anyone.
He says those who commits openly to their civic non-leftlib non-progressive convictions, they get attacked, ridiculed. Trolling communities rule the digital space.
A community can only work if it has one leg in the cyberspace, so we have to create the opposing pole of the destruction, we need to create the culture of work, building of a country, and patriotism in the digital space too. To counter the Tisza Party's aggression they created the Fight Club previously, but the fight is not for everyone, many has enough of conflicts. So this new place for those who doesn't want to participate in direct political clashes, but want to build the country.
These give support in the question of the national sovereignty too, so on international level. Have to make an immune system against the globalists, the leftlibs, those who are on the side of war, and are there in digital space already.
The "Civic Associations" was a movement created by Fidesz next to the party, to do grassroot propaganda and help out in various tasks during campaigns and elections to unburden the party and save some bucks. For me it seems they want to do the same but on facebook, forums, and comment sections. The Fight Club is essentially a trollcommando which gets various messages and has to seek out the nests of opposition and write those as comments there. Eg. open up Magyar Péter's (the leading face of the opposition) or Karácsony Gergely's (the mayor of Budapest) facebook profile and troll the commenters with political messages.

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Fifth. What did Hungary gain with the victory of Trump?
Avoided WWIII - for now. Ended the political discrimination against Hungary. Ended the economic sanctions against PaksNPP - we can finish the enlargement. American investments: 4 new R&D investments for now, and another 3 from September.

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Now the deep dive.
Is a world war coming?
No sure answer, Trump made the world more secure. What the fuck. 
He cites a study which asked people all over in the West if there will be another WW in the next 5-10 years, here's the percentages of the yes side:
France: 55
Spain: 50
Italy: 46
US: 45
UK: 41
Germany: 41
He says authors and analysts publish stuff about WWIII by the dozen these days.
He collected bad omens indicators of a world war and processes leading to one, based on the history of the interwar period:
- Rivalry strengthens between the great powers. This guy is a genius. He says 3 Suns are on the sky now: USA, Chiner, and Russia.
- Number of armed conflicts rises. In 1990 there were 111 armed conflicts all over the globe, in 2024 184. Since 2010 armed conflicts between states - not just simply between armed groups - doubled. He wisely keeps quiet about the actual numbers here. I wonder where an armed conflicts starts according to him and the lackeys who collected the stuff for him. When aunt Mary beats uncle Joe with the rolling pin?
- Before great wars arms race gets stronger. From 1990 to 2025 military spending grew to 1,5 times of the original. I wonder if this has something to do with Trump demanding that 2% spending from NATO cunts. Most investments into arms are financed by loans, and loans can only be covered if the investment pays off, ergo the weapons have to be used, wars have to happen. I don't get this, but okay.
- World economy gets ordered in power blocks. The big geopolitical blocks close down the markets from each other. In the past 10 years the number of policies that restricts global trade grew by 5 times.
- The rise of migration. Global migration doubled, it effects 300 million people.
So, he says, chances for another WW grows continuously.

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Relevance to Hungarians:
- Keep calm, strategic patience. Do not allow Ukraine in the EU coz that would bring the war in. Clapping in the crowd, up until now they sat like a dead fish.
- Have to act for the peace, but our limitations and lack of impact are clear.
He saw this when he visited Zelensky and told him that time is not on their side they should try settling, he got told by Big Z that he is wrong, time is on Ukraine's side, they have to continue the war and they'll win.
We have to concentrate on our region and create "Regional Peace Alliances". We did this with the Serbs, Northern Hungarians. We can hope for one with the Romanians, after the elections the Czechs will be probably in, and Poland is returned by half already, and we can't resign from one with the Austrians.
We have to prepare to stay out of a war if one breaks out. Staying out is not a declaration, but an ability.

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5 pillars of Staying Out:
1. Lessen vulnerability, create good relations with all the centers of powers.
He lists 6 such center and says only one is problematic: USA, Russia, China, India, and the Turk/Altaic world. All is fine except Brussels. Under good relations he doesn't mean declarations of theoretical friendships while drinking, not even sympathy for political attitude. He says he means that we have to make the interest of all the economical success of Hungary, to make our success their success, so neither of them has interest in the destruction of Hungary.
This is a basic thought in the liberal school of foreign politics. If countries satisfy their needs with trade there is no need for war. If they create economic interdependence, a war would be detrimental to the participants. I have to point it out: this is a very globalist thought!
2. Have strength to defend ourselves.
Our defense spending at 1750 billion Hooves. We created a chain of arms industry centers: Győr, Zalaegerszeg, Kaposvár, Várpalota, Kiskunfélegyháza, Gyula. 4 west, 2 south, nothing in north east. I'm not sure about the actual products. There is one new factory for the Rheinmetall Lynxs. We bought bunch of some helicopters, we developed the army, we entered international miltech development. The Hungarian army has to reach a technological superiority versus who the fuck???, we have to build a kind of "precision army".
Yeah. Defend from whom? And the war next door shows that tech is highly overrated, cheap uncomplicated mass produced weapons trumps it. If we faced Ukraine or Russia, they'd just stroll through the country after BTFOing our 25K soldiers - probably not even 10K at actual frontline units. What the fuck do we prepare for? Because we rely on NATO and the "Peace Alliances" above not to get into war. What this spending for? Ofc NATO participation for we have to do stuff within NATO. Especially spend more on US weapons now. But how this helps us staying out of a war if WWIII breaks out? We can't deter shit. This is so stoopid.
3. Recession proofing, self-sufficiency in four fields: arms industry, energy, food production, digital capabilities. The last one is highly related to LLMs/AI, for it will change everything from work, through governance to wars. We have to do this AI work ourselves, for the EU counts nothing on this field. The whole thing how to reach this seems very unclear. Do we create LLM ourselves? Do we at least train open source LLMs, like the Mirage, ourselves? Or we just include ChatGPT in everything? Clearly he knows the audience has 0 idea about these beyond some sensationalist articles, and I see he also has only some vague ideas.
4. Superiority in human resource. The oldtimers called it cultural superiority. We spend the most percentage of GPD in Europe on education. Says him at least. There are 3 Hungarian universities in the top 2% of universities of the world, and 9 in the top 5%.
5. Long-term plan for political stability, a plan that overarches political cycles, and even generations.
He says this one thing should be common understanding in all the parties: we can't close in ourselves in no closets blocks. We are part of the Western alliance but we have to be there in the eastern economy too. This isn't openness, but balance. We have to reach balance if we want to live as a nation in the next decades.

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Back to Europe.
Will there be a European war?
This is already reality. The Russo-Ukrainian war is a European war. Europe plays with fire since 2014.
Western politicians describe this conflict as the clash between democracy and authoritarianism. He says he doesn't know if they believe it or they just saying so but this has nothing to do with reality. He says even if this was real it won't be relevant at all. It's about the balance of power. As Ukraine moves towards a side it will create an imbalance. He says it's perfectly fine if Ukraine wants to join NATO or EU, and it's fine if these accept Ukraine, but the moment Ukraine moves to that side, this will change the balance and create an existential threat to the other side which will react so. Even good will can start wars, if applied at a bad place, with bad timing and bad methods.
He refers to the security dilemma of Realpolitik ofc. But he doesn't go there explaining.
He says the European war wasn't a result of a decision, but it was a consequence. The same with world war. He says they have an inside joke: those who invent the global order they invent the global collapse too, as those who invented the train, they invented train crashes.
He says if the global order collapses there will be regional survival zones. And the big question is how the European will look like and how will fit into that. Especially that Europe got into this war.
He says he has the experience from the meetings of the heads of states and governments of EU member countries. He says the EU decided to go to war, that will continue to support Ukraine even if the US leaves. The peace project of EU became a war project. Hungary decided not to go to war. The EU decided Hungary has to as well. The EU decided that Hungary has to have a pro-Ukraine and pro-war government, they are entering into our internal politics. Orbán and the Fidesz decided it won't be so.

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EU presented the budget of the next 7 year budgetary cycle.
This is a war budget, everything is centered around the logic of war. 20% of all the spending will go to Ukraine. The rest won't be spent on agricultural, economic development, but military preparations. This is about an EU in war against Russia. It fights a war against Russia on the soil of Ukraine, in the hope that a defeat of Russia will collapse the system, open up liberalism, and the Yeltsinian times will return which they think will be good for business.
Hungary needs a budget that needs a development budget, and we won't accept this budget as the foundation for negotiations. Other EU leaders won't even talk to the govt. they expect a new one in 2026 anyway. 
BUT.
He says we already got half of the EU gibsmedats from this cycle. The EU holds back the other half. A new EU budget needs unanimous vote, and as long as we don't get the dough there won't be new EU budget. We will bring home this money and we won't make concessions from our sovereignty.
So basically the EU buys our vote for this "war budget" with the money that's ours - they just hold it back - and our Party and Government tells us that this is somehow a great victory for us. Orbán does this with everything. He tells us he'll veto everything, then for something symbolic in return he doesn't and we have to celebrate. With the latest 18th sanction package against Russia was this: we got a paper guarantee that ensures us we shouldn't need to worry about energy prices. What the fuck.
After this he talks about how the opposition parties were promised they'll get the money if they manage to win in 2026 and do bunch of stuff for the EU (like accepting migration pact or supporting Ukraine and such).

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About Europe's reasons of her actions.
EU decided that they accept the role of the supporter of progressivism or wokism, now that Trump made the US quit with. So now Europe got herself into a position what the US President doesn't just see annoying, but as a political opponent. The current leaders of the EU placed the EU on a forced trajectory, and they'll make the worst deals in the worst time with the US, and this will lead to a trade war which we can't win. These leaders also thought if we confront China along with US, that will help with the US. They were wrong, and they spoiled relations with China too. The latest Trump offer was to sell weapons to Europe what they can give to Ukraine. Brussels tries to fill the vacuum as a supporter of the war, which also makes impossible to make amends with Russia.
So Brussels now is in a trade - and quasi-cold - war with Washington and Beijing, while participates in a hot war against Moscow, and wants to deepen this participation more.
He asks: why? What is the reason behind all these, especially now that most Europeans, citizens, don't support this.
He has a couple of ideas:
1. Federalist master plan. At every crisis they look at a chance for centralization. Raise the jurisdiction of the centralized EU governmental bodies, and cut back the powers of the state governments.
2. EU budget can only be kept up with wartime budget and war economy because it lost the competitiveness. No idea what he really means.
3. Getting Ukraine into the EU they could create a personally managed region within the EU which could prove quite profitable for some participants in the economy. There was a discussion something along the line of this between the European Commission and Zelensky. He means that Ukraine is basically in the pocket of some corpos, it is so indebted and bought up, the local government wouldn't have any real say in anything, they could govern it directly from Brussels.
In the past 10 years we let UK out but want Ukraine in. The UK is anti-federalist, but Ukraine is.

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What is Hungarian grand-strategy?
In 1920 we got defeated. Our enemies decided about us: Hungary will be small and poor. They made this our fate. The point of our (Orbán and Fidesz) grand strategy to change that: Hungary will be great and rich. Before all our neighbours grab the pen to draft a formal protest against this, he suggests to the translators to use the word "great" what the President of the US uses in the Make America Great Again, and not the big.
I think he dun goofed with the explanation since Whole Hungary is called Greater-Hungary customary, he should have emphasized the spirit of the quote not the word.
These are the key questions of our grand-strategy:
1. Where do we get the people?
2. Where do we get resources and energy?
3. Where do we get capital?
4. Where do we get knowledge?
5. How will we be capable for self-defense?
6. How to stop them leaving us out from the international decisions?
He says to explain it it's a separate lecture, but he reflects some on the first question:
We won't import people, we support families. European statistics only shows direct monetary support and doesn't calculate with tax cuts and such. And we are leading in these type of supports, such as women who give birth for two children get immunity for income tax for the rest of their lives. They also starting a new a system that helps young people acquire property with low interest loans.

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Why the future belongs to Central Europe?
Basically migration flooded Western Europe with non-Europeans, for now various Muslims, but Africans will arrive soon in a great flood which the West won't be able to handle.
Statistics:
Germany: 42% of students have migration background.
France: 40% of 4 year olds and below has migration background.
41.2% of the Viennese students are Muslim. Christian is only 34.5%. This is our neighbour.
Western countries now are irreversibly mixed countries. The cities will have Muslim majorities in the forseeable future.
Western Europe will stay migrational destination. They have ready made admitting communities, the newly migrating don't come into the nothing, but they go for specific people who receive them.
About in 10 years we'll have to defend our western borders not just the south.
Why westerners could not defend themselves?
Their last clash with the Muslim world in Western Europe was the battle at Poitiers over 1300 years ago. This is the last experience of the Franco-German Europe that reinforced that national survival and the Christian faith goes hand in hand. By today this is not in their national instinct. Our Constitution says: we acknowledge the role of Christianity in keeping our nation and national character. He says when he tells this in the west, they don't understand. Their history did not teach them this historical lesson. So now their old, well known countries don't exist anymore.

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Will Christianity keep us?
He talks about the relations between Christianity and politics. He talks about three stations:
1. When people still had a "living" belief. People weren't simply religious, or church-goers, but their beliefs permeated through their lives. It was kind of an innate state. He calls this Faithful Christianity. Secularism however destroyed this and we slipped down on the slope to the next one:
2. The living belief shrinks but the culture which grew out of it still remains as a coordinate system, that helps to differentiate between good and bad, what we should think of man and woman, children, family, responsibility, punishment and forgiveness etc. For all these questions we give answers according to the Christian culture. He calls this Cultural Christianity. Central Europe is still here.
3. Zero Christianity. Even as guide Christianity is ceased to exist. Here people give up the culture, and there is a point: when they accept same sex marriage. Westerners are here, and mass migration caught them in this state.
I understand what he talks about and tried to not sure it will make any sense for the reader.
Is there a lower state? Can we hold on to ours and stay? Can we climb back to the living faith? He says he does not know the answer, this will depend on our children. Have we taught them that our duty as Hungarians? Keep what we have, get what we don't have but we need, reject what we don't even need. We'll see what kind of parents we were.

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After this long talk there are some questions and whatnot, there's a bishop next to him, who also talks. One thing that might interest us is a short sketch how the EU can survive.
He says it would be important to restore the balance in the jurisdictions if member states and the EU.
He also draws up a picture of a "Concentric EU":
1. circle of Security (security of energy too; even Turkey and Ukraine fits)
2. circle of Free Movement (unified market, Schengen)
3. circle of Common Wallet (Eurozone)
4. circle of Constitutionalized Institutions (for those who wants United States of Europe)
All the nations have their own needs and all the nations can decide which circle they want to belong, and not to force them to wear the same sized shoe.
This is the only chance to save the EU.
Pic not entirely related but depicts soemtin similar.


All right. This concludes his speech. I got tired and commented less and less I think. Really should have came up with some funny stuff, but this is all I could muster.
Perhaps one day someone will Google something and find it and get something out of it.

Huh... Intresting...
He does realize that Hungary actually is in Nato and the EU right?

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 >>/54489/
Well he noted it at one point. I think I noted it he noted it.
I think he is trying to create the illusion that whatever happens it's part of some plan they have in motion.
We are in the situation where EU multis rule the market, but we have to rely on the Russians for energy (gas, nuclear), while the gas is true to Turkey as well, but the Chinese build their battery and car plants in the country, and now we have to take American investments to satisfy Trump's trade balance demands or whatever probably part of being a good client for Washington.
So Orbán just claims that this is their the master plan, we are doing "connectivity". But we are on a path with hard constraints.
And there is a thing that too many masters as a great author once wrote. Kek.

Frankly he talked a lot, but he touched on many topics and spent 2-3 minutes on most, and even where he talked more, those raise more questions, than gives answers. I got the feeling the whole thing was very shallow. I hoped for something more substantial.

Now media is reiterating his talking points over and over. I had little time to listen this morning, but caught some of it, about the gibsmedats:  >>/54483/
So, for each budgetary cycle the EU parliament votes on the budget, this budget also decides how much funds each country gets. These funds what the EU holds back from Hungary citing various reasons, like corruption, freedom of speech apparently the opposition has no voice in the country - this is false, there are some funky stuff, but most of the largest media outlets are all pro-opposition and human rights violations such as not allowing gay marriages or not letting in the migrants just like that and not accepting the "migration pact". This money also plays role in various negotiations related the the Ukrainian war.
So Orbán and govt media says Hungary will get this money. I'm fairly sure the EU has to give it to us by the end of the cycle... this needs some research, how long they can hold back transferring it??? these funds are specifically for spending. But - they say - how we get it back will depend on the next government elected in 2026.
According to them Magyar Péter and the Tisza Party made a deal with Brussels, that they get the money when they get elected if they start supporting the war in Ukraine, let in the migrants, deconstruct the family supporting policies of the current govt, etc, etc.
And they say that the Orbán government can get it back the money while not compromising the country's sovereignty, while staying out of the war.
Weirdly enough Orbán said we won't accept next EU budget until they give us the money. He also said that budget is a war budget and its baed, and we have to veto it, because we have to stay out of the war. But if we don't veto it, this means we enter the war, and they are willing to trade our entry for that money.

 >>/54491/
This is the same thing with the sanctions, funds for Ukraine, and weapon shipments.
We are after the 18th sanction package. Which one of these was vetoed by Orbán? Which funds were denied, and weapon shipment torpedoed?
There is this alternative fantasy universe created by the media and the politicians, foreign and local both, opposition and governmental both, where Orbán stops EU support. The reality is that all passes. And not against Orbán's will, but with his cooperation.
There are some bartering going on for our consent, yes. I remember three occasions:
1. When they sent out Orbán for a coffee and they voted the motion in without him. The genius idea attributed to Scholtz.
2. One of the sanctions introduced price cap on Russian fossil fuels. We "successfully managed" to get exemption from this so we could buy those on any price. We were allowed to pay more.
3. When they wanted to send money to Ukraine and we got some of the EU funds allotted to us for our signo.
Must be other occasions, but these I can recall.
Does this means things stop? Well maybe like at a stop sign at a crossroad. But traffic goes on, sanctions goes on.
Vetoing means denying. Full stop. There would be a list of sanctions that failed to pass. Not failed in their effect, but which never were implemented because Orbán said: no!
And back to the fantasy world. One side is angry because Orbán prevents the support of Ukraine, the other side is delighted by it. Meanwhile no such thing happens.

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Our dear Ursula made the best trade deal ever.
https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20250727-trump-eu-chief-seek-deal-in-transatlantic-tariffs-standoff
https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/5422634-trump-eu-trade-deal-tariffs/
15% tariffs on European goods (including cars)
EU purchases $750 billion worth of energy from the US (forbids buying gas from Russia, in the name of "energy independence")
EU invests $600 billion more than planned in the US (not sure about the full amount, the news carefully keeps quiet about it)
EU buys arms from the US, coincidentally the military budget was recently raised to 2% and from there to 5% there will be money to spend.
I heard there will be zero tariffs on US goods arriving to Europe. The articles I checked have not wrote anything or I'm just blind. Asked grok and chatgpt and I found most likely there won't be any tariffs on US goods. There was a zero-zero proposal tho, that's out of the window.
> It's a good deal for everybody," Trump told reporters
Well as long as EU doesn't count as everybody. It doesn't matter who sits in the White House, if the US gets horny, EU has to bend over.

Check out the politico article. How they hiding the sad fact of getting robbed is an art in itself.
https://www.politico.eu/article/us-and-eu-strike-trade-deal/

 >>/54493/
Not great.
Interestingly the Japanese deal was a 15% tariff both ways but the EU one is not. Hmmm....
EU already buys energy from US.
I also don't know how those investment deals work. Who is investing? The government or Private organisations?
In Saudi Arabia's case it was simpler as they have a state investment fund. But even then I heard they didn't have enough to invest what they promised.